THE SYNTHETIC AMMONIA INDUSTRY IN THE USSR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000900090003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 21, 1955
• Content Type: IR

'ibi ; SAB~L Iu..
TIONALS
;PROVISIONAL` INTELLI,GENCE EPGR'
THESYNTHETIC ,Amm0xIA INDtJST
IN THE r-USSR
CiA/RR PR-115 r) ^"
1!T,a N! i N n
{
21 June 1955
bi191114-77-1
.CEN,TRAL INTELLI.GENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND.' REPORTS
AOT ~ELLI4SA TO
-i!EIGN J1'mTIONALS
A ,RDP7=01093A000900Q9D00 8
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 WARNING
.This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United 'States'i
within the meaning of the espionage ,.laws
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of.-Which in any manner'
to an unauthorized person is prohibited byiaw-
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NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE SYNTHETIC AMMONIA INDUSTRY IN THE USSR
CIA/RR PR-115
(ORR Project 22.456)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
Office of Research and Reports
NOT RELEASABLE TO
FOREIGN NATIONALS
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II. Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Prewar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Wartime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Postwar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. Comparison of Soviet and US Production . . . . . . . .
C. Location and Production of Plants . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Stockpiling and Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. Total Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Current Use Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Wartime Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
C. Current Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
V. Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
VI. Raw Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
VII. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions . . . . . . . 19
A. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
C. Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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*7 h nip"
Appendixes
Page
Appendix A. Synthetic Ammonia Plants in the USSR . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix D. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Tables
1. Estimated Production of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR,
Selected Years, 1940-57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Estimated Production of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR
and in the US, 1949-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Estimated Production of Synthetic Ammonia Plants
in the USSR by Region, 19544. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
)4. Estimated Use Pattern of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR,
1953 and 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
`i. Comparison of Prices of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR
and in the US, 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Input Requirements for the Manufacture of Synthetic Ammonia
in the USSR, 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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CIA/RR PR-115
(ORR Project 22.456)
THE SYNTHETIC AMMONIA INDUSTRY IN THE USSR*
Summary
The synthetic ammonia industry in the USSR is essential to the
development of the Soviet industrial economy in time of peace and
would be a highly strategic industrial factor in time of war.
Synthetic ammonia, the most important of the basic nitrogen com-
pounds, is widely used in the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers
and industrial explosives and is required for the manufacture of all
nonatomic military explosives and propellants.
Production of synthetic ammonia in the USSR in 1954 is estimated
to have been about 714,000 metric tons** -- equal to about three-
tenths of 1954 production of synthetic ammonia in the US. There is
no evidence td indicate either trade in or stockpiling of synthetic
ammonia by the USSR, and total available supply is assumed to be
equal to production.
About 464,000 tons of synthetic ammonia are estimated to have
been consumed by Soviet industry in the manufacture of nitrogenous
fertilizers in 1954, and about 175,000 tons were required for other
industrial uses. The remaining 75,000 tons represent apparent con-
sumption in the production of military explosives.
It is estimated that annual production of synthetic ammonia in
the USSR will increase at a rate of almost 5.5 percent per year
during the 1954-57 period, providing agriculture with a substantially
increased supply of nitrogenous fertilizers. The amount of nitrogen
required to meet anticipated increases in food production is large,
however, and it is estimated that production of synthetic ammonia
will have to be at least 2.5 times the 1954 level before there is
an adequate supply of nitrogenous fertilizers for agriculture.
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of ORR as of 1 March 1955.
** Throughout this report, tonnages are given in metric tons.
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As indicated by Khrushchev's 1953 proposal to increase mineral
fertilizer capacity to about 17 million tons by 1959 and to 29 million.
tons by 1964 -- almost 3 and 5 times the 1953 level, respectively the USSR apparently plans a substantial increase in synthetic ammonia
capacity. Assuming that the USSR plans to produce the same relative
quantities of each type of fertilizer as were produced in 1953, the
fertilizer program would require 1.1 million tons of synthetic
ammonia in 1959 and 2 million tons in 1964. Adding 300,000 tons to
cover peacetime military and industrial needs, planned production
of fertilizer for 1959 would require about 1.4 million tons of
synthetic ammonia and for 1964 about 2.3 million tons. Althoagh it
cannot be stated categorically that synthetic ammonia goals of this
order of magnitude will prove to be unattainable within the given
time limits, the current growth rate appears to be about one-'zalf
that required to attain the goals.
In terms of the present capability of the USSR to meet emergency
conditions, synthetic ammonia currently being used in the production
of fertilizers could be reallocated quickly to the manufacture of
military explosives. Such reallocation would provide the USSR with
ample synthetic ammonia capacity to sustain a war of major proportions.
The synthetic ammonia industry in the USSR is vulnerable only in
that production facilities are concentrated in nine plants.
The synthetic ammonia industry is potentially a good indicator of
Soviet intentions. Preparatory to initiating large-scale military
action, Soviet production of military explosives would be greatly
increased. Synthetic ammonia -- primarily in the form of its deriv-
ative, nitric acid -- would be diverted from intraplant manufacture
of fertilizers and shipped to explosives-manufacturing installations,
most of which are located at some distance from the ammonia plants.
Conversely, major increases in the production of nitrogenous ferti-
lizers which could not be accounted for by expansion in synthetic
ammonia facilities would indicate reduced production of military
explosives.
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A. Significance.
Synthetic ammonia is the most important of the basic nitrogen
compounds.- In wartime it is converted to nitric acid, which is used
in the manufacture of all nonatomic high explosives and propellants,
and it is also used for certain industrial products of an indirect
military nature. In peacetime, synthetic ammonia is widely used for
the manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers. Currently it is the
source of almost three-fourths of the nitrogen used for these types
of fertilizers in the USSR.**
Because synthetic ammonia is an essential material in the
manufacture of military explosives, its availability places a measur-
able limitation on the Soviet capability for the production of military
explosives. At the same time, production of synthetic ammonia pro-
vides some indication of Soviet capabilities for the production of
nitrogenous fertilizers. This information is useful, in combination
with other factors, in gauging the progress of agricultural production.
It should be emphasized that future expansion in the synthetic
ammonia industry will have the dual effect of increasing Soviet
capabilities for both peacetime production of fertilizer and wartime
production of military explosives.
* Chemical nitrogen, as distinguished from organic nitrogen which
occurs in vegetable and animal matter, can be obtained from air, from
coal, and from certain other mineral resources. There are three com-
mercial methods of "fixing" atmospheric nitrogen -- that is, combining
it with other elements into useful compounds: (1) the synthesis of
ammonia by direct combination of nitrogen and hydrogen; (2) the treat-
ment of calcium carbide with nitrogen gas, yielding calcium cyanamide;
and (3) by passing an electric spark through air, forming oxides of
nitrogen. Combined nitrogen can also be recovered from gases produced
in the coking of coal as byproduct ammonia and can be obtained from
mineral deposits (as in Chile) in the form of sodium nitrate.
*3F It is estimated that 1.76 million tons of nitrogen fertilizers with
a nitrogen content of 361,000 tons were produced in the USSR in 1953.
