MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01093A000100110004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 17, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

iApprp /e4 Fo' fr a) 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP 110004-2
17 January 1952
Lq~A
This document is a working paper, The data and
conclusions contained herein do not necessarily
represent the final position of ORR and should
be regarded as provisional only and subject to
revision. Additional data or goat which may
be available to the user is solicited. This
report contains information available to CRR as
of 1 Decmber 1951 a
THIS DOCUFIENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE OP THE UNITED STATES,, WITHIN
MEANING OF TITLE 18, SIXTIONS 793 AND 794 OF THE
U. S. CODE,, AS AIEIMEDe ITS TRANSMISSION CH REVS
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UN'
AUTHO tIZED .SON IS FROHIBITED BY LAWO
,f ' ;Y-CLASSIFIED
(f59. CNRdvGcDTQ: TS S
r#4 tad flEVtcly DATA:
Uf,'iF RUVIEWEFi,
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SECURITY INFORMATION
49
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Provisional Report No 0 11
(CIA/ M FR-11)
ItCITANT SHIPPING IN THE USSR
;. .. , , UO CHAN G_ rN CLASS. [ 1
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TIAL
I. Introduction a . ? . . . . . o . ? . ? . ?
1. Historical Impoitance a ? ? a . * ' * . 0 r o o ? s a . ? a m 2
2. Development . . a a Q o o a . ? a r a a a r e 3
3 a Organisation . O ? r . a . m . . . . ... . . O a . . ? . 5
11. Volume of Traffic . .
l . Prewar
a' . . . ? ? . a . ? o a ? ? ? ? a o . m ? a a a ?
2. World War II o v ? o r o . o m . m a o m o m o o a a a 6
3 r Postwar o e ? o m a .a a . a . a O ... m a O o m a a a 6
III. Capabilities
lA
Basic Data O . ? . a . . ? a a . a . ? a ? a . a . O m a 6
a, Port Facilities and Installations a a a.? a a m A 6
b. Size, Condition, and Distribution of the Merchant
Fleet a ? ? ? ? a o ? s a ? ? ? . . a o s a ?
o Quantity and Quality of Maintenance . . . . r a ? 9
d. Efficiency of Operations . . . ? . ? ? ? ? . ? . ? 10
e. Availability of Foreign Tonnage . . . . . . . a . ... 10
2. Present Capabilities
. ? O ? ? a O a ? 'O a . ? O ? a a a 10
a. Total . ~'. O O O O O a O ? O . O O O O .] r O O O 10
b, By Areas .(1 aar~p? t O O ? O O m O O O . a a . ? ? . a 10
c t By Type of Cargo . a O O ? . t a ? . ? ? . O O O ? ? O 11
3. Potential Capabilities
as Now Construction . ?
b. Foreign Acquisitions
co
d?
a,
y
h o
I0,
Increased Charter . Q a O . . . . . . a . . a . a
Seizure of Foreign Tonnage in Soviet Ports . a a
Capture of Shipping through Occupation of Western
Areas
. O O O a O O O O O m ! 4, r . O O a . a a O O -
+~
Defections fr c the West a a a a o o a o m a a m a . 12
Diversion of Traffic to?yOther Meana . a m m . . . a . 13
Improved Maintenance and Regal' a m m o a ? m o . o a 13
Increased Efficiency of Operations a a a m a a a a 13
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IV. Materials and Manpower Requirements . . . . . . . . . . * . 14
1.
Materials . o ? . . . ?
