PRODUCTION OF MILITARY BRIDGING IN THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000500100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1954
• Content Type: IR

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CA INA-11LOW G` 3
PRODUCTION OF MILITARY BRIDGING IN THE SOVIET BLOC
CIA/RR PR-59
(ORR Project 31.214)x;!; =:_r n.rNG-: ir. l :.",
24 May 1954 F;,- . 3 r
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and.should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solicited.
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE
TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1. Fixed Bridging. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Floating Bridging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. Development of Industry and Production. . . . . . . 4
1. World War II and Earlier. . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Post-World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A. Production Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.. Current Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Potential capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
III. Input Requirements . . . 13
A. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
B. Steel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A. Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Intentions o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendixes
Appendix A. Production of Floating Bridges in the European
Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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Page
Appendix B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix C. Gaps in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix D. Sources . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . 23
Tables
1. Post-World War II Fixed Bridging in the USSR . . . . 7
2. Post-World War II Floating Bridging in_the, USSR. . . 8
3. Annual Requirements of the Floating Bridge Park
in the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Input Requirements for Bridging in the USSR... . . . 14
Following Page
Figure 1. Soviet Temporary Bridging during World Wax II . . 6
Figure 2. US Bridging in Italy during World War II. . . . . 6
Figure 3. US Bridging in Germany during World War II. . . . 6
Figure 4. Railroad Bridge over the Oder River near Podejuch,
East Germany (July 1953) . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 5. Railroad Bridge Repairs in East. Germany
(July 1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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CIA/RR PR-59
(ORR Project 31.214)
PRODUCTION OF MILITARY BRIDGING IN THE SOVIET BLOC*
Summary
This report indicates that the-Russians have been well enough
satisfied with their World War II techniques and equipment for
bridging rivers to fail to take advantage of improved equipment made
available to them either through capture from the Germans or on Lend
Lease from the US.
In consequence, the volume of production of military bridging in
the USSR is limited to that required for the maintenance of the level
of the stocks on hand either with troops or in storage. This pro-
duction is of minor magnitude and has a negligible impact on the
Soviet economy inasmuch as the annual input amounts to only 11,300
tons** of steel and 2.2 million board feet of lumber which are
allocated to floating bridging. The fact that there are no
indications of production or stockpiling of military fixed bridging
can be explained by the diversion of about 100,000 tons of steel per
year, beginning in the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946-50), to the re-
.building of war-damaged permanent bridges. The Russians apparently-
prefer to meet a current need for improvement of their rail and
highway system rather than to immobilize the material in a stockpile
earmarked for military use.
The importance of the Soviet railroad bridges is self-evident in
view of the fact that over 80 percent of all freight is hauled in the
USSR by rail. A brief comparison of Soviet techniques with German
techniques in replacing damaged bridges in the same area in World
War II is therefore included.
During the war the Russians demonstrated their ability to replace
quickly a'destroyed heavy-duty bridge. across a wide river by the use
of a temporary pile trestle bridge. They were obliged, however, to
start constructing concurrently a longer span steel bridge that would
* The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent
the best judgment of the responsible analyst as of 1 April 1954.
** Tonnages are given in metric tons throughout this report.
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be available before the ice, which would be loosened by the next
spring thaw, would take out the closely spaced pile trestles. Such
double effort could become critical`if many bridges were involved.
In contrast the Germans met these conditions by designing and
producing during their invasion of Soviet territory some 60,000 tons
of new-type military fixed bridging known as the SKR 6. This equip-
ment consisted of a number of easily handled members which could be
bolted together in several designs according to the length and
strength of the span desired. In particular,- this.equipment made
possible the replacement of a destroyed long span between undamaged
piers, a frequent type. of damage-encountered during World War II
because of the difficulty of destroying piers by air attack.
An important advantage of the German bridging equipment was that
the easily transportable members-could be carried by truck-to the
sites of two or more destroyed bridges along-the:same main supply
route, where the bridges could then be concurrently rebuilt. This
simultaneous construction would not have beenpossible with heavy
members, requiring rail transport;:.which would in turn have
necessitated the-:.construction of the first bridge before the
material could be..;br.ought up.to'the next site.
