THE TANK AND ASSAULT GUN INDUSTRY OF THE USSR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000300080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 27, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE TANS. AND ASSAULT GUN INDUSTRY
OF THE USSR
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CIA/RR PR-25
27 February 1953
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE- AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
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WARNINGF
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the ,espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
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SECURITY INFORMATION
PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
THE TANK AND ASSAULT GUN INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
CIA~RR PR-25
~ORR Project 31-51)
NOTICE
The data and conclusions contained in this report
do not necessarily represent the final position of
ORR and should be regarded as provisional only and
subject to revision. Additional data or comments
which may be available to the user are solicited.
This report has nat been coordinated with the IAC
agencies. The subject is scheduled for inter-
agency review by the Armaments Subcommittee of the
Econamic Intelligence Committee.
Office of Research and Reports
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~NTIAL
co~rrrs
Page
Summary and Conclusions 1
I. Introduction . ~
A. Definition and Description of Tanks and Assault Guns . 2
1. Definition 2
2. Description . . 3
a . Tanks .
(1)
(a) Driving Compartment . .
(b) Fighting Compartment
(c) Engine Compartment
(d) Transmission Compartment . .
(2) Armored :Revolving Turret
~
(3) Armament ? . .
(~+) Engine and Transmission .
5
(5) Suspension .System ?
5
B. Development of, the Industry and the Product
~
1. Prewar .
6
2 . Wartime . . .
9
3. Postwar .
11
C. Interrelationship with Other Manufacturing Industries
12
D. Organization of the .Industry .
13
II. Production . . . ..
l~+
A. Production Methods and Techniques
l~F
B. Postwar Production . . .
16
~A~EH3ENilAL
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1. Postwar Reconversion , 1~
2. Postwar Rates of Production 17
a. World War II Base . 18
b. Calculation of Postwar-Rates 19
(1) State of Information , lg
(2) Chief Variables , 20
Labor 21
Techniques and Methods 21
Plant Equipment 22
Product Design 22
Supply of Component Parts 22
Weather . . 23
Scale of Effort 23
(3)
(e) Kharkov Locomotive Plant No. 75
imeni Komintern 28
(f) Sverdlovsk Urals Heavy Machine Building .
Plant imeni Ordzhonikidze 28
(g) Omsk P1an~t No. 17~+ imenni Voroshilov , 29
(h) Gar'kiy Automobile Plaint imeni Molotov 3p
3. Postwar Annual Production 3Q
C.
Potential Productive Capacity
39
1.
Total Capacity of Current"Producers
39
2.
Capacity of World War II Plants Since Converted
to.Civilian Production
39
3?
Additional Capacity from Further Convez?sion and
New Plant Construction
ZEO
C(f~~TIAl,.
Plant-by-Plant Estimates 2~
(a) Nizhniy Tagil Railroad Car Plant
No. 183 .imeni Kaganovich 2~
(b) Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant
No. 178 imeni Stalin 26
(c) Gor'kiy Krasnoye Sormovo Plant No.?112. .
imeni Zhd.anov 26
(d) Leningrad Heavy Machinery :Plant ~ ~ +
No. 185 imeni Kirov 27
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'~I~TIAL
III.
Supply and Demand for Product , .
~+2
A.
Demand for Product
~+2
B.
Tank and Assault Gun Inventory .
~+2
C .
Demand versus Supply .
~+7
IV.
Input Requirements
~+7
A.
Metals .
~+7
B.
Nonmetallic Materials
50
1. Rubber .
50
2. Plastics and Fabrics
51
C.
affect of Materials Input Requirements on the Economy .
52
D.
Electrical Energy
52
E .
Manpower ,
55
F .
Transpartat ion
5.5
G.
Petroleum Products
55
V.
Vulnerabilities and Intentions .
56
A.
Vulnerabilities of the Industry
56
B.
Intentions concerning the Industry
56
Appendixes
Appendix A.
Gaps in Intelligence
57
Appendix B.
Methodology
5q
Appendix C.
Sources and Evaluation of Sources
61
Photographs
Following Page
Figure 1. Tank Hull Construction on the KV-1 Tank
at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Restricted) l~+
~4~?~~~NTIAL
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FJpENTIAL
Following Page
Figure 2. Mounting the Turret on the KV-1 Tank at the
Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Restri.cted) l~+
Figure 3. Installation of the Engine in the. KV-1 Tank
at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (Restricted) l~+
Figure ~+. Completed KV-1 Tanks Being Removed.fro:m the.
Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant by Soviet Army
Crews (Restricted) 1~+
Figure 5. Completed KV-1 Tanks Standing at Chelyabinsk
(Restricted) 11+
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',~19Ft9~NTIAL
SECURITX INFORMATION
.THE TANK AND ASSAULT GUN INDUSTRY OF THE USSR
Summary and Conclusions
The tank and assault gun industry of the USSR is closely related to
the heavy equipment industry of the USSR. The weight and mobility of
the Soviet tanks and assault guns that have gone into production during
and since World War II require manufacturing facil~aies beyond the
capabilities of the Soviet tractor and automa~tive industries, with-which
the development of the tank industry was associated up to World War II..
The prodizctian of tanks and assault guns in the.. USSR is highly
centralized. Current Soviet production of tanks and assault guns is
centered in six plant complexes -- three in the Urals area and one
each at Kharkov, Leningrad, and Omsk -- where it is carried on'ri.
close physical proximity to the production of heavy equipment, includ-
ing locomotives. In these plant complexes, which themselves possess
sizable steel production facilities, the capacity currently devoted
to the production of heavy equipment could be reconverted quickly to
the production of tanks and assault guns, for which it was used in
World War IT.
The hi-story of the tank and assault -gun industry of the T.JSSR since
World War II may be divided into three phases.- The first phase, extend=
ing from 1945 to 1947,- was a period of conversion to civilian production
and of salvaging war material. The second phase, extending from 1947 to
1949, was utilized to refurbish plants designated for continued tank
and~ar assault gun production and to apply'lesaons learned during the war.
The third phase, extending from 1949 to the present.,. saw serial produc-
ti~n of the. new T-54 medium tank, as-well as the JS-.III heavy tank, and
the corresponding. assault gun. models.
Soviet production of tanks and assault guns, which totaled
18,11$ units in 1945, dropped to 8,116 units in 1946 and to 7,681 units
in 1947. In 194$, production rase to $,291 units,? in 1949,. to 10,A59
units. (The rise in 1949 was due primarily to the introduction.. of the
~ .This report contains information available to CIA as of 31 December:1952.
A
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T-54 medium tank to serial production.) Production in 1g50 was
10,3+8 units; in 1951, 10,950 units. Production in 1951 absorbed
approximately 2.percent of the steel, h percent of the nickel,
and 16 percent of the molybdenum produced in the U:~SR.
It is.estimated that full mobilization in -t:he Soviet Bloc would
require some 76,000 tanks and assault guns: This demand could be
met in part from the 1 January 1952 Soviet inve>ntary of 59,388 units.
The deficit of some 17,000 units. could be made up by the six plants
currently-producing tanks and assault guns,-which have a potential
annual capacity of some.2g,000 units,.,. with a substantial margin to
compensate for combat .losses. Reconversion .of other plants would not
be necessary.
I. Introduction.
A. Definition-and Description of Tanks and. Assault Guns. 1
1. Definition.
A tank may be defined as an armored tracked combat vehicle
possessing great mobility, fire power, and striking force. An assault
gun may be defined as an armored tracked.nonturreted vehicle used for
direct-fire artillery support_in the combat area. A tank is designed
to close with the enemy and engage him in close combat. An assault.
gun, with its. more. powerful armament, is allowed by its armor to enter
the combat .area and engage in artillery support of the tank:- The
term "self-propelled. gun" is often used interchangeably with. assault, gun,.
This usage is incorrect,_however, because a self-propelled-gun is no
more than the name implies: an artillery piece normal]tiy used for
indirect fire whose motive power is self-contained.. The .USSR is not
known to have any such self-propelled guns.
Tanks and assault guns are usually classed as light,
medium, or heavy.. This classification can be made on the basis of
~ Footnote references in arabic numerals are to sources listed in
Appendix C.
'~' Since current Soviet-.production includes only medium and heavy types,
reference to li~kit tank or assault 'gun models will appear in this report
only in the historical section which follows.
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relative vehicular weights and gun calibers and also by combat
mission. The light tank is primarily a reconnaissance vehicle;
the medium tank combines moderately heavy armament and armor with
great mobility and shocking power; and the heavy. tank is the
slugger of the three., designed with.its heavier gun to deal with
fortified positions and other tanks. Assault guns-are classified
to correspond with. tanks of comparable- weight whose chassis:. are
used for their construction..
2. Description.
The main parts of a tank are the armored .hull, the
armored revolving turret, the armament, the engine, the transmission,
and the suspension system. The armored hull provides protection for
the crew and machinery. The turret provides for 360-degree employ-
ment of the armament, or fire power.. The engine, transmission, and
suspension system provide for the tank's mobility, speed, maneuver-
ability, and cross-country performance.
