ELECTRIC POWER IN EAST GERMANY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000500150001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 66
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 15, 1954
• Content Type: IR

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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
ELECTRIC POWER IN EAST GERMANY
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. CIA/RR PR-64
- - 15 July 1954
CENTRAL
4
.11
'INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
rPicE4OF RESEARCH AND REPORtS-
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FAIL 9 -1954
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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S '
US OFFICIALS ONLY
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
EIECTRIC POWER IN EAST GERMANY
CIA/RR PR-64
(ORR Project 27.204)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
US OFFICIALS ONLY
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Summary
CONTENTS
Page
I.
Introduction
A. Description of the Industry
B. Importance of the Industry
C. Historical Development
D. Administration and Organization
,)
3
3
4
II.
Resources and Facilities
A.
Natural Resources
B.
Electric Generating Plants
8
C.
Transmission and Distribution Lines and Networks
10
III.
Production and Consumption
13
A.
Production
13
1. Generation
13
2. Import and Export of Power
15
B.
Consumption
18
C.
Consumption Controls
20
IV.
Expansibility
21
A.
Increase in Capability
21
B.
Deterrents to Expansion
23
C.
Expansion Estimate
24
V.
Input Requirements
24
VI.
Location
27
A.
Generation Facilities by Geographical Areas
27
B.
Transmission Facilities by Geographical Areas . .
28
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Appendixes Page
Appendix A. Electric Generating Plants in. East Germany . . 31
Appendix B. Technology and Terminology 43
Appendix C. Methodology 47
Appendix D. Gaps in Intelligence 51
Appendix E. Sources and Evaluation of Sources 53
lab 1 s
Production of Electric Power in East Germany, 1948-55 16
Power Consumption Pattern in East Germany, 1947 and
1951-52
Additions to Electric Power Plant Capacity in East
Germany, 1951-55
Estimated Total Electric Power Production Capacity in
East Germany, 1950-55
5. Fuel Consumption for Power Production in East Germany by
Centrally Controlled Plants, 1949
9
24.
6. Estimated Inputs of Fuel for Thermal Power Plants in
East Germany, 1950-55 27
LI 1 us brat. Lone. Following Page
Figure 1. Fast Germany: Electric Power Production (Chart) . 59
Li gure 2. Ea::;t Germany: Electric Power Production (Detail)
(chart) 58
,I gore _ . East Germany: Electric Power Plant Capacity
(Chart) . . ........... . , 58
East Germany: Major Electric Power Generating
Gill one and Transmission. Tines (Map) . . . 58
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(ORR Project 27.20)4)
ETECTRIC POWER IN EAST GERMANY*
Summary
The electric power industry of East Germany is of primary impor-
tance in the economy of the country. The industrial development of
East Germany is largely dependent upon the chemicals, synthetic fuels,
metallurgical, and mining industries, all of which depend upon electric
power. In 1953 these industries alone required about 45 percent of
East Germany's total production of electric power. There is, in East
German industry, no economically feasible substitute for electric
power.
The electric power** output of East Germany is the largest of the
European Satellites and is about equal to that of Czechoslovakia and
Poland combined. In 1953 the estimated production of electric power
in East Germany, 25.6 billion kwh (kilowatt-hours), was equal to about
19 percent of that of the USSR and 5 percent of that of the US.
With the exception of a few privately owned plants and "communal
or "municipal," plants, which constitute only a minor part of the
total national capacity, the industry is nationalized. The operation
of the plants and transmission systems, the allocation of output, and
the planning and implementation of the expansion of facilities are
under the control of the East German government.
Because of the topography of East Germany, the water power
resources are relatively small. As a result, about 98 percent of the
total electric power is produced by thermal electric plants, most of
which use various forms of indigenous brown coal. There are ahequate
reserves of this fuel in East Germany.
The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 15 May 1954.
** The term electric power as discussed in this report is liiiffLted
to the production and delivery of electric power and to the facilities
which are involved in production and delivery.
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World War II seriously affected the East German electric power
industry, less by direct war damage than by large-scale Soviet dis-
mantling and removals following the war and continuing to 1948.
Nearly 4o percent of the 1945 capacity was thus taken out of service,
and obsolescence resulted in further reductions. These losses have
been partially offset by rehabilitation and new construction, but
complete recovery of production capacity has not yet been accomplished.
In spite of lost capacity, however, production of electric power
in East Germany has increased in each of the postwar years. Results
were accomplished by increasing sharply the hours of utilization of
power-plant equipment and by pressing equipment to excessive load
limits. Estimated production of 25 billion kwh in 1953 and of 30.5
billion kwh at the end of the Five Year Plan in 1955 represents in-
creases of 66 percent and 100 percent, respectively, over 1948. Even
with this increased production, shortages and some form of restrictions
are likely to continue for at least the next 5 years.
It is estimated that in the last two years of the current Five
Year Plan, 1954 and 1955, there will be an increase in East German
electric power capacity of about 1 million kw (kilowatts), bringing
the total to about 6 million kw, an increase of 20 percent over 1953.
Expansion of facilities for the production of electric power will
continue to be hindered by dependence on outside sources for material
and equipment. East Germany is not capable of meeting its own require-
ments for production facilities. Therein lies one of the principal
vulnerabilities of the industry.
I. Introduction.
A. Description of the Industry.
The electric power industry of East Germany involves the
electric generation, transmission, and distribution facilities of
public-owned systems, industry-owned systems, and a small number of
privately operated plants. Collectively, it is a highly technical
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industry, with great economic and social influence, which has been
broken out of the over-all integrated system of prewar Germany as
it existed prior to the establishment of Soviet zonal boundaries.
This redivision required technical adjustments to the system and
placed the industry indirectly, though effectively, under Soviet
political and economic control, which had major effects on the con-
duct, operation, efficiency, and capability of the industry.
B. Importance of the Industry.
The electric power industry of East Germany, through the
medium of its generation, transmission, and distribution components,
plays a most important role in the industrial economy of the country.
East Germany is one of the most important industrial components of
the European Satellite group and is primarily concerned with the
manufacture of finished products. To a considerable degree, these
products depend upon the importation of raw materials from outside
areas. Formerly East Germany received a large portion of these
imports from the West, but under present conditions greater emphasis
is placed on obtaining raw materials and electrical equipment re-
quirements from the USSR and from the other Satellites.
The consumption of electric power by domestic consumers
received some favorable emphasis in mid-1953, but it still plays a
minor role in the economy of East Germany, and its needs are subor-
dinate to those of industrial consumers.
East Germany has a large and important chemical industry which
includes the production of synthetic fuel, a major mining industry,
and a number of manufacturing industries vital to the nation's economy.
All of these are users of electric power and many have their own
generating plants. The importance of electric power to an economy
that is striving to expand both its industrial output and the base of
that output is obvious. An effort of the magnitude Imposed by the
USSR has placed a tremendous requirement upon the electric power industry.
C. Historical Development.
To understand the East German electric power industry as it
exists today, a brief historical review is important. From 1932 to
World War II, a period of industrial activity highly accelerated by
the rise of the Nazi regime, production of electric power increased
very rapidly in Germany to approximately 75 billion kwh in 194:3.
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(See Fig. 1.*) This was a period of rearmament, and it included a
tremendous industrial expansion, with special emphasis on chemical
and synthetic fuel developments. It should be noted that as early
as World War I the electric power expansion program began to lean
heavily toward the use of brown coal for thermal generation of elec-
tric power. This desire to use an abundant and cheap local fuel,
even though it was less efficient technically than imported coal,
led to the development of the generating plants close to the brown
coal fields, where large industrial users of power were also located.
This development gave rise to a transmission net of considerable
magnitude, designed to provide power to the areas outside the coal
fields and to interconnect the various sources of power generation.
This transmission net provided Germany with a relatively highly inte-
grated industrial economy.
The electric power industry was a basic part of that economy,
and by the close of hostilities in World. War II the industry had
reached an estimated production of 70 to 80 billion kwh. 1/** What
was later to be known as East Germany accounted for about 25to 27
billion kwh. 2/ (See Fig. 1.) Some loss of capacity resulted from war
damage, and with the end of the war came the dismantling and removal
of about 4o percent of the newer and more efficient plants _V from
Berlin and East Germany to the USSR. This left East Germany with major
problems of reorganization, technical operation, reconstruction, and
new construction of electric power facilities. Needless to say, the
imposition of a Soviet-planned industrial economy of great magnitude
placed a heavy burden on the electric power facilities of East Germany.
Even under these handicaps the electric power industry raised produc-
tion some 45 percent in the period from 194-6 through 1950. L/ Thin
was accomplished by cannibalizing, importation of spare parts, balancing
boiler and turbine capacity, regulating consumption, operating generating
units far beyond safe limits, and deferring maintenance. There 1,r're
few new plant installations.
D. Administration and Organization.
The ministries concerned with the administration of nationalized
industries in. East Germany have been reorganized repeatedly. Until
* Following p. 58.
** Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix E.
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early November 1953 the State Secretariat for Coal and Power was
established as the administrative control of the energy economy of
East Germany. This department was divided into the Main Adminis-
tration for Coal and the Main Administration for Power. The Main
Administration for Power was divided into five subordinate functional
departments, each covering specific spheres of responsibility.
Geographically, East Germany was at first organized as five
operational areas described as Energy Districts, and it is assumed
that the functional organization carried down through the districts. L/
The Energy Districts were as follows:
Energy District Supply Area
North Mecklenburg and Brandenburg
South Thuringia
East Saxony
West Saxony-Anhalt
Central East Berlin
These districts were organized around the framework of the
former large companies operating in the respective areas.
Information indicates that on 1 January 1952 the Main Admin-
istration for Power was reorganized. It appears that as a result
of this reorganization the Main Administration for Power was divided
into five areas, or districts, known as VVB's (Vereinigung Volks-
eigener Betriebe -- Association of People-Owned Enterprises), very
similar to the former areas but with somewhat different boundaries.
The principal change seems to be the establishment of a new north
area and the combining of the Brandenburg area with Berlin. These
areas are outlined below.*
Energy District Supply Area
North (Schwerin-VVB) Mecklenburg
South (Weimar-VVB) Thuringia
East (Dresden-VVB) Saxony
West (Halle-VVB) Saxony-Anhalt
Central (Berlin-VVB) Brandenburg and East Berlin
There appears to be some question about the correct titular
description of the individual areas or districts.
