FOREIGN RADIOBROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 215
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 1999
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: October 21, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

or Release 19/0.x/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A00070004p008-Q
US OFFICIALS ONLY
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
FOREIGN RADIOBROADCASTING RECEPTION
POTENTIAL IN THE USSR
CIA/RR PR-82
21 October 1954
DATE
AUTIi; R 7Q; 2
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
CLASS. CHANGED _0:, a1
WCt)MENT NO.
nw CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
REVIEWER: 914
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109
US. OFFICIALS ONLY
dd&TM,T
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDp79-01093A000700040008-0
WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC,; Sees. 793 - and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited'by law.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 199N9/09IO C P79-01093A000700040008-0
CO
US OFFICIALS ONLY
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
FOREIGN RADIOBROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL
IN THE USSR
cIA/RR PR-82
(ORR Project 40.295)
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
S^ 0ft"ELCT
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
CONTENTS
Page
Summary and Conclusions 1
I. Transmission Facilities of Foreign Broadcasters
into the USSR (Aural) . . . 7
A. Voice of America (VOA) 11
B. British Broadcasting Company (8BC) . . . . . . . . 14
C. Italy: Rome Overseas and Radio Vatican . . . . . . 14
D. Clandestine and Quasi-Clandestine Broad- 14
casters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Radio Free Russia (RFR) . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Radio Liberation . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 15
E, Other Non-Communist Broadcasters . . . . . . . . . 16
F. Foreign Communist Broadcasters . . . . . . . . . . 1.7
II. Radiobroadcasting System of the USSR . . . . . . . . . 18
A. Development of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Early History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
a. Special Circumstances Which Faced the
USSR in Radiobroadcasting . . . . . .
b. Soviet Concepts of the Functions and
Qualities of Radiobroadcasting . . . . . .
c. Early Soviet Planning . . . . . . . . . .
18
20
20
2. Development of Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. Administrative and Planning Changes,
1924-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
a. 1924-28 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
b. 1928-40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Over-all Functioning . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Wartime System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
24
25
Approved For Release 19 K TF 679-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
Page
C. Postwar Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Postwar Administration . . . . . . . . . . . 28
a. Over-all Administration . . . . . . . . . 28
b. Administration of Programming . . . . . 30
c. The Soviet Domestic Radiobroadcasting
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
d. Administration at the Local Level . . . . 34
(1) Programming . . . . . . . 34
(2) Installation, Operation, and
Maintenance of Radio and Wire-
diffusion Networks . . . . . . . . 35
e. Administration of Soviet Foreign
Radiobroadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2. Postwar Transmitting Facilities . . . . . . . 38
a. Domestic Service . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
b. International Service . . . . . . . . . . 41
c. Television and Frequency Modulation . . . 48
(1) Television Facilities . . . . . . . 48
(2) Frequency Modulation (Ultra
High-Frequency) Broadcasting . . . 52
III. Receiving Equipment in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A. Number, Ch.aracteristics,and Distribution of
Radiofication Facilities (Aural) 56
1. Number ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2. Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
a. Independent Radiobroadcasting
Receivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) Superheterodyne Receivers . . . . .
(2) Tuned Radio-Frequency Receivers
(TRF)
(3) Fixed Tuned Receivers . . . . . . .
65
66
68
68
Approved For Release c fiptNiP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
Co
(4) Crystal Receivers . . . . . . .
b. Wire-Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . .
(1)
General Account of Development of
Wire-Diffusion . . . . . . . .
(a) In Large Cities . . . . . .
(b) Spread into Suburban Areas
(c) In Rural Areas . . . . .
(2) Equipment Used, in Wire-Diffusion
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . .
(a) Equipment Used in City
Systems . . . . . . . .
(b) Equipment Used in Rural
Systems . . . . . . . . .
(3) Recent Developments in Wire
Broadcasting . . . . . . . . .
3. Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Production, Import, and Export of Radiobroad-
casting Equipment . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Radiobroadcasting Receivers . . . . .
b. Loudspeakers . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Availability of Receiving Equipment . .
2. Maintenance and Repair Facilities . . . .
3. Legal Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . .
Li.. Economic Factors . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
. .
68
. .
68
. .
68
. .
68
. .
69
. .
70
. .
71
. .
71
. .
73
. .
74
. .
77
. .
. .
80
. .
80
. .
83
85
. .
85
. .
86
. .
86
. .
86
. .
87
.. .
88
Approved For Release I 9=~lD~ a 1~L79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
CONFtDET\L
S
Page
a. Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
b. Licensing Fees . . . . . . . ? . . . . . 91
D. Television . . . . . . ? . . . ? ? . . . . . . ? 93
1. Number, Characteristics, and Distribution
of Television Receivers . . . . . . . . . . 93
a. Number . . ? ? . ? ? . . . . . . . . . . 93
b. Characteristics . ? . . ? . . . . . . . . 94
c. Distribution . . ? . . . . ? ? . ? ? ? 95
2. Production and Import of Television
Receivers . ? . . . . . ? . . . . . . .
3. Television Wire-Diffusion . . . ? ? . ?
4. Availability and Maintenance of Television
Receivers . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . ?
a. Cost ? ? ? ? . . ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
b. Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. Regulations and Conditions of Listening . ? ? . . ?
95
97
98
98
98
A. Regulations . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . ? . ? . 100
1. All-Union Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2. Local Area Laws . . . . . . ? ? ? ? ? . ? . . 101
a. Moscow . ? . . ? . . . . ? . ? . . . . .
b. Belorussia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C* Ukraine
d. Caucasus
e. Central Asia, Far East, and Siberia . . .
f. Baltic Republics . . ? . ? . . . . 0 .
3. Reasons for Registration of Receivers . . . .
4. Official Attitude Toward Listening to
Foreign Broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Effectiveness of Listening Regulations . . .
Approved For Release 199
101
102
102
102
102
102
103
105
IA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
CONFIDENTIAL
B. Conditions of Listening . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Controlled . . . . . .
2. Public . . . .
3. Private Listening . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
105
105
106
106
C. Jamming . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 107
1. Hi tart' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2. Jaer Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3. Frequency Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
109
4. Jammer .Power
5. Jammer gadulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6. Number of "jammers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7. Jamming Proagdures 111
8. Jamming Organ nation . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9. Jamming Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
10. Atmospheric Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . 113
V. Effectiveness of Foreign Broadcasts . . . . . . . . . 111.
A. Size of the Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
1. Direct Listening Audience . . . . . . . 11)4
2. Indirect Audience . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B. Nature of the Audience . . . . . . . . . .. . . 116
1. Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Prisoner-of-War and Labor Camps . . . . .
3. Civilian Population . . . . . . . . . .
0. Popular Stations, Languages, Times, and
Frequencies for Listening . . . . . . . .
1. Popular Stations and Languages . . . . . . .
2. Best Listening Times . . . . . . . . .
3. Popular Frequencies . . . . . . . . . ?
D. Reactions to Western Broadcasts . . . . . . . . .
118
118
120
120
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
E.
Page
1. Official . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
a. International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
b. National . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
2. Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
a. Reasons for Listening . . . . . . . . . . 123
b. Programs Listened For . . . . . . . . . . 123
c. Opinions of Foreign Broadcasts . . . . . 124
Economic Effects of Foreign Broadcasts . . . . . 125
VI. Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Appendixes
Appendix A. Frequencies Used to Broadcast VOA Programs
to the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
Appendix B. Schedule of VOA Broadcasts to the USSR . . . . 133
Appendix C. USSR Radiobroadcasting Transmission Data . . . 139
Appendix D. Discussion of the Radiobroadcasting
Coverage Maps (Nos. 2-4) . . . . . . . . . . 155
Appendix E. Soviet International Service . . . . . . . . . 159
Appendix F. Television Stations of the USSR,, 1 May
1954 . . . . .............. 161
Appendix G. The All-Union Scientific Technical Society
of Radio Engineering and Electrical Com-
munications imeni A. S. Popov (VNORiE). . . . 163
Appendix H. Reported Distribution of Radiofication
Facilities of the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . 165
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Page
Appendix I. Characteristics of USSR Television
Receiving Facilities, 1950-54 . . . . . . . . 169
Appendix J. Law for the Defense of Peace, USSR Supreme
Soviet, 12 March 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Appendix K. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Appendix L. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
1. Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
179
2. Filling Gaps .
Appendix M. Sources and Evaluation of Sources . . . . . .
1. Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
181
181
182
Tables
1. Estimated Size of Major Groups in the Soviet
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2. Foreign Radiobroadcasting in Russian and Other
Soviet Languages, May 1954. . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Foreign Radiobroadcasting to the USSR, by
Language, May 1954. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IL? Frequencies Used by VOA in the US and Abroad . . . . . 12 5. VOA Weekly Programming, Original and Repeat . . . . . 13
6. Expansion of the Soviet Radiobroadcasting System 39
from Its Inception in 1922 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Comparative Weekly Output of Program Hours . . . . . . 45
8. Estimated Number of Radiobroadcasting Reception
Facilities in the USSR, 1940 and 1946-60. . . . . . . 56
S-E-C R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Page
9. Characteristics of Vacuum Tube Receivers Manufactured
in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
10. Partial Distribution of Radiofication Facilities
in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
11. Estimated Production of Radiobroadcasting
Receivers, 1945-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
12. Estimated Total Production of Radiobroadcasting
Receivers in the USSR by Classes, 1945-53 . . . . . 83
13. Estimated Production of Loudspeakers in the
USSR, 1946-54 . . . . . . . . . 84
14. Average Retail Prices of Soviet Radiobroadcasting
Reception Facilities . . . . . . 89
15. Schedule of Subscriber Fees for broadcast Receivers
in the USSR 92
16. Estimated Number of Television Receivers in the
USSR, 1951-56 . . . . . . . . . . .
17. Estimated Production of Television Receivers in the
USSR and USSR-Owned Plants in East Germany
1940 and 1947- 5 3 . . . . . . . . . . . 96
18. Percentages of Interviewees Citing Word-of-Mouth
Media as Regular and as Most Important Source of
Information in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Illustrations
Following Page
1. VOA Twenty-Four Hour Schedule by Language ... . -73
2. USSR - Organization and Administration of
Radiobroadcasting . . . . . ? . . . . ? . ? . . . ? ? 28
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Following Page
3. USSR - Organization of the Domestic Radio-
broadcasting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31
4. USSR - Channel Hours of High-Frequency Radio-
broadcasting - 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48
5. USSR - Estimated Production of Radiobroadcasting
Receivers - 1945-54. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
Maps
1. USSR - Domestic Regional Broadcasting System . . . . .
32
2. USSR - Area Coverage of Domestic Low-Frequency
Radiobroadcasting Transmitters . . . . . . . . . . .
40
3. USSR - Area Coverage of Domestic Medium-Frequency
Radiobroadcasting Transmitters . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
4. USSR - Domestic Targets of Soviet High-Frequency
Radiobroadcasting Transmitters . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
5. Soviet International Radiobroadcasting Effort . . . . .
41
6. USSR - International Radiobroadcasting Trans-
mitters and Program Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
7. USSR - Radiobroadcasting Jamming Facilities . . . . . .
108
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
CIA/RR PR- 82
(ORR Project 40.295)
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN RADIOBROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL IN THE USSR*
Summary and Conclusions
Slightly more than une-half of the total foreign radiobroadcasts
beamed into the USSR are in the Great Russian language. Radio
Liberation leads the field in terms of total transmission hours per
week, but the Voice of America (VOA) employs six times as many
frequencies, and its total potential audience is greater insofar
as radio-wave propagation is concerned.
The combined total of VOA and Radio Liberation broadcast time
represents $5 percent of total foreign radiobroadcasts into the USSR.
Many radio transmissions not specifically designed for or beamed
to the USSR are receivable there, both technically and linguistically.
These broadcasts have not been included in this report because they
lack directness.
The physical facilities of the radiobroadcasting transmitting
system in the USSR are quite extensive, with a total of 167 trans-
mitters operating on low-, medium-, and high-frequencies in the
domestic and international services.. After 1947, coordination of
important stations of the Satellite countries into the USSR radio-
broadcasting system has resulted in 13 additional transmitters
carrying Moscow programs in the international service. The stabili-
zation in the growth of radio stations in the USSR indicated since
1950 is misleading for it is known that use is being made of
Satellite transmitting stations in the international service of the
USSR. The total power output of USSR transmitters has increased
steadily since World War II. The stabilization in growth of the
number of transmitters is not to be taken as an indication that
the Soviets are relaxing their efforts to propagandize the Western
world. The constantly increasing power output of transmitters,
The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 June 1954. How-
ever, some material of a later date has been included.
C NFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999 02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
the improved technical efficiency of transmitting facilities, and
the use of transmitters more advantageously located in Satellite
countries, have resulted in a noticeably improved reception in
Europe and North America of Soviet radiobroadcasts, an expanded
coverage of Soviet originated programs to include the Satellite
countries, through the use of the domestic systems in the countries,
and a domestic system which is estimated to have achieved fairly
good coverage over the USSR through the use of a complex of trans-
mitters and wire-diffusion* networks. While perhaps some few
additional transmitters may be added to the radiobroadcasting-
transmitting base in the near future, it is believed that the Soviets
will probably concentrate on the improvement of the system through
the use of increased total power outputs, technical improvements in
transmitting facilities, and in the selection of more advantageous
transmitting locations.
The Soviet Radiobroadcasting System is administered by the Main
Administration for Radio Information which is subordinate to the
Ministry of Culture, USSR. The Ministry of Communications provides
technical services to the broadcasting system by providing and
maintaining the radio transmitters and wire-lines necessary for
the operation of the transmitting system, plus operation and main-
tenance of some of the wire-diffusion networks. In addition there
is coordination between the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Com-
munications, and the Ministry of Radio-Technical Industry on matters
pertaining to research, development, and production of technical
equipment, and on means for improving the system. Programming
policies are under the control of the Main Administration for Radio
Information, but are closely supervised by the Department of
Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party. Supervisory responsibility over local programming content
and quality is placed on local organs of the Communist Party. The
subordination of the Soviet radiobroadcasting system under the
Ministry of Culture in 1953 accomplished the centralization of all
re- usion radio is a system of loudspeakers which are connected
to a central program distribution point by either telephone circuits or
by specially strung wire lines. The program distribution points are,
in turn, connected to the broadcasting station by either wire lines,
or, in the case of small places and remote areas, by radio receiving
units. In effect it is State control of program and station selec-
tion.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
propaganda-information functions under a single head, thus facilitating
the dissemination of the current "party line" through all media, and
making it possible to more efficiently and effectively place respon-
sibility for various functions on other appropriate ministries.
'The development, quality, and use of television in the USSR is
believed to be in the developmental stage. Technical and economic
problems of its expansion, including also expansion of transmitters
and receivers, will probably continue to occupy the attention of
those responsible for television in the USSR. It is doubtful that
television for the general public of the USSR will be realized except
in a few large cities, for some years to come.
The use of frequency modulation for broadcasting in the USSR
will probably be delayed for some time in view of economic factors
involved in inaugurating a system which is somewhat competitive with
the existing aural system, and possibly also with television, which
probably has higher priority.
The estimated number of radiobroadcasting reception facilities
in the USSR increased from 1 million independent receivers in 1946
to approximately 5.5 million in 1953, and from 6.7 million loud-
speakers in 1946 to 11.4 million in 1953. (The actual increase of
receivers and loudspeakers over these 7 years was approximately the
same.) The number of receivers in use in 1953 was 5.5 times as many
as in 1946, while the number of loudspeakers in use in 1953 was 1.7
times the number used in 1946. It is probable that the present
aural reception base of the USSR will continue to expand into rural
areas and that independent tube receivers, crystal receivers, and
wire-diffusion loudspeakers will be employed, as appropriate to a
given circumstance. Notwithstanding the current drive to radiofy
the countryside by use of wire-diffusion systems, the over-all
proportion of loudspeakers to receivers is decreasing. It is ex-
pected that this trend will continue.
The plan to increase the reception base to 20 million units in
the USSR by 1954 and to 30 million units by 1955 is fantastic. The
possibility of increasing the reception base to 30 million units
by 1960 would appear more reasonable. The inadequacy of wire-line
facilities, especially in rural areas, will probably delay completion
- 3 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
of radiofication* of the USSR for some years to come.
The estimated total production of class 1, 2, and 3 receivers
(those with high-frequency reception capabilities) in the USSR since
World War II is around 3 million units; class 4 receivers (those
with low- and medium-frequency reception capabilities only) about
2 million units; and crystal receivers, about 4 million units.
During the early postwar years the annual production of class 1, 2,
and 3 receivers constituted more than 90 percent of the very modest
total production, but by 1951 their production had decreased to 10
percent of the total. The production pattern again changed in 1952
and for the years 1953 and 1954 the total estimated annual production
was 1.6 and 2.3 million of this class receiver respectively --
amounting to approximately 30 percent or more of the total annual
production. It is probable that the rate of production of small
independent tube receivers will continue to increase, but that
production of receivers with high-frequency reception capabilities
will not increase substantially above the present rate, and for this
type of receiver the rate may level off to as low as 25 percent of
total receiver production. It is believed that the annual rate of
production of crystal receivers will continually decrease over the
years.
The potential reception base of the USSR as a target for foreign
radiobroadcasts should increase somewhat during the next few years.
The employment of battery-powered tube receivers in rural areas,
where police supervision is more difficult than in urban areas, may
afford some increased possibility of listening to foreign broadcasts
without detection.
Conditions of listening in the USSR are considerably different
from those in the free world. The majority of the USSR radio
audience must listen over wire-diffusion system loudspeakers. The
content of programs and the installation and operation of the
systems are strictly controlled by trusted Communist Party members,
It is quite evident that the authorities intend to keep the wire-
diffusion system as the core of the USSR reception base, and to take
other measures to build up a "captive!audience, forced to listen to
.ocatsiya (Radiofication) is a general Russian term meaning
the development of radio on the consumer side, thus it includes the
manufacture and distribution of radio receivers and loudspeakers as
well as the organization of listening.
-4-
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
only Communist programs. This situation, combined with the increase
in jamming facilities and techniques, especially in urban and in-
dustrial areas, indicates a decreasing reception potential for
foreign broadcasts.
Group listening to Soviet broadcasts is encouraged by having
listening points in factories, schools, recreational centers, squares,
and other public areas.
Listening to Western broadcasts is usually done surreptitiously.
Home listening within the family circle seems to be a normal prac-
tice. By various techniques the listeners can be assured of not
having to listen in a hurried or furtive manner. Those who do listen
to foreign broadcasts appear to do so daily or several times a week,
conditions permitting.
USSR jamming of foreign broadcasts varies according to time of
day, time of year, program, frequency, and location. Jamming is
systematically and regularly applied against Russian language pro-
grams directed into the USSR. In the Moscow area foreign broadcasts
in the English language are not subject to such intensive jamming as
are broadcasts in the Russian language. Jamming in urban areas
appears to be more effective than in rural areas.
In the USSR as of January 19511, there is estimated to be one
receiver for every 39 persons. However, the number of receivers with
high-frequency reception capabilities is estimated to range from
one receiver for every 82 to 128 persons. The largest potential
audience is concentrated in the urban and industrial centers of the
European USSR. It is believed that the better classes of receivers
are in the hands of the intelligentsia, the ruling class, and the
armed forces personnel.
Radiobroadcasts of all Western countries directed into the USSR
are listened to by the Soviet people. The programs of the Voice of
America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) are
considered the most popular.
The severe attacks made by press and radio upon foreign radio-
broadcasts subsided in 1953 but were resumed again in 1954. From
these attacks and through word-of-mouth dissemination of information
a very large proportion of the Soviet population at least becomes
aware that foreign radiobroadcasts to the USSR are being made.
- 5 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
This awareness should tend to increase the size of the listening
audience. As more persons learn of the validity of foreign radio-
broadcasts this too should increase the audience.
The effects of foreign radiobroadcasting can be judged by the
number of defectors from the USSR, the thought and discussion
provoked among the Soviet populace, and the dissatisfaction with
the present working conditions.
Monetarily, the broadcasts serve as a continual drain on the
Soviet economy. It is estimated that the Soviet jamming network
employs roughly 10,000 technicians and costs approximately 5 times
more than the total costs of US broadcasts to the whole Orbit.
It is also believed that the foreign broadcasts have been one
of the prime factors causing the Russians to intensify their radio-
fication programs.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
I. Transmission Facilities of Foreign Broadcasters into the
USSR (Aural).
It has been necessary to treat the radiobroadcasting reception*
potential of the USSR in a somewhat different manner than was the
case with the other papers in this series.
Among the many factors involved here are: the vastness of the
land mass, which creates complication in the reception of radio
waves; the relatively high incidence of bilingual and multilingual
people, ever, in the lower "strata" of that "classless society"; the
sharp urban/rural dichotom of reception facilities; and the many
ethnic groups (see Table 1) and the variety of native languages.
Table 1 lists the sizes of the most important ethnic groups.
Estimated Sizes of Major Groups in the Soviet Population 2/
1940
Group
Millions
Group
Millions
Great Russians
100.0
Georgians
2.3
Ukrainians
36.0
Estonians
2.3
White Russians
8.5
Lithuanians
2.2
Jews
5.0
Armenians
2.2
Uzbeks
5.0
Latvians
1.6
Tatars
4.5
Mordovians
1.5
Kazakhs
3.2
Chavashi
1.4
Moldavians
Azerbajdzhans
2.5
2.Ii
Tadzhiks
1.3
Of the dozens of languages spoken daily in the USSR, this report
is concerned with those which are specifically beamed to the USSR.
The most widely used of these, of course, is Great Russian, commonly
referred to as the Russian language.
Hereafter., the expression "radiobroadcasting reception" will be
in most cases shortened to "reception."
i* Footnote references in Arabic numerals are to sources listed
in Appendix M.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
There are many programs* on the air waves which, though not
specifically beamed to the USSR, are nonetheless physically and
linguistically receivable there. An outstanding example is programs
in the Polish language, which is understood not only by the millions
of native Poles who are now situated within the confines of the
USSR due to territorial acquisitions of the World War II period,
but also by many other Soviet citizens.
Another important language is Hebrew, which is not beamed into
the USSR although there are many Jews scattered throughout the
country?,,*
These peripheral linguistic phenomena have been lightly treated
or ignored in this report, because it is felt that the line must
be drawn somewhere and there is a common denominator in the pro-
gramming hours compiled in this study, viz. deliberate propaganda.
For example, the programs broadcast by the Iranian government in
the Azerbaydzhani language are designed for the northern Iranian
peoples, not for the southern Soviet peoples. Thus although the
people of Soviet Azerbaydzhan can receive these foreign broadcasts,
and may well be affected by them, still the programs were not
designed for Soviet consumption, and therefore do not represent a
deliberate attempt on the part of a foreign country to propagandize
the Russians.
Although Polish is much more widely understood in the USSR than
any other language except Russian and Ukrainian, and although many
hours of Polish language broadcasts beamed to Poland are technically
receivable in the USSR, still these broadcasts have not been in-
cluded in Table 2%*, because it is felt that inclusion of such
transmission in the over-all figures would distort the picture.
Indeed, the reception of Polish language VOA broadcasts by Russians
might induce a negative reaction, since Poles have for centuries
been anti-Russian. Thus a program designed to stir the heart of
the Pole might well be repugnant to the Great Russian, the Lith-
uanian, or the Ukrainian.
Many other languages, such as Arabic, Armenian, German, Greek,
The termUprogram," unless specifically stated otherwise, means
a radiobroadcast program.
** See Table 1.
;*t* Table 2 follows on p. 9.
.S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
N-Q r'O N-N .. rlNrlMN
C- fEl
H O U\ L1- O U, O U\ O O LC\
N 1.(\N1OL(~N1.118tiu;V; -O C\j N CC-\j H H M Q C', U\MN NHHH rl
F~ N N
Q)
O tiU\U\O u, O
U\ 10 C- N U\ L- O
~ ..~N Mrl O ri
8N8tio8S8O?~; %
N ri Ll- O ?- CO U\ M N N HI ~
C-
H H
o 8
ti J
ri N
8?
8-
O\ -
00 H 0
C, I 8?J
L- ti 00
r1 N
r1 OU\C.-OU\OOOO1A8
td U\N U\N U\O l~-UlU1[~ rl
O T H C\j r-i M O\ UI M N [' rl ri O
ri H
a]
a)cqqc~~
O
H CO
ri M ~
r-1
8 O N- C' 0 E-- 8 O 8 ON
C N M r 1 O r-I ~, _7
0 ? N O - 0 8 8 8 0 1r\ U\ NI 81? ti
MN ri N l7D9 N
L`- N N O9 OD U\ N
14 H ID r-l H 9
M ?rl ?r1
P $ co
-l U td O
k P~qq F O9i (0 r"
. 0r~~ O' r4 14
Q) Cd td O Q. tU 'O O pp~~
N C 01 FU+ 4 O Cam.
GPaH: UW0-"m (5 + a H PGGfff~~~
00 1r\ 8ti
CV N..O'rl NN
N
O O O Lr\ U\ o
U;V;oti88 ti ,r
N N..:Irl NN cli ---I ---I
??8ti88 C-
N N..:'r-I L-
C~ N aMD
H
11~tAOh~?-8O Cam- t(\
NNL'r1NN -419
L.'
Ld
Co
O
F".
4T
O
0
O
m
N c~cd
d
O~
.C )x PO-. 4 0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Hindi, Kannadian, Kurdish, Ladino, Persian, Pushtu, Telugi, Turkish,
Urdu, and Yiddish, broadcast regularly by the Home and/or Regional
Services of countries contiguous to or near the USSR, would be under-
stood by at least a small segment of the Soviet population. All such
programming has been disregarded in this stud, not because it lacks
effectiveness, but because it lacks directness. This section is
concerned with broadcasts beamed to the Soviet people by foreign
countries, both Communist and non-Communist. The most significant
broadcasters, in terms of total hours of programming per week and
total hours of transmissions by the various languages, are shown
in Table 3.
Table 3
Foreign Radiobroadcasting to the USSR, by Language* j/
May 1954
T{^ttrc per week
Rus- Arme- Belo- Esto- Geor- Lat- Lithua- Ukrai -
sian nian russian nian gian vian nian nian Total
VOA 17.50 3.50 5.25 3.50 3.50 5.25 7.00 15.50
BBC
United
Nations
Italy (Rome)
Vatican
Spain
Philippines
Canada
Ecuador
Greece
Iran
Lebanon
Yugoslavia
Rumania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Czechoslo-
vakia
12.25 12.25
2.50
7.00
0.75 0.25
3.00
5.00
7.00
8.00
2.50
1.75
1.00
7.00
7.00
1.00
2,50
2.50
2.33 2.33 11.66
0.50 l.oo 1.00 3.50
0.75 3.75
5.00
3.25 10.25
1.50 9.50
2.50
1.75
1.00
7.00
7.00
4.00
2.50
2.50
Footnotes 1or Table 3 follow on p. 11.
S-E-C-R-E-T
2.50
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 3
Foreign Radiobroadcasting to the USSR, by Language
May 1954
a/ W
)
(Continued
Hours per week
Rus-
i
Arme-
m
Belo- Esto-
Russian nian
Geor-
gian
Lat-
vian
Lithu-
nian
Ukra-
nian
Total
Broadcaster
an
s
arl
Poland
1.75
1.75
RFR
18.00
18.00
Radio
Liberation
17.50
3.50
1.75
3.50
31.50
2/
T
l
50
127
00
8
00 5.25
2
7.00
4.00
8.58
15
.83
183.41
ota
.
.
.
_
a. Original programs only; that is, no repeat broadcasts are included. 'Radio
Liberation programs in Caucasian and Middle Asian languages are not shown.
b,, t minutes of this time is comprised of a 15-minute program broadcast 3
times a week by the Central Greece Armed. Forces Services.
c. Includes languages not specified in the table.