(1) Armored Hull.
The armored hull is a-rigid compartment. composed
of armor plate., or castings,. welded or riveted together. In some
tanks the hull unit is one large casting. Normally,. the hull is
divided into four compartments: driving, fighting, engine, and
transmission. The arrangement of these compartments within the hull
may vary, but the following arrangement is typical.
(a) Driving Compartment.
The driving compartment is located in the --
forward-portion of the hull. It contains the driver and-the mech-
anisms and instruments for controlling the tank's movement.
(b) Fighting Compartment.
The fighting compartment comprises the
middle portion of the hull and the turret. Here is housed that part
of the crew concerned with the direction of the tank's fire: the
tank commander, the gunner, and the loader. This portion of the hull
usually contains most of the ammunition and communications equipment
of the tank.
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(c) Engine Compartment.
The engine compartment, located directly to
the rear of the. fighting compartment, is separated from the latter
by a hermetically sealed bulkhead in order to protect the crew from
the toxic effect of exhaust gases and to prevent fires from spreading
throughout the entire machine. This compartment contains the engine
and certain auxiliary equipment, such as ventilators and radiators.
(d) Transmission Compartment.
The transmission compartment is located, in
most instances, in the extreme rear of the tank and contains the
various mechanisms which transmit power-from the engine to the drive
sprockets, which, when rotated, displace the tracks, causing the tank
to move.
(2) Armored Revolving Turret.
The armored revolving turret contains the basic
armament of the tank, which consists of a heavy caliber gun and one
or more machine guns. In modern tanks the turret is a single casting
and provides fire mobility in the horizontal plane by revolving on
ball bearings through a complete circle. The horizontal rotation of
the turret can be controlled either manually or by means of an elec-
tric ar $ydraulic motor.
(3) Armament.
The main srmament of the tank usually is mounted
in an armored shield, or mantelet. It is possible to turn the mantelet
an its trunnions in order to allow movement of the gun in the vertical
plane. In cases where two machine guns, are located in the turret, one
is mounted coaxialZ,y with the tank gun in order to assist in laying the
main gun on the target. The second gun is usually mounted on top of
the turret and is used for antiaircraft defense as well as for fire on
ground targets.
(~+) Engine and Transmission.
The engine in modern tanks is of the internal
combustion type -- either a gasoline or a diesel engine. .Because
of the basic characteristics of internal combu.atio:n engines, the
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crankshaft cannot be connected directly to the driving wheels or
drive sprockets of the tank. Some auxiliary mechanism such as the
transmission is required in order to vary the speed. of .movement in
conformity with road conditions. The transmission may be a mechan-
ical type, or it may employ fluids in varying degrees, as in hydrau-
lic transmissions, torque converters, or cross-drive transmissions.
In arty event, the power is transmitted from the engine .through a
mechanical or fluid gear assembly to.the differential and, by means
of the final drive assembly, to the drive sprockets.
(5) Suspension System.
The suspension system consists of the running gear,.
suspension arms, and springs. The. running gear consists of those parts
providing for the actual movement of the vehicle, such as the tracks;
the drive sprockets; the guide wheels (idlers), which guide the tracks
and prevent them from falling. off; the bogie wheels (road wheels), by
means of which the hull rests on the tracks; and the support (return)
rollers, which keep the upper segment of the tracks from sagging. .The
suspension arms connect the hull-with the bogie wheels... The. springs
protect the hull from the shock caused by movement of the vehicle over
rough terrain.
b. Assault Guns.
Assault guns generally are built on a tank chassis and,
like. tanks, have armor, armament, and tracked motive power. An assault.
gun, however, has more powerful armament than a tank in the. same weight
class. The increase in gun size necessitates a redistribution of
weight and makes it impossible to use a turret. The lack of a turret
leads to a decrease in fire mobility: that is, in the rapidity with
which fire can be shifted from one target to another. To compensate
further for the increase in armament weight, armor must be sacrificed
by a reduction in armor thickness ar by the elimination of all armor
#'rom less vulnerable places. The machine gun, when carried by an
assault gun, serves primarily as a means of self-defense rather than
as an instrument of attack. Therefore, machine guns either are
completely lacking in an assault gun or are considerably fewer. than
in a tank. ;The assault gun differs from a tank in its tactical employ-
ment as well as in its construction.
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B. Development of the Industry and the Product.
1. Prewar. 2~
The Red Arrr~y became acquainted with tanks for the first
time in lglg, during the civil war, when it captured a French Renault
tank from White Russian forces. In the fall of lglg the Soviet of War
Industry decided to construct its own tanks, using the captured Renault
as a model.
Plans for the construction of this Soviet Renault tank were
completed in January 1g20, and production began. in :February at the
Sormovo plant in Gor'kiy, now the Gor'kiy Krasnoye Sormovo Plant No. 112
imeni Zhdanov. The armor was produced by the I~horskiy Steel Plant
imeni Gor'kiy in Kolpino near Leningrad; the engine was manufactured by
the AMO (Moskovskoy Automobil'noye Obshchestvo) plant in Moscow, now
the Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Stalin; and the other parts were made by
the Sormovo plant . Assembly of the: first tank be ga,:n at Gor' kiy in
August 1820. So many problems were encountered.tha~t it was November
before the tank-was ready for testing,-arid-December before it was
actually delivered. Thus some 15 months were required for the produc-
tion of this first Soviet tank. By March 1g21, 15 of these 7-tong
3~+-horsepower (hp)~ gasoline-powes?ed units armed with a 37-milli-
meter (mm) gun had been produced. Thereafter, however, .production was
suspended as a result of the rapid mechanical failure of these units
in the field.
Large-scale production of tanks began in the USSR in 1827,
when the MS-1 (small escort). tank appeared. This-tank was in many ways
similar to the Renault tank, although embodying certain Soviet innova-
tions. One special feature was the location of almost all of the final-
drive components in the same housing with-the engine,-with a resulting
econorr~y in space. The MS-1 was the last Soviet tank to use a "tail,"
ar open framework, on the rear to aid the tank in crossing obstacles.
During the .late 1g20's, extensive e:xper:Lments were conducted,
to develop an original: tank design. The appearance of the T-2~+ tank in
~ Weights of Soviet tanks are given in metric tons, customarily and
throughout this report.
~' Horsepower of engines represents brake horsepower, customarily
and throughout this report.
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1930 was a direct result. The T-2~+ carried 20-ram armor, a ~+5-mm gun,
and four machine. guns and weighed 18.5 tons. One of the novel features
of the T-2~+ was its three-level armament. In addition to hull armament,
a small top turret rotated independently of the main turret, thereby
making it possible to fire simultaneously in different directions.
however, the increased height of the tank and the inevitable effect
which the rotation of one turret had on the aiming of the other rendered
this design unsatisfactory.
During the period of the First Five Year Plan (192$-32), the
Soviet tank industry, conscious of its own backward technology, strove
to assimilate foreign experience in the-field and to adapt its designs
to the capabilities of the automotive and tractor industries, which were
growing rapidly. Tank development in the West during this period was
featured by two different tendencies. French military authorities
conceived the tank as a mobile fort which could advance with the infantry.
Therefore, they constructed small, slow-moving escort tanks and -
ponderous powerfully armed and armored vehicles. UK and US military
authorities saw tanks as modern cavalry and concentrated on highly
mobile, thinly armored vehicles with comparatively weak armament. Forced
to choose between the two concepts, Soviet authorities selected that
of the UK and the US, which they held to be technically the more
advanced.- They reasoned that increasing the speed of a tank was a
much more complex problem than that of strengthening the. armor. Ta
achieve high mobility, the designer had to solve all the problems
inherent in the use of a powerful engine and a gear and suspension
system capable of standing up under high speeds. According to a Soviet
source, "Tt behooved Soviet tank construction to follow the path of
constructing light, fast vehicles in order that later it might find its
own independent means of combining high mobility with powerful armor
and armament." Following this principle, the Soviet industry .during --
the 1g30's proceeded with the development of very small tanks, as well
as light, medium, anal heavy types.
The manufacture of~ very small tanks,. or tankettes, was fore
the most part based on automobile construction (with automobile engine,
transmission, and differential) and was begun with the production of
the T-27 tankette (1932). The T-27, patterned after the British Carderi-
Lloyd tankette, combined one machine gun and 6-mm to 9-mm.armor with a
speed of ~+5 kilometers (km)-.per hour and a weight of 2.8 tans.
Tankette design took a turn toward amphibious tanks in this
period,`-and in 1932 the Soviets produced the 3.5-ton T-37, which was
_ 7
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followed in 1935 by the very similar T-38. Still a third amphibious
tank was released in 1940. This was the T-40, with 15=rrun armor,. two
machine guns, and a weight of 5.8 tons.
