FOREIGN RADIOBROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL IN EAST GERMANY

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• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1951
• Content Type: IR

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4 PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT rah-7/9
FOREIGN RADICUROADCASTING RECEPTION POTENTIAL
IN EAST GERMANY :
CIA/RE PR- 54
(SRI; Project 46,272)r
1 April 1954
NOTICE
IME"NT
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision.. Comments and data which may
be available to the user are solLcited,
WARNING
THIS DOCUMENTOONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL
DEFENSE OY THE UNITED STATES WISHIN THE MEANING OF THr,
ESPIONAGE LAW, TL E 18, OSC, SECS 793 AND 794, THE
TRAWSVMSSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN
UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
US ,OFFICIALS ONLY
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VI, Trends 0 , ? , ,
Appendixes
_
.
Page
58
Appendix A. Reported Organization of the General Direotovate .
of kroadcast Radio, East Germany, December 1950-
August 1952
61
Appendix B. Reported Personnel of the State Radio Committee,
East Germany, 1953.
63
Appendix C, Radiobroadcasting Transmitting Facilities in East
Germany, 1949 . G 0
0
69
Appendix D. Radiobroadcasting Transmitting-Facilities in East
Germany, January 1954 , .
Appendix E? Characteristics of Radiobroadcast Receivers Produced
in East Germany a 0 0
0
77
Appendix F. Methodology. . 0 0
79
Appendix G, Gaps in Intelligence ? C C I 0 0 0 .0& 0
0
81
Appendix Ho, Sources and Evaluation of Sources. e 0 0 a a
a
83
1, Evaluation of Sources, J 0 1 G n 0
0
83
20 Sources, . 0' 0 0 0 0 0
0
84
Tables
10 Reported Foreign Radiobroadoasts to East Germany (Aural)'
Weekly Program Vours (Non-Entertainment) and Number
of Frequencies Used, by Type, January 1954 0
5
2. Growth in Pow,ix of.RadiObroadoast Transmitters in East Germany,
Selected Years, 1934-540.6 . 2. ,.......,... ,
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NIMI? .11.?? .0/M. 4?A.? war loom*
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3, ,Eptilmated Number of Broadcast Receivers in East Germany,
1946-57 d. . ? ...... ..... LI4588?.E4 .37
4. Estimated Number of Br Adcast Receivers and Percentage
Distribution by East German Postal Districts,
November 1950 ... ... ? ? . Se ...... V 41
Estimated Productim Civilian Radiobroadcast Receivers
in East Germany, 1946-51 45
Chart
.Presumed Ovzanization of the East German State Raul()
Committee ........... ?..
biEjet
ro11oving Page
Iffin
22
RadiobrIadcasting Transmitting racilities in East Germany. 28
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(OUR Project 46,272)
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FEIGN RAPIODROArCASTIPG nErEPTIoll PPTENTIAL
IN
EAST GEMANY*
Summary and Conclusion
From the available evidence, it is clear that East Germany- continues
to be a fertile target, especially from the proximity of West Perlin and
West Germany, for exploitation by foreign radiobroadcasting directed into
that domain. This conclusion is supported by the following? .
1. The availability of large numbers of suitable receivers in
the hands of the populace.
2. She propensity of the average East German to listen to
foreign broadcasts, especially RIAS (Radio in the American Sector, Derlin)
produced by a combination of native curiosity, pan-Germanism, known wel-
fare inadequacies, and) in marked contrast, the better economic status of
West Germans.
3. The failure of jamming to blot out completely foreign broad-
cast reception,
LL The failure or unwillingness of the Russians or the East
German SED hierarchy to solve the problem of foreign broadcast listening
by imposing drastic prohibitive measures, such as confiscation of all
radlobroadoast receivers capable of Such reception
The absence of any other rapid media of mass communication to
replace the present basic rediobroadcasting system in use in East Germany
today,
6 Possible undermining, by persons within East German radio
officialdom potentially susceptible to disloyalties, of Kremlin-inspired .
East German Government efforts to solve the foreign broadcast menace and
domestic broadcast ineffectualities,
East Germany, since the end of World War II, has become the target of
an increasing volume of foreign broadcast transmissions.. The program con-
tent of these transmissions ranges from pro-Western to "objective" to '
pro-Soviet-
The estimates and conclusions contained in this report represent the
best judgment of the responsible analystas of 1 January 1954. However,
some material of a later date hns been included,
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Historically, Germany has been among the leading nations, of the World
in the development and use of radio as a medium of mass communication.
It was one of the earliest nations to recognize and use radio broadcasts
as a propaganda weapon. At the end of World War II, its radiobroadeasting
facilities were partly destroyed, damaged, sold, or confiscated. East
Germany's radiobroadeasting service got off to a slow and unsure start
under Soviet control and restraint. It lacked key trained personnel and
effective organization and management. .Domestic production of broadcast
equipment and receivers for home consumption.was almost at a standstill.
Even after substantial production was. revived, the Russians did not permit
retention of a significant amount of newly produced East German broadcast
equipment for hone use until 1952. Also in-that year, the Russians began
to return German professionals to their homes in East Germany. Technical
radio management was completely reorganized and integrated. Eadiobroad-
casting organization and management was completely revamped and put on a
centralized basis for better control of facilities and program content
and of the security level of its personnel.
Great progress has been made since 1952, but there are indications
that neither the Russians nor the SED Party Hierarchy in East Germany are
yet satisfied, A plan to reorganize the present State Radio (Droadcasting)
Committee, reported to have been drawn up in March 1953, has not been
implemented, however, even after the provocation, if it were needed,
brought home by the effectiveness of broadcasts from West Germany Which
helped to spread the East German riots in June 1953. ?
The nazi. broadcasting system transmission base remained virtually at
a. constant dimension during the decade ending in .1941. Some facilities
were damaged, destroyed, or confiscated in consequence of World War II
and Soviet occupation. The East German transmission base, however, had
been pearly restored to its prewar condition within 5 years of the end
of hostilities. Possibly influenced by the Soviet philosophy of
dependence on very high power transmitters, the East Germans have almost
tripled their total transmitter power during the last 3 years. This
increase in transmission should make it much more difficult to penetrate
the area with Western broadcasts effectively and should Provide much
better coverage of Western Europe by East German stations.
Although the number of broadcast 'receivers in service had fallen to
a relatively low point by the end of World War II, A steady growth has
brought the number up to .an estimated 3,7 to 4 million today. These
figures include a few very high frequency and television receivers. The
geographical distribution of radio receivers follows generally the same
pattern as the distribution of the population. Dy far the great bulk
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of receivers in operation are relatively insensitive, many with only one
tube, and in general of a poor quality, reflecting shortages of material
and poor workmanship. These receivers are hardly capable of satisfactory
reception of high-frequency transmission from fcreign countries. There
is some development of wire-diffusion systems in public places, factories,
and newly constructed apartment houses, and a few, apparently, in private
homes. Much of the East German production of electrical equipment has
gone for reparations and export,- The prohibitively high prices charged
for receivera and the conditions surrounding their purchase tend to make
It hard for the average citizen to ac.atire them.
There are no formal laws, decrees, or statutes specifically forbiddin
listening co foreign radiobroadcasts. There has been, however, a steady
increase in the harassing measures adopted by the East German regime to
restrict this practice. These measured involve both legal and political
restrictions (surveillance, intimidation, insinuation) and technical
interference with reception through jamming operations. There are
definite restrictions on the viewing of television programs and permits
to own a set are held to a minimum.
The present jamming facilities in East Germany are capable of reducing
seriously the potential East German audience for Western broadcasts. This
is done by the use of both high-power and medium-power transmitters stra-
tegically located and of log-power local jammers which distribute their
signals over electric power lines.
In spite of countermeasures, Western broadcasts have been effective
In East Germany. A large audience listens regularly to Western programs,
The effect upon East German listerners has had widespread political and
economic reverberations. Among Western stations, RIAS (Radio in the
American Sector, rerlin) has been in the forefront of popularity among
East German listeners.. RIAS broadcasts reportedly were effective in
spreading news of the 17 June 1953 riots throughout East Germany. News
and political programs are the most popular programs broadcast by Western
stations.
The radio audience in East Germany has become an increasiagly
attractive target for Western exploitation. This exploitation is welcomed
by a large part of the audience. Accordingly, foreign broadcast trans-
mission ,into East Germany has increased over-all since the end of World
War II. To counter this, the East Germwn. radiobroadcast service has
moved toward centralized .control, integration, and improvement in the.
effectiveness of Its radiobroadcasting propaganda weapon at home and
abroad, particularly in West Germany. Incompetence, subversion, and
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security-vulnerabilities of personnelassociated with the East German radio-
broadcast service have forced the authorities to improve the screening
and training of employees and applicants. Organizationally, 1952 was the
critical and dynamic year, but some evidenee shows that the many cure-all
actions taken that year have not yet solved East Germany's radicbroad-
casting problems.
Trends point towerd increasing foreign exploitation of East German
listeners, Managerially and organizationally, East Germany, probably
under Soviet insistence and directionl.has been moving dynamically on all
fronts since early 1952 toward greatly improving the effectiveness a the
broadcasting resource in its East German and West German political .and
other missions. Although the trend is upward on availability of East
German receivers, it is levellingoff or receding on the number capable
of foreign reception. .The East German transmission base trend has been
upward in terms of total power being used, clearly' for purposes of
"qapturing" both the East German and West German audience. The jamming
trend and its degree of effectiveness have been rising-and will probably
continue in that direction, A slight trend is perceived in the direction
of possible ,alternative syntems, such as frequency modulation (ITO and
IN? wire diffusion, and group listening, possibly designed to yield
ultimately a "captive" audience, at least insofar as foreign broadcasting
is concerned,
I. 'Transmissien Facilities of Fereign Broadcastere ta East GermanL(Aural),
? -
Seven Communist countries, 7 Western countries (excluding West Germany).
and 4 organizations operating in West Germany beamal weekly total of 248.5
hours of original programs into East Germany, exclusive of entertainment.
Although a considerable portion of this broadcast time is designed for
both West German and East German listeners, all of it has potential
reeeption:in East Germany and is therefore significant to this study.
Table 1* shows the breakdown, by country, of ereign broadeasts to
East Germany, It will be. noted that progranm by local West German. stations
re not included in this table, for reasons discussed in I, G, below,
47-755,aj-T-FOliows on p.. 5,
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Table 1
leported Yoreign Rndiobroadsts to Fast Germsny (Aural)
Weekly Program tow's (Non-Entertainment)
snd !lumber of Frequencies Used, by Type 1,4
Zrnnuary 1954
?
scavass--astSUssues.....arlt..
Communist Countries
egwou...166
Original
Weekly Program
Eours
' Number of Frequenelea
'Medium c/
2
1
1
0
1
1
0
ir,ow d/
0
1
n
0
(..%
t -
??
Very
1:01 1311_
13
8
v
4
2
2
2
35
23.5
9
12.5
9
7
5
0
0
0
(3
0
0
, ,
USSE
Poland
Czechoslow.kia
TkumAnia
Yugoslavia.
Hungary
1:,ulgaria
Totsl
101
Western Countries
kr..xcept West Germany)
Switzerland
- 32.
, 0
2
? 0
UK
Trance
21 .
6.5
-r)
. 6
2.
1
1
. 1
-,
Italy
5. ?
0
3
Vatican City
5
5(...)
1
-,
pain
2
0
' 2
Turkey
2
. 0
1
0
r)
VOA
15
0
Totra Be
7-lootnoie-eferences in arIbio numerals are to sources listed in Appendix
.?ootnotes for Table 1 follow on p, 6,
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Table 1
.Reported Foreign Rediobroadeasts to East Germany (Aural)
Weekly Program Hours (Nm-Entertainment)
.and Number of Frequencies Used, by. Type- 1/
January 1954
(Continued.)
AMMILIMIYMPARISOMMOCial.
Number of 7.E2aueneies
Original
Weekly Program
sours
Very /
High 2i
fm?ftityyr7.,.?
High -b/
Medium51'7/d/
Low -
West Germany
1
1
3
R'Pli (Radio free aussia)
18
0
2
0
S'edio Liberstion
3,5
0
1
0
lotal
67.5
Grand Total 248.5
z=e:
_ .
a< Very high frequencies WEFT extend. from 30 to 300 megacycles ffic-T-Tald
are often referred to as "very short waves,"
b. High frequencies extend from 3,000 to 30,000 kilocycles (kc) and are
often referred to as "short waves."
c. Medium frequencies extend from 300 to 3,000 kilocycles and are often
referred to as "medium waves,"
d. Low frequencies extend from 30 to. 300 kilocycles and are often referred
to as "long waves,"
Actual reception potential is much greater than this table would indicate,
since many of the Western broadcasts are repeated at later hours- None of
the broadcasts from Communist countries are repeated, although most of them
are transmitted on several frequencies simultaneously.
Or the 248.5 hours of original programs, 101, originate in Communist
countries (ineluding Yugoslavia), 80 in non-German Western countries, and
67.5 are beamed from West Germany rt should be pointed out that a malority
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of the 67.5 hours beamed from West Germany are carried by stations which
are owned or controlled by US interest, either officially or by citizens'
committees.
The outstanding broadcaster to East Germany is the organization known
as RIAS, or Radio in the American Sector (of Berlin). It operates around
the clock and carries programs that are of interest to both East and West
Germans.
This report is based upon the latest available information, but it
must be realized that frequencies and programing may change from day to
day and certainly from month to month. It is felt, however, that the
over-all picture remains relatively constant and that the composite study
presented will remain reasonably accurate until major changes in broad-
cast policy are effected,
A. RIAS Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor nerlin (Radio.
American S
in the
PIAS has transmitters at Britz, in the US Sector of Berlin, and
at of inthe US Sector of West Germany near the Czechoslovak and East
German borders. At Britz there are 4 transmitters, 2 of them on medium
frequency, 1 on high frequency, and 1 on a very high frequency unit
employing frequency modulation (FM) type of emission. The 40-kilowatt
(ka) transmitter at Hof operates on medium frequency. 2/
RIAS has maintained continuous broadcasting since early 1952, 3/
At least one frequency in each category, -- medium, high, and very high--
is in operation from 0500 to 0305 (GMT). The gap from 0305 to 0500 (GMT)
is filled by a second medium frequency unit which operates from 1500 to
0500 (GMX): a third medium frequency transmitter is in operation from
0700 to 1800 (GMT), 4/
Most of the material prepared for East German listeners by the
Voice of America (VOA) in Munich and New 1'c:irk is relayed by RIAS? but this
represents a very small fraction of the total RIAS transmissions. 5/
RIAS2 though controlled by the US High:Commissioner for Germany
(HICOG)p is essentially a German station for the German people. 6/
Originally designed to reach the people of West Derlin, it operated only
as a Wire-diffusion unit, by interconnection with the Perlin telephone
system, for the first 6 months after its inception in early 1946. 7/ As
the capacity and facilities of RIAS expanded, it gained recognition
throughout Germany. Although many other transmitters are beamed toward
East Germany, RIAS has by far the strongest and most extensive voice. 8/
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Approximately one-third of BIAS programs '(52 hours -a week) are of
an informative nature. Of this, 24 hours a week are devoted to news
coverage Or comments on the news. 9/ The remainder consists of music,
plays, and the like.
B. Voice of America (VOA).
The Voice of America spendscomparatively little time or money in
trying to reach the ears of East Germans, 12/ probably because it is felt
that BIAS IS doing a good job. VOA, New York, prepares and transmits 1
hour of? material daily except Sunday for East German consumption, employing
from 3 to 8 high frequencies. 11/ This material is also relayed by Tangier,
Africa. RIAS picks up 3 of the 15 minute programs for relay and repeat
broadcasts, and several local West German stations handle the fourth pro-
gram. 1E/ These four programs consist mostly of news, press coMments,
interviews, topical reports, and spotlights on US life. A special Thursday
program features "USA -- Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow." In addit-aa,
there is a one-half hour Sunday program "Answers to Listeners' Letters
and Stamp Corner," which is also transmitted by RIAS? from preshipped tape.
No VOA transmitters in West Germany are employed to beam German-language
material to the East German people. 13/
Probably the most significant function of VOA, as far as East Ger-
man listeners is concerned, is the Russian-language programing designed
for Soviet occupation troops stationed in the Satellite countries./
These programs are broadcast over numerous medium- and high-frequency
channels, and most of them could be picked up by the troops in East Germany,
whether or not tpecifically beamed toward them. Such programs are not,
however, represented in Table 1, because they are not specifically designed
for or beamed to the territory of East Germany.
C. Radio Free Europe (RFE).
Although there are About 600 Germans on the Munich staff of RFE, 12/
there is no more than a token appeal to East .Germany and it is not included
in Table 1, Primary target areas ef:RFE are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, and Bulgaria. 16/
D. tma_pritishl:icastilfLg_9u_r-Q,imtlstrLaslo.
ap beams 21 hours of original programs weekly to Germany, using
1 low, 1 medium, and 2 high frequencies, 11/ Some of the BDC programing
has in the past been expecially designed for East German listeners, but for
the most part it is of a general nature for German-speaking peoples of
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varying political Inclinations. lc/ A
from Montreal once a week. 12/ All of
the medium frequency and at least 1 of
a day is transmitted on low frevenby.
one-half hour program la relayed
these transmissiOna are carried on
the high frequencies, but only 1 hour
20/
DIOC concentrates on objective coverage, of the news, but includes
fill,in music and feature programs that?depiat daily life of the Western
Worl4 as well as ?programs alich point up Dritish appreciation for problems.
of European peoples. 31/
E Sad Liberation.