Manpower
2. Manpower . . . . . ? . . . . . ?
14
14
a. Indirect Employment . ? . . ? . 14
b. Direct Employment . . . a . ? . ? . . ? 14
c. Skill.Distribution .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
V. Limitations, Intentions, and Vulnerabilities ? . 15 .
1. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . . . . . . . 15
2. Intentions ? ? . o . . . ? ? . ? ? . ? ? ? o ? a 17
3. Vulnerabilities ? a o ? .. . . . . . ? . . ? . ? . ? . . 18
1a. Peacetime a o r ? o o . . 's ? a ? ? . . . ? -. ? ? o 0 18
b., Wartime ? . ? o o ? a a ? ? ? a ? . o s . o . v 19
Appendix A. Gaps in Intellig nce v
App o . o ? o o ? o a ,o 0 o a o 0
endix B. Sources 0 . v o o 0 0 a. v o a o? a. o a o a
20
23
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CI,RR PR,?n
SECURITY INFORMTION
W ROM SHIPP TG IN
In contrast to the position of the USSR as a world power, the Soviet
merchant fleet ranks well down the list when compared with the merchant
fleets of other nations and is of little significance in world--vide merchant
shipping operations. On the'other hand, despite the limitations which its
modest size imposes on its potential wartime capabilities, the Soviet mer-
chant fleet is of vital importance to the USSR. Certain areas of the USSR
depend upon merchant shipping for virtuai.'ly all, of their transport require-
ments. The importance and vulnerability of Soviet merchant marine activities
are further indicated by the fact that, should the merchant fleet be damaged
or immobilized in time of war,, little of the traffic normally carried by sea
could be diverted to land routes. The overcall strategic limitations of
Soviet merchant shipping will not be surmounted until a radical change in
the nonaggressive merchant marine policy of the USSR, occurs.
Although the Soviet merchant marine is under the control of the Minister
of the Merchant Marine, the various shipping companies appear to be allowed
considerable independence in operation and to'be subject only to political
supervision and the over-all requirements of the Five Year Pleuras. The Soviet
merchant fleet, employing about 30,000 persons,, totals 1,952,822 gross reg-
istered tons ( T), of which 517,725 GRT comprise US Lend Lease vessels, The
fleet is widely distributed, 53.1,239 GRT being in the Baltic and the Arctic,
354,662 GRT in the Black Sea, and 1,087,,921 ORT In the Far East., Tonnage
,.consists mostly of cargo and c mbination ships, tankers representing only
125,150 GRT of the total. The capabilities of the USSR for expending the size
of its merchant fleet either by demestic construction or by the purchase of
vessels abroad are considered to be relatively minor. Present donestic produc
tion of oceagoing merchant tonnage is estimated to be less than 50,,E ORT
annually. Acquisition of foreign shipping through either direct purchase or
construction contracts has been negligiblsonly about 50,E GRT annually
from all sources.
The USSR has a number of excellent ports on all its seacoasts, with the
exception of the Siberian coast linee0 The Northern Sea Routs, though limited
by seasonal factors, is an important new area of operations for Soviet shipping,
and a gradual expansion of ports along the route can be expected. The princi-
pal factor limiting the capacity of Soviet ports is that many of them are ice-
bound for long periods of the year. In spite of the great strides which the
USSR has made in overcoming the physical limitations of weather upon merchant
shipping operations, lee and weather will inevitably remain a major problems,
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The Soviet merchant fleet is engaged primarily in routine operations bey
toes its own ports and those of the Soviet Bloc and Western Europe. While
ocean traffic between the USSR and foreign ports is carried chiefly by foreign.
flag ships, domestic operations are conducted almost exclusively by Soviet
tonnage., Export traffic consists generally of raw. materials and bulk products,,
while imports are largely finished goods. Little or no reliable data are
available on the volume of Soviet maritime traffic, Estimates of the present
ton-kilometer performance vary between 38 billion and 84 billion annually, the
latter figure being the probable annual goal of the Fourth Five Year Plan
(1946=50? It is estimated that the total cargo lift of the fleet is about
2 5 million long tons
Foreign-owned tonnage at present is, as in the past, a major factor in
meeting the shipping needs of the USSR. While the USSR can charter large
amounts of dry cargo tonnage, any great increase in the present rate of charter-
ing probably mould most with effective opposition from the West, In the event
of war, however, the USSR probably mould acquire a considerable amount of ton-
nage through seizure of shipping in occupied areas. Such seizure might more
than double the present size of the Soviet fleet?