The experimentation came to a close with the onset of
World War II, when Soviet authorities recognized the necessity for
heavier armor and armament. This necessity precluded the use of
amphibious tanks and also halted the general use of tankettes by the
USSR ,
The first Soviet light tank of the 1930's (1932) was the
T-26, which was patterned after the British 6-ton Vickers model. The
T-26, with one 45-mm gun and one machine gun, had 15-mm armor and
weighed 8.6 tons.
The high-speed wheeled-tracked BT light tank, based on a
Walter Christie design, also appeared. in 1932 and soon became standard
in Soviet tank units.. This vehicle possessed 15-mm armor, one 45-mm
gun, and one machine gun and weighed 13 tons. Utilizing an interesting
wheel-track combination, it was capable of 72 km per hour on wheels and
53 km per hour on tracks.
In 1941 the light tank T-60 appeared. This vehicle was
virtually identical with the previously mentioned amphibious T-40
but was not amphibious. A further development of the T-60 was the
light tank T-70 which was heavier and more powerfully armed. The
T-70 carried a 45-mm gun and weighed 10 tons.
Like their predecessors, the T-60 and !P-70 tanks were
designed and built in a manner similar to the automobile. This
similarity made possible the use of mass production methods and was
to be of great value at the beginning of World War II, when the
basic tank industry was transplanted to Eastern USSR. Be-cause of the
increased weight of the T-70, two automobile engiriE~s were installed
in series to supply greater power. The light tank series proved to
be too vulnerable, however, and the chassis was utilized as a basis for
the creation of assault guns as the need for them became apparent
during 1941-42.
.Simultaneously with the continuous refinement and adapta-
tion of foreign designs to Soviet specifications, the tank industry
made considerable advancement toward its awn original designs. In
1933-34 the medium T-28 and the heavy T-35 were produced. The three-
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turreted T-28 with 20-mm armor was armed with one 76-yarn gun and four
machine guns. This tank had a crew of six and a speed of ~+0 laa per
hour. The five-turretedt 50-ton T-35 had 22-mm armor and was armed
with one 76-mm gun,-two 45-mm guns, and six machine guns. With a
crew of nine, this vehicle was capable of 32 km per hour. Externally
these two tanks resembled their respective British relatives, the
16-ton Vickers and Independent tanks. The internal machinery, how-
ever, was of Soviet design.
hrnnediately before the outbreak of World War II the Soviet
tank industry produced its own completely original designs: the 32-ton
medium-tank T-3~+ and the ~+7-ton heavy tank KV. These two tanks incor-
porated certain improvements in design and technology. The use of
steel castings in the manufacture of turrets and hull components greatly
expedited mass production, marking the first use by the Soviets of
castings-for this purpose. The fact that the T-3~+ and RV had excellent
cross-country performance characteristics in spite of their considerable
weight was a result of using extremely wide tracks in order to distribute
the ground pressure over as wide an area as possible. Powerful diesel
engines were installed in these tanks for the first time in arty mass-
produced-Soviet. tanks. Their use not only provided a high unit power
rating for these models (17.5 horsepower per ton for the T-3~+ and
1~+.5 horsepower per ton for the KV) but also meant an appreciable
reduction in fuel consumption in comparison with gasoline engines. In
addition, the fire hazard occasioned by the use of gasoline engines
was greatly reduced. It is also worth noting that the RV was the first
Soviet-tank to utilize the torsion bar suspension system st-ill in wide
use today.
2. Wartime.
The saga~of the tank industry during World War II is an eye-
opening indication of Soviet industrial capabilities. The- rapid advance
of the German. armies into the western part of the USSR in 19+1 resulted
in the loss of two of the largest tank plants (at Stalingrad and
Kharkov) and rendered a third useless (at Leningrad). These three
plants-had accounted for nearly 60 percent of prewar capacity. ~ In
spite of these reverses, the Soviet industry was able to produce
7,400-tanks in 19+1. ~+~ With personnel and equipment evacuated in late
1941 to the Urals area -- to Nizhniy Tagil, Chelyabinsk, and Sverdlovsk --
and to Omsk, in Siberia; it produced in 1942 14,500 tanks.-and 50 assault
guns, or double the 1941 output. 5~ In 1943, production rose- to 20,350
tanks and'-2,500 assault guns and increased further in 1944 to a high point
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of 16,700 tanks ,and 7,500 assault ~,nans, or some 330 percent of 19+1
production. 6/
This industrial feat was accomplished inn spite of the loss
of plants, skilled labor, and equipment-and in spite of the chaos in
the supply of raw materials and components. Production was further-
complicated by the fact that the development of heavier antitank weapons
and heavier tank guns necessitated a constant increase in armament size
and armor weight. ~ As a result, there were frequent model changes
which required more raw materialper unit. In many cases, equipment used
for the earliest production was not suitable for the construction of
later models, for the new Soviet tanks and assault guns- were afar cry
from their much less-complicated and lighter forebears.
The 76-mm armament. of the original KV heavy tank soon
proved to be too light and was replaced by an 85-mm gun. .The KV-85
was closely followed by .the Joseph. Stalin I (JS-I), which went into
production. late in 19+3. The hull and suspension system of the JS-I
were similar to the KV type, but the JS-I carried a 122-mm gun mounte d
in a massive cast turret. By the end of 19+4 the JS-IL appeared, .and
early in 19+5 appeared the third in this series, the JS-III,~characterized
by the distinctive compound obliquity of the front, or glacis, plate.
The JS-III participated in the assault an Berlin, Even in the postwar
period it is considered by many to be the finest heavy tank in the
world.
The T-3~+ medium tank proved extremely successful in the
early days of the war.. German antitank weapons. were too light to stop
this tank from fulfilling its combat mission. 10/ In 19+3 the first
modification appeared. -This was the T-3+/85, or T-~+3, which substituted
an 85-mm gun for the T-3~+'s 76-mm gun. The second modification, the
T-4~+, appeared in 19~+~+. It incorporated several changes, including a
lower silhouette, more frontal armor, and a better system of removing.
powder gases from the turret.. This vehicle saw combat early in
19+5. 11
Soviet experimentation in the field. of assault guns had been
very limited prior to World War II, and the value of such weapons was
not fully appreciated until the Soviet winter offensives of 19+1-~+2. 12
In early 1943, serially produced .assault guns appeared for the first
time. The SII-76 assault gun mounted a 76-mm gun on the T-70 medium
tank chassis. Soon thereafter, a series of assault guns. appeared which
paralleled tank development and utilized the same chassis as the tanks.
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Thus, in the medium field, the T-3~+ chassis .was the basis for the SU-$~
{$5-mm gun),.-the SU-122 (122-mm gun), and the SU-100 (100-mm gun.), which
is the present standard issue medium assault gun. In the heavy field
the KV chassis served as a basis for the JSU-122 and for the present
standard, the JSU-152. 13
3. Postwar.
The postwar development of the tank .and assault gun industry
may be divided into three periods. The first period extended .from the
cessation of hostilities in 1g~+5 until the spring of 1g~+7. It was
characterized by.,the partial or total reconversion of plants-that had
been producing tanks and assault guns to the production of civilian
articles and by extensive salvage operations. l~+ During this period
a basic division of productive capacity was made between civilian and
military items at the plants selected to continue tank and assault gun
production. The second activity of this period, the salvage operation,
has done perhaps more than any other single factor to cloud the picture
of developments in this industry. At the cessation of hostilities,
great quantities of equipment of all types were strewn over the land-
scape from Central USSR to Berlin. A program was initiated to salvage
this equipment for its scrap value and to create serviceable items of
equipment by cannibalization wherever possible.. In many cases, only
some casting and. welding facilities were required, together with the.
necessary crane capacity.. Since transportation was at a premium,
these vehicles were taken to the nearest plant possessing the necessary
facilities. This salvage activity gave rise to the many prisoner-of-
war reports listing practically every metallurgical plant in this area
as a "tank plant" and has complicated intelligence treatment of the
industry ever since. 15
The second period extended from the spring of 19+7 until
the spring of lg~+g. 16 This period was taken up by the organization
of the reconstituted industry and the reconstruction of plants in
areas occupied by the Germans. The introduction of new methods and
techniques that had been learned in the war but .which were too exten-
sive to initiate without interrupting war production was undertaken,
as well as the establishment of more economic supply lines for
component and raw materials than had been possible under wartime
conditions. The basic items of production at this time continued. to
be the T-~+4 (and~or other modifications of the T-34$5) and the
JS-III and the corresponding assault gun types, the SU-100 and the
JSU-152. 17 It is not ka~.own to what extent the T-~ became a
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standard production item, but either the T-~+4 or other modifications
of the T-3+/85 were serially produced until the ini;roduction of the
T-5~+ in 1g~+9.