Radio Liberation, sponsored by the American Committee for Liberation
from Bolshevism, Inc., went on the air 1 March 1953 Ath a 10-ka high-
frequency transmitter located at Munich. 22.1 Proadcasts are beamed to East
Germany in the Russian language and are apaarently designed to appeal to
the elLte of the Soviet occupation forces, since the operation is supported
by the Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR also
located in Munich. 23/
Radio L:beration begins the broadcast day with a one-half hour pro-
gram of news and features, carried on 3 high frequencies; 1 is beamed to
East GermanY, 1 to Austria, and the third to the USSR. From 0330 to 2300
(GMT), this program is repeated continuously on the East German frequency. 24/
Thus the Radio Liberation effort shows as only 3.5 hours a week of original
--
programs, although the total weekly broadcasts, as far as reception potential
is concerned, amounts to 140 hours.
F . Radio Free Russia (11100
Radio Free Russia (RFR) is a mobile, clandestine unit operating on
high frequency, controlled by the Natsionalno Trudovey Soyuz (National
Worker's Union -- NTS). 32/ Programs are in Russian with no rebroadcast in
the German.language, as was the practice in 1951. 26/ FI is the only
known non-Communist radio station operated by Russians and has as its
objective an internal resistance to Communist pressure by the formation of
underground cells, each with 2 or 3 members, that would listen to RFR broad-
oasts for guidanae in their activities. 27/ in addition to special broad-
casts designed for the common soldiers of the Soviet occupation forces, 28/
RFR periodically sends "operational messages," 29/ and comments on matters
of internattonal interest and Soviet internal affairs.
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UR IS on the air 18 hours a week, 311 Its transmitter (or tran-
mitters; .operate with low?power,ebut a study shows that its signal
is receivable about 75 percent of the time, probably in part due. to -
frequent changes in transmitting frequency over a rather wide- range, which
helps to reduce the effect of,:oviet jamming.
Other Western Broadcasters.
Six other non-Communist countries transmit 52 hours of program time
a week in the Germanlanguage for Germany, using I low, 1 medium, and 14
high feequencies. 32/ Neus and comments on the news are featured in
the broadcasts.
.
Except for Vaticem City, which employs 1 low Fend 5 high frequeneies,
end Prance,. which uses 1 medium and 1 high frequency, &11 of these trans-
missions are carried by high frequency. 33/
Switzerland is high in this category, with 32 hours of broadcast
time in the German language, The other countries are prance ?6,5 hours,
Italy-and-Vatican City -- 5 hours eneh, and Spain and Turkey -- 2 hours
each. _
It will be noted that programs carried by local West German stations
are not included, although in many cases they are received. by East German
residents and.come under the general eategory of "foreign stations" as far .
as East Germany is concerned, The reason such programs are not included is
that there is no reasonable place to draw the line that is, it would be
obrioubly inaccurate. to list all transmissions by local West Germnn stations.
It would be less inaccurate, but would nevertheless present a confusing
picture, to include. only the MDR (Vordwest Deutsche 1,undfunk) network.
Therefore the dichotomy has been on the basis of bether or not the statiens
operating in. West Berlin and West Germany have intentionally beamed their
programs to East German. residents. Since IUDS is just getting into this
field, it is not included, although e!),ny future study of this nature would
have to take its facilites into consideration.
E. Foreign Communist nros,deasters.
-,!ommunist countries, exclusive of East Germany, transmit 101 program
hours in the German language - to East Germany, using 1 low, -6 medium, and
31 high frequencies.- Me USS8 leads this group with 35 hours, followed by
Poland,- Zunenia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, in that
order. Most of these pregrams are devoted to the news, or are related to
news items.
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All of the programs broadcast by the ussa to Eat Germany are
carried on at least 4 frequencies,. and 1 of the half-hour programs is
carried on 2 medium and 8 high frequencies. 11./
Of the 13 high frequencies used by the USSR in these broadcasts,
12 emanate from Moscow, the other from Leningrad. One of the Soviet
medium-frequency, transmitters is in Kaunas, Lithuania. 35/ The other,
100-kw medium-frequency unit, operates in Leipzig, East Germany, but is
under Soviet control. It is used to relay some of the programs originated
by aadio Moacowa 36/
II. East Germany Broadcasting System.
A. Early History.
1. German Leadership in the Field of Radio.
Historically, at least until the end of World War II, Germany
vas among the leading nations of the world in the development and use of
radio as a medium of communication. It kept pace with other technologically
modern countries of the period. In many instances it outran them, By the
beginning of World War II, Germany had built up a huge radio research and
development capacity, It .had prolific radio equipment productive facilities.
While consuming large quantities of its own production to build up its own
operational communication resources, it was able to export large quantities
of radio equipment. puring the period, Germany had evolved mass techno-
logical and. organizational "know-hoa" and the necessary trained manpower
pool.
Germany's radio history dates from 1897 at least. In that
year radiotelegraph communication over a short distance took place in that
country. Sadiobroadcasting, as a voice medium of raaid mass communication,
was initiated in 1923 with the establishment of a transmitting station in
Taarlin. It was about this time that the practical applications of the
vacuum tube, both for transmission and reception, began to be heavily
exploited. High-frequency radiobroadcasting was commenced there in 1929.
In 1930, television picture transmission was conducted and very-high-
frequency radio was employed on German railroads. In the same year, public
address and wire diffusion facilities became associated with radiobroad-
casting. As early as 1936, PM techniques were conceived and tested_ 37/
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2. German Droadcasting as a Political Weapon.
The first use of radio to further a nations political
objectives took place in Germany in 1915. Isolated by war blockade,
Germany took 'to radio to establish a Morse-code telegraph news service to
neutral countries. This German novelty perhaps gave a cue to Lenin, On
the very first day of the proletarian revolution in Russia, on 7 November
1917, he had the Russian Cruiser AnX02a announce to the "world" by radio-
telegraphy that 'they had overthrown the provisional government. Daily
accounts of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk followed with preaen7
tations of the revolutionary :views. for reception by the outside world. 38/
It was during the 1914-18 period that the popular discovery
of propaganda and its power was made. 11b.t "In the immediate post -a 1917
period, the Soviet leaders had found that, deprived as theyaaxe at the
start of all other means of power, they had in propaganda a cheap effective
weapon of their own. By its use, they broke the spirit of the German
armies in Russia, and its application on the international scale materially
.assisted them in putting an end to the intervention policies of Rtasia's
former allies..." 4o/ In effect, the Russians. are doing the same thing
today on. German.soil.
3. German Management Organization.,
Consistent with early pot-World War I efforts to democratize
Germany, radiobroadcasting service was provided by private tompanies. Ten
such companies were ia business when, sometime before Hitler came to power,
they were merged into. the.Reich Rundfunk Gesellschaft (State Radiobroad-
casting Company). 41/ With this move, private broadcasting enterprise
seems to have died 7n Germany. It was consonant with the then current
trends toward statism.
When Hitler came to power in 1933, sweeping organizational
and managerial changes were made inGermanradiabroadcasting. It is highly
probable that Garman experience over the years in the field of propaganda
and the potentialities of radio as aamedium for its dissemination, coupled
with Hitler's intentions, gave great iMpetus to the develoament and use of
raditabroadcasting AS an instrument of State following Hitler's political
victory.
. Hitler moved dynamically. One of the initial acts or his
new goverament was the organization early in March 1933 Of a: Ministry of
Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment. It was headed up by the infamous
Goebbels. It absorbed the.Stata Radiobroadcasting Company. The purpose
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of the new Ministry was to coordinate the national and international propa-
ganda efforts of Hitler's National Socialist (Nazi) Party, a synonym for
the German Government, 12./
Fully sensing the potential of radio as a medium of propaganda
as did the Russians, Goebbels organized his Ministry into five deaartments,
giving recognition to radio along with other media of mass communication.
These were propaganda, radio, press, cinema, and theater. Goebbels, who
enjoyed cabinet rank and stood near the top of the Nazi hierarchy, gave
national dictatorial powers to these departments, Upon activating the
new Ministry, Hitler took over all propaganda channels and facilities,
including the German radiobroadcasting network. Their operation was then
coordinated with the experienced propaganda department of the Nazi Party, .1.13,/
It is likely that German jamming of Soviet foreign-language propaganda
broadcasts, begun about 1935, was also a responsibility of this new
ministry. 44/
Sometime prior to 1942 the Nazis took direct action in improvin
and expanding the propaganda benefits of radiobroadas.sting, The Nazi Party
had a radio section. The section had regional and branch offices in all
provinces and districts. Heads of these offices, acting as political and
radio propagandists, set up reception facilities to close any communication
gaps between the Government, the Party, and the masses. To achieve this
end, the radio-manufacturing industry, at the request of the Minister of
Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, manufactured large numbers of cheap
"people's" radio receivers.
From the foregoing it can be seen that Germany had gone a
long way in the development and exploitation of radiobroadcasting as a
medium of rapid mass communication even before World War /I, It had,all
the human and physical resources for the undertaking. The fact that Ger-
many lost the war can not be attributed to a failure of mass communication,
or specifically radiobroadcasting, to do an'effective job. It is probably
more nearly correct to conclude that mass communication including radio-
broadcasting contributed greatly to the solidification of German thinking
and to rallying the populace to build up its war efforts to the tremendous
peak achieved in 1943,
:A is with this background that post-World War II East German
capabilities in the field of radiobroadaasting must be viewed, conditioned,
however,,, by Kremlin dictates, Pan-Germanism, and subversion by East Germans
themselves.
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'1' -2-1ElEena.
Emerging from World Wax II, Eaat Germany, under Soviet
possession and control, was in chaos. Goebbels and his Ministry were gone.
Radiobroadcasting transmitting and reception facilities were partly de-
stroyed, damaged, Sold, or confiscated. So were the general telecommuni-
cations facilities, including wireline plants used for .broadcast network
operations. Experienced key personnel, engineers, and technicians were in
short supplY. Some fled to the Nest) others died in the war or were
otherwise liquidated) or were probably considered poor security risks.
Still others, including thorough-going scientists and research engineers,
were deported to the USSR for terms of 5 years and in some cases remained
for a second 5-year term.
2, Larjz?..._ManagementOrianiz_atio.a.
In July 1945 the Soviet Maitary AdMinistration created in
East Germany a?Central Administration for Posts and Telecommunications
for the administration and operation of information cmmunication services
in general.In these early days, such radiobroadcasting as could be
provided cane under the Ministry of Popular Education. It is not clear
what the division of responsibilities was between these two mechanisms in
the field of radiobroadcasting. It is likely, that the Ministry was
essentially responsible for programing, program content, and program con-
trol, whereas the Central Administration for Posts and Telecommunications
installed, operated, end maintained the physical facilities,
SeVeral changes took place.in organization between 1948 and 1952.
In the spring of 1948 the Central Administration for Post andftelecommuni-
cations was redesignated the Main Administration for Posts and Tele-
Communications and was placed under the newly, created German Economic
Commission. this Main Administration became the Ministry.of Posts and
Telecommunications in October 1949. 47/ As of 1951, while adMinistrative
control was ostensibly in the hands of the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
communications, the Soviet Control Commission through its Telecommunications
Department was exercising' at least strict superVision over the more vital
aspects of Ministry functions. 48/ ?
Soon after, in early 1950, the radiobroadcasting administration
was reorganized and placed in "a position.mf'dependenCe directly under the
Minister-President .of the German Democratic Repnblic" 1GDR). 122/ There
are other indications that'at.the same time the Ministry of Information may
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operated and controlled the radiobrOadcasting service, aerhaps in behalf
of the Minister-President, as the General Directorate LOT. General Manage-
ment Of the Soviet Zone Radio Droadcasting SysteM7. Appendix A is a
reported organizaaion chart of this directorate, at least as it stood
during the period from December 1950 to 31 August 1952, Although the chart
gives a somewhat iietailed depiction of activities, it appears to distort
the line and stalf functions And overemphasize by relative detail the
importance of c.he technical functions. Program management is Considered
to be s line function, not a staff function as shown. Some of the techni-
cal fanctions shown as line functions are believed to be staff functions.
Thie directorate was decentralized in form and operation.. Apparently each
of the radiobroadcast stations -and studios had its own technical, editorial,
and operations staffs.
Perhaps significantly, there was a reported shortage of trained
and. loyal (to Communism and East Germany) personnel tor staffing the new
General Directorate organization. In particular there was a shortage of
editors?reporters, and commentators. Accordingly, at the end of 1950 a
central radio school was established and two courses were organized. One
was a 6mOnth political course and the other was a 5-month professional
radio course. There were only 19 pupils in the first course, 36 in the
second, and 90 in the third. In the latter Ito percent were women', As
will be noted in later subsections, this school did not solve either com-
petence or loyalty problems once and for all. 22/ It may well be that
this dual.problea, now as then, may be one of the most vulnerable internal
spots in the whole East German radiobroadcasting complex,,
Prior to 1952, according to the evidence, the administration
of the radio medium as a natural resource was not. centered in one organi-
zation in East Germany. Organizational decentralization or division aa
research, development, and technolegy in the field of radio qas also a
condition of the period. At least by Western standards these situations
would not generally lead to the effective and efficient use of the radio
resource for legtimate purposes nor for the development and use of that
resource as an electromagnetic warfare weapon, a'subject of considerable
concern to the US today. 21/*
For an estiaate on this general subject see CIA/SE-38 Soviet Bloc
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in 'Electromagnetic Warfare,
Ta7k5r'1953-.S.
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It is strongly conjectured from subsequent evidence that
during the winter of 1951-52 the USSR and the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
Germans realized that radiobroadcasting in East Germany wag losing ground
to West Berlin and West Germany and that this tool of the State was not
making its full contribution to fashioning East Germany -- and for that
matter West Germany -- as a solid Communist satellite of the USSR.
3. The Critical Year 1952.
Evidence clearly shows that the year 1952 was critical to
radiobroadcaating in East Germany. By this time, Soviet and East German
SED officials were unhappy with the development and effectiveness of that
resource bAh. at home and abroad. Neither was it standing up to the
Input of foreign broadcasts, particularly from West Germany. In con-
sequence, a number of far-reaching actions were initiated to correct the
unsatisfactory conditions. Among these were reorganization of radio
administration, reorganization of radio technological activities,
reorganization of radiobroadCasting administration and operations, baniti-
zation ca: personnel, ambitious replanning for the rapid expansion of -
facilities) and a revamped approach to radiobroadcast program content and
slant.
.0Ver the years the Kremlin has asserted the organizational
concept that the administration of radio as a medium should be centralized
for ccatrol and administrative purposes.* It is so organized in the USSR.
Apparently it had. beers somewhat decentralized in East Germany as late as
1952. Entering 1952. there was a Main Department for Communications under
the Manistry of Posts and.Telecommunications. It was in some way related
to a Central Office for Postal and Telecommunications Techniques The
lattea had among its duties the technical and organia,ational supervision
of all radio transmitting and receiving stations. However, broadcasting
eqw_pment used by the General Directorate 4:Or General Management of the
Scliet Zone -Radio Broadcasting Systegwas. not included. The Central
Office was the procuring and purchasing office for,all radio stations
with regard to equipment. It was also responsible for rendering expert
(Tinton on receivers and for-ehecking of all electrical apparatus in the
interest of interference suppression. &branch of the Central Office was
concerned with radio security. 22/ Reportedly, in April 1952, "the Soviet
Control Council ordered that the organizational set-up of the Mlnisterium
W--lhis concept has significance for jamming operations in which the
avoidance of self-jamming is an important consideration.
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fuer Post-ernmelde-technisches Zentralant (Central Office for Postal and
Telecommmications Techniques) be altered to-conform to Soviet patterns.
The Russiens demanded that all radio communications be .controlled by a
special Main Administration." 13./ This demand may have been in some way
relate': to means for coordinating planned expansion of jamming. Dy June
1957 there was in fact established, presumably pursuant to the above
de,and, a Main Radio Administration under the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
emmunications. Though some parts of the Central Office were retained,
he essential radio functions and duties were apparently assumed by the
new Main Radio Administration. 514/
It seems likely that it was the Main Radio Administration
which carried the burden in preparing two regulations on radio adopted as
decrees by the GDS in August 1952. These were the "Decree on Radio-
Frequency Installation" and the "First Provision for Execution of the Decree
on Radio-Frequency Installations." These decrees by definition and
explanation cover all uses of radio in the radio spectrum range from 10
kilocycles to 3 million megacycles. Oddly enough, introduction to the
basic decree itself would seem to limit the benefits which it seeks to
achieve by the phrase "In order to protect the interference-free reception
of broadcast transmissions and of radio news transmissions." 55/
Several other organizational shifts were conceived during
1952 and put into effect on 1 January 1953, which directly affected the
exploitation of rado in East Germany in general and, pertinently here,
radiobroadcasting As directed by the Council of Ministers of East Germany,
a Central Institute for Radio Techniques was established on 1 January 1953,
for "purposes of coordination and .guidance in the field of radio engineering,
and in order to promote a research and technical development in this field."
It was made part of the Main Radio Administration of the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunicatons.
At the same time (1 January 1953) the Radio Department
of the Central Office for Postal and TLlecommunications Tecnniques was
shifted to the new Central Institute lor Postal and Telecommunications
Techniqges. In the shift it took with it all installations, equipment,
and instruments which could be used for research and development in the
field of radio technology. Further to bring together in one place creative
talent Ln the field of radio and the necessary research and development
tools apd equipment, "personnel and equipment useful for radio development
work" were transferred from the 4-month old State Radio 1Eroadcasting7
Committee, successor to the General Directorate previously mentioned, to
the new Central institute. The Committee, hoiever, was to retain "equip-
ment and personnel essential to the radio and television studio industry."
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?
To oversee the new Central Institute, the Ministry for Posts and Tele-
communications was to appoint a board of trustees (kuratorium), subject
to the approval of the Director of the Central Office for Researcd and
Technology. An unconfirmed report relates that the board was to include
repreaentation.from the Academy of Sciences, the Technical University of
Drepden, the Ministry of Traffic apparently transporg, the Office of
Economic Questions, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and the
tadustries engaged in producing radio equipment and related products.