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About midyear 1952 the 5 Laender (political divisions) of
East Germany were -abolished, and the area was organized into 14 Bezirke
(political districts). 1/ Eventually the power system will be re-
organized to conform to these political divisions, and there probably
will be 15 VEB (Volkseigene Betriebe People-Owned Enterprises)
Nationalized Distribution Sections consolidated under the Berlin Power
Administration VEB. .3_/ It is not clear whether or not the intentions
are to abolish the five energy districts at that time. As a functional
group, they probably could continue to serve as the generation and
transmission organization, leaving the distribution function to the
smaller unit. It is very probable that the organization plans are not
sufficiently well advanced to permit a clear definition.
It must be pointed out that until 1 January 1954 there existed
a group of Soviet-owned industrial corporations, SAG's (Sowjetische,
and later Staatliche, Aktiengeselischaften) which were the largest
electric power producers in East Germany. They were producing from
35 to !IO percent of East Germany's total electric power. 2/ These
plants were not under the Min Administration for Power but did con-
tribute energy to the general supply. By 1 January 1954, however,
all the SAG power plants had reverted to German operation and control
as nationalized properties.*
It now appears established that the organizational structure
of East German industry, from the ministerial level down, has been
changed. 10/ It is indicated that the structure is composed of a
new Ministry of Heavy Industry, which has absorbed the functions of
the former Ministry of Metallurgy and Mining, of the State Secretariat
for Coal and Power, and of the State Secretariat for Chemicals, Stones,
and Earth. This change was made retroactive to 1 November 1953, but
all planning measures bearing on the activity of the new ministry in
1954 were to have an effective date of 1 January 1954. 11/ Subordinate
to the Minister of Heavy Industry are four deputy ministers, one of
which is the Deputy Minister for Gas and Power. Under the Deputy Min-
ister for Gas and Power are the respective Main Administrations for Gas
and for Power. The Main Administration for Power is divided into five
VVB's corresponding to the previously described Energy Districts.
The so-called. "captive" electric power plants of industries
under the control of other ministries, deputy ministries, or secre-
tariats apparently still function under those controlling authorities.
Espenhain I and II may have been exempt from the turnover. Some
observers state that these two power generation units are being retained
by the USSR as a power supply for the Wlsmut uranium mines.
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These plants are, of course, outside the general sphere of "public
supply," but through the national power network they do contribute
to the public supply.
II. Resources and Facilities.
A. Natural Resources.
The economy of East Germany like that of any region, is, to
a large measure, adjusted to its natural resources. Further, any
attempt to accelerate the industrial activity of a region must include
increased production of electric power. Increased production of elec-
tric power must be accompanied by increased fuel supply when the
primary source of energy is coal. The dependence of electric power in
East Germany on the coal supply is apparent when it is realized that
nearly 98 percent of the production is by thermal electric plants.
The primary energy resource in East Germany is brown coal, and the
bulk of thermal electric power generation is based upon that fuel, of
which there is a supply sufficient to meet the demands of the area in
the predictable future. 12/ A small amount of hydroelectric power is
generated, but it is an insignificant factor in the total production of
electric power in East Germany.
Although there is a wide variation in the heating quality and
other characteristics of brown coal and in the physical forms in which
it is used, this report treats it as a single class of solid fuel.
It may be briefly described as a fuel having a high ash and moisture
content, low calorific value, and poor storage qualities, all of which
make it a less desirable fuel for the production of steam than the so-
on:lied hard (Stein) coal.* Its ready availability in large quantities
and relatively short transportation hauls, however, compensate for its
deficiencies, and it will continue indefinitely as the principal fuel
for the generation of electric poster.
About 12 power-generating plants in East Germany were classi-
fied as hard coal plants, the fuel for which was imported mainly
from Poland./ It -appears that these plants have been in the process
of being converted to the use of brown coal, but the status and extent
of the conversion are not known.
* In European terminology, "hard coal" is a general term used to
indicate grades of coal superior to brown coal.
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The use of brown.coal also affects the location of the genera-
tion plants, for transportation and storage problems usually make it
advisable to place the generating plant as close as possible to the
mine. A second determining factor is that some very large industrial
consumers of electric power are also heavy users of brown coal and
are therefore located close to the fuel supply.
There is evidence to indicate a coal shortage in East Ger-
many during the winter of 1952-53, 14/ but the shortage does not
appear to have seriously affected the production of electric power.
The severe winter of 1953-54, however, created a fuel shortage
which was reflected in the electric power industry, and there are
indications that there was a definite power shortage throughout
East Germany.
Although several important rivers pass through East Germany,
they do not represent large hydroelectric resources. 12/ An added
deterrent to the use of hydropower is the much longer time required
for the development of hydroelectric facilities, time which the
accelerated plan does not provide. A hydroelectric pump-storage plant
is used at Niederwartha to provide power at times of high demand (peak-
ing power). This type of development is generally not very economical
and usually is feasible only in special cases. This installation is
the only one of its kind in East Germany and is of minor importance to
the over-all power-production goals.
B. Electric Generating Plants.
By the end of World War II, Germany had developed a highly
integrated electric power generation and transmission system. This
system had a capability sufficient to meet the war needs of the country.
East German electric power facilities had not suffered extensively
from war damage, 1.Y although they did experience considerable disrup-
tion and were in need of rehabilitation, primarily as a result of the
heavy wartime production loads they had carried:- The estimated 1945
installed capacity* of the portion included in the zonal boundaries
of East Germany was over 8 million kw. ll/
* In this report, capacity is used as a general descriptive term and
refers to the production potential of the facilities available for
the generation of electric power. Installed capacity is usually defined
as the total of the manufacturer's intended productive capacities of
the equipment concerned. Installed capacity also is known as rated
capacity or nameplate capacity.
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The real loss in capacity in East Germany was a result of the
extensive dismantling program carried on by the USSR following the
war. Soviet removals included much of the newest and most efficient
equipment and represented a production capacity of about 3 million
kw, 1...q/ nearly 4o percent of the total East German capacity.
During the period following the war, 1945-49, the electric
power industry appears to have been in a highly confused state. The
wide variance in many source figures indicates that dismantling,
nationalization, and reorganization placed the industry in a position
where a determination of the actual installed capacity of the various
plants was virtually impossible. Moreover, the condition was far from
static; the USSR was still engaged in dismantling up to 1948. This
dismantling was coupled with such factors as long operating cycles,
badly maintained equipment, and material and equipment shortages, and
all contributed to the continuing capacity loss. In addition, reporting
systems and channels that had existed during the war were completely
disrupted. The capacity remaining in 1948 existed in about 1,439 power
plants 12/ and reportedly amounted to some 4.2 22/ to 4.8 21/ million
kw. A study of the 1947 operating report 22/ indicates that in 1946
there were some 740,000 kw L/ of capacity in power plants that were
not connected to the public network or were of less than 1,000 kw of
capacity.* Annex 18 of the 1947 operating report L/ contains a graphic
portrayal of plant capacity indicating that at the early part of 1947
capacity had been reduced to 2.8 million kw. This is a capacity that
can best be described as "usable capacity," and it must be made clear
that, because of the great imbalance between boiler capacity and gen-
erating machine capacity, there is no direct method of establishing,
from sources or from totals of estimated plant capacities, the real
installed plant capacity for the area. It is significant that the
greater portion of the source material represents the average annual
productive capacity of East Germany for the period 1947 through 1950
as 2.8 million kw. LI One source EW indicates that 42 percent of
the generating machine capacity and 23 percent of the boiler capacity
was not being used in 1950.
* See Appendix A for a tabulation of reported electric power plants
with individual capacities of more than 1,000 kw, with CIA estimates
of those capacities.
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The total estimated East German installed capacity for the
year 1950 is as follows:
Kilowatts
Thermal electric plants
3,695,500
Hydroelectric plants
104,500
Total
3,800,000
Although it is possible that, because of the lack of identi-
fiable information, some plants with capacities of more than 1,000 kw
are not included, it is believed that this estimate is within a range
of accuracy of minus 10 percent and plus 20 percent. In addition,
there is approximately another 700,000 kw of capacity El/ in small
units which are not necessarily connected to the grid. In general,
these units are connected with industrial plants and furnish electric
power to those plants. There is little detailed information available
on the size or location of these units, but the aggregate of 700,000 kw
has been mentioned in published sources, and there is no reason to
doubt the magnitude of the group estimate. Although these units do not,
in the majority of cases, represent a contribution to the public supply
network, they do represent an addition to the industrial economy of
the region. To be consistent with published sources, which report
primarily only on the public supply network, the capacity of these units
is not included in the estimate of total East German capacity.
Through 1952, a great amount of effort appears to have been
expended on improvisations and repairs to existing equipment, with some
attempts to balance boiler capacities with generation capacities.
C. Transmission and Distribution Lines and Networks.*
After World War I, Germany progressively developed its trans-
mission system to a point where it was adequate to supply the demands
placed upon it during World War II. During the between-wars period, it
was a well-integrated system and developed beyond the somewhat localized
requirements of World War I, for by its extension and. integration it
provided for considerable diversification of industry. Although it
suffered some war damage in World War II, tt was, to a large degree,
quite readily repaired and was more than able to meet requirements at
the close of the War in 1945.
See the map, East Germany: Major Electric Power Generating Stations
and Transmission Lines, following p. 58.
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After 1945 the East German electric power transmission system
experienced appreciable dismantling (about 30 percent .2.?./) by the
USSR. Among the major facilities dismantled were i4 out of 10 circuits
to Berlin, the line between Trattendorf and Berlin, and the lines
between Finow and Pasewalk, and between Finow and Strausberg. Many
double-circuit lines were reduced to single-circuit lines, and the
experimental direct-current, high-voltage line from Elbe (Vockerode)
to Berlin was removed. ?.2./ It appears that even with the increased
activity in power production and the emphasis on power requirements,
there has been relatively little construction of new transmission
lines and circuits. This indicates that there are other more serious
requirements facing the industry. Some activity, however, has been
noted:
1. Construction of a transmission line from Hohenwarte to
the uranium mines in the Saalfeld area. 12/
2. Construction of a transmission line from Loesnitz to
Hartenstein. .3.1/
3. Tapping of the Hennigsdorf-Strausberg transmission line,
avoiding the French sector at Lindenberg, and building from there a
double-circuit, 100-kv (kilovolt) transmission line to Friedrichs-
felde.