A. Voice of America (VOA).
The VOA programs are the most significant Western World broad-
casting effort in Soviet languages, at least in terms of to of vBekly
programming and number of frequencies employed. VOA uses
quencies to originate and repeat a total of 227.5 transmission hours*
to the USSR. Of this, 126 hours are in Russian and the remainder
is divided among 7 other Soviet languages.**
Table it shows the number of frequencies in each frequency
range employed by VOA20* It includes transmitters in the US and in
Munich, Germany,, the two points from which all VOA programs emanate,
and also the relay transmitters in Tangier, Salonika, and Stuttgart.
Transmission hours, as used in this report, refers to original
program time plus all rebroadcast time.
See Table 3.
Table 4 follows on p. 12.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Also included are the 5 frequencies of the US Coast Guard cutter
"Courier," as well as the BBC frequencies used to relay VOA
scheduling.*
Table 4
Frequencies Used by VOA in the US and Abroad
Band
Number
VHF a/
none
none
HF W
17 me
5
15 me
15
11 me
16
9 me
16
7
me
9
6 me
8
5 me
2
3 me
1
Subtotal
72
MF c1
LF 1 1
Total 77
a. Vi y-high frequencies (VHF) extend from 30 to -350 megacycles mc)
and are often referred to as "very short waves."
b. High frequencies extend from 3,000 to 30,000 kilocycles (3 to
30 me) and are often referred to as "short waves."
c. Medium frequencies extent from 300 to 3,000 kilocycles (kc) and
are often referred to as "medium waves."
d. Low frequencies extend from 30 to 300 kilocycles and are often
referred to as "long waves."
Much of the total transmission time of VOA consists of
* For more detailed listing of frequencies, see Appendix A.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
repeats of previous broadcasts; the total of original VOL New York
and VOA Munich programming is only 45.5 hours, for Russian and non-
Russian Soviet languages combined. The Great Russian language is
used for 17.5 hours of these programs, and the other 28 hours are
divided as shown in Table 5.
Table 5
VOA Weekly Programming, Original and Repeat 1
Language
Original Program
Hours
Repeats
Total
17.50
108.50
126.00
Armenian
3.50
14.00
17.50
Estonian
5.25
12.25
17.50
Georgian
3.50
17.50
21.00
Latvian
3.50
8.75
12.25
Lithuanian
5.25
l4..00
19.25
Ukrainian
7.00
7.00
14.00
45.50
182.00
227.50
During 126 of the 168 hours in a week, a Soviet citizen with
a suitable receiver can receive a VOA broadcast in the Russian lan-
guage. Of the remaining 42 hours in the week, 17.5 hours 'are
blanketed by VOA broadcasts in other Soviet languages. Figure 1
shows a.24 hour VOL schedule, by language as of 16 May 1954.* All
but one of the original programs are clustered in the late evening
and early morning hours, Moscow time.
Most of the programs originated by VOA are carried simul-
taneously on a great number of frequencies; one program, for example,
is transmitted on 1 low and 35 high frequencies.
Although all program and frequency assignments are subject
Following p,l3. Appendix B shows the same schedule In table
form.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
to change from day to day, it is considered doubtful that these
changes would substantially alter the general impression to be gained
from this presentation.
B. British Broadcasting Comparqr(BBC).
The British Broadcastin Company (BBC) initiated its Russian
language service on 214 March 19146, 1/ and by 1954 was beaming 12.25
weekly hours to_the Soviet Union, all in Great Russian. In addition
to this original programming, BBC relays most of the VOA schedule,
amounting to another 35 hours of transmission time. Since the re-
lays by BBC occur simultaneously with-the original VOA broadcasts,
this transmission does not appear in Table 2.
BBC transmits its Russian-language programs on 1 low fre-
quency, 3 medium frequencies, and 6 high frequencies. The high-
frequency transmissions are in the 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 17 mega-
cycle bands, and the exact frequency within each band varies from day
to day in order to minimize the effect of Soviet jamming. # 2/
C. Italy: Rome Overseas Service and Radio Vatican.
The combined Italian radiobroadcasting (Overseas Service and
Radio Vatican) into the Soviet Union amounts to about 15 hours a
week of original programming, with no repeat transmissions. Vatican
Radio concentrates mainly on the non-Russian languages -- Lithuanian,
Ukrainian, Latvian, and Belorussian -- with only 145 minutes a week
in Russian. Rome Overseas Service transmits 7 hours a week in
Russianand 2.33 hours each in Lithuanian and Ukrainian. 10
D. Clandestine and Quasi-Clandestine Broadcasters.
A "clandestine" broadcasting station is one which operates,
usually without overt legal registration, from an unannounced
location, with the principal intent of subverting the target aud-
ience. It usually speaks for an illegal or exiled group, and
typically attempts to conceal its true location and sponsorship.
A "quasi-clandestine" broadcasting station is one which has
some, but not all, of the attributes of a clandestine station.
* For a discussion of jamming, see Section NJ C, p. 108.
- 14 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO00700040008-0
..
ZI.
"?
M
N
o
4:.
N
O
O
O
:?ii
O
i}C
?
O
0
OD
0
cn
M:j
N
MIN
0
..
rn
0
0
00
0
0
?
co
0
0
?
0
p
is
o
H
~
o ~,
;.$
o
I- Q Q 4
V w 0
W L2 ~
Q Q Q Q
ti Q ? N
~ = Y c
a
I
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO00700040008-0
O
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
1. Radio Free Russia (RFR).
Radio Free Russia is operated by the Natsionalnoy
Trudovoy Soyuz (National Worker's Union -- NST), an anti-Communist
group with headquarters in West Germany.
RFR beams 18 hours a week of Russian language broad-
casts into the USSR, using two mobile transmitters; one operates in
the 6 megacycle band, while the other uses 11-12 megacycles. The
frequencies vary widely within these bands to prevent jamming, and
BBC reported in 1951 that its signal was receivable, in June of that
year, about 75 percent of the time. 11
2. Radio Liberation.
Radio Liberation is a quasi-clandestine anti-Communist
station, with headquarters in Munich, West Germany. It is supported,
at least in part, by the American Committee for Liberation from
Bolshevism, Inc. 12
Although the Russian language scheduling of Radio Libera-
tion has been fairly consistent since its inception in March 1953,
the Caucasian and Soviet Middle Asian programs have been sporadic. 13
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reported on 2 July
1953 that "broadcasts in languages other than Russian" by Radio
Liberation had "not been heard recently." ,lL The same source re-
ported on 11 July 1953 that "from 1800 to 2200 LZMT7 programs in
Azerbaydzhani are heard on the hour, in Armenian at 15 minutes past
the hour, and in Avar at L15 minutes past the hour." 15 By late
1953, Radio Liberation had apparently settled down to a fairly
consistent scheduling in its non-Russian language broadcasts, using
five frequencies in the 6, 7, 9, and 11 megacycle bands beamed to
Soviet Middle Asia, and two frequencies in the 9 and 11 megacycle
bands beamed to the Caucasus area.
In mid-1954 a major'schedule change was effected by Radio
Liberation which resulted in a substantial increase in total trans-
mission time. The number of frequencies employed also increased.
It now uses 13 high frequencies, three each in the 11, 9, 7, and 6
megacycle bands, and one in the 3 megacycle band. Ten of these
frequencies are used for the major Russian language broadcasts,
which are beamed to East Germany and Austria as well as to the USSR.
This beaming operates around the clock, with two daily hours of
- 15 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
basic programming repeated continuously. Thus the weekly total of
original (basic) programming is iLL, and total weekly transmission
time, on this beaming, is 168. 16/
Another half-hour Russian-language program is carried on
the Caucasus beaming, and is repeated 7 times for a daily total of
4 transmission hours. Thus the total of Russian-language broadcasts
by Radio Liberation amounts to 196 hours a week, of which 172 hours
are original programs, and 1782 are repeat broadcasts.*
It will be noted in Table 2 that the Radio Liberation
schedule is heavier than that of VOA in terms of total transmission
time. It should be pointed out, however, that VOA employs 77
frequencies, many of which are in higher bands -- 15 and 17 mega-
cycle bands -- which greatly increases the area of coverage. Thus
the reception potential would appear to be greater for VOA than for
Radio Liberation.
Radio Liberation now has a significant schedule in other
Soviet languages. Armenian, Azerbaydzhani, Georgian, and one of the
North Caucasian languages (Avar, Chechen-Ingus, Cherkess, Karach-
3alher, or Osetian) are carried daily on the Caucasus beaming in
addition to the Russian-language program mentioned above. Belorussian
is broadcast on a special beaming to East Germany and the USSR. The
fourth beaming -- to Soviet Central Asia -- is also a very significant
broadcasting effort. The 3ashkir language is carried daily on this
beaming, in addition to one of the Turkic languages (Kazakh, Turkmen,
or Uzbek). 17
The total weekly transmission time of Radio Liberation,
as shown in Table 2, is 385 weekly hours -- more than half of the
total foreign radiobroadcasting transmission time beamed to the
USSR. VOA is second with 227.5 total transmission hours,. and all
other broadcasters combined represent a total of 106.5 hours.
E. Other Non-Communist Broadcasters.
Seven other non-Communist countries and the US employ 15
frequencies to broadcast a total of 36.25 weekly hours in Soviet
languages. Most of this time, 30.75, is in Great Russian.
* See Table 2.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
France does not originate any Soviet-language broadcasts,
but uses one high frequency to relay the UN Russian-language program.
Canada and Ecuador are the only countries in the Western
hemisphere, except the US, which carry Soviet language material in
their international service. These two countries broadcast 8 and 7
hours a week, respectively, in Great Russian. Each country has a
Ukrainian program as well.*
F. Foreign Communist Broadcasters.
Communist countries, including Yugoslavia, use 20 frequencies
to broadcast a total of 25 weekly hours in the Russian language to
the Soviet Union4 None of these broadcasts are repeated. 18
Almost one-third (7 hours) of this broadcast time is comprised
of Yugoslav programs, and an equal amount is transmitted by Rumania.
Approximately one-half of the Satellite broadcasts consist of press
reviews for Radio Moscow. No Soviet language is used for these broad-
casts except Great Russian.
Communist China inaugurated uussian-language broadcasts in
November 1952 to commemorate the Sino-Soviet Friendship Month, but
these broadcasts were discontinued early in December of the same
year, 191 and have not been noted since that time. Therefore it is
not included in the tables.
See Table 3, p. 10, above.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
II. Radiobroadcasting System of the USSR.
A. Development of the System.
1. Early History.
Prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917 there had been
no practical radiobroadcasting* of voice and music as we know it
today. There had b een, as a result of the newly discovered vacuum
tube, voice modulation tests of radio waves prior to and during the
First World War. But although its practicability was established,
organized broadcasting to the public did not develop until after
1918. Similarly, the practical value of organized propaganda as
a tool of governmental policy had not been recognized until the
experiences of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution were
assimilated into political thought. 20 The coincidence in time
of these three events; the developmen of broadcasting to the
practical state, the confirmed usefulness of propaganda as a
political tool, and the seizure of power by a hardened group of
revolutionaries, had important consequences in the development of
broadcasting methods and techniques in the USSR.
a. Special Circumstances Which Faced the USSR in
Rad o roadcast1ng.
The USSR presented problems in broadcasting which
differed greatly from those of the more advanced industrial nations
of the West, and these problems restricted the development of
broadcasting. The Bolshevik inheritance of basic needs, facilities,
and resources in the field of radio, together with their generally
over-ambitious plans for industrial development created a complex
of problems in priority allocation for broadcasting.
The vast physical extent of the USSR plus the great
*ariability in population density, developed resources, climate,
topography, and radio wave propagation characteristics, created
problems in the choice of equipment to be produced, frequency
allocations, transmitters, powers, and locations, and connecting
facilities between transmitters and studios. These factors were
area er, t e expression "radiobroadcasting" is most cases
will be shortened to broadcasting.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
conditioned by yet another unique feature, the linguistic and cul-
tural diversity of the population of the USSR. Whereas many of these
problems could have been resolved by the utilization of different
types of equipment according to location., and by local stations
serving areas according to population density and national origin,
these solutions were not acceptable by those in power. The Communist
viewpoint was oriented strongly toward strict control from the cen-
ter, and toward standardization of equipment for economic reasons.
An important decision was called for concerning
priorities of development, and hence allocations of resources between
communications facilities and other industrial investment, and be-
tween broadcasting and the creation of the basic telecommunications
network. The USSR had an extensive overhead telegraph and telephom
system, but it was mainly concentrated in the Western areas, and
threaded very thinly eastward toward the Pacific. Many radio
facilities existed to overcome wireline deficiencies.. In general,
telecommunications equipment was neither adequate nor up-to-date,
and heavy investment was necessary. 21 The resources of the country
in technical manpower were scarce, .and production facilities appar-
ently were insufficient to meet the needs of a nation becoming in-
dustrialized, The distribution of electric power, upon which radio
normally depends, had not been extended by Czarist Russia to any
great extent beyond a few large cities. 22
The immediate over-riding inheritance o.f the Bolsheviks,
however, was the political, social, and economic chaos stemming from
the War and Revolution and the period of War Communism. This chaos,
together with the immensity of the other problems, effectively pre-
cluded any early, concerted effort to attack the problem of radio-
broadcasting other than in the densely populated urban-industrial
areas, and even this was on a small scale.
As a result of all these circumstances Soviet broad-
casting remained considerably behind the development of Western
broadcasting. Nevertheless, efforts were being made to overcome
the deficiencies in material, technical personnel, and industry,
to the point where greater quantities of resources could be diverted
from basic economic and military needs and toward the development
of a broadcasting system.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
b. Soviet Concepts of the Functions and Qualities of
Radiobroadcasting.
Perhaps the most important factor in the determina-
tion of the role to be played by Soviet radio and its organization
is the Bolshevik view that no social service to the population can
be disassociated from strict government control and supervision.
Radio is important in the USSR as a solidifying link and a "trans-
mission belt" by which the party can mobilize the population for
the attainment of the Kremlin's goals. From the beginning the
Soviet leaders had a deep practical awareness of the potential
of broadcasting as an administrative tool and as a means of
Communist indoctrifnation and agitation of the populace. From
this concept of radio the Soviet leaders have designed and re-
designed the broadcasting apparatus to give it maximum effective-
ness in much the same manner as they have developed other mechanisms
of control and supervision. Included in this idea of state monopoly
is the desire to expand the mass audience to the full limit of the
population and to prevent penetration by foreign broadcasting ser-
vices into the USSR.
c. Early Soviet Planning.
As has been mentioned earlier, because of the
chaotic economic and social situation and the special problems faced,
progress of radiobroadcasting was slow in the first few years of
Communist rule. It was not until 1924 that systematic broadcasting
'was begun and an organization set up to administer the system. De-
tailed information of early Soviet planning for the development of
broadcasting is not available. During this period it seems that the
development of broadcasting was given a priority relative!y below
the demands for capital investment in heavy industry and the needs
of the basic communication nets. Nevertheless, of the 80 kilowatts
of transmitting power reportedly radiated over Europe in 1925, the
USSR may have accounted for about half of it. 23 By 1924 plans had
apparently progressed to the point where a mechanism to administer
broadcasting became desirable. To this end, in October 1924, the
council of People's Commissars established a "Joint-Stock Company
nor Radiobroadcasting," known as "Radioperedacha," which stock was
held jointly by the Moscow Council of Trade Unions and the Public
Education authorities. During the same month the !'Sokolnicheskaya"
radio station, operated by the Moscow Council of Trade Unions,
went on the air. 24 This marked the beginning of systematic
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
broadcasting in the Soviet Union.
2. Development of Facilities.
The first major broadcast in the USSR was transmitted on
17 September 1922 by a 12 kilowatt medium frequency station at Mos-
cow alleged to be the most powerful station in the world at that
time. (US stations began transmissions officially in 1921 but
broadcasting was carried on experimentally several years before.)
Lenin, recognizing the value of broadcasting as a part of the Soviet
plan to control the minds of the masses, quickly set about to take
over this powerful medium of agitation and propaganda.
In 1925-26 the Soviet radio system made great strides,
setting up more than 30 broadcasting stations of one or two kilo-
watts each and inaugurating wire-diffusion exchanges in Moscow..
Leningrad, and several other large cities.
Although the development of broadcasting was given a
lower priority than, for example, heavy industry, the USSR is be-
lieved to have had a total broadcasting output of about 40 kilowatts
in 1953, or half of the broadcasting power output reportedly radiated
by European transmitters.
By 1927 the number of transmitters in use in the USSR was
at least 23 (including a new 45 kw transmitter at Moscow) with a
total power output of 126.5 kilowatts.
By 1929 the USSR was operating over 40 principal broad-
casting transmitters in some 40 cities, averaging over 5 kilowatts
each in power output, and providing, except in a few cases, coverage
in the immediate area of the respective transmitters.
It is interesting to note that in 1929 the Radio-
Electric Conference of Prague was held to deal, among other things,
with the allocation of frequencies to all European broadcasting
stations. At this conference it became clear that the Russians
intended to continue the illegal operation of broadcasting stations
in frequency bands which had been reserved by the Washington Confer-
ence of 1927 for maritime, aeronautical, and other special services.
The Conference proposed a 60 kilowatt maximum power output for the
future but it was not accepted as binding, and within a year the
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions opened a 100 kilowatt
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
station in a suburb of Moscow.
By the end of the First Five Year Plan, in 1932, the USSR
reportedly had 57 broadcasting stations in operation, with a total
power output of 1503 kilowatts as compared to 23 stations and a
total output of 126.5 kilowatts at the beginning of the Plan in 1928.
According to information from the Soviet Radio itself, more than
50 dialects or languages were used in "broadcasting" by the end of
1932. Part of the total power increase during the First Five Year
Plan can be attributed to the installation of the 100 kilowatt
station of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions in a Moscow
suburb in 1929, and to the conversion of the Moscow, Leningrad, and
Novosibirsk stations to 100 kilowatt output between 1930 and 1932.
The following year saw the inauguration of the gigantic 500 kilowatt
low-frequency "Comintern" transmitter at Moscow, the largest in the
world at that time. No high-frequency stations of any consequence
were.as_yet in operation. In fact, in 1930 there were only three
such transmitters in use in all of Europe.
When Nazi Germany entered the field of international
high-frequency broadcasting in 1933 the Soviet broadcasting service
began transmissions in German and other European languages on the
new 500 kilowatt Comintern transmitter. No details are available as
to the extent of this first international broadcasting service. To
counteract German high-frequency propaganda broadcasts, the USSR,
France, and the UK hurriedly entered the field. Italy was already
broadcasting propaganda in Arabic to North Africa and the Near East
at this time via the powerful Bari radio station.
By 1934 the USSR's broadcasting service operated about
60 main transmitters averaging over 15 kilowatts each in power.
Six of these were 100 kilowatts or more and one was 500 kilowatts.
Of the 55 cities listed as having broadcast stations, only two,
Moscow and Khabarovsk, appear to have had high-powered high-frequency
transmitters. In addition, there were some low-powered high-
frequency stations providing regional coverage. The number of
listeners in the USSR was reported to be about 10 million, with 22.5
million in the remainder of Europe. In 1934 the total number of
broadcast hours was estimated to be about 330,000 hours for the year,
with over 60 languages represented.
The Second Five Year Plan (1932-37) resulted in an in-
crease to 77 stations in 67 cities of which seven were 100 kilowatts
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
or more, having a total power output of 1765 kilowatts. Only four
cities, Moscow, Novosibirsk, Tashkent, and Khabarovsk were listed
as having high-frequency transmitters.
During the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42) the Russians
apparently concentrated on expansion of the wired network facilities
and improvement of existing transmitter facilities. By 1940 the
number of broadcasting stations, according to the Berne List of
Broadcasting Stations, numbered 81 in 69 cities, an increase of
only 5 transmitters over 1937. According to Soviet statistics,
broadcasting was conducted in 62 languages or dialects by 1940,
either by radio or through the 11,000 wired exchanges then in
existence, of which about one-third were under the operational or
technical management of the Ministry of Communications. By June
of 1941 the number of loudspeaker sets in the wired exchanges
totaled 5 million according to the newspaper Izvestia.
3. Administrative and Planning Changes, 1924-40.
a. 1924-28.
With the establishment of Radioperedacha the Russians
entered a period of concerted effort to plan economically and admin-
istratively for resolving their handicaps and goals. The compara-
tively slow tempo apparently decided upon permitted the next few
years to be a period of experimentation both in equipment and organ-
ization. Economic resources were not invested in this program to
a degree where commitment to a particular pattern of transmission
or reception was unnecessary. Since there was no possibility of
making.radiobroadcasting receivers* or reception facilities,avail-
able to the minority peoples of the USSR the problem of central
control was not acute. Similarly, radiofication of the entire
nation was out of the question. As a result there was concentration
on the European part of the USSR, principally the urban-industrial
region. Radioperedacha operated with the. Sokolnicheskaya radio
station as its.base. The Cultural Section of the Moscow Council of
Trade Unions directly operated the station. They in turn added to
the active audience by instituting the first wire-diffusion ex-
change. 25 The use of wire lines to distribute aural broadcasts
was to become one of the most significant developments of the Soviet
* Hereafter, the expression "radiobroadcasting receivers" will be
in most cases shortened to receivers.
S-E-C-R-E T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
SSE-C-R-E T
system. This manner of broadcasting is known under different names
and it fulfills different functions. In Eastern Europe radiofication
is also known as telediffusion, radio-distribution, relay-exchanges,
re-diffusion, etc. It is indirect reception, mostly from a small
radio receiver, with an amplifier which feeds dozens, hundreds, or
even thousands of small loudspeakers. This type of system usually
serves as an intermediary, relaying programs from other points, but
it can also be used to initiate broadcasts. The honest purpose of
such wired indirect reception, and most likely the original purpose
for its use in the USSR, is to overcome economic difficulties in
equipment production, and technical difficulties such as electrical
noise in industrial areas. The system recommends itself to poor
countries where the majority of the people cannot afford an indi-
vidual receiver but can acquire or hire a loudspeaker. There is
also the obvious advantage for a totalitarian state in that the
relay point is in complete control of the programs. The man who
controls the relay point is in a position to determine just what
will be broadcast. 26 The continued and expanded use of this
system in the USSR n undoubtedly due to the fortuitous combination
of economic considerations and political advantages to the Communist
Party.
b. 1928-40.
Changes in the administration of broadcasting occurred
at the outset of the First Five Year Plan (1928-32), and again in
the Second Plan (1933-37), reflecting the degree of change which had
occurred in the technology, the economy, and the political adminis-
tration of the country.
In July 1928, Radioperedacha was dissolved and the
control of broadcasting was transferred to the Commissariat of Posts
and Telegraphs. 27 The transmission and reception base of the coun-
try, while still in its infancy, had expanded to the point where
there was a need for administration on an All-Union level. Also
the international development of radio had raised the need for a
central authority to represent the USSR at international conferences
dealing with frequency allocations, power regulations, and general
radio procedure. The Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs was a
natural choice.
The administration of broadcasting and reception
was apparently not satisfactory under these auspices however, and
S-E-C-R-E4'
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
with the aim of achieving more centralized control of radio work
the All-Union Committee for Radiobroadcasting and Radiofication
(VRK) was established under the Council of Peoples Commissars in
January 1933. 28 Nine months later the Council, in a regulation
dated 27 November 1933, defined the authority and powers of the VRK,
and charged it with the "organization, planning and operational
direction of all radiobroadcasting in the USSR, including wire-
diffusion by lower broadcasting exchanges in district centers, Machine
Tractor Stations, etc." 29 The subordination of the VRK directly
under the Council of Ministers was apparently due to the realization
that an activity with so many cultural, social, economic, technical,
and political ramifications could not adequately be administered by
a specialized technical and economic commissariat.
Thus it appears that by 1934 the format of the Soviet
broadcasting system, its reception pattern, and its organization
and management, had been firmly established. The description which
follows will in general apply to the period from 193 until the
present, although in section II, paragraph B, the system will be ex-
plored in greater detail, in light of more recent knowledge.
c. Over-all Functioning.
Moscow was the central station with a complex of
transmitters. On low- and medium-frequencies Moscow was serving
radio receivers in the area by radio, and loudspeakers by wire.
The Moscow distribution system served the so-called local (regional)
stations in the various Republics and regions either by wire-line or
by radio. These local stations relayed Moscow programs, and also
originated their own local programs in the proper language or lan-
guages. The local stations served radio receivers in their own
areas and also distributed programs by wire-line to loudspeakers in
their own immediate areas and probably also to some more distant
cities and villages. In this system all radio levels below Moscow
relayed programs from the higher levels and could originate programs
for wire transmission. LO/ This systematization gave Moscow a
command channel down to the lower levels of social and economic
activity.
The general outline of the present reception was
also formed in the 1930'x, and has continued essentially unchanged
in the postwar period, except that certain changes in emphasis have
occurred which will be discussed later. Chief among the steps
- 25 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
taken at various times to form the reception system are as follows: 31
(1) The extensive use of wired radio nets.
(2) Prohibitive purchase prices for tunable receivers.
(3) Installation of loudspeakers and receivers for group
listening.
(4) Registration and licensing fees for receiving equip-
ment.
(5) Jamming foreign broadcasts beamed into the USSR.
B. Wartime System.*
Shortly after the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1941,
the Soviet broadcasting system quickly began to show signs of de-
centralization due to the rapid German advance in the western USSR.
Many of the large republic and local transmitters were destroyed or
captured by early 1942 in the Baltic area, the Belorussian SSR, the
Jkraine, and parts of the RSFSR. At the beginning of the war the
principal Moscow high-frequency transmitters were: RV 96 of 100
kilowatts, RKI of 25 kilowatts, RNE of 20 kilowatts, RAN of 20 kilo-
watts and RVS9 of 20 kilowatts or more in power output. By October
of 19h these transmitters ceased to operate and the powerful low-
frequency Comintern station likewise disappeared from the air waves.
A number of emergency transmitters then appeared, mostly of extremely
poor quality. All in all, broadcasting conditions for the western
part of the USSR were poor during this period. The number of Russian
broadcasts for home consumption decreased and the original division
of the home service into four broadcasting zones was abandoned tem-
porarily. This reorganization, in late 1941, involved a substantial
decentralization of the Russian and foreign language broadcasting
services. Radio Center Moscow lost much of its importance, and
other centers, notably Kuybyshev, the temporary Soviet capital,
came into the foreground. The services maintained by regional cen-
ters replaced programs previously broadcast by Moscow, especially
those destined for the various national zones.
In January 1942 the USSR inaugurated three powerful high-
frequency transmitters at Komsomol'sk in the Soviet Far East, which
were constructed by RCA and known to have an output of 50 kilowatts
each. These transmitters served, and still serve, purely as relay
FOlAb3bl
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
stations for Moscow and Khabarovsk programs, both national and inter-
national. Some of the programs were relayed from Moscow via the tele-
phone line installed along the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1939,
while others were received by high-frequency radio for retransmission.
Other high-frequency stations known to have been in operation during
the early part of the war include: Khabarovsk, Vladivostok,
Kuybyshev, Leningrad, Tbilisi, Alma Ata, Sverdlovsk, Magadan,
Petropavlovsk, Novosibirsk, Yerevan, Kamchatka, and Tashkent.
By the b eginning of 1942, Moscow had resumed some of its
functions which were temporarily carried by regional centers.
Greater attention was paid to the quality of transmitters and to
necessary adjustments for good reception. The improved military
position at that time made development toward centralization possible.
The five Kuybyshev high-frequency stations abandoned the Soviet home
program in favor of relays from Moscow. After one year of war Moscow
again became the chief broadcasting center of the USSR. Transmissions
were begun for German-occupied Soviet territories in eight languages.
In 1943, according to a 1947 Tass dispatch, the USSR com-
pleted construction "in the east of the country" of what they called
the world's most powerful medium-frequency broadcasting station.
(This presumably refers to the so-called "Staling transmitter, re-
portedly of one million watts and originally located in the Ural
Mountains area. Its present disposition is unknown.)