" Also effective 1 January 1953, the Minister of Posts and
Telecommunications created and placed under his Main Radio Administration
a People's-Owned Radio Installations Planning and Assembling Enterprise
for Radio Transmitting and Receiving Installations., It is physically
located on the grounds of the Funkwerk in Koepenick, Perlin) where one or
more powerful radiobroadcasting and/or jamming transmitters are located.
In the production and erection of radio installations, the Enterprise has
the duty of preparing projects 4ith cost estimates, technologcal projects
for radio installations with cost plans setting up uniform drafting norms,
and performing technical evaluations upon request. It may perform
designing and: assembly Work and Construction management. It has the right
to .nspect radio installations being produced by other enterprises. It
was to be the only agency authorized to give final approval for the trans-
fer of completed installations; .g./
It seems amply clear that this sequence of shifts in
technical radio organization and management reflects a clear pattern for
improving coordination, integrating research and development effort,
gearing the latter to operational needs, proliferating creative production,
enhancing top level control, and generally accelerating the exploitation
Of the radio medium, probably for both East German and Soviet benefit.
The two or more thousand German returnees with competence in science, tech-
nology, and engineering who remained in East Germany after their return
undoubtedly are contributing greatly to a revived East German technological
competence,.particulorly those who had or acquired Communistic sentiments.
b. Creation of the State Radio Committee.
To overcome organizational and administrative defects the
East Germany Council of Ministers adopted a far-reaching decree on
14 August 1952, At that time, President Grotewohl explained "that the new-
great tasks in creating the foundations of Socialism in the GER enhanced
the importance of the democratic radio. The previous system of the demo-
cratic radio is no longer up to these tasks and cannot satisfy the gro4ing
requirements of the working population. In the future the entire work of
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the radio gill be centralized in Berlin and will be subject to uniform
direction." 21/ The decree, so revealing as to East German, and probably
Kremlin, intentions and plans, follows 58/:
111
"Decree of the Government of the German ,Democratic Re ublic
ConcerningLthe Setting up of a State Radio Committee
3 from Auust iii, 92
(nib) The new and great task of the building of the foundations
of socialism in the German Democratic Republic, demanding the
raising of the political and cultural level of our population.
It is a question of develop rig the socialist formation of the
workers, of propagating among the inhabitants and of instilling
Into them deeply, the idea of the defence of peace and our
country, hatred of the imperialist warmongers, militarists and
traitors to their country; of intensifying the struggle for the
unity of Germany for the rapid conclusion of a peace pact. For
the solution of these problems, the radio of the German Demo-
cratic Republic is developing increasingly important activity.
The system of the radio of the German DemocraticBepublic, which
existed hitherto, no longer suffices for present day tasks, nor
does it meet the overgroging demands of the workers.
The new tasks demand that the people of the German remo-
oratic Republic and of western Germany should have the possi-
bility of receiving three different programmes carefully
co-ordinated, and of high quality, broadcast throughout the day
by the radio of the German Democratic Republic. That i6 why
radiophonic acttvity must be centralized in the German Democratic
Republic in Berlin, and subordinated to a single directorate which
will be responsible for the structure of all three programmes.
That is why the Council of Ministers has decided to promulgate the
following decree,
.4?1:1?1??????11.
-1. With the .aim of improving radio activity in the German
DemocraticRepublid, a state radio committee has. peen Set up
attached to the Council of Ministere.
The administration of the State Radio Committee comet
within the competence of the president, the vice-Oresident and
11 members.
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3. (a) The chairman of the State Radio Committee is nomi-
nated and recalled by the chairman of the council on the proposal
of the Council of Ministers.
(b) The vice-chairman and the members are nominated
by the premier, on the proposal of the president.
4. The administration of the Radio Committee is charged
particularly with the following tasks:
(a) The planning and structure of the programmes of
the broadcasts of the German Democratic Radio.
(b): Continual use of the experience of the Radios of
the Soviet Union and the countries of People's Democracy.
(c) The working out, on scientific bases, of activities
concerning programmes.
:(d) The direction of radio studios in the regj,ons of
tiya German Democratic Republic.
(e) The direction of the television centre in Berlin
and the development of television in the German Democratic Republic.
(f) The direction of the radiophonic school as a pro-
fessional institution for the preparation of cadres.
(g) The publication of a weekly paper on radio programmes,
(h) Co-operation with the competent ministries and
secretariats of the state, to ensure technically the transmission of
programmes of the German Democratic Radio.
(i) The conclusion of agreements with friendly radio
organizations in the framework of cultural agreements of the German
Democratic Republic,
(j) The observation of obligationsj.esulting from its
membership in the International Droadeasting 0rpni.2ation (92q.
5. (a) The decision will be carried out on the directives
of the president.
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(b) The chairman of the lAdio Committee will issue,
within his field of competence, directives and instructions based
on and in execution of the lawa.which are in force, and the decrees
.of the Council of Ministers, and will control their carrying out,
6, The budget of the Radio Committee will be established
separately within the fremework of the state budgetary plan of the
(erman Cemocratic Fepublic.
7, The Radio Committee attached to the Council of Ministers
is the responsible body in the field of planning and investments
for everything concerning radio in the German Democratic :epublic,
8, The studios in the various regions of the German Demo-
cratic Republic are directly responsible to the Radio Committee,
9. Directives are given by the Radio Committee.
10, The present decree comes into force on the it of September,
1952,
An analysis of this decree reveals basic changes ir Govern-
ment policy, The reogranizetion shows a shift from deeentralieatior to
centralization for control, oordination, and economy reasons- The new
Committee is attached directly to the Council of Ministers affording elose
liaison with top Government leaders. Top level officials of the Committee
are subject to appointment and removal by top level officials of the
Government and probably the Party (SE)), The decree not only directs what
to do, but also, in some matters, how to do it. The Committee is respon-
sible feir certain eolicy formulation,for, program planning and content, as
well as for broadcast service bperations. It is reported that the Committee
is empowered to coordinate all technical offices of the CTR for the pur-
poses of :nsuring faultless technical transmissions of its broadcasting
programs over the networks, 59/ (See n, 1,, 3, a, above, on Technical 1;adLo
Management),
A presumed organizational structure of the new State Radio
Committee (SSC) appears in the aceompanying chart.* The Committee members
appear to have specific responsibilities beside those of the Committee sa a
whole, The assigned specieic responsibilities probably reflect the importance
attached by the government and the Party to those matters. It is significant
that most of the Committee members are concerned with program content, his
seems to mean that efforts to eapture and retain en audience (pan-nerman)
44 12o11owing p. 22c
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were to be the crucial task of the new Committee. The chart attempts to
?
depict the functions of the Committee and to identLfy,line and staff
relationships as well as principal lines of coordination with e)tternal
mechanisms. The Television Center segment of the SRC is apparently
operational and developmental. As of 1 January 1953, when there was a
Central Office for Television, the dominant function was probably develop-
ment. According to one comprehensive report it was an organization of
considerable size. Apparently, however, when radio technical management
was reshuffled, the new Television Center segment of SRC lost much of its
developmental functions. 60/
Within about 2 weeks of the adoption of the decree, on
I September L952, the SRC as in business. By 16 September 1952, three
phases of the reorientation were implemented. These were centralization
of program production in Berlin, large-scale release of employees, and
the use of the new Koepenick transmitter, possibly as a jammer. 61/ On
14 September 1952, Berlin initiated 3 directed programs over the 3 newly
constituted netaorks. One of these was directed chiefly to West German
patriots to encourage resistance to the West German Government, the second
contained cultural and scientific matters, and the third was addressed to
the masses. 62/
There are three other aspects of organization and manage-
ment which are highly germane to an understanding of East German and Soviet
intentions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. They are personnel, eenip-
ment availability, and relations aith other Soviet Bloc countries. These
deserve separate treatment.
4. Personnel Problems,
The loyalty and performance of personnel associated with
East German radiobroadcasting seems to have been continuing problem at
least since 1951. It is conceivably a soft, vulnerable spot in the East
Genmon structure.
In November 1951, Friedrich Trede, business manager of
the Communist-run Perlin radio station was dismissed without notice by
SED authorities, reportedly because he refused to join the Party. He was
to be succeeded by SEn activist Vogel. The same report states that about
900 employees of Berlin Radio who reside& in West Germany were dismissed
in 1951. All staff members who still resided in West Germany were directed
to move to East Perlin by the end of 1951. This directive applied as well
to SED members aho by special permission had been permitted to retain per-
manent residence in West nerlina 63/
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PRESUMED ORGANIZATION OF THE
EAST GERMANY STATE RADIO COMMITTEE (SRC)a
EXTERNAL COORDINATION
SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY (SED)
Central Committee
Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications
Main Radio Administration
Central Institute of Radio
Techniques
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
STATE RADIO COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN?Kurt Heiss
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN?Wolfgang Kleinert
FIRST SECRETARY?Otto Langer
Central Office of Research
and Technology
Police
Trade Union Organization
Ministry of State Security I
STAFF FUNCTIONS
Legal I.
Administration
Personnel
Personnel Performance I
(Possibly includes SRC and
"pre-military training").
13169 CIA, 3-54
GENERAL MEMBERS
(DIRECTORS)
(Special Functions)
SECRET
ADMINISTRATION
Herr Ebel
LINE FUNCTIONS
Technical Department
Center
Berlin-Adlershof
Transmission
(Apparently takes in the radio
transmitting facilities)
MAIN PERSONNEL
Herr Adannek
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE
Herr Zahnke
rTelevision
MAIN TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT-
CHIEF ENGINEER
Dr. Probst
TELEVISION
Hermann Zilles
Technicians for the 3 Programs
External Technical Service
Technical Scheduling Office
PROGRAM CONTENT,
Radio Station Operations
Wireline Networks (?) POLICY, AND CONTROLSb
PROGRAM PREPARATION b
SECTIONS
Commentary Domestic
"All-German Questions" Foreign Affairs (formerly
News truth about America)
Literature West German
Cultural Policy West German Communist
Theater and Film Party and Unions
Drama Political Culture
Music Children's
Entertainment Soviet Union and Satellites
Economics Current Events
Youth Religions
F:edagogics Berlin
Science and Research SED
Regional Broadcasts Women's
Sports Domestic Economy
Farm Broadcasts Country News
PROGRAM
AND
EDITING
CENSORSHIPb
I Editing
Censorship
TRANSMISSION
Werner Fehlig
MAIN MUSIC
Prof. Pischner (or Pfuechner)
Main Music Department
"All
I
"ALL-GERMAN QUESTIONS"
PROGRAMMING
W. Perk
-German Questions"
Literary and Cultural?
LITERARY AND CULTURAL-
POLITICAL PROGRAMMING
R. Fuetzner
Political Subjects
Entertainment and Public
ENTERTAINMENT AND PUBLIC
PERFORMANCES PROGRAMMING
Kaete Ellrodt
Performances
"Youth Pedagogics"
"YOUTH AND PEDAGOGICS"
PROGRAMMING
Hanna Prisky
and
SECRET
a Reconstructed from material from various sources up
to 30 November /953.
bit is not dear how these functions are tied together
organizationally to effect control of program content.
Some of these sections may have been combined
sometime between March and November 1953.
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One reliable report of 16. September 1952 states that
widespread personnel changes were taking place, no doubt in connection
with the staffing of the new SRC. About 3,000 employees including
technicians, were to be released from the Leipzig, Dresden, Potsdam, Halle,
Weimar, and Schwerin stations. On the other band, some 400 selected com-
petent radio peeple were to be employed to help staff the new operational
headquarters in Berlin. 2../
Another report reveals that at the beginning of January
1953, 76 young reporters and editors who had been recruited from among
the workers and peasants, went to work on the staff of the SRC. -They were
given basic theoretical and practical training in.a 1-year course at
the SRC radio school. They reportedly have the necessary qualifications to
afford them an opportunity to become qualified reporters and editors in
a short time. 65/ This action is considered consistent with the recon-
struction and reorientation of the administration of broadcasting under
the SRC.
In spite of a "clean" slate of personnel selected to
staff the new SRC in September 1952, by November 1953, East Germany was
agaliehaVing loyalty problems in its radiobroadcasting sfructure. One
report of 23 November 1953 relates that the. Investigation Committee of
Free Jurists reported. that several hundred employees of the GDR SRC:,
among them GDR Television Director Hermann Zilles, a member of the SED,
had been "released for political reasons." 66/ Another report Which
may relate to this item dated 18 December 1953 states that a "large number'
of employees of the Soviet Zone radiobroadcasting system ha, been dis-
missed without notice for political reasons," qi and still another
? report, dated 16 December 1953, states that "al East Zone oress and
radio editors will be thoroughly screened by the State security service
during the next two months.. Special attention is to be given to their
attitude during the June 17 uprising and their reports on the rebellion." 68/
One highly illuminating report from reliable sources in
the Soviet Sector of Berlin, if true,.gives an indication of the potential
security-risk vulnerabiltty, questionable competence, or political
unreliability on numerous personalities in the SRO. Some of the
characterizations on the more important personalities are quOted below
from that report 69/:
Kurt Heise, Chairman SRC: "Spent much time in the
Soviet Union and often visits there now. Unpopular.
Central Committee warned him against drinking on
duty. Referred tollIAS as 'station we will soon
kill off.'"
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????? ?????
Hermann Zilles? SRC Committee Member and Chief
of the television station at Adlershof: "Has
been disciplined several times by the SED
because of immorality and incompetence. Good
connections with West Germany. An intriguer."
Note: The report avers that he had been
released for political reasons."
Zahnke, SRC Committee Member: "When drinking,
complains about the GDR government."
Eduard v. Schnitzler, Senior Commentator:
'Intellectually able but amoral. Is criticized
at every party meeting as not being sufficiently
attached to .the Party. in an employees' :meeting
he claimed that Radio Berlin could learn:apme-
thing from RIAS."
Erich Selbamnn: "Son of a Cabinet Minister,
Selongs to:the Party leadership within the
station past Derlini7 but Is in conflict with
it. Is having divorce troilbaa."
Appendix B contains a consolidated listing of reported
biographical sketches on personnel of the SRC -- 1953.
4
From all the available evidence it is difficult to con-
ceive how the SRC can function as an efficient, effective, dynamic
organism. Neither esprit-de-corps nor morale seem to be of the highest
order. Wide variations in political orientation appear rampant. Reported
incompetence is scattered over the structure. Solidarity in sense of
mission, devotion to duty, aid loyalty to a cause seem wanting. Sub-
version might well flourish in such a human environment.
5. Eqnipment Considerations.
About 1950-510 Soviet economic policy probably motivated
by political considerations, toward East Germany underwent change. Prior
aa, this time, at least in the field of telecommunications, the USSR and
certain of the satellites as derected by the Kremlin, were absorbing
practically all of East Germany's production of telecommunications equip-
ment including radio equipment. Little if any was left in East Germany
with which to rebuild its telecommunications operational resources'.
Soviet policy clearly called for acceleration in the build-up of East Germany's
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O... *ma. ...?? wpm. waleur
telecommunications esnipment production capacity in 1951-52, it also
called for an increase in the amount of East German production which could
be retained there for use. This shift in policy may well have been
occasioned by Soviet recognition that the depleted telecommunications
resource of East Germany was retarding the over-all economic contribution
which East Germany could make to the USSR. The Russians may have also
reasoned that the effectiveness of East Germany es a strategic area could
be enhanced as a first line of defense by enlarging its resourees. The
build-up in East German radiobroadcasting facilities commenced about this
time, and undoubtedly stems from that change in Soviet policy, The details
? of equipment and facilities build-up appear in other sections of this
Report.
6, Intra-Soviet Bloc Arrangements.
. --
In the field of intra-Soviet Bloc relations the SRC has been
carrying out the terms of the decree, previously nuotedi which set it up
Mentioned specifically is the /nternational Broadcasting Organization
(01R). Originally this mechanism could make some?claim of being a trule
international .mechanism for dealing with international broadcasting.
However, in 1949, virtually all Western country members gave up memberahip.
This left actual control in Communist, if not Kremlin, hands. Yugoslavia
and Syria were expelled in 1951. in 1951,Communist China and in 1952 East
Germany became adherentG. Finland, the only remaining non-Communist mem-
ber, has not been active From 195a' on, OIR has become essentially a
Soviet Bloc organization with administrative and technical headquarters
at Prague, It is considered to be an important mechanism for coordinating.
the Soeiet Bloc radiobroadcasting operation. 12i
Possible in consequence of East Germany's adherence to
the OIR, the SRC of the GDR has concluded several agreements with other Soviet
Bloc countries. An agreement was signed in Moscow on 13 February 1953
between the SRC and the Radio Information Committee attached to the.
Council of Ministers of the USSR. In submitting to his government, the
Chairman of the SRC characterized the agreement as a further step towards
the strengthening and development of cultural relations between the two
entitiep, as well as cooperation between them in the field of broadcasting
end probably jamming. 71/ On 15 May 1953 a similar agreement was signed?
between the GDR and Bulgaria. Under the agreement, radiobroadcasts were
to be exchanged and each country was to send experts to the other to
familiarize themselves with developments in the radio field. 72/ In late
7ecember 1953, another similar agreement was signed in Perlin?Uetween
the GDR SRC and the Radio Committee of the Rumanian Council of Ministers.
Under the agreement the two countries "will regularly exchange their best
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programs" and will otherwise cooperate in the field of broadcasting. 73/
It is probable that similar agreements with other Bloc aountries have
been:concluded, are in the maaing, or are under revision,
it seems reasonably clear that the Kremlin, through the
medium of the OIR, is laying down fundamental policies and directions in
the field of radiobroadcasting to be implemented through bilateral and
multilateral operational agreements between the Soviet Bloc countries. 1'
a logical mechanism for coordinating and integrating the whole Bloc
radiobroadcasting complex as well as jamming activities directed against
foreign broadcasts.