Of the total amount of nitrogen, 253,000 tons were furnished by syn-
thetic ammonia; 103,000 tons, by byproduct ammonia; and 5,000 tons, by
calcium cyanamide. (For methodology, see Appendix B.)
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B. Organization.
The nine plants producing synthetic ammonia in the USSR in
1954 were subordinate to the Main Administration of the Nitrogen
Industry, Ministry of the Chemical Industry.
C. Technology.
The general method of synthesizing ammonia is standard
throughout the world, and any variations in manufacturing techniques
represent only modifications of the original German process. Hydro-
gen and nitrogen, in a ratio of 3 to 1, are subjected to high
pressure and temperature and are then passed over a suitable catalyst.
As nitrogen can be obtained fairly simply from the air, usuaLly by
liquefaction, the key to an efficient production process is a low-
cost source of hydrogen.
In the USSR, synthetic ammonia plants obtain their hydrogen
by one of the following methods: (1) by fractional distillation of
hydrogen from coke-oven gas; (2) by electrolytic decomposition of
water into hydrogen and oxygen; or (3) by passing steam through a
bed of incandescent coke, which produces a mixture of hydrogen and
carbon monoxide. The source of the hydrogen has a locational
significance for the industry. Plants which use the first method
are located close to plants producing metallurgical coke. The
electrolytic method requires great amounts of electricity and is
feasible only in areas with ample supplies of low-cost electric
power. The use of the water-gas method permits a somewhat wider
choice of location from the point of view of a hydrogen source, but
the cost of shipping coke to the plant is a significant factor. A
fourth method -- the production of hydrogen from natural gas, which
is widely used in the US today because of its low cost -- has
apparently been under investigation by Soviet engineers, and plans
for a plant have been drawn up. There is no evidence to indicate,
however, that any units based on this method are in operation or
under construction. 2/*
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix D.
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II. Supply.
A. Production.
1. Prewar.
The synthetic ammonia industry in the USSR was begun
during the First Five Year Plan (1928-32) with the construction of
the Dneprodzerzhinsk plant near Gor'kiy and the Berezniki plant in
the Urals. In the Second (1933-37.) and Third (1938-42) Five Year
Plans, additional plants were completed at Dneprodzerzhinsk and
Gorlovka in the Ukraine, Stalinogorsk in the Moscow area, Chirchik
in Central Asia, and Kemerovo in West Siberia. These seven plants
produced an estimated 335,000 tons of synthetic ammonia in 1940.*
With the German invasion the plants at Dneprodzerzhinsk,
Gorlovka, and Stalinogorsk suspended operations, thereby reducing
the synthetic ammonia capacity to about 50 percent of prewar J and
the annual rate of production to about 170,000 tons.* All of this
capacity, however, was not permanently lost -- the equipment at
Gorlovka and at least part of the equipment at Stalinogorsk was
shipped east for reassembly. 4/ Between 1942 and 1944, annual pro-
duction was probably increased about 100,000 tons as a result of the
expansion of the Kemerovo and Dzerzhinsk plants; the increase in
production at the new Chirchik plant; and, possibly, the partial
resumption of operations at Stalinogorsk.xxx By 1944 the industry
was producing synthetic ammonia at an estimated annual rate of
270,000 tons.
See Appendix B.
Estimated capacity in 1940 was 425,000 tons, and postinvasion
capacity was therefore about 210,000 tons. Individual plant studies
indicate an annual rate of production of 170,000 tons from
Dzerzhinsk (15,000 tons), Berezniki (80,000 tons), Kemerovo (35,000
tons), and Chirchik (40,000 tons) in the autumn of 1941. 3/
. According to information on Soviet plans, production at
Dzerzhinsk was to have been increased about 30,000 tons between 1940
and 1944- 5/ It was announced that Kemerovo increased production by
30 percent from 1942 to 1953, and it is believed that production
rose 100 percent during the 1041-44 period (see Appendix A). Chirchik's
capacity was about 60,000 tons, 7/ and it was announced that production
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3. Postwar.
The Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50) stated that "'three
nitrate plants shall be restored to their prewar capacity and new
plants built." J In accordance with the Plan, the plants at
Stalinogorsk, Gorlovka, and Dneprodzerzhinsk, which were shut down
during the war, were back in operation on a partial basis before
the end of 1947, 10 and it is estimated that by 1950 they were
back to approximately their prewar production level. Capacity at
Chi:rchik was increased substantially probably doubled -- between
1945 and 1950. Ill/ By the end of the Five Year Plan the industry's
seven plants were producing at an annual rate of 520,000 tons,
55 percent more than in 1940. In addition, new plants at Kirovakan,
Severo Donetsk, and Rustavi with a production potential of upwards
of 185,000 tons were under construction.* Estimated production of
synthetic ammonia in the USSR during selected years from 1940 to
1957 is shown in Table 1.**
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-55), as published, pro-
vided simply for an "expansion in the production capacities of
ammonia." 12 It is estimated that production was increased 1.94.000
tons between 1950 and 1954, chiefly as a result of expansion at
Stalinogorsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk and of the beginning of operations
at Severo Donetsk and Kirovakan.*
B. Comparison of Soviet and US Production.
Estimated production of synthetic ammonia in the U_5SF, and
in the US, 1949-54, is shown in Table 2.*** For the most part, the
rapid rise in US production in recent years has been in respcpse to
an increased demand for synthetic ammonia and synthetic-ammor~a-
based fertilizers for agriculture.
rose about 50 percent from 1942 to 1943 -- presumably from about
40,000 to 60,000 tons. 8/ These increases total 85,000 tons, and it
is possible that by 194 an additional small amount of synthetic
ammonia was being produced at Stalinogorsk.
* See Appendix A.
* Table 1 follows on p. 7.
*** Table 2 follows on p. 8.
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Table 1
Estimated Production of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR J
Selected Years, 1940-57
Amount
Index
Year
(Thousand Metric Tons)
(1940 = 100)
1940
335
100
1944
270
81
1946
318
95
1947
362
108
1948
436
130
1949
476
142
1950
520
155
1951
568
170
1952
620
185
1953
677
202
1954
714 b
213
1955
753
225
1956
794
237
1957
837
250
a. For methodology, see Appendix B.
b. Probable range: 650,000 to 800,000 tons. Ranges
were estimated for individual plants, as shown in
Appendix A, and they add to an aggregate range of
565,000 to 895,000 tons. As the probability of the
actual total falling within the aggregate range is
greater than the probability of the individual estimates
falling within their respective ranges, the aggregate
range can be reduced by a substantial amount. Assuming
that the true figure for 1954 production falls within
the extreme range from 565,000 to 895,000 tons, it is
estimated, at about the 85-percent confidence level,
that the true figure lies in the range from 650,000 to
800,000 tons.
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Table 2
Estimated Production of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR and in the US
1949-54
Soviet Production
Year
Soviet Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
US Production
(Thousand Metric Tons)
as Percent
of US Production
1949
476
1,174 /
40.5
1950
520
1,420 a/
36.5
1951
568
1,603 aJ
35.11.
1952
620
1,863 aJ
33.3
1953
677
2,074
32.6
1954
714
2,467 b
28.9
a.