4. Construction of transmission line to the Upper Silesian
coal fields. (This transmission line fbrmerly extended into LaUta
but was dismantled.) .3.3./
5. Construction of a 220-kw north and south transmission link,
Bohlen to Espenhain to Berlin 2/1/
6. Reported completion of 4 220-kv transmission line,
Espenhain to Zwoenitz. Z./ (Only one circuit had been completed in
NOvember 1952.) 2f/
7. 'Increase of the voltage to 110 kv on the transmission line
from Pasewalk to Grief swald to Stralsund, ly./
8. Plans to restore the 110-kv transmission line, Berlin to
Trattendorf.
9. Construction of a 110-kv transmission line from Altenberg
to Dresden. ,22/
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10. Reported construction of a substation, "Marke," which
has double-circuit 220-kv transmission line connections to Dieskau-
Susigke and Magdeburg and double-circuit 110-kv transmission line
connections to Zschornewitz and Ifockerode.112/
The fact that reliable sources report that some additions to
generating plants have been completed or are under construction,
without reference to connections to the transmission system, indi-
cates that there are some additional lines, either planned or com-
pleted, which are not known at present. These additions may, of course,
be accommodated by relatively short, low-voltage circuits. It is
also apparent that shortages of materials, especially copper, are a
serious deterrent to the transmission construction program. In the
main, however, the transmission net is satisfactory.
On 5 March 1952, the discontinuance by East German authorities
of all power connections between the Soviet Zone of Berlin and the
other sectors created a serious transmission .problem. This action
involved cutting the transmission line connections with the West and
rearranging the circuits in such a way as tb bypass Spandau and run
directly into Hennigsdorf. L1-1/ The East German government was
apparently well prepared for this step, although it probably created
some minor power shortages in areas outside of Berlin. The action
also made available to East Berlin some additional power which it
badly needed.
In August 1953, some transmission of electric power from West
Germany to East Germany was resumed. LW The available information
indicates that at present the power is flowing over two transmission-
line Circuits, the Rettmer-Hagenow circuit and the Hallendorf-Lehrte-
Helmstedt-Magdeburg circuit. This exchange is discussed in greater
detail under III, A, 2, below.
The electrical distribution systems* of East Germany were
adequate during the war years. Since the Soviet occupation, however,
very little information about them is available. It is probable
that within broad limits they are able to meet reasonable demands.
* A distribution system is that part of an electrical power system
that lies between the high-voltage transmission system, usually
starting at a substation on the latter system, and the consumer. It
essentially is concerned with the functions of distributing the energy
to the individual customers and is operated, in a general way, at
lower voltage levels.
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It can be expected that there are transformer shortages, but it is
doubtful if the effect on the electrical distribution systems is of
serious consequence at this -bump. Industry, the consumer of the
great majority of East Germany's electric power, is generally located
relatively close to sources of power or to transformation centers,
and distribution functions involve relatively short lines. The
needs of domestic consumers, ordinarily requiring extensive distribu-
tion systems, have been subordinated in East Germany to the require-
ments of industrial consumers.
After mid-year 1953 the "New Course" initiated a shift in
emphasis more favorable to the domestic consumer. Although this will
eventually bring some increased electric power supply to the domestic
consumer, it is very doubtful if the quantitative change will be
significant, and the new policy is not likely to change the electric
power balance.
III. Production and Consumption.
A, Production.
1. Generation.
The program of plant dismantling in East Germany, so
energetically pursued by the USSR prior to 1948, certainly made it
difficult for East Germany to accept and implement the new economy
built around the exploitation of the industries and the resources
of the area. Thus the imposition of a planned economy with produc-
tion targets set purposely high created a major problem. Before
the advent of the Five Year Plan (1951-55), East Germany was able to
increase its electric power output steadily to a point where it
_
attained a 1950 production of 18.9 billion kwh. 72 ,43 The preliminary
an
pl objective for 1955 was 31.4 billion kwh. 44 Later, when the
full plan* was announced, it was evident that the goal had been raised
* Hereafter referred to as the original Five Year Plan. Frequent
source references to "National Economic Plan" and "Economic Plan" are
concerned with annual plan adjustments for a given current year.
These adjustments, apparently, are not limited to single revisions
but are designed to permit a state of fluidity. They remain within
the scope of the long-range Plan (Five Year), however, and probably are
based upon a current capability estimate. This situation appears to
be a basic element involved in many statistical inconsistencies.
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to 33.4 billion kwh.)22/ In mid-1953, possibly reflecting the "New
Course," the target.for 1955 was lowered to 31.5 billion kwh.
Production of electric power is so closely related to
such factors as generation capacity, hours of operation, and operable
capacity that a brief discussion of these relationships will be of
benefit.
From 1945 through 1950, production of electric power was
accomplished with few, if any, new plant additions. At least it can
be stated that new plant additions did not result in net capacity
gains. It is evident, however, that production was progressively
increased during this period, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.*
This increase in production was achieved by the extensive
exploitation of such devices as repairs to existing equipment, the
use of many forms of improvisation, and the increase of the hours of
operation of the generating units to the very maximum. The latter
method probably can be considered the most important and, in some ways,
the most significant. The 1947 figure of 2.8 million kw of operable
capacity produced 13.7 billion kwh during that year. This was the
result of approximately 5,000 hours of equipment operating time for
the year. In 1950 the operable capacity was relatively the same, but
the production had increased to 18.9 billion Oh. Thus it becomes
apparent that the primary aid to production was the increase in the
annual operating time to 6,600 hours per year. Such unusually long
operating cycles are' subject to some doubt. The fact remains, however,
that considerable positive information seems to point to this method
of increasing production. Further, it appears to be the most likely
and practical way of increasing the productivity with the available
equipment. Such extreme production efforts can be considered dangerous
to future production capabilities. They result in deferred maintenance
and excessive wear on equipment, and they are considered poor operational
risks. Mat the end result of such operating practices will be is a
debatable matter, as there are few yardsticks for comparison. In the
US no such demands are ever placed on equipment. Hence it is impossi-
ble to say haw far or for how long power-system equipment can stand
that kind of treatment. There can be no doubt, however, that if the
practice is continued, it will certainly be costly, and it may be
disastrous.
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In order that the situation may be clearly understood,
it is repeated that the 2.8 million kw is the average capacity that
was available for operation during the period from 1945 to 1950.
It is not installed capacity, and it must be remembered that units
were constantly being repaired and brought into service, but that
other units were being lost and removed from service. It is not
reasonable to expect the industry to continue to accelerate its
production rates without extensive new plant additions. That can
be accomplished only if expansion plans remain on schedule and new
plants are brought into being. This condition appears doubtful, for
material and equipment schedules are not being met.)11/ It is
believed that the electric power industry in East Germany will produce
only about 30.5 billion kwh in 1955, a billion kwh less than the reduced
plan goal announced in July 1953. It is significant, however, that
the predicted requirement is in consonance with the estimated achieve-
ment of production in 1955, as shown in Figure 3.*
Production of electric power in East Germany from 1948
through 1955 is given in Table 1.**
2. Import and Export of power.
Electric power is a commodity only in the broad sense
that it is bought and sold. It must be realized, however, that it
cannot be stored and thus lacks a very important component of market
barter. Usually, its sale to the ultimate consumer is of the nature
of a monopoly trade. Another important factor is that the consumer
can ordinarily exercise a right to call for any quantity at any time,
within the physical limits of the supply system. He may call for
quantities several times his normal requirements and may expect
immediate delivery, except in cases where the seller has placed
fixed limits on the demands of the buyer.
Thus there is an element of service injected into the
supply sequence, and the electric power industry becomes functionally
divided into service areas that are represented by some corporate form
of organization. These corporate units have relatively large invest-
ments in generation, transmission, and distribution facilities
designed to provide electric power to consumers in a specific geo-
graphic area.
* Following p. 58.
** Table 1 follows on p. 16.
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Table 1
Production of Electric Power in Fast Germany
1948-55
Million Kilowatt-Hours
1948
1949
1950 1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Plan
14,000
2/
14,300
2/
18,000 2/ 21,177 12/
22,642
12/
24,48512/
29,196
12/
33,41412/
Production Estimate
15,400
2/
17,300
2/
18,900 2/ 21,362 1/
23,462
2/
25,600 1/
28,000
1/
30,500 1/
Production Estimate, by
Thermal Electric Plants
N.A.
N.A.
18,400 20,750
22,800
24,900
27,300
29,700
Mid-1953 Plan Revision
Requirement
25,600
28,600
30,500
Plan ProductiOn
24,700
27,800
31,500
Difference
- 900
- 800
+1,000
a.
" Z2/
d. 22/
e. One source quotes probable production as 23,200 22/; another estimates electric power for 1952, based upon data known as of
30 September 1952, at 23,100 231; and another has field comment that states "the plan for production of 23,462,000 kwh was
fulfilled." 21/
f. Graphic extrapolation.
g. This revision is dependent upon a schedule of capacity additions that to date do not appear probable; hence it is not believed
that 1955 production will be capable of exceeding the revised requirement. 22/
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These corporate units have found that they can achieve
large benefits, improve their ability to serve, and reduce their
plant investments by interconnecting their systems and trading
freely among themselves. This power exchange between two or more
systems is frequently (although not necessarily) netted at the end of
a settlement period, leaving the actual financial transaction a one-
way affait. The benefits are, of course, not limited to any two
systems, and they tend to increase with such related factors as the
addition of larger systems, coverage of greater geographic areas,
diversity of generation sources, and diversity of the character of
load.
Thus it becomes obvious that, from a technical viewpoint,
political boundaries 1?ecome very artificial when they restrict the
free flow of power. It is desirable to provide agreements that will
permit a relatively free flow of power across national frontiers_
Prewar Germany had an electric system integrated on a
much larger geographic and industrial scale than had the postwar
zonal areas, and the free flow of electric power across the new
boundaries was most important. Although East Germany could benefit
considerably by such an exchange, the East German officials seemed
determined to attempt independence from the West. To accomplish this,
various forms of exchange harassment were employed, the most note-
worthy being the 5 March 1952 curtailment of power exchange with the
West, Li primarily aimed at West Berlin, although other areas were
affected.
The problems of an economy plagued with a deficit of elec-
tric power forced East Germany again to permit the flow of power across
its boundaries, and on 24 August 1953, after an interruption of about
18 months, transfers from West Germany to East Germany were resumed
at least on a limited basis. 22/ These transfers are made at two
exchange points. One provides for 45,000 kw of firm power over the
Rettmer-Bagenow line, a 110-kv connection feeding a loop .5.,Y circuit
that is the principal supply to Energy District North (Mecklenburg)
and also ties into the Berlin area at Hennigsdorf. Mecklenburg ha
been mentioned as the agricultural area that suffered most as a
result of the 5 March 1952 power interruption. It may be significant
that this power exchange was initiated at the start of the harvest
season, when Mecklenburg requirements could be expected to increase.