7. Reported Plans to Reorganize the State Radio Committee.
A single report, upon which no confirmatory information
is available, states that in Yebruary or March 1953 the SRC visited the
Soviet Union. Following the visit, recommendations were reportedly
made for the reorganization of Radio Berlin (East Zone) along Radio
Moscow lines. The recommendations envisaged a mechanism of five main
departments: political agitation, music, literature and drama, science
and education, and administration. Allegedly, considerable economies
would result from this change. 74/
An intelligence comment on the above reaort states in
part: l"The reorganieation of East German information media which nas
been taking place since last September suggests considerable dissatis-
faction with their effectiveness. Last fall ... the functions of the
entire Office of Information were transferred to thePress Office of
-Minister-President Grotewohl. It is expected that the SRO, whose functions
are political and administrative rather tnan technieal, will ultimately
be consolidated with the oll Office of Information in some new general
propaganda agency under Groteaohl." 75/ While this report may be true
end the, intelligence comment valid in so far as plans or intentions are
concerned, it is very doubtful that the structure of the ?SRC, at least,
has been so altereda If in fact it has not been so altered, it would
seem that the influence of RIAS in spreading the riots in East Germany
in June 1953 provided a suitable occasion, were one needed, to revamp
SiC better to cope with foreign influences.
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1- Pre-World War II.
At the beginning of the 10-year period 1934-44e the area
presently defined as East Germany was served by one low-frequency trans-
mitter (known as the Deutschlandsender), located at Zeesen, near Berlin;
2 relat:ively high-power, medium-frequency transmitters at Berlin and
Leipzig; and 2 medium-power, mediumrfrequency transmitters-lit Dresden and
Magdeburg.
During this 10-year period, the low-frequency transmitter
was inereased in power from 60 kw to 150 kw and, finally, to 200 kw and
the transmitter site was changed from Zeesen to Herzberg. The power of
the t-ansmitter at Dresden was increased from 0.25 kw to 5 kw and one
new 5-kw, medium-frequency station was added at Reichenbach.
The complete geographic coverage of the area was further
ensered by the installation of low-power, booster transmitters in areas
whrre signal strength for reception by weak receivers proved to be too
leu, The number or locations of such booster stations is not available. 16/
By 1940, radiobroadcasting on very high frequencies had been
introduced; with two stations in operation, -- in Derlin and on the
Brockenburg in the Harz Mountains -- and a second station for Berlin was
under construction. 77/
Germany was a pioneer In the then infant art of television
Scheduled entertainment programs had been transmitted for a few months
prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939. Two of the three
television stations were located in the area presently designated East
Germany -- in Berlin and Witzloben Brocken in Harz.'A/ The war put an
end to this, although the Germans did a great deal of research on
military? applications of television. With the surrender of Germany in
1945 and the Soviet occupation of the East Zone; the research ended.
German scientists, and their television equipment, dere taken to the USF
'where it was reported that the television equipments were modified by
the Germans for use in Soviet television broadcasting facilities.
In 1934, all German international broadcasting was conducted
from Zeesen employing 6 high frequencies with power of 5 kw. During the
Nazi regime this service was increased markedly, in terms of numbers of
frequencies employed and the power of transmitters. Dy 1937, the number
This subsection was prepared by OSI.
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1.1.-? OEM ..1???? 1?10.? Ow* vr.11,
of high frequencies had been inareased to 12, with 50 kw power on 2, and
5 kw on the remainder. Dy 1940, 33 high frequencies gere employed -- 6
with power of 12 kw, 3 with.poger of 20 kw, and 24 with power of 50 kw. 79/
No inforMation is available as to the hours of programing which were
originated, the transmission schedules or the world areas to Whieh such
programs were addrested.
2. World War II and the Immediate Post-War Years
Notwithstanding the ravages of World War II the East
German radiobroadcasting facilities apparently were restored to their
prewar activity fairly rapidly ye1947 not only had prewar service been
restored, but there had been additions. One low-frequency, 2 medium-
frequency, and 2 high-frequency transmitters had been added. There were
a feg shifts of traasmitter locations, but coverage does not seem to have
changed materially.? Dy 1950, 2 more loa-frequeneyand 3 more medium-
frequency transmitters had been added.. :
Television end 'very-high-frequency (VHF) services do not
appear to have been restored during this 5-year period.e
8ecent Growth.
a ?
- From 1950 to the present there has been considerable
grogth:in the broadcasting facilities in East Germany, It is believed that
1951-52 as the iMportaat period in this :change. Plans were-made-then. for
the development and construction of high-power transmitters?. The fruit Ln
of these plans was the installation of several high-power, medium-frequency
traasmitters in East German towns. These transmitters w.:re based on a
design allch had the .cover name "Zwilling" (twin) or Zae71 As the. name
implies high power as aehieved by installing to identical halves
.(halbzuege) and operating both $imultaneously.. There are: indications that
half sections of these transmitters were installed initially and operated
alone on an interim basis while taeir twins were being eompleted in the
East German factory at Koepeniek,
4, Present Facilities,*
The present day radio and television transmitting faeilities
of East Germany are believed to include approximately 4 1o4-frequency trans-
mitters with- powers up. to 100 kw, 15 medium-frequency transmitters aith
estimated poiers up to 440 ka, 3 high-frequency transmitters with estimated
peelers up to 10 kw, 6 very-high-frequency transmitters employing frequency
modulation (rM).type of emission, and 3 television transmittere. There are
no reports of plans to restore the high-frequency international broadcast
facilities of prewar Germany.
* See?M;irfol.lowing p. 28.
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Magdeburg
Brocken
,..Effarz Mts.]
60 sp
(-.) 100 Kilometers
Radiobroadcasting Transmitting
Facilities in East Germany
( includes power increases scheduled for 1954)
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? The increase in power of the low- and the medium-frequenc
transmitters from 1934 to 1954 (selected years) is set out in.Table 2
Table 2'
? Growth in Power of Radiobroadcast Transmitters in East Germany
Selected Years, 193454
sr.
? Total Average
-Power Power
Year Number (kw) J.
Low-Dmosa_TElamalEgi
1934
1
6o
60
1937
1
6o
6o
1940
1
150
150
1947
2
120
60
1949
1
loo
loo
1950
4
105
26
1953
3
14o
47
1954
4
1,o4o
260
Me41um-Fz:2N.lency Transmitters
1934
4
220
55
1937
4
280
70
1940
5
230
46
1947
7
290
41
1949
8
297
37
1950
11
362
33
1953
15
1,872
124
1954
16
2,452
153
The reported total transmitter output power in the medium-
frequency broadcast band in East Germany is now nearing 2 million 'watts,
giving this area, roughly the size of Ohio,' almost 6 times the total or
it had in the 'same band in 1950.
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High frequencies wore not employed for domestic broad-
casting in Germany prior to World War II. Information on high-frequency
transmitters employed since 1945 Is inadequate to warrant tabular presen-
tation.
a. Low-Fre uepcy Broadcast Transmitters.
The low frequencies used in some European broadcasting
services have the capability of giving good coverage day and night in their
primAry service area, When high-power transmitters are employed, their
primary service area is obviously rather large. Before World War II,
therefore, people in all parts of Germany were able to receive consistently
god signals from the low-frequency, 200 kw Nazi Deutschlandsender located
at Zeesea, later at Herzberg. It is believed that the tiussiahraismantle
this installation during the early days of their occupation of East Germany
at the close of World War II. A substitute was installed at Koenigs
Wusterhausen, a Berlin suburb, by East German authoaitiaa. Thi a1a+4a,
transmitter was built around an old German Army transmitter and was rated
at 20 kw, By 1949, this substitute installation had been replaced by a
100-kw transmitter, and it is probable that thisapowar will be Increased
to 500 kw in the near future.
A second. high-power installation for operation in
the range 150-300 ka is variously reported as under development or under
construction for installation in Zehlendorf, Koepeaick? Ludoigslust? or
Burg near Magdeburg. Known as the SL-II, it is to have a power output of
between 750 and 900 kw. It is scheduled for completion in 1954.9,2/
b. MediumaYre uency Broadcast Transmittera.
In the first half of 1950 the Ministerium flier Post
und Fernmeldevepen (Ministry of Posts and Telecommanications) asked the
Zeltral-amt fuer enrschana und Technik (Central Bureau Of Planning and
Engineering) of the Staatlichen Planaommission (State Planning Commission)
to develop a 250-k4 medium-frequency broadcast transmitter for production
purposes. Apparently within the following 2 years this program was
modified by the Z-3 or Zwilling program which envisaged the operation
of these transmitters In pairs to produce about 500 kw. In the
original plans only Derlin-Koepenick was scheduled to get a twin instal-
lation initially, The other East German locations were to get only a half
Lh_a11_Lz2gl for interim operation at power of 250:kw until the second half
could be delivered, Ill/ Production schedules identified these transmitters
as the SM (Sender, Mittelwellen -- Transmitter, Medium Wave) aeries with
the numbers I, II, III., and IV assigned to the individual installations.
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Operation of the twins (440 kw) at Berlin-Koepenick and Sehwerin began in
October 1953. The reported power of transmitters put into operation in
October 1953 at Burg (near Magdeburg) and Dresden-Wilsdruf is 300 kw.
This may be an exaggeration of an actual power of 220 kw (the reported
power of a half),or operation of 2 halves at reduced powar pending
delivery of some parts, or operation of a half at well over its rated
capacity,
Among the reported features of all these transmitters
are quick tuning to any point in the broadcast band and. directiOnal -
anteana systems at the installations, The transmitters may be completely
retuned in 40 minutes and the two-tower antennas provide for a degree of
directivity. Provisions: are reportedly being made for varying the
direction of maximum signal radiated by these antennas, They are so
oriented that it is possible to condentrate the signal in the direction
of Western Europe, The exception to this is the Dresden-Wilsdruf instal-
lation about which there is not suffcient information.
Erfurt is scheduled to get a 440-kd installation in
1954, but it is not known when the power of the Durg,and Dresden-Wilsdruf
installations will be raised to that figure. At one time, Leipzig das
reaorted to be scheduled to get a 440-kw installation, but in view of
the fact that it presently has tdo.100-kw transmitters broadcasting separal
programs it may be assumed that its priority was not as high as that of
cities having lower power transmitters in operation, or as those nearer
the Western border. 02/ he locations of these transmitters near the
border and the flexibility of operation afforded by quick tuning and
antennas of variable directivity provide bases for conjecture about
possible methods or operation, such as redirecting the program to a part
of East Germany other than the normal service area, jamming of Western
broadcasts,? or beaming of Eastern propagandabroadcasts toward Western
Europe,
For a tabulation of 1949 and 1954 transmitting
facilities, see Appendixes C and S.
Mobile Transmitters.
A new factor in mediumafrevency broadcasting in
East Germany was introduced during .1952-53 by the production of mobile
5-kw and 20-4cw transmitters. These transmitters were reported to have
been designed for mounting in trailers for transportation from one site
to another by highWay. Doth RET's (1Radiofunkteohnik), Finikwerk, Koepenic
and C. Lorenz, Leipzig, are reeorted to be participating in the con-
struction of these units. It is possible that some of these units will
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operate on 575, 611, 728, 800, 820, and. 920 kc inasmitch aaerystals for
these frequencies are reported to have been ordered.
It is probable that some of these units are intended
to be Used to jam. Western broadcasts. Another possible use for these
transmitters would be to give better signal strengths to weaken signal are
of East Germany until permanent transmitter installations may be atdompliahed.
This would tend to discourage listening by the East Germans to Western
broadcasts, particularly if the East German transmitter were operating on
the Same frequency ?that of the Western stations..
One 20-kw transmitter appears- to have been in
operation in 1953. It is reported variouplY,as,having,been used for
jamming and as having a steady test tone as modulation, Two additional
transmitters are, expected to be completed in 1954 which, when dOMbined
with. the first, will be known as SM-VII0 It. is reported to be deetined for
installation at Potsdam-Golm. it is reported five 5-kw transmitters were
to be completed in 1953. 113.:.il
? d, Vf M 131:521AK-1111A.V.-2
There is an increasing interest in the Use Of VA FM
broadcasting in East Germany, as there: is in much of Western Europe ': -The
main reason for this popularity ie the crowded medium-frequency broad-
cast band. Since VHF signals do not traVel Materially beyond.the.horizon,
mountain top transmitters dan provide excellent service for a'restricted
area without interfering with another PM transmitter on the same frequency
Operating in a remote part of the country'
The first post-World War II FM broaddast transmitter
in East Germany was installed in Perlin in the fall of 1950, with one in
the Harz Mountains, near Drocken, follOwing.shortly thereafter. As of
October 1953, transmitters are reported to be operating in Leipzig,
Schwerin, Derlin-Friedrichatadt, carrying the Berlin III program; in
Inselsberg (Thuringia)?:Drocken (Harz Mountains), and another is projected
for Berlin tO carry the Derlin I Program. In,view of the report of 30
additional VHF transmitters (10 each with powers of 0.25 kw, 1 kw, and 10 kw,
respectively) having be2n completed. In late 1953 it is possible that there,
Will be considerable expansion of the VHF FM?facilities in 1954
In. addition to providing interference-free reception.
a group of FM stations operating on different frequencies in an area can
provide a convenient program distribution network0 Daalmana is tne
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designation for the method of receiving and rebroadcasting programs over
an FM network. There are also reported provisions for supplying medium-
frequency AM (amplitude modulation) broadcast transmitters with programs
from these networks in East Germany, Miler nations have found this a
successful system for program distribution.
In addition to the above advantages of FM, it is
relatively impervious to jamming since the jamming transmitter must be
located virtually within it of the target station to be effective. 84/
e?
When .the East German broadcasting facilities had
achieved a fair state of repair following World War ti, listenershad a
choice of three programs in addition to those of local origination.
Network operations ',Jere provided by wire-line interconnections under the
administration of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications Berlin 1,
Derlin II, and 715er1in III programs were intended to attract all listeners
by the variety of their offerings. They were sUpplemented by approximately
1- our of programs originating locally.,
"Berlin I is an 'al1-German fighting program'; it is
not only a program for East German audiences, but the main vehicle of
Communist radio propaganda fel. West Germany." During 'a recent reorgani-
zation Berlin It was reported to have been discontinued, having been
replaced by "DeutSchlandseader" propaganda broadcasts aimed at West
'Germany. It had carried "many of the programs of Berlin I, but its
particular emphasis" was "on the exposition of Communist theory of science,
society and art." Berlin III "is characterized by less ideological inten-
sity and more nonpolitical broadcasts than Berlin I."
In the main it is believed that 4reline facilities
distribute these programs, As the VHF FM transmitter program goes forward
distribution will probably shift to these transmitters. There have already
been reports of a device (Dallempfaenger) for receiving.a program from an
FM transmitter and feeding it to a medium-freqaency transmittera (See
section 'an TM Broadcasting). Similar techniques have been used in the US
and other countries with success for several years. 62./
f. Directional Antennas.
The use of a directional antenna installation at a
radio transmitter provides for reinforced eignals in some directions at
the expense of signal strengths in other .directionsa The East Germans
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are reported to be installing directional antenna systems at the sites of
some of the high power transmitters. These systems are so arranged that
signals may be beamed to the West, CT to the East. With some adjustments
the antennas will radiate equally in all directions. The significance of
this, when coupled with the reported high powers of the transmitters, is
that the East .Germans will be in a position to beam extremely powerful
signals to a large part of Western Europe from these installations, many
of which are relatively close to the border between East and West Germany.
There are re.,)orts that high-power, medium-frequency
transmitter installations at. Berlin-Karepenick-, Burg (near Magdeburg),
Dresden, Erfurt, and.8chwerin Were to include two-tower directional
antenna systems. They were said to be aimed toward the West, 'with the
exception of the Dresden installation, the direction of which Is unknown. 216/
It should be noted that Schwerin, Burg, and Erfurt are relatively close to '
the border. The medium-power (20 kw) transmitter at Potsdam-Golm is also
reported to have. a directional antenna system. pl./ The high-power, low-
frequency installation supposedly under construction at Zehlendorf is also
to have a directional antenna. 88/
g, Television.
Because of the lack of trained manpower in East Germany
and its economic condition,- there as no post-war television in the country
until 1952, when. an installation at Berlin-Adlershof began a 2-hour daily
test transmission. This operation was begun despite such handicaps as
lack of proper raw materials from whidh to manufacture the delicate and
complex cOmponents of the transadtting and receiving equipment, fires in
the studios, and accusations of sabotage. These latter were levelled
against East GerMan technicians'by German and Soviet administrative personnel.
Original demonstrations of television were apparently
"closed-circuit" operations. That is, the transmitting and receiving
equipments were connected by cable, rather than by a radio link.as is custo-
mary in the US. Difficulties in finishing the 'transmitter were finally_
overcome in 1952 so that broadcasts in the true sense Of the word were
sent out at a frequency of approximately 99 mc with.a low-power-(100 watts)
transmitter, 2,2/
Now there are indieatione that the transmitter
situation has impoved and in addition to a more powerful transmitter in
Berlin, one has heen'put into operation at Leipzig. Two hours of daily
programs are scheduled .There are reported plans for six transmitters to
be located on the trocken (in the Harz .Mountains), intresclen, Erfurt,
Salswedel, Stralsund, and.on the richtelberg (in the Erz Mountains). 22/
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Studio facilities in Berlin are reeorted? as being
-elaborate. It is reported that these facilities are intended to supply
programs for the entire East Zone. At the moment, still and moving
picture films provide a considerable part of the programing in East Berlin.
A shortage Of camera pick-up tubes is said to be a major factor in
limiting the programing facilities. .21/
h. .Miscellaneous Transmitters
Soviet occupation forces in East Germany are pro-
vided with program service by transmitters in Berlin-Koenigs Wusterhausen
and Leipzig. Neither of these transmitters is under the control of the
East German authorities. Operating on a frequency of 263 ko with an
estimated power of 20 kw,."Radio Volga" has been located at Koenigs
Wusterhausen by direction-finding equipment. Studios are believed to be
In Potsdam. Some programs are believed to originate in these studios,
but most of the time is devoted to relaying programs from Radio Moscow
and from Berlin 711, This station, started in 1946 )has never used a call
letter identification, nor has it announced its location. 22/
The high-frequency transmitter inLeipzig, not
under the control of the East German governMent, relays the German-language
programs of Radio Moscow's European service.