13
b.
14/
C.
Location and Production of Plants.
Estimated production of synthetic ammonia plants in the USSR in
1954, by region,* is shown in Table 3.* Studies of each of these
installations, outlining the information and methods used in arriving
at the estimates of output, are presented in Appendix A.
D. Stockpiling and Inventories.
There is
is probable that
large quantities
hibitive amounts
stockpiling of a
venient practice
no information on Soviet stockpiling practice, but it
synthetic ammonia is not stockpiled in the USSR. Such
of synthetic ammonia are used in wartime that pro-
of high-pressure tankage would be required for the
significant quantity of the chemical. The more con-
-- and the one undoubtedly followed in the USSR -- is
* The term region in this report refers to the economic regions
defined and numbered on CIA Map 1.2048.1, 9-51 (First Revision, 7-52),
USSR: Economic Regions.
Table 3 follows on p. 10.
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that of stockpiling finished and semifinished products such as filled
munitions, high explosives, and ammonium nitrate.
There is no evidence of Soviet trade in synthetic ammonia
with non-Soviet Bloc countries. Since September 1951, when East
Germany planned to ship 70 tons to the USSR,* 15/ there has been no
evidence of trade with other Bloc countries.
F. Total Supply.
Because of the probable nonexistence of a stockpile of synthetic
ammonia in the USSR and the absence of significant trade, the total
supply of synthetic ammonia available to the USSR in 1954 is assumed
to be about equal to the estimated production of 711+,000 tons.
III. Expansion.
Expansion in the synthetic ammonia industry during the 1954-57
period cannot be estimated with any degree of certainty, but the
information available indicates a lower rate of expansion than.for the
191+8-53 period. Projections beyond 1957 can be made only on the basis
of past experience and on what little can be inferred from announced
Soviet objectives and related statements.
New production from plants either under construction or believed
to be undergoing expansion is estimated at 123,000 tons. Severo
Donetsk is estimated to be currently operating 91,000 tons short of
its estimated potential; Rustavi, when completed, will contribute an
estimated 32,000 tons.** If this new tonnage materializes by 1957,
as is estimated, it will represent an average annual rate of increase
of almost 5.5 percent.
* The volume of Soviet trade in certain ammonia end products, such
as ammonium sulfate and ammonium nitrate fertilizers, is fairly sub-
stantial. The available evidence indicates, however, that the net
balance is close to zero. 16
See Appendix A.
Continued on p. 12.
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No definite information on long-range plans for the nitrogen
industry is available beyond the announced Soviet plan to increase
mineral fertilizer capacity. In 1953, Khrushchev announced that
mineral fertilizer capacity would be 16.5 million to 17.5 million
tons by 1959 and 28 million to 30 million tons by 1964 (about 3 and
5 times, respectively, the 1953 production level of 6 million tons). 17
A breakdown of this planned production by type of fertilizer has not
been announced, and thus the planned increases for nitrogenous ferti-
lizers (and more specifically for synthetic ammonia) are not known.
Assuming, however, that the USSR plans to produce the same relative
quantities of nitrogenous fertilizers and synthetic ammonia as were
produced in 1953, the fertilizer program would require 1.1 million
tons of synthetic ammonia in 1959 and 2 million tons in 1964.*
Adding 300,000 tons to cover military and industrial requirements,
planned production totals for 1959 and 1964 would be roughly 1.1
million and 2.3 million tons, respectively.
In terms of the past performance and current growth of the industry,
these goals appear to be rather ambitious, although there is no avail-
able information on the production of chemical equipment and on other
factors with which a more definite appraisal of the situation may be
made. As stated above, the annual increase in production during this
period from 1954 to 1957 is estimated at almost 5.5 percent, which is
considerably lower than the 9.3 percent growth rate from 1948 to 1953
and about equal to the over-all rate for 1940-53. A projection from
1954 to 1964 to meet the synthetic ammonia goals derived from
Khrushchev's mineral fertilizer proposals, however, would require an
annual growth rate of about 12 percent.
* The 1953 output of fertilizer in terms of nitrogen was 361,000 tons
(see Appendix B); so the 1959 and 1964 goals would be 1,023,000 tons
and 1,745,000 tons, respectively. In 1953, byproduct ammonia and
calcium cyanamide supplied 108,000 tons of nitrogen, and synthetic
ammonia the remaining 253,000 tons. Assuming that byproduct ammonia
and calcium cyanamide will contribute 172,000 tons in 1959 and 227,000
tons by 1964 (based on expansion of coke production), the remaining
851,000 tons and 1,518,000 tons of nitrogen would have to be supplied
by synthetic ammonia. When these requirements are converted to
synthetic ammonia and 8 percent is added to cover conversion losses,
the'totals become 1.1 million tons and 2 million tons.
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It is evident, however, that the Soviet planners are dissatisfied
with current progress and intend to accelerate the growth of the
industry. Shortly after the new fertilizer goals were announced the
Minister of the Chemical Industry stated:
Together with a considerable expansion of the
operating plants, a large construction program must
be undertaken for the building of new plants for the
production of nitrogen, phosphate, and potash ferti-
lizers in various regions of the country. 18
Pointing to the current unsatisfactory rate of growth, the Minister
said:
The plan for increasing production capacities
of mineral fertilizers provided by the Plenum's
decision calls for the realization of a large pro-
gram of capital construction. At the present time,
this program is being carried out in a definitely
unsatisfactory manner. ... The Ministry of Con-
struction is faced with the task of considerably
increasing the volume of capital work in the
construction of enterprises for the production of
mineral fertilizers and insecticides. 19
This latter statement seems to agree with -- or at least does not
cotitradict -- estimates of expansion through 1957.
In summary, the assumed long-range goals for the synthetic ammonia
industry appear to be rather optimistic, but in view of the fact that
the current over-all growth rate for basic chemicals is estimated at
10 percent per year, they are not unattainable. Fulfillment of the
goals will require, however, a considerable increase in the current
rate of expansion of the synthetic ammonia industry.
IV. Consumption.
A. Current Use Pattern.
End uses for synthetic ammonia, as indicated above, fall
into three general categories: military, agricultural, and indus-
trial. In addition to its consumption in military explosives and
its primary peacetime use as a fertilizer, synthetic ammonia is
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also consumed by a number of industries, the most important of which
is the chemical industry itself. The chemical industry consumes
sizable quantities of synthetic ammonia in the production of indus-
trial explosives, of various inorganic and organic chemicals, of
plastics, and of synthetic fibers. Synthetic ammonia is also used
in the production of paper, petroleum, metals, rubber, and other
products.
On the basis of estimates-of consumption in the manufacture of
fertilizers and estimates of industrial requirements, a general use
pattern can be established. The estimated use pattern of :synthetic
ammonia in the USSR in 1953 and 1954 is shown in Table 4:
Table 4
Estimated Use Pattern of Synthetic Ammonia in the USSR
1953 and 1954
Amount
(Thousand Metric Tons)
Percent
Distribution
Consumer
1953
1954
1953
15,54
Agriculture
332
464
49.0
65.0
Industry a/
159
175
.23.5
2.4.5
Military
186
75
27.5
10.5
Total
677
714 .