Not much is known about the reconstruction of the Soviet
broadcasting system from 1943 to 1946. Temporary transmitters were
set up, however, in the larger recaptured cities in the Ukraine and
Belorussian SSR. In 1944 there were about 20 high-frequency trans-
mitters announcing as Moscow although some of them were actually
located at other cities such as Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and
Kuybyshev. The number of radio transmitting stations rebuilt during
this period was not great, but due to lend-lease aid and redistri-
bution of transmitters the rehabilitation of the broadcasting system
was accomplished, apparently without great difficulty.
In 1946 the Fourth Five Year Plan began with 27 new trans-
mitters being put into operation, including a powerful medium-
frequency station at Riga. Improved broadcast stations were built
in Simferopol, Stalingrad, Moscow, Kiev, Kuybyshev, Kharkov,
Novosibirsk, and Alma Ata. Many new telephone lines capable of re-
laying radio programs were put into use during this period.
S-E-CRET
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
According to a statement by Ivan T. Peresypkin, Marshal of Signal
Troops, 5 million radio receivers survived the war and were in use
as of 1 January 1946.
C. Postwar Developments.
1. Postwar Administration.
The previous section serves to indicate how the combined
conditions of early Soviet economic development and the political
perspective of the Communist Party have worked toward the formation
of the present broadcasting system in the USSR. With this as back-
ground, and with the recent information available, this section
will explore in considerably greater detail the recent developments
in the system and the coordination of the activities of thevarious
offices which have some authority and responsibility in the manage-
ment of operations. Figure 2*, Soviet Organization and Administra-
tion of Radiobroadcasting, shows the breakdown of the various
organs concerned with broadcasting, and their subordination within
the hierarchy. An examination of this chart will suggest both the
formal and informal relations between the organs of government and
party. It also provides a basis for a study of the agents who
guide the broadcasting endeavor within the USSR, and is a frame-
work into which can be woven the various facts regarding the general
atmosphere and specific conditions under which these agents operate.
a. Over-all Administration.
The Soviet broadcasting system, until March 1953, was
administered by the Radio Committee (VRK) attached directly to the
Council of Ministers of the USSR. On that date the VRK was merged
with other propaganda and information agencies into the newly
created Ministry of Culture, USSR. L2/ Since then it has been re-
ferred to as the Main Administration for Radio Information of the
Ministry of Culture, USSR. 33 Alexi A. Puzin remained as chief of
this body. There is no ind cation that the responsibilities or
functions of the organization have changed to any great degree. In
addition to serving as the All-Union authority on broadcasting
matters, this body also serves as the authority within the RSFSR.
Each of the remaining fifteen Union Republics has its own Radio
Information Committee, which has become subordinate to the Republic
* See Figure 2 following p. 28.
-28-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 z
0
Q
F-- 0
Z
z
2 Q
C)
Q Q
I L p Q
0
ur)
M
z0
0
N LL
Z0
0
0
0
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T 1093A000 0 -
r~-
Z
'E m
4 O
c?z
y H NY
c?-
tv;
O
t - I
I #
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
E
~ E N
c U
1I
J 'I
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C--R-E-T
Ministry of Culture and the Main Administration of the Soviet
Ministry of Culture. 34. Similarly, the Autonomous Republics,
National Okrugs, Krays, Oblasts, and smaller territorial subdivisions
each have their own Radio Information Committee whose membership
and activities are controlled by the higher organs. As of 1953
there were, under the central direction of the parent administration,
163 local radio committees in Republics, Krays, and other districts,
and up to 2000 editorial boards (redaktsii) operating the important
wired-radio exchanges in district centers, major industrial enter-
prises, and elsewhere. 35
The Main Administration for Radio Information has
been put in charge of the problems of broadcasting. Within this
body there are four separate administrations, as shown in the Figure.
One body, the Administration of Radiofication, deals exclusively
with technical matters. It has been stated that this board has the
final word on plans for radiofication and the building of networks,
and that it cooperates with other technical bodies. 3Y Its prin-
cipal dealings would be with the Ministry of Communications and
presumably with the New Ministry of the Radio Technical Industry.
The Administration of Radiofication approves plans for releasing
radio equipment, fixes the types of apparatus to be used for mass
reception, and. coordinates the plans with commercial and research
activity in the field of radio. The other important subdivisions
of the Main Administration are the Administration of Central Broad-
casting, the Administration of Local Broadcasting, and the Adminis-
tration of Foreign Broadcasting. The actual broadcasting and pro-
gramming policies and actions are controlled by these organs. In
addition there are lesser staff units such as the Planning, Finan-
cial and Accounting Section, a State Publishing House for Affairs
of Radio, a Recording Plant, and a Technical Supplies Section. 37
Transmitting equipment, radio lines for both short
and long distances, and other technical equipment are under the
control of the Soviet Ministry of Communications. This also in-
cludes many of the wired exchanges. Besides its responsibility
in coordination of decisions and plans with the appropriate body
of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Communications has
jurisdiction over the installation, maintenance, and much of the
operation of the broadcasting equipment. Several Main Adminis-
trations of Communications are involved in this work as is
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R E T
indicated in Figure 2.128/
b. Administration of Programming.
The use of mass media to sway public opinion is in-
herent in the Soviet theory of the administration of a state. It
was a Lenin doctrine which was adopted -- that to perpetuate itself
the Soviet State must maintain a balance between coercion and per-
suasion. Propaganda machinery was created to Implement the tenet of
persuasion. In the broadcasting sphere this activity is administered
by the Main Administration for Radio Information of the. Ministry of
Culture, but It is closely supervised by the Section of Propaganda
and Agitation (Agitprop) of the Party's Central Committee. Agitprop
units at lower levels insure a relay through the. Soviet system. A
tight control over all media of information is centered in this sec-
tion, which determines both the general line and the specific course
of action in all matters affecting Soviet opinion. Agitprop pro-
cedures are based, of course, on the policy determinations of the
Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party. 3V
Assistance in securing uniformity of facts and intier-
pretations to be disseminated through the system is given by the
Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavlit)
of the Council of Ministers and by responsible subdivisions of the
Main Administration for Radio Information of the Ministry of Culture.
For example, Glavlit, through Agitprop, insures that all broadcasts
are in accord with the Party's political and ideological doctrines.
Glavlit also is responsible for seeing that broadcasts do not
divulge any economic or military secrets. The extent of this sur-
veillance is apparent by the fact that Glaviit has representatives
in local Soviet governmental units. io ,
c. The Soviet Domestic Radiobroadcasting.System.**
The Soviet domestic broadcasting system operates at
four distinct levels which are: the Central Broadcast Network or
Home Service, emanating from Moscow; thq.larger republic or RSFSR
regional networks emanating from cities such as Kiev, Alma Ata, and
Khabarovsk, the important oblast centers; and the local broadcast
systems which deal primarily with wired-radio exchanges extended
uee F igure 2 followinZ D. 28-
** FOlAb3bl
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R E-T
to the kolkhoz level. Figure 3* is a graphic presentation of this
information.
In practice the domestic system appears to function
as follows: the Home Service and National Programs originating at
Radio Center Moscow are sent by wire or by high-frequency radio
where necessary to all large radio centers, including all republic
capitals and other important cities such as ASSR, Kray, and Oblast
centers. Smaller and more isolated communities, especially those
in the Arctic regions, receive Moscow by radio, low-, medium-, or
high-frequency.
The Home Service and National Programs for Siberia
and Central Asia originate at Radio Center Moscow. The Home Service
is divided into three distinct programs: the Main Program, the
Second Program, and the Third Program. The Main Program is broadcast
19 hours per day to the entire USSR by as many as 20 transmitters
simultaneously, and is relayed, at least in part, by virtually all
radio centers in the country. It contains all programs of vital
interest to the whole nation such as news, domestic press reviews,
and party talks. The Second Program, which is of lesser national
importance, is transmitted 10 hours per day by as many as 7 stations,
on low-, medium-, and high-frequency simultaneously and does not
appear to be directed to the entire Soviet Union except on certain
occasions. The Third Program, which consists entirely of entertain-
ment features and concerts, is transmitted for L hours each evening
on. one high-frequency and one medium-frequency channel, and is
directed only to the European part of the USSR. No stations. outside
of Moscow have been observed carrying this program.
The USSR, because of its size and the variance of
time zones, is actually divided into four radio zones as follows:
the. European USSR, including the Caucasus, Western Siberia, and the
Central Asian Republics; Central Siberia and the Arctic regions;
and the Soviet Far East. Because of the difference in time zones
between parts of Siberia and European USSR, Moscow transmits
"National Programs" to the afore mentioned areas at times when the
Home Services would either be unavailable or unsuitable for the
areas east of the Urals. Radio centers in each of these radio
zones relay all or part of these programs. The program for the
Soviet Far East is the most extensive of the National Programs,
See Figure 3 following p. 31.
S -E-C R-E T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
totalling almost seven hours daily. This program is relayed by
Khabarovsk and other cities in the Soviet Far East. As many as 16
transmitters at Moscow alone have been observed simultaneously
carrying some of these national programs on low- and medium-frequen-
cies.
In addition to the home and national broadcasts.,Radio
Center Moscow also transmits a regional service for Moscow Oblast
and certain adjacent oblasts such as Bryansk, Smolensk, Ryazan, and
Tula. The oblast capital studios in the surrounding area originate
1 or 2 broadcasts daily for retransmission by Moscow on low- or
medium-frequencies. A city-wired network for loudspeaker sets in
the Moscow Oblast is yet another service emanating from Radio Cen-
ter Moscow.
Republican capitals and large RSFSR radio centers,
while carrying a large proportion of the Moscow programs, also origi-
nate republic and regional programs designed for their respective
political administrative areas.
Map No. 1, Soviet Domestic Regional Radiobroadcasting
System,* represents graphically political subdivisions to the oblast
level, the transmitting station and studio locations, and the design
of area programs.
While most administrative areas rely on the services
of one transmitting center with pick-ups in studios adjacent or in
subordinate areas, some larger republic administrative subdivisions
may have a number of regional networks or transmitting centers to
afford adequate radio oovera a in important populated parts. The
most notable areas of this tpe are in the Ukrainian SSR, Kazakh SSR,
and the Khabarovsk Kray.
The Ukrainian SSR, for example, in order to serve
adequately the entire republic, has various subordinate regional
broadcasting centers such as Kharkov, Lvov, and Odessa, in addition
to the main station at Kiev. These regional centers in turn have
several or more studios in adjoining oblasts which feed programs by
wire to the regional center for rebroadcast back to the same oblast
area from which the program originated. This unique arrangement,
which is common throughout the USSR, is undoubtedly a natural out-
* Following P. 32.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
0 Q W 0
0 0
= 0 0
N0
zo
0U
LL
0
0
V
W
V)
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 ?s
9 .,
I
~/~" J ~ ,lam ~ ? .r
y,,~, ~ ~
'(
Y
?'
Y f
q ~
T y v
_
~ ~
p.
1 +
q,,
~'c~'C+f v
Y d/
y A P
,fo
E
Yr
c i
tw`
p
~~34y'
qc
5
~ 1
r
n
.~
~
,
/
. _
? ?
.
~
.
4
l
vw wn
?'
/
y a
a
f
a"?
6s a
z
t~
0
e 2 r ~ ~~ oe' .
~ , zy '*w
/
~~ ~ a
r k
n
:
y
!wam
K
~_
TII
f 2
S eua4n r
~ ^ ONGQ~g S N:.
e, a
m
\
= ~~
1
89
/ ?
`4C
~
.. MoYa I
s
ss o '
/ / ,..,\9\~ / ~G~ .C ryAYgxly i~s xssavsq
XXX r, /
T..
- N~cF
~~Sfr ?ken h ,F ~'a?"'^w I
R
A- -.
oor '- nummm srcpub'a ~usRt
- ob,,,o, wY
blib
5 E P
\ ~?+ .ice. a+q^n
.
-bb i
osmw
tler6 s
Y boM
re?nx okra, mm
,uUO mw w?...m,~w m.
a
\
F\
r
- ?,1m br
h,
.?m
u?
en ~m
~ k
^
.,,,. ~
..: . .
gao
13296 an, A so
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
growth of the lack of sufficient transmitting equipment to supply
oblast and regional centers. It may be perpetuated by the centrali-
zation policy of the Soviet broadcasting authorities who apparently
are desirous of maintaining strong echelon control in the organi-
zation without sacrificing the principle of oblast participation.
A typical example of this arrangement on a republic scale may be
seen in the composition of the Belorussian system wherein all oblasts
of the Republic originate programs at the oblast center studios of
Gomel, Vitebsk, Molodechno, Brest, Mogilev, and Grodno. These are
transmitted by wire to the capital at Minsk for broadcast by a high-
powered, low-frequency transmitter providing reception in the
originating area. Wired radio exchanges in each oblast are respec-
tively fed by radio from Minsk and undoubtedly, when practicable,
by wire direct from the originating studios. It would seem that
landlines are lacking for this service in most cases and radio
must be relied on for the burden of intra-oblast dissemination, else
this awkward procedure would not continue year after year. The
method can be defended on the basis of several economic features,
especially since the oblast studios generally do not originate
enough local programming to warrant the use of separate high-powered
transmitting facilities, but it is uneconomical in that it requires
numerous reception centers for the various local distribution net-
works. This method of broadcasting is employed throughout the
European part of the USSR, Western Siberia, and Central Asia, and
to a lesser extent in the Soviet Far East where wire communications
and distance factors inhibit the use of the system.
Although in political divisions such as the Belo-
russian SSR o'blast studios are linked with the republic radio center,
there are some cases where, due to geographic, linguistic, or other
factors, a studio from one republic or RSFSR oblast may feed its
local broadcasts by wire to the transmitting center of a neighboring
area which is under a different administrative control. Examples of
this are in the Kirov and Ulyanovsk oblasts of the RSFSR where the
studio broadcasts from these oblast capitals are fed by wire to
Kazan in the Tatar ASSR for retransmission to the originating areas,
or in Kursk and Orel in'the RSFSR transmitting through facilities
of Kharkov in the Ukrainian SSR.
In most cases the theoretical primary coverage area
of a transmitting center approximates the political administrative
area for which the broadcasts are intended. The function of a re-
public or large regional center in almost every instance is to serve
- 33 -
SE-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
its own administrative area. In the case of a large republic or
kray this may result in the use of a high-powered high-frequency
transmitter or in the division of the republic or region into as
many as eight centers to ensure complete radio coverage. Such is
the case in the Ukrainian SSR, which in addition to the republic
center at Kiev, has large regional centers at Lvov, Kharkov,
Chernovtsy, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, and Stalino-Donbas. Each of
these centers in turn has two or more oblast studios which originate
local broadcasts for retransmission to their respective areas. A
glance at the domestic coverage map No. 1* of the USSR indicates
that all oblasts of the Ukraine have either a transmitter or a
broadcasting studio, thus assuring almost complete coverage by
radio for the republic.
Some oblasts, and marry sovkhozes, kolkhozes, and
isolated settlements receive broadcasts either from Radio Center
Moscow or from the center of their respective administrative areas.
The signal is then fed from a central receiving location to the
various loudspeaker units connected to the wire-diffusion exchanges.
Populated areas near telephone trunk lines may receive the programs
direct by wire from the originating point. Most large cities in
the USSR have wire-diffusion exchanges which originate programs of
local, interest in addition to retransmitting programs from Moscow
or other centers.
d. Administration at the Local Level.
(1) Programming.
Due to its unique physical structure, the wire-
diffusion exchange is peculiarly suited to a program policy which
can be adjusted to local needs. Because they are numerous, however,
and because their programs do not go over the air, the exchanges
present a difficult supervisory monitoring problem. Along with
possible advantages, therefore, they run the risk of consistently
putting on inferior programs, and, what is more serious to the
regime, they may be used for non-party political purposes. A con-
flict between experimental local initiative and central control of
the local exchange was experienced in the early development of ex-
changes. The conflict was resolved in favor of central control.
Within two years of its establishment the VRK decided, in 1935, to
See Map No. 1 following p. 32.
- 34 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
reconstruct completely the system of control of exchange broadcasting.
The Committee found that many of the exchange originated programs
were of the primitive "pot-boiler" variety. Others were for one
reason or another unacceptable. Some were regarded as politically
illiterate or even harmful, and cases of alleged nationalist diver-
sions and of anti-state speeches were cited. Consequently, the
right of exchanges to originate their own broadcasts was limited
to a specified number of major exchanges, and these were permitted
to do so only for as little on one-half hour or at the most 2 hours
a day. Instructions were issued explaining how exchange-originated
programs could be tied in more closely.with the local party unit
needs and for current propaganda and agitation purposes. The local
party units are responsible for this being carried out. / Just
as the Main Administration for Radio Information is controlled.by
Agitprop, so the local radio committees and editorial boards are
supervised by appropriate local Party organizations. Instruc-
tions to these local Party units state that they "should pay close
attention to broadcasting and radiofication. They Mould deal firmly
with all shortcomings in this field and should strengthen their con-
trol over the ideological content of broadcasts." 1J3 This control,
however, is apparently loose or shirked, judging by the occasions
it is criticized by higher Party echelons. Several reports indicate
that this shortcoming is being attacked by Soviet officials by
strengthening the principle of interlocking membership of Party or-
gans and Radio Committees, by special training of trusted Party
members for work in the broadcasting field, and by organizing special
teams for correcting laxity in local Party units. 44
(2) Installation, Operation, and Maintenance of Radio
and ire-diffusion Networks.
Requests for installation of wired speakers may
be initiated by individuals, organizations, or state enterprises.
No installation of wired speakers is allowed except through regular
procedures. Individual radio receivers may be purchased openly but
they must be registered and licensed immediately.. In general
the procedure for the acquisition and installation of Radio Centers
in populated places where no center exists is as follows: a re-
quest is initiated by the local enterprise (a kolkhoz or logging
trust, for example), and directed to its appropriate local adminis-
tration, such as the Oblast organ of the Ministry concerned. These
local administrations then take action by making application for
loans under the state funds which are for this purpose, and then
-35-
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
distributing the credits to the enterprises, with an order to the
local Ministry of Communications office, which has the responsibility
for allocating the equipment and seeing that it is installed. The
local Communications office has continuing responsibility for ser-
vicing and maintaining the equipment, 6 and in many cases the
equipment itself is located within the local Communications office.
Under this arrangement the technical operation is carried out by the
Ministry of Communications' personnel. The present drive for ex-
tensive radiofication of the country has increased the need for this
type of installation, and the combination of the equipment of electri-
cal and radio systems in the same office for combined operation and
maintenance has in recent years been emphasized by the Soviet Govern-
ment and the Communist Party. This permits the development of radio
relay networks in rural areas without an increase in personnel or
electric generating systems. According to V. Vasil'ev, Chief of
the Main Administration for Radiofication of the Ministry of Communi-
cations, "The number of combined radio and communications systems is
steadily increasing.... Combination found its greatest application
in cases where radio relay instruments were set up in one mutual
place with commutators of city telephone systems and intra-regional
communications systems, as well as with telegraph equipment.... The
results of such measures have been a savings of thousands of rubles.
The idling time of broadcasting systems was sharply reduced.... The
incorporation of the maintenance of electro-communications and radio-
broadcasting systems in the Ukrainian SSR was carried out in 198
regional offices and in 128 branches. The result, according to un-
official data, was a saving of about 100,000 rubles per month." L7
In cases where a wired network already exists, requests for additional
speakers by individuals are made at the Communications Office, or
to the local Radio Committee. Assessments for the use of the speakers
are paid at the Communications office, the radio committee office
or at the local Inkasso office, where electric and other service
bills are paid.
Both technical operation and maintenance of the
wire-diffusion networks, and the programming operation evidently
vary widely in quality. Praise and criticism of local personnel are
seen frequently in Soviet literature. The principal criticisms
leveled against the system are: the local offices and employees of
the Ministry of Communications are lax in the installation, and
negligent and uncooperative in the maintenance and operation of the
equipment, / the local offices and employees of the Ministry of
Culture exercise poor judgment in programming content and quality, LO/
- 36 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
the local Party organizations show lack of vigilance in that they
do not see that inefficiencies and errors are corrected, 51 and
there are frequent interruptions of power, and a widespread lack
of spare parts for servicing equipment failures. 52
In attempts to correct the shortcomings of the
reception system the Soviet hierarchy is making considerable efforts
to popularize radiofication, train personnel, and agitate among the
Party members for maintenance of strict vigilance over the system.
The aid of the Komsomol groups is being demanded, and the DOSAAF,
Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Airforce, and
Navy, is urged to use its influence and technical ability to aid
rural localities in the achievement of radiofication.,/ To the
extent. that the shortcomings are resultant from some inadequacies
at higher levels, criticisms are also directed against the Ministries
directly concerned, and the onus of poor planning and inefficient
administration is placed at their doorsteps.
e. Administration of Soviet Rad.iobroadcasting.
This aspect of Soviet broadcasting is operationally
under the control of the International Bureau, or, as it is also
called, the Administration of Foreign Broadcasting of the Main Ad-
ministration of Radio Information, and-the technical equipment is
administered by the Ministry of Communications. 55/ During the past
two years the Russians appear to have gradually eased the expansion
of foreign radio operations and shifted attention to the improvement
of the efficiency of broadcasts by using more powerful transmitters
located, where possible, closer to the target areas. For this reason,
and also because of Western efforts to penetrate the iron Curtain by
radio, there has been apparent acceleration of radio network inte-
gration between the USSR and its Satellites. Agreements for "cooper-
ation" in the radio field were signed in 199 and 1950 following a
tour of Eastern Europe by A. A. Puzin, head of the VRK, now the Main
Administration for Radio Information. The agreements apparently pro-
vide the legal basis for Soviet intervention. Little is known of
the contents of these agreements aside from general provisions for
exchange of information, the institution of reciprocal "music weeks,"
and similar measures. The known existence of landlines between Moscow
and most of the Satellites, the reported presence of personnel with
experience in Radio Center Moscow, and the whole apparatus of policy
coordination evolved by the USSR, go far to ensure. an integrated
effort in the broadcasting field.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
Moscow in 1946 apparently hoped to dominate inter-
national broadcasting by making the International Radio Broadcasting
Organization (OIR), in which it has obtained votes for eight of its
Union Republics, the'recognized authority for international broad-
casting. With the reorganization of the International Telecommuni-
cations Union (ITU) in 1947 the OIR was reduced to the status of a
regional European radio agency. In 1949 virtually all of the
Western members walked out of the.OIR, restricting its competence
to Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia and Syria were expelled in 1951, and
Finland, the only remaining non-Communist member, has become in-
active. This development enhanced rather than lessened the value
of OIR to. the USSR, which began to use it to integrate the orbit
radio network. With the adherence of Communist China in 1951 and
East Germany in 1952, the OIR became an important medium for coor-
dinating the total Soviet radio effort. 56
2. -Postwar Transmitting Facilities.
a. Domestic Service.*
In 1947 there were 100 broadcasting stations Known
to be in operation in the USSR. This is equal to the prewar figure
of approximately 100. By late 1947 approximately the same power
output of 4000 kilowatts was reached. From this point the emphasis
appeared to be on the expansion of the Soviet international broad-
casting system, the improvement of technical facilities for all ser-
vices, and the expansion of the Soviet radio system to include many
full and part time relay transmitters in Satellite countries. At
least three captured German high-frequency transmitters of up to
200 kilowatts were reportedly installed at three separate cities in
the USSR.
As can be seen from Table 6;** the number of trans-
mitters in the USSR increased only slightly from 1950 to 1953. During
1950 and 1951 at least three high-frequency and several medium-
frequency transmitters in the western USSR were put into operation,
primarily in the international service. Other transmitters built
during this period appear to be mainly supplementary stations for
improved regional coverage. At the present time the total number of
transmitters stands at 167 of which 110 are low- and medium-
FOlAb3b
;t* Table 6 follows on p. 39.
-38-
S-.E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 6
Expansion of the Soviet Radiobroadcasting System
from Its Inception. in 1922 57
Number of
Low- and Medium-
Total Power
Output
Year
Transmitters
Frequency
High-Frequency
(In kilowatts)
1922
1
1
0
12
1924
2
2
0
N.A.
1925
N.A.
N.A.
0
40
1928
23
23
o
126.5
1929
5
5
0
200 J
1930
2
2
0
395
1932
57
52
5
1503
1933
62
57
5
N.A.
1934
64
58
6
N.A.
1936
68
61
7
N.A.
1937
77
67
10
1765
1940
9o
N.A.
N.A.
1898
1941
1943
100
69
N.A.
54
N.A.
15
4000 b/
2000
1944
80 /
60 b
20
2200
1946
85
65 J
20
3200 W
1947
100
70
30
4000 /
1949
132
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.,
1950
160
110
50
5000 b/
195.3
167
110
57
5785 J
a. All data are for 1 January, except from 1941 to 1953 when the
figure applies to the second half of the year.
FOIAb3bl FOIAb3bl
Total power output figures for period 1944-53 are
probably accurate within 5 percent.
- 39 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
frequency stations, and 57 are high-frequency stations, with a com-
bined power output of about 5785 kilowatts. Appendix C lists
alphabetically the Soviet broadcasting stations, with notations on
power and frequency. It is not. possible to give a complete break-
down between foreign and domestic stations since there is evidence
that some transmitters serve both purposes at different times.
The domestic radio coverage maps Nos. 2 and 3*
show that the Soviet broadcasting system achieves fairly good
coverage over a substantial area of the USSR through its complex
of low- and medium-frequency transmitters. The hinterland and
Arctic regions appear to be covered adequately by the use of power-
ful high-frequency transmitters, as shown on map No. L.** Thus
it is likely that in almost all parts of the USSR the listener is
able to receive at least one program of the Soviet radio, depending
of course on the type of receiver used. Appendix D contains a
discussion of these broadcast coverage maps and outlines the general
assumptions on which they were based.
In addition to the primary stations in the USSR there
are reportedly in existence small rayon transmitters with a radius
of 25 to 30 kilometers which broadcast such things as local govern-
ment orders, warnings, discussions of work, and contests. 58 The
operation of these stations has not been confirmed by monitoring.
There are also reported to be small portable medium-
frequency kolkhoz radio stations with a radius of five to eight.
kilometers which are supervised by the large collective farms or by
the local executive committees. They serve a dual broadcast-communi-
cation function. The kolkhoz stations issue work orders to the
kolkhozniki and advice on agricultural matters is given. One
'.{clkhoz can also contact a nearby kolkhoz by the use of these trans-
iitters. It is reported that loudspeakers are set up in the fields
At appropriate locations, and programs are transmitted through them
at the beginning and end of work days as well as during rest
periods. L9/
See Maps 2 and 3 following p. 40.
# See Map 4 following p. 40.
-40-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
]J :5
2J
50 60 (0 30 36 00 110 12J 130 ;50 :fig - IE5
ryb
a Lr e of D mes c how-,fe uenc Ra
, . .. X ~c roadcas mg --Transmitters s a
A ~
U
> y V/ ~,o.X,
(
/
\
?. ,.~
M' `l
I
~ ~ ..//" / b /$ 9.
S t. }'
, ! :
1?'.,
'
r'- t` (
'"
~G~ -'~_`~~ E
N 15LAND5L i! \ ~,` \ ?,~
-'
,
.
~
i
, {
6' 0-500 rubles, and the Class 4 Lrz was then available for 300
rubles. 168/
In 1950, the price of the Vostok is reported to have
been further lowered to 850 rubles. 169
Around 190, prices on most types of receivers
apparently were lowered substantially, to within the price ranges
believed in effect currently; These prices are set out in Table 14.
Table 14.