_gReceivingEtpmeriEaELGEEEEz.
Introduction.
Prior to World War II, Germany ranked first of all European countries
in the field of telecommunications research, production, and utilization.
In 1935, more than 7 million broadcast receivers were 11 use in Germany. 93/
A large proportion of those receivers 1,4...!re of high quality and covered
the low-, medium-, and high-frequency broadeast bands.
After the coming-to-poaer of the Nazi hierarchy, radiobroadcasting
was exploited as a prime pro2aganda tool. Concomitant to the supplemental
coverage of the country by a network of small transmitting stations for
synchronized transmission of a single program was the wide-spread dis-
tr'bution of inexpensive, 2-tube, relatively insensitive broadcast receivers,
designed for lor.al reception. Loudspeakers attached to wire-diffusion
systems, employing existing telephone wire lines as the medium of trans-
mission, also were employed to some extent. These relatively insensitive
receivers and the wire-diffusion loudspeakers served the dual purpose of
making broadcast reception economically available to practically the entire
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development and future of broadcasting by means of wire-diffusion. Tecause
of the Lack of data pointing out the directions and extents of these
influencing factors, an ahnual growth of 200,000 receivers for East qermany
and 10,000 for East Berlin has been assumed for a lover limit, and 400,000
and 20,000 receivers for East Germany and East Berlin respeatively, for an
upper limit, It is felt that figures between these limits will probably
be realized.
From the figures in Table 3 it is estimated that in 1952
there were about le receivers per 100 population in East Germany and 28 in
East Perlin, while the figure for the combined area amouated to an aVerage
of 19 receivers. By way of comparison with pre-aar conditions, as of
31 March 1939, there were an estimated 20.3 receivers per 100 populatior
in the territory now kaon as East Germany, 27,25 in Lerlin (not East )erlin),
and the combined figure for East Germany and all of :eerlin was 22,1 re-
ceivers per 100 population, 121/
As of late 1952 and early 1953, there were in West erlin
and West Genially an estimated 22 broadeastereeeivers per 100 population, 104/
It.e same souree gives the number of listeners per set as 2,53 for West.
Germany, 3 lieteners per set for West Derlin, and 4 listeners for East
Germany and Fast 7.-er11n combined
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The. number of loudspeakers connected to the. vire-diffusion
networks of East lermany is not known and no estimate of the. number is
attempted :or this-reecitta This system is discussed in III, As 4; be1o4,
where it is stated that the system has been expanded sinceWorld War -TI.
he nuniber of receivers operating in East. Germany for
reception of very-high-freqaency (a4) broadcasts is not known, It is pre-
sumed, however, to be a very small number, In the first place, it is
tholaght that there are not many receiver's with the very-high-frequency
comeonent available for such reception, and although there are adapters
preduced Alich will allow this reception when used in conjunction with. the
ueual type of broadcast receiver intended for lower frequency bands, it is
not believed that many of these are it use. Furthermore, this type of
'Jroadcast is net developed to any extent at the present timee As develop-
ment of this transmission takes place, receivers vill undoubtedly-be made
available and an increasing number will be in operation.
b. TeleVibione
, The number of television receivers in East Germany' is
apparently very small, This is indicated by an estimate in one report of ?
50 receivers in operation in East Berlin at the end of September 1952, while
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a second report gives an estimate of 800 receivers in East Germany in
December 1952. 10.5i Estimates of the number for later dates are not avail-
able, A substantial number of Leningrad T-2 receivers produced as
reparations for the Russians were reportedly returned to East Germany as
being faulty. This has been resorted as 10,000 and again as 40,000
receivers. 106/ At most it can be said that at the present time there is
a very small reception base for television, but it can be expected to
grow wath improvement in design, lowering of prices, and lessening of
production demands for reaarations. The rate of growth will depend upon
Soviet wishes.
2. Characteristics.
a. Aural.
Notwithstanding the German tradition of production of
high-quality telecommunications equipment of top efficiency, it appears
that a large part of the broadcast receivers in use in Germany at the
close of World War II were by intent relatively insensitive and were
capable of local reception only.
In mid-1945 the Russians reportedly ordered that all
broadcast receivers be reduced to three tubes. Since about 85 percent
of all receivers at the time had 3 tubes or less the order was applicable
to only 15 percent of receivers. It is not known to What extent this
order was carried out, except that in Leipzig it vas not enforced, and
only a few apparently obeyed the order. It is not known at that date
the order was rescinded, but production of receivers with more than
three tubes for sale in East Germany was resumed in early 1914-7 101/ so
it would appear that the order did not have much effect upon the listening
capabilities of the receivers or habits of the listeners,
Numerous reports indicate that many high-quality German
broadcast receivers found their way to the USSR with returning Soviet
military forces. It seems logical that most of these broadcast receivers
would have been of high quality, Although the pre-war distribution of
high quality receivers is believed to have been fairly uniform throughout
Germany and the current incidence of broadcast receivers in East Germany
is almost as high as in West Germany, it is doubtful that the proportion
of these receivers &let are of high quality is as great.
The quality and workmanship of recently produced broad-
cast receivers for purchase by the East German public appears to have
deteriorated markedly by comparison with pre-war produced receivers.. One
reason for this deterioration appears to be the absence of thorough
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testing of new models, which are put into production as soon as pilet
models are completed. Improvements and adjustments are made later, based
on complaints of purchasers. 12?/ An unconfirmed report by a former
employee of a plant producing one of the cheap one-tube receivers stated
that it was being discontinued because the set had proved to be unsatis-
factory. 122/
The probable causes of this deterioration in the quality
of broadcast receivers are the Soviet influence on design and workmanship;
shortages of materials with concomitant substitutions, and lack of pur-
chasing power of the people to obtain higher quality receivers. The
production of the higher quality receivers probably is intended for
reparations to the USSR, the export trade, and the use of the hierarchy of
East German officialdom.
The list of broadcast receivers produced in East Germany,
as given in Appendix El indicates that a large majority of these models
are equipped for high-frequency reception. Even the one-tube set, Type
is capable of receiving high frequency transmissions, although
? limited in range from 5.9 mc to 9,8 mc.* nevertheless, a one-tube receiver
is relatively insensitive and it is highly speculative that it can be used
satisfactorily for reception of transmissions originating at distant
iodations.
.Even though most of the types of broadcast receivers
produced in East Germany appear to have high-frequency reception
capabilities, the distribution of broadcast receivers would not necessarily
follow production, since many factors affect the availability of these
receivers to the general public,
The use of receivers capable of reception Of very high
frequencies is relatively new. The behavior of radio waves in the very-
high-frequency band is such as to limit reception generally to 'line-of-
sight" distance from the transmitter, Which automatically precludes
reception of Programs from distant stations.
There is no known production of receivers designed
exclusively for very-high-frequency receation in East Germany, although
6 models, 3 of medium quality and 3 of high quality, contain YM reception
components in addition to the low, medium, and high frequency components,
* This range covers the portion of the high-frequency broadcasting bands
employed for high-frequency broadcasting by East German stations-. See
Appendix D,
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YM adapters are available for two other models. It is not known ho4 many
IN receivers are operating in East Germany, but presumably they are few
in number. The characteristics of tdese receivers are not known.
b. Television'.
The Leningrad T-2 television receiver has a very small
screen, 13 by 18 centimeters !about 6 by 7 inches) with a 625-line picture,
50 frames per second, the same as the West Germaxi picture delineation.
It is said to be the oldest Of the Soviet models, snd is presumably the
type used in East C.;ermany. Aside from performance standards, this size
picture is outmoded and far from satisfactory to the viewer, An improved
model with a larger screen and better performance is reportedly under
development and production, 112/
3. DiTtribution.
a, Aural.
Table 4 shows the estimated number of broadcast receivers
by postal districts as of November 1950, and affords a representation of
the geographic distribution throughout East Germany.
Table I.
Estimated Number of Droadcast Receivers and Percentage Distribution
by East German Postal Districts
.November 1950 111/
Postal
District
erlin
))resden
Erfurt
Halle
Leipzig
Potsdam
Schwerin
Total
-3roadcast
Receivers
324,000
435,000
490,000
773,000
773,000
422,000
218,000
31453,000
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Percentage
Distribution
9.4
12.6
14.2
22,4
22,4
12,4
6.8
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In general, the incidence tends to follow the pOpulation
pattern, with a somewhat heavier concentration in the cities where there is
a concentration of state, military, and Party personnel, since these are
the ones most able to purchase receivers and are particularlY favored in
other respects.
' It is apparent that the people as a'Whole have receivers
Capable of short-distance reception, although the majority of types of
receivers produced in East Germany have greater capabilities. The
.estimates of receivers wIth high-frequency capability vary from 4o1 to 90
percent, from Which it can be deduced that a large perdentage of them is 1
capable of such receptionot least theoretically.
Many defector reports relating to reception of broadcasts
on the part of farmers indicate that receivers are operating in the rural
as well as the Urban areas. The following excerpts are of interest with.
'respect to distribution: "... in Coswig most homes have radios"; "Most
of the farmers have old sets ... The reception ... is limited only to a
few stations ..."; "Most people in Cottbus own radio sets ..."; "... many
families (Anneberg-Duehholz) own their own radios ..."; "The number of
privately-owned radio receivers owned by the population of Muechelm is
estimated at 1,500." 114
While, certain types of receivers can be adapted to FM
reception by Means of.a special unit, and a few types of receivers are
initially equipped for this reception, it is not known. where the few FM
receivers are located. Presumably they are odned by state, industrial.,
and Party personnel in the upper brackets in East Berlin and the cities
having VHF transmitters.
b. Television.
So far the distribution of televition receivers has been
limited to peoples-owned plants,. schools, universities, state-owned clubs
and hotels, and important State and Party officials. 1173/ Presumably they
are confined to East. Berlin and its immediate environs. It is conjectured
that distribution will necessarily be very slow, primarily because of the
prohibitively high cost of the receivers. Geographically-they will be con-
centrated around the cities in which television transmitters Will be
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?????? 4.? *Ida OD. NISI MOO
4. Wire-Diffusion.
The wire-diffusion network, begun under the Nazi regime,
was used to connect loudspeakers in public places and in private homes,
its use was far less extensive than the use of individual receiVers,
especially in private homes. The telephone cables were employed to
transmit programs direct to the listening points. The system permitted
a choice on the part of the listener among several programs. The sUb-
seriber might possess either a simple loudspeaker of a tube broadcast
receiver. In the case of a tube receiver, the subscriber could either
connect the loudspeaker of the receiver to the wire-diffusion network,
or employ the receiver for direct radio reception. The principal
advantage of wire-diffusion reception was freedom from atmospheric and
Industrial interference and from jamming. Wire-diffusion systems were
found chiefly in large cities. 114 in 1942, 170,000 loudspeakers were
in use throughout Germany. 115
The wire-diffusion system in East Germany has been expanded,
since the end Of World War IT. Mainly, installations have been planed--
in the major squares and streets of towns and cities:, in factories'
recreation centers, barracks, premises of mass organizations, collective
farms, and in newly-constructed apartment houses, 116/
These systems appear to range in size from a single loud-
speaker in a village square for limited use in making occasional
announcements, :to the elaborate center of the Eisenhuettenkombinat Oat in
Frankfort-on-the-Oder, which is claimed by the Berlin aadio to be the
"largest and most. modern factory radio installation in the German Dema-
cratic Republic." The studio is said to be abke-tG-tmomaitlifferent
programs simultaneously and the installation to have 4o relay points to
which hundreds of loudspeakers can be connected. 117
Wire-diffusion loudspeakers in newly-constructed apartment
houses appear to be the only installation$ in private-dwellings, The
high incidence of independent receivers in private dwellings probably
aacounts for this situatien.
No information is. available as to numbers of loudspeakers
in service today ov aa to geographical distribution,
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E fivailabillty and Costs of Radio Receivers,
1, Production ei1112EERFIE,
a, Aural,
002.6.41fflalla.???
Assuming availability of raw materials ,East German
telecommunication production facilities are capable of manufacturing
practically all types of telecommunications equipment, including broad-
cast receivers of all ranges of capability from simple One-tube low-
cost table models to 9-tube deluxe console models with automatic
record players and tape recorders, A very high percentage of all these
models are capable of reception of low, medium, and high frevenzies.
Some models also have very-high-frequency rece)tion capability,
'..;he East Germany five Year Plan (1951-55) contemplated
standarizing of broadcast receivers by the production of only 4 basic
types, with average retail prices of 95 DME, 250 rNE, 350 nmE, and 700 JME
(East German Marks), Emphasis was to be placed on increased production
of the cheapest models. 118/ '73som the number of models listed in Appendix
E, it is seen that there Us a wide variety of radio reeeivers it is
likely that these are numerous variations of a few basic types, as
improvements and advancements in the art have been incorporated into pro-
duction, and as variations are introduced to satisfy differences in
performance demands.
Production of radio receivers, tubes, and component
parts has been carried throughout East Germany and in East rerlin in many
plants. The majority are being produced at the T,TE.q. plant, i.e., plants of
the People's Owned Enterprises, with a small number produced by private
plants and the Soviet-owned SAG plants (Staatlicner Aktien Gesellsehaften),
This is borne out by the proposed 1954 production plans of the State
Planning Commission. This plan itemizes 160,000 radio receivers to be
produeed by SAG plants: 607,000 by plants of the VE; and only 46,00a by
private plants, totalling 813,000 set6, 112/ It Is ,not stated that these
sets are radiobroadcast receivers and it is presumed that other types of
an unknown quantity ere included,. All production, of eourse, is planned
by and under the supervision of the Russians,
Radiobroadcast receivers produced in East Germany have
been shipped to the USSR as reparations, exported to Soviet floc countries,
to non-Ploc countries, and. some have been used for home consumption
(some as replacements for -retirements). While data are not available as
to proportions of the above, it is known that less emphasis has been'placed
on reparations since 1950-51, Tor these reasons, production figures do not
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reflect accuretely the growth of the recedtion base in East Germeny,
Table 5 shows the'estimeted production of eivilian radiobroadeast receiver
sets for the years 1946-51,
Table 5
Estimated Eroduction of civilian Radiobroadcast Receivers
in East Cermany 120/
1946-51
Yer
llumber
1946
6o,000
1947
1009000
1948
15o,000
1949
220,000
1950
275,000
1951
321,000
While shortages of certain materials and components are
reported to have aused slow-downs in production of SOM2 types of
electronics equipment, these shortages apparently tave not prevented a
fairly steady increase in production of broadcast receivers yer by year,
'In Appendix E under the description of the chexacteristies
of mdiobroadcast receivers produeed ill at Germany it will be noticed
that there sre none listed as being intended for very-tigh-frequency trm)
reception exclusively, There are 6 models, 3 of medium quelity end 3 of
high quality, with nil reception components in addition to the usual low-,
medium-, and high-frequency components. Seventy thOusend Stern broadenst
receivers sre reported to have been produced in 1953, 45,000 of which
conteined very-high-frequency components. The 1954 quota, of produetion.
of Stern broadcast receivers is said to be 84,000 units.' of which. 70,000
unit swill contain VEF components, 121/ from the descrLption of the
models listed in Appendix E, it appears that the majority of such
receivers are of Stern manufacture, 1T'or two other models, PM adapters
are availab)..e, A separate one-tube super-regererative converter unit
not indicated in the table) is also re?orted available to eneble 7M
reception on AM broadcast receivers at a cost of 80 leVE 122/
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4?11.? ?????? 411?1?1? ????? 4.1*
Imports related to production of radiobroadcast receivers
and imports of radiobroadcast receivers into East Germany have been minor.
As already stated East Germany produces radio receivers not only for its
own use and for reparations but for export.
b. Television.
There are varying reports on the production of television
receiving units. Production started in East Germany in 1951 as reparations
to the USSR One report gives the planned production for 1951 as 44,000
sets and 60,000 sets for 1952, with only 17,626 receivers delivered and
accepted as of 27 October 1952. RV A production figure for 1951 of
29,000 Leningrad T-2 receivers is reported. 124./ There ere other
indications that anticipated production plans were not fully realized.
A production goal of 200,000 receivers in 3-2 years, possibly from mid-1952
through 1955, has been reported, but there is some doubt apparently as to
the possibility of realizing this rate, wnich averages some 57,000 re-
ceivers per year. 125/ Production of Leningrad T-2 receivers apparently
was discontinued in late 1952 and a newer, improved model vas scheduled to
begin production in East Germany in late 1953 or early 1954. It is not
known wnether this model would be for export or for domestic use or
both. 126/
2. AvailabilIty and Prices of Radio Receivers
a. Aural,
Under a state-controlled economy, the availability of
broadcast receivers can be very closely regulated by controlling their.
cost to the people. As can be expected, therefore, the high prices pre-
vailing :or receivers precludes the purchase of all but the cheapest and
least effective, except by high officials. The simple one-tube receiver
thus popularized in East Germany sells for about 96 DME. According to
a publication of the Free Gernan Trade Union, 17,000 of these receivers
were to have been distributed in Derlin. and 33,000 in the Soviet Zone by
early 1952 127/ Whether this was actually accomplished is not known,
but it emphasizes the plans of the state to popularize a set which would
be satisfactory for nothing but local reception. A two-tube receiver
sold for 120 UNE prior to Slily 1952, in Cottbus, where Most households
reportedly owned radio receivers. 128/ Other types of receivers were
reported as selling at 420 WE for one of the best all-wave receivers;
500 DNE for a medium-size receiver made in East Germany; And 900 1E for
the most expensive nasupunkt" receiver in a State store catering.
exclusively to Soviet Army officers. 129/
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? ?