It would have seemed-logical for the Russians to have adopted this
equipment for :postwar ;'use.: -.They not only fai3ed. to do so, but they
also scrapped.a:stock of equipment whichc,came.under their control.
It is ..pertinent to point out the,.importance: of ,this oversight,
because US experience in World War II has shown that small captured
stocks of the equipment on the Western Front could be used to
excellent advantage. It should also be pointed out that US
experience has shown that railroad bridging-is the most vulnerable
part of the transportation system. Destruction of track required
excessive use of time and explosives, and the destroyed track was
easily replaceable. Tunnels were extremely difficult to damage more
than superficially. It was also found that interchange of classifi-
cation yards could be readily put.back into operation after air
attacks: It is also significant.that railroad bridges which span
dry gullies also require replacement because it is not possible to
run a train down hill and up hill again as can be done in the case
of a truck highway which by-passes a destroyed bridge.
To sum up the situation, the Russians have emphasized intensive
training in the use of their crude but effective World War II
floating bridging rather than attempting to replace it with more
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modern equipment. It is safe to state that they will be able to move
their combat troops across water barriers speedily and effectively
with the equipment available. Although these floating bridges are
sufficient for tactical and operational purposes, the subsequent
logistical support of these armies by the Rear Services is contingent
upon the replacement of destroyed fixed bridges. The Russians are
capable of producing an adequate quantity of steel bridging, as
shown by their allocation of about 100,000 tons a year to replacement
of war-damaged bridges, but they apparently lack an adequate stock-
pile of proper material (60,000 tons as determined by German require-
ments during World War II).
A continual watch should be maintained to determine if there is
a change in the Soviet policy either as to stockpiling or as to the
adoption of improved types of fixed bridging. Such change would be
one indication of an effective military preparation for war.
I. Introduction.
A. Definitions.
Military bridging consists of equipment suitable for rapid
erection by troops in the field. This is distinct from commercial
bridging, which in general requires longer to erect and involves
less portable equipment.
Military bridging is either "fixed" or "floating," depending
upon the nature of its supports.
B. Description.
1. Military fixed bridging has the following characteristics:
a. Loading.
Light: for pedestrian traffic.
Medium: for vehicular traffic.
Heavy: for tanks, heavy vehicles, or trains.
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Timber.
Metal: steel or aluminum.
Prestressed concrete (military use not confirmed).
c. Type of Span.
Truss: steel or wood.
Unit beam: steel, wood, or prestressed concrete.
Suspension: steel cable.
2. Military floating bridging has the following characteristics:
a. Loading.
Light: up to 36 tons.
Heavy: 36 to 82 tons.
Extra Heavy: over 82 tons.
Wood: preferably plywood.
Metal: sheet steel.
Rubber: impregnated fabric.
c. Material for Superstructure.
Wood.
Metal: steel or aluminum.
C. Development of Industry and Production.
1. World War II and Earlier.
a. Fixed Bridging.
The development of military bridging in the USSR
before and during World War II was unimaginative. The USSR utilized
locally available timber and abundant manpower and attained a high
order of effectiveness in the use of hand and simple power tools.
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Soviet military bridge builders were able to provide sufficient
river crossings to avoid delays in the forward movement of their
armies. See Figure l.*
The US supplied the USSR with stocks of Bailey
bridging for light and medium fixed highway bridges, a more versa-
tile type of bridging than the Soviet metal prefabricated box girder
design RNfl4 4, which approximated the US World War I type H 20.
It is in the important field of building heavy
railroad bridges that the Russians failed to take advantage of German
World War II developments. A discussion of this German World War II
material is given in considerable detail because it was developed to
meet conditions encountered by the Germans in southern USSR during
their invasion of this territory, conditions which still exist today.
At the beginning of the war the Germans were supplied with Roth-
Waagner bridging, an Austrian development for spans between 100 and
200 feet, and with broad flanged steel beams for spans up to 100 feet.