Average teta-il Prices of Soviet 'adiobroadcasting teceotion Facilities 170
Type
Number of Tubes
Price Ranee
(i?ubl.es
Class 1
7 ,or more
1200-1600
Class 2
6-7
600-700
Class 3
4-5
220-4.00
Class 4
3-4
180-250
Crystal
0
30-60
Loudspeakers
0
-89-
S-E-C-R-:-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
otwit-hstanding the reported plentiful stocks of
receivers in cities in the '~uro-jean USSR, it does not necessarily
follow that turnover of these s'oeks was rapid. It is estimated
that in ebruary 19149 only persohs in the higaer-pay brackets coi ld
afford to pay 1350 rubles, which would purchase only the cheapest
receiver equipped for high-frequency reception offered for sale in
rioscow. Moscow radio shops were reported as being crowded but
people were _aerely looking -- not buying. 171
Un the other hand, the stock of receivers in Kras-
notorsk was reported to have been considerably lower after 19149,
when prices were reduced, and local stores were reported to have
sold out shipments on he date of arrival. 172/
In June 1951, a survey of radio stores in JJzaudzhi_'.au,
3 vero-Jsetian Oblast, revealed that 6-tube sets were in plentiful
supply (a total of about 20 in 6 different stores) but ti-,at none
were in -roorking condition; they'had apparently been injured in transit
and the demand for diem was not so pressin}~ as to justify the effort or
cost to replace broken tubes or ;make other t,;rpes of repair. Tn
3tal;nrad, at around the sane tire, no receivers with high-frequency
reception capability were seen on display, although salesman said
that normally 3 or 14 of the standard types were available. /
In ']ecember 1951, the one radio store in Vinnitsa
was reoorted to ' ave an ample shock of all types of receivers. 17
In a r 1952 in .ubezhnoye, in the Ukraine, 4 'types
of receivers of Soviet manufact.re were available to the public at
prices ranging between 300 and 1500 rubles. The price of 500
rubles for the Rekord type receiver was said to be a reasonable
price in comparison with the wa+e of Soviet workers in that city. 175
In iia.rch 1952, the number of radio shops in vor. onezh
was said to be quite noticeable and the variety of tubes on display
far exceeded siailar cisplays it ?ioscow, and equalled the displays
of the larger shops in Leningrad. 176
As of :March 1952, the supply of receivers in Kherson,
was said to be very poor, expecially of the better makes. 177
In li ht of tie estimate that only 1 million receivers
were in use in the USSR at the beginning of 19146, and that less than
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
a total of 1 million tube receivers were.produced during 19146, 19147,
and 19483, it is quite probable that much of the stocks on retail
display represented window dressing up to 1949, when production of
tube receivers increased sharply.
With the lowering of prices and the increase in
supply, more receivers became available so that, generally speaking,
independent tube receivers have recently becoine available, economically,
to those of the political and industrial hierarchy downward to the
professional level of scientists, teachers, engineers, and army offi-
cers and to plant and enterprise officials of the upper and middle
levels.
Economic attraction appears to be one of the govern-
ment's chief methods of convincing the populace of the desirability
of possession of a wire-diffusion loudspeaker over an independent
receiver. The cheapest independent tube receiver costs from 6 to 8
times more than a loudspeaker, which costs 30 rubles. The loud-
speakers used in the Soviet wire-diffusion system are comparable
to those installed in medium-priced receivers. At a cost of from
30 to 60 rubles each for crystal receivers, the loudspeaker would
appear to be a much more attractive means of listening to Aadio
Moscow in electrified areas than the crystal receiver, which, in
most instances, would necessitate earphone listening. In most
cities and other electrified areas, loudspeaker installations are
included in new housing, automatically, as well as in industrial
plants, public and quasi-public gathering places and public
transportation vehicles.
b. Licensing Fees.
The schedule of subscriber fees for broadcast
receivers in the USSR is shown in Table 15.3
The effective date of these registration charges
for tube receivers is unknown. The rate for loudspeakers, however,
was reduced from 10 rubles to the current rate of 5 ri>bles (4
rubles for certain kolkhoz installations) as of 1 April 1953. 179
Ta ie l5-fo_l.lows on p. 92.
S -E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 15
Schedule of Subscriber Fees for 3roadcast Receivers in the USSR. 178/
Annual Fee
(Rubles)
Oategory I - for ind_vid,:al use
36
Category II - for use in village reading rooms,
"Red Corners," and radio auditori.ums
54
Category III - for use in trading, productive and
entertainment enterprises, in training
institutes, on ships, airplanes, trains,
and automobiles.
75
For Crystal Receivers
All us age
For Loudspeakers a/
Those connected to wired centers of the Ministry
of Communications, except
Those in kolkhozes connected to Ministry of
Communications centers
a. No inL ormati_on is available on the subscriber Tees for ou -
speakers not connected to Ministry of Communications relay centers.
This decree constitutes the first tangible evidence
of a direct r..onetary benefit to the consumer in the field of communi-
cations as a result of the new economic course adopted by the Soviet
government after the death of atalin. It directly reduced the
subscription rate of at least 80 percent 180 of the loudspeakers
(around 8 million of the 10 million in service) in the USSR at that
time. Also, at that tii:e, there were several million tube receivers
in service on which subscriptions rates were from 3 to 7 times
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S E C R E T
higher. If the intent of this Soviet decree had been primarily a
consumer benefit, it is quite probable that there would have been
similar reductions in. subscription rates for tube receivers, as well.
This reduction in subscription for loudspeakers, therefore, appears
to be an economic. inducement to aid the drive towards radiofication
of the rural areas, which was said to be lagging. 181 The prefer-
ence of the slightly lower rate for rural areas over urban areas
gives further support to this theory.
The more recent, "The Seventh Annual Soviet Price
Reduction Decree,." which went into effect on 1 April-1954,
affected 11 categories of foodstuffs. It is estimated that this
decree would actually have no. significant effect on the food bill
of an average Russian family of four. The monthly savings resulting
from the reduction are estimated to be only 5 rubles or 1 percent
of the old cost.. The 1954 annual drop in the index was too small
to be registered. 182 Even with the substantial reductions made
in prices of receivers in recent years the 1954 price reduction
decree, following maturation of the "1953 new course of solicitude
for the consumer," will probably result in the ownership of a
very f'ew more broadcasting receivers by the average Russian.
D. Television.
1. Number, Characteristics and Distribution-of Television
Receivers.
a. Number.
Estimated numbers of television receivers in the
USSR for the years 1951 to 1956 are set out in Table 16..E
Those figures for 1954, 1955, and 1956 are based
solely on Soviet public pronouncements of production plans. These
figures appear to be in the same tenor as recent announcements
concerning aural radiofication and are believed to be grandiose
and unrealistic,
Table 16 follows on p._94.
- 93 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Table 16
Estimated Number of Television Receivers in the USSR J
1951-56
1951
1952
1953
1951.
1955
1956
a. Source 162/ except for 1952.
b. Interpolation. 184
40,000
95,-000 b/
150,000
500,000
1,270., 000
2,270,000
b. Characteristics.
Thus far, Soviet television receivers have been
characterized as obsolete, by Western standards, and very expensive.
Their chief weakness appears to be the short life of the tubes.
The characteristics of these receivers are given in Appendix I.
This appendix contains a summary of available information on
announced models. It is doubtful. that all of these have reached
the production stage.
The KVN-49, the Moskvich T-1, and the Leningrad
T-2 are the models mainly in use. These have small screens, not
much larger than the size of a postal card. The larger screen of
the T-4 model which is presently coming into service, mainly
for group viewing, is believed to be achieved by the use of re-
flecting mirrors rather than by direct scanning. This method was
studied in the USA and abandoned in favor of direct view large-size
cathode ray tubes. The technique of the manufacture of the large-size
cathode ray tubes, however, is well known, and there appears to be
no reason for its nonuse in the USSR, except for economic considera-
tions. It appears, therefore, that the Soviet authorities have
chosen to provide television receivers to at least a part of the
population. in the simplest and most economic manner. 185/
- 914 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
c. Distribution.
Distribution of television receivers, naturally, is
limited to the service area of television transmitters. Theoreti-
cally, this limits their operation to a radius of not more than
100 kilometers from the transmitter; in practice -- in the USSR to
about. 50-60 kilometers. 186
Although the USSR claims to have several new tele-
vision transmitters in service, in such cities as Sverdlovsk, Gorkiy,
Odessa, Kharkov, there is no information on receivers except in the
areas around Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. There are estimated to
be approximately 100,000 in the area of Moscow, 40,000 in the
area of Leningrad and about 10,000 in the area of Kiev. 1.87 It is
probable that distribution of television receivers in the other
areas is negligible.
2. Production and Import of Television Receivers.
The Soviet domestic production of television receivers
has been minor. Less than 100,000 are estimated to have been pro-
duced in the USSR up to the close of 1953.
Up to 1953, there was no indication that the USSR had
successfully mastered the necessary techniques to mass-produce any
type of cathode ray tube for television purposes. Of course.,
there is the possibility that, if such capability does exist within
the USSR, it has been diverted to other purposes, especially
military one. For whatever reason, since the beginning of 1951,
about 3/4 of the television receivers destined for use in the'USSR
are believed to have been produced in USSR-owned plants located in
East Germany.
Table 17* shows the estimated production of television
receivers in the USSR and in USSR-owned plants in East Germany for
1940) and from 1947 to 1953.
Total production (both in the USSR and USSR-owned plants
located in East Germany) for 1953 is estimated at about 74,000
units. The production plan for 1954 is said to be 325,000 receivers;
for 1955, 760,000 receivers; and for 1956, 1 million receivers.
able 17 0 lows on p. 96.
- 95 -
S-E-O-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
What proportions of these totals are to be produced in East Germany
and in the USSR are not known. The main factor which may limit the
production of television-receivers in the USSR is the shortage of
cathode ray picture tubes. One means of overcoming this deficiency
may be to import these tubes from Hungary or East Germany.
The trend in Soviet television receivers appears to be
following 4 or 5 years behind the US. Television receivers are
becoming simpler and'cheaper while the picture tubes are becoming
larger. Examples are the recently announced types Sever-3, Avangard,
and Svet, (See Appendix I).
Estimated Production of Television Receivers.
in the USSR and USSR-Owned Plants in East Germany 188/
1940 and_ 19+7-53
Units
1940
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Production
in the USSR
100
1,000
3,000
5,000
9,000
11,000
15,000
34,000
Production in
USSR-owned
Plants in
East Germany.
30,.600
34,500
40,100
Total
100
1,000
3,000
5,000
9,000
41,600
49,500
74,100
If these types prove to be acceptable in usage, they could
provide one means of boosting unit. production since their assembly
should be less complex than the Leningrad T-2 and T-4 models. Another
factor in increasing production of electronics equipment may be the
recent creation of the Ministry of Radio Technical Industry.
Nevertheless, in order to achieve presently announced
goals, the Soviets would have to quadruple 1953 production. during
1954, to more than-double the 1954 production during 1955, and to
again increase 1955 production by about 1/2 in 1956. This appears
to be a very ambitious undertaking particularly in consideration of
- 96 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
the parallel radiofication goal. No doubt television receiver pro-
duction will increase substantially in the USSR and in East Germany,
but it probably will fall far short of the announced goals.
3. Television Wire-Diffusion.
Soviet technical literature for the past several years
has indicated that the television reception base in the USSR.is .
intended to follow the pattern of aural broadcasting in that wire-
diffusion of television will be employed as well as the use of
independent receivers.
In the one wire-diffusion television receiver for which
details are available (the Pioneer) only 9 tubes, plus the picture
tube are used. (See Appendix I). Other Soviet technical literature
indicates t!iat the goal of development for television wire-diffusion
is a receiver with as few as four or five tubes. In consideration
of the employment of from 20 to 35 tubes in independent television
receivers, this would represent an appreciable, saving in radio
tubes. 189/
Extensive experiments in wire-diffusion of television
are reported being conducted by the laboratory of the Moscow .
Municipal Wired.Radio Network At Kalinin, on the route of the
coaxial cable from Moscow to Leriin;rad. As of September 1953,
according,to an.article.in the Soviet technical journal 'Radio,
"The quality of the picture at the sub-
scriber points of the Kalinin center cannot
be adjudged.satisfactory. Since the inter-
urban television channel will. not pass a band
wider than 3 megacycles, the picture definition
corresponds to about 250 lines. Therefore,
the construction of the existing Kalinin Wired
Television Center can b-e considered only as an
interesting.experiment in the transmission of
television by cable over considerable distances."
190/
On a local basis, it was announced in August 1953 that
an experimental wired television center to supply 50 subscribers
would be installed in a Moscow apartment house in 1953. 1.91 No
information is available as to whether or not this was carried out.
S.-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
To date, insuffici4nt information is available as to what
progress has been made regarding wire-diffusion television. It,
should be pointed out, however, that even on a local, urban basis a
wired-diffusion television system would require the use of coaxial
cable between the relay centerand the subscriber points instead of
ordinary wire as employed in the aural wire-diffusion system. While
wire-diffusion television would effect a considerable saving in
terms of electronics equipment 'land in the complex assembly of that
equipment, it would also require a considerable outlay of coaxial
cable, which is also believed to be in short supply.
ti.. Availability and Maintenance of Television Receivers.
a. Cost.
Until July 1949, the Moskvich T-1 and the Leningrad
T-1 were reported to have cost'approximately 3,000 rubles. At that
time, they were reduced to 1,500 and 2,000 rubles, respectively. 192
Recent reports indicate that the most popular television receiver
presently available, the Leningrad T-2, is priced at 2200 rubles;
the less-satisfactory KVN-49, costs about 1300 rubles.
Prices of from.1300 to 2200 rubles have the effect
of placing individual ownership of television receivers beyond the
economic means of all except those in the upper income brackets.
One highly reliable source reported that. the largest radio and tele-
vision store in Leningrad, in October 1952, was thronged with people,
but apparently few were buying,; as the Leningrad T-2 receiver was
available for immediate delivery. izv
Most television receivers are purchased by social
and political organizations for group use in such places as reading
rooms, libraries, and "Agitpunkts." 195
The license fee for use of a television receiver is
said to be 120 rubles per year. ?196
b. Repair.
According to the Moscow press, in January 1952, a
radio trust had been set up with 3 television workshops in Moscow
and 1 in Kiev, for the installation and repair of television re-
ceivers. 197 (It is probable that similar plans had been made for
-98-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Leningrad, but no information is available on that area). In ?arch
1952, L installation and repair personnel are reported to have been
factory-trained, and 40 additional personnel were enrolled in a six-
months' course. From these cadres, training of additional installa-
tion and repair personnel was planned to be conducted on an on-the-
job basis in the television workshops. Initial plans called for the
training of 120 persons in this manner. 19
As of September 1953, however, there appears to?have
been only one television service bureau in Moscow and it was two
months behind on repair orders alone, with a backlog of 4,000
requests. 199/
On the basis of intermittently published articles
in the Soviet press, USSR television receivers require frequent
repair service. This is probably die to the inferior quality of
Soviet radio tubes, particularly the picture tubes. The instability
and fluctuation of the electric current supply in many parts of the
USSR, including areas of the city of Moscow, is probably a contrib-
uting factor in tube failures. Spare parts are said to be often
"temporarily" unavailable and obtainable only after long delay.
S -E-C -R-E -T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
IV. Regulations and Conditions of Listening.
A. Regulations.
In addition to the regulations and laws in the USSR affecting
radio receiver ownership and listening on an All-Union basis there
are other relative regulations and laws instituted and enforced in
certain local areas. These are discussed below.
1. All-Union Laws.
It is a generally accepted principle in the western
world that, excepting national security secrets, the widest possible
exchange of information not only contributes to international under-
standing and cooperation but also works to the advantage of in-
dividuals as well. It is also a generally accepted rule that a
totalitarian state prohibits the dissemination to its citizens
types of information undesirable to the regime.
The Soviet government exercises strict control over all
types of communications media in the hands of its citizens. Radio
is no exception. It is the policy of the USSR to prevent the ac-
quisition by its populace of any information of whatever nature
which might be construed as contrary to their propaganda line. As
a result the regime expends considerable time, money, and effort to
keep foreign radiobroadcasts from its populace.
Before World 'gar II there were apparently few if any
regulations in the USSR affecting either the ownership of radio
receivers or listening to foreign radio programs. The only existing
regulation at that time required radio owners to pay subscription
fees. Shortly after the war broke out, however, a decree was issued
by the government that all receivers had to be given over by a
certain date to the government for the period of the war or the
owners were subject to a severe,penalty for non-compliance. 200
The people obtained receipts for their receivers and those who
lived in regions not subject to the German occupation or adjacent
to those regions, as a rule got their receivers back shortly after
the end of the war. 201/
Since the end of World War II security measures have
tightened considerably. Pursuing this path, the Supreme Soviet of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics promulgated the decree on
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700640008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
"Law for the Defense of Peace" on March 12, 1951. This decree does
not prohibit listening to foreign broadcast programs but it makes the
oral dissemination of information heard over such programs a crime
against the State. The law in part states "persons guilty of war
propaganda should be arraigned and tried as major war criminals."
(See Appendix J.)
To obtain further control over receivers there is another
law that makes it obligatory for every citizen who owns a receiver
to register it with the local branch of the Soviet Ministry of Com-
munications. Once this registration has taken place a listening fee
or radio tax becomes automatic. 202 Fees range from 4 rubles per
year for loudspeakers in kolkhozes to 75 rubles per year for re-
ceivers located in public places, automobiles, etc.* These fees
must be paid regardless of whether the receiver is in working con-
dition or not. 203
2. Local Area Laws.
a. Moscow.
In the Moscow area on September 14, 1945 a decree was
passed by the Moscow Radio Committee informing owners than in order
to have unlimited use of their receivers it was necessary to register
them at the nearest post office and pay a subscription fee as per
existing tariff. 204/ Furthermore, the registration certificate has
to be kept with the receiver, together with the receipt of payment,
and must be presented at the first request of a radio committee in-
spector.
In February 1953 the newspaper Evening Moscow carried
announcements from the Moscow City Relay Network reminding owners
that all radio and television receivers "without exception" were
subject to obligatory registration and payment of taxes. 205 After
a receiver was purchased it had to be registered within three days.
To make sure the registration occurred within this period a fine
was imposed for late registration and the money was compulsorily
withheld from one's pay.
* See Table on p. 92.
$-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
b. Belorussia.
Due probably to its geographic location, Belorussia
appears to have more stringent regulations. At 3obru_ysk, until 1949,
it was necessary to have a permit in order to buy a radio receiver.
Penalties are also reportedly existing, for those caught listening
to foreign broadcasts. 206 The only information on the actual
penalty imposed is in the vicinity of Lida. On 1 July 1952 emergency
measures of the early postwar era were supposedly re-introduced.
Persons found listening; to the loreign radio programs were now liable
for punishment of 1 to 5 years imprisonment. 207/
c. Ukraine.
The Kievan newspaper, Pravda Ukrainu, announced on
29 August 1951 the obligatory registration of receivers in accordance
with Ukaze (law) No. 2078 of the Ministry of Communications. Failure
to do so would be treated in accordance with existing statutes. 208
d. Caucasus.
The usual regulations exist for listeners in the
Caucasus area. "Persons evading` the registration of radio receivers
shall be held criminally responsible in accordance with article 481
of 14 March 1945, Decree of the Council of People's Commissars
USSR." 209
e. Central Asia, Far East, and Siberia.
No special regulations other than the All-Union
regulations appear to be in effect in these areas. 210
f. Baltic Republics.
The subscription' fees in the Baltic area had to be
paid half a year in advance. 211/ Although there is apparently no
law governing foreign radio reception, a person caught listening to
foreign broadcasts is reportedly prosecuted as performing ar act
hostile to the regime. 212/ A person who fails to register his
radio will be subject to a fine 213/ in accordance with decision
No. 1593 of the Council of Peoples Commissars of 29 September 1939.
Furthermore, the transfer of wired radio speakers, their installations
and inclusion in a wired network; the taking down of radio wiring,
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
and the fitting of radio speakers, is prohibited to unauthorized
persons. 214
3. Reasons for Registration of Receivers.
Persons registering receivers are required to give the
full capabilities of the receiver. If the receiver contains high-
frequency bands, the authorities would then have a record of those
persons who could listen to such foreign broadcasts. Besides this,
the registration not only serves the purpose of collecting, an addi-
tional state tax but also could serve to facilitate the impounding
of all receivers in case of an unfavorable political development or
a war.
)j.. Official Attitude Toward Listening to Foreign Broadcasts,.
While receivers in the USSR have not been confiscated
on a mass scale as they were during World War II, some confiscation
oe special types, however, has been reported in. certain sections of
the country. 215/ Although listening to foreign broadcasts has not
been.officially prohibited throughout the Soviet Union, it is for-
bidden de facto. Listening to foreign broadcasts has been made
increasingly difficult by the Russians liberal interpretation of
the "Law for the Defense of Peace." In August 1952, for instance,
it was reported that 6 people in Liepaya (Latvia) were arrested and
charged with listening to foreign broadcasts. 216
Certain areas, such as Moldavia, Estonia, and other
peripheral areas maintain a more strict attitude toward listening to
foreign broadcasts. 217 On 1 January 1952 the Radio Committee of
the Moldavian Communist Party ordered Komsomol organizations in the
frontier regions to form "flying squads" to control local radio use.
These squads worked in shifts at night checking houses and kolkhozes
which might possess private receivers. both registered and unregistered
with the local communications center. These squads were escorted by
armed.agents of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) or militia. 213/
The following year in Lithuania and Kirghiz the Komsomol
radio clubs were subjected to more strict control. All radio clubs
in the Kliapeda Oblast received orders to submit to the military
authorities all data pertaining to the already operating or newly
purchased receivers. 219/
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
In addition, the local security organs in the Kaunas and
Vil'nyus areas (Lithuania) were ordered by the commanding officers
of the security police on 1 April 1952, to confiscate all receivers
operated on batteries. The local party secretaries were instructed
to check and report such receivers to the security police immed-
iately. 220/
In addition to these immediate measures, the local party
organizations were ordered in May 1951 to observe and to report all
known radio listeners in their respective areas, as well as all radio
mechanics, radio amateurs, and persons who knew foreign languages
and owned receivers. 221/ The .region apparently attempted, in such
a manner, to eliminate clandestine listening to foreign broadcasts.
Communist Party cells in local areas launched a vigorous
campaign warning people at every opportunity that legal proceedings
would be instituted against those who were caught listening to
foreign broadcasts. These warnings were issued by the Rayon Communist
Party Committees at collective farm meetings, factory party committee
meetings, etc. These party committees were also called "sekretye
Sotrudniki," better known as "Seksets" (secret police indicators).
To their normal functions was added the duty of discovering the
listeners to foreign broadcasts and reporting their naves to the
police. 222/
In the Minsk Oblast in Belorussia, early in 1952, it is
reported that every week, at special meetings of local party cells
in factories and kolkhozes, the question of listening to radio pro-
grams was discussed. At such meetings it was openly said that
listening to foreign broadcasts was forbidden, 223/ if not by law,
then certainly de facto.
At another meeting early in 1952 in the Minsk Oblast, an
engineer lecturing to a political-technical team of a combine said:
"The workers must be subdued to a military discipline---- /ffe7 who
listens to any enemy's propaganda, /and he7 who does not report to
the authorities those who are listening, is himself an American
spy." 221.x/
Tube receivers are under more strict surveillance than
crystal receivers or loudspeakers. During 1951 there were checked
intermittently by employees of the radio center. These employees
checked to see whether the serial numbers on the receiver corres-
-1014-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
ponded with the number in the central file, whether the receiver had
an indoor or outdoor antenna, and the length of the antenna. 225/
This was done presumably to find out if either the receiver or the
antenna had been altered to improve listening conditions.
5, Effectiveness of Listening Regulations.
In spite of continued warnings, threats, and punitive
measures by the Soviets, listening to foreign radiobroadcasts seem
to continue, when circumstances permit.
By and large, after the intensified attack on foreign
broadcasting in 1951 by Soviet press, radio, and jamming stations
the residents had little inclination to buy receivers in Soviet
owned stores. Given the opportunity to purchase a receiver unbeknown
to Soviet officials, such as from a departing German specialist,
the Soviet people expressed great desire in purchasing If the receiver
was capable of receiving high-frequency programs. 226
Some Russians insisted the receiver be capable of
receiving foreign broadcasts before they were interested in purchasing.
Still others who brought radios in to be fixed by German specialists
specifically told the specialists they would like to improve the high-
frequency reception because they wished to listen to foreign broad-
casts. 227
B. Conditions of Listening.
1. Controlled.
Listening in the USSR today differs considerably from.
that in the free world where individually owned receivers capable of
receiving a large number of transm.ittin stations predominate. In
the USSR a majority of the radio audience must depend on loudspeakers
wired into receiving relay stations. The wire-diffusion loudspeakers
are located not only in public areas and factories but also in pri-
vate dwellings. Some loudspeakers have no knobs and as a result are
on at all times. 2283 Others have only one knob which is the on-off
switch and controls only the volume. This speaker must also be left
on. 229 These loudspeakers are strictly controlled by a trusted
party member. The party is, therefore, in complete control over all
information which reaches the public through wire-diffusion systems.
In Moldavia, the propaganda and agitation instructor of the Party
- 105 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
provides ror the.-appointment of three members, local secretaries
of the Party in each club or canteen in the towns and villages,
who are responsible to the Party authorities for the proper use of
receivers in the various establishments. These three-man control
teams. must see to it that, apart from the Soviet programs broadcast
through.the relaying centers, no foreign broadcasts are allowed to
be heard. When there is' no program from the Soviet stations, the
receivers must be kept under ldck and key under the supervision of
one of the members of the Control Team. Furthermore this Control
Team has to submit every week a written report to the local Communist
Party Secretariat on its work in controlling the reception of the
radio programs. 230
The prevailing conditions of listening to internal
Russian broadcasts can best be described by looking at the ratio
of loudspeakers in the wire-diffusion system as compared to the
independent receivers. It is estimated that in 1953 in the USSR
there were 11,38 million loudspeakers, and 5.521 million independent
receivers* or 2 loudspeakers to each receiver.
2. Public.
Listening to internal Soviet broadcasts may be done in
a group or alone, in private or in public, over the wired loudspeakers
and/or privately owned receivers without any fear of molestation.
The Soviets have encouraged group listening through the installation
of group listening points in factories, kolkhozes, schools, recrea-
tional centers, squares and other public areas., using either loud-
speakers or independent broadcasting receivers. Listening to foreign.
broadcasts, however, presents an entirely different picture. Due
to the official and quasi-official measures exercised by the Soviet
officials, any listening to foreign broadcasts must be carried on
with axtreme caution. As a result, listening to Western foreign
broadcasts in public places is not practiced.
3. Private Listening.
Due to existing conditions, those who listen to Western
broadcasts must develop a certain degree of ingenuity to keep from
being detected. By various techniques the listeners can be assured
of not having to listen in a hurried or furtive manner. 231
S-E-C-R-E T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
According to available information, listening to.foreign
broadcasts by the Soviet populace is generally done on the sly and
32 Home listening, within the
while the individuals are alone. ?L2/'
strict family circle also seems to be a normal practice. Not knowing
who can be trusted-or who is sufficiently reliable, the families are
careful not to create suspicion among their neighbors.
Occasionally group listening is practiced. Even then
the groups are limited to eight or ten closely trusted friends who
exercise precautions and at times go beyond the regular precautions
by placing guards at the doors to warn if a stranger approaches. 234
Listening to foreign broadcasts in. secret groups, however,
is not the common practice. It is always risky to rely on the-dis-
cretion of many people and moreover regular group listening could
too easily attract the attention of informers or the MVD.
Those who do listen to Western broadcasts appear to do so
with regularity, daily or at least three times weekly, conditions
permitting. 235
C. Jamming.*
1. History.
The present era of Soviet jamming of broadcast trans-
missions can.be considered as having started with the jamming of
Russian-language programs from Madrid in 1946. From then until
February 1943 no deliberate jamming of either the VOA or the BBC
could be discerned. American broadcasts in Russian were first
jammed in the Far East USSR in March 1948 and in Western USSR in
April 1948. The Vatican broadcasts to the USSR were jammed
shortly afterwards, the. ?3BC relays of the VOA were. attacked from
25 July 1948. Following this, Russian bulletins from Athens,
Ottawa, Belgrade and other sources became targets for the jamming.