The second exchange point provided for 45,000 kw, on a "when available"
basis, from Hallendorf (West) to the Magdeburg area. This exchange
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point must involve the circuits through the Helmstedt-Harbke area,
which was one of the principal exchange points under the old agree-
ments.
Thus it appears that the present power exchange is a
one-way arrangement, insofar as power flow is concerned: power goes
to East Germany, and West Germany obtains direct fiscal gains from
the transfer.
There are other points of interchange of power, with
Poland and Czechoslovakia. The transmission lines involved are not
of major importance, and available information indicates that the
power flows are not of significant quantities. .5_2/
B. Consumption.
The power consumption pattern for East Germany for 1951-52
appears to be reasonably consistent with that established in 1947,
the chemical industry being the largest single user of power. The
power consumption pattern for East Germany in 1947, 1951, and 1952
is shown in Table 2.*
It is interesting to note, as shown in Table 2, that there
appears to have been a percentage reduction in the 1951 domestic
consumption of 1.3 percent from the 1947 percentage, and an addi-
tional drop of 0.5 percent by 1952. This percentage decrease from
1947 to 1952, translated in terms of kwh, represents a reduction of
about 420 million kwh and probably reflects the various restrictive
programs aimed at domestic consumption prior to the announcement of
the "New Course" in mid-1953. It is possible that this falling trend
in domestic consumption may be arrested or even reversed; it is the
declared intention of the "New Course" to increase the power supply
to the small consumer. ,No information has become available, however,
which supports this intention. It is apparent that the industrial
consumption of electric power in East Germany is over 60 percent of
total consumption, and it is probable that this proportion will not
change materially.
The per capita electric power consumption in East Germany does
not present a very meaningful statistic. Although the population
trend is not well defined, it may be assumed that the population of
* Table 2 follows on p. 19.
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Table 2
Power Consumption Pattern in East Germany
1947 and 1951-52 2/
Percent
Industry
1947
1951
1952
Chemical
16.5
16.9
16.8
Mining
14.1
14.5
15.3
Liquid Fuel
9.2
12.0
11.8
Other Industries
19.9
17.0
17.1
Occupation Power
9.9
8.6
8.3
Transport and Public Use
6.3
7.1
7.3
Agriculture
2.9
2.5
3.5
Domestic
12.2
10.9
10.4
Plant Use and Losses IV
16.0
10.5
9.4
Total 1/
100.0
100.0
100.0
a. There is no indication that the pattern in 1953 was
materially different from that in 1951 and 1952.
b. The figures 10.5 percent for 1951 and 9-.4 percent for
1952 appear to be disproportionately small. The figure
of 16 percent for 1947 appears to be closer to reasonable
limits. Experience in the US indicates a range of from
15 to 20 percent for this category.
c. Total production (not including imports) in terms of
million kwh was as follows: 1947, 12.8; 1951, 21.3;
1952, 23.4.
East Germany will hold fairly even at about 18.5 million. Consider-
ing the continued and changing domestic use restrictions and the dis-
proportionate emphasis on industrial requirements, this population
figure related to electric power production figures would not
establish a very reliable set of values. The following comparison,
however, serves as a relative indicator.
Although an estimate based upon known values would indicate
about 713 kwh per capita in East Germany, one source quotes 620 kwh
per capita (over-all) for 1947. LV The over-all per capita use in
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the US for 1952 was 2,940 kwh (as derived from Federal Power Commis-
sion production data and the US Census estimate). If East Germany
attains its 1955 probable production of 30.5 billion kwh and the
population holds at 18.5 million, the per capita use in 1955 will be
1,650 kwh.
C. Consumption Controls.
The officials of East Germany are in a position to exercise
two most effective power-use controls.
The first of these is the spreading of industrial use
patterns?.12/ by adjusting the industrial requirements to a 2)4-hour
use basis. This is the most satisfactory method of reducing system
demands and of stretching the system capability. TechnicallY, it
could be classified as a method of improving the system-load factor,
for it permits a given system capacity to produce a greater quantity
of kilowatt-hours. This, in turn, increases industrial production,
reduces system reserve requirements, and improves system utilization
(without added investment). Indirectly, it also improves the domestic
load pattern; when work shifts are spread, the normal use habits of
the popuiaoe are also disturbed, with a consequent lowering of peak
demands. This system was used with considerable benefit in the US
during World War II. In normal times, however, it is not acceptable
to the populace and is either actively or passively resisted.
The second power-use control is the establishment of limiting
controls on consumption. L/ These involve the actual restriction of
the amount of power that may be used and the establishment of specific
time limits when power may be used. Rigid penalties for infractions
are imposed, and there is apparently no hesitancy to 'black out" cir-
cuits to domestic consumers. Under that system the industrial con-
sumer has positive priority on the power generated. It is effective
within the limits of the amount of power ordinarily made available
to the domestic user. As shown in Table 2, the amount has ranged
from 12.2 percent in 1947 to 10.4 percent in 1952.
Following the 17 June 1953 strikes and disturbances in East
Germany, the officials promised a relaxation of the domestic electric
power restrictions. Some information indicates that these measures
may originally have beenonly promises which were not to be kept. L/
Later information indicates, however, that there has been an effort
to reduce power cuts. In the face of a power deficit, it appears that
it will be some time.before the measures being taken can be fully
evaluated.
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IV. Expansibility.
A. Increase in Capability.
After the termination of the dismantling phase, near the end
of 1947, East Germany was faced with the problem of how to revitalize
and implement its electric power industry sufficiently to keep abreast
of the requirements. Although there was evidence that the technicians
within the electric power industry were aware of the problem facing
the industry, reconstruction and expansion of facilities lagged seri-
ously, even though they were outlined in broad form. ?.1/ For some
time the planning did not appear thorough, and there was no real
evidence of coordinated effort. To a large degree, requirements were
met by long hours of operation, improvisation, and repairs of a more
or less temporary nature. This type of effort carried the industry
through 1950.
In such a situation, an improvement in plant efficiency would
have been a help. Improved efficiency, in effect, releases more kwh
for useful work with the expenditure of the same quantities of fuel,
supplies, and labor. Data on plant efficiency are too fragmentary to
permit a firm evaluation, but continuing efforts to raise efficiency
are doubtless being made. Such factors as conversion from hard
coal to brown coal, neglect of preventative maintenance, excessive
hours of operation, and material and equipment shortages, however,
are not conducive to high operating efficiencies. 2/ Consequently,
it may be expected that the operating efficiencies of the East German
plants will remain below normal during the period of the First Five
Year Plan (1951-55). J.1.2/
The Plan called for the addition of 340,000 kw of generating
capacity during 1952 IS/ and announced the expansion of support
facilities such as those industries manufacturing generating and tur-
bine equipment. /1/ This 340,000 kw included both the construction
of new facilities and the rehabilitation of existing facilities.
Such important projects as Elbe (Vockerode), Calbe-West, Fuerstenberg
East, and Trattendorf were involved in this Plan. 2/ A new plant,
Berzdorf,* of 350,000 kw, was also mentioned, but provision for
actual construction of this plant does not appear to have materialized.
* Apparently to have been constructed in two phases, the first to
have been 150,000 kw initiated in 1952.
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The Plan called for a capacity improvement of 655,000 kw for
the year 1953. /2/ By mid-year, however, this goal was reduced to
6o4,000 kw, IL/ a decrease of 8 percent. The same Plan document
indicated that of the 604,000-kw increase, only 55 percent, 336,000 kw,
would actually be accomplished in 1953. /2/ The 8-percent reduction
from the original Five Year Plan goal appears to be inconsistent with
the stated intention of the "New Course" to eliminate power cuts and
improve future power supplies, but it may reflect an attempt to jockey
a bad plan into a more realistic position.
An even more significant factor appears when the Plan figures
pertaining to capacity additions for 1954 and .1955 are reviewed. The
original capacity expansion goal for the 1951-55 period was 2.78 mil-
lion kw, but about the time the "New Course" realignment was being
felt, the objective was raised to 3"million kw. This was done in
the face of the fact that statistical performance data for three-
fifths of the Plan period had indicated an accomplishment of only
23.9 percent of the Plan goal. At the same time, the official docu-
ment expressed the probability that the new goal would be realized
by about 88 percent.* This sort of double-objective planning is
not only confusing but would appear to bc tantamount to an expression
of lack of confidence in the expansion possibilities of the Plan.
Planned and estimated additions to electric power plant
capacity in East Germany from 1951 through 1955 are shown in Table 3.**
* A later document /Y with an information date of December 1953
(received May 1954), indicates that only 196.7 megawatts would be put
in operation in 1953, instead of the expected 336 megawatts. This
document states, however, that the carryover into 1954 would be 137.25
megawatts and that 25.4 megawatts not planned had been completed. This
indicates that the Plan had again been revised, apparently to values
similar to those listed as probable (Table 3), and that this revised
Plan was likely to be unfulfilled. This document continues with a Plan
figure for 1954 of 741.0 megawatts. At this point it is not clear
whether or not the carryover (137.25 megawatts) is to be in addition to
the 741.0 megawatts. From all this, one fact emerges: the capacity
additions are repeatedly falling behind objectives in a manner that
will certainly hamper-the Five Year Plan goal.
** Table 3 follows on p. 23.
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Table 3
Additions to Electric Power Plant Capacity in East Germany 22]
1951-55
Thousand Kilowatts
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1951-55
Original Five Iear Plan
270
340
655
750
765
2,780
Revised Target
160
171
604
1,010
1,060
3,005
Probable or Actual
160
171
336
863
940
2,470
B. Deterrents to Expansion.
There appears to have been considerable lost effort in the
failure of the responsible officials in East Germany to recognize the
importance of coordinating the reconstruction program and establish
priorities on material and equipment for the electric power industry. 113_/
Because East Germany had not previously constructed large
turbines, boilers, and generators, 12/ time was lost getting industry
organized and expanded to build such equipment. The East Germans had
originally anticipated the importation of much of this equipment and
material from the West. When this failed, relatively unsuccessful
efforts were made to obtain equipment from Czechoslovakia, L/ and more
recently a concerted effort has been made to organize and establish
priorities for the procurement of material and equipment for the elec-
tric power industry. L./
Even with this implementation of the program for the construc-
tion of new facilities, there still remains considerable doubt as to
the probable quantitative net gain in capacity that will materialize.