100.0
100.0
a. See Appendix B.
An estimated military consumption of synthetic ammonia in 1953 of
186,000 tons was obtained by subtracting agricultural and indus-
trial estimates totaling 491,000 tons from estimated synthetic
ammonia production of 677,000 tons. As it is a residuum, this
military consumption estimate may include an accumulation of errors
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contained in the estimate of total synthetic ammonia production and
in the industrial and agricultural estimates.*
A. recent piece of information indicates that a significant
shift in the consumption pattern for synthetic ammonia may have taken
place in 1954 as the result of a large reallocation from military
to agricultural uses. According to a Soviet announcement, production
of mineral fertilizer in 1954 increased 16 percent over 1953, 21
which was considerably in excess of the announced increases of 7 per-
cent, 6 percent, and 9 percent in 1951, 1952, and 1953, respectively.**
As there is no evidence indicating that such a sharp increase in 1954
could have been accounted for by expansion of superphosphate, ground
phosphorite, or potassium types of fertilizers, or by expansion in
the nitrogen industry, it is reasonable to assume that synthetic
ammonia was diverted from the military to the agricultural sector.
Requirements for 1954 were therefore derived by assuming a 10-percent
increase in fertilizers other than nitrogen types (in line with
increases for the past few years) and by assuming that most of the
remainder of the over-all increase resulted from a reallocation of
synthetic ammonia.
Total production of synthetic ammonia for 1955 is estimated
at 753,000 tons, and if combined military and industrial consumption
for 1955 were to remain at the estimated 1954 level, about 500,000
tons would be available for production of fertilizer -- an estimated
80 percent to 85 percent more than in 1950.E Although the nitrogen
* An estimate of military consumptionbased on ammunition pro-
duction for 1953 which amounted to about 55,000 tons, 20 falls
within the range of the military consumption obtained by the residual
method, if the lower limit of total production is combined with the
upper limit of the industrial estimate. The estimate based on
ammunition production does not, however, include all military require-
ments. Certain quantities, which may or may not be significant, are
required for guided missiles and for any stockpiling of explosives
in bulk rather than in the form of finished ammunition.
X The increase was apparently much sharper (about 20 percent) in
the last half of 1954, as the USSR announced the increase for the
first half of the year to be only 11 percent over the corresponding
period of 1953. 22
Xxx See Appendix B.
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fertilizer goal for 1955 was not announced in the Fifth.Five Year
Plan, this percent increase in synthetic ammonia tonnage allocated
to agriculture appears to be of the same order of magnitude as the
planned increase of 88 percent for all mineral fertilizers during
the Fifth Five Year Plan.
B. Wartime Requirements.
Assuming a complete diversion from fertilizer production and
allowing a small quantity, about 50,000 tons, for indirect military
and essential civilian use, the maximum tonnage available for. military
explosives in 1955 would be an estimated 700,000 tons.
For purposes of comparison, the Soviet explosives program
in 1944 required an estimated 285,000 tons of synthetic ammonia, 2
US peak consumption in World War II was at the rate of about 850,000
tons per year,* peak German consumption was about 300,000 tons, 25
and peak Japanese consumption was less than 100,000 tons. 26 On the
basis of estimates of World War II military consumption, it appears
that sufficient ammonia capacity is now available in the USSR to
fight a sustained war of major proportions. It should be emphasized
at this point that substantial production should be forthcomi'ig as a
result of the fertilizer goals announced for 1959 and 1964, which
will provide a strong base for production of ammonia in the event of
war . *
C. Current Requirements.
There is sufficient tonnage of synthetic ammonia avaiLable in
the USSR to meet current military and industrial requirements,, but the
quantity allocated for nitrogenous fertilizer manufacture is sub-
stantially below the minimum amount which Soviet planners wouL d
consider satisfactory for current operations. According to recent
statements, the bulk of mineral fertilizers are applied to the basic
industrial crops -- cotton, sugar beets, and flax -- leaving an
insufficient quantity available for food and fodder crops. j'
* Production estimate for first 8 months of 1945 converted to
annual rate. Estimated from data on wartime munitions production. 24
** See p. 12, above.
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On the basis of published Soviet material, a rough estimate
can be made of what current requirements for fertilizer production
would have to be to provide an adequate level of agricultural output.
In 1945 the late Pryanishnikov, a leading Soviet agricultural chemist
whose work has recently been praised in the press, 28 drew up a
proposed system of nitrogen balance for Soviet agriculture. 29/ This
system was designed to provide (among other things) an adequate
quantity of grain in the USSR, and it was based in part on a more
intensive application of mineral fertilizers. Pryanishnikov visu-
alized it as an intermediate plan, with fertilizer requirements
determined largely by the potential growth rate of the chemical
industry, and he intended that it be superseded by better systems
when even greater quantities of mineral fertilizers became available.
In the proposal, chemical nitrogen requirements were set at 1.3
million tons, about 3.6 times the actual nitrogen input in 1953
(361,000 tons).* That this might well be viewed by Soviet planners
as a realistic minimum is evident from the Khrushchev proposal of
1953 to increase mineral fertilizer capacity by 1959 to about 3
times and by 1964 to about 5 times the estimated 1953 production.-**
Assuming that the Pryanishnikov proposal can be taken as a
fair approximation of current requirements for fertilizer nitrogen,
about 1.5 million tons of synthetic ammonia would then be required
for agriculture.,XXX and total requirements would be 1.8 million
tons -- at least 2.5 times the estimated 1951+ production.
V. Prices.
The latest available price quotations for synthetic ammonia in
the USSR were published in 1950. Comparison of 1950 prices of
synthetic ammonia in the USSR and in the US is shown in Table 5.X
Since 1950, prices of synthetic ammonia in the US have risen some-
what and as of December 1954 were about $98 per ton for refrigeration
grade and about $95 per ton for fertilizer grade. 30
P. 3, note **, above.
See p. 12, above.
Assuming that byproduct ammonia and calcium cyanamide will
shortly be contributing about 150,000 tons of nitrogen, the remaining
1.15 million tons of nitrogen would have to be supplied by synthetic
ammonia. In terms of synthetic ammonia, and adding 8 percent to
cover conversion losses, the total would be 1.5 million tons.
xxxx Table 5 follows on p. 18.
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Table 5
Comparison of Prices of Synthetic Ammonia
in the USSR and in the US aJ
1950
USSR 31 USJ f
(Rubles ( Ruble-Dollar
Grade per Metric Ton) per Metric Ton) Ratio
Refrigeration 1,240 84.15 14.7. 1
Fertilizer 1,160 81.40 x.4.3: 1
a. F.O.B. point of manufacture.
b. Prices at beginning of 1950.
VI. Raw Materials.
The input requirements for the manufacture of synthetic zi.mmonia in
the USSR in 1954 are shown in Table 6.
Table 6
Input Requirements for the Manufacture of Synthetic Amnnonia
in the USSR
1954
Material quantity a/
Electricity 3,596 Million kilowatt-hours
Coke (for gas generation) 915 Thousand metric tons
Coke-oven gas 935 Million cubic meters
a. Requirements for the production of 714,000 tons of
synthetic ammonia. The methods used in calculating the
estimates are presented in Appendix B.