Beginning on 24 April 1949, a new period.of particularly intensive
jamming of VOL Russian-language frequencies began and was later
extended to cover BBC Rus-sian programs.
In May 1950, VOA broadcasts in Soviet Bloc languages ,
began to suffer, and in the fall of 1951 VOA broadcasts in Finnish
i~ This subsection prepared by OSI.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
were attacked by Russian Jammers. BBC bulletins in Rumanian,
Bulgarian, and Albanian were attacked in April 1952, and jamming
has since been extended to other transmissions. in Cominform lan-
guages from European and Middle East countries. 236
2. Jammer Locations.
The location of jammers has been determined for only a
small percentage of jamming transmitters. Most jammers transmit at
intervals on ttidenttt or code designator, which apparently is
associated with the particular stations. To date some 631 idents
have been recorded. 237 It is not known whether more than one
ident originates at a same station, but it seems possible that
jamming does occur from this number of different stations. (A
particular ident is often observed on several rrequencies simul-
taneously, indicating the use of more than one transmitter at
the station -- see section 6 below).
The USSR Radio Jamming Stations Map 7* shows the
approximate location of those idents which have been located by
monitoring observations.
The accuracy of the determination is different in
different cases but it is generally thought to be within 50 to
100 miles. Since it is known that nigh-frequency broadcast stations
and stations in the civil communications service are regularly
diverted to jamming operations whenever needed, the cities at which
such stations are located are also indicated. A certain number of
collateral reports of jammer locations have been received from
defectors. However, most of these are unconfirmed and the validity
of the information is unknown, particularly since the external
appearance of a jamming station is generally not different from any
other radio station. The locations thus reported are also indicated
on the map. Although the map cannot be used for pinpoint locations
and it probably shows only a small portion of the total, it serves
to give a general impression of-the distribution of jamming stations.
3, Frequency Coverage.
The Bloc jamming signals cover all portions of the radio
spectrum usually used for broadcast activities -- Low-Frequency
* See Map following p. 108.
- 108 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
SECRET
0 5 .0 6C 60
2 )C 80 90 i0 110 12C I30 140 1i0 'J2 160 - 165
3V
1Radiobr~Id~ting
U
Jamming
U
..
.
"' p
{'
e
?`
1
/ c~
~~ ~
,
f
"
K
f,
.
72.
j
o/
y
~.
..i
,,~
1,~
y
X i~ ~, ,~' l vim. ~ ?,A ~ ~\ ~ \~`1 ~~~ '
J' "l ~\.
,,
a T C
A.
5 ?\. \v
?\
r
;^L ` ,, ""
: / ~
4 ~
u'
~
aS
J
.`
_~r/
i{1 , Vl /
1? I Jl: rcrcri^Dj C p?~ c y`. Vi ~% i %H .a.S4 f i /t~ w \ \~.~~ +0
s.bn~0 rya .i' $
' >I fnnD
p
r l
fo r E J q
sqa?, * ?~yg~,~ avodak /~ i1 0 s ~~ ~~~b A % `
Li"
MINSK
KIEV
m 61
45
Blagovesh&eoek ~ $ S
OKHAR'KO
POL * f?
KAMAN
" 0
?
)
\
Z
/aa
~. C I .Mm M YAKUTSx
'~ y t`f
~'~ 04
\vSARATOY~
OSTOV
Kuybyshe
cn Ya 4oy,. / h ,(19VERDLOVSx ~? 5 ,~ ~`~ ~/~`?
Roman \\\\\\~,~,~~~~,,,,,,,llllll LJ
111 r~
DZAU
OMSK
TTFLIS
N / c t ? }KxnoNOYARSK KOMSOMOL'SK
NO~
VOSIBIRSK
45
n
~~
Cto Q~
xxAB ~eovsK
35
B u
I 7 r \ I `~~ 11.
yV
aRx x
hilov
. / ? ASAKltABAD 7 O VLADiVOSPOK
Main civil communications center N
~t
po~
ao
R 1 W~ ~~
%~,
avl~ ALMA-ATA
R
ammer
?TASHKENT ? ~_ ? Reported (unconfirmed) s \ ? High frequency broadcasting station 0
i
d f
b
l
ne
rom
Jammer
ocation o
ta
(Transmitters of high-frequency broadcasting monitoring observations P
stations and civil communications centers are
? y L ABAD regularly diverted to jamming operations) (Locations determined by monitoring are subject to a 25200
0
mile error, depending upon conditions of monitoring.)
js
`
NOTE4Thel um of 0 er tF6~smitter lo
grys not yet
o 200 aoo a00 e0o 000 rur~ ae much gi~eater than the nihmber shorn,
\ -d [ar - ~. sw u~. s.us, nod ,wn,r w? wd~d ew rc../ ~/
~ `.-_~
Statute Miles ( V\
~`,
\
~
,
Id.,,d .,.km5a, dm My roudon., de .x m..uMr + - ~r _ f
0 200 400 600 800 1000 `Z/' \ ,I + '
Kill
SECRET
~c 61 i3" ti5
13342 CA, 7-54 FOlAb3bl
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
(LF), Medium-Frequency (MF), and High-Frequency (HF). '-Signals have
been reported as low as 173 kc and as high as 21.7 me. 2L8/ Jamming
transmissions have been reported in the 455 to 470 kc frequency
band, which is the "intermediate frequency" used in most European
receivers. These jamming signals are apparently intended to "break
through" into a receiver regardless of its tuned frequency. 239
The signal frequency jammers appear to be divisible into
three groups: those operating on low- or medium-frequencies on the
target broadcasts, using ground-wave propagation to reach the target
areas, those operating on high-frequencies on the target broadcast,
using sky-wave propagation to reach the target areas, and those
operating on high-frequencies on the target broadcasts, but designed
to supplement sky-wave propagation by ground-wave coverage in the
larger towns and cities. 240
Most of the jamming signals intercepted have been in the
high-frequency portion of the spectrum where the Western broadcasting
is concentrated. All broadcast bands have been jammed, although the
higher ones (17 and 21 me) seem to be less intensely jammed, due
possibly to the fact that most Soviet high-frequency receivers are
not capable of receiving these frequencies. 21a
4. Jammer Power.
It is not possible to determine accurately the power of
a transmitter by observation of its signals received at a long dis-
tance. However, the jammers apparently have very wide variations
in power output, depending upon the frequency of operation and the
type of coverage intended--ground-wave or sky-wave. Tranbmitter
outputs are believed to range up to 200 kw on high-frequency and
up to 500 kw on medium-frequency and low-frequency. 2h2_/ During
severe ionospheric disturbances, it has been observed that a
number of jammers have been heard in the US when all other trans-
mitters, both jammers and communications stations faded out, which
indicates that the jammers heard were of very nigh power. 243 It
is possible that high-frequency jammers with powers of one kilowatt
or less are used for ground-wave coverage in densely populated centers.
Jammer Modulation.
From all indications the jammer transmitters are am-
plitude modulated, although in many oases the AM has rhythmic
--109-
S-E-C-R-E ;
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
variations of.frequency.
Many types of audio frequency signals are used for the
jammer modulation. Some jammers appear to combine two or more types
of modulation at times, and to apply one of.several types separately
at other times. More than a dozen descriptive terms have been
applied. to the various types of amplitude modulation which have been
used.
The band of audio freque es which make up the various
types of jamming modulation is usual between 40 cps*and 14000 cps,
with certain types limited to less than 3000 cps at the high end,
and certain others extending perhaps to 5000 cps or more. L4 Since
this frequency range includes the fruencies of normal speech, it
constitutes an efficient jamming signal.
6. Number of Jammers.
To count the number of jammers on a frequency in any
given period of time is very difficult. The stronger jammers tend
to mask the presence of weaker ones and a count is thus likely to be
an under-estimate.
Conversely, although there is no evidence of this, a
jammer heard on one frequency and time may be the same jammer using
a different ident on another frequency and time, and a count could
thus be an over-estimate. Recently, a world-wide "number count" was
made of jammers in simultaneous operation, and more than 900 jammers
were logged. 2L51 How many of these jammers are in the USSR and how
many are in the Satellites is not accurately known.
It is probable that, if necessary to meet an increased
broadcasting effort, the number of jammers could be increased by the
use of reserve transmitters, releasing communications transmitters
for, jamming by more efficient use of facilities and services, and
by diverting traffic to alternative media. Many lightly loaded ser-
vices which do not require the use of transmitters on a 214-hour
stand-by basis could be made available for jamming during part of
the day. The USSR has at various times diverted transmitters from
domestic program service to jamming, and has jammed even at the
cost of interfering with its own domestic programs. 2146
* Cycles per second.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R E-T
7. Jamming Procedures.
In the past it appeared that perhaps 70 percent of the
jammers operated at definite times and on definite frequencies with
little or no control exercised over them for instantaneous action,
while the remainder of the jammers followed ai flexible procedure,
being controlled quite effectively and rapidly to jam any new pro-
grams which appeared. 247 More recently it appears that the
majority of the jammers are in the latter category and are quite
flexible.
In order to cover each broadcast effectively, a number
of jammers are frequently used on each channel to be jammed. Often
two, three, or four jammers can be distinguished on a single channel,
and occasionally as many as nine or ten have been observed.
Many of the roving jammers are closely controlled from
monitoring stations so that immediate action can be taken to jam
any new programs, or programs which undergo unannounced frequency
changes.. Under some conditions the jamming follows the. broadcast
frequency changes as though the jammer and a monitoring receiver
were being operated by one. individual. L48/ I
8. Jamming Organization.
The organization responsible for the control of the jam-
ming has not been positively determined. However, responsibility
for-basic policy probably is assigned to the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD), 249/ with the Ministry of Communications generally
being responsible for the operation. 250/
The belief that jamming is controlled by the MVD is
further substantiated by the reported fact that the Department of
Counter-Intelligence (OKR) of the MVD is responsible for direction
of the jamming performed by the Soviet Army in East Germany for
the purpose of protecting itself from foreign broadcasts. The
jamming equipment is operated by a sub-unit of the Army signals
regiment. 251
It is known that the jamming organization is well in-
tegrated, with the USSR and the Satellites cooperating fully in the
jamming of western broadcasts to the USSR and the Satellites.
Apparently part of the organization is in rapid communication with
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1X6
a listening station or stations from which the jamming activity is
controlled, while other jammers receive their instructions either
in writing or by some form of communication that is subject to a
variable delay of several days' duration. 252 It is probable that
instructions pass between the principle control center, possibly
Moscow, and the provincial cities, and Satellite capitals.
The major portion of the rapid control communications is
assumed to be carried on by wire or micro-wave circuits. 253 There
is a report of a direct telephone linbetween MVD headquarters and
one of the larger jamming centers. 2547
A majority of the jammers use idents which are transmitted
in International Norse code. These idents are usually repeated
periodically, with intervals varying from 20 seconds to one minute
or more, 255/ with 58 second intervals most frequently observed. It
is believed at present that an ident is limited in use to a definite
geographical location and its main purpose seems to be to facilitate
a check of the performance of the jammers by the control net.
9. Jamming Effectiveness.
The effectiveness of the USSR jamming program varies
according to time of day and time of year, program, frequency, and
location, which makes it extremely difficult to determine effective-
ness except as observed in a specific location at a specific time.
However, in general, the following conclusions can be drawn: jamming
is systematic and regularly applied against Russian language programs
directed to the USSR, despite the fact that these programs have at
times been broadcast simultaneously on as many as 40 different fre-
quencies. Jamming in the urban areas is probably more effective
and thorough than in the rural areas, which may be due to the
dependence, in rural areas, on sky wave signals instead of on
ground wave signals. Evidence of this is contained in Embassy reports
for the period between 24 March and 23 April 1954. Out of a total of
568 observations of Russian language broadcasts monitored in Moscow
only 17 were intelligible.
25X1X6
A defector reports that reception of VOA broadcasts in Tbilisi was
almost always poor, but in an area from 60 to 100 km. outside
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1X6
Tbilisi, the reception of Russian language VOA broadcasts was quite
clear. 257 Another report states that in May 1953 it was almost
impossible to understand VOA in the vicinity of Riga because of heavy
jamming. 258 Reception in the Moscow area, of English language
broadcasts is not subject to intensive jamming as are Russian lan-
guage programa. For example, the VOA reception summary for the last
six months of 1953 indicates that of 11 reports from Moscow of
Russian language high-frequency programs, on only four occasions was
at least one frequency found to be intelligible. On the other hand,
during the same period, out of 14 reports from Moscow of English
language high-frequency programs, on six occasions at least one fre-
quency was intelligible. 259 This is verified in general by the
mentioned above. It is possible that broadcasts in
some Satellite languages can also be heard. For instance, it is
reported that prior to 1952 BBC broadcasts in Polish, Czech, and
Serb were not interfered with in Moscow. 260/
10. Atmospheric Conditions.
In addition to jamming other conditions adversely effect
radio reception.. Atmospheric conditions, both natural and manmade,
vary considerably throughout the USSR from day to day, and even from
hour to hour. In the large cities and industrial areas radio re-
ception will be poor because of noises and power shortages from the
use of dlectrical equipment. Similarly, natural atmospheric inter-
ference in the mountains, and the northern Taiga and Tundra Auroral
zones of the USSR always render themselves to adverse radio reception
conditions.
- 113 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
V. Effectiveness of Foreign Broadcasts.
A. Size of the Audience.
1. Direct Listening Audience.
There are no "hard!facts" available on the size of the
listening audience for Western: broadcasts. Most defectors decline
to make any estimate as to the :number of people who listen to such
broadcasts. 261
The effectiveness of Western broadcasts is mainly in-
ferred from fragmentary direct and indirect evidence. It is es-
timated that on 1 January 19,514 there were in the USSR approximately
5.5 million independent receivers. Of this number some 3.125
million* were tube receivers, of which 2.175 million* were believed
to have had high-frequency tuning capabilities. The remaining
receivers were of the crystal type, some of which, in the fringe
areas of the USSR could receive certain foreign broadcasts. At
least half a million of these tube receivers must be written off
because they are for group listening in places like trade unions,
factories, recreational areas and other public places, and relay
centers of wire-diffusion systems, where they are under control of
the authorities and therefore not available for listening to non
approved sources. 262 This leaves a range from 1.675 to 2.625
million receivers with high frequency tuning capability which are
capable of receiving some foreign broadcasts. Based on an estimated
population of'214 million persons,** this leaves a range of one
receiver for every 82 to 128 persons.
If the reports are true that "virtually everyone who
owns a radio" 263 listens -.o Western broadcasts, this would still
leave only a relatively small segment of the total audience potential
that would be capable of receiving the broadcasts directly by radio.
The largest portion of the potential audience is situated
These .quantities were determined on the assumption that 750,000
of the 1 million receivers in the USSR after World War II have high-
frequency tuning capability and are s till in use, and on the percen-
tage of such receivers to the total receivers produced in the USSR
since the War (see Section III).
:- Informatioli obtained from ORR/S/OM.
-114 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
in the European part of the USSR and in the peripheral areas. They
also appear to be concentrated in urban and industrial areas rather
than in rural areas. 26~.
2. Indirect Audience.
The size of the total audience should not be judged en-
tirely by the number of available receivers capable of receiving
Western broadcasts. Despite official sanctions to inhibit word-of-
mouth communications there is every evidence that there exists in
the Soviet Union an important unofficial oral communication system
which is inextricably interwoven into the controlled official
media. Even though refugees, returnees and defectors continually
state the dangers of talking with another person about foreign
broadcasts, they also say that rumors circulate very quickly. 265
The Intelligence Research division of the Human Resources Institute
made a study of some 2700 returnees, defectors, and refugees from
the USSR and found that unofficial word-of-mouth communication
provides a major news source for all strata of the Soviet popula-
tion. 266 Pertinent extracts from this study are shown in Table
18.
Percentages of Interviewees Citing Word-of-Mouth Media
as 'Regular and as Most Important Sources of Information
in the USSR 267
Percentage
for Total
Group Percentage by Occupational Group
Professional Employee Worker Peasant
A. Regular Source 50 53 44 48 62
B. Most Important
Source 33 32 22 22 69
a. Based on oral interviews.
- 115 -
'S -E-C -R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
More siginficant than the over-all importance of oral
dissemination is the question of group difference in the use of this
medium. According to the above study the better educated, or in-
telligentsia, reported receiving word-of-mouth communications more
frequently than did the-lower classes, but, in relation to other
sources, oral dissemination is relatively less important. For the
lower class, oral dissemination plays a relatively more important
role as a source of information.
Even though this study was not made for the purpose of
discovering a pattern for oral dissemination of foreign broadcasts,
the evidence at hand indicates no change in the basic pattern. 2683
B. Nature of the Audience.
On the basis of presently available information the Soviet
listening audience cannot be divided into the standard social cate-
gories by age, sex, class, occupation, etc. Ordinarily the official
differentiation of the population in the USSR along. the class lines
is distinguished by the intelligentsia, the working class, and the
peasantry. Actually, however, the limits on the accessibility of
these distinct groups makes it currently inadvisable to make such a
fine dividing line between the various classes. The most feasible
approach is to adopt a gross differentiation into two groups; the
ruling class and the intelligentsia on one hand and the peasants and
workers on the other.
Two other groups, the military and prisoners of war, do not
fall within the above categories and as a result are treated in-
dividually.
1. Military.
There are reportedly large numbers of radio sets in the
hands of armed forces personnel. 26g This military group appears
to enjoy the most freedom of listening to foreign broadcasts, es-
pecially radio operators and officers. 270 Even among these groups
the individuals exercise a degree of caution because there exists an
elaborate network of informers and bureaus in the Soviet Army for
disciplining their personnel who break the rules. 271/
Severe warnings were issued by certain. officials to those
caught listening to foreign broadcasts, but these same officials
- 116 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
seemed to exercise a greater degree of tolerance among military
personnel than comparable officials dealing with civilians. 272
2. Prisoner-ofWar and Labor Camps.
Direct listening by internees of labor camps presents a
relatively small problem since there are, very few receivers in these
camps and these, unknown to the officials, are used for clanaestine
listening. 273 Oral dissemination. plays an important role among
internees. News of happenings in the West is obtained through
civilian drivers of vehicles and administrative personnel having
authorized access to the prisoner compounds..274
3. Civilian Population.
Among the remaining Soviet population the independent
receivers capable of receiving Western broadcasts appear to-be con-
centrated largely in the hands of members of the intelligentsia and
the ruling class. This was especially true until receivers became
more abundant and less expensive in 1949. Until that time only
field officers, TEND, Party members, certain industrial key per-
sonalities, and a few people who were completely above suspicion,
could either afford or be entitled to buy receivers capable of
receiving foreign broadcasts. 275 Even Komsomol members were not
permitted to own receivers for fear they would become disloyal. 276
In 1949 the picture began to change. More receivers were available
although the better ones, capable of receiving foreign broadcasts,
were still too high-priced for the average individual to purchase.
2L7/ Even though independent receivers became more abundant, evi-
dence indicates they are not all capable of receiving foreign
broadcasts* and the better receivers remain concentrated in the hands
of the intelligentsia and the ruling class. 278
Further evidence indicates that at least some Communist
Party officials listen to foreign broadcasts, although to what degree
is not known. 279 It is known, however, that some strong pro-
Communist Party members do listen regularly to Western broadcasts
purportedly for. professional reasons. They reported it was one of
their party duties to be prepared to answer all questions at the
It is estimated that 33 percent of all independent receivers pro-
duced in the USSR since World War II are capable of receiving low-,
medium-, and high-frequency broadcasts. See Figure 5 following p.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
frequent group discussions in the party organizations. In order to
refute the "tmonstrous falsehopds" at these group discussions they
had to keep up with Western broadcast information. 280
In view of the fact that there is a large degree of
listening among military personnel who have at their finger-tips a
much more expensive receiver than is used by the general public,
and because it is known that the Russians do have a large number
of transmitting stations, it can be assumed that there are also
considerable numbers of receivers for commercial use. Therefore,
in addition to these persons who listen to Western programs by
means of broadcast receivers,' there are also those who listen oy
means of radio receiving facilities not intended for radiobroad-
cast reception. This portion of the population may be comparatively
small but it is composed of active adults who would normally be
interested in keeping abreast of world activities. These persons
are operators of stations other than radiobroadcast stations,
namely, those of maritime, amateur, point-to-point, police, meteor-
ology-cal, aviation, and railroad units. It is also known that most
of these units use high-frequency radio equipment with receivers
better and more capable of accurately receiving Western broadcasts.
If this is combined with the better skill of the radio operator
in avoiding jamming, it will be found that this audience could
represent an important group-of the total population with respect
to listening to foreign broadcasts.
C. Popular Stations, Languages, Times, and Frequencies for
iL stening.
1. Popular Stations and Languages.
The popularity of foreign broadcasts emanating from the
different Western countries varies in different sections of the USSR.
VOA and BBC appear to oe the preferred stations by the largest per-
centage of returnees, refugees, and, defectors. 281/
Sufficient information is not available to rate other
foreign broadcasts according to a descending line of popularity.
Other broadcasts reported to have been received include: Radio
Madrid, 282/ Radio Free Russia, Radio Liberation, 283 Vatican
Radio, 2 Iranian programs, 295 Yugoslav and talian. broad-
casts, 2 and Sidney, Australia. 287
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
The most popular language for listening is the Great
Russian language in which all the above stations broadcast.
Those listening for foreign broadcasts attempt to locate
programs being broadcast in their own native language. 288 Thus
the Baltic people usually listen to VOA and 13BC not only in the
Russian language but they also seek to locate the programs being
broadcast in their own language, which is more understandable to
them. 289 Evidence also indicates that Lithuanians listened to
Lithuanian language programs being broadcast from Radio Rome and the
Vatican Radio. 290
The German language was also popular among the listeners..
This language was not only understood among the German people living
in the various regions but was also understood by many Russians who
had a limited amount of German language in their early education. 291/
Thus German language programs listened to include Radio Ankara, 297
"Southwest" and Nord ;Test Deutscher Rundfund (1 ti'0R) 293/ and RIAS. 294
Still other languages listened to include English from
Switzerland, Italian, Spanish, 295/ Iranian, and Turkish. 296/
The reasons for the popularity of the stations vary from
individual to individual depending upon such things as the person's
likes or dislikes, education, background, and language, and .torn
one section of the USSR to the other depending upon the strength of
the station, effectiveness of jamming, and language preference.
Over-all, however, as stated above, VOA and BBC are
rated the most popular stations.* The main reasons for VOA's popu-
larity, at least among refugees and defectors, are: it is usually
considered as having the best international news service; it takes
a stronger line against the Soviet regime and its leaders 297/; the
Russians feel more deeply toward the Americans than toward the
British; they look upon America as the nucleus and moving force in
the world outside the Iron Curtain. 298
3BC's popularity came from the hi hly educated respon-
dents, whose tendency was to prefer 1350 news because of its
3*Lack of sufficient information did not permit a choice to be
made between the two. According to State, IBS/E, VOA Evaluation
Reports, VOA was referred to more often in the press and radio.
S-E-C-R-E T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
objective and reasoned quality and excellence of political com-
mentary. 299 Other refugees prefer BBC because it is broadcast at
a more suitable time in relation to their working hours and was.
not jammed as heavily as the VOA programs. 300
2. Best Listening Times.
Ideally the most convenient time for listening would be
early in the evenings. and mornings, in order to conform to the
working hours of the Russians. Most Western broadcasts, however,
are severely jammed particularly during these periods. Because of
the severe jamming it is relatively fruitless to listen for foreign
broadcasts from 1800 to 2400 hours local time, unless one has a
relatively sensitive receiver or lives outside the urban and indus-
trial centers. Ill/ Even though these hours are more suitable to
the individuals concerned, those who listened to foreign broadcasts
regularly, without interference, usually listened for short periods
between the hours of 2400-0600 depending on the local conditions. 302
This is not to say'that all listening is carried on during
these hours. It is sometimes possible on some frequencies to hear
fairly well at the edge of the frequency, so those who choose to
listen at other times do so in this manner, 303 although none too
successfully.
.3. Popular Frequencies.
The most popular frequency for listening varies with the
time of day. During the day the 10.3 me and 9.7 me are most
popular. In the evenings the reception is best on 15 mc, 12 mc,
and 7330 kc. 304 Radio Madrid is received best on 7500 kc and
Yugoslav broadcasts are heard on 1200-1225 kc.
More important than the popular stations, times and fre-
quencies for listening, from the standpoint of this study, is the
reaction to foreign broadcasts by both the individuals and the regime
on an international and national scale.
D. Reactions to Western Broadcasts.
1. Official.
a. International.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Moscow apparently hoped in 1946 to dominate inter-
national broadcasting by making the Soviet-controlled International
Radio Broadcasting Organization (OIR) the recognized radio frequency
agency for controlling international broadcasting. In 1947, however,
the OIR was reduced to the status of a regional European radio
agency. From its control center in Prague, OIR observes the imple-
mentation of the Copenhagen Plan allocating medium and high frequen-
cies to Europe. Both the QIR and the European Broadcasting Union
(EBU), which replaced OIR as regional radio representative for
Western Europe, inform the interested governments of variations from
the Copenhagen Plan.
The USSR has also obstructed an agreement on new
frequency allocations tc the West and has refused to cooperate with
the efforts of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to
put into operation the frequency allocation system agreed upon at
the Atlantic City Telecommunications Conference in 1947. Instead,
the USSR insists on keeping the inordinate number of .frequencies
reserved under the 1938 Cairo Convention 306 and can claim inter-
ference with its broadcasts.
CIR has consequently accused the US, UK, and France
of being guilty of using 123 transmitters on 78 channels in violation
of the Copenhagen Plan. 307
b. National.
Du.e to the violent attacks by Soviet press and radio,
virtually everyone in the USSR knows. about Western broadcasts. In
an effort to combat these broadcasts the Russians launched an inten-
sive radiofication plan, making available at a much lower cost
loudspeakers wired to a central diffusion system and radios suitable
for receiving local stations only,. and increased their jamming efforts.
Both of these tactics are discussed elsewhere in this report.
Western broadcasting was under particularly heavy
attack in 1950 by Soviet radio commentator Lapin who devoted a series
of talks to this subject, wrote an article in Izvestia and summarized
his charges against VOA on Soviet Radio Day, 7 May 1950. In the
7 May 1950 issue of the Soviet monthly magazine Radio, the official
organ of the Radio Information Committee, Western broadcasts were
attacked. Another article in the June 1950 issue was devoted to "The
Radio of the War Instigators"; it accused VOA and other Western broad-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
casts of using spies and traitors, and an accompanying cartoon
ridiculed these "guest speakers" of VOL
In June of the same year, the Soviet Weekly, New
Times revived a controversy with VOA over the living standards in
the US and the USSR. This article accused VOA of distorting facts
and "impudent and unscrupulous" lying.
Any reference to Western broadcasts in Pravda and
Izvestia editorials or Tass bulletins gets the widest distribution
in the provincial press and regional stations. An example is a
dispatch by Pravda's New York correspondents which was broadcast by
Radio Moscow 2 times in 15 languages on Soviet Radio Day, 7 May
1951. 308/
Similarly, an article, "Voice of America" by
Doris Efimov, in Krokodil of 30 October 1951, said that voices
calling for peace would eventually drown out VOA.
Still another article in Izvestia, 26 October 1951,
"The Ideological Expansion of American Imperialists" by 13. Vronskiy
depicts foreign broadcasts as the hope and support of Western im-
perialists.
The foregoing are typical examples of Soviet media
depicting foreign broadcasts as the voice, mouthpiece, megaphone,
bugle and trumpet of monopolies, capitalists, and Wall Street --
controlled by business men and capitalists, and not the true voice
of the people.