See Figure 2.* This type of bridging sufficed for requirements in
Western Europe. 2,/** During the advance into the USSR the Germans
were faced with an unexpected situation because of the ice conditions
of the Russian rivers, which compelled the use of long spans to
avoid the multiplicity of piers which would form ice gorges. The
supply of Roth Waagner bridging material was not sufficient to meet
the demand, and, in consequence, the German State Railways were
called upon to develop a similar but simpler type of bridging material,
using commercial shapes which could be produced in any rolling mill.
This new type was named SKR 6 (S for Shaper, credited with the design;
K for Krupp, where the steel was rolled; and R for Reichsbahn, the
German State Railways which were charged with the development. See
Figure 3.* This material permitted construction of spans 2/ up
to 460 feet in length.
Another type of bridging developed by the Germans was
a highway suspension bridge for medium loads, with a span up to 360
feet. This bridging was particularly useful for spans across deep
gorges in the mountains where trestles would be out of the question.
* Following p. 6.
** Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix D.
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Its light weight (about one=third of a standard bridge) and quick
erection time (about one-fifth of that required for a conventional
bridge) rendered it valuable for tactical use. This bridging was
first fabricated at Duesseldorf 3/ by J. Gollenow and Sohn.
b. Floating Bridging.
In addition to wooden and steel pontoons, the
Russians had developed a rubber fabric pneumatic boat, Model A3.
This boat proved vulnerable to small arms fire, and for that reason
its mission has been subordinated to. use as an assault boat rather
than a bridge.support. Another objection found to rubberized
fabric was that it became hard and. brittle in cold weather, hence
unsuited to winter use in the USSR. During the war the US supplied
the Russians with. 3,000 rubber pneumatic floats of 6.tons capacity
but compartmentalized to render them less vulnerable to small arms
fire. 4/
Some: pneumatic equipment has been. reported in use as
late as 1952, but there are no reports of 5/ any current production
of this type in the Soviet Bloc.
2.'. Post-World War II.
a. Fixed Bridging.
Three types of pre-World War II prefabricated fixed
bridges are identified in the postwar Soviet Army: 6/ the SMB 2, a
wooden bridge for shallow streams; the RMM 4,.a box girder bridge
similar to the US World War I type H 20; and suspension bridges --
PVM, LVM,,and TVM -- which are less effective than the Gollenow
material developed by the Germans in World War II. Table 1* shows
the characteristics of these types of fixed bridging.
There is a report that East German industry is.pro-
ducing a type of prefabricated bridging similar to the Bailey. bridge
for 80-foot spans and 72-ton loads, and a lighter one for 30-ton
!loads, 7/ but no data are available on volume of production. However,
the Bairey bridge is fastened together with pins and these pins must
have enough clearance to permit insertion and removal. On long spans,
this clearance is cumulative in its effect and allows too much play
Table 1 follows on p. 7.
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SKETCH
SHOWING TYPICAL DETAILS
OFA PORTION OF
?FMPORARY
RAIL ROAD TRESTLE
nVER THE
DNIEPER RIVER AT KIEV USSR
PREPARED FROM MEMORY
M A PARTV 0P PGC. -PllcrW WIIO
VISITED THE SITE ON 7' JAN, 1044.
FIGURE 1. SOVIET TEMPORARY BRIDGING DURING WORLD WAR II.
This 1,600-foot bridge was built by the Russians
in 10 days. Because of the close spacing of the
pile trestles, this bridging had to be replaced
with a bridge with longer spans as soon as the
ice released by the first spring thaw destroyed
the trestling.
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FIGURE 2. US BRIDGING IN ITALY DURING WORLD WAR II. Captured Roth-Waagner
bridging was utilized by US engineers to construct a 200-foot
through truss span across the Garigliano River near Minturno.
When the truss reached the far abutment, the temporary trestling
was removed.