A purchaser is required to present his credentials and
to make a formal applieation for purchase of a new receiver. Periodically,
all broadcast receivers. must be registered. 130/ These measures tend to
control the availability of receivers, both old and new. Reportedly the
Central Committee of she Soviet Zone SEP Party in October 1952 prepared
a legistlative bill for the "seizure with receipt" of all private radio
receivers, and theia replacement in enterprises and homes with a single
type receiver, and in shops and apartments with loudspeakers. 121 This
points to the possieility that, at some future date, only cheap,
insensitive broadrast receivers and loudspeakers will be at the disposal
of the people. It is therefore evident that while the majority of the
people now have access to some sort of broadcast receiver, even though
it is apt to be a one-tube set, the Russiana are concerned over the
number of higher quality receivers still in the hands of the general
public and are prepared to take drastic measures if and when they con-
sider recovery rf these receivers expedient.
It is not known to what extent broadcast receivers
capable of veey-high-frequency reception are available. There are several
models producki in East Germany that have VE41 components in addition to
the usual loa-, medium-, and high-frequency components. VHF adapters are
available for several Modelsdand a separate super-regenerative converter-
unit to enable VET reception on AM broadcast receivers is available at
a cost of 80 INIE 132/
b. Television,
The limited number of the Leningrad T-2 television
receivers .aich were available in East Germany in 1952-53 retailed for
3,500 ONE in the State shops. A newer model, reportedly to be
ready it 954, is expected to sell for 1400 to 1500 DME. Payment
by instaliments is not allowed. Price, alone, would preclude purchase
by the nseral public. The usual approval to purchase a receiver is
necesse y, but permits are understood to be limited to trusted Com-
munist,, supposedly to prevent reception of "capitalist" programs from
the W.:rst,. Ownership, thus far, has been limited to top Party and
gove:ament officials, schools, factories, clubs, and Communist Party
orgalizations, 133/
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IV, Yegulations and Conditions of Listening
A. Aural,
1 Reanlations.
Curing World War El the National Socialist authorities
promulgated a law which forbade all listening to foreign programs, under
threvut of severe penalties, including death. 134/ These restrictions
were ebolished after World War a, and according to present information
there are no laws, decrees, or statutes forbidding listening to foreign
broadcasts by the East German population, although it has been reported
at verLous times that legal measures were being contemplated, 135/
Despite the lack of formal regulations forbidding listening
to foreign broadcasts there are a number of mk?esures to open to OR
authorities as a means of inhibiting this practice. These include
intimidetion and insinuation, including loss of jobs,. The names of
regular listeners to .7r.CAS broadcasts have occesionally been published in
the press, end these listeners have been caut.oned against the dangers
inherent in this practice. 136/ German youth leaders were ordered by
East Zone authorities to inform on persons listening to Western radio
broadeasts. 137/ in February 1953, Vcakspolieei questioned students of a
school in Eberswalde regprding the radio stations to whieh their parents
listened, 138/ In Slily 1953 a campaign was leegun against BIAS in which
employees of the county administration offiees in Lucken, Brandenburg,
were informed the listening to EIAS was forbidden and would be punished
by immediate dismissal, 139/ tn October 193, probably as a result of
the East Zone riots in June and the part played in them by F.IAS broadeasts,
a special RIAS-listener file was Bet up which contained the names of
employees of the funs nnd Leuna works, 140/
Although there mre no formal restrictions against listening
to Western broadcasts, listeners have been warned that they were violating
the Law for the Protection of the Peace, passed by the Satellites in
1950-51. This law forbids the spreading of false rumors, and has been
applied by the Communists to information eontained in Western broadcasts,
Other measures taken by the authorities to limit the
audience include orders to hold power discribution.to a minimum during
news broadcoests of BIAS and VWDR, 141/ This ratLoning of electric power
greatly hampers the ebility of radio set owners to tune in Western stations,
No information is available on radio receiver license fees, if there are
any such fees.
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There are, therefore, numerous techniques available to the
authorities to restrict listening to Western broadcasting. Why the
authorities have not instituted stricter measures, such as the con-
fiscation of radio receivers or the passage of legistation specifically
forbidding listening to foreign programs, is not clear. The regulations
and conditions concerning broadcast receivers and reception in East
Germany are comparable to such regulations aad conditions prevailing in
most countries of the Soviet Zloc. In the absence of an extensive 'tire-
diffusion network, the confiscation of independent broadcast receivers,
which would be an effective measure to prohibit East German listening to
Western broadcasts, would also remove a prime propaganda tool from use by
the authorities. Further, such confiscation apparently would be con-
trary to Soviet poliey in regard to the claimed "freedom of the people"
under Communism, Moreover the mass reaction, active or passive, or the
East Germans might well be inimieal to the Russians' best interests in
East Germany.
2. Conditions of Listening,
The advanced state of technology in East Germany, which is
considerably in advance of this.t of the majority of the Satellites, has
provided a production base ahich has resulted in the availability of a
relatively large number of radio receivers for the East German population(
M:st of these receivers have some capability for reception of low,
medium and high frequencies, but are not of sufficiently high sensitivity
to receive signals emanating frem distant points, that is, weak signals.
Preclusive control of reception by means of the aire-diffusion
technique appears to have limited use in East Germany, Probably because
the Russians recognize the difficulties involved, there appears to have
been no effort to extend this controlled listening technique into private
homes. Eowever, the present ogram of wire-diffusion, with its instal-
lations in factories and public places, seem to assure that the German
public will be exposed to Party doctrine at least some of the time,
Although there has always been a certain amount of inter-
ferenee with reception due to the jamming of Western broadcasts, the events
of 17 June 1953 have evidently caused the Russians to take strong measures
to blot out reception of these programs,. This subject is discussed at
greater length in IV, C, below,
According to reports certain measures have been taken by
some East German listeners to overcome the effects of the jamming
operations. One eource reports that the magnetic Ferrite antenna used
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in good quality West German receivers were obtained and installed on
radio receivers in East Germany. These antennas supposedly have sharp
directional characteristics Which, permit the separation of the RIAS
transmissions from those of East German jammers. 12-2/. It has also been
reported that VHF attachments for radio receivers are available to those
people who wish to receive the VI F transmissions of nearby Western
stations, Which are relatively free from interference.
B. 'Visual..
The viewing of television programs is rigidly controlled by the
regime. Official sanction is necessary even to watch a set, and permits
to own one are limited to trusted Communists. 2.2i.V The Communists seem
to have in mind, at least for the present, some such system for tele-
vision as that used throughout the Satellites to control radio listening,
i.e.,. the wire-diffusion network. Plans are reported to call for the
Installation of a network of television sets in public places, such as
theaters and meeting halls, thus placing viewing more strictly under
the control of the State.
Both the East and West German television systems use the
625-line viewing screen., At present, however, the number of television
receivers available in East Germany is very limited. Reports in early
1953 indicate that only a few hundred sets had been supplied, with most
of these going to state-owned enterprises and Communist Party centers.
C. Jamming.*
1. Introduction.
East qerman jamming of Western broadcasts may date back to
1947 when Soviet Zane listeners to RIAS reported, in letters to the
station, that there was interference with RIAS signals reminiscent of
the jamming activities of World War 1E, 145/ The congestion of the
European broadcast bard in recent years could have inspired mistaken
reports of jamming. It appears well-established, however, that by 1951
the East Germans were engaging in deliberate jamming activities. An
instance of this was reported in Which a transmitter in Erfurt operated
on a frequency so clese to that of a West German transmitter at Munich
that serious interference resulted in Bavaria as well as in East Germany. 116.1
This subsen-ion,prepared by OSE.
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Performance of jammers in East Germany indicates that, as
a result of an expansion of facilities beginning in 1952, the East Ger-
mans now have all the important elements of an effective jamming system, 147/
These include high-power transmitters, directional antenna arrays for
these transmitters, a monitoring system to determine which programs shall
be jammed, a control network over which to send jamming instructions to
the various jamming stations, and a staff of trained personnel,
While there have been reports of jamming of Western low-
frequency 148/ and high-frequency 1.122/ transmissions, East German'
activities are devoted mainly to the medium-frequency band. This is to
be expected because a large proportion of the Western radiobroadcasts to
East Germany are in this band. Because most of the East German jamming
of the medium-frequency band consists of broadcasting their Own programs
on both high- and low-power transmitters operating on or very close to
the frequencies of Western transmitters, it might be well to review
briefly the history of the most recent allocation of European low and
medium frequencies
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a, The Coperhm21112911.2ncy Plan.
In the summer of 1948 a European broadcasting conference
was held in Copenhagen to help resolve the problems brought about by the
crowded condition in the low- and medium-frequency broadcast bands. The
results of this conference were put into effect in March 1950, The US,
not being a European nation, was. not a signatory power. However, the
USSR refused to be bound by the convention if it were not observed by
Spain (which did. not attend the conference), by Luxemburg (which announced
that it would not sign) and by the powers occupying Germany, including
the US.* The USSR reserved to itaelf the right "to take the necessary
technical measurea to eliminate interference in the work of its stations"
if all the signatory powers did not abide by the convention. .152/ This
reservation has provided the Soviet Bloc with an excuse for operatin
transmitters at powers much higher than those of the Plan and on
frequencies other than those assigned,
-a Under the terms of the Copenhagen frequency Plan, the US Armed Forces
Network was assigned one frequency, All other US broadcast operations
in West Germany do not conform to this plan, to. which the US was not a
party.
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2' -!...."2.1.1.2gL2.221.12121.121-
a. 21,11EILW77.-.?1A2LINETEE.
The jamming pattern in East Germany is similar to that
of other Satellite nations in that a number of high- and low-power trans-
mitters are used, under the direction of an effective monitoring and
control network, Noise-modulation jammers are used against low-frequency
and high-frequency transmissions;, while, in general, programs modulate
the medium-frequency jammers, 151/ Program modulation serves to pro-
pagandize Soviet Dloc populations as well as to reduce reception of Western
programs. One difference, however, between East Germany and the rest
of the Soviet ?lac is the apparent lack of use in other Moe nations of
the power-line jammer (to be described below which appears to be used
in East Germany,
he institution in 1952 of the program of high-power
broadcast transmitter construction presaged more and better facilities
for ,jamming. It is reported that the high-power (220-440 kw) medium-
frequency broadcast transmitters now being put into service in East
Germany are designed for frequency change to any point in the broadcast
band (525 to 1605 Ito) in 40 minutes. 12E/ In view of this, and the fact
that reported locations of jammer stations generally coincide with the
sites of known broadcasting stations, it is probable that the East
Germans are depending on the use of these broadcast transmitters nlat only
to put strong ptopaganda signals into Western Europe, but to effect a
marked reduction in reception of Western broadcasts in East Germany, A
list of the broadcast transmitters probably used in this service, together
with their locations, frequencies, and powers, is to be found in Appendix D,
Those operating on the same frequency as Western transmitters are so
marked.
b, 2he Power-Line Stamen
In addition to the use of the high-power transmitters
for jamming, the East Germans appear to have developed a jamming apparatus
which distributes its signal over electric power lines in a town, The
device is reported to be loeated at a central point in a town, often the
post office or the liolkspolizei 1:Peop1e's Police'; installation, Known es
"the set for improving radio reception in poorly served localities"
(note disauasion of Soviet attitude toward lopenhagen Plan, above), it
apparently receives the radio program of an East German transmitter and
retransmits it over the power lines on the frequency of the Western signal
which is to be jammed. Reported as having an output power of 50 watts,
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it is said to be effective within a radius of about 12 kilometers
(7.5 miles". '11-,is jamming sigma, however, will not be transmitted by
power trmsformer whieh may be installed in the electric power dis-
tribution system This janmer, known as either the "Transponierungsempfaenge
frequency nhanging reeeiver: or as the 1F 2962 epparatus, is variously
reported as using 5 or 8 tubes One report indicates that provision may
be made for sending A noise instead of a program by means of this equip-
ment 'here are indications that from 300 to 600 of these devices were
ordered and that 65 were delivered in 1953, There is little information
ns yet on the distribution of these equipments, 153/
'n Effectiveness of Western Propaganda Yroadcasts
A size of the Audienve
Estimates as to the size of the audience listening to Western
broadvasts in. East Germany nre difficult to express statistically,
lowever, one of the most recent estimates pinees the number of radio
listeners in. East Germany at 12 million plus, 154/ When this is com-
pared with the total population of East Germany, whieh stands at about
18 million inhabitants 156/ some idea of the very large audience can
be obtained.
The attention paid by the communist authorities to the effects
of Western broodcasts upon,the East German population is an indication
that the audience is considered to Lave reached sufficiently high pro-
portions to be of doncern,
As has been previously ststed,na large percentage of the redio
receivers are in private homes in East Germany, RIAS transmitters,
located in. nerlin and at Eof, West GerMany, enjoys the geographical .
status of "local" stations, 1:eports of reeeption of PIACI broadvasts
have been received from all parts of East Germany, eVen those parts now
under Polish controlt 156/ A survey eonducted in early 1953 indicted
that RIM outranks all otherWestern stations in popularity among
Germans, with 8 out of 10 adult East Zone refugees reporting that they
listened, more often to 717:AO than to any other stationn broadnasts
are generally considered as supplementary to RAO, but it does not
enjoy anywhere near 88 large n audience, 157/
See'IT. concerning the impact of Western broadcasts, particularly RIAS,
upon the East German SK policy and the reactions of some of its officials
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b, Nature of the Audience,
The audience for foreign broadcasts in. East. Germany appears to
be drain from all sectione of the population, and includes Soviet per-
sonnel as well as native inhabitants. It is retorted that enlisted
personnel- of Soviet Army units in Germany are not allowed to have ralio
receivers in military barracks; thus officers are the only military
personnel who have the opportunity to listen to foreign broadcasts.
There are numerous reports that Soviet officers do listen to foreign
broadcasts, with reception of ITO, VOA, RYAS, FeEs Radio Liberation,
Radio aree Russia, and Yugoslev broadcasts in Russian being reported. 159;
During the ferlin Yalth. Festival in 1951, a study was made by
RIAS personnel in West Derlia of the reaction of East Zone Youth to
foreign broadcasts. The refUlts of this study showed that 88 percent
of those interviewed reported listening to the radio, and of this total
83 percent stated that the:. listened to Western broadcasts, la/ More
than 15,000 members of the ?ree German Youth movement in the Soviet Zone
are reported to have visited R1AS studios during the restival, 161/
The OS Eigh. Commission, in a report of Yebruary 1953 on its
Derlin operations, listed the following priority target groups within
East Germany e (1) public opinion leaders'(e.g., the press, political
figures, educators, clergy, etc.), (2) visiting Soviet Zone residents,
(3) youth, (4) students, (5) unemployed and refugees, (6) labor, and
(7) women. 1621
Questioning by HX0G personnel of some 500 East German farmers
Who visited Perlin, during January-Jebruary 1952 as to their listening
habits indicated that 82 percent where regular radio listeners... Of these,
nine-tenths listened to RIAS's farm -broadcasts, three-tenths to those of
VWDRf and one-fiZth to Soviet Zone stations. 163/ It is interesting to
note that among the farmers thus questioned, by far the great majority
expressed a preferenae for farm programs or political broadcasts, while
such programs OX radio plays, music, and comedy drew only a small per-
centage of listeners
C? Popular Stations Times, .:.nd Frequencies for Listening<
1, Aural? -- Low Mediumaillgaency.
Lecording to numerous surveys, by far the most popular station
among East Carmans is SIAS, This is probably due to a variety of reasons.
RYE, for example, does not consider East Germany as a target area, and its
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broadcasts are beamed almost exclusively to the other Satellite countries.
vac is reported to be pepular among certain of the more educated elements
of the population, and its news is valued for its objectivity, but
reception of BBC broadcasts is reportedly poor. 164/ BOR is oonsidered
mostly as supplementary to RIAS broadcasts it should be remembered also
that RIAS's position in the center of East Germany is unique, and affords
an opportunity not accorded to any-other stations.
Reports indicate that the best times for broadcasting vary
with the type of audience, that is, whether the broadcasts are intended
for the East German population or for Soviet personnel stationed there.
One report, for example, indtcates that the best time for VOA Russian-
language broadcasts to East Germany would be 2030-2200 GMT, which is off.
duty time for Soviet troops. 165/ This is borne out by another report,
which gives the period .1900-2200 GMT as the time best suited for listening
to foreign.broadcasts. 166/ This latter report also points out the
difficulties encounterenvy Soviet enlisted personnel in attempting to
listen to foreign broadcasts, since there are few individuals who have
access to tunable broadcast receivers...
VOA at present carries Rassian-language broadcasts to
Germany at 1900-1930 and 2215-2245 GM, both times mentioned as having
good reception or high frequency. Other VOA and LBC Russian language
high-frequency broadcasts mentioned as having good reception are those in
the 9-me band in the daytime, and in the 14- and 12-me bands in the
evening. 161/ tadio Liberation is reportedly very effective in its
brohdcasts in the 6-mc band from 1500 to 1530 GMT. 12/
Az has been previously shown, RIAS outranks by far all
other station, in its popularity among East German listeners. In 1951,
a sampling of opinion among East Zone residents indicated that more
than 80 percent of those who listened to the radio regularly deaended
mainly upon RXAS broadcasts. 1g21/ Amcng those stations heard, the
relative popularity rating showed RIAS first with 66 Percent, MDR
second with 12 percent, Radio Leipzig and Radio Berlin (both Communist)
with 3 and 2 percent respectively, and BBC With. 1Lpercent. A more
recent suraey? made in November 1953 by-a/coal indicated that RIAS hed
lost approximately .one-quarter of its audience since mid-1951, 112/
but remained by far the most popular station. The loss of listeners was
attributed mainly to poor reception owing to jamming pitrations, rather
than to a drop in the quality of its programs.