The third and present period may be dated from May 19~+g,
when serial production of the T-5)+ medium tank was undertaken at
Nizhniy Tagil. 18/ Soon thereafter, it is bel:ieveii~serial production
of the T-5~+ was undertaken at other medium tank producing plants. The
third period was marked by an increase in tank production, as the
USSR sought to create a sufficient stockpile o:P new medium tanks to
replace the aging and, by their standards, obsolete T-)+~+, T-~+3, and
T-34 mediums which were still either stockpiled or in the hands of
troops. lg/
C. Interrelationship with Other Manufacturing Industries.
Before World War II the automotive and tractor industries were
paramount in their contribution of finished and semifinished parts to
Soviet tank production. The automotive industry furnished the engine
and drive mechanisms, and the tractor industry contributed the suspen-
sion system. The hulls and turrets were const:ructesd from a number of
comparatively light steel plates which were bolted or welded together.
Most of -the tank parts were quite similar to automobile and tractor
parts-and, therefore, did not exceed the capacity cif foundries,
forges, cranes, and machine tools in these.pla:nts. 20
The development of this industry and its product during
World War II and in the postwar period has radically altered the
position of the tank and assault gun industry in the economy of the
USSR. Automobile engines,' even when employed in-series as in the
SU-76 assault gun (the last to use a gasoline engine), proved to be
inadequate in supplying the power needed for speed and cross-country
mobility. The armored vehicles of today employ specially constructed,
powerful, light-weight diesel engines of almost 1,000 hp. Instead
of a number of individually light armor plates weighing perhaps
1,000 pounds apiece,. modern tanks must have heavy castings weighing
10 or 15 tons apiece.- 21/ The traci;ox suspension systems could not
support the weight of-these modern monsters, nor could the light
automotive drive"mechanisms adequately handle the power required to
maneuver them. Only plants with the heaviest .equipment can satisfy
tank and assault gun requirements, for they alone possess the required
foundries, forges, cranes, and machine tools.
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The interrelationship of the tank and assault gun industry with
the tractor and automotive industries no longer exists. It is to the
locomotive plants and heavy equipment plants that the observer should
look for the production of modern Soviet tanks and assault guns. At
the present time, Soviet tanks-and assault guns are produced in two
heavy equipment plants, a locomotive-plant, a railroad car plant, a
mining machinery plant, and in buildings at Chelyabinsk specifically
built far tank production.
D, Organization of the Industry.
Little information concerning the organization of the Soviet tank
and assault gun industry is available. When the bits and scraps of
information available are coupled with the general pattern of Soviet
industrial organization, however, it is quite logical to assume that such
production is administered by an organization subordinate to-the Ministry
of Transport Machine Building of the USSR.
The-tank industry started out under the auspices of the Soviet
of War Industry in-1919. 22~ Little or no information is available
concerning the organization of this industry during the 1920's and early
193o's. In 1937, and probably for some years previous, tank production
was the province of the Peoples' Commissariat of Heavy Industry, which,
in August 1937, became the Peoples' Commissariat of Machine Building.
A decree of the Supreme Soviet dated 5 February 1939 subdivided this
commissariat into three independent commissariats for heavy, medium,
and general machine building. In 19+2 the Peoples' Corrunissariat of
Medium Machine Building became the Peoples' Commissariat of Tank
Industry. 23~
? The Peoples' Commissariat of Tank Industry consisted of several
chief directorates, of which German. intelligence identified only a chief
directorate of supply and a transportation unit. 2~+ The supply organiza-
tion saw to it that the plants had an adequate supply of rew materials,
machine tools, fuel, and so on, and maintained a number of regional
offices to coordinate that supply. 25 It is logical to assume the
.existence of a chief. directorate for production, or some similar office,
responsible for the actual production. of armored vehicles.
On 15 October 19+5 the tank commissariat disappeared again into
a Peoples' Commissariat of Transport Machine-Building. In March 19+6
this organization assumed its present name, Ministry of Transport Machine
~ .See Appendix A, Gaps in Intelligence.
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Building. 26~ This ministry is known to contain, among others, chief
directorates for the production of locomotives, rai:Lroad cars, and
diesel engines. 27~ There seems little doubt ghat :it also has a chief
directorate for tank production.
Centralization of production is one of 'the principal characteris-
tics of the physical organization of tank and assau:Lt gian production in
the USSR as contrasted with the US, where production is extremely
decentralized. The US assembly plant does little more than combine
completed components and subassemblies int-o the finished product. Thus
a part such as the tank turret is cast in a foundry, shipped to a machine
shop miles away for machining,after which it travels additional miles to
the final assembly plant. For example, it was recently stated that one
US tank track manufacturer has 23 subcontractors. 2t3~ The dispersion of
production in the US is based upon a highly developed degree of specializa-
tion facilitated by excellent transportation facilities. A Soviet tank,
on the other hand, almost literally develops from the iron pig to the
finished product in one spot. The iron is made into steel, the steel is
cast into the form desired, this casting is machined, the finished casting
is incorporated into a subassem~ily, and the various subassemblies are
incorporated into the finished product, all in one plant. 29~ With the
exception of the armament and the engine, very .little is subcontracted.
During World War II, there were less than 100 plants in the USSR engaged
in any way in the manufacture of tanks and~or tank parts.
An examination of the methods and techniques used in the USSR in
tank and assault gun production is essential to a complete understanding
of the capabilities of this industry and to a prope_~ evaluation of intel-
iigence information concerning armored vehicle :production.
Soviet assembly methods underwent a radical change during
World War II. During the first part of the war the workers moved rather
than the work. Several hulls were lined up in an assembly hall, and
the various components were introduced into these stationary hulls,
as illustrated in Figures 1 to 5.~- 30~ There was.oilly a limited
specialized division of labor; groups of workers moving from tank to
tank welded the hull, installed the electrical systc?m, mounted the
Figures 1 to 5 follow this page.
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Figure 1. Tank Hull Construction on the KV-1 Tank at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant. hoto-
(Note the use of the cutting torch in the foreground. This and the following p
graphs illustrate the preassembly line era of Soviet tank construction.)
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Figure 2. Mounting the Turret on the KV-1 Tank at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant.
(Note the radiators stacked at right rear.)
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Figure ~+. Completed KV-1 Tanks Being Removed from the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant by Soviet
Army Crews.
(Note the noncommissioned officer in the foreground with acceptance papers in hand.
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Figure 5. Completed KV-1 Tanks Standing at Chelyabinsk.
(Mechanical and Assembly Division 1 of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant appears in
right rear.)
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suspension system, and so on. however, in 1943-44 a drastic change
occurred with the installation of conveyor assembly methods and a
further specialization in the division of labor. Thereafter the
work moved, and component parts were fed to strategic points along the
assembly line and introduced into the tank as it moved along. Workers
at the same time became increasingly specialized. Needless to say, the
new method was a much more efficient way of doing things, and mar~y~
Stalin prizes were awarded for its "discovery." 31
A postwar technical innovation, widely used in the West, has
been recently reported at the Soviet Army tank repair shops at
Kirchmoeser, in East Germany. This innovation is the installation of
a vertically revolving cradle for the tank hull, by means of which
gravity welding may be used at arty point on the hull. Although its use
in the USSR proper has not yet been reported, there is little doubt
that it is being used. 32/
The Soviet industry has followed Western example also in making
increased use of automatic welding under flux, a technique which increases
the welder's efficiency five or six times and produces excellent welds.
Ry the end of World War II this process was in use at all plants in the
USSR. At one of the largest Soviet tank plants, one-fourth of all hull
welding and slightly less than one-third of all turret welding was done
by automatic welding machines. The use of automatic welding in tank
construction has undoubtedly increased in the postwar period. Mention
was made in 1950 of the development of coiled electrode welding, in
which the electrode is fed to the welding area from a coil mounted in
the welding machine. 33/
There has been an increase in the size of castings used in tank
construction in the USSR (as in the US). A Soviet writer mentioned in
19+7 that the casting of complete hulls has been undertaken "recently." 34/
The US introduced complete hull castings in the mass production of tanks
late in World War II. Use of these large castings reduces drastically
the amount of welding required. There is also less scrap loss, because
less machining is required.
The Soviet industry, even during World War II, possessed an
excellent method of bonding rubber tires to road wheels, a method which
may be found superior to US practice when more details are available. 35/
Another interesting innovation is the extensive ,use of aluminum castings
in the diesel engine. For example, the block and crankcase are of
aluminum. 36/
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A recent analysis of a captured T-~+3 (T-3+/85) Soviet tank
produced some interesting conclusions. 37/ Generous use had been made
of alloy steels and other quality materials.. Manufacturing techniques
were adequate. Finishes on nonessential surfaces were found to be
excessively crude by US standards. A high degree of precision had been
used in machining essential working parts. There wa,s much evidence of
comprehensive and detailed knowledge of the latest manufacturing
techniques. This high level of technique, however, was not consistently
applied in actual production. This inconsistency illustrates a very
important point applicable to this industry: although Soviet research
and development often may equal and on occasion may surpass US research
and development, the application. of techniques t;o mass production
suffers by comparison with US practice.
B. Postwar Production.
A definitive estimate cannot be made of postwar production of
tanks and assault guns in the ITSSR, because of gaps in available informa-
tion. However, research has disclosed enough information to indicate the
probable magnitude of the Soviet effort in this field.