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VII. Capabilities, Vulnerabilities, and Intentions.
A. Capabilities.
The supply of synthetic ammonia available in the USSR in 1954
is estimated at 714,000 tons (probable range: 650,000 to 800,000
tons), equivalent to about three-tenths of US production in 1953?
This supply is considered to be adequate to meet the requirements for
explosives and the needs of industry but insufficient to meet minimum
demands in all sectors of agriculture. According to official state-
ments, supplies of fertilizer (presumably including nitrogenous
fertilizers) are adequate to satisfy requirements for the basic
industrial crops, but for food and fodder crops there is an unspecified
shortage, the effect of which is to hamper current production of those
crops.*
In the event of a general war in the immediate future, much
of the synthetic ammonia which is allocated to fertilizer would be
diverted to the defense industry, principally in the form of nitric
acid to be used for the manufacture of high explosives and smokeless
powder and, to a lesser extent, for the manufacture of fuming nitric
acid for use as a rocket fuel oxidizer. In addition, some of the
remaining production of ammonium nitrate would be reallocated for
admixture with TNT, picric acid, hexogen, and other high explosives.
In the absence of wartime destruction, the output of synthetic
ammonia is sufficient to sustain a prolonged military effort of
major proportions.
B. Vulnerabilities.
The Soviet synthetic ammonia industry is self-sufficient, and
no-economic vulnerabilities are apparent.
C. Intentions.
Preparatory to the initiation of large-scale war, Soviet
production of military explosives would be greatly increased. This
would necessitate a change in the allocation patterns of ammonia
and its two primary derivatives -- nitric acid and ammonium nitrate.
Ammonia and nitric acid, the latter in large quantities, would be
diverted from intraplant manufacture of ammonium nitrate to explosives-
* See p. 15, above.
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manufacturing installations, most of which are located at some distance
from the ammonia plants. In addition, the production of ammoniim
nitrate would be reduced, and part of the remaining output probably
would be reallocated from agriculture to the plants manufacturing
military explosives. In view of the changes which would take.pe;ace
in the ammonia industry in preparation for war, the industry is
potentially a good indicator of Soviet intentions.
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APPENDIX A
SYNTHETIC M ONIA PLANTS IN THE USSR
1. Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant.
a. Location.
Dneprodzerzhinsk, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Ukraine (South, III).
b. Coordinates.
48?29'30" N - 34?40'00" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
95,000 tons (range: 65,000 to 125,000 tons).
Estimates based on German intelligence place the 1945 planned
production of this plant at 67,000 tons of synthetic ammonia, but it
is probable that some expansion has taken place since then, as the
nitric acid capacity is believed to have been increased about 50
percent sometime after 1949. 33/ If the total nitric acid production
of this plant -- estimated to be 180,000 tons in 1953 -- were con-
verted to ammonium nitrate, it would require an ammonia production
of 104,000 tons. It is probable, however, that sane of the nitric
acid would not be converted, in which case the ammonia requirements
would be reduced. In view of the assumption that 150,000 tons of
the nitric acid production are being converted to ammonium nitrate
and 30,000 tons are being shipped out as acid, an ammonia production
of 95,000 tons would be required.
2. Sergo Ordzhonikidze Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant.
a. Location.
Gorlovka, Stalino Oblast, Ukraine (South, III).
b. Coordinates.
48?18'00" N - 38?05'50" E.
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c. Estimated Annual Production.
55,000 tons (range: 45,000 to 65,000 tons).
Nitric acid production at this plant has been estimated at
77,000 tons, 3I+/ bf which an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 tons are
probably shipped to the nearby Gorlovka explosives plant. Ammonium
sulfate production is reported to be about 55,000 tons annually. 35
Assuming that all nitric acid not shipped to the explosives
plant (59,500 tons) is converted to ammonium nitrate, ammonia
requirements for nitric acid, ammonium sulfate, and ammonium nitrate
would be about 55,000 tons per year.
3. (Plant Name Not Available).
a. Location.
Severo Donetsk, Voroshilovgrad Oblast, Ukraine (South, III).
b. Coordinates.
1+8056'30" N - 38028'00" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
36,000 tons (range: 20,000 to 50,000 tons).
It is known that the synthetic ammonia plant under con-
struction in Severo Donetsk was not completed in January .:L951, but
according to a Soviet report it has since been put in operation. 36
Many reports from returning prisoners of war and German technicians
indicate that the equipment for this plant was taken, at least in
part, from the Leuna Works in East Germany. On the basis of one of
these reports, it is estimated that the capacity production of syn-
thetic ammonia using this equipment will eventually reach 300 tons
per day of nitrogen or, assuming 350 working days per year, an an-
nual production of about 127,000 tons of synthetic ammonia. : v
Based on a 50,000-ton production of nitric acid in 1953 and assuming
sufficient ammonia capacity to convert all the acid into ammonium
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nitrate, synthetic ammonia production in 1953 is estimated at 29,000
tons. 38 Production in 1954 is estimated at 36,000 tons. It is
assumed that production will reach 127,000 tons by 1957.
4. (Plant-Name Not Available).
a. Location.
Kirovakan, Armenian SSR (Transcaucasus, V).
b. Coordinates.
40?48'56" N - 44028'o6" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
29,000 tons (range: 20,000 to 35,000 tons).
The construction of a synthetic ammonia plant based on
electrolytic hydrogen was begun at Kirovakan after World War II,
probably sometime during 1946. According to a Soviet report,
this plant was in operation sometime before 1953. 39
Several reports indicate that 16 electrolyzers were
installed, 40/ and the description furnished by one source 41
indicates that they are Bamag C-500 cells or Soviet copies of the
Bamag cell. Sixteen electrolyzers of this type would produce
sufficient hydrogen for about 82 tons of ammonia per day, about
29,000 tons per year.
5. Chernorech'ye Chemical Combine i.meni Kalinin.
a. Location.
Dzerzhinsk, Gor'kiy Oblast (Central, VII).
b. Coordinates.
56?1431" N - 43?32'o9" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
56,000 tons (range: 45,000 to 65,000 tons).
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Planned capacity of this plant for 1945 was reported to be
about 58,000 tons, L2/ and there is no evidence of expansion beyond
that figure. On a basis of 350 operating days per year, this would
equal about 56,000 tons of ammonia annually.
6. Stalin Chemical Combine.
a. Location.
Stalinogorsk, Moscow Oblast (Central, VII).
b. Coordinates.
54?05,27? N - 38?13'10" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
140,000 tons (range: 100,000 to 200,000 tons).
According to a reliable report, the Stalinogorsk plant was
built to produce at least 100,000 tons of synthetic ammonia per
year. 43 During the early part of World War II the plant; was shut
down and at least partially dismantled but it was back in operation
sometime before 1947. According to the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-
50), the plant was to be rebuilt to its prewar capacity. iJ Recent
press reports state that the output of ammonia was increased 50 per-
cent during the 1951-53 period "without expanding the production
area" and that output of ammonia in 1953 was increased 56 percent
over 1950. L5/ The plant capacity could have been increased 50 per-
cent or more by technical changes inside the converters. 46/ It is
assumed that production in 1950 was 90,000 tons (near the prewar
level) and that production in 1953 was 140,000 tons.