There is a considerable amount of daily attrition of available production
capacity, some of it temporary in character and some of it more serious
and permanent. This attrition of capacity is not directly predictable.
Because of the long hours of operation and the poor condition of main-
tenance, however, it is a significant factor. As such, it offsets an
equal amount of new-capacity additions, and it is believed that before
real capacity improvement can be realized, a greater effort will have
to be directed toward rehabilitation.
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_ _ _ ?
C. Expansion Estimate.
The expansion effort .11.as been estimated by graphical projec-
tion of the historical kwh-production curve and by translating that
in terms of capacity. Source statements, although in general agree-
ment that the production objective will not be attained, are in wide
disagreement as to the planned capacity additions (kw) that can be
accomplished by 1955. These statements of additions vary from 2.3
million kw L32/ to 4 million kw. LI/ It is estimated, however, that
capacity additions of about 2.3 million kw will have been built during
the Five Year Plan. This compares favorably with the official East
German figure of 2.5 million kw as a probable addition. (See Table 3.)
Added to the 1950 estimate of 3.8 million kw, this additional capacity
of 2.3 million kw would give an estimated total capacity of 6.1 million
kw for 1955, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4
.Estimated Total Electric Power Production Capacity
in East Germany 2/
1950-55
Million Kilowatts
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
3.8 4.2 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.1
a. For graphical representation of estimated
total capacity, see Figure 3, following p. 58.
V. Input Requirements.
In 1950, some 104,500 kw of principal plant capacity in East
Germany was represented by hydroelectric power plants and 3,695,000 kw
by thermal electric plants. About 97.4 percent of the requirement was
met by thermal electric power. With the exception of a very small
amount (less than 2 percent of the total) attributed to gas and diesel
sources, this thermal electric power was produced from various forms
of coal. Because of a lack of available statistical information
covering all of the power plants in East Germany, the development of
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a pattern of use of these various forms is difficult. A 1949 fuel-
use breakdown for the centrally controlled plants has, however, been
provided by a documentary source. L/ This breakdown is shown in
Table 5.*
Since the centrally controlled plants in 1949 accounted for
about 35 percent of the total production, Table I may be reasonably
used as a basis for Table 6,** which gives the estimated amounts of
coal required by the electric power industry during each year of the
Five Year Plan.
In Table 6 it will be noted that a number of forms of brown coal
have been combined into one item, "Other Forms of Brown Coal." This
grouping is justified because the specific heat rate of these forms
(kg/kwh) is considerably higher than that of raw brown coal, and in
comparable time periods there will probably be a rather wide variation
of the "mix" of all these forms of coal. This mix will depend on
such variable factors as available supply, transportation, heat, and
moisture content of the fuel, as well as on the manner in which the
system load is assigned to the various interconnected plants.
It is estimated from Table 6 that, although the percentage is
declining, the quantity of hard coal consumed annually in the produc-
tion of power remains about constant. The decline in percentage is in
conformity with the stated intention L3.2/ to reduce and, eventually, to
eliminate the use of hard coal for the production of electric power.
Conversion, however, will probably.be slow, for plants designed for
the use of hard coal are difficult to operate on brown coal and effi-
cient operation can be attained only by the conversion of boiler equip-
ment to permit use of brown coal. As such conversion is made, it can
be expected that an equivalent thermal input of the appropriate forms
of brown coal will be required. To date, specific evidence of success
in this effort is meager; at least one plant, Peenemunde, seems to be
using brown coal, and it is possible that others have made the con-
version.
* Table 5 follows on p. 26.
** Table 6 follows on p. 27.
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Table 5
Fuel Consumption for Power Production in East Germany
by Centrally Controlled Plants 2/
1949
Fuel
Thousand
Metric
Tons
Specific
Kilograms
per Kilowatt-Hour
Million
Kilowatt-
Hours
Percent of Production
of Centrally
Controlled Plants
Hard Coal
133
1.18
113.2
1.85
Raw Brown Coal
11,899
2.59
4,600.0
75.17
Dry Coal
73
1.22
59.7
0.97
Brown Coal Briquettes
1,332
1.29
1,027.0
16.80
Brown Coal Dust
10
0.94
9.9
0.16
Brown Coal LT Coke
310
1.15
269.3
4.40
Brown Coal Briquette Chips
35
1.79
19.5
0.32
Gas Coke Breeze
3
1.40
2.05
0.03
Gas
11.0
0.18
Diesel
7.7
0.12
Total
6,119.35 b/
100.00
a. The fuel (tons) quantities shown above may not reflect total deliveries to plants, as they
represent only the quantities used for the production of electric power and exclude inputs to
steam heat or process steam.
b. Centrally controlled plants included virtually all of the large power plants, except the
SAG's, and accounted for about 35 percent of total East German production in 1940.
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Table 6
Estimated Inputs of Fuel for Thermal Power Plants
in East Germany 2/ 12/
1950-55
Thousand Metric Tons
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
Raw Brown Coal
33,900
38,200
42,520
46,715
51,700
56,460
Other Forms of Brown Coal
5,012
5,644
6,222
6,794
7,438
8,075
Hard Coal
1,260
1,850
1,803
1,803
1,803
1,803
Total Fuel Requirement
1j.22?).22.
115,6911.
50,511-5
55,312
60,914.1
66,338
a. Range of error; plus or minus 10 percent.
b. This table is derived from the estimate Of thermal electric power pro-
duction (shown in Table 1), reduced by the East Berlin production (5.8
percent) and prorated on the basis of the ratio established by Table 5,
except that the hard-coal inputs are a composite figure. The latter in-
cludes an additive for East Berlin but shows no consumption increase
after 1950, with the proportionate increase included as raw brown coal.
VI. Location.
A. Generation Facilities by Geographical Areas.
Because the pre-World War II German electric power industry
was constructed for a united- Germany, East Germany was confronted with
the problem of the adaptation of an electrical generating and trans-
mission system constructed for a different geographical base. As a
practical matter, this in itself would not have been serious if the
free exchange of power across political boundaries had been permitted.
This free exchamge would have assisted in a balancing of area deficits,
on both a local and a national basis. Through savings in coal ship-
ments and better loading of the more efficient plants, it would also
have permitted considerable economic advantage. Politically imposed
barriers not only have hampered such exchange of power but also have
severely reduced imports of electrical equipment and materials from
the West.
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In the immediate postwar years, the East German electric
power industry was adversely affected by the severe dismantling
program of the USSR. Then came the effort to revitalize industry
and the electric power compOnents of industry. It is difficult to
see that this effort followed any logical plan, for to a large degree
it seemed to be an attempt to do everything at once with but little
over-ail success. This effort was followed by a period showing
evidence of more logical planning, and by 1953 it appeared that
considerable progress was being made in getting together the compo-
nents of a workable electric power industry.
There is now a large concentration of power plants in the
Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt mine areas. Before the war the Berlin area
of Brandenburg was also well developed, primarily because of its
centralized economic and political importance, but the loss of major
generating stations to the West Berlin area created some serious
deficits for East Berlin and adjacent areas. This area had depended
heavily on imported hard coal. This dependence again created supply
problems, and an effort was made to convert the plants to brown coal
use. Upper Thuringia contained a large number of thermal electric
plants designed primarily to support the chemical industry in the
Halle area. Southern Thuringia contained a considerable number of
lesser hydroelectric installations On such rivers as the Saale, the
Werra, and the Weisse Elsier. Mecklenburg was of lesser importance
insofar as generation facilities were concerned.
B. Transmission Facilities by Geographical Areas.
Prewar Germany had a well-integrated transmission network and
was able to transport large blocks of power to the many load centers
of its system. Most elements of the economic life of Germany centered
on Berlin, and to a considerable degree this was also true of the
electric power network. Many transmission lines were designed for
the transmission of power to and from Berlin and were thus known as
radial circuits. The power network was far from simple, however,
and there developed many other circuits and load centers concerned
with large industrial areas and mining centers. Thus the network
became a very complex pattern of transmission lines to and from all
the principal industry and population centers.
The creation of the several postwar Zones, of course, was not
based upon the operation requirements of the electric power system,
but upon political boundaries. The dismantling program of the USSR
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was also felt in the transmission network, as many elements of
logical circuit arrangement were destroyed or removed. Later efforts
were made to rebuild many former circuits and restore the network
to a functional operating capability. Again, these efforts were
limited by equipment and material shortages. There is, however,
evidence of considerable success, for when the exchange agreements
were discontinued with the West at Berlin in 1952 it was apparent
that the rearrangement of the circuits to bypass West Berlin had been
completed well in advance. There are, however, many evidences that
East Germany has an over-all net power deficit, and also it is
believed that the transmission net capability is not sufficient to
eliminate all area shortages.
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APPENDIX A
ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANTS IN EAST GERMANY
This appendix provides a list of electric generating plants
divided into two general groups, thermal electric and hydroelectric.
The list is limited to those plants with a capacity of at least
1,000 kw. The 1950 capacity shown is that described in detail in
Appendix C and is an estimate of individual installed capacities
as of 31 December 1950. For the year 1950, a considerable amount of
excellent information is available in sufficient volume and detail
to permit a reasonably accurate determination of the individual plant
capacities which, aggregated, can be considered as the basis for the
determination of the productive capacity of the East German power
industry. It must be pointed out that the Information is of 1950
?date and the estimates represent the analyst's opinion of the 1950
capacities of the referenced plants as those capacities were deduced
from the screening of a mass of reports.
Since 1950, and especially during the last 6 months of 1953, a
large volume of good source information on the electric power industry
in East Germany has become available. This information has been con-
fined largely to such aspects of the industry as the political, gen-
eral economic, organizational, planning, and over-all requirements
for material and equipment. It has contained very little statistical
information on individual electric plant capacities or on operational
data. There were, however, two reports received in late 1953 which
listed purported 1952 capacities of a number of important plants and
indicated changes for those plants, mostly increases over the figures
in the 1950 list. This more recent information is shown in the
1952 column, with a few isolated additions, to reflect the latest
reported plant capacities. The figures should be used with caution,
as sufficient supporting material is not available to establish the
stated capacities firmly. The apparent increase in capacity from
1950 to 1952 should not be accepted as actual, for it is believed
that some of the reported 1952 capacities were planned but not ac-
complished. In addition, there is little available information on
capacity losses, such as those caused by failures of equipment,
retirement of old equipment, or the abandonment of the smaller, in-
efficient plants. Determination of these doubtful elements can be
made only as further information is received.