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FIGURE 3. US BRIDGING IN GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II. Captured German
SKR 6 bridging was utilized by US engineers to span a 300-
foot gap across the Inn River near Passau. The bridging was
cantilevered across the gap without requiring false work or
other temporary supports. Note the movable erection crane on
the top chord of the bridging.
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or sag. Therefore, the use of the Bailey bridge is limited to shorter
spans than would be the case with a bolted or riveted type of bridge.
Post-World War II Fixed Bridging in the USSR
Load Class
Width
of
Roadway
Bridge
Span
Weight
per
Lineal
Designation
(Tons)
(Feet)
(Feet)
Foot
Remarks
SMB 2
Wooden Bridge
RMM4
30-50
11.75
21
570
Adjustable
in height
5 feet
10 inches
to 11 feet
9 inches
above
bottom of
stream
Box Girder Bridge
10
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
16
10
111
224
30
13
82
448
Suspension Bridges
6o
13
52
448
PVM
Foot traffic
2.25
393
N.A.
LVM
2
6.5
260
N.A.
TVM
10
N.A.
197
N.A.
There is a gap in intelligence concerning the pro-
duction of prestressed concrete beams for use in military fixed
bridging, although a published technical report by N.I. Polivanov on
Reinforced Concrete Bridges (Zhelezo-betonnyye mosty) has even been
translated into Korean for the benefit of North Korean forces. 8/
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b. Floating Bridging.
Since World War II the Russians have put much
emphasis on river crossing exercises and training. Their floating
bridge equipment is simple, practical, and adequate for the heaviest
loads. The characteristics and types are shown in Table 2. 9/
Post-World War II Floating Bridging in the USSR
Maximum
Capacity
(Tons)
Light
TZ 1 Footbridge (Foot Soldiers) Floats are waterproof bags
stuffed with hay, etc. Unsink-
able under small-arms fire.
Standard for Rifle Regiment.
DDP Footbridge (Foot Soldiers) Uses wooden pontoons. Exped-
ient bridge built by troops
or local labor.
Md PA 3 Light 15.4 Pneumatic floats easily sink-
Pontoon Park able by small-arms fire. UVS-
A3 type has simplified super-
structure.
NLP Light 17.6 Replaces Md PA 3 and uses
Pontoon Park folding plywood pontoons.
Assigned to the Engineer
Battalion of the old style
Infantry Division.
DLP Wooden 36.4 Improved design for the new
Pontoon Park style Infantry Division.
Standard equipment.
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Post World War II Floating Bridging in the USSR
(Continued)
Maximum
Capacity
(Tons)
Heavy
DMP 42 Wooden 55.1 A crude and cumbersome expedient.
Bridging Park Constructed of lumber at site by
troops and local labor.
N2P 45 Pontoon Park 82.5 Well designed late model of all
steel construction. Standard
equipment.
Extra Heavy
TMP Heavy Pontoon 110.3 Steel-decked pontoons. Standard
Park equipment.
SP 19 Heavy Bridge 132.0 Uses 63.5-foot steel-decked barges
Park as floating supports. Standard
equipment. Combination railroad
and vehicular bridge.
All of the foregoing floating bridging equipment can
also be used to construct rafts for ferrying personnel and equipment
across. water barriers. Heavy capacity floating bridging is reserved
for rear echelon units which are able to effect crossings of the
heaviest equipment.
In summation, there is little doubt that the present
status of the Soviet floating bridging equipment and techniques will
suffice for all tactical requirements.
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Floating bridges in comparison with fixed bridges can
even permit the crossing of trains, although the delays involved
greatly reduce the tonnage capacities of the rail line in the same
manner that the steepest, or "ruling," grade lowers the tonnage
capacity of an entire line.
II. Production.
A. Production Methods.
1. Fixed Bridging.
Any mill capable of rolling sheets or simple shapes can
produce the unit member or girder type of bridging. Likewise, any
wire rope or wire cable plant can produce the supporting cable for
the suspension bridge. No plants have been reported as devoted to
the exclusive production of these specialized end products. The
product mix of plants producing these components therefore tends to
conceal the identity of the bridging production earmarked for
military use.