7. Voroshilov Chemical Combine.
Location.
Berezniki, Molotov Oblast (Urals, VIII).
b. Coordinates.
59?24' N - 56?44' E.
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c. Estimated Annual Production.
88,000 tons (range: 75,000 to 95,000 tons).
Two units with capacities of 125 tons of ammonia per day were
installed at Berezniki, one in 1932 and the other in 1934. L7/ On the
basis of 350 operating days, annual production would be about 88,000
tons per year. Reports of expansion after 1934 have not been con-
firmed and are assumed to be based on plans which were never carried
out. The Soviet press announced that production of ammonium nitrate
in the first quarter of 1947 was 35,000 tons, a rate of about l40,000
tons per year. 48/ Such a tonnage would require about 64,000 tons of
ammonia and would be well within the estimated capacity of the plant.
Industry experts state, however, that the capacity of this plant
could be increased 50 percent or more by changes inside the con-
verter. 49
8. Nitrogen Fertilizer Combine.
a. Location.
Kemerovo, Kemerovo Oblast (West Siberia, IX).
b. Coordinates.
55?21'45" N - 83?01'15" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
70,000 tons (range: 60,000 to 105,000 tons).
A report based on German intelligence states that the synthetic
ammonia capacity of this installation was 100 tons per day in 1938 and
was increased in 1941 by the addition of.a second ammonia synthesis
unit with double the capacity of the first. 50 No information is
available substantiating this figure, however, and it is assumed that
the second unit has the same capacity as the first. Assuming the plant
is operated 350 days per year, production would be 70,000 tons per
year.
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9. Stalin Electrochemical Combine.
a. Location.
Chirchik, Uzbek SSR, Tashkent Oblast (Central Asia, X:b).
b. Coordinates.
4127'25"N -6935'00" E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
145,000 tons (range: 135,000 to 155,000 tons).
An announcement in 1946 stated that during the 1946-510 period
it was planned to increase the ammonia capacity of this plane to
120,000 tons. 51 It is assumed that the plan was carried through;
that production in 1950 was 85 percent of capacity; and that produc-
tion in 1953 was 96 percent of capacity (350 days), about 115,000
tons. According to a recent press statement, it was planned to in-
crease 1954 production of ammonia 27 percent over 1953 produc,
tion. 52 It is assumed that this plan was carried through and
that production in 1954 was about 145,000 tons. According to prewar
German intelligence, the original plan was a 3-stage expansion to
about 150,000 tons. 53
10. Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant.
a. Location.
Rustavi, Georgian SSR (Transcaucasus, V).
b. Coordinates.
41?33' N - 45?03' E.
c. Estimated Annual Production.
At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in 1946, a delegate pro-
posed that a nitrogen fertilizer plant producing at least 70,000 tons
of fertilizer annually and costing about 150 million rubles be con-
structed at this site. 54 In June 1954 it was reported that "the
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first section of the new plant is intended to be completed by the end
of this year" and in August 195+ that the plant was "entering the
final inspection period." 55 It is estimated that this plant will
be put in operation by the end of 1955 and, on the basis of planned
fertilizer production, will eventually produce 32,000 tons of ammonia
per year.
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
1. Soviet Production of Synthetic Ammonia, 191+0-53.
.A study of the six plants in operation in 1911.0* revealed that
191+0 production of synthetic ammonia was about 335,000 tons. Using
this figure as a base, production totals for 1946, 1947, and 1911$
were calculated from the information that the output of nitrogen
fertilizers in these years was 95 percent, 108 percent, and 130
percent (planned), respectively, of 19+0 production. 56 Although
a shift in the consumption pattern for synthetic ammonia from
military to civilian could account for a share of the reported
increase in nitrogen fertilizer production and thus give an upward
bias to estimates of ammonia production, the few bits of information
available on production of individual plants for the immediate post-
war years indicate that the totals derived by these percentage
increases are not unreasonably high.
From plant studies it was concluded that production was 677,000
tons in 1953. Production totals for 1949, 1950, 1951, and 1952 were
obtained by interpolation (9.2 percent increase per year).
2. Estimate of Industrial Consumption, 1953.
The estimate of industrial consumption was built up mainly from
estimates, of individual industry requirements. Estimates of synthetic
ammonia consumption in the production of industrial explosives,
plastics, metals, textiles, petroleum, and sulfuric acid were calcu-
lated. The remaining end uses were estimated from the US consumption
pattern** by assuming that they were in proportion to gross national
product originating in industry in the two countries. In view of the
sketchy nature of the data on which the estimate is based, the range
* Chirchik did not begin operations until November 19110 and thus
did not contribute appreciably to production in that year.
** Estimated. 57
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of error is set at plus or minus 35 percent. The industry estimates
were made as follows:
a. Industrial Explosives.
An estimate of 38,000 tons of explosives required by the Soviet
coal industry in 1951 was revised to 40,000 tons to allow for increases
in production and changes in techniques. Industrial explosives re-
quirements for construction, metal mining, quarrying, and nonmetal
mining were computed on the basis of the relative magnitudes.of the
industries in the US and in the USSR and totaled 83,000 tons. 5""
Applying an estimated factor of 0.37, total synthetic ammonia
requirements for industrial explosives were estimated at 46,000 tons.
b. Metal Treating.
Primary uses for synthetic ammonia are in the nitriding of
steel and as a processing agent in the recovery of metal from ores.
Inputs were based on requirements for synthetic ammonia in the US
(37,000 tons) and the ratio of steel production inthe US and the
USSR.*
c. Textiles, Including Rayon and Nylon.
The primary use for synthetic ammonia in the textile industry
's in the manufacture of kapron, a nylon-type Soviet synthetic. A
US ammonia factor of 0.28 60/ for the production of nylon was applied
to an estimated production of 6,000 tons of kapron in 1953.
d. Petroleum.
The primary use for synthetic ammonia in the petroleum
industry is in the refining of crude oil. Inputs were based on
requirements for synthetic ammonia in the US (22,000 tons) and the
ratio of petroleum production in the US and the USSR.*
Steel production in 1953: US, 101 million tons; USSR, 38 million
-tons . 59
Petroleum refined in 1953: US, 2.155 billion barrels; USSR,
360 million barrels (estimated).. 61
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e. Sulfuric Acid.
An estimate of 3,000 tons was obtained from a published
report. 62
f. Plastics, Synthetic Resins, and Lacquers.
It is estimated that 10,000 tons of synthetic ammonia were
consumed in the production of plastics, synthetic resins, and
lacquers: 5,000 to 6,000 tons, for the manufacture of urea-
formaldehyde and cellulose nitrate plastics;and the remainder for
cellulose nitrate lacquers. This is to be compared with an esti-
mated 80,000 tons consumed in the manufacture of plastics, resins,
and lacquers in the US in 1953-
g. Other End Uses.