.The first step in the consideration of postwar production
is to e"stablish which plants actually have been engaged in tank and
assault gun production. Since World War II, nearly every heavy industrial
installation has been reported at one time or another to be engaged in
such production. It is first necessary, therefore, to assemble all the.
information available and to evaluate each plant in order to determine
whether the plant is capable of producing tanks and whether or not it
actually has been engaged in such production since World War II. The
evaluation of some plants indicates that. they produce only components. 38
Others became associated with tanks during the general salvage period
following the war. 39/ In other plants, tanks were received to be
scrapped. ~+0/ Some plants did not have the equipment necessary to produce
tanks. For example, a plant in Novaya Darnitza has soften been reported
as a tank plant. Investigation shows that this plant did not have forge
and foundry facilities capable of handling large tank parts and that in
fact it was a tank repair plant. ~ In. this manner the field has been
narrowed to a few plants which are capable of producing tanks or assault
guns and are believed to have been, in fact, producing them since
World War II.
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An exhaustive study of the plants considered to-have engaged
in postwar production d~.scloses certain pertinent facts which have a
bearing on such production. In the first place, each plant was histor-
ically a part of a larger industrial complex which utilized common trans-
portation facilities and various other minor facilities for the production
of several different end items. Duxing the war these complexes produced
tanks and~or assault-guns and other military products:. In the postwar
period the complexes in question have produced tanks and~or assault guns
together with civilian products. It should be noted, however, that the
plant producing tanks and~or assault guns was and is for all intents and
purposes a separate entity with its own management, labor force, equip-
ment, and supply system. 42~ For this .reason the "multimodel confusion
factor," or the confusion and resultant loss of production caused by
trying to produce different products in the same plant and over the same
lines of equipment, does not apply here. Certainly the utilization of a
single rail system and certain common facilities such as storage areas
for coal and other raw materials -- as well as the mere fact of close
proximity -- causes a certain amount of confusion and inefficiency. How-
ever, this is a problem the USSR faced both before and during the war,
and it can be safely assumed that production in a particular plant of
the complex is influenced by this factor no more. now than it was then.
It .also has-been determined from a detailed examination of each plant
that,. although certain modifications have occurred since World War TI;
these modifications-were designed to make each smaller segment of -the
wartime plant more self-contained and more efficient. For example, a
new tank diesel engine production shop was built at Chelyabinsk so that
the tractor engine shop could return to its prewar location. ~+3~ However,.
changes in components facilities aside, no radical expansion of tank
assembly line capacity is known to have occurred during the postwar
period in any of .the plants listed.
2. Postwar Rates of Production.
If it is known how many units were produced by a plant
during a given period of World War II, and if it is known that such
production then required a certain number of assembly lines of a certain
capacity, and if it is?knawn that certain of these assembly lines of
known capacity-have been engaged in the same production at a given-
time since World War II, then,. all-other conditions remaining the-
same (including the same relations ip of production-to capacity , it
is possible to calculate the number of units produced during this
given time. That is, if a given number of identical assembly lines
could produce a certain number of units per month in World War TI;
then, if conditions have not changed since World War II, a smaller
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number of assembly lines can. now produce a proportionately smaller
number of units per month. Since .the Nizhniy Tagil ]3ailroad Car
Plant, for example, is known to have produced 21 tanks per day from
3 identical assembly lines during .its peak sustained production
period during World War II, it seems logical to conclude that, so
long as the same conditions prevail, each of those 3 lines, if
producing in the postwar era, is producing 7 tariKs per day.
Detailed information on Soviet production rates during
World War II and on the number-and characteristics of assembly lines in
the various plants was obtained from the intelligence files of the German
Army High Command in World War II (OKH Fremde Heere Ost). The German
estimate of production rates was arrive~~ at by-three different methods --
25X1BOb
Stalin stated in 19+6 that. the Soviet tank industry had'
produced an average of 30,000 tanks, mechanized vehicaes, and armored
.cars during the last 3 years. of the war, or a total of 90,000 units. ~+~+~
German calculations for 19+3, 19+4, and early 19+5 plus the writer`s
calculations for the remainder of 1945 show a total production of -some
65,000 tanks and assault guns. This production leaves 25,000 other
mechanized vehicles and armored cars to be produced over-the 3-year period
to bring the total up to Stalin':s not unambiguous figures. This figure
checks against German information. an Soviet armored car and mechanized
vehicle production during World War-II. 45~
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b. Calculation of Postwar Rates.
(1) State of Information.
The foregping investigation has established what i~s
believed to be an accurate portrayal of the characteristics of each
Soviet assembly line and the actual number of tanks or assault guns
produced by each individual line during World War II. Direct intel-
ligence information has permitted the determination of the status of
these assembly lines in the postwar period up to the beginning of
1950. That is, it has been ascertained which lines have been producing
tanks and assault guns since 19+5 and when the assembly lines not
retained for such production were converted to.the-assembly of other
items. The status and essential characteristics of each wartime
assembly line in the postwar period will be discussed in detail below.
As already noted, German information gives the rate of production of each
assembly line during World War TI. Since it has been established which
lines were in actual production in the postwar period, it is possible to
calculate the number of units which were produced from 19+5 through. 19+9,
if the conditions prevailing in the industry during the war have not
changed.
There is a great deal of information strongly
indicating that in one important respect-the industry continued to
operate in the postwar period on the same. basis as in World War Ii --
the labor force that was. engaged in the manufacture of tanks and
assault guns continued to work around the clock, though on the basis
of three 8-hour shifts rather .than on the World War II basis of two
12-hour shifts. Evidence to this effect is available for. the period
1~~+6-~+g. ~+6~ Although such evidence, taken by itself, does not show
conclusively that World War II rates of production have been maintained
to date,. it is a Strang indication that the USSR has been trying to
utilize these facilities to the utmost..
There is very little direct intelligence informa-
tion on tank. and. assault gun production from 1950 up to the present
time; this ]_ack of information is an important gap in US intelligence.
Although. little direct information .s available on tank plants for the
period 150-51, however, direct information is available on the other.'
plants in the complex which replaced the World War II plant. This
information provides a basis for indirect deductions concerning tank
or assault gun production in this period. F'or exainpl.e, as of
l January 150, the fitizhniy Tagil Railroad Car Plant: had two railroad
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car assembly lines and one tank assembly line in operation. ~+7~ Certain
possibilities exist concerning the operations of this complex since
tha"t date:
(a) Production of tanks has completely ceased,
and the tank assembly-line is idle.
(b) Production of tanks has completely ceased,
and-the tank assembly line is being utilized.
for railroad car production.
(c) Production of railroad cars has completely
ceased, and the railroad car asserribly.lines
are producing tanks.
(d) Production of railroad cars has completely ceased,
and the railroad car lines are idle.
(e) The tank assembly line and~or the r:~,ilroad car
lines are producing some other products...
The information available on this plant for the period from 1950 to
the present. indicates-that railroad_ car production continues at
approximately- the same "rate as in 1.9+9. ~+8~ This i~~.formation makes
possible the elimination. of possibilitie s (b) through: (d) cited above..
There is no evidence"that another product is being produced in these
plants. This.-leads to the 'following hypothesis. The tank assembly
lines in the various:plarits which. were producing tanks or assault
guns in 19+9 are producing this product at .pre sent. or they are standing
idle. It cannot logically be assumed that these assembly lines are
standing idle,. in view of the announced Soviet intentions of utilizing
labor and equipment to the utmost. ~+9~ Consequently, it .seems logical
to assume that these lines continue to produce tanks or assault guns.
Nor does it seem likely, in view of the world situation, that produc-
tion on these.;lnes_has been slowed down during this"period. This
reasoning, coupled with the facts which are available, can be applied
to all the plants which were producing tanks or assault guns. as of the
end of 19.9, as will be illustrated during the discussion of each plant'
which follows..
(2-) Chief Variables.
Data from German .intelligence files furnish a fairly
comprehensive account of the Soviet tank. and assault gun industry during
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World War.II. In the application of these data to the-postwar period,
an examination must be made of possible variables, in ordex to.deter-
mine their effect upon production rates in this period. Depending
upon the magnitude of these variables and their net effect. when balanced
against one another, production from a particular assembly line may
be greater or less than during the war. Available intelligence
information is limited to the point that, although certain trends can
be indicated, no precise determination of the magnitude of-these trends
can be made. Some of these trends would tend to increase, and some to
decrease, production rates, and their net effect on assembly line rates.
or production represents the range of error in calculations made on
the'-base .of World War II praduction rates. Obviously, since the net
effect a~ these trends is unknown, no precise range of error can be
stated. It should be noted, however, that, with one exception, the
chief variables -- labor, techniques and methods, plant equipment,
product design, supply of component parts, weather, and scale of
effort --tend toward an increase in assembly line production rates.
The assumption that postwar conditions affecting production rates have
been the same~as those prevailing during the war should therefore lead
to estimates of postwar production rates that would be on the conserve-
tive side.
(a) Labor.