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Thermal Electric Plants
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Nomme)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Agfa-Seide (see Premnitz)
Alten-Dessau
51?49'
12?12'
6.3
12.0
Ammendorf
51026'
11059'
5.0
7.6
Amsdorf (near Ammendorf)
51?28'
11024'
3.5
Anna-Mathilde (mine)
51029'
5.7
Apolda
51001'
11?30'
1.5
12.0
Arnsdorf
51?06'
13059,
5.0
Aschersleben
51045'
110281
2.5
Auma
5o042,
11056'
1.5
Bad Blankenburg (see
Vollrath und Sohn)
Bad Sulza (see
Doebritschen)
Beeskow (see Finkenheerd)
Berlin (see Klingenberg
and Rummelsburg)
Bergwitz (see Wittenberg)
Bischofferode
51?3p'
10?27'
3.9
Bismarck Hall
52040'
11?341*
3.9
4.6
Bitterfeld
51937'
12?19'
190.0
218.o
Bleicherode East
51026'
10?35'
18.0
18.0
Bleicherode (potash works
51?261
10?35'
5.7
9.4
Boettcher (Porstendorf)
50058'
11?39'
1.5
Bohlen (Otto Grotewohl)
51012'
12?23'
190.0
196.8
Borna (mine)
51007'
12?30'
7.0
Boma (see Deutzen, Dora
Helene,. and Witznitz)
BramoW (Rostock)
54?05'
12?08'
8.0
Brandenburg
52?25'
120331
3.5
Breitungen
50?46'
10?20'
35.0
50.0
Breitungen-Regis (to be
enlarged to 120)
51?05?
12?26'
5.0
Briesen
52?20'
14?17'
1.5
* Approximate coordinates.
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-4-omme)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Brigitta (mine) (near
GrUbe Brigitta)
50030'
14?21'
7.6
Brotterode-Mommel
50050'
10026'
1.5
Bruckenberg III (near
Zwickau)
50044'
12?30'
2.5
Bubiag-Emanuel (mine)
Bubiag-Marie Anna (mine)
51031'
51031'
13?43'
13?43'
23.0)
24.0)
37.2
Bubiag-Milly (mine)
51?31'
13?43'
3.0
Buchenau (see Solvaywerke)
Buna (see Schkopau)
dalbe (see Eisenhuetten
Kombinat West)
Casar (see Westeregeln
511127)
Chemnitz
50050'
12055'
39.0
Chemnitz (railroad)
50?50'
12?55'
4.5
Chemnitz (see Oberlungwitz)
Clara III (mine)
51?20'
14020'
13.8
Clara IV (mine) (near
51?33'
14022'
4.4
Werminghoff)
51033'
14022'
4.4
Concordia (Nachterstedt)
(mine)
51049'
11?29'
48.0
Coswig (see Fertilia)
Cottbus
51046,
14?20'
2.4*
Dessau
51?50'
12?15'
2.0
Dessau (see Alten)
Deuben (near Zeitz)
51?07'
12?04'
63.2
63.6
Deutschland-Oelsnitz
(mine)
50?25'
12?10'
3.5
Deutzen (near Borna)
(mine)
51?07'
12?30'
16.8
Doebritschen (near Bad
Sulza)
51?05'
11?40'
1.0
24.0
* Includes some diesel and/or hydro generating
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950
(Estimated)
1952'
(Reported)
North
East
Dora Helene (Borna)
51?07'
12?30'*
2.5
Dresden West
Dresden (railroad)
51?03'
51?03'
13?35'
13?35'
28.0)
3.1)
126.0
Eilenburg
51?28'
12?37'
2.0
Eisenach (automobile
factory)
50?59'
10?19'
2.8
Eisenach (yarn factory)
50?59'
10?19'
1.5
Eisenhuetten Kombinat
West (Calbe) (Magdeburg-
Rothensee)**
51?54'
11?46,
Eisenhuetten Kombinat East
(Fuerstenburg) (Josef
Stalin)**
52?09'
14?41'
Eisleben (hear Querfurt)
51?33'
11?26'
7.8
Elbe (see Vockerode)
Elisabeth (near Mucheln)
(mine)
51?18'
11?49'
9.0
Elise (near Nucheln)
(mine)
51?18'
11?49'
5.5
Erfurt
51?00'
11?02'
44.0
44.0
Erfurt (see Gispersleben)
Erika (Ilse) (Jonny
Scheer) (mine)
51?13'
13?29'*
2.0
Ernst Thalmann (see
Leipzig South)
Eva Renate
51?35'
13?58'*
2.0
Espenhain I and II
51?11'
12?28'
365.0
288.0
Fabrik Hirsch (near Gera)
50?52'
12?05'
1.0
Fertilia (Coswig)
51?53'
12?27'
4.o
Finkenheerd (near
Beeskow)
52?15'
14?34'
75.0
78.0
Finow (Mark)
52?50'
13?42'
31.0
Fleming (near Weida)
50?46'
12?04'
1.0
* Approximate coordinates.
** Reconstruction planned.
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Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
Coordinates
Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
North
East
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
Floha (Gruenheinichen
Paper Mill)
50046'
13?09'
3.5
Forst
51?44,
14?38'
2.6
Forst (see Friedrich-
schain)
Fortschritt (near
Meuselwitz)
51?03'
12?18'
2.0
Freital (see Zaucherode,
Freital Hydro)
Friedrichschain
51?44
14038'
2.0
Gardelegen
52032'
11?22'
3.5
Genthin (see Henkel)
Georgiy Dimitroff (see
Leipzig North)
Gera
50052'
12005'
9.9
Gera (see Fabrik Hirsch)
Gertrude (mine) (near
Meuselwitz)
51?00'
12?20'
9.9
Gispersleben (near
Erfurt)
51?02'
10?59'
31.8
31.8
Glauchau
50?49'
12?32'
2.6
Glauchau (see
Schweinsberg)
Gluckauf (see
Sonderhausen)
Goelzau (Kothen)
51045'
11?58'
5.6
Gotha
50047'
10043'
2.0
Gottessegen (near Lugau
and Oelsnitz)
50?44'
12045'
4.o
Greiz
50039'
12?12'
6.0
Greiz (see Schleber)
Gross Grimmia (see
Hedwig)
Gross Kayna
51?17'
11?56'
68.o
Grossrohrsdorf
51?09'
14?01'
2.2
Guenther (near Guenther
Kolonie)
50039'
12012'
1.5
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Thermal Electric Plants
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Coordinates
North East
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950 . 1952
(Estimated) (Reported)
Halberstedt
51?53'
11004'
1.9
Halle-Trotha
51030'
12000'
39.6
Hansa Troebitz (mine)
(near Kirchhain)
51038'
13034
5.0
Harbke
52011'
11003'
147.0
141.5
Hedwig (Gross Grimmia)
(mine) (Hohenzellerhall)
52006'
10035'*
17.0
Heiligenroda
50051'
10016'
8.5
9.8
Helmstedt (new plant op-
posite West Zone plant)
52014'
11000'
8.5
Henkel (Genthin)
52024'
12010'
2.8
Hennigsdorf
52?38'
13012'
15.0
Heye III (near Hoyer-
swerda) (mine)
51026'
14015'
2.5
Hirschberg
50?24'
11?49'
1.0
Hirschfelde
50057'
14055'
132.0
137.7
Eoyerswerde (see Heye III)
Jena (see Zeitz-Burgau)
Jonny Scheer (see Erika)
Kaiseroda (near Studt-
lengsfeld) (Kalikombinat)
50?49'
10007'
36.4
48.6
Kamen z (see Lauta)
Karl Liebknecht (see
Leopold)
Kirchhain (see Hansa
Troebitz)
Klettwitz (see
Wilhelminengluck)
Klingenberg (Berlin)
52031'
13?34'
160.0
248.0
Kochuette (Mansfeld)
51034'
11?28')
28.0
28.0
Krughuette (near Mansfeld)
51032'
11?33')
Kothen (see Goelzau)
Kriebstein (near
Kriebethal)
51003'
13001'
6.3
Krupp-Gruyson (Magdeburg)
52?06'
11038'
9.5
Kyritz
52?57,
12?24'
3.0
Lauchhammer
51030'
131348'
12.0
20,0 (West)
Lauta (near Kamenz)
51?27'
14?04'
80.0
85.0
Kulkwitz (near Leipzig)
51017'
12014'
55.0
* Approximate coordinates.
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Leipzig, North (Georgiy
Dimitroff)
51?20'
12o23'
28.0)
Leipzig (yard factory,
probably Lindenau)
51?18'
12?20'
6.1)
135.0
Leipzig, South (Ernst
Thalmann)
51?18'
12020'
23.0)
Leopold I and II (near
Taucha) (Karl Liebknecht
near Bitterfeld)
51?30'
12?30'
49.0
Leuna (Merseburg)
51?22'
12?00'
97.0
98.2
Luckenwalde
52?05,
13o10,
1.0
Lugau (see Gottessegen)
Lutzkendorf
51?18'
11051'
54.0
Magdeburg
52?10'
11?40'
45.0
45.0
Magdeburg (see Krupp-
Gruyson)
Mansfeld Helbra
51?34'
11028'
13.1
Mansfeld (see Kochuette
and Krughuette)
Marga (mine) (near
Senftenberg)
51031'
14?01'
13.6
Marie (mine)
51?36'
14?27'*
1.2
Mariannengluck (near
Spremberg)
51?35'
14025'
4.5
Maxhuette (Maximilian-
shuette factory)
50040
11?24'
7.7
Meissen
51?09,
13o29'
1.4
Merseburg (see Leuna)
Meuselwitz (see
Fortschritt and Gertrude)
Michelwerke Gute Hoff flung
(mine) (near Rossbach)
51?55'
11054'*
Michelwerke Leonhardt
(mine) (near Zipsendorf)
51003'
12016'*
3.5
Michelwerke Michel (mine)
(near Naumburg)
51?09'
11?49'
8.5
* Approximate coordinates.