2. Floating Bridging.
Steel pontoons can be produced in any shipyard or
factory capable of fabricating sheet metal. Reports are available*
of such production in the Satellites.
Wood pontoons are made in furniture and woodworking
plants, and the military use items are mixed with other end items,
rendering a separation of the product mix very difficult. In the
case of the production of pontoons in East Germany, this work is
disguised as "construction of sports-craft." 10
1. Fixed Bridging.
The Fourth Five Year Plan involved the replacement of an
enormous quantity of bridging destroyed by the Germans in World
War II 11/ averaging over 100,000 tons of steel per year. It is not
surprising that no reports of production of military fixed bridging
* See Appendix A.
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exist, and it is quite possible that such production does not exist
in view of the much greater need for diversion of the steel to the
restoration of war-damaged bridges. In support of this theory,
Figure 4,* dated July 1953, shows a railroad bridge over the Oder
River l kilometer north of Podejuch. 12/ It is noted that the left-
hand span is a 56-meter truss, constructed of Roth Waagner military
bridging by the Germans during World War It. The failure to re-
place this with a commercial type of welded or riveted span involves
constant maintenance to keep the fastening bolts tightened on this
military bridging and is indicative of Russian inability to replace
war-damaged. bridging except on a priority basis. In further con-
firmation, a photograph, Figure 5,* of a bridge over the Oder near
Kruenig 13/ undergoing repairs in July 1953, indicates that gradual
replacement of war-damaged bridges is continued into the Fifth Five
Year Plan.
Few reports are available of military bridge production in-
the USSR, and these reports are of low evaluation. Typical examples
are a prisoner-of-war report of August 1949 reporting a bridge
factory near Slavgansk, Ukrainian SSR, 14/ and a prisoner-of-war
report of June 1949 covering a vague description of bridge production
at Voronezh, RFSSR. 15/ Neither report mentions the type or amount
of end product.
In consequence, the only estimate of the amount of steel
required as a stockpile by the USSR for the first year of a war to
effectively rebuild destroyed bridges in their line of communication
must be determined from German experience in World War II during
which the German Army Engineers were called upon to rebuild 26 large
railroad bridges, 30 large highway bridges, as aell as 36.8 kilometers
of small- and medium-length span bridges for railroad and highway
traffic. This construction involved an estimated 60,000 tons of
steel 16/ and. is a reasonable estimate of a stockpile adequate to
meet the requirements for a war reserve. The 100,000 tons of steel
per year 17/ used for the rebuilding of war-damaged bridges by the
USSR since World War II would be immediately available for military
purposes in case of war, and this output could be increased many
times without crippling the economy.
* Following p. 12.
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2. Floating Bridging.
Production of floating bridging utilizing steel pontoons
has been reported from Satellite shipyards,* and reports have been
received concerning the continued production of wooden pontoons at
woodworking and furniture factories* in the Satellites. 18/ These
reports, however, are too scattered and inconclusive to sum up as an
index of the production attained.
The only method of estimating-,this production is based
on the use of separate depreciation factors for equipment in storage
and equipment in the hands of troops. This is based on the reason-
able assumption that World War II stocks were adequate and satis-
factory, an assumption that is borne out by reports of intensive
.training with World War II equipment rather than with new types. It
is therefore reasonable to assume that current production is limited
to the most satisfactory of existing types for the replacement of
worn-out equipment rather than the adoption of untried types. On the
basis of a 17-percent annual replacement factor for bridging in the
hands of troops, which is used in training exercises and exposed to
the elements, and 6-percent for that in storage, the annual pro-
duction rate is 24 light, 14 heavy, and 5 extra heavy bridge parks
as shown in Table 3.**
C. Potential Capacity.
The potential capacity of the Soviet steel industry is
adequate for the wartime production of fixed and floating bridging
because wartime production would actually require less than the
output now allocated. (This estimate is based on current allocations
of 100,000 tons to the replacement of war-damaged fixed bridges
and an estimated wartime requirement of 60,000 tons for fixed
bridging as determined by World War II German experience on the
Eastern Front, a reasonable assumption in view of the Soviet pre-
dilection for pile trestle construction.) The increase in require-
ments of steel for floating bridging from 11,000 tons to 17,240 tons
is no larger, because wood is substituted for steel wherever
practicable.