The most popular programs unong East Germans appear to be
news and political broadcasts. This is true of all sections of the
population -- professional people, workers, farmers, and students. 211/
These broadcasts are carried by RIAS on both medium and high frequencies.
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Some programs, with their broadcast times, which have a
certain popularity among East German listeners are listed below: 172/
Frequencies
3.1.31
Time (GMT) Medium High
"Berlin' Speaks to the Zone"
0620-0630
1240-1250
"The Week in Bonn"
0930-1000
Perm Broadcasos
1120-1130
RIAS Locator Service
1145
A.V. Boerner's Commentary
1901-1906
Other popular programs ere "Pinsel and Schnorchell" "The
Parade," and "The Perlin Atmosphere." Ey
Islanders," "Hit
2 Aural -- Very sigh
Most of lhe specific programs listed in Section IV, C, 1
are also carried by RAS on VHF siMultateously with the medium- and high-
frequency transmissions. There is no information available as to pro-
gram preferences for VHF reception.
3, Televieion.
The prosent situation as regards the reception of television
broadcasts from the West is unclear. There is little or no information
which would indica'oe the size or nature of the audience, and the present
base for reception of telecasts is still in a very elementary stage.it
is, therefore, inyossible to make any appraisal of the conditions which
might govern reciption of television in East Germany.,
D. Some lconomic Effects of Western Broadcasts.
All Euidence points to .he fact that Western radiobroadcasts have
had a considerible econemic'effect in East Germany. It is estimated, for
example, that at present there are 6o or more transmitters of various
power ratinge used at least pert time in East Germany in the jamming of
Western brmicasts. This operation involves the employment of skilled
technicians and a large amount of expensive equipment, all of which are
a drain upo% the East German economy rather than a positive contribution-
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Broadcasts by RIAS have often had the effect of causing panic
buying by reporting the existence of shortages in East Germany. In one
such instance a RIAS report of a shortage of meat in Zrandenburg was
carried at 064o hours, Py 0800 the county offices had been mobilized
to see to it that the report would be proved false, and meat taken from
that usually reserved for Soviet troops was put on the market.
Yn another case it was reported that a collective wage contract
for the Brandenburg Steel Works was concluded only after great difficulty
with the workers, These difficulties were attributed to BIAS broad-
casts, 176/
The most dramatic eviienee of the effect of Western broadcasts
wen the East German economy oecurred during the riots which took place
in Berlin and the Soviet Zone in ,:une 1953. Numerous reports testify
to the effect of RIAS broadcasts in spreading the news of the riots
throughout East Germany. ;11E/ It is perhaps too strong a statement to
attribute the "new course announced by the East German regime to this
development, but it is certain that considerable damage was done to the
economy during the period of the riots. Looting and property damage
were reportedly widespread. In addition, there was the expense involved
in moving People's Police and soviet military units to Derlin to quell
workers' resistance. Any effect upop the riots that may have been
attributed indirectly to the RTAS broadcasts would seem to have been
well worth the effort in term of the disruption, even though temporary,
of the functioning of the eroeomy in East Germany,
The broad malignant Umpact of Western broadcasts upon the
propensity of the East German worker to work heartily, though not
measurable quantitatively, iF estimated to be appreciable.
E. East German Press end Radio Reaction to Western Broadcasts,
There is abundant evidence of the reactions of the East German
press and radio to Western broadcasta. Some instances of this have been
reviewed in LV, A, Articles have appeared in the official press
listing the names of persoes known to be regular RIAS listeners. Ely
The party organ, Neues Deutechland, has often carried articles inveighing
against those East Germans eho listen to the "anti-democratic (Western)
radio," 179/ Listeners to RTAS and NWT, were warned that they were
violating the Law for the Peotection of the Peace, 12:2/ which was passed
by a11 the Satellite countries in the latter part of 1950. In April
1952 the magazine of the People's Police carried an article which stated
that 'RIAS listeners have lost the right to do duty in the People's
Police." 1?1/
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Perhaps the finest tribute to the effectiveness of Western broad-
casts is contained in an .article whieh appeared in Neues Deutschland.
This article carried a statement to the effect that it was not igre:?even
for true Communists to listen to Western news on an academic basis, since
this made them a perty -- wittingly or unwittingly -- to the campaigns
of the "warmongers and foes of democracy," 182/
VT. Trends,
The end of World War II left East Germany in political, economic,
and social chaos. Its radiobroadcasting resources were depleted,' Their
reconstruction proceeded slowly end unsurely under Soviet controls and
restraints, The winter. of 1951-52 became critical and dynamic, Technical
radio management, radiobroadcasting management, and production of radio
equipment all went under review or reorientation to overcome deficiencies
and to cope wi.th the influence of foreign broadcasts, particularly those
from Western Germany. Most major changes were completed by Sanuary 195j
Personnel problems, principally coneerning competence and loyalty, have
persistently plagued the effectiveness of East German radiobroadcasiing
and its administration. To cure all ills, the State Radio Committee was
set up in September 1952. One unconfirmed bat reliable report indicates
that plans were laid in March 1953 to reorganize radiobroadeasting %gain.
There is no evidence to show that this planned. reorganization has since
taken place, notwithstanding the recognized success which West Germany's
broadcasting had in causing the spread of East German rioting in June 1953.
In spite of serious problems: the trend since 1952 has been toward more
effective and efficient organization and management of East German radi
broadcasting resources,
The trend in ?the East German normal broadcasting transmission base
appears to be to saturate not only East Germany with medium-frequency
signals, but to beam them toward much of Western Europe for propaganda
purposes. In addition, it appears that from the current modest beginning
the East Germans will make increasing use of very-high-frequency (FM)
and television broadcnsting with expanding coverage of the countryn
The trend in the number of available broadcast receivers for use
In East Germany for the usual types of broadcasting is steadily upward
aM it is expected to continue in this direction, with possible larger
increases in FM and television receivers than in the past, since
Indications point toward development of these types of broadcasting.
This' upward trend should be helped by the present attitude of the iissiensi
which contemplates a larger portion of East German production going toward
home consumption, It Is not expected that the percentage of receivers
capable of satisfaetory high-frequency reception from foreign countries
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will improve materially. While production embraces many high-quality
models with several tubes and incorporation of all wave bands, it is
probable that these will not find their way into the hands of the average
citizen, Who can afford to buy only the cheapest receiver. The latter
is a relatively insensitive receiver capable of local reception only,
The better, more expensive, reeeivers will continue to be held by the
,higher-ups in the government, military, industrial, Party, arid Soviet
circles. There should be an increased reception base for rm and tele-
vision as these two types of transmission are expanded. Their distribution
will naturally follow the installation of the transmitters since both
are virtually of a line-of-sight nature The .development of wire-
diffusion networks and loudspeaker connections will probably continue to
follow the pattern of the past, with limited use in private homes unless
Soviet policy changes rad1eally toward this arrangement.
The trend in restrictions on listening to foreign broadcasts during
the period 1946 to the present time has been toward an increase in such
measures, but until now has not reached the point where listening to
such programs is legally prohibited- or where the regime has taken steps
to confiscate sets.
As regards the conditions for listening, the general trend here hs?
been toward an increase in the measures taken by GE1Raauthorities to build
up a "captive" audience which will be forced to listen to the Communist
programs, aecompanied by a decrease in the reception of Western broad-
casts as a result of jamming interferenve,
It is estimated that the current strong propensity on the part of
the average East German to listen to foreign broadcasts, especially those
from West 'Perlin and West Germany, will increase with increasing efforts
to prevent it.
Xf present plans for expansion of both strategically located medium-
and high-power. transmitters, and low-power local jammers distributing
signals over electric power lines are carried out, the potential East
German audience for Western broadcasts will be reduced. The apparent
goal of this progrsm is to make reeeption of Western broadcasts in East
Germany impossible., The complete achievement of this goal will require
jamming facilities considerably in excess of those presently in use of
believed to be projected.
There has been a recent trend toward a decrease La the si,e of the
East German audienfle for foreign broadcasts, but this is attributed to
Interference resulting from jamming rather than to any drop in the quality
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of programs, "Lncreased difficulty in getting through the jamming curtain
with presently airt.ilable transmitting equipment can probably be expected
in the future, because the Oommunists are constantly stepping up their
efforts in this respect.
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APPENDIX A
REPORTED ORGANIZATION OF I'M GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF RADIORROADCASTING: EAST GERMANY
December 1950 - August -1_952
GENERAL MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT L.
SOVIET ZONE
RADIOBROADCASTING SYSTEM
TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT
FERNSCH CENTRUM
Aldershof?Berlin
STATION
Potsdam
TECHNICAL DIRECTION PROGRAMMING
TELEVISION SUPERVISION
HSOUND SUPERVISION
PHCYTO TECHNIQUE
HLIGHTING
H STAGE
STATION
Berlin
GENERAL LABORATORY
GDR
BROADCASTING SYSTEM
STATION
Leipzig
CHIEF: CENTRAL LABORATORY
BROADCASTING DIVISION
TELEVISION DIVISION
TECHNICAL SUPERVISION?CABLES
IMPULSE AN]) SYNCHRO DEVICES
SIGNAL INSTALLATION
STATION
Dresden
--I HIGH FREQUENCY INSTALLATIONS
DEFLECTORS? HIGH VOLTAGE
INSTALLATIONS
BROAD BAND AMPLIFIERS
TELEVISION CAMERA AND
CAMERA AMPLIFIERS
TELEVISION OPTICS H TRANSFORMERS? NETWORK
INSTALLATIONS
OFFICE OF PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT
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STATIONS
Weimar
Halle
Schwerin
STUDIO
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APPENDIX B
RETCRTM PERSCNNEL CF THE STATE RADIO O'ONMITTEE
---- FAST
HEISS Chairman of the Commission is Kurt Halos, a professional
journalist, who W35 formerly director' of 'the Soviet Zone Radlobroadcanting
System and editor of Deutenhlandsender. His wife is Russian.
Born in 1909 in Mannheim, Helss became a Communist Party member when
he fled from C.ermany in 1933 e4,cape arreot by the Gesapo. After
World War II he served for a time as chief editor of Radio -Leipzig, until
assuming the position of Director of Radio rertin ou 26 October 1949. In
December /95/ he left Radio Berlin to become Director of the East Zone
Radlobroadcasting System, suceeding Hans Mahle. In August 1952 he was
appointed to his present position.
Heise attended the Antifa (Lnti-Fasnist) School in Moscow. He waliin
Warsaw with a delegation from the Central Radio Office from 20 June to
6 July 1950, where he signed a protocol on behalf of the GDR providing for
cooperation and exchange of knowledge between the two conatries
FTEINERT Wolfgang Fleinert, who also received training at the &Alfa
School, is Deputy Chairman of the Commission. He headed a Commission
delegation to Sofia on 28 April 1953 to conclude an agreement on coopera-
tion in the field of broadcasting with the Radio Committee of the Bulgarian
council of Ministers. He is a member of the S.
PERK W, Perk, of Deutschlandsender, is responsible for the broadnaat
"All-German QuestIons," He has visited the Soviet Union, He deals with
Radio'Berlin's West German .reporters, who are equipped with miniature re-
corders for work in the GDR.' Perk speaks and writes German poorly and his
own commentaries must be extensively edited. .
PFEUCHVER (possibly Pisahner) Professor PTnechner ip in charge of the Main
Musin,Department. He believes that Radio Berlin, in line with the "new
course," should imitate RIAS ,1 first hot music) then political reports."
(CONNEVT- This is not, of course,, the RIAS method.) He sends people to
West Berlin to buy Western records and to engage Western artists -- money
no object. Party affiliation not available. Piachner has been reported to
be an SED member,
FUKALNER R. Fuetzner is responsible for literary and cultural-political
broadcasts, He has visited the Soviet Union. His job is to demonatrate the
"impossibility" of Western culture, Party affiliation not available.
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S-E-O-R-E-T
EIIRODT &tete Ellrodt is in charge of entertainment and public
Figaiiences. She plant off-color jokes about the Americans and the
West. Party affiliation not available. A K. Ellrodt, perhaps the same
persons has been reported as Chief Editor of Berlin III and a member of
BED,
PRISKY Hanna Frisky is in charge of "Youth and Pedagogiee." She
maintains close liaison with Komsomols, and believes that "you can'tede
anything with the grown-up,eanyway." She is often in the Soviet Union
and Satellite States. Party affiliation not available. ?
ADAMEK Heinz Adameks director of the Main Personnel Departments is
responsible for personnel policy. He hae close connections with the
State Security Service. Be is a mebber of the SED, and regards political
attitude as a decisive factor in the employment of personnel.
PROPST W. Propsts director of the Main Technical Department, is
supposedly a technicians but was removed from his post at Radio Berlin for
incompetence. Heise took over his functions. Propet explains technical
faults at Radio Berlin as being the reeult of poor qaality of technical
personnel and equipment.* Propst is a member of the SED. '
ZAHNKE .Zahnke is the supervisor of empleyeeel work conduct. .When
riMing, he complains about the GDR government. Party affiliation is not
available,
HEVDEISOHN Meter Nendelsohns a member of Free German Youth, was installed
In the commission to keep von Schnitzler and Gesener under observation.
Be is a yonng man, in his early 20s. lion Schnitzler wan formerly in
charge. Party affiliation not aVallable.
GISSNER Herbert Gessner; a well-known commentator, was removed from
Radio Vianich in 1947. His wife was employed in the cultural section, but
was removed for conduct injurious to the SED. Party affiliation net
available,
KUHFELD Guenter KUhfeld has had difficulties on the score of morals and
professional qhalifications. party affiliation not availdble.
SCHNEIDER Helmut Schneider waa formerly chief of eection. He wae removed
In a series of intrigues and is now a script writer for DEFA. Be writes
dramatized documentaries for Radio Berlin and did the Rosenberg dhows. Be
is very able, though a heavy drinker. He is reported to have stated that
"the party is the highest form of exploitation." Party affiliation not
47?TPERTZ717aCi1ities at Radio Berlin Include 6 recording rooms, 14 cutting
rooms, and 10 dubbing rooms; half of them are constantly out of service and
all have acoustical faults.
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Approved For Release 1999/09KRi_9*FRID79-01093A000500050001-8
CO. 101.1, mole MI" 1.1.
available. An Hy Schneider has been reported as .an SED menber, in the
Entertainment Department.
REONBAK Frew. Rennhak is in charge of Berlin I. Eels a heavy drinker.
and is professionally unqualified. His party affiliation is not known. It
is reported that he was in "Western Enigretiony"
MOERICKE Hanz Nbericke is in charge of Berlin III. His father is a
personal friend of Wilhelm Pieck. When drinking, be makes critical remarks
about the Communist system. Be receives financial support from his father-
in-law? Who lives in West Berlin. Party affiliation not available.
Name
Adolph,Kari
Alberty
Bartel:3
Bauer
Bexertt
Boehm
Bosse, Johann
Brang
Braumann
Brenk
Burkhardt, H.
Buschmann
Busse, H.
Classen, H.
Crossman
Demuth
Doerge '
Dost, W.
Duchrow
Dunger, K.
Ebel
Edelhoff
Edeimann
Fehlig? Werner
Frenzel-
Froehlich
Gegget, H.
G4isetzner
Grenzel
Gruenstein
Bakke, Rudi
Haendler
Function
"????????,1111.21?Or.m...1??????111*W
Director, Leipzig Radio
Assigned Announcer
Assigned Announcer
Youth Departnent
Assigned Announcer
Transmission - 3 Programs
Nes and Program Announcer
Director's Pool
News and Program Announcer
Assigned Announcer
Chief Editor, Berlin II
Chief Editor, Berlin I
Theater, Film and MUbie Depextnent
West German Communist Party and Unions Department
Women's Department
Transmission - 3 Programs
Technician for 3 Programa
Current Events Department
SED Department
Children's Department
Director of Main Administrative Department
Domestic Economy Department
Country News Department
Deputy Director, Leipzig Radia?. or Director,
Transmission
Berlin Department
Director's Pool
West Germany Department
Assigned Announcer
Berlin Section
Censoring Department
Technical Director, Leipzig Radio
Truth About America Department
Party
N.A.
No Party
BED
BED
No Party
SED
No Party
SED
BED
SED
BED
SED
SED
SED
BED
SED
No Party
SED
SED
SED
BED
SED
BED
BED
SED
No Party
SED
No Party
SED
BED
SED
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8
F F
Name
Hartmann
Hats
Hauuchild
jokann
Heizig
Herr
ierwia
Heydecks H.
Hildebrandt
Hilgert
Hoerne, Wolter
Horn
Intelas
Xahlow
Kaminski
Kasswan
Kaul, Dr.
Kendt
Klaehn
lenges, HQ
Mackat
Mlerche
Atka, V,
Valtrodt
Nehmzoy
Opitz
Ortner,
Paschke
Paul.
Pbuetzner,
Rudolph
Pletsch
POlensen
Polland
Porth
Preusker
Schnitzler, von
Schoellig
Schoenendorf, W.
Sthwendtner
SeIbmann,
Soeldner
Steinke
Stelzner, R.
Stoll
Stuebe
Function
Assigned. Announcer
AS signed Announcer
News and ProGrram Announcer
Personnel Referent
AU:signed Announcei.
Censoring Departnent
Assigned Announcer
West Germany Department
Director's Pool
Director's Pool
Fbreign Connections
Tchnican for 3 Programs
Technical Scheduling Office
Dramatics Department
Cenuoring Department
Transmission - 3 Programs
Direvtor,'Iegal Department
Assigned Announcer
News and ProgranAnnouncer
Neve and Program Announcer
Domestic Econogy Department
Director's Pool
Traffic Office
External Technical Service
Censoring Denartment
Finance Department -
Youth Department
SED Department
Berlin Section
Director, Radio Berlin or Deuts hlandsender
News ana Program Announcer
Assigned Announcer
Files and Archives (Scu.nd Carrier)
Director's Pool
Chiefs Production Department
ComMentary Department
Production Directors Organization Office
Deputy Director, Production
Technical for 3 Programs
Science or Economic Department
Womengs Department
Director's Pool
Religious Department
USSR and Satellite Departments
Literature Department
-66.-
Party
lib Party
No Party
SED
SED
No Party
SED
No Party
SED
No Party
LA
SED
LA
SEP
SED
SED
SED
SEP
Vo Party
Nb Party
SED
BED
NO Party
BED
SED
N.A.