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Michelwerke Vesta (mine)
(near Naumburg)
510 09'
11?49'
3.5
Mittweida
50059'
12?59'
5.1
Mucheln (see Elisabeth
and Elise)
Muehlhausen (Diesel)
51013'
10?27'
25.0
Mumsdorf (see Phoenix
and Rositz)
Nachterstedt (see
Concordia)
Naumburg (see
Michelwerke)
Neukirchen (mine)
50?58'
12028'
5.0
Neustassfurt (near
Stassfurt)
51052'
11035'
5.0
Niederlausitz (see
Plessa)
Nienburg (see
Osternienburg)
Oberlungwitz (near
Chemnitz)
50?50'
12?50'
4.o
Oelsnitz
50?25'
12?10'
5.1
18.o
Oelsnitz (see
Gottessegen)
Osternienburg (near
Nienburg)
51?48'
12?02'
13.0
12.0
Peenemunde
54?08'
13?47'
15.0
40.0
Pfaennerhall (mine)
(near Querfurt)
51023'
11?36'
15.0
8.0
Phoenix (mine)
(near Mumsdorf)
51004'
12?19'
2.5
6.3
Plauen
.50c)30'
12008;
2.2
32.0
Plessa (Niederlausitz)
51?28'
13?37'
34.0
Porstendorf (see
Boettcher)
Potsdam I and II
52?24'
13?04'
16.0
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Premnitz (Agfa-Seide)
Prenzlau
Probstzella
Profen (mine) (AKW)
Pulsnitz
Querfurt (see Eisleben
and Pfaennerhall)
52?32'
53o191
50032'
51?08'
51?11
12?20'
13?52,
11?23'
12?13'*
14001'
8.3
2.3
3.2
1.0
6.6
26.0
Radebeul
51006'
13?39'
2.0
Reichenbach
50037'
12?18'
13.9
Remptendorf (see
Burgkhammer Hydro)
Riebeck (see Deuben)
Rodleben (near Zerbst)
51?56'
12?08'
4.o
Rositz (near Mumsdorf)
51001'
12?23'
12.0
Rositz (coal) (near
Mumsdorf)
51001'
12?23'
2.5
Rossbach (see
Michelwerke)
Rostock (see Bramow)
Rummelsburg (Berlin)
52?31'
13?31'
53.0
78.0
Saalfeld
50039'
11021'
2.9
Schkopau (Buna)
51?24'
11059'
193.0
192.7
Schleber (textile plant)
(near Greiz)
50039'
12?12'
1.5
Schoenbeck
52001'
11?45'
1.2
Schwarza (Zellwolle)
50041'
11019'
14.0
Schwarzenberg
50033'
12?47'
8.0
Schwarzheide (Trieb-
stoffwerk)
51?28'
13?32'
20.0
22.0
Schwerin
50038'
11?23'
Schweinsberg (near
Glauchau)
50045'
12030'
4.5
34.0
Senftenberg (see
Marga and Viktoria)
* Approximate coordinates.
** Includes some diesel and/or hydro generating capacity.
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
(Estimated)
(Reported)
North
East
Sollstedt (potash works)
51019'
10030'
2.1
2.9
Solvaywerke (Buchenau)
51?04
10016'
1.0
Sonderhausen (potash
works)
51022'
l0?52'
7.5
10.7
Stassfurt (see
Neustassfurt)
Steudnitz
51000'
110401*
2.0
Stralsund
54?18'
13006'
8.0
Studtlengsfeld (see
Kaiseroda)
Theissen (near Zeitz)
51005'
12006'
33.2
Threna (mine)
51015'
12?32'
3.0
Torgan
51034'
130001*
38.o
Torgelow
53?38'
14?01'
1.0
Trattendorf I and II**
51033'
14?22'
Triebes
50?41'
12?02'
1.0
Triebstoffwerk (see
Schwarzheide)
Troebitz (see Hansa)
Troglitz (see Zeitz)
Viktoria II (near
Senftenberg)
51030'
13?52'
6.o
Viktoria III (near
Schwarzheide)
51028'
13052'
6.5
Vockerode (Elbe)**
51?51'
12?21'
Volkenroda (potash works)
51015'
10?34'
3.8
5.2
Vollrath und Sohn (near
Bad Blankenberg)
50?41'
11016'
1.5
Wahlitz
52006'
11047'
2.4
Weimar (railroad)
50059'
11019'
2.5
Weimar
50?59'
11?19'
1.0
Weissenfels West
51012'
11058'
4.o
Weissenfels South
51012'
11058'
9.4
Werminghoff East
51?24'
14019'*
39.8
* Approximate coordinates.
** Reconstruction planned.
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Thermal Electric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Westeregeln Solvaywerk
Westeregeln (Casar Mine)
Wilhelminengluck
51?51'
51?58'
11?24'
11?24'
7.6
2.0
(Klettwitz)
51?33'
13054'
23.0
Wittenberg (Bergwitz)
(mine)
51052'
12?39'
2.5
Witznitz (mine)
51?09'
12?29'
6.6
Wolfen (film)
51?40'
12017'
66.8
67.2
Wolfen (dye)
51?40'
12017'
32.0
41.3
Wolgast
54?03'
13?46'
4.8
Zaucherode (Freital)
51001'
13?39
3.5
Zeitz II
51?03'
12009
12.6
Zeitz (Municipal)
51?03'
12?09'
5.0
Zeitz (Troglitz)
51?04'
12012'
68.0
68.7
Zellwolle
53?00'
11045'
3.5
6.5
Zerbst (see Rodleben)
Zigenruck (see Zeiss
Hydro)
Zipsendorf (see
Michelwerke)
Zittau
50054'
14050'
2.5)
Zittau II
50054'
14?50'
3.5)
22.3
Zschornewitz
51?43'
12?24'
176.5
174.5
Zwickau
50?44'
12?30'
14.3
21.0
Zwickau (see
Bruckenberg III)
Total
3,695.6
Hydroelectric Plants
Aue
50035,
12?42'
1.6
Auehammer
50?34'
12040'
4.o
Bleiloch (Talsperre)
50032'
11?43'
4o.o
14 .0
Burkhammer (near
Remptendorf)
50034'
11?42'
2.2
Canitz (see Wurzen)
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Hydroelectric Plants
(Continued)
Coordinates
Installed Capacity
(Thousand Kilowatt-Hours)
1950
(Estimated)
1952
(Reported)
North
East
Doebritschen (near Bad
Sulza)
51005'
11?40'
1.0
Eichicht
50?37'
11?26'
3.0
Freiberg
50?55,
13?22,
7.4*
Freital
51?01'
13?39'
5.6**
Hohenwarte
50?36'
11?30'
5.5
Hydrierwerk (near
Zerbst)
51?58'
12?05'
6.3
Kriebstein (near
Kriebethall)
51?03'
13001'
6.3
Meiningen
50033'
10025'
Mihla Werra
51005'
10020'
1.5
41.0
Mittweida
50059'
12?59'
0.9
Muehlhausen
51?13'
10?27'
1.5
Spichra
51?01'
11?40'***
1.0
Themar
50030
10038'
1.5
Torgelow
53?38'
14?01'
1.0
Unterpreilipp (near
Schwarza)
50044'
11?20'
1.5
30.0
Wurzen (Canitz)
51?22'
12?44'
3.1
Zeitz-Ziegenruck
50037'
11?39'
2.5
Zeitz-Burgau (near Jena)
50?56'
11?35'
1.1
Zeitz-Wisenta (near
Ziegenruck)
50037'
11?33'
4.5
Total Hydroelectric 104.5
Total Thermal Electric (figures rounded) 3,695.5
Total Installed Capacity (figures
rounded)***'* 3,800.0 86/
Indicated capacity includes more than one plant in the vicinity.
Includes some deisel and/or thermal generating capacity.
Approximate coordinates.
Range of error, minus 10 to plus 20 percent.
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APPENDIX B
TECHNOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY
The term electric power, as used in this report, covers the
generation of electric energy and its delivery to the consumer. These
two objectives are accomplished by means of facilities for generating,
transmitting, and distributing electric power. Collectively, these
facilities are usually referred to as a power system. Grouped on a
national basis, the facilities constitute a nation's electric power
industry. A brief description of the processes involved and definition
of some of the terms used is provided in the following paragraphs.
Generation of electric power is accomplished by three general plant
types: Thermal electric, hydroelectric, and internal combustion.
Thermal electric plants are those which obtain their energy from the
combustibn of solid, liquid, or gaseous fuels. The energy obtained is
used to generate steam, which serves to motivate a mechanical device,
usually a turbine, which, in turn, drives an electric generator.
Hydroelectric plants are those which, by means of mechanical devices,
convert the energy of falling water into electrical energy. Internal
combustion plants make use of either liquid or gaseous fuels to ener-
gize reciprocating engines or turbines that drive electric generators.
Of this group of plants the most common is the diesel electric.
To understand meaqurement of the output and consumption of electric
power, an understanding of a few terms of standard definition is
necessary. The term kilowatt (kw) refers to the instantaneous measure-
ment of energy and is frequently used to express the capacity of a
plant, which is, then, the level of the power output at the time of
maximum production. The multiplication of the capacity (kw) by the
units of time (hours) during which the capacity is applied results in
kilowatt-hours (kwh), which is the standard unit of measurement of
electric production. Therefore, the capacity of a plant may be quoted
in kilowatts (kw) and its annual output in kilowatt-hours (kwh).
Transmission lines are the electrical "pipelines" used to ship
power from a source, a generation station or substation, to some dis-
tant point. The termination of a line may be either a consumer's
premises or a point of redistribution. Transmission lines are usually
classified by their voltage, which is somewhat analogous to hydraulic
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pressure and is one of the factors in the determination of the dis-
tance the energy may be transmitted. The voltage is usually expressed
in kilovolts (kv); 1 kilovolt equals 1,000 volts.
Substations, or transformer substations, are used to change the
voltage of an electrical line or circuit. Usually there will be at
least two substations to a line, one to raise the generator voltage
to the transmission voltage and the other to lower the transmission
voltage to the distribution voltage. "Distribution voltage" is the
voltage of a portion of an electrical system at the consumer's end and
is generally lower than that described as transmission voltage. It is
designed to serve a limited distribution area, generally the customer's
premises.
It is desirable to point out that every power system is a complex
individual design and will have a great variety of combinations of
the elements discussed.