The standards of operation of the Soviet merchant rime, including
mmainte ce, operating .efficiency, and other aspects of merchant shipping
activities, are well below those of the West, a situation aggravated by Con-
flicting Soviet direction and poor administration, Some dogma of Improvement
in the performance of the merchant fleet could be brought about by better main-
tens ce and repair if the Soviet authorities so desired, beat there sems to be
little likelihood that the necessary measures will be initiated in peacetime
In wartime, on the other hand, the importance of water transport to the Soviet
war effort might mace such measures imperative,
The material a manpower requires ments of the Soviet oceans going merchant
fleet appear to be substantial. Steel requisonnts are eestimatd at 46,500
metric tons annually, while the NO oil requirements were estimated in 1949
to total 924,180 metric tons annually,
The principal importance of Soviet merchant shipping in global. strategic
terns lies in the support which it could give in time of war,, In these terms
the Soviet merchant fleet represents a critical weakness. Strong military forces
cannot be transported across long stretches of open water and supported from
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Gi ~P~F ~Y
home bases without adequate shipping, The merchant fleet which the USSR now
controls is only of moderate size and, therefore, is insufficient to permit
Soviet participation in large-scale intercontinental warfare, a major wea3cness
which can be remedied only by the following:
aW Domestic construction, presently almost nonexistent;
b. Purchase of foreign tonnage, being carried out only
to a minor degree;
c. Construction in foreign yards, now proceeding at a
very slow rate; or
dp Capture and defections, in the event of rapid Soviet
advances in Western Europe.
Merchant shipping is of basic importance to the Soviet econwW, Many
areas of the USSR depend upon coastal. shipping for a major portion of their
transport requir ts, the areas along the Northern Sea Route and the Pacific
coast north of Vladivostok being particularly dependent upon coastal chipping.
In addition, there are other'areas where the loss of shipping facilities would
seriously affect the Soviet economy,, For ox mple, in areas along the Baltic
coast and the Black Sea it is probable that present rail, lines could not handle
oven minim requirements if water transport were lost,
Despite its importance to the economy of the USSR, the Soviet merchant
fleet is small in comparison with the merchant fleets of other world powers.
The ocean-going merchant fleet of the USSR, including 517,725 gross registered
tons (CRT) of US nod Lend Lease vessels, * totals 1,952,822 GRT, or about
2,7 percent of the world merchant fleet,, The Soviet fleet, however., is
occupied primarily with domestic and Soviet Bloc traffic and is of virtually
no importance in world a maritime transport operations, of which it handles
much less than 1 porcc, ,t., Roliab1?' traffic data are not available, and cstii
agates of the 1950 tonnki1ameter performance of the Soviet ocean fleet range
all the.way from 38 billion ton-kilometers to as much as 84 billion ton''
kilt deters, ins figure of 38 billion ton--? 1ometere Is belioved to bp . close
to actual performance.
2tr3ev~elnt
Russian maritime operations date from the earliest history of the
country, but merchant shipping in terms of organized operations began in 1876,
when a small fleet, financed by national subscription, was founded for the
express purpose. of reducing Russian dependence upon foreign bottom, principally
British. A substantial fleet, howc er, did not exist until after the Russo=
Japanese War in 1904., In the following decade, progress was rapid, By 1913
the fleet had goon to wal.A. over a million (tT of ocean-going ships, and there
were Russian shipping agents In ever 50 foreign cities. Despite this
* Footnote references in arabi nmaarals fifer to sources listed. in Appendix B
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progress, the Russian merchant fleet was incapable of meeting the duds made
upon it ? In 1914, for example, 92 percent of Russian exports and 86 percent
of imports were handled by foreign ships. Al The fleet was largely antiquated
when Russia entered World War I in 1914, but it consisted of about as much
oceangoing tonnage as that to which the USSR now has a clear title (see
below).
After 1917 the development of the merchant fleet became a matter of
urgency to the USSR because of the shortage of foreign exchange, the large re-
quirements for imports, and the need to export. The fleet, which had almost
disappeared during and after the Revolution, was rapidly built up by the pur-
chase of foreign ships and a little domestic construction. This enabled the
USSR to reduce somewhat its previously almost complete dependence upon foreign
tonnage, but it still depended upon foreign shipping for a major part of its
maritime transport requirements. Expansion of the merchant fleet continued
during the First (1928-32) and Second (1933?37) Five Year Plans, and by 1939
the USSR had 1,136,000 CRT of ocean shipping.