Beginning February and March 1953 (immediately pre-
ceding and shortly after the death of Stalin) there was an obvious
change in Soviet reactions to foreign broadcasts. The Soviet press
exercised unusual restraint in mentioning foreign broadcasts in that
there was a virtual absence of any reference to foreign broadcasts
in press as well as in radio sources. Apparently Moscow was trying
new ways of fighting the foreign broadcast infiltration. It is
possible that ?W?oscow decided the more vigorously they renounced
foreign broadcasts the more curiosity it would arouse in their
populace and in turn give the Soviet people a greater desire for
listening. Although the Soviets limited the open attacks on
foreign broadcasts, they carried on the fight indirectly in the
context of slogans coined at the party congress which call for
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
greater alertness to dangers of "foreign views, ideas, and sentiments."
309
In January 1954, there began to be more stern calls
for greater vigilence in every branch of Comrnu.nist construction.
Articles beamed to ships at sea and echoed at home service broadcasts
warned that "intelligence services of imperialist states are fever-
ishly looking for all sorts of degenerate people" 310/ for their
subversive aims. Apparently the Soviets have again reversed their
tactics in fighting the effects of foreign broadcasts.
2. Individual.
a. Reasons for Listening.
Curiosity seems to be the most important motive for
listening to foreign broadcasts; curiosity about the liCe in America,
about how ordinary Western people really live and how the Western
standards compare with their own standards of living. 311/ Many of
the listeners indicated they did .not believe in the truthfulness of
the Soviet news sources and as a result they sought to listen in order
to check the validity of their own news sources. 312 Still others
indicated that the constant Soviet propaganda against the 1-TS pro-
duced a fear that war was imminent and they were curious to listen
and discover if there were any indications to confirm these fears.
313
b. Programs Listened For.
In view of the reasons for listening, news programs
stood in first place as the type of program listened for. Nearly
every person interviewed who listened to foreign broadcasts indicated
news as the main program for which he listened -- news of all types.
The Russians are only moderately interested in news of conferences,
314 or on the straight reporting of conditions in the USSR. 315/
A type of relatively low interest content was news pertaining to
free world events which were of no consequence to the listener. 316/
The more important news consisted of that which
was obviously pertinent to the East-West conflict, particularly
the US position, 317/ replies from Western politicians to the
accusations raised by Soviet diplomats, 318 the western point of
view on the possibility of a new world war, 319 information on
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
world events that could affect the USSR, )LO/ and news relating to
or affecting neighboring countries or areas. 321
After straight news programs the next in importance
was other information about the West, 322/ the attitude of the West
toward the USSR, 323 truth on the real strength of foreign
Communist, movements, 32l/ and the strength and activities of the
West. 3257
In the peripheral areas, especially in the 3altics,
the occupants not only watched for the above but also sought further
indications of opposition to Communism, changes in the Soviet
government which might not otherwise receive publicity, 326 and
encouragements which give them hope and indicate that they are not
forgotten. 327,/
Music and entertainment programs were of insig-
nificant value to most people, 323/ or were not of sufficient con-
sequence to risk detection of listening.
The above information pertains to all strata of the
Soviet population. Evidence indicates, however, that the better
educated groups usually listen to the programs more objectively to
discover if the US interests are founded on purely selfish motives.
329 It has also been indicated that the "Bourgeoisie," meaning
the beneficiaries of the regime among the Russian civilian population,
were more interested in entertainment programs than foreign politi-
cal information. 330
c. Opinions of Foreign Broadcasts.
Some of the more strongly pro-Communist, while in
the presence of fellow party members, declare the information of
foreign broadcasts to be absolutely unworthy and "monstrous false-
hoods." 331/ In general, however., the programs impressed the listen-
ing audience favorably. From the many remarks made by refugees and
defectors, it was indicated that the broadcasts could become more
effective if more time and space were devoted to programs with the
following characteristics:
(1) Truth about the Communist movement and its aim:
(2) Programs carefully checked so as not to include
outdated expressions,
-124 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S -E-C-R-E-T
(3) Particular emphasis on the failure of Communist
diplomacy or propaganda;
(}a.) Tnformation about parliamentary and democratic
institutions in the '4estern meaning of the word, and a comparison with
the Communist system
(5) Exposure of Communist methods of dealing.
(6) Selection of topics to coincide closer with those
on which Soviet propaganda concentrates at the given time.
(7) More programs about the fate of escapees, such
as discussions of their well being, how they were received, their,
adjustment and settlement;
(8) Aid and advice to Soviet listeners in combatting
the pressure of Soviet ideology and propaganda;
(9) Use of facts and figures to refute the claims
ana tenets of the Marxist doctrine in particular and Soviet propaganda
in general;
(10) Absence of demogoguery or blatant propaganda in
attempting to win over the audience;
(11) Statements which are demonstrated slowly and
persistently with facts, figures, and eye-witness accounts
(12) More differentiation between th3 Soviet people
and the Soviet state, with no blame on the people for the excesses
of the regime
(13) Subjects not limited to political conditions in
the USSR. All aspects of the Soviet society and the Soviet system
should be under attack--
(14) The programs should attempt to give the people
new ideas which would raise them out of their state of apathy and
indifference caused by work and continual pressure from the regime.
At the same time, this must all be exercised with great
skill and care because the people are touchy on any item that could
possibly be construed as indicative of lacking appreciation of Russia.
The commentaries, therefore, should not be too sharp or anti-.Russian
in form, and allowances should be made so as not to create a feeling
among the Russians that Western transmitters are adopting exactly the
same method as the Communist propaganda.
E. Economic Effects of Foreign Broadcasts.
There is no real way of measuring the economic effects of
foreign broadcasting. The effects that can be judged have to be
gained through inference. Since many defectors from the USSR
- 125 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
indicated that listening to foreign broadcasts gave them the courage
to defect, it can be assumed that, even though the effectiveness
cannot be measured, the broadcasts do provoke some thought and dis-
cussion. among the Soviet populace. Encouragement from the outside
world and dissatisfaction with the present working conditions could
create unrest among the Soviet populace. Such unrest, if instituted,
would probably adversely affect labor's propensity to produce in
quantity and quality and might even incite acts of industrial sub-
version.
It is increasingly evident that the Soviet. regime is becoming
more concerned over the effectiveness of foreign broadcasts. It is
reported that the Russians are busily organizing courses for students
to familiarize themselves with the technicues of foreign broadcasts
and ways of counteracting them. 33
In the Caucasus the local party in the rayon districts re-
portedly set up special "radio discussion circles" in order to combat
foreign broadcasts. 333/
Monetarily, the broadcasts serve as a continual drain on the
Soviet economy. It is estimated that the Soviet jamming network
employs roughly 10,000 technicians and costs approximately five times
more than the total costs of US broadcasts to the whole Orbit. 33L/
It is believed that the foreign broadcasts have been one of
the prime factors for causing the Russians to intensify their radio-
fication programs.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R E-T
VI. Trends.
Following World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR was
in a state of political, social, and economic chaos and was faced
with many problems requiring important decisions r?lative to control,
development, and growth. These problems and decisions, which dif-
fered greatly from the norm, placed restrictions on the development
of radiobroadcasting. Nevertheless the efforts made to overcome
deficiencies in material, industry, and technical personnel resulted
in greater quantities of resources available for diversion from the
basic economic and military needs to the development of a broadcasting
system.
It is estimated that in 19141, prior to Korld War II, the Russians
had 100 broadcasting transmitters with a total power output of 14000
kilowatts. Almost 1/3 of the transmitters and 1/2 of the-power out-
put were lost as a result of the war. By late 1947, however, the
growth in terms of numbers of stations and total power output had
again reached the prewar level of physical facilities. The rate of
growth in numbers of broadcasting transmitters in the USSR remained
relatively constant until 1950. From 1950-53, the number of trans-
mitters increased only slightly, indicating stabilization to a great
extent. The total power output, however, continued to increase at
a constant rate.
Since 19147 the trend seems to be toward the improvement of
technical quality and efficiency in the domestic service and toward
coordination of important stations of the Satellite-countries into
the Soviet international broadcasting system with a view toward
improvement of reception of Soviet progran both in the USSR and in
the international target areas without a correspondingly great ex-
pansion of the transmitter power base. It is believed that this
trend will continue.
With the subordination of the broadcasting system under the
Ministry of Culture in 1953, it appears that the USSR is attempting
to centralize all propaganda-information functions under a single
responsibility and thus achieve the dual function of relieving the
Council of Ministers of direct administrative responsibility and
facilitating the dissemination of the current "party line" uniformly
through all media. This further.strengthens the supervisory ability
of the Communist Party over the "education and enlightenment of the
masses." At the same time the move maintains the Ministry of
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Communications in a relationship to broadcasting which is of a
strictly service nature, to provide technical facilities, advice,
and maintenance assistance to the Ministry of Culture.
The progress made in the development, quality, and use of tele-
vision in the USSR appears still to be in the developmental stage.
Technical and economic problems of expansion, including transmitters
and receivers, will probably occupy the main attention of those
responsible for television in the USSR for some time to come.
While two radiobroadcastirig stations in the USSR have been using
Frequency Modulation in the UHF band for a number of years it seems
likely that the economic factor of the competition of radiofication
and the further development of TV, which probably have higher
priority than a new aural broadcasting system, may delay FM develop-
ment for some time to come.
The reception base of the USSR is being extended from the urban
areas to cover the rural areas. Independent tube receivers, crystal
receivers., and wire-diffusion systems are being employed as approp-
riate to a given circumstance. The use of small independent tube
receivers is increasing. The over-all proportion of wire-diffusion
loudspeakers to independent receivers is decreasing somewhat, not-
withstanding the current drive to radiofy the countryside by use of
wire-diffusion systems. From 1951 to 1954 the annual estimated pro-
duction of the better classes of receivers, those having low-,
medium-, and high-frequency reception capabilities, has increased
from approximately 11 percent per year to 33 percent per year. The
estimated annual production of loudspeakers during the postwar
years (1946-54), with some slight fluctuations, has remained quite
constant -- at one million loudspeakers.
The Soviets exercise strict control over all types of communi-
cations media in the hands of its citizens. In carrying out its
policy of preventing the populace from acquiring information which
might be construed as contrary to the propaganda line, considerable
time, money, and effort is expended to keep foreign. radiobroadcasting
from the; people. Legal restrictions affecting the ownership of
receivers relate only to the compulsory registration of them and to
the payment of a subscription fee which entitles one to listen on
them. Specific laws which prohibit listening to foreign radio
programs apparently do not exist. In 1951, however, a decree was
promulgated, "Law for the Defense of Peace" which prohibits oral
- 128 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
dissemination of information heard over such programs. This law is
subject to wide interpretation and persons guilty of it are to be
arraigned and tried as major war criminals. Information is not
available to indicate a trend either in the number or severity of
such laws, restrictions, or any consistent effort to enforce them.
As regards the conditions of listening, the general trend appears
to continue toward an increase in the measures taken by authorities.
to build up a "captive" audience which will be forced to listen to
the Communist programs. This, combined with the increase in jamming
facilities and techniques, especially in urban and industrial areas,,
indicates a decreasing reception potential for foreign broadcasts.
Nevertheless, the severe attacks by the Soviet press and radio
on foreign broadcasts indicate that the regime is becoming more con-
cerned over the effectiveness of such. broadcasts as may get through.
From these attacks and through word-of-mouth dissemination of in-
formation, an important medium of communication in the USSR, a very
large proportion of the Soviet population at least becomes aware
that foreign broadcasts to-the USSR are being made. This awareness
should tend to increase the size of the audience as more persons
learn of the validity of foreign broadcasts.
With the lowering of prices and increases in supply, tube re-
ceivers have recently become available, economically, to those of
the political and industrial hierarchy downward to the professional
level of scientists, teachers, engineers, and army officers and to
plant and enterprise officials of the upper and middle levels of
this "classless society."
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO00700040008-0
wl
Is S
H CO
O O
O, ,O
ON ON
L1L 1-r,
O UN 0
10 0
,0 10 ~ S 00 C
00 10 '0~ 00 ro, 10
,a ,,D 0
,o
-I r-I M r I
rO ~
cli
N- tr\ N Imo
- rr~
O p
I
1
f\ O
~z O 8IsN ti
N N H H
r- N-N
? 8~ M 8~
N O O O O O O Q O\ O Off, ff, Off, icy 1\
Off, ~Oi rn 10 b HOC, 101 V\ 0 a, n Lr\ ~' a, 01
rn o as O\ O, O, O,
02 O (\ 00 00
O
r- r-I H H rH
H -I Hi
co
H 00 00 0 = p-\I- a~D ON a7 N-
rH'I rl rHi rH-I rH-I rH-I rH-I
H
N 00
H N H N H m a,
N
HH H HH S Hg
O LP Lt~t\ UI% 00 t(\ O u\ O tin in
1-1
r- r\ H
NH H MN Ci m
rQH
H H Hri H H
0
H H
O\
IA V~
r- OS O
N-~
r- tiN
H H H
OM 0 ,O
cc D r
r-
H 1 r-I
I
e a w o
c5
43
a z a
0
43
A
N H
N N
4~ N
C
V) C%3
N A
N N
fa W
W
b O
N 0
to H
+-
b
N H
U 4
N N
0
O FO
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO00700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX B
SCHEDULE OF VO.A BROADCASTS TO THE USSR /', 33-6
Time Transmitting
GMT Program Content Location Frequencies (kc)
0130- Daily: News - Political USA 11890, 11790, 9650,
0200 9545, 6170, 6060,
60140
0315- (This is a repeat of the USA 11790, 9650, 95445,
03145 0130-0200 GMT program) 6170, 6155, 6060,
6040
Tangier (Relay) 11940, 11830, 9665,
9635, 96151- 7250,
7115, 7160, 6140,
6080
1415- Daily: News - Political USA 17830, 17795, 17760,
1445 or News Oommentary 15330, 15270, 15250,
15200, 15130
BBC (Relay) 15230, 15210, 11860,
11770, 9675
Munich (Relay) 15410, 11830, 9540,
7115, 6140, 6080,
Salonica (Relay) 11845, 11735, 9530,
7265
Tangier (Relay) 17770, 15440, 153145,
15295; 15240o 119140,
11760, 9635, 9500
US Coast Guard 11805, 9685
Cutter "Courier"
(Relay)
Footnotes t.o Appendix B follow on p. 137.
- 133
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Time Transmitting
GMT Program Content Location
Leopoldville
(Relay)
1645- Round-up of International Munich
1715 News; News & Comments;
Inside. Russia .& Other BBC (Relay)
Areas Behind Curtain;
Interviews with Escapees; Munich (Relay)
Quick Rebuttals of Soviet
Line as Monitored on In-
ternal Russian Broadcasts Tangier (Relay)
and Press.
1800- Daily: News - Political USA
1830 or News Commentary
BBC (Relay)
Munich (Relay)
Tangier (Relay)
2115- Daily: News - Political USA
2145 or News Commentary
BBC (Relay)
Munich (Relay)
Frequencies (kc)
15160
11700, 9700
15410, 9540, 6185,
6140, 3980, 173
15295, 9635
15330, 15200, 11900,
11830, 9615
11750, 9690
15410, 6185, 6140,
3980, 173
15440, 15295, 11760,
9555
15270, 15250, 15165,
11890, 11870, 11790,
11710, 9700, 9650,
15330, 11900, 11830,
9615, 9520
9690, 9660, 7250,
7110, 5990
9540, 711-5, 6185,
6140, 6080, 3980,
173
Salonica (Relay) 7265, 7215, 6040,
5960
- 134 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C R-E-T
Time
Transmitting
GMT
Program Content
Location
Frequencies (kc)
Tangier (Relay)
15345, 11940, 11770,
9635, 7160
US Coast Guard
7200, 6015, 1260
Cutter ".Courier"
(Relay)
Leopoldville
9210
(Relay)
0015
Repeat of 2115-2145
Tangier
7115
0045
program
0045-
Repeat of 2115-2145
Tangier
7115
0115
program
0115-
Repeat of 2115-2145
US Coast Guard
7200, 6015, 1260
0145
Cutter "Courier"
0115-
Repeat of 1645-1715
Tangier
11940,
9635, 9615,
0145
program
7235,
7160, 7115,
6140,
6080
Repeat of 1645-1715
Armed.Forces Net
548
program
Repeat of 1645-1715
(Munich)
Armed Forces Net
1108
0145-
program
Repeat of 2115-2145
(Stuttgart)
Tangier
7115
0215
program
0215-
Repeat of 2115-2145
Tangier
7115
0245
program
0245-
Repeat of 2115-2145
Tangier
7115
0315
program
0345-
Repeat of 0130-0200
Tangier
7115
0415
program
135
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Time
transmitting
GMT
Program Content
Location
Frequencies (kc)
0415-
Repeat of 0130-0200
Tangier
7115
0445
program
0445-
Repeat of 01.30-0200
Tangier
7115
0515
program
0515-
Repeat of 0130-0200
Tangier
7115
0545
program
0600-
Repeat of 0130-0200
Tangier
15130, 11830,
9635,
0630
program
7250, 6080
1230-
Repeat of 1645-1715
Munich
15410, 11890,
11830,
1300
program
9540, 7115, 61
40,
6o8Q, 173
1230-
Repeat of 0130-0200
Tangier
17770, 15440,
15345,
1300
program '
15295, 15130,
11940,
11760, 9635, 9
500
1300-
Repeat of 0130-0200
Munich
15410, 11830
1330
program
1330-
Repeat of Q130-0200
Munich
15410, 11830
1400
program
Tangier
17770) 1544Q,
15345,
15295, 15130,
11940,
11760, 9635, 9
500
1445
-Repeat of 1645-1715
Munich
0
11830
1541
173
1500 b/ program
,
.
,
1500-
Repeat of 1415-1445
Ituni ch
173
1530
program
1530-
Repeat of 1645-1715
Munich
173
1545 . program
1545-
Repeat of 1415-1445
Munich
173
1615
program
- 136
Approved For Release 1999/09/p2 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
Time
GMT Program Content
1615- Repeat of 1415-1445
1645 program
1715- Repeat of 1415-1445
1745
1830- Repeat of 1645-1715
1845 J program
1900- Repeat of
1930
1800-1830
1930- Repeat of 1800-1830
2000 program
2000- Repeat of
2030 program
2030- Repeat of
20145 b program
2115- Repeat of
2215 program
Repeat of
program
2245- Repeat of
2315 program
2315- Repeat of
2345 program
1800-1830
16145-1715
1645-1715
16145-1715
21.5-2145
2115-2145
23145- Repeat of 2115-21145
2415 program
S-E-C-R-E-T
Transmitting
Location
Munich
Munich
Munich
Munich
Munich
Munich
Munich
Munich
Tangier
Tangier
Tangier
Tangier
Frequencies (kc)
15410
15410
173
15410, 6185
15h1D, 6185
6185
61.85
9540,-7115, 6185,
173, 1195
15345, 11940, 9500,
7100
7115
7115
7115
a. VOA schedules and frequency assignments are subject to change
from day to day and season to season,
b. .15-minute element.
- 137 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX C
USSR RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMISSION DATA a/* 337
anuary
Low Frequency -. Medium. Frequency - High Frequency
.E Footnotes to Appendix C follow on p. 153.
See special notes at end of tabulation.
Call
Power - kw
Frequency - kc
Symbol**
Abakan, RSFSR
Rv68
2.5
617
A
Alma Ata, Kazakh
RV90
10
. 1,32
RWJ
5
5310
15
5860 .
15
5900
15
6220
15
9250
15
9340
15
9380
15
9451
15
15000
Arkhangelsk, RSFSR
RV36
10
356
Ashkhabad", Turkmen
RV19
10
380
15
6179
15
9600
15 ..
9680
15
11839
Astrakhan, RSFSR
RV35
10
791
Baku, Azerbadzhan
RV8
35
218
2
4958
2
6195
2
9340
Birobidzhan, RSFSR
RV22
2
710
V
Blagoveshchensk
RV1.22
5
227
1
4956
Bukhara, Uzbek
6072
Cheboksary, RSFSR
RV74
5
319
Chelyabinsk, RSFSR
RV72
10
737
Chernovtsy, Ukraine
674
-139-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Power
Frequency
Symbol
Chimkent, Kazakh
RVL
1
4310
Chita, RSFSR
RV52
20
164
Chkalov, RSFSR
RV45
10
300
Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine
RV30
20
1070
Dzaudzhkau, RSFSR
RV64
10
592
RV64
10
881
Dzhambul.
5310
Frunze, Kirgiz
RV6
2.5
611
1.
4049
1
5060
Gorkiy, RSFSR
RV42
10
620
'Gorno Aitaysk, RSFSR
RV83
1
308
Groznyy, RSFSR
RV23
1
656
Guryev, Kazakh
1
5150
Ioshkar Ola, RSFSR
RV61
10
845
Irkutsk, RSFSR
RV14
20
200
Ivan, I .SFSR
1
4997
RV31
10
926
Izhevsk, RSFSR
RV78
4
584
Kaliningrad, RSFSR
RV129
20
1142
Karaganda, Kazakh
RV46
20
728
Kaunas, Lithuania
100
827
100
1385
9685
15430
RV17
10
254
10
566
Khabarovsk, RSFSR
RV69
50
200
Rv54
50
340
RV69
629
10
760
20
4273
4581
20
5940
20
6019
20
6149
20
8820
20
9378
20
9669
20
11800
20
15180
- 140 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Call
Power
Frequency
Symbol
Kharkov, Ukraine
RV4
100
385
100
.647
A
Kiev, Ukraine
RV87
150
209
RV9
100
782
D
RV9
100
1169
id
40
6020
40
7290
40
9271
40
9593
40
9670
40
9804
40
11720
40
11785
Kishinev, Moldavia
Rv95
100
998
Klaypeda, Lithuania
Komsoiaol'sk, RSFSR
See Kaunas
180.
656
RV39
791
881
50 ?
5965
50
6055
50
6115 A
50
7280
50
9530
50
9565
50
9660
50
9725
.50
11710
50
11750
50
15230
Krasnodar,.RSFSR
RV33
20
611
Krasnoyarsk, RSFSR
RV128
50
218
5910
Kuybyshev, RSFSR
RV16
10
809
Leningrad, RSFSR
RV53
100
263
RV70
10
800
10
1124
7340
9600
9750
11630
- 141 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Call
Power
Frequency
Symbol
Leningrad, RSFSR
11885
A
15055
A
Lutsk, Ukraine
50
414
U
Lvov, Ukraine
RV149
50
935
Madona, Latvia
RV126
20
1349
Magadan, RSFSR
3970
A
4160
A
4679
5830
6967
11690
Makhachkala, RSFSR
RV27
4
313
RV137
10
912
Minsk, 3elorussia
RV10
150
291
50
lh00
V
Mogilev, Belorussia
10
1106
Molotov, RSFSR
Moscow, RSFSR
RV2
100
54,95
155
RV1
500
173
RV71
150
200
100
236
100
548
RV86
150
872
15
4380
50
15
4465
50
15
4550
50
20
4634
15
4675
50
15
4890
50
15
5065
50
10
5080
20
15
5175
50
- 142 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location Call Power Frequency Symbol
Moscow,. RSFSR 10 5260
20
10 5380
2.0
15 5780
15 5912
50
10 5922
20
15 5930
50
15 5940
50
15 5957
50
15 5965
50
15 5970
50
15 5980
50
15 5990
50
15 6000
50
15 6010
50
15 6030
5o
15 6035
50
15 6040
50
20 6046
15 6060
50
15 6070
50.
15 6090
50
- 143 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Call' Power Frequency i Symbol
15
6100
50
15
6115
50
15
6120
50
15
6130
50
15
6137
50.
15
6145
50
15
6150
50
15
6160
50
15
6170
50 .
15
6185
50
15
6195
50
15
6200
50
15
6210
50
15
6405
50
15
6540
50
3
6660
15
6700
50 15
7100
.50
15
7115
50
15
7155
50
15
7165
50
- 1414 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location Call Power Frequency
Moscow, RSFSR 15 7177
50
15 7180
50
15 7190
50 15 7200
50
15 7210
50
15 7215
50
15 7225
50
15 7235
50
100 7.215
.15 7255
50
15 7260
50
15 7265
50
15 7272
50
15 7280
50
100 7295
15 7300
50
15 7310
50
i5 7320
50
10 7330
20
15 734.0
50
15 7360
50
11.5 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Symbol
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C--R-E-T
Location Call Power Frequency Symbol
Moscow, RSFSR 15 7370
50
15 7375
50
15 7400
50
15 7420
50
20 7790
10 8345
20
10 8644
20
10 8760
20
10 8910
20
15 8915
50
10 9145
20
15 9230
50
15 9390
50
15 9430
50
15 9450
50
15 9470
50
15 9480
5o
15 9490
50
15 9515
50
15 9530
50
15 9540
50
- 146 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Moscow, RSFSR.
Call Power Frequency Symbol
15 9545
50
9550
50
15 9555
50
15 9565
50
15 9610
50
15 9620
50
15 9625
50
15 9640
50
15 9650
50
15 9655
50
15 9660
50
15 9675
50
15 9680
50
15 9690
50
15 9700
50
15 9710
50
15 9720
50
15 9740
50
15 9750
50
15 9765
50
- 147 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location Call Power Frequency Symbol
Moscow, T.SFSR 15 9770
5o
15 9780
50
15 9790
50
15 9801
50
10 9850
20
10 9880
20
15 11645
50
15 11685
50
15 11690
50
15 11702
50
15 11710
50
15 11715
50
15 11720
50
15 11725
50
15 11740
50
15 11745
50-
15 11755
50
15 11760
50
15 11765
50
15 11780
50
- 148 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E C-R-E-T
Location Call Power Frequency S;nnbol
Moscow, RSFSR 15 11790
50
15 11805
15 11810
50
15 11815
50
100 11820
100 11825
100 11830
15 11840
50
15 11850
50
15 11860
50
15 11880
50
15 11890
50
15 11900
50
15 11910
50
15 11920
50
15 11930
50
15 11945
50
15 11954
50
15 11960
50
15 11970
50
15 11980
50
20. 12020
20 12270
20 12300
- 1-49 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location Call Power Frequency Symbol
?1oscow, RSFSR 10 13400
20
10 14380
20
20 15040
15 15100
50
15 15110
50
15 15120
50
15 15130
50
15 15140
50
15 15170
50
100 15180
15 15200
50
15 15210
50
15 15220
50
15 15230
50
15 15250
50
15 15270
50
15 15280
50
15 15300
50
15 15310
50
10 15320-
20
15 15325
50
-150-
S-E-C-Et-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
Location
Call
Power.
Frequency
Symbol
RSFSR
Moscow
15
15340
,
50
15
15360
50
15
15370
50
15
15390
50
15
15400
50
15
15410
50
15
15430
50
15
15440
50
15
15450
50
15
15!70
50
15
1554o
50
15
17750
50
15
17810
50
15
17820
50
15
17830
50
15
17840
50
Murmansk, RSFSR
RV79
10
656
1
4850
~Nalchik, RSFSR
RV51
1
350
U
Nikolayevski RSFSR
1
997
2
4364
A
2
5230
RSFSR
Novosibirsk
100
272
,
5225
r
15310
-151 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Call
Power
Frequency
Symbol
Nukes, Uzbek
R
1
2
331
Odessa, Ukraine
R
3
10
548
R
3
10
1211
Omsk,, RSFSR
R4
49
10
390
Petropavlovsk, RSFSR
RV
102
566
50
5360
50
6070
50
9530
50
9545
V
50
11840
A
5o
11885
50 .
15110
50
15230
A
Petrozavodsk, Karelia
RV91
10
611
4995
Riga, Latvia
RV140
100
575
Rostov, RSFSR
RV12
20
764
Saransk, RSFSR
RV65
7.