A particular electric power plant may be described as having a
specific capacity in kw. That is an expression of instantaneous capac-
ity which is, to a large extent, theoretical and is probably arrived
at by taking the arithmetical sum of the rated capacities of several
generating units in that plant. In order to approach a more factual
determination of the capacity of the plant as a unit, several other fac-
tors must be known and considered: boiler capacity, character and
availability of fuel, operating efficiency, condition of equipment,
operating requirements, and others. When these are all considered and
evaluated, some estimate of plant capacity may be expressed. It is also
probable that for any one plant technicians will produce estimates of
considerable variation, depending upon the assumptions used in preparing
the estimate upon and the extent of the available knowledge of the
operating requirements involved. Such terms as operable capacity and
available capacity are found in references. These may have shaded
meanings in the thoughts of tne user, and unless the facts and assump-
tions upon which they are based are clearly defined, they are very apt
to create confusion. About all that can be gleaned factually from
such references is that the basic, or installed, capacities are being
qualified.
This applies to the broad grouping of electric facilities often
referred to as a power system, the assembly of generating plants,
transmission facilities, and distribution facilities into the operating
unit. Although this grouping is a practical and necessary functional
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arrangement, it tends to increase the complexity of the situation,
to multiply the variables, and to reduce the accuracy of the esti-
mate. For this reason an effort has been made in this report to
summarize capacity in terms of an installed capacity estimate and to
derive production estimates by considering both capacity and histori-
cal production trends.
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_ _ _ _ _ _
APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY
An economic analysis of the electric power production of East Germany
presupposes that a determination or a reasonable estimate of production
capacities can be made as of a definite time; that certain production
trend relationships can be established from as many known elements as
can be determined, estimated, or reasonably resolved; and that these
trends can be compared with known plans for development of facilities
and of production.
On the basis of the information that was available, this report
covers capacity and production values through 1953. This information
was complemented by estimates through the Plan period terminating in 1955.
The objective of this procedure was the establishment of certain con-
crete information:
1. A dated list of generating plants.
2. The capacity of those plants in terms of kw as of 1953.
3. An historical fix of system capacity for as many years as
practical.
4. An historical fix of system production from World War II to
the latest available information.
5. Graphical projection of 3 and 4, above, over the Plan period
and compared with the Plan.
6. Rationalization of Plan effects by review of construction of
facilities and efforts to accomplish the Plan.
7. The influence of factors such as fuel, material, and equip-
ment supplies on Plan effects.
8. The significance of economic, political, and regulatory
factors in terms of the Plan.
9. Establishment of ranges of error of estimates.
In the development of the statistical data for
became apparent that a graphical comparison of the
tion accomplishments of prewar Germany and of East
to present a picture of the relative magnitudes of
ments (see Fig. 1*). As this graphic presentation
came obvious that such factors as rates of growth,
this report, it
electrical produc-
Germany would serve
those accomplish-
progressed, it also be-
World War II effects,
and the Five Year Plan relationship were brought into focus.
* Following p. 58.
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In charting production for prewar Germany the data were plotted from
1900 to 1943. The curve clearly shows the steady climb of electric
power use to 1929, the economic chaos of the early 1930's, and the in-
dustrial rise initiated by the Nazi regime, climaxing in the war and the
1945 collapse. The estimate for the period 1939 through 1945 is a wartime
estimate taken from a 1947 operating report and is not confirmed in detail.
East German production from 1936 through 1945 has been estimated in
source material and is also subject to some qualification. From 1946
through 1952, production figures are reasonably well established.
It is also noteworthy that the plotting of the production data de-
velops a relatively smooth curve. Although there was some deviation in
source data, it is believed that the curve is representative well within
a reasonable range of error. The estimated achievement was derived by
projecting the historical curve through 1955. To translate the relative
values, this projection was detailed in a blown-up section (see Fig. 2*).
In projecting the same relative rate of production increase, several
factors were considered, and it was assumed that the area could not further
accelerate its production rate, in view of the physical condition and long
operating periods of plant equipment; that the new construction program
was well behind Plan through 1953; and that critical material and equip-
ment shortages were not becoming less critical. The projection indi-
cated an estimated production for 1955 of 30.5 billion kwh.
A plot of the original Plan figures was superimposed on this curve.
The plot originates on the production curve. The Plan curve drops below
the 1952 and 1953 production-curve points, then rises above the produc-
tion curve in 1954 and 1955. This is explained partially when it is
realized that preliminary Plan figures did not appear until well into
1951 and the full Plan was not announced until 1952. So it appears
that preliminary Plan figures started with accomplishments for 1951; then
when it became apparent that production was going to be better than Plan
in 1952, the balance of the Plan (1954 and 1955) was raised to more
ambitious goals. Other factors probably contributed to the raising of
the Plan goals. Acceleration of the construction of electrical equipment
building facilities was needed, and there was an added time element
necessary to construct new generating and transmission facilities. The
result was a Plan increase for 1954 and 1955 that is considered beyond
the indicated capability of the industry. Thus, the estimated production
achievement for 1955 was projected to 30.5 billion kwh.
* Following p. 58.
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In an effort to estimate the installed capacity of the electrical
power industry, a generating plant list was compiled. The data of this
list were compiled for the year 1950, which seemed to be the latest year
for which the available data were sufficient to permit a reasonable
capacity estimate by individual plants of capacities of at least 1,000 kw.
This tabulation produced an estimated installed capacity of 3.8 million
kw. (See Appendix A.)
Various sources have reported installed capacities for the period
1946 through 1950; when the data were plotted the dispersion was too
great to permit any factual determination of a trend. (See Fig. 3.*)
It is evident that these data were affected by many factors, one of
which was the poor condition of equipment, which made summarized ca-
pacities subject to wide variance from day to day. To predict the prob-
able 1955 capacity installation, the estimated production of 30.5 billion
kwh was translated in terms of 5,000 hours of use (announced Plan base),
which gave a probable capacity of 6.1 million kw. This, plotted on the
capacity curve (log)*, was connected by a straight line with the
3.8 million kw estimated capacity for 1950. (See Fig 3.) This curve
was, then used to establish capacity estimates for the intervening years.
It is worth noting that this curve, extended backward, lies within the
various reported capacity values.
* Following p. 58.
** Log curve was used for this development, as historical evidence
indicates that capacity improvements for the electric power industry
generally develop an exponential type of curve.
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APPENDIX D
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
Lack of recent information on the installed capacities
vidual electric power plants in East Germany is at present
most significant gaps in intelligence. Some specific data
vidual plants have been filtering in, but plant capacities
not given or are inconsistent. Since 1949 there have been
data on the operation, production, and fuel consumption of
electric power industry as a whole.
of indi-
one of the
on indi-
are often
little firm
the
Plans for transmission line additions of over 50 kv are fairly
well known, but information on completed lines is meager. In some in-
stances information exists on new generating plants, but there is
little information on their connection, or proposed connection, to
the transmission net.
The former organization of the Land government was related to the
control and administrative organization of the Energy Districts.
Since the abolition of the Land governmental units in August 1952
and the inauguration of the 15 Bezirke, little information has been
received which shows adaptation of the electric power administrative
units to that change in the lower echelons.
The short period since the introduction of the "New Course" has
not produced clear information as to its effects on the electric
power industry, on other industrial production, or on benefits to the
domestic consumer.
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APPENDIX E
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
In searching the field for the various types of information needed to
produce a study of the electric power industry in East Germany, a great
number of reports and documents were reviewed. Most of the information
required was technical and specific. The bulk of the useful information
was contained in a relatively small number of reports. The sources can
be roughly grouped as follows:
a. Documentary reports obtained through unknown sources. These
were most valuable, for they were apparently prepared by German statis-
ticians with a natural bent for detail.
b. State Department despatches were valuable and, in most in-
stances, current sources of information.
c.. A number of Army G-2 reports were factual and valuable sources.
The basic data for the G-2 information, of course, came from a variety
of sources, many of which were former German technicians in the electric
power industry.
d. Some spot information came through publications, generally non-
technical ones. These were frequently obtained through FBIS.
e. Numerous SO and CS reports were useful and valuable sources.
This is especially true of the more recent reports.
f. A large number of reports prepared from defector interrogation
were valueless, but a few originating from technical personnel (pri-
marily German engineers) were excellent sources. It is believed that
often better information could have been obtained in these cases if
technical interrogation had been possible.
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2. Sources.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
Source of Information
Doc. - Documentary
A -Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F - Cannot be judged
Information
1 - Confirmed by other
2 - Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - Doubtful
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
sources
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments
and organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff
officer; or information extracted from such documents by a staff
officer, all of which may carry the field evaluation "Documentary."
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report.
No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation
on the cited document.
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SECRET
Billions of Kilowatt Hours
80
60
40
20
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EAST GERMANY
ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION'
Figure 1
Wartime
Estimate2
EAST
...?"*1
..,'".. i
I
GERMANY
Original
Five-Year Plan
,
.--
E
Total Electric
Production (Based
boundaries
Power
on pre-war-_,
of Germany)
'
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
'----A
hievement
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925
13272 CIA, 6-54
1930
1935
'Comparison of Electric Power Production of East Germany with the
Df Ge'T -y (WO- Wc-fd bourio/E.,E)
1940
1945
1950
2Data during this period must be qualified in view of World War SECRET
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CIA
timate
1955
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SECRET
Billions of Kilowatt Hours
EAST GERMANY
ELECTRIC POWER PRODUCTION
Figure 2
.433.4
Original
Five-Year
0.0"
AEstimated
chievement
.f
10
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955
13273 CIA, 6-54
SECRET
Plotted on semi-logorithmic grid
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Millions of Kilowatts
7"7:7771,
EAST GERMANY
ELECTRIC POWER PLANT CAPACITY
3.8
1
1947 1948 1949
13274 CIA, 6-54
ft,
Figure 3
CIA estimate of installed capacity
for 1955 to achieve estimated
production of 30.5 billion KWH 6.1
Capacity from plant list
Reported level of capacity
available for operation 1947-50
1950
Probable installed capacity
Reported available capacity
Projected back
o Various capacity reports
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
Plotted on semi-logarithmic grid
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500150001-7
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113
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NOTE: The isolated power plants on the map are connected
to the network by transmission lines below I/O kv.
SOURCE: Karte der Hochspannungsleitungen in West-und Mitteldeutsch-
land von 30kV und darOber 1:500,000; Vereinigung Deutarher
Elektrizitatswerke(110EW), Frankfurt am Main, 1953
14
0
0
Thermal-electric generating station
Hydroelectric generating station
Substation (selected)
TRANSMISSION LINES
220 kv. 110 kv.
220 kv. (proposed) 110 kv. (proposed)
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STANDARDFORM".6Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500150001-7
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO :
FROM :
SUBJECT:
DATE:
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500150001-7
Approved For Release 199
09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500150001-7
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