See Appendix A.
Table 3 follows on p. 13?
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FIGURE Ii. RAILROAD BRIDGE OVER THE ODER RIVER NEAR PODEJUCH, EAST GERMANY
(July 1953). The span on the left is a 56-meter-long through
truss of Roth-Waagner military bridging material bolted togeth-
er by the Germans during World War II which has not yet been
replaced by a permanent riveted span.
RAILROAD BRIDGE REPAIRS IN EAST GERMANY (July 1953).
This railroad bridge over the Oder River near Kruenig
was not replaced for P years following its destruction
during World War II.
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Annual Requirements of the Floating Bridge Park in the USSR
Bridges in Hands
of Troops
Bridges in Storage
Replacement
Replacement
Factor
Factor
Total Annual
Floating
of
of
Requirements
Bridge Parks
Number
17 Percent
Number
6 Percent
Bridge Parks
Light
110
19
78
5
24
Heavy
65
11
47
3
14
Extra Heavy
26
4
20
1
5
III. Input Requirements.
The current annual input requirements for bridging in the USSR
are 2.2 million board feet of lumber. In case of war, the requirements
would increase to 21.9 million board feet, as shown in Table 4.* In
addition, local standing timber would be used by troops in field
expedients. This use would have no impact on the lumber industry.
B. Steel.
The current annual input requirements for steel in the USSR
are 100,000 tons for replacement of war-damaged fixed bridging and
11,326 tons for the replacement of floating bridging or a total of
about 111,000 tons per year. Wartime input requirements are estimated
at 60,000 tons for fixed bridging (based on German requirements) and
17,240 tons required for floating bridging, a total of about 77,240
tons of steel.
Table follows on p. 14.
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Table 4
Input Requirements for Bridging in the USSR
Peacetime Inputs
Units
Steel
(Tons)
Wood
(Tons)
Replacementst"Light Floating Bridge Park
24
36
1,560
Replacements.,' Heavy Floating Bridge Park
14
1,300
575
Replacements, Extra Heavy Floating Bridge
Park
91990
440
Total Replacements, Floating Bridge
Park
43
11,326
2,575
Replacements, Civilian Fixed Bridging
100,000
0
Total Peacetime Inputs
111,326
2,575 a/
Wartime Inputs
Augmentation, Light Floating Bridge Park
126
190
8,200
Replacements, Light Floating Bridge Park
188
280
12,200
Augmentation, Heavy. Floating Bridge Park
74
6,370
3,040
Replacements, Heavy Floating Bridge Park
112
10,400
4,6oo
Total Floating Bridging
17,240
28,040
Total Fixed Bridging
6o,ooo
0
Total Wartime Inputs
77,240
28,040 b/
a. The equivalent of 2.2 million board feet.
b. The equivalent-of 21.9 million board feet.
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IV. Vulnerabilities and Intentions.
A. Vulnerabilities.
The vulnerability of the facilities for the production of
bridging is small because of the dispersion and interchangeability of
these facilities.
The vulnerability of the finished product in place is great
because bridges are obvious bottlenecks in the transportation system
and are priority targets for air attack.
B. Intentions.
The stockpiling of supplies of military bridging is an index
of preparation for a war of aggression. However, there have been no
reports of any activity in stockpiling of this material except for
the normal reserve of tactical bridging for units to be called up in
case of a general mobilization.
On the other hand, there is a report of the scrapping of
1,000 tons of the advanced type of German SKR 6 railway bridging at
the direction of the Russians. 19/ This action clearly indicates
lack of interest in or appreciation of the advantages of improved
types of heavy fixed bridging by the USSR and constitutes a weakness
in the Soviet war potential.