The remaining end uses for synthetic ammonia in the US con-
sumed an estimated 220,000 tons. On the basis of the ratio of gross
national product originating in industry in the US and the USSR
(0.37), 63 it is estimated that about 81,000 tons of synthetic
ammonia were consumed in the USSR in 1953 for other end uses..
h. Total Requirements.
Total Industrial requirements for synthetic ammonia in 1953
are therefore estimated at 159,000 tons with a range of error of plus
or minus 35 percent.
3. Calculation of the 1953 Input Requirements.
Input requirements were calculated separately for three types of
plants, according to the method used for obtaining hydrogen. Esti-
mates were based on published Soviet input factors, which, in most
cases, agree closely with comparable US data.
a. Electrolysis of Water.
The 1954 estimated production of synthetic ammonia from the
two plants using the electrolytic method (Chirchik and Kirovakan) is
174,000 tons. A Soviet text reports that by this method the con-
sumption of electric power per ton of ammonia is 15,000 kilowatt-
hours. 64 The power requirement is therefore estimated at 2.61
billion kilowatt-hours.
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b. Coke-Oven Gas.
The 1954 estimated production of synthetic ammonia from the
three plants extracting hydrogen from coke-oven gas (Gorlovka,
Dneprodzerzhinsk, and Kemerovo) is 220,000 tons. A Soviet text
reports the consumption of electric power at 2,100 to 2,500 kilo-
watt-hours per ton of ammonia. L5/ using an average of these two
figures, the estimated requirement is 506 million kilowatt-hours.
A Soviet handbook lists the requirements of raw coke-oven gas per
ton of ammonia as 4,100 to 4,400 cubic meters. !L6/ Based on an
average of those two figures, the total requirement is 935 million
cubic meters.
c. Water Gas.
The 1953 estimated production of synthetic. ammonia for the
four plants using the water-gas method (Severo Donetsk, Stalinog6rsk,
Dzerzhinsk, and Berezniki) is 320,000 tons. A Soviet text lists
the average power requirements per ton as 1,500 kilowatt-hours.
The estimated total, therefore, is 1480 million kilowatt-hours. 67
The carbon requirements for making water gas were derived from the
following input factors: (1) 2,200 to 2,250 cubic meters of hydro-
gen are used per ton of synthetic ammonia, / (2) the content of
water gas averages about 50 percent hydrogen by volume, 69 and
(3) 540 kilograms of carbon are required to make 1,000 cubic meters
of water gas. 70 On these bases the requirement per ton of
ammonia is 2.4 tons of carbon, and the total requirement is 768,000
tons of carbon.
d. Total Requirements.
Summarizing the. estimates outlined above, the major inputs
for the production of synthetic ammonia in 1953 were as follows:
Electricity 3,596 Million kilowatt-hours
Coke-oven gas 935 Million cubic meters
Carbon 768 Thousand metric tons
The equivalent of 768,000 tons of carbon in terms of coke would be
approximately 915,000 tons.
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4. Estimate of Agricultural Requirements for Synthetic Ammonia.
The 1953 estimate of agricultural requirements for synthetic
ammonia was derived from the following nitrogen fertilizer estimates
for 1953:
Thousand Metric Tons
Total production of nitrogen
(20.5 percent N)
1,760
Calcium cyanamide
25
Byproduct ammonium
sulfate
500
Synthetic ammonium
sulfate
130
Ammonium nitrate
1,105
Calcium cyanamide and byproduct ammonium sulfate require no synthetic
ammonia. It is estimated that 332,500 tons of synthetic ammonia were
required for the production of the other nitrogen fertilizers
36,400 tons for synthetic ammonium sulfate and 295,100 tons for
ammonium nitrate.
The 1950 estimate of agricultural requirements for synthetic
ammonia was derived from the following nitrogen fertilizer estimates
for 1950:
Thousand Metric Tons
Total production of nitrogen fertilizer
(20.5 percent N)
1,400
Calcium cyanamide
25
Byproduct ammonium sulfate
354
Synthetic ammonium sulfate
130
Ammonium nitrate
891
It is estimated that 274,000 tons of synthetic ammonia were required for
production of synthetic ammonium sulfate and ammonium nitrate -- 36,400
tons and 238,000 tons, respectively.
5.
Estimate of 1954 Consumption Pattern.
The revised but unpublished 1953 estimate of production of mineral
fertilizer was as follows:
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Thousand Metric Tons
Total production of mineral fertilizer 6,000
Nitrogen 1,760
Superphosphate 2,040
Ground phosphorite 1,615
Potassium
Thomas slag 165
The announced 1954 increase in the production of mineral fertilizers
was 16 percent, a total of 960,000 tons. Applying an increase of
10 percent to all types of fertilizers except nitrogen give,3 an
increment of 424,000 tons, and it is assumed that the remaining
536,000 tons were obtained through an increase in nitrogen types.
The estimated production of nitrogen fertilizer for 1954 is,
therefore, 2,296,000 tons.
The breakdown of nitrogen fertilizers by type for 1954 was then
estimated as follows:
Thousand Metric Tons
Total production of nitrogen fertilizer
(20.5 percent N) 2,296
Calcium cyanamide 25
Byproduct ammonium sulfate 54C
Synthetic ammonium sulfate 13C
Ammonium nitrate 1,601
No increase was estimated in the production of calcium cyanamide and
synthetic ammonium sulfate, and on the basis of coke estimates the
increase in byproduct ammonilun sulfate was estimated to have been 8
percent.
The amount of synthetic ammonia required to produce 130,000 tons
of synthetic ammonium sulfate is 36,400 tons, and that regUired to
produce 1,601,000 tons of ammonium nitrate is 427,400. These add to
a total of 463,800 tons.
The industry requirement for 1954 was obtained by adding 10 per-
cent to the 1953 estimate, an increase from 159,000 to 175,000 tons.
Subtracting the industrial and agricultural requirements from the
1954 estimated total production of 714,000 tons leaves a remainder
of 75,000 tons, which represents estimated military consumption.
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APPENDIX C
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The most important gaps in information about the synthetic
ammonia industry in the USSR are in production and distribution.
As reports. on total production are practically impossible to
obtain, estimates must be built up from plant data. More
information is needed on current production of individual plants,
particularly those for which estimates are based on German
intelligence, which is now more than 10 years old.
The component in the distribution pattern for which infor-
mation could most likely be obtained is nitrogenous fertilizers,
particularly ammonium nitrate. More definite information on
current and planned production of this type of fertilizer would
be useful in deriving estimates of the consumption pattern of
synthetic ammonia. At the same time, information on nitrogenous
fertilizers would provide useful indications of planned expansion
in the synthetic ammonia industry.
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APPENDIX D
SOURCE REFERENCES
The main sources used in compiling this report may be classified
in the following groups:
Soviet sources are books, periodicals, press statements,
speeches, and state plans and Plan fulfillment data. They are con-
sidered reliable and were useful in estimating current production
of several plants and in preparing several other important sections
of the report. A CIA report on mineral fertilizer production, based
for the most part on open Soviet sources, was very useful in esti-
mating the consumption pattern for synthetic ammonia.