1061
Saratov, RSFSR
RV3
20
340
Simferopol, RSFSR
RV73
10
647
Stalinabad, Tadzh.ik
RV47
2
350
6702
7201
A
Stalingrad, RSFSR
RV34
10
557
D
RV34
10
835
N
Stalino, Ukraine
RV26
50
710
Stavropol, RSFSR
RV124
746
Sverdlovsk, RSFSR
RV5
40
370
9470
15270
Sykyvkar, RSFSR
RV41
1
218
Tallinn, Estonia
RV151
100
1034
Tartu, Estonia
RV150
20
710
RV150
20
1214
Tashkent, Uzbek
RV11
50
254
400
6
0
15
73
15
6824
Tbilisi, Georgia
RV7 35
191
RV7 35
200
1182
- 152 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Location
Call
Power
Frequency
Symbol
Tbilisi, Georgia
2
5040
2
6050
A
Tiraspol, Moldavia
RV57
10
12I1
I
Ufa, RSFSR
RV37
10
281
D
RV37
10
692
N
Ukhta, Karelia
RV67
2
548
I
Ulan Ude, RSFSR
RV63
10
281
Uzhgorod, Ukraine
20
890
Lithuania
Vilnyus
10
665
,
1385
Vladivostok, RSFSR
RV162
10
245
100
548
100
611
A
5
5015
5
6080
A
5
9480
A
Voronezh, RSFSR
20
566
RV25
944
Voroshilov, RSFSR
RV77
10
380
Yakutsk, RSFSR
RV62
10
263
2
5979
Armenia
Yerevan
RV21
50
364
,
5
6075
5
7150
A
Yuzhno, Sakhalinsk
2
360
RV60
973
1
4732
1
5002
SYMi3OLS: A Alternate Frequency N Nightime Operation V Variable
D Daytime Operation S Seasonal Frequency
I Inactive U Unverified Information
Note regarding power: The listed.figures are usually authorized power
of the transmitter, but in some cases of known deviation the actual
operating power has been substituted. When two powers are listed, the
figures represent the lower and upper limits of power where a station
uses more than one transmitter on the frequency at different times.
a. Each line entry does not necessarily represen a separate rans-
mitter, as transmitters employ different frequencies at different times.
- 153 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX D
DISCUSSION OF THE RADIOBROADCASTING COVERAGE MAPS: NUMBERS 2-L.*
Maps of broadcast coverage, which are based on such technical
considerations as signal strength, receiver sensitivity and atmos-
pheric noise level, will give a general impression of the area
where reception may be expected. They must not be considered as
representing specific areas of coverage. While graphically it is
necessary to draw a limit, the observer must recognize that all
beyond this limit is not necessarily out of. reach and everything
within it is not necessarily covered.
Signals, in progressing outward from a transmitter, decrease
more or less gradually into areas where the interference from other
stations-on the same channel, from atmospheric noise or from man-
made noise will be significant. However, the latter will vary from
place to place at-any given time and from time to time to any given
place. Moreover, the signal intensity of the station itself depends
on a number of factors, some of which are unknown to us in the
present case (such as efficiency or directivity of the transmitting
antenna, and the earth conductivity, and atmospheric noise level in
the vicinity). Some-of these, factors are subject to wide fluctuations,
(such as sky-wave transmission conditions). Another variable factor
is the ratio of signal to interference which a listener will tolerate.
This will vary'widely with his attitude (is he earnestly seeking the
intelligence in the communication or is he listening critically to
be entertained?).
Thus it is recognized that close to a station the signals can
be accepted as satisfactory most or all of the time and at some
distant point they are unsatisfactory most of the time and that
selection of some intermediate distance as the boundary of "service"
will be arbitrary.
In the case of ground-wave coverage (the dark areas in circles
shown on the maps, figures 2 and 3) variations in the arbitrary
assumptions as to.limit of,signal strength. would make an appreciable
difference in the indicated areas, but the over-all impression of
ground-wave coverage in the Soviet Union would bemuch.the same as
is Appendix prepared by OSI.
- 155 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
is shown. In the case of sky-have coverage (the light areas shown
in circles on the maps figures ,2 and 3) applying to nighttime con-
ditions on the low- and medium-gfrequency bands, the field intensity
of.the signal at points distant. from the transmitter decreases com-
paratively slowly with distane ? so that a small change in the
arbitrary assumptions (for ex le., the minimum acceptable field
strength) would make a large change in the indicated coverage area.
For this reason, it is especially pointed out that the areas of
sky-wave covers a (light circles) on figures 2-and .3 should not under
any circumstances: by taken lit; all . it is likely that often areas
not encircled will receive reasona y strong sky-wave signals and
it is also likely that often areas encircled will not receive ser-
vice from the particular station on which the circle is centered.
The circles are intended merely to give an impression of the areas
beyond the ground-wave services in-which at night, broadcasts on
the low- and medium-frequency bands frequently penetrate.
In the case of high-frequency, ground-wave coverage is restricted
to a few miles and the main, purpose is to render sky-wave coverage
at great distances. Signal strength at distant points will vary
widely with time of day, season, frequency, and antenna directivity,
so that it is not practical to indicate coverage on a technical basis.
The high-frequency coverage map (figure t) therefore merely indicates
'the location of the transmitter and the direction and general area
which it is intended to serve.
Technical assumptions used in the preparation of the low-frequency
and medium-frequency coverage maps are as follows:
A minimum field intensity of 0.25 millivolts per meter (mv/m)
ground-wave constitutes acceptable service on medium frequencies
and 1.0 my/m ground-wave on low frequencies.
A. minimum nighttime sky-wave field intensity-median value
based on standard propagation curves -- of 0.5 my/m on medium
frequencies and 1.0 my/m on low frequencies constitutes
acceptable service.
Ground-wave coverage on'medium frequencies calculated for the
center of the band (1000 kc/s) is representative of other fre-
quencies in the band.
Ground conductivity is "good" in loamy or marshy areas,
- 156 -
S-E-C-R E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
. S -E-C -R-E -T
coverage may be less than shown in rocky or arid areas, better
than shown if over water.
Antennas are non-directional vertical radiators from 0.2 to
0.4 wavelengths'high on medium frequencies and from 0.15 to
0.3 wavelengths high on low frequencies'
There is no interference from another station operating on
the same channel at the same time.
- 157 -
S -E -C R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX E
SOVIET INTERNATIO TAL SERVICE . a/* 338 `
Weekly output in transmitter hours by language
(November 1953)
To Europe
Albanian
26.00
English/French/German
59.50
Bulgarian
47.00
Italian
14.00
Czech and Slovak
19.00
Danish.
21.00
1,049.25
Dutch
24.50
English
101.50
To the Far East
Finnish
46 25
French
70.00
Japanese-
238.00
German to Austria
28.00
Korean
241.50
German to Germany
143.50
Mandarin
329
Greek
49.00
Mongolian
75.25
Hungarian
17.00
Uighur
7.00
Italian
63.00
Lithuanian
7.00
Total
890.75
edonian
M
24.50
?
ac
ian
Norwe
33.50
To Western.North America and Far East
g
Polish
21:00
Portuguese
10.50
English
28.00
.Rumanian
41.00
Serbo-Croat
52.50
To North America
Slovene
31.50
Spanish
56.00
English
686.00
Swedish
32.50
Ukrainian
14..00
Ukrainian
7.00
Total
700.00
Special Concerts
Norwegian/Swedish
3.00
* footnote follows on p. 160.
-159-
S -E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S -E-C-R-E-T
To Latin America
Portuguese
42.00
Spanish
84.00
Total
126.00
To :Near and Middle East
Arabic
39.67
Armenian
28.00
Persian
67,67
Tadzhik
7.00
Turkish
62.41
Total 204.75
To South and Southeast Asia
Bengali 21.00
Cantonese 21.00
English 28..100
Hindustani 11.00
Indonesian 28.00
Tonkinese 28.00
Total 140_00
Total Transmitter Hours Per Week
To all Areas 3,138.75 hours
Daily Average 448.39
T. -Satellite transmitter hours are not included in these
statistics.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX F
TELEVISION STATIONS OF THE. USSR
1 May 19
Picture
Transmitter
Location Power (kw).
Sound
Transmitter
Power (kw)
Picture
Frequency
(mc)
Sound
Frequency
me
Symbol
Baku
C
Gorkiy
EJ
Kharkov
59.25
65.75
E c/
Kiev 5
2.5
77.25
83.75
Leningrad
59.25
65.75
Minsk
Moscow
49.75
56.25
Odessa .3
49.75
56.25
E
Riga
E
Saratov
E
Stalingrad.
C
Sverdlovsk
C
Tallinn
Tomsk
Vladivostok
Yaroslavl
a. Prepared by OSI.
b. Symbols: E Experimental
C Under construction
c. Gorkiy, Kharkov,and Riga are reported to have experimental
stations and to have regular stations under construction.
- 161 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S -E-C -R-E-T
APPENDIX G
THE ALL-UNION SCIENTIFIC TECHNICAL SOCIETY OF RADIO ENGINEERING
A ELECTRICAL O 4UT I A IMENI A. M
This organization is a central coordinating organization for
Soviet scientific research and development in the various fields of
radio engineering and electrical communications. It numbers among
its members Ministers and Deputy Ministers, directors of many
scientific research institutes and higher educational institutions.,
plus practically all the prominent scientists and technicians in
the fields for which it is responsible. The functions are defined
in its charter, the basic principles of which are as follows:
VNORiE is a voluntary, organization.of scientists and
engineers'from all parts of the USSR, whose mutual activities
are directed toward the constant improvement of Soviet radio
engineering and electrical communications and toward the
rapid fulfillment of I. V. Stalin's instructions to "sur-
pass the achievements of science abroad."
In fulfillment of its duties as a coordinator of scientific
research VNORiE allocates specific projects to its members. It also
passes resolutions calling on a ministry,. an institute, or sometimes
an individual, to proceed with a particular project. It.appears that
these resolutions carry considerable weight due to the high level of
the personnel which"are party to them. The section "Organization of
Radiobroadcasting" was established early in 1946. Its activities
have been reported on in several sessions 1946-51. In the reports
presented in these sessions the overwhelming. majority were concerned
with problems of wire-diffusion broadcasting. Several dealt with
multi-channel wire-diffusion systems. Others which figured prominently
in the discussions were reports concerned with standards for mass-
produced receivers. Reports on VHF1 FM, TV, and TV wire-diffusion
have also been discussed. The implementation of-such reports in
research laboratories and factories of the USSR is likely to be
carried out within enterprises of both the Ministry of Communications.
and the Ministry of the Radio Technical Industry, with some work
carried on by the Administration.of Radiofication of the Main Ad-
ministration for Radio Information.
- 163 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX H
REPORTED DISTRIBUTION OF RADIOFICATION FACILITIES OF T 'LIT USSR a 340
Radiobroadcast
Receivers
(Thousands)
Number As of
Baltic States
1,768.3
288.5
Wire-diffusion
Radio Relay Loudspeakers
Centers (Thousands)
Number As of Number As of
20,124
7,794.3
542
Estonia
78.5
Jan 53
N.A.
N.A.
Latvia
130.0
May 53
200 May 52
96.0 Nay 54
Lithuania
80.0
May 54
342 May 52
75.0 May 54
RSFSR
1.
.European
485.8
1,586
222.1
3
,
Krasnoday Kray
58. I4ay 54
5 24 May 54
(50.0)
Si
Stavropol Kray
15.0 May 53
N.A.
132.0 "lay 53
Arzamas Oblast b/
N.Z.
N.I.
N. 1.
Arkhangelsk Oblast
Astrakhan Oblast
Balashov Oblast
Belgorod Oblast
N. I.
N.A.
N.I.
N.A.
(47) 51
N. I.
N.I.
N. &.
(4.2)
N.I.
N.I.
N.A.
51
Bryansk Oblast
N.A.
109 May 53
(4.0)
52
Crimea Oblast
N.A.
N.A.
95.0 May
54
Gor'kiy Oblast
(22.0) 53
(70) 49
(80.0)
49
Grozny Oblast
N. I.
N.I.
(7.7)
53
Ivanovo Oblast
Kaliningrad Oblast
N. I.
N.A.
(12) Apr 53
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Kalinin Oblast
(0.3) Nov 53
N. A.
(23.0) Dec 53
Kaluga Oblast
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Kamensk Oblast
30-0 May 54
N.A.
86.0 May 54
* Footnotes for Appendix H
follow on p.
- 165 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
168.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
T
E
-
S-E-C -R4-
Radiobroadc4st Wire-diffusion
Receivers'; Radio Relay Loudspeakers
(Thousands) Centers (Thousands)
Number As.of
Number
As of Number
As of
Kirov Oblast
6
49 2.5
49
Kostroma Oblast
N.A.
N.A.
63.5
May 511
Kursk Oblast
7.0 52
(52.0)
52
Kuybyshev Oblast
N.A.
N.A.
(3.0)
51
Leningrad Oblast
(85.0) Feb!53
(700.0)
Feb 53
Lipetsk Oblast
Moscow Oblast
N.I. 3
230.0 May; 511
N.I.
N. A.
N.I.
600.0
May 53
(City of Moscow)
1,000.0
48
Murmansk Oblast
Novgorod. Oblast
N.I.
N.A.
N. A.
(30)
N.A.
48 (35.5)
14.8
Orel Oblast
1.0 May 52
N.A.
47.0
May 52
Penza Oblast
(0.1) 49-
(29)
49- N.A.
Pskov Oblast
(20)
52 N.A.
Rostov Oblast
N.A.
(124)
Nov 53 (60.0)
52
Ryazan Oblast
(0.2)
133
May 53 (002)
51
Saratov Oblast
N.I.
N.I.
(30.0)
53
Smolensk Oblast
(21.4)
90
52 (29.4)
50
Stalingrad Oblast
j4.I.
132
48 56.0
48
Tambov Oblast.
NA.
(10)
53 (10.0)
53
Tula Oblast
U1'yanovsk Oblast
N.A.
N.I.
N.A.
106,
N.A.
Mar 52 N.A.
Velikiye Luki Oblast 8.5 b/Jul 52 N.A.
26.5 c/Jul 52
Vladimir
N.I.
N.A.
N.A.
Vologda Oblast
N.I.
(1i)
52 (4.a) 52
Voronezh Oblast
N.A.
(27)
49 (20.0) 49
Yaroslavl Oblast
(0.3)
48
N.A.
(0.6) 48
Chuvash ASSR
N.I.
N.I.
N.I.
Dagestan ASSR
N.I.
N.A.
N.A.
Kabardinian ASSR
N.I.
N. A.
N.A.
Komi ASSR
N.I.
N.I.
N.I.
Mari ASSR
N.I.
N. I.
N. I.
M4ordovinian ASSR
N.A.
100
Dec 52 N.A.
North Ossetian ASSR N.A.
N.I.
N. 1.
Tatar ASSR
Udmurt ASSR
N.I.
N.I.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
- 166 -
S-E-C-.-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Radiobroadcast
Receivers
(Thousands)
umer Is
2. Urals# and Western
Siberia 94.2
Altai Kray (1.4) 52
#Chelyabinsk Oblast N.A.
#Chkalov Oblast. (5.0) 51
#Molotov Oblast N.I.
Kemerovo Oblast (1.2) 52
Kurgan Oblast N.I.
Novosibirsk Oblast 10.0 49
Omsk Oblast 74.6 May 51
#Sverdlovs.k Oblast (2.0) May 52
Tomsk Oblast N.I.
Tyumen Oblast N.A.
Bashkir ASSR N.I.
3. Central Siberia N.A.
Krasnoyarsk Kray N.I.
Irkutsk Oblast N.A.
Tuva Autonomous Oblast N.I.
4.
Yakutsk ASSR
Far East
Khabarovsk Kray N.A.
?Maritime Kray 15.0 Aug 53
Amur Oblast N.I.
Chita Oblast 13.0 May 53
`'.iagadan Oblast N.A.
Sakhalin Oblast 9.0 May 53
Buryat-Mongol ASSR N.I.
37.0
- 167 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Wire-Diffusion
Radio Relay Loudspeakers
Centers. (Thousands)
W umber As of fiber As of
792 288.8
289 Dec 53 (19.3) Dec 53
N.A. N.A.
(5) Nov 53 N.A.
'N..I. N. I.
N.A. (0.5) 52
N.I. N.I.
(148) May 54 (107.0) Nov 53
N.A. 80.0 May 51
234 May 51 17.0 Nov 51
(116) Nov 52 N.A.
N.A. N.A.
267
65.0 47
(132) Dec 53 (18.0) Dec 53
105 May 53 (4.0) May 54
N.I. N.I.
30 May 52 N.A.
465 323.9
N.A. 90.0 Jul 49
N.A. 100.0 May 54
N.A. (1.2) May 53
(65) May 54 66.0 May 53
N.A. N.A.
100 Nov 53 47.6 Nov 53
(300) 52 19.1 46
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Radiobroadcast
Wire-Diffusion
Receivers
(Thousands)
Radio Relay Loudspeakers
Centers (Thousands)
Number
As of
umber As of Number
As of
Belorussian SSR
(54.o)
53
(387) Nov 53 (236.0)
Nov 53
Karelo-Finnish SSR
(1.0)
48
(35) 51 35.0
May 53
27.
Moldavian SSR
27.0
Mar 54
167 Mar 54 120.0
Mar 54
Ukrainian SSR
500.0
May 53
(13,650) 53 2,500.0
May 54
Caucasus Republics
178.3
1,032 281.5
Armenian SSR
k47.2)
May 54 (332) May 54
(56.5)
May 54
Azerbaydzhan SSR
85.0
May 53
300 May 53
90.0
May 53
Georgian SSR
46.1
May 52
400 May 53
(135.0)
53
Central Asia Republics
102.5
1,201 594.0
Kazakh SSR
(1.5)
May 54 1,000 May 53
300.0
May 52
Kirghiz SSR
19.0
53 133 May 51
60.0
53
Tadzhik SSR
(5.0)
48
68 48
(24.0)
50
Turkmen SSR
15.0
May 53
N.A. 53.0
May 53
Uzbek SSR
62.0
52
N.A. 157.0
52
a: These figures represent minimal distribution. They account for a
total of approximately 9.5 million reception units, of an estimated
national total of 17.5 million. Figbres shown in parentheses are
partial figures.
b. New oblast established in 1953.
c. Total facilities 35,000.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S -E-C-R-E-T
CHARACTERISTICS OF USSR T'i?,EVISION RECEIVING FACILITIES
1950-54 a-;r
Model Description
KVN-49 341 Size of Screen: 10.5 x 14 cm. (approxi-
mately 4" by 5,5")
Channels:
No. 1: 48.5-56.5 Mc (video 49.75 Mc2
Audio 56.25 McJ
No. 2: 58-66 Mc (video 59.25 `1c
Audia 65.75 Ncj
No. 3: 76-84 Mc (video 77.25 Mc
Audio 83.75 Mc5
No. of Tubes: 16 plus picture tube.
Comment: First exhibited in 1949, reportedly
now considered obsolete, to be discontinued
when feasible.
Moskvich T-1 342
Size of Screen: 10 x 13 cm. (Approximately
411 by 57t)
Channel:
No. 1: 48.5-56.5, also FM audio band.
No. of Tubes: 20
Comment: This is reported to be a direct
and almost unaltered copy of a German table
model receiver.
Leningrad T-1 343 Size of Screen: 10 x 13 cm. (Approxi-
mately 4" by 5")
Channel: probably same as P-1oskvich T-1
No. of Tubes: 22
Comment: This model is similar to the
o sv ch T-1, except that it is capable of
reception of either 441 line images (used
experimentially by the Soviets) and 625 line
Footnote -follows on p.. 171.
- 169 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
CHARACTERISTICS OF USSR T. LEVISION RECEIVING FACILITIES
19 0-
(continued)
Model Description
Leningrad T-2 344/
images, which standard has been adopted.
Size of Screen: 135 mm x 88 mm (approximately
5.3" by 7.4")
Channels: Same as KVN-49, above.
No. of Tubes: 32 plus picture tube.
Comment: Combination AM FM, and TV. This r e-
ceiver.can also receive very high frequency
F M 'transmissions .in the 66-67.5 Me band.
Further, it provides reception of broadcast
stations in the low-, medium-, and high-
frequency bands by means of the radio .fre
quency portion of the Leningradets receiver
which is built into this receiver.
T2-A 3W Size of Screen: 310 mm diamater (approxi-
"
t
T-4 346
ma
ely 1.e j.
Channels: Presumed to be the same as the
Leningrad T-2.
No. of Tubes: 26
Comment: This is presumed to be a modifi-
cation of the Leningrad T-2.
Size of Screen: 381 mm x 508 mm (approxi-
mately 15" by 2011).
Channels: No information available, but
presumed to be the same as the T-2.
No. of Tubes: 35
Comment: It is believed that this receiver
uses a five-inch type LK-100 projection cathode
ray tube with a set of reflecting mirrors
and correcting lense producing a picture 15.2"
x 20.311 on a screen. This receiver is prob-
ably intended for group viewing.
- 170 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
CH flLCTERISTICS OF USSR TELEVISION RECEIVING FACILITIES
k J_ 976--54)
(continued)
Model Description
Sever-3 2!L7/ Size of Screen: 18 x 24 cm (approximately
711 by. 9.511)
Channels- Not available, but presumed to be
the same as KVN-49.
No. of Tubes: 17
Comment: Reports indicate that the first
model of the Sever was deemed obsolete before
it went into production. The second model is
said to be either in production or scheduled
for production during 1954. The Sever is re-
ported to have UHF FM reception capabilities,
also.
Pioneer 348 Size of Screen: 10 x 14 cm. (approximately
(TL-2) 4 x 5.5")
No. of Tubes: 9 plus picture tube.
Comment: In consideration of the very small
number of tubes, this model probably is not a
complete television receiver, but a ,model to
be used connected by wire to a central tele-
vision relay center. This system is compar-
able to the wire-diffusion loudspeakers in
aural radiofication.
Avangard 349 Size ofScreen: 4 times the area of the KVN-
(TL-1) 49, (dimensions not available).
Svet 354
No. if Tubes: 16
Comment: No other information available.
Size of Screen: 24 x 36 cm. (approximately
9.511 x .11.x" )
Comment: tdo other information available.
Temp 351 No information available,,
a. Most data for 1953.
- 171 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX J
LAW FOR THE DEFENSE OF PEACE, USSR SUPREME SOVIET, MARCH 12, 1951 352
"The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
guided by the high principles of the Soviet peace-loving policy,
which pursues the goal of reinforcing the peace and friendly relations
between peoples, recognizes that the conscience and sense of justice
of peoples who have in the course of the lifetime of A single genera-
tion borne the misfortunes of two world wars cannot be reconciled
with the impunity of war propaganda conducted by leading aggressive
circles in certain states, and makes common cause with the challenge
of the Second World Congress of Peace Partisans, which expressed the
will of all progressive humanity in respect to forbidding and con-
demning criminal war propaganda.
"The Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
decrees:
"l. That it should be recognized that war propaganda, in
whatever form it is conducted, undermines the work of peace, creates
a threat of a new war and is in View of this fact a most weighty
crime against humanity.
"2. That persons guilty of war propaganda should be arraigned
and tried as-major criminals."
-173-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX K
METHODOLOGY
The totals of foreign broadcasting hours transmitted in Russian
and the other Soviet languages (Tables 2 and 3) were obtained from
overtly published materials of the broadcasting agencies and from
reports based on monitoring.
The expansion 'of the Soviet radiobroadcasting system (Table 6)
and the. comparative weekly output of international program hours
are.collated from monitoring observations, station lists, overt
publications, and finished intelligence reports.
The methodology used in computing the statistical.data in Table
8 -- the Estimated Number of Radiobroadcasting Reception Facilities
in USSR (1940, 19)6-60) -- accompanies the. table. The number of
reception facilities was based on overtly published materials from
finished intelligence reports and from information in Soviet press,
trade journals, and radio. The distribution of facilities as set
forth in Table 10 and Appendix H was obtained entirely from USSR
open sources -- newspapers, trade journals, and radiobroadcasts.
The characteristics, average retail prices,, schedule of subscriber
fees, and estimated production of radiobroadcasting receivers,
loudspeakers, and television receivers as shown in Tables 9,,11-
15, and 17 were taken from CIA/RR/I/EE special paper for this re-
port, 2 June 1954. The reported number of television receivers
in the USSR was taken from a State Department review of internal
developments in the Soviet Union, and various overt
news. publications. FOlAb3bl
The information supporting the appendixes was taken-from overtly
published materials, monitoring observations, State Department and
USIA dispatches and reports, and CIA reports. The sources are in-
dicated on each appendix.
The information supporting the various charts was taken pri-
marily from overtly published materials. Figures 1 and 5 are
graphic presentations of the data shown in the table preceding
the chart in the report. Figures 2, 3, and 4 are discussed where
appropriate in the text.
- 175 -
S-E-C-R -E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
The information for mapJ 1 through 6 was taken primarily from
overtly published sources and monitoring observations. The infor-
mation shown on map number 7 was collated from various surveys,
CIA and USIA reports and finished intelligence reports by OSI.
- 176 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
APPENDIX L
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
1. Gaps.
Soviet technical literature contains a wealth of generalized
information concerning the radiofication of the USSR. Furthermore,
a sufficient number of receivers have been obtained to give fairly
good information as to technical capabilities and characteristics
of Soviet equipment. These sources, however, are deficient in
growth and distribution statistics of loudspeakers and receivers..
The voluminous outpourings of the Soviet press and radio and
statements made by key and subordinate personalities are not only
often contradictory, slanted, and misleading, but the comparisons
are such that actual quantities are seldom revealed.
Information based on personal observations is from persons whose
observations and experiences were limited geographically to the
European areas of the USSR, and little or no information is avail-
able on the Siberian and Asiatic areas.
Much of the information for Sections IV and V of this report
was obtained from refugees and escapees who were people basically
opposed to the regime at home, and their response to anti-Communists
was further colored by their escapee status. Consequently, one
probably cannot assume that their reactions are highly representative
of the population of the USSR.
The Soviet government is constantly making available to a large
segment of the population receivers capable of receiving foreign
programs and, at the same time, is carrying on a campaign against
such listening. Information on the rationale of the Soviet govern-
ment with respect to these apparently opposing policies would be
of value.
Information is needed on exports and imports of receivers and
receiver parts. Intelligence is needed relative to the correlation
of production of plants located within the USSR and other Soviet-
owned plants located in Satellite countries.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
Intelligence is needed regarding the. production and use of the
better type receivers, and those having high-frequency reception
capabilities, in contrast to the class 4 type receivers which does
not have this capability.
Information indicating the relative production and use of the
different models of class 3 receivers, specifying those which have
high-frequency reception capability is needed.
Intelligence is needed relative to the wide differential in the
estimated production of radiobroadcasting receivers in the USSR
since 19115 and those. estimated to be in use in 1953 (some three
million more produced than in use).
Since there is no evidence of mass imports of Satellite or other
foreign produced radiobroadcasting receivers, intelligence is needed
relative to the receivers which producers in certain Satellite
countries claim are taken by the USSR (20 to t0 percent of current
production). he Soviets may dispose of them for a profit in
Satellite or foreign countries. There is some evidence that this
has been done]
It is further evident that information after 1952 has been
increasingly difficult to obtain, especially in the following cae
categories:
a. Data on the effectiveness of foreign radiobroadcasting
among smaller ethnic groups, especially in the peripheral areas.
b. Information on the sociological nature of the audience, such
as age and sex.
c. Size of the audience listening to non-Russian language
broadcasts from outside the USSR.
d. Information relative to non-listeners -- those who have sets
but do not listen, and why.
e. Information as to the audience listening with commercial
receivers other than military.
f. Statistical information relative to the number of families
in the USSR by areas and the average size.
g. Effects of foreign radio programs upon the attitudes and
behavior of Soviet listeners.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R E-T
2. Filling Gaps.
Efforts to fill gaps have been proceeding on two broad fronts --
the general and the specific. As for the general, a Telecommunications
Working Group of the EIC Subcommittee on Requirements and Facilities:
for Collation has completed and approved a "Catalogue-of Requirements
for Telecommunications Information." The purpose of the catalogue
is to bring together all the items of information needed by the in-
telligence agencies. From this catalogue, it is expected that col-
lection manuals geared to the capabilities of the various collection
agencies will be-prepared. Such manuals should. serve as interro-
gation aids to reduce the need for spot requirements. In connection
with this program, the EIC Subcommittee on Electronics and Tele-
communications has reported on the Survey of Intelligence Deficiencies
on telecommunications Equipment Production and Facilities. These
surveys establish priorities which can be incorporated in the col-
lection manuals. This program, when implemented,.should improve
both the quantity and quality of. raw materials and thus. help fill
many existing gaps.