All of the assembly lines have been working.
three 8-hour shifts in the postwar period as opposed to the two l2-hour..
shifts worked during the. war. 50~ .The fatigue factor on an 8-hour
shift is-less than that on a 12-hour shift. Moreover, .the wartime labor
force of old men, young boys, and women has been replaced by r-eturning
veterans, who are presumably more efficient. It is conservative to
assume that the .postwar labor force is as efficient as the wartime force,
since, as indicated, the postwar group probably is more efficient.
(b) Techniques and Methods.
I The large-scale mechanization. and modernization
of Soviet tank manufacturing and assembly methods-occurred during.World
War II and is reflected in the wartime production rates which form the
basis of our calcu.7_atians. These developments, therefore, do not consti-
tutu a postwar change to be. reckoned with. 51 However, certain postwar
improvements would increase the efficiency of the assembly line, such as
the introduction of large-scale use of tank hulls-formed as a single
casting, 'which would reduce the amount of welding to be lane on.the
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line. 52 It is therefore conservative to assume that technologically
the assembly lines are as efficient as they were during the war.
(c) Plant Equipment.
Intelligence information inciicates that the
USSR is using automatic machinery to an increasing extent. 53/
Furthermore, the Soviets are turning to the use of increasingly higher-
speed cutting by machine tools. 5~+/ It is logical -to assume that these
improvements are used on tank and assault gun assembly lines. Although
this gain in efficiency would be dependent to some degree on the capacity
of the foundries and forge s. which supply inputs to the machine shops and
assembly lines, it still must be considered as increasing the efficiency
of the assembly lines as compared with wartime standards.
(d) Product Design.
The tanks and assault guns produced at present.
are larger and more complex than those of World War II, particularly in
the medium tank field. 55/ The introduction of the T-54 meant changes
with which the labor force would have to become familiar, and it is
probable that for some time this factor had a n~~gat:ive effect on assembly
rates at the various plants. There is evidence that such items of equip-
ment au stabilizing units are being installed in the various tanks. 56/
This and other developments would make the product mare complex and
correspondingly more difficult to assemble. It should be noted, however,
that this factor affects the efficiency of the assembly line only in
terms of the time required to install such a unit and not in terms of
the time required to produce it.
(e) Supply of Component Parts.
Perhaps the most important variable in calcula-
tions of postwar production rates is, the- supply of component parts.
Regardless of the efficiency of the assembly line, it cannot produce
without corriponent parts. It is known that both the plant and .the Soviet
Array have in operation within the plant inspection systems that are
designed to insure the smooth flow of production. 57/ It is known that
arty failure to fulfill the Plan has dire consequences. 58/ A drastic
failure to produce the required number of tanks or assault guns would
have caused a radical shake-up in administration, ar~d such a shake-up
has not been. reported. 59/ It is therefore conservative to assume that
the supply of component parts to the assembly lines is at least as well
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scheduled as was the case during the war, when the supply of component
parts was complicated by the evacuation of supplier and producer plants
from the combat area. 60~
(f) Weather.
Production, particularly the final acceptance
procedure, is slowed to some degree during the winter months because
of cold and snow conditions, especially at the Urals plants and at
Qmsk. 61~ However, the effect of this factor on postwar production
should not have changed greatly since the war period.
(g) Scale of Effort.
Another important question ~s whether or not
the assembly lines are being operated at less than capacity. There. is
no direct evidence either pro or con on this question. A11 indirect
evidence indicates, however, that if a line is being operated at all,
it is operated at capacity. The economy of the USSR is a planned
economy. 62~ Therefore, when it is decided by Soviet authorities that
a certain number of tanks and assault guns are to be produced during
a specific period of time, the industrial capacity required to produce
that number is specifically earmarked for such production. On balance
it seems unlikely that more capacity is alloted than is required to
fulfill the Plan. This argument is persuasive, not only because the
USSR is known to be seeking to extract the maximum from its equipment
and its skilled labor force, but also because the assembly lines pro-
ducing tanks and assault guns have been reported as working around the
clock. 63~ Therefore,- there seems to be little reason to doubt that if
a tank or assembly line is producing at .all; it is producing at full
capac it}r .
As has been previously stated, the magnitude of
each of the variables listed above and their net effect an the. rate of
production from. each assembly line cannot be determined from the Intel-
ligence data now available, On the basis of the reasons given above,
however, it seems probable that each of the wartime assembly lines is,
producing more than it was during the war. It is probably conservative,
therefore, to estimate postwar production an the assumption that the
output of each assembly line is na greater than that of maximum sustained
wartime production.
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(3) Plant-by-Plant Estimates.
There follows a discussion of each postwar producing
plant with emphasis an its tank and assault gun assembly lines, including
a detailed explanation of the derivation of the ,daily production rates
given in Table 1.~
(a) Nizhniy Tagil Railroad Car Plant No. 183
imeni Kaganovich.
The Nizhniy Tagil Railroad C,ar Plant is the
largest medium tank producer in the USSR. German sources state that
during the period of its highest sustained maximum production, this
plant produced 21 medium tanks per day from 3 identical assembly lines. 6~+~
German covert operations and prisoner-of-war sources state that it
required 97 hours for a tank starting on the assembly line to be carried
through final acceptance at this plant. 65/ From an examination of the
floor space devoted to the assembly line and from direct postwar informa-
tion, it is estimated that each of the 3 lines can accommodate 28 tanks
at one time. 66~ By dividing 97 hours by the. 28 tanks.. on the line, it is
found that the average time per tank position is 3.46 hours. The plant
has assembled-tanks on a 24-hour schedule both during the war and in the
25X1 B~~stwar period. On this basis the production of tanks at Nizhniy Tagil
was computed at 24 = 3.46 = 6.94, or, for all practiral purposes, 7 tanks
per day, from each of the 3 lines. This result checks with the German
- ana];ysis output of 21 tanks per day during the war. In the --
period June-July 1945, one of the assembly lines was Fonverted to rail-
road ear production. 67~ A second line was converted to such production
in November-December of-1945. 68~ The remaining assembly line, which
has been physically separated from the other two, has produced medium
tanks up to the present time with such interruptions as are noted and
cited in Tables 6 and 7, below. Since work has proceeded on a 24-
hour basis in the postwar period, it is calculated that on the average
seven medium tanks per day-were produced. On the ba:;is of positive intel-
ligence concerning railroad car production at this p]_ant in April and
July 1950 and in December 1951, it is assumed that the capacity applied
to tank production is unchanged. 69~
~ Table 1 follows on p. 25.
~' P'p ? 35 and 36, below.
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Swrsaary of Data for Computing Soviet Productian Rates
for Tanks and Assault Guns
Nizhniy Tagil
Chelyabinsk
Sverdlovsk
Ura]mash
Gor~kiy
183
No
No. 178
Gor~kiy No, 112
Leningrad No. 185
Kharkov No. 75
ssaul
Omsk No. 174
imeni Molatov
,
Radium Tank
Heavy Tank
Medium Tank
Heavy Assault Gun
Medium Tank
Tank-
Gun
Medium Tank
Assault Gun
Units of wartime llaily Output
21
7-8
10
0
0
3
3
b
12
Estimated Units of Present
Daily Output
7
3.5
0
b
4
0
3
b
0
Number of Kariime Production
Lines
3
2
2
0
4
1
1
1
N,A,
Estimated Number of Present
Production Lines
1
1
0
2
1
0
1
1
0
Hrnars Required to Transit
Assembly Line
97
132
100
132
100
N,A.
100
98
N,A,
Units Required to Fill
Assembly Line
28
20
20
18
18 ~
N,A,
12
2!~
N,A,
Units aY Output per Assembly
Line per 24-Hour Day a/
6.9
3.6
~ !~.$
6.5
4.3
2.9
5.9
a. Units of output per 21t-Hour Day = 24 x Units Required to Fill Line
ours Required to Transit Line
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0
(b) Chelyabinsk.Tractar Plant No. 178 imeni Stalin.
Chelyabinsk is an excellent example of three
independent plants in one combine (Kombinat). Duri~.ig World War II this
plant -- or perhaps more properly these plants -- produced heavy and.
medium tanks anal diesel engine accessories. 70 The: medium tank plant
ceased production in the spring of 19~+~+ and is ~toda~r the tractor plant
producing the S-80 tractor, while the accessories plant, Plant No. 255,
continues production in the postwar period., 71~ The Chelyabinsk heavy
........
tank plant is named for Stalin; its peak sustained production Burin 25X164dyyyyyyyyy
....................
the war was seven to eight tanks per day yyyyyyyyyy
plant a heavy tank required 132 hours to traverse the final assembly
line and final acceptance. 7~+ Therefore, the rate of production by
1 assembly line may. be computed at .132 + 20 = 6.6; ghat is, 1 tank would
come off the line every 6.6 hours. Each line-was in operation 2~+ hours
per day, and production could then be computed at 2~-E + 6.b = 3.6 tanks
per day per line. The 2 assembly lines thus produced 7.2, or, for all
practical purposes, 7 tanks per day. Information or.~ tractor production
at this plant in 1950 and 1951 indicates that the cepacity devoted to
tank production remained basically the same as it wa,s during the first
four postwar years. 75~
(c)~Gor'kiy Krasnoye Sormova Plant No. 112
imeni Zhdanov.