2. German Intelligence.
German sources are considered fairly reliable and were useful
in estimating 19+0 production. Some of the individual plant esti-
mates in this report, however, are still based primarily on German
intelligence, which is now more than 10 years old.
3. Army and Air Force Prisoner-of-War Interrogation Reports.
The interrogation reports are considered fairly reliable
but were of direct usefulness only in estimating production at 1 or
2 plants, but a CIA report on the nitric acid industry, which
included production estimates based primarily on prisoner-of-war
reports, was, in turn, very useful in estimating production at
several plants.
it.. Reports Received through CIA Channels.
These reports are considered to be reliable for the most
part and were of principal value in estimating the production of
certain of the plants.
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Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
1 - Confirmed by other sources
A
- Completely reliable
2 - Probably true
B
- Usually reliable
3 - Possibly true
C
- Fairly reliable
4 - Doubtful
D
- Not usually reliable
5 - Probably false
E
- Not reliable
6 - Cannot be judged
F
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which.will carry the field evaluation "Documentary"
instead of a numerical grade.
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
25X1A
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25X1A
25X1 C
STATSPEC
25X1A
STATSPEC
25X1A
25X1A
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8. Khimicheskaya promyshlennost', Jan 44, p. 1-2, U. Eval.
RR 3.
9. Soviet Embassy, Washington. Special Supplement on the Fourth
10.
Five-Year Plan, Jun 46, D. 9, U. Eval. Doc.
11. Planovoye khozyaystvo, no 1, 1950, p. 63-64, U.
Eval. RR 3.
13. Commerce. Business Statistics, 1953 (Statistical Supplement
to the Survey of Current Business), Washington, 1953, p. 120,
U. Eval. RR 2.
14. Commerce. Survey of Current Business, Max 54 and Feb 55,
U. Eval. RR 2.
15.
16. CIA. CIA RR 32, The Mineral Fertilizer Industry in the USSR,
18. Pravda, no 264, 21 Sep 53, U. Eval. RR 2.
19. Ibid.
20. CIA. CIA/RR 41, The Ammunition Industry of the Soviet Bloc,
STATSPEC 27 Aug 54, p. 15, s US ONLY.
21.
22. Joint Press Reading Service, no 204, sec B, 4 Feb 54, U.
Eva!. RR 3.
25X1 C-RDP79-01093A(9000935, sec B, 4 Feb 54, U. Eval. RR 3.
0003-8 CIA. CIA/RR 32, op. cit., p. 16.
23.
24. Civilian Production Administration. Official Munitions
Production of the United States (by months, Jul 40-
Aug 45), May 7, U. Eval. RR 2.
25. US Strategic Bombing Survey. Final Report, Jan 47, p. 5,
U. Eval. RR 2.
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26. US Strategic Bombing Survey. Chemicals in Japan's War
25X1A (Appendix to the Report of the Oil and Chemical Division),
27.
28. CIA. FDD, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol VI, no.
29.
30.
6 Oct 54, p. 15, U. Eva1. RR . tr of Pravda, 21 Aug 554,
p.
2-3)
CIA.
FDD, Micro C-6118, op. cit., p. 94, U* Eval. RR
2.
Oil,
Paint and Drug Reporter, 27 Dec 54, sec II, p. 11,
U.
Eval. RR 2.
31. Spravochnik-tsennik na osnovnyye stroitel'nyye, tekhnicheskiye
i vspomogatel'nyye materialy proizvodstvenno-tekhnich.eskogo
naznacheniya, iii trumenty i avtozapchasti v tsenakh 1950 g
(Price Handbook on Basic Construction, Technical and
Auxiliary Materials for Productive-Technical Purposes,
Instruments and Automobile Spare Parts in Prices of the
Year 1950), vol II, part 1, Baku, 1950, p. 172, U. Eval. Doc.
32. Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter, 29 Jan 51, sec II, p. 91, U.
Eval. RR 2.
33. CIA. CIA/RR 24, The Nitric Acid Industry in the USSR, !+ Jun 53,
25X1A
311. CIA
25X1 A
3
5. 36.
25X1A Pravda, no 264, 21 Sep 53, p. 2, U. Eval. RR 2.
37.
38. CIA. CIA/RR 24, op. cit., p. 28-29, SUS ONLY.
39. Pravda, no 264, 21 Sep 53, p. 2,.U.. Eval. RR 2.
40.
25X1A
43.
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25X1A2g
25X1A
25X1A8a
44. Soviet Embassy, Washington. Special Supplement on the Fourth
Five-Year Plan, Jun 46, -p. 9, U. Eval. Doc.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51. Trud, 3 Feb 46
52.
53.
54. Zasedaniya Verkovnogo Soveta SSSR (Sessions of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR), Moscow, l9 6, p. 99, U. Eval. Doc.
55.
56. Khimicheskaya promyshlennost`, no 1., Apr 47, p. 1-4, U.
Eval. RR 3-
57. National Production Authority, Chemical Division.
Nitrogen Consumption and Requirements, 24 May 51, U.
Eval. RR 2.
National Production Authority, Chemical Division.
Chemical Nitrogen, Estimated Supply and Requirements,
26 Feb 52, U. Eval. RR 2.
58. CIA. CIA/RR PR-74, Brief Guide to the Economics of the
Soviet Bloc, 5 Nov 54, p. 23, 26, and 2, S.
Interior, US Bureau of Mines. Mineral Market rpt no MMS
2273, Consumption of Industrial Explosives in 1953, U.
Eval. RR 2.
59? Iron Age, vol 173, no 1, 7 Jan 54, U. RR 2.
60. National Security Resources Board. Mobilization of the
Chemical Industry, Washington, Jan 50, p. 44, C.
Eval. RR 2.
61. Interior, US Bureau of Mines. WPS no 67, World
Petroleum Statistics, 1953, Mineral Industry Series,
U. Eval. RR 2.
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62. CIA. CIA/RR 25, The Sulfuric Acid Industry in the USSR,
29 Oct 53, p. 27, SUS ONLY.
63. CIA. CIA/RR PR-74, op. cit., p. 23 and 26, S.
64, Vol'fkovich, S.I. Puti sovremennoy khimii (Paths of Modern
Chemistry), Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p. 30, U. Eval. RR 2.
65. Gogin, V.F. Glubokoye okhlazhdeniye koksogogo gaza (ILow-
Temperature Fractionation of Coke-Oven Gas), Moscow,
Goskhimizdat, 1947, p. 6, U. Eval. RR 2.
66. Spravochnaya knizhka azotchika (Handbook of the Nitrogen
Worker), Moscow, Goskhimizdat, 1944, p. 41, U. Eval? RR 2.
67. Vol'fkovich, S.I., op. cit., p. 30, U. Eval. RR 2.
68. Dubovitskiy, A.M. Tekhnologiya ammiachnoy selitry (Technology
of Ammonium Nitrate), Moscow, Goskhimizdat, 1949, p..43, U.
Eval. RR 2.
69. Spravochnaya knizhka azotchika, Moscow, Goskhimizdat, 19441
p. 40- 1, U. Eval.. RR 2.
70. Ibid.
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