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APPENDIX A
PRODUCTION OF FLOATING BRIDGES IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
Date
of
Country
City
Plant Name
Product
Output
Infor-
mation
Hungary
Budapest 20
Stieber
Steel
500 per
1950
Hungary
Csepel 21/
Rakosi
pontoons
Pontoons
year
200 per
1951
Hungary
Balatonfured 22/
Matyas
Balaton
Pontoons
year
N.A.
Since
Navigation
1950
Hungary
Budapest 23
Company
Laczkouvits
Pontoons
N.A.
Since
Shipyard
1950
Baja 24/
Hungarian
Pontoons
250 wood
1953
Ship-
per
building
month
and Re-
75 steel
pair Works
per
(Formerly
month
Sopron 25/
Kiffera
Martina)
Sopron Fur-
Wood pon-
100 per
1953
Rumania
Braila 26/
niture
Factory
Progresul
toons
Pontoons
month
1,200 per
1952
Bucharest 27/
23d
and
super-
structure
Components
year
N.A.
N.A.
August
Factory
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Plant Location
Date
of
Country
City
Plant Name
Product
Output
Inf or -
mation
Rumania
Braila 28/
Sovrom
Pontoons
N.A.
Since
Transport
1949
Poland
Kamienna
Shipyards
Linen and
Pontoons
40 per
1951
Gora 29/
Auxiliary
year
Glogow 30/
Machinery
Factory
(FAMAL)
Shipyards
Steel
N.A.
1952
East Germany
Berlin 31/
Yachtwerft
pontoons
Pontoons
1,210 per
1952
Koepenick
year
,Brandenburg 32/
Wolgast 33/
Thaelman-
werft
Peenewerft
Pontoons
Pontoons
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1952
(50 T)
Czechoslovakia-
Usti Nad
CKD Ship-
Steel
3 per
1953
Labem 34/
Melnik 35/
yard
CKD Ship-
pontoons
Steel
day
N.A.
1953
Valtirov 36/
yard
CKD Ship-
pontoons
Steel
N.A.
1953
yard
pontoons
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
The original purpose of this report was to give a factual picture
of the production of military bridging in the Soviet Bloc and its
impact on the economy of the USSR with particular reference to input
requirements of steel.
It was apparent at an early date that pertinent data were lacking
and that some other approach was necessary.
In consequence, a study was first made of German and US bridging
equipment on the basis that this equipment had come to the attention
of the Russians during World War II and might have been the basis of
Soviet postwar production. This assumption was not substantiated
inasmuch as the Russians were apparently satisfied in general with
their World War II bridging and in fact scrapped a supply of splendid
German bridge material which came under their control.
The only remaining approach was to examine the Soviet published
production of commercial fixed bridging in connection with the Fourth
Five Year Plan, and to estimate the annual attrition of the Soviet
inventory of floating bridging, which gives anything but an accurate
estimate. However, it does indicate quite clearly that the require-
ments represent but a slight drain on the Soviet economy even when
based on a liberal allowance of floating bridge equipment to the units.
Rigid economy in the allocation of this equipment as contemplated by
would reduce the requirements in peace and war to
less than 50 percent of the above estimates.
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GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The security consciousness which surrounds the production of
weapons also extends to the production of military bridging. No
reports of any value are available concerning the production of
bridging in the USSR and only a few are available concerning the
Satellites.
Instead of identifying the separate gaps in intelligence it is
simpler to state that no firm production or stockpiling data. exist
on military bridging.
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1. Sources.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
"Eval.," have the following significance:
A - Completely reliable
B - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Not reliable
F -.Cannot be judged
Doc. - Documentary
1
- Confirmed by other
sources
2
- Probably true
3
- Possibly true
4
- Doubtful
5
- Probably false
6
- Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign govern-
ments and organizations; copies or translations of such documents
by a staff officer; or information extracted from such documents by
a staff officer, all of which will carry the field evaluation
"Documentary" instead of a numerical grade.
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the
cited document; those designated."RR" are by the author of this
report. No "RR" evaluation is given when the author agrees with the
evaluation on the cited document.
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