According to German estimates the highest sus-
tained production of the Krasnoye Sormavo plant at Gor'kiy was some
five tanks per day from each of two tank assembly lines. 76 It is
estimated that each line accommodated 20 tanks, and that as was the case
in the other medium plants,. some 100 hours were required for a tank to
traverse the assembly line and acceptance procedures in this plant. 77~
On this basis the rate of production by one line may be computed at
100 + 20 = 5; tYiat is, 1 tank would come off the line every 5 hours.
The plant worked 2~+ hours per day. Production-per line per day may thus
be ca~mputed at 2~+ + 5 = ~+.8, or approximately 5 tanks . This plant was
scheduled to be phased out of tank production. 78~ The first line was
phased .out in early 191+6, and tank production ha.d ceased altogether by
March 191+7, when the plant devoted its entire capacity to locomotive and
river craft production. 79 -There is no production of tanks at this plant
eavy tank assembly lines accommodated some 20 tanks each. 73,/ In this
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(d) Leningrad Heavy Machinery Plant No. 185
imeni Kirov.
Although one of the chief tank producers in the
prewar period, the Leningrad Heavy Machinery Plant No. 185-did not make
much of a contribution to the wartime tank and assault gun production of
the USSR. Most of the plant was evaeu~,ted to Chelyabinsk in September
181+1, and the plant buildings. were largely destroyed during the siege
of Leningrad by the Germans. 81/ After the German tide had ebbed,
reconstruction of the plant was gradually undertaken. In 191+1+ it was
assigned the repair of damaged tanks and assault guns belonging to
units on the northern front. 82/ From the scanty information available
concerning the plant during the early postwar period, it is exceedingly
difficult to determine just when this repair activity changed to the
actual fabrication of new units. From what information is available,
however, it~is estimated that heavy assault gun production started in
a somewhat desultory manner early in 191+5. 83 Production during the
early postwar period was hampered by the fact that both this plant and
its local suppliers were being reconstructed. Therefore, it is esti-
mated that the first of the plant's two assembly lines did not reach
full production .until late in 191+7; the second, not until June 1911$. 84/
Based on its repair operations and postwar plant-information, each of
these lines is estimated to hold 18 assault guns. 85/ When operating
at capacity, production of heavy assault guns in the other heavy plant
requires some 132 hours-from the start of assembly through final
acceptance. 86/ The plant is working 21F hours per day, which means that
the 18 tanks on each line would be finished in somewhat less than 6
days far a production rate of slightly over 3 per day per line.
Production has been computed on this basis for the period beginning with
June 1918, when production first reached capacity. Production in the
earlier period (191+5-1}7) was estimated in terms of the information
available concerning the rste of reconstruction of the plant, and the
estimate cannot be said to equal the accuracy of later calculations.
Detailed information which would permit a more exact calculation of
production for the period 191#5-47 is lacking. Information concerning
nonmilitary production at this planti, dated March, August, October,
and December 1950 and April and November 1851, permits the conclusion
that the capacity devoted to assault gun production remains basically
the same as in .191+9. S$
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(e) Kharkov Locomotive Plant No.e of product on
the antifriction bearing industry. 152/
B. Intentions concerning the Industry.
The intentions of the Soviets regarding the tank and assault gun
industry appear to be threefold; to continue the advances of the USSR
in armored vehicle development, to replace pre-sent tank and assault gun
holdings with more modern equipment, and to maintain sufficient operating
and potential capacity to support the Soviet Army in any operation it
might undertake.
With respect to over-all Soviet intentions, the information used
in preparing this report does not indicate-any significant trends in the
tank and assault gun industry. The rise in mediLUn tank production in
19+9 seems prompted mere by the decision. to put t;he T'-5~+ into general
production than by any specific. international developments. This indus-
try has a much higher rate of production at all times than has been the
case in the US. Although the conclusion. should not arbitrarily be drawn
that the USSR is preparing for war, it does mean that hostilities can be
initiated with much less preparation and a shorter lead time than would
be required in the US.
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APPENDIX A
GAPS IN INTELLIGENCE
The security system surrounding the production of armored vehicles
in the USSR is extremely efficient. For this reason, complete informa-
tion on the equipment and production processes employed for such produc-
tion.is lacking in many cases.. Information on the equipment and produc-
tion of military and civilian end items at the Sverdlovsk, Nizhniy Tagil,
and Chelyabinsk plants is much more abundant than such information on
Leningrad and Kharkov. Information on the ~nsk plant, and in fact on
the entire city of CLnsk, has been extremely scarce in the postwar period.
A second gap in intelligence is the lack of detailed and technical
information on tank and assault gun models other 'than the T-3~+~85?
Detailed information on the size,. method of manufacture, and composition
of the component parts. of the JS-III, JSU-152, and other models would
aid in the determination of productive capacity of the equipment
involved, and also in the more concrete identification of such parts
with a specific model.
A third gap in intelligence is a lack of information to determine
what methods are used by the USSR to maintain its sizable park of tanks
-and assault guns, what percentages are declared obsolete and destroyed,
and what success is obtained-in protecting vital parts such as wiring,
batteries, and optical equipment. Such incidents as a German panzer
division immobilized because rats ate the insulation off the wiring
systems of their Tiger tanks, and the US mothballing of Essex-class
carriers to prevent corrosion only to find that the lack of moisture
in the air destroyed the entire wiring systems, raise the question as
to whether all the tanks and assau]:t guns the Soviets expect to reclaim
f~?om stockpiles will operate when the time comes.
Finally, a decided lack of information for 195c~ and 1951 constitutes
the greatest gap of all in intelligence. Specific and detailed gaps in
intelligence have been mentioned throughout the text.
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APPENDIX B
METHODOLOGY
The. purpose of this report was to give a picture of the armored
vehicle industry and its impact on the economy of the USSR, with partic-~
ular emphasis on input factors. From the point of view of methodology,
this purpose involved the determination of the individual material
input requirements for the different models produced, and then the
determination of-the number of models of that spec if is type produced
in each of the plants involved.
There was a complete lack of detailed input inf ormation. However,
a US manufacturer had prepared an engineering analysis of the Soviet.
T-3+/85 tank..-This report, cited above in the text, approached the
tank from an engineering point of view; however, it was possible to
obtain input information from basic data given in the report. For
example, the report gave the finished weight of certain parts and
the chemical analysis of the part. With these facts it was possible
to compute the weight of the various chemical components of the part.
A total of the component weights for a particular material would then
indicate the finished weight of that raw material required for the
T-3+/85 tank. From the industrial processes known through plant
analysis to be used in the manufacture of that part in the USSR, it
was then possible to arrive at a yield percentage for that raw material
and the input factor for that raw material. In a like manner the total
inputs for the T-31+85 were derived.
The lack of detailed information on the models currently produced
necessitated allating inputs proportionately by weight in relation to
the T-31+/85 except in cases where the components were common to all
models, such as the battery, or common to other models, such as the
suspension systems.
With the individual unit inputs established, it was then necessary
to compute the number of individual units produced in each of the plants.
The methodology used to calculate production is outlined in the text, as
are other methods used in the preparation of the report.
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APPENDIX C
SOURCES AND EVALUATION OF SOURCES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
.For the purpose of correctly evaluating the sources of intelligence
used in the preparation of this report, there must be considered the
repatriated prisoner of war, the defector, or the agent who furnished
the basic information and also the collection agencies that extracted
and transmitted the information.
25X1BOad
A thorough survey of the files of the former German General Staff
and the-files of the various German Array-groups has also been made.
Whatever errors German. intelligence made in .World War Ir on the stxa-
tegic level and in the political sphere, their tactical-and operational
intelligence has proved to be quite accurate. In the case of the armored
vehicle industry, marginal notes and comments have added. to the extensive
picture availal,~le. Here again, the industrial approach with emphasis on
equipment and processes renders the time lag much less important than
woul.el normally be the case. Further information on the. German data used
and their reliability can still be obtained from the staff who prepared
the documents.
Statements in the Soviet press have been used, acrd these assume
surprising significance when seen against the background of an induc-
t-vial and operational approach.
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25X1A2g
The evaluation of collection agencies must. consist of an evaluation
of the use made by the collector of the raw material available to him,
since the anal,}rst is not in a position to gauge tYie total amount of raw
material as opposed to that exploited. To these comments it may be
added that the main deficiency in collection seem; to be a stress laid
on quantity rather than quality.
1. A.A. Antonov, Y.E. Magedovich, B.A. Artomanov, The Tank,
Military Publishing House, Ministry of Armed Forces,
Moscow, 1947. (prepared under the general editorship of
Col. General of the Armed Farces B.M. Korobkov), pp. 58=67, 96.
2. mid., PP? 58-66.
3. V.A. Malishev, Soviet Tank Designers during World War II,
Intelligence Division, GSUSA, ID 5 1590.