As for specific efforts, advantage is-taken of knowledgeable
sources. discovered in the daily reading process by, the initiation
of specific requirements geared.to our known gaps and to the source's
competence. Numerous requests for requirements are constantly being
responded to in this field. Persons going abroad to work on ORR
requirements are briefed in advance of departure with a view to
pointing up the deficiencies of present information and directing
specific attention to currently pertinent needs.
-179-
S-E-C-R-E-.T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX M
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
a. Transmission Facilities of Foreign Broadcasters to the USSR.
The information on foreign radiobroadcasting directed to the
USSR audience was obtained in the main from -sources, based on F OIAb3 b1
monitoring and overt publications. It is considered reliable.
b. Radiobroadcasting System of the USSR.
The information on transmitting facilities and organization
and administration of radiobroadcasting in the USSR was obtained
F OIAb3 b1 from reports, monitoring of radiobroadcasting programs, overtly
published materials, and finished intelligence reports. These
sources, generally, confirm each other and are considered as being
of good reliability.
c.Receiving Equipment in the USSR.
On the premise that all outpourings of the Soviet press and
radio have as their first objective to serve some purpose of the
Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the voluminous but par-
tial Soviet statistics on radiofication appear to be published
chiefly for their value as promotional propaganda. In many instances
they have been found to be slanted and misleading. By careful study
of the volume of such outpourings on the subject of radiofication
which have been published during the years 1946-53, the statistics
in Section III have been produced. These figures and other infor-
mation are believed to have fair reliability.
The information on receiver production and characteristics
was obtained from CIA published and unpublished reports, trade
catalogs, Armed Services, State Department, and USIA reports. This
information is taken as having from fair to good reliability.
d. Regulations and Conditions of Listening.
The materials relating to regulations for the most part
- 181 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
come from overt and covert CIA reports confirmed by overt publi-
cations, Armed Services, State Department Despatches, finished
intelligence reports and special studies. They are believed to be of
good reliability.
e. Effectiveness of Foreign Broadcasts.
The effectiveness of foreign broadcasts is mainly inferred
from fragmentary direct and indirect evidence. This evidence is
from CIA overt and covert reports, Armed Services, State Department
and USIA reports and despatches, and overt publications and infor-
mation. This evidence is taken to have from fair to good reliability.
2. Sources.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.,"have the following significance:
Source of Information
Information
A - Completely reliable
1 -
Confirmed by other sources
t
B
- Usually reliable
2 -
Probably
rue
C
- Fairly reliable
3 -
Possibly true
D
- Not usually reliable
4 -
Doubtful
E - Not reliable
5 -
Probably false
F - Cannot be judged
Doc. - Documentary
6 -
Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a
staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by a
staff officer, all of which will carry the field evaluation "Docu-
mentary" instead of a numerical grade.
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on
the cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this
report. No "iR" evaluation is given when the author agrees :; h
the evaluation on the cited document. Evaluations designated
"SI" are by OSI-.
1. CIA/RR 46.1.3 (WP), Foreign hadiobroa.dcasting deception
Potential in Bulgaria, 2 Jun 19 3. 3, US OFFIC LA S ONLY.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S -E-C-R-;E-T
CIA/RR 16.1.1 (WP), Foreign Radiobroadcasting Race tion
Potential in Czechoslovakia, 10 Jul 19 3. , US OFFICIALS ONLY.
C RR PR- 2.-Foreign Radiobroadcasting Reception Potential
in Rumania,, 11 Dec 19 3. S, US OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA RR PR- 3, Foreign Radiobroadcasting Reception Potential
in Poland 1 ec 1 ,.U OFFICIALS .
C]W/R 'R-L1.~, Foreign Radiobroadcasting Reception Potential
in Albania, I .eb 9 . , U OFFICIALS ONLY.
CIA RR PR- 0, Foreign Radiobroadcasting Reception Potential
t 1 ar 19 , US 0FFTCI1JT ONLY.
in Hunga 7. 9
C A PR- 4,, , Foreign Radiobroadcasting Reception Potential
Y
.
in China.,1 Apr 1953. a, US O_FICIAL, ONL
2. Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy, Prentice
FOIAb3b1
!4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
FOIAb3b1 9.
10.
11.
FOIAb3b1
16.
17.
FOIAb3b118.
New York,'1950, P. U. Ev oc.
USIA. VOA Program Schedule, 16 May 195L. U.
-Hall, Inc.,
Eval. Doc.
Ibid.
USIA, VCA Program Schedule, 22. cit.
Ibid.
London Calling, Supplement, London, 28 Aug 1952, p. 8. U.
Eva 3.
USIA.. VOA Program Schedule, offe cit.
Ibid.
State, HICO0, Frankfurt Despatch No. 696, 5 Sep 1951. C.
19. State, OIR Psych.oloical Intelligence. and 'esearch Staff, P-
cholonical Intelligence Digest, Issue No. 13, 15 May 1953,
t . Eval. nr 2.
- 183 -
S'-"-C -R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
FOIAb3bl
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
CIA/In 23-52 (WP), The Radio System of the USSR in the Ser-
vice of the National. Economy, Annex, 10 Mar 19 3, p. 6.--g-.
Ibi ., pp. 4-5.
Harry Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 221-222.
CIA/RR 23-52, 22. cit., p. 27
1. Ye. Coron, Radio Vebhchanie, Moscow, 1.9!i., pp. 13-1L.
U. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., pp. 13-14. U.
L. r,.. Cristea, Radio-Freedom and Treedom of Listening in Cen-
tral and iastern urooe, London, 1752. 11. val. RR 2.
Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, Cambridge,
`Iarvard Jniversi.ty Press, 1951, p.. 226. U. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., p. 226.
Izvesti aa, 29 Nov 1953. U. Eval. RR 2.
nkl les, op.- cit., p. 226.
CIA/.I R 23-5.2, op. Cit., pp. 40-U1.
Ibid.
(;IA RR 23-52, op, cit., p. 54.
33.
25X1A2g
FOIAb3bi4.
35.
36.
37.
38.
25X1A2g
25X1A2a
40.
41.
25X1 A2c%2.
FOIAb3b143.
44.
25X1A2g
Ibid., pp. 5
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXV, No. 636, 9 Max 1951.
Eval. 2.
inkeles, op. cit., p. 233.
Vladimir Usovski, Soviet Civil Law, Ann Arbor, 1949, pp. 65-66,
U. Eval. RR 2.
Inkeles, op. cit.. pp. 271-273:
- 184 -
Approved For Release 1999/O9l -Q4Bh!-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1 A2g 46.
FOIAb3b1
47. Radio No. , pp. 8-10, Apr 19 3. U. Eval. RR 3.
25X1 A2g 48 ?
49.
50.
FOIAb3b1
Pravda, 7 May 1951, p. 1. U. ;oval. RR 2.
25X1A2a1.
FOIAb3b152.
53. Radio Propa anda teport S. 12, 27 Apr 1954, Eva l. fqit 2.
FOIAb3b1
54.
55.
56.
57.
25X1 A2g 58.
59.
FOIAb3b1 60.
61.
62.
25X1A2q
64.
3.
25X1 A2g 65.
Radio No. 1,?Jan 1951,p. it. U. Eval. RR 2.
Izvestiya, 19 Dec 1953, p. 2. U. .oval. RR 2.
CIA/RR 23-52, op. cit,, P. 54.
State, Soviet Affairs, Dec 1953, pp. 23-31. S. Eval. FW. 2.
Inkeles, cit.
CIA RR 234- 2op. cit.
Radio No. 11, "Soviet Radio Engineering During the Last 35
Years," 1952. U. Eval. SI 3.
CI:k RR 23-52 o-o. cit. P. 43.
Pravda 23 Sep 1951. U. Eval. ST 3.
Ibid.
T.RUD, 19 Mar 1952, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
Vol. IV, No. 13. U. Eval. SI 3.
66. ',~'ttu J o . citi .
25X1 A2g67 ?
- 185 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T.
68. IWG, Working Paper, Shipment to the USSR of Marconi Tele-
25X1 A2g69.
FOIAb3b1
70.
FOIAb3b1 71.
72.
73.
FOIAb3b1
74.
75.
25X1 A29 76.
77.
78.
79.
25X1 A2g $0,
81.
FOIAb3b1
25X1A2g82?
83.
25X1 A2g 85
8.
86.
87.
Mar, 1954. S. US Eval 12. ' 25X1 X7
of Soviet Press, No. 182, 30 Apr 1951. S. Ev
uCrvi e, 14o. 47', to reo l:Y),L, U. Mva... 51 3.
Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 27 Mar 1951, reported in
Summary 25X1 X7
LiterarGazette, 18 Feb 1953, reported in Joint Press Read-
ing Service, 3. 149, 18 Feb 19.52. U. Eval. .
CIA/RR 23-52, op. cit.
3I3.
WDGS Report No. R-5-51. 16 Jan 1951. C. E
Daily Worker, "TV in 'the Soviet Union," 28 Sep 1952. U. Eval.
Report on Internal Developments in the Soviet Union for
York Herald Tribune, 11 Apr 1954. U. Eval. SI 3.
Navy, Treasure Island Serial No. 11964, 7 Mar 1950. .C.
Toronto Globe and Mail. 15 Aug 1952. U. ;val. SI 3.
Izvestiya Akademii Nauk/Otdeleniye Tekhnicheskikh Nauk,, Oct
1947, p. 12 55. U Eval. 1 3.
88. F. Chestnov, Radio Se odn a, Military Publishing House of
89.
War 14inistry, USSR, 1950-U. Eval. SI 3.
Radio Yezegodnik, 1936, reported in FDD U-2600 of 13 Nov 1952.
Eval. I 2.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
90. Vestnik Akademii Nauk, Jan 1946, p. 91. U. Eval. SI 2.
91. I. onorovskiy, " roadcasting on FM," Radio No. 1, Apr
19)46 reported in FDD Per Abs 20778. U. Eval. Doc.
92. Vestnik Svyazi-Elektro Svyaz', No. 2/3, Feb/Mar 1946,
reported in FD Per Abs 197T5. U. Eval. SI 2.
FOIAb3bl 993
4.
95. Radiotekhnika, Vol. II, No. 5, May/Jun 1947. U. Eval. SI 3.
96. F. V. Kushnir, "Ultrashort Wave FM Transmitter in Leningrad,"
Radio No. 5., May 1948, reported in FDD Per Abs 4/49T96. U.
Eval. SI 3.
97. Sidorov, "The Ultrashort Wave Section of the Leningrad City
Radio Club," Radio No. 8, Aug 1951, reported in FDD Per Abs
194T113, U. Eval. Doc.
98. "Shortwave Operators Prepare for 9th All-Union Radio Ex-
hibition," Radio No. 11, Nov 1950, reported in FDD Per Abs
177T77. U. Eval. Doc.
99. Radio No. 1, Psurtsev, N., "Tasks of Soviet Communications
woorrkers in the 5th Five-Year Plan," Jan 1953. U. Eval. SI.2.;
100. International Telecommunications Union, Geneva, European
Broadcasting Conference (Stockholm 1952), Final Acts. U.
Eval. Doc.
F OIAb3b1101.
25X1 A2g 102.
103. CIA/RR 23-52, op. cit.
FOIAb3b1104.
105.
25X1 A2g 107.
108. CIA/RR 23-52, 22. cit.
109. Ibid.
25X1 A2g 110
11,
112. Ibid.
FOIAb3bIL13.
11)4.
115. Ibid.
116. 3.
117. bid.
118. bid.
- 187 -
S-E-C-R-E-T.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A 119-
120.
FOIAb3bl 121.
122.
"Radio Yezhnegodnik, 1936" (Radio yearbook, 1)3b), publisne
by the State Publishing House for Problems of Radio,
Moscow. U. Eval. Doc.
International Broadcasting Union, Monthly Bulletin No. 231,
U
E
D
l
45
.
.
oc.
va
Apr 19
.
25X1A2
g
MIR
123.
FDD Translation No. 1 9, The Law on the Five-Year Plan for
the Restoration and Development of the National Economy of
the USSR, 1946-50Y 2 Jan 19 9. val. RR 2.
25X1A2
g
124.
International Broadcasting Organization, Documentation and
Information Bulletin, Geneva, Switzerland, Aug 19L7. U.
Eval. RR 2.
125.
CIA RR PR-42, op. cit.
CIA RR PR-43, op. cit.
CIA RR PR-44, op.
126.
25X1A2g
127.
128.
I. T. Peresyphkin, "Radio - A Powerful. Instrument in Defense
of a Country," Chapter IX (A USSR publication). U. Eval. Doc.
25X1A2g 129.
130.
25X1A2g
131.
25X1A2g 132.
133.
FOIAb3b'~34.
25X1A2g 135.
136.
FOIAb3bl
137.
138.
F. Vishnevetskiy, Central DOSARM Uommittee, "Fulfilled in a
Bolshevik Manner " Radio No. 8, Aug 1951, (FDD Periodicals
Abstracts 194T10). S. Eval. Doc.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
139. ORR Project 46.1.1 (WP), op.
ORR Project 46.1.3 (G,JP), OP.
ORR PR-42, ?P. cit.
ORR PR-43, op. cit.
140.
141.
142.
25X1 A2g143.
144.
145.
25X1A 146.
147.
148.
25X1A2g
FOIAb3b1 149.
150.
151.
152.
'FOlAb3bl 153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158,
ORR PR-44, ?p.. cit.
ORR PR-50, ?p? cit.
PR 54 o cif
RR
cit.
cit.
- , =. .
O
CIA/SI 82-52, Study of USSR Broadcast Receivers, 1 Dec 1952.
CIA RR/I/EE, Special Paper for this report, 2 un 1954. S.
CIS,/3I 82-52, op. cit.
n - Y he odnik1 1936 " o, cit.
Pravda. 8 May 19 0 . U. Eva l. - .
CIA RR/I/EE, Off. cit .
Ibid.
Ibid.
Treasure Isla d, from Izvestiya, 114
CIA RR/I/EE, 22. cit.
Ibid.
CIA RR PR-44, OD. cit.
CIA/RR 46.1.3, W, off. cit.
159.
25X1X7
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
CIA/RR PR-42, op, cit.
Feb 1954.
U. Eval. RR 2.
VOAEvaluation Report No. 25, Jan May 1953. State
oval. RR 2.
Eval. RR 2.
State, HICOG Frankfurt Despatch No. 1497, 20 Nov 1951. S.
- 189 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A2g
espatch No. R-26-49, 19 Feb 19 49 C Ev
l RR
State, Moscow
,.~.....~ Statey Moscow
25X1A2g 160.
161.
25X1A2g 162.
163.
25X1 A2g 164.
165.
25X1A2g 166.
16.7.
168.
169.
170.
171.
25X1A2g
172.
173.
25X1 A2g 174.
175.
25X1 X7176.
177.
25X1A2g 178.
179.
.
25X1A2g 180.
181.
25X1A2g
a
Despatch No. 719, 23 Nov 19119_ R_?E,val PP
?o
07 ECIC XT 616-T (ri
tate, Moscow Despatch No. R-26-L9 AT'_ +'
S
M
Va e,
oscow Despatch No. 719, op. cit.
CIA/S 18
2-52, 2. Cit.
CIAy,RR/I/EE, op.. cit.
S'La a Mosc
: T
cL v_
o
spat
182. CIA RR/CSM/114 8 Jun 1954 S
183. State, Review of Internal Developments in the Soviet Union,
3 Mar 1952. C_ Fvn1 RA o
25X1 A2g184.
185.
186.
_
S-E-C R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
--p ~~Y1C~~ uevetop Projection Type
TV Receiver, 26 Jun 1953. C. Eval. RR 2
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
S Joint Committee on Vni I/ , WT
v. ctll ]PR
FOIAb3b1
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E:T
187.
188.
25X1 A2 189'
9190.
191.
192.
193.
191.
195.
25X1A2g
FOIAb3b196.
25X1A2g 197.
198.
199.
200.
25X1A2g
CIA estimates based on Soviet press and radio statements.
Eval. RR 3.
CIE RR/I/EE, op. cit.
CIA/RR 11, Soviet Bloc Production of -iv an Radio and
Television Receivers, 2 ep 195 - 5 2. 5.
CIA RR I-EE, op. cit.
Moscow, NA R-118-y2, 31 Oct 1952. S. Eval. Field 1. RR 2.
Documentation and Information Bulletin, USSR-- Position of
d
l
an
Television, European Broadcasting Union, Geneva., Switzer
TT TA-1
1 ?L L .
State, Moscow Daily Press Review No. 53, Section B, 23
Mar 1952. U. Eval. RR 3.
Current Digest of-the Soviet Press, published by the Joint
Committee on Slavic Studies, Vol. V. No. 49, 20 Jan . 1951 .
State, HtWUU, rraniciur4, ,uc,5pauvaa -? -i~+ -rte -
No. 25, _PIR-184, 18 Jul-1951., (info.., .19f9), (CIA 673374),
25X1 A2.9 201.
202.
FOIAb3bl
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
State, Moscow Despatch No. 32
C. Eval. RR 2.
- 191 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1 A29 203.
25X1A2g
205.
206.
25X1A
204. State, OIR Intelligence Report No. 61hh_ Barri PrG +.n wroo_
207.
208.
209.
uVnu vl lu ormaTjion in the USSR and the Soviet Bloc, 12 Feb
71 If W1 -I U-U
p
v
.
. .
a .
State, Moscow Despatch No. 325. o
FOIAb3bl
211.
212.
25X1A2g
213.
2114.
215.
25X1A
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch 1277, 28 Oct 1950. S. Eva1. RR 2..
State, IBS, Report No. USSR-3, 4 Jun 1951. U. Eval, RR 3.
216. State, IBS/E, Country Report on Radio Baltic States, Mar
1953, P. 5. . Ev
25X1A2g
25X1A
217.
25X1A2g218.
219. State, IBS, Report No. 25,
May 19553. S. Eval. RR 2.
S E C R E T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO00700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A2g
220. State, IBS, Report No. 1 USSR-3, op, cit..
221. Ibid., p.
25X1X7 222.
25X1 A2cc?23 ?
24.
25X1 A2 225.
g 226.
Ibid., para. L.
227. Ibid.
State, Munich, AMCONGEN Despatch No. 330, 1 Apr 1954. C.
Eval. NR 3.
228. "My Russian Odyssey," Minnesota Morning Tribune, 8 Feb
1954. U. Eval. RR 2.
230.
-25X1A2g
232. State, Frankfurt, HICOG,--9ponge Report No.
op# cit.
25X1A2g
233.
234. State, IBD, VOA Evaluation Report No. 23, Sep 1952. S.
Eval. RR 3.
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No.' 11:97, 20 Nov 1951. S.
Eval. RR 3.
235.
25X1A2g
193 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093AO00700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
25X1A
25X1 X7 236.
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A2g 237. No, I-A-1-2. 13 May 1954. S. Eval. RR 2.
238. CIA/SI 201-51, Status of Soviet Jamming Activities and
25X1 X7 239-
240.
241.
25X1A
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
Capabilities as o 1 Sep 1951, 5.
Memo to DCI from ADCO, Report
Operation, 15 Dec 1953. S.
HRB Report No. 45-2, op. cit.
Memo to DCI from ADCO, op. cit.
CIA SE-38, op. cit.
Ibid.
7W Report No. 45-2, op. cit.
CIA SE-38, op. cit.
25X1 A2g5O.
25X1 X7 251.
252.
HRB?Report No. 45-2,.op. cit.
253.
Memo to DC.I from ADCO, op. cit.
54
25X1A2g 2
.
255.
HRB Report No. 45-2, op. cit.
256.
Eddy i}ilmore, Washington Sunday Star, 14 Mar, 1954. li
SI 2.
257.
25X1A2g
258.
259.
USIA, IBS, World Wide Reception Summ r Report No. R
- ,
25X1 A2g 260.
261.
25X1A2g
Jul 1-Dec 31, 1953. C. Eval. RR 2.
and World Report, 26 Mar 1954, p. 59. U. Eval. RR 2.
Streiber, Theodore C., "The New Voice of America," US News
- 194 -
S -E-C-R-E-T
25X1A2g
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No. 1497, oP. cit., p. 11..
262. State, IBS/E Report No. A-105, May 1952 (info.., April 1947-
25X1A2g
Mar 1951). U. Eval. RR 2.
New York Times, 22 Oct 1948, p. 2, col. 2. U. Eval. RR 3.
State.-HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch
Robert L., Chief, IRD, "Word of Mouth Communi-
Jones
266
,
.
cations in the. Soviet Union," Research Memorandum No.
15, HRRI Project, Air Research and Development Command,
Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama. U..Eval: RR 2..
267. Ibid. Abstract?frot table on pp. 3; 6-7.
' ~~ 12 4. 11
25X1 A2g 268.
ct
269. State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No. 1277, 2 1950. S.
Eval. RR 3..
State, IBS, Report No. A-105, op. cit.
270.
25X1A2g
State, Psychological Intelligence Digest, Word-of- ou.
Media in the Soviet union." Issue--II/7, Apr 1, 1954, Abstract
-from table on pp. 2-4.
a
"Through the Iron Curtain BBC and the Cold.War.on the Air,"
London Calling Supplement, London, 28 Aug 1952. U. Eval.
RR 3.
State, IBS, VOA Evaluation Report No. 25, May 1953 (info.,
Jan-May 1q , -P.77 h. val. 2.
te Hh (G Frankfurt Despatch No. 1277, op. cit-
St
.- 195
S'-E-C -R-E -T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
S-E-C-R-E-T
271.
25X1A2g 272.
273. Munich Radio Center formation Report No. 115, Some Data
on Reception of Western .roadcasts an. Listening Conditions
in the USSR." (CIA 2204126). 3 Nov 1953. U. Eval. RR
25X1A
274
275.
25X1A
25X1A2g
25X1A
25X1A2g 276.
iaaio
277. State, , Frankfurt Despatch No. 763,. 11 Sep 1953
(info., 1951-52). S. Eval. RR 3.
278. Ibid.
25X1A2g M
25X1A2g
279.
25X1A2a
280. State, Moscow Despatch. No. 427, 6 Feb 1951 S. Eva1.. RR 3.
281. Media of Communications and the Free World, Intetnational
Public pinion Research, Inc., 20 Feb 1953. U. Eval. RR 2.
25X1A State HICOG Frankfurt Despatch No. 1497, og. cit.
25X1A2g
282. OMEN
283. State, Munich AMCONGE Despatch No. 330, op. cit., Encl. 1,
25X1 A2g 284?
285.
25X1A
286.
25X1 A2g287 .
288.
- 196 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
p. 2? Encl. 2 pp. 3 12.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
289.
290.
291.
25X1 A2 292.
g 293.
294.
25X1A
295.
296..
297.
298.
299.
25X1A2g
25X1 A '3000
25X1A2g
301.
25X1A
302.
25X1A2g
303.
25X1A2q
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No. 1197, oP. -ail., pp. 10-11.
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No. 1497, op. cit., p. 16.
USIS, IBS/E, Interview with Thomas Whitney AP L`orrespondent
in Moscow i9953, 29 Jan 19 info,, 194473), OF? T.CIAL
SE ONLY. val. RR 2.
State, Munich, AMCONGEN Despatch No. 330, 22..cit., Encl. 2,
"Through the Iron Curtain - BBC and the Cold War on the Air,"?
London Calling, Supplement, 28.Aug 1952, taken as quotes
from Radio Moscow, op* cit.
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No, 1080, 5 Nov 1953 (info.,
19)-53), para. 6, C. Eval. RR 2.:
Mate,
State
Moscow Despatch No, 322s 2 Mar 1954. C. Eval. RR 2.
HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No. 1080, op, cit.
- 197 -
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
25X1 A29 304.
25X1 A2g 305.
State, Munich, AMCONGENDespatch No. 330, opo cit., Encl,
2, p? 4.
State, Moscow Despatch No. 359, 1 Apr 1954. S. Eval. RR 2.
State
HICOG, Frankfurt 'Despatch No. 1497, 22. cit.
State, Munich, AMCONGEN Despatch No. 330, op. cit., Encl. 1,
306. International Telecommunications Conference,. Cairo 1938
Printing Office, D. C., p. 207-8. U. Eval. Poc.
307. State,OIR Report: No. 4800.59, Dec 1953, Pp. 30-31. S.
Eval. RR 2.
308.
25X1A
309, State, IBS/E Report No, 130, "Iron Curtain Press and Radio
Comment on the VOA," (info., 1 Feb-28 Feb 1953). U.. Eval.
RR 2 (2).
310. State, Psychological Intal l i gQn Di aes, Issue 11/2, 15
25X1A
25X1 A2g 312.
313.
314..
315.
316.
317. ibid.,: P. 4.
25X1A2g
25A 'A
25X1 A2019.
25X1 A29 320.
USIA, IBS/E Report No. A-123, Feb 1954, p. 3. U. Eval. RR 2.
Ibid., p. 5.
lib id., p. 4.
tate, IBD, VOA Evaluation Report No. 25. May 1953 p. 13
HICOG, Frankfurt Despatchdo. 1567, 29 Dec 1952. C. Eva!.
RR 2.
U. Eval. RR .
State, HICOG Frankfurt D tch No. 1497, 22. cit., p. 13.
- 198 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
321. State, IBD, VOA Evaluation Re orc No. 22, 15 Sep 1952; p.
12. S..Eval. R 3.
25X1 X7 322.
25X1A2g
323.
324.
325.
20
5X1A2g
326.
25X1A2g 327.
328.
25X139.
331.
25X1A2g
332.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
25X1A2g
342.
25X1A
State, HICOG, Frankfurt Despatch No. 1567, 22. cit.
Ibid.
State, Munich, AMCONGEN Despatch No. 330, 22. cit., Encl. 1,
p. 8; Encl. 2, p. 8-
State., HICOG Frankfurt Despatch No. 1497 op. cit.
a e, HICOCT, ra u Despatch No. 1497, op. cit.
State, IBD,.VOA Evaluation Report No. 17, 15 Apr 1952,
131 0. Eval. RR 3.
State Moscow Despatch No. 427 op. cit.
Latvian Information Bulletin, Apr 19 2, p. 13, (CIA 5397).
U. Eval. RR 3.
State, IBS, VOA Evaluation Report No. 20, 15 Jul 1952. U.
Eval. RR 2.
State, OIR Report No. 4800.59, op..cit.
USIA, VOA Program Schedule, 16 May 19 4. U. Eval. Doc.
Ibid.
Information for Appendix C supplied by
Information for Appendix E supplied by
FOIAb3bl
CIA FDD Summary No. 54, 29 Mar 1952. S. Eval. RR 2.
The information contained in this Appendix is based entirely
on Soviet open sources -- newspapers, trade journals, and
radi.obro adcasts .
25X1 A2g 343:
345. Ibid.
346. Ibid.
25X1A2g
FOIAb3bl
S-E-C-R-EST
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
25X1A2g
317 .
348.
^
25X1A2g
3119. Ibid.
350.
351.
352.
COIN D eP .
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000700040008-0
FOIAb3bl
FOIAb3bl
Ibid.
25X1A2g
Izvestiya, 13 Mar 1951. U. Eval. Doc.
 Approved For Release 19
Ww
WD&KA9-01093A000700040008-0
US OFFICIALS ONLY
US OFFICIALS ONLY
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP 93A000700040008-0
C4NFIDEAM