SED
SED
SED
SED
No Party
SED
No Party
No Party
SED
SED
SED
SED
SED
SIM
SED
&ED
SED
SEP
Approved For Release 1994/ Idi-NA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8
SECRT-
'Dia=
Function
toopmelyma,....coilpECI.MR121.5.1.101
Thierfelder. 'Censoring Departnent
Thiess Aseigned Announcer
Tbelg Assigned Announcer
Wander Assigned Announcer
Zilles Hermann Deputy Directorv Dutchlandsender or Director,
Television Branch
Zinneringv Political Culture Department
SED
No Party
No Party
No Party
BED
SED
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-0
-0
3
CD
a.
-11
CD
(7)
a) Location
CD
et
-Berlin-Koenigswusterhs.usen 841 100
CD
CD
Merlin-Deutschlandsender 191 100
a
c.o
aerlin 6115 ' 5 to 10
7113
erlin 7610 5
tresden 1465 10
4?1110..01.14.1=11.1.1.m.
S-E-C-R-E-T
APPENDIX C
FACIIMIIS?B_EAZIL_LTIRMAtu 184/
1949
od peAwddv
Frequency Power
(kc) -(lpt)
7trfurt
cb
aalle
CD
ipzig
a
a
:eipz ig
aoksdem
01a
:active r in
a
Co
1231 20
1303 20
785 100
9729 12
722 7
564 20
1231 20
Prow
Berlin Home Service
Deutschlandsender
Deutschlandsender
"Radio Volga"
Central German Radio and
Saxony Regional Service
Central German Radio and
Thuringian Regional
Service
Central German Radio and
Saxony Anhalt Regional
Service
Central German Radio
"Radio Volga"
Berlin Home Service and
Potsdam Regional Service
Berlin Home Service and
Neckletburg Regional
Service
Hours of Operation 2/
Approximately 18.5 hours
daily
Approximately 18.5 hours
dpily
Irregular
Approximately 17,5 hours
daily
Approximately 17.5 hours
d al 1 y
Approximately 17.5 hours
daily
Approximately 17.5 hours
daily
N.A.
Approximately 18.5 hours
daily
Approximately 18.5 hours
daily
CD
Remarks (7)
CD
CD
CD
CD
Power e st imated
a
Program for USEal?
)ccupation force);
CD
6
a
(.0
Program for U.
occupation f ? 7a
a
cri
a
a
a
cri
a
a
a
a. Detailed program schedules not available.
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.10d peAwddv
a)
Location
CD
-a
CD
CO
Biglin-Koenigswusterhauser
APPENDIX D
RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 182i
January 1954
Frequency Power Hours of
(kc) (kw) Progiaa Operation (GMT)
173 2.1
Low, Medium and High Frequencies
N.A. Berlin I
?33?-?71?)aasumed
0900-0000)
Baplin-Koenigswusterhauser 185
K.)
Binlin-Xoenigswusterhauser 263
1>
Bnlin-Koenigaimaterhsuser 833
13
B41111-1Coenigswusterha,user 6115)
CD . 7150)
Balin-Koepenick 782
CD
(AV
a
a
Bglin-Koenigswusternauser 782
a
100
20
20
5
440
70.
Deutachlandsender 0330-0710,
0900-0000
"Radio Volga" to Daily: 1500-2200
Soviet Occupa-Sunday: 1000-2200
tion Forces
Berlin I 0330-0710,
0900-0000
Berlin I 0330-0710,
0900-0000
Night Program 0000-0330
Deutschlandeender 0330-0910
1100-1300
(1500-0000
du, do.
Nglin-Stadt sender 1570
c
a
a
a
? ?
20 Berlin III
(which para-
;leis Berlin I
from 0330-0710)
0330-0710,
0710-0850,
1040-1700,
1730-0000
ET
Remarks a)
CD
-a
CD
CD
Station not announced or listed; 92
probably used to counter VOA on 173act
Power to be increased to 500 kw in ti6
K3
near nature.
Relays Moscow Main Program 5 hours .(-;
daily, 8 hours Sunday; this stations
not under GDR control.
Probably triobile type transmitter. 0
CD
cb
a
CD
>
a
a
Spare transmitter for Berlin-Koepenig,
above. a
a
a
01a
a
a
Transmitter is the &filling Z-3,
recently installed.
. Underscoring indicates that
this frequency is the same as that of a radiobroadcast station located in West Germany.
- 71 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
0
CD
a. Location
S-E-C-R-E-T
RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GEMANY 182/
January 1954
(Continued)
Frequency Power
(ke) .,(kw)
9,
+in
-a
Dresden I 910
C)
5;
33
0 -
"CV
Dreisden II Wiledruff) .1016
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Co
Program
Hours of
Operations (GMZ) Remarks
Low, Mediumdand High Frequencies
Probably Berlin I
or Berlin III
20 erlin III
Saxony Regional
Service
300 Berlin III
Saxony Regional
Service (also
short programs
several times
weekly from
Goerlitrzin
Lusatian Serb)
033C-071u
0710-08501
1040-1700,
1730-0000
1700-1730
Reported to be under construction.' * g
Frequency reported to be in the lolow
w
frequency range beteeen 150 and
300 kc; Power reported to be be-
tween 500 kw and 1,000 kw.
Location reported variously as
Berlin-Zeblendorf? Ber1it-Koepenick,12
ludwigslust, or Burg (near Negdeburgt?
(parallels Berlin I), K3
0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I),
0710-0850 likmw transmitter
1040-1700,:
1730-0000,
1700-1730.
- 72 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
- o
inaugurated 9 Oct 195g
CD
CA)
cn
cn
63
CD
Location
RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 182/
January 1954
(Continued).
Frequenty Power
(kc) (kw)
a;xfurt
w
CD
CAD
CAD
CAD
adetermined - thought to
Se Halle
c)
K3
Halle-Bernburg
0
fRipzig
a
ipz
a
a
a
ig
a
a
a
01a
?1pig iii
63
20
B.A,
1196
20
1043
1:40
9730
10
1079
20
Program
Hours of
Remarks
Iow, Medium, and High Frequencies
Berlin I
0330-0710,
0900-1715,
1745-0000.
Thuringian
1715-1945
Regional Service
Undetermined -
0330-1700)ezsunied
thought to be
1730-0000)
Berlin III
Berlin I
0330-0710,
0900-1715,
1745-0000
Saxony Anhalt
1715-1745
Regional
Service '
Berlin III ?
Leipzig Regional.
Service
Night Program
Deutschlandsender
Berlin III
-73-
(1?.
Expected to be replaced in May 1954a7
by 440 kw transmitter.
CDw
CAD
CD
CD
Low power transmitter apparently uses
to jam the RIAS-Hof (West Germany) 51.71!
transmitter on the same frequency.
0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I))
0710-0850) Actual power output believed to be
14404-1700., 70 11.7.
1730-ooloo
1700-1730
0000-0330,
0330-0910,
1100-1300,
1500-0000
0330-0710 (parallels Berlin
0710-0850, Mobile type transmitter; super-
1040-1700J rower transmitter scheduled for
1730-0000 Leipzig in 1954.
8- 1.00090009.000V?601.0-6/dC1N-V10
S4-C-R-E-T
RADIOBROADCASTING TBANSMITTLNG FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY
Apiary 195h
(Continued)
Location
a_
-
CD
41i1341g
C,)
CD
-a
Adeburg (Burg)
a
0
Oetennined - though to
Plauen
PetsdaM,-Golm
CD
cb
Frequency Power
(kc)
Hours of
Program Operations((GMT)
? antI High Frequencies
Leipzig Regional 1700-1730
Service
1322 100 Radio Moscow (re*, 1600-2130
lays German pro-
grams from Moscow
European Service)
575 300 Berlin I 0330-0710,
09oo-1715;
1945-0000
Saxony Anhalt 1715-1945
Regional
Service
890 2 Berlin I
611 20 Berlin III
'Brandenburg
Regional
Service
-74-
enter
This station is not under GDR
control.
0330-0710) assumed Not announced or listed; forperly
0900-0000) interfered. with RIAS --Hof (West
Germany).
0330-0710 (parallels Berlin
0710-0850, Probably maile type transmitter.
1040-1700;
1730-0000
1700-1730
S-E-C-R-E-T
8-1.00090009000V?601.0-6/c1CIN-V10 : Z0/60/6661. eSeeleN .10d
-0
-0
a
Frequency Power Hours of
Location (kw) Program Orations .(GMT)
Low Medium;and High Frequencies
S-E-C-RZ-T
-
RADIOBROADCASTING TRANSMITTING FACILITIES IN EAST GERMANY 1A2/
January 195
(Continued)
CD
CD
Ichwerin
CD
CAD
CAD
CAD
25
CAD
25
Unknown
0
a
Remarks
Pu
CD
ET
m
728 4.40 Berlin III 0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I), Cl)
0710-0850) 440 kw power inaugurated 9 Oct 19531,
m
1040-1700) CAD
1730-0000 CAD
CAD
1700-1730 25
CAD
Mecklenburg
Regional
Service
683-Night N.A. Berlin I
1385-Day
grlin-Friedrichstadt 92.5
.4
cb
a
CD
0330-0710)assumed
0900-0000)
Very High Fre4uencies (FM)
0.25
Berlin III
0330-0710 (parallels Berlin I))
0710-0850
1040-1700
1730-0000
0.25
Berlin I
Projected
0.25
Berlin I
0330-0710
0900-0000
N.A.
Berlin I
0330-0710
N.A.
Berlin I
0330 0900-07N0000
N.A.
Berlin IIT
03300710. (parallels Berlin I)
0710-0850
1040-1700
Wlin-Friedrichstaa 94.9
CD
Bracken (Harz Motuitains) 94.6
CD
cn
CD
gelsberg (Thuringia) 94.0
ta-ipzig 88.0
a
ahwer in
Co
89.2
Mecklenburg
Regional SerWe 1700-1730
S-E-C-R-E-T
8- 1.00090009000V?601.0-6/dC1N-V10
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8
Approved For Release 1999/09/a4katepP79-01093A000500050001-8
APPENDIX E
CHARACTERISTICS OF RADICBRQMINUMURECEIVFES PRODUCED IN =TUMMY 116,/
Name
No. of
Thbes
Frequen y
Bands t.
emarks
RFT u 11
1
LNE
I' Band,5.9.9.8 kc. Probably
most population setplowest costo
Stern 4 u 64
4
LMH
Superheterodyne, AC-DC) adapter
for VHF available.
Stern 4 u 65
14.
LHVB
Superheterodyne.
Stern 5U 61
5
L H
Superheterodyne, Ac-rc,, adapter
for VHF available.
nrr 5 E 61,D
4
M
Superheterodyne.
RFT 5 E 63
5
LMBVH
"Medium class' set: pbonograph.
RFT Stern 5 u 53
5
LMH VH
Superheterodyne.
RFT 5 E 64
5
N.A.
Phonograph.
RFT 6 E 62
6
LMH
High-fidelity, record player and
tape recorder.
6 D 71
5
Portable, Ac-rco
Stern 9 E 91
9
L M H VH
Superbetaroplaul,
Stern 9 E 92
9
L M H VH
Superheterodyne) record player and
tape recorder.
9 E 61
Belaphon 4251ff
LA,
N.H.
L M H
Receiver for coaches (busses).
"Sonnebere
66/52 W
5
LMH
Superheterodyne.
'Olympia!'
522 'JM
5
NH
Superheterodyne.
64/50 WS
4
M H
Superheterodyne.
RFT S 1049B
5
H
Automobile set.
RFT AE 66
N.A.
M
Automobile set, superheterodyne.
Skala
5
Stern]. U 16 12/
1
Loy cost, said to have been dis-
continued in .1953.
Stern 7 E 86 y
7
LMHVH
Superheterodyne? tone controlled.
Stern 12/
2
M
Midget superheterodyne dispatch case.
4. low frequency.
? - medium frequency.,
H - high frequency.
VH - very high frequency.
b. These sets were reported scheduled to be placed on exhibition at the
Leipzig Fair, 1952, They were new developments not then in production
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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01093A000500050001-8
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25X1 X499
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S-E4-11-E-T
APPENDIX F
METLIODOICGY
The totals of radiobroadcasting hours transmitted to East German
audiences, both foreign and dome etic, were obtained from overtly pdbliahed
material of the broadcasting agencies and from reporte based on monitoring.
.71a0 estimates of the nuttier of broadcaat receivers (Table 4) for the
years 1946 to 1951 were taken from CIA/HR 1M410 25 August 19530 BIS (this
vas the only source of the geographital distribution), overt published
materials and a State Department despatch. For subsequent
years estimates' were predicated on a flat yearly increase, extending the
estimates to 1957, which baa been done in the S/COM contribution, dated
9 January 19540 to officewide projects ENC-P-6. As a result of research
for the current reports it was felt that the estimates for EIC-P-6 probably
were high because of the uncertainties of the impact of certain economic
factors. These include the development of very-high-frequency and tele-
vision broadcasting, wire-diffusion expansions and the "new course," which
,is intended to liberalize economic benefits to the masses. For this reason
a more modest yearly growth increment wee considered and adopted. Lower
estimates then resulted and were coMbined with those for EIC-P-6 so that
eatiMates for 1952 through 1957 are stated in the form of a range for each
yoi. rather than a definite figure..
Appendix E setting forth the characteristics of radiobroadcaat receivers
produced in East Germany was derived from material contained in catalogs of
a German import-export organization; CIA/RR 11, 26 September 1952, and
25X1 A8a
?
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k. No information is at hand regarding plans beyond 1954 for radio
broadcasting transmitting facilities.
1. Tb .re is little information regarding proposed power of new VHF
(rm) and 7V transmitters.
2 I1&
to fill gaps have been proceeding on two broad fronts a- the
general and the specific. AB for the general, a Telecommunications Working
Group of the EIC ?i'ubcommittee on Requirements and Facilities for Collation
has undertaken to develop a complete, new set of requirements manuals geared
to the specific capabilities of the various. collection agencies, along with
the establishment of priorities according to subject matter and country.
In consonance With this program, working groups of the EIC Subcommittee on
Electronics and Telecommunications is now preparing 4 set of survey sheets
on the Soviet Bloc countries which will measure the state of our intelligence
in the field, the deficiencies, and the reasons for the deficiencies. This
over-all program Mhen put into effect, should greatly improve the quantity
and quality of raw material and should help to fill in some of our more
wide-open gaps.
As for specific efforts, advantage is taken of knowledgeable sources
discovered in the daily reading process by the initiation of specific
requirements geared to our known gaps and the competence of the source.
were also utilized to a limited extent
in the preparation of this report. In addition, numerous requests for re-
quirements have been respondea to in this field and continue to help fill
in gaps.
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APPENDIX H
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
a. Transm1slsa_Easllities2LE2E21galroadcasters to East Germany (Aural
The information on foreign broadca6ting addressed to the East German
25X9A2 audience was obtained chiefly from based on monitoring and on
overt publications. It is considered reliable. 25X1A8a
c. Rece1lflaLEILLIaZa"2-__-tETEX'
This -information on distribution of receivers came largelyfrom NIS NIE
and CIA punished documents, State Department despatches,
In general, this information was confirmatory.
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The information on receiver production and characteristics was
from CIA published documInts, and East German trade catalogs,
This information is taken as having fair reliabilit
d. Regulations and. Conditions of Listenin
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Department and USIA despatches, Since
Most of the material in i c om?
reports were, in general, substantiated by the overt Information, they are
believed to be of good reliability.
obtained
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State
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e. Effectiveness of Western Broadcasts.
The majority of the material on the effectiveness of Western broad-
casts is taken from surveys made by ParOG or BIAS personnel. These surveys
are considered to be of good validity. Information on popular programs,
statione, and frequencies was obtained from HICOG reports, and confirmed as
to time and frequencies by program schedules overtly published.
2. Sources.
Evaluations, following the classification entry and designated
have the following significance:
Source of Information
A - Completely reliable
D - Usually reliable
C - Fairly reliable
D - Not usually reliable
E - Vot reliable
F - Cannot be judged
Information
"Eval.?"
Doc. - Documentary
1 - Confirmed by other sources
2 Probably true
3 - Possibly true
4 - DoubtfUl
5 - Probably false
6 - Cannot be judged
"Documentary" refers to original documents of foreign governments and
organizations; copies or translations of such documents by a staff officer;
or information extracted from such documents by a staff officers. all of which
will carry the field evaluaton 'Documentary" instead of a numerical grade.
Evaluations not otherwise designated are those appearing on the cited
document; those designated "RR" are by the author of this report, No 'RR"
evaluation is given when the author agrees with the evaluation on the cited
document. Evaluations designated "SI" are by WI.
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OFFICE CV RESEARCH AND REPORTS
Projects Control Staff
Control Sheet
DocumrNTN0
CIA/RR PR
Series ;:: A;;
TO: T's
nnther CIA/RR PR-54
Lite of Document I April'54
Fp:
? 00050001-8
711 AR ts
tiAlkag
Classification
Number of copies 154
DISTRTBOTION
C::OPY NO, DIVISION OR AGENCY DATE
RETORTED
1, 2 AD /RR 3 May 54
#2 ret'd 5 May 54
2, 3 2 6 May 5.4
75, 76 az T 7 May 54
?2ZR i ? - II . ! ?
Henry Loomis. USIA 7 May 54_
',5 oscArD 1 'Ili s'q
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I 1 511-1
-2
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25:1A%al
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