4.. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, Annex 1, GMDS
(German Military Documents Section , H3/818.
5., mid.
6. Ibid.
7. Malishev; op. cit.
8. mid.
9? Soviet Armored Vehicles and Anti-Tank Weapons, Intelligence
Division, GSUSA, Jun 19
lb. H. Guderian, Panzer Leader, Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 25X1A2g
1952, P? 234;
12. L.I. Gorlitskiy, Development of Soviet Assault. Guns,
Intelligence Division, GSUSA, ID 5 1590.
13. Zh. Y. Kotin, The. Soviet Heavy Tank Jose h Stalin,
Intelligence Division, GSUSA, ID 5 1590.
14. CIA IR Code 64 Files (USSR).
15. Ibid.
16. mid.
17. m1d.
1$. CIA IR Consolidation 7011741.
19? CIA. IR Code 64 Files (USSR).
20. Antonov et al., off. cit., p. 65.
21. CIA IR Code?4 Files~USSR)
22. Antonov et al. off. cit., p. 57.
23.
2~+. Ibid.
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25. OKII Weissexemplar 3644, g Jun 1944, GMDS.H3/1060.
26. Ibid.
25X1 A2g 27
28. Ibid.
2g. CIA IR Code 64 Fi~.es (USSR) .
30. cIA X4597, 14598, 14599 14600, 14602.
31. Ibid.
32.
25X1 A2g 33
34.
35?
36.
25X1A2g
37?
38.
39?
40.
41.
42.
25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1A2g
CIA estimate.
id.
Ibid.
CIA IR Code 64 Files (USSR).
Ibid.
Ibid.
CIA. IR Consolidation 8000106.
The intelligence reports listed below constitute a sampling of
the some 60,000 individual documents which were utilized in
the preparation of Tables 3 through g.
a. Nizhniy Tagil Railroad Car Plant No. 183 imeni Ka,ganovich.
USAF Treasure Island 2 13, APr 1947.
IR Consolidation 7010070.
CIA
.
OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3/81$.
b. Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant No. 178 imeni Stalin.
USAF SV Source Exploitation Form 17535, 17 Sep 1848;
17537, 11 Sep 1848.
25X1A2g
CIA. Survey of Soviet Press, 15 Mar 19+9?
25X1X7
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25X1X7
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1A2g
b. Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant No. 178 imeni Stalin (Continued).
USAF Treasure Island 1688 2 Se 1 1+g; 28~g0, 8 Dec 191+8.
rav a, 7 Apr lg 7.
Moscow News, 25 Jan 1g1+7.
USSR Home Service, 20 Mar 1g1+7.
CIA IR Consolidation 701171+1.
OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS x3/818.
c. Leningrad Heavy Machinery Plant No. 185 .imeni Kirov.
USAF SV Source Exploitation Form 111+13, 12 Jun 191+8..
USAF Treasure Island 85372 19 Apr 1951.
USSR Home Service, 22 Sep 191+7; 3 Feb 1947.
Pravda, 16 May 191+7.
Izvestiya, 2 Mar 191+7.
OKH Fremde. Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3/818.
CIA IR Consolidation 700~1~+1-3.
d. Kharkov Locomotive Plant No. 75 imeni Komintern.
USA ID 55og4>~ R-113-49, 15 Apr lg4g.
USAF Treasure Island 42611, 25 Jan 1946; 55731, 1 May .1950-
Pravda, 3 Jun 1846.
OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, Cd4IDS x3/81.8.
CIA IR Consolidation 700 705.
e. Sverdlovsk Urals Heavy Machine Building Plant
imeni Ordzhonikidze. '-'"
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25X1A2g
25X1A2g
USAF Treasure Island 91747, 3 Jul 1951,
USE'A ~2 Special Bi-wee
25X1A2g
25X1X7
25X1X7
25X1A2g
25X1A8a
25X1X7
Economic News Bulletin ,300, ~+ Sep 1946.
OHI3 Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Productions GNIDS H3~818.
CIA IR Consolidation 7001971.
43? See sources listed in note 42b.
44. Ma.lishev, op. cit.
45? GMDS files on Soviet armored vehicles..
e. Sverdlovsk Urals Hea Machine Building Plant
imeni Ordzhonikidze Continued .
CTA. IR Consolidation 70109
f. Omsk Plant No. 174 imeni Voroshilov.
Pravda, taken from SDS, BC 355.
Pravda, 16 Jan 19
46.
47.
48.
50. See sources listed in note 2.
51. Nla,lishev, op. cit.
49.
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25X1A8a
25X1X7
25X1A8a
25X1X7
25X1X7a
52. Ibid.
53. G.I. Zuzanov, Agregatnyye Stanki (Combination Machine Tools),
Moscow, 1948, 220 pp.
54. G. Bortkewitsch, et al., Auf Hohen;Touren (At High Speed),
German translation of Soviet text, Leipzig, East Germany,
1951...282 pp.
55? C1A estimate.-
56. Antonov et al., op. cit.
57.
58. Ibia.
59. lbia.
CIA BR Files.
60. CIA IR Code 64 Files (USSR)..
61. CT_A. IR Consolidation 7ao197125X1 A8a
62 . Ma,lishev, off. c it .
63. CIA FBIS Daily Report No. 21
64. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3 81
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. CIA IR Consolidation 70010070.
6$. Ibid.
69.
70. OI{H Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Pro uc ian~ X818.-
71. CIA IR Consolidation 70117T1.
72. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, Cd~S H3~81$.
73? Ibid.
CIA IR Consolidation 701.1741.
82. ~ Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3~81$.
83. CIA IR Consolidation 700.
84. Ibid.
85. id.
86. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, G~!mS H3~818.
76. OKS Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Produc on, GMDS H3/t31t5.
77. CIA IR Cansolidation 700709 .
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. I is .
$1 CIA IR Consolidation 7008143.
74.
75?
25X1X7a
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`25X1A2g
25X1A2g
S~E-C-R-E-T
87. CIA IR Consolidation 70081+3.
88
89. CIA IR Consolidation 7006705.
g0. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3/818.
91. Ibid. ?
92. GRIDS files on Soviet armored vehicles...
93? CIA IR Consolidation 7006705.
9~+. Ibid.
95? Ibid.
g6. Ibid.
97. CIA IR Consolidation 7006705.
OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3/818.
g8. CIA IR Consolidation 700 705.
99?
USAF Treasure Island 55731, 1 May 1950.
25X1X7
25X1A2g
100. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3/818.
101. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production,, GMDS H3/818.
102. Ibid.
103. CIA. IR Consolidation 7010961.
10~+. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
25X1 A2g 107.
25X1X7
108. CIA. IR Consolidation 7001971.
109. Ibid.
OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GMDS H3/818.
110.. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, (SIDS H3/818.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. CIA IR Consolidation 7001971.
11~+. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, CYNIDS H3/818.
115. CIA IR Consolidation 7011919..
116. "Military Aspects of the Economic Development in the Soviet
Bloc, 1951," Tntelli~ence Review, No. 189, Feb 1952, P? 56?
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117. CIA IR Consolidat-ion 7010070.
118. Malishev, op. cit..
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Production, GML1S x3/818.
122. CIA IR Consolidation 700709 .
123. CIA. IR Consolidation 7012829.
124. Ibid.
T25. CIA IR Consolidation 8013403.
CIA IR Consolidation 7002822.
126. CIA IR Consolidation 7011919.
127. CIA Strategic Intelligence Digest, Vol. II:I, Army Contribution,
Pp? 1-7?
128. This estimate was arrived at following informal consultation
with the Euxasian Branch, G-2, GSUSA>
129. Ibid.
130. Soviet Russian Tank and Assault Gun Park, GMDS H3/1069,
1-Apr 19 5.
131. Operations Research Olfice, Department; of Army, Survey of
Allied Tank. Casualties in World War :CI, Mar 1951.
GMDS files on Soviet tank casualties..
132. GMDS x3/871.
133?
25X1 A2g 134
135.
136. CIA. estimate.
137. Department of the Army pamphlet 30-3-.L Foreign Military Weapons
25X1A2g and E ui ment Vol. II, Armored Vehicles, 1 Mar 1951.
138.
139: 'CIA. IR Consolidation 7011741.
25X1 A2g 140 .
141. CIA. estimate .
142. G-2, GSUSA, Contribution to ORR Pra~ect 1]_0-51.
143' CIA estimate.
25X1X7
144.
145. Consultation-with I CG RR. Working papers on file.)
146. N.A. Voznesenskiy, The Economy of the USS~t during World-War II,
Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 19 , P? 5
GSUSA ID 581590.
GMDS H3/871.
OKH Fremde Heere Ost, Tank Productions GMDS H3/818.
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147.
CIA IR Code 64 Files (USSR).
148.
Ibid.
149.
Ibid. (Working papers on file.)
150.
Ibid. (Working papers an #'ile.)
See sources listed in note 42.
151.
CIA. estimate.
' 25X1 A2g
152 .
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