World War lI losses were substantial, and in June 1945 the Soviet-owned
merchant fleet, not. counting Lend Lease ships totaling 638,000 (itT, had declines
to 943x791 C;tT4 Including US-owned vessels, however., the USSR had much more
shipping in 1945 than in 1939. Since the end of World War II, reparations,
salvage operations, and acquis.tions from the Satellite countries have steadily
built up the merchant fleet to its present level,
The following table illustrates the size of the Soviet merchant fleet
by selected years as reported by the US Maritime Administration:
Size of the Soviet Merchant Fleet
1939,
1945-51
Cross BW4R12x9d Tome
-
T2 ame
1939
1,136,E
1945
943,79141
1946
1,238,000
1947
1,306,000
1948
4299,000
1949
1, 324, 000
1,13249000
1950
1,365,000
1951
1,435,097 p/
a. xclud.ing Lend Luse tonnage, which
in 1951 totaled 517,725 GFtT,
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3. Cruaat~eno
Although limited in scope, the available information. on governmentaal
organization with respect to the Soviet merchant fleet is quite reliable.
The Soviet ocean-going fleet is under the authority of the Ministry
of the Merchant Marine, whose Minister is assisted by five deputies. The
various Divisions of the Ministry control and direct such activities as
planning, finance, operations, inspection, and try. The merchant marine
itself is divided into three main fleets: the Northwestern, the Southern,
and the Far East fleets, These, in turn, are divided into numerous operating
companies, which appear to be responsible for activities in specific geographic
areas. Tanker operations are tinder the control of the Chief of the Tanker
Fleet within the Ministry, At least three separate tanker companies operate
in the Black and the Caspian seas.. Tankers in the Baltic and Northern areas
are under the immediate control of the Chief of the Tanker Fleet, while the
Far East tanker fleet handles such shipping in that area.
The individual companies within the various Soviet merchant flootas
apparently operate as do non-Soviet. steamship ' compaani es, including the main-
tenance of traffic and the collection of fares and freight charges The chief
difference appears to be that Soviet shipping companies must contend with the
ubiquitous transport plan and the supervision of political commissars who
scrutinize al]. aspects of operations.
The extent of control which the Soviet Navy torts over merchant shipping
operations is not py ocisely. known, but there is evidence that the anted forces
do have considerable authority over operations in certain areas such as the
Far East and the Far North. The Minister of Merchant Marine is currently
an admiral, and many naval officers hold high positions in the Ministry,
There are indications, moreover, that merchant ships always are available
to serve as naval auxiliaries whenever requirements for additional naval
tonnage arise,
Information on the volume of Soviet merchant shipping is reasonably adequate,
except for the years Imodiately proceeding World War Ii,
1,
in 1937 the Soviet merchant fleet carried 29 million metric tons of
freight and, contrary to the gaaeral impression, handled a substantial part of
Soviet foreign trade. In that year, for ample, half of all exports by water
was carried in Soviet ships, The 1931 figure, by contrast, was only 4 percent,
Soviet shipping, however, carried a smaller proportion of purely domestic trade
before World War II than at present; The . foregoing figures, from a Soviet trade
source, are believed to be accurate. 2/1
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In the prewar years, Leningrad in the northwest, Vladivostok in the
Far East, and Odessa and Batum on the Black Sea were by far the most important
ports in the USSR. Nearly half of all Soviet exports passed through Black
Sea ports, while Baltic ports handled about 75 percent of all imports, Some
trade with the large ports, however, was spread gradually between other newly
expanded ports in theca areas, to the extent that by 1939 each region of the.
USSR had increased considerably the number of its Important ports and thus
reduced many of the bottlenecks in freight movements. In the Black-Sea, for
example, the development of petroleum and ore exports was responsible for the
building and expanding of n mmerous ports stab as Poti, Batvmm, and Tuapse,
2 0 ~?
During World War II the operations of the Soviet merchant fleet were
confined largely to Lend Lease traffic in the Atlantic and in the Far East and
to. local activity in the Baltic and White seas, Use of a number of the major
ports in the Black Sea was lost for varying lengths of time, and traffic was
routed through other smaller ports in the area. The merchant marine was used
very little in regular coerce, being pressed into service to support military
operations with such uses as supply ships and armed raiders.. Probably the most
Important function of the merchant fleet was to carry Lend Lease traffic.
30 t,f
Little specific inforatiaticn is available on the postwar volume of Soviet
ocean-going traffic,. and the scanty data which have been compile are subject
to wide error, possibly as much as 25 percent or wore. It has been estimated
that, ocean freight performance amounted to 40 billion to 45 billion tong-
kilometers in 1947, The Soviet press has announced that the Plan goal
for 1950 was fulfilled by 102 percent. Estimates on the actual 1950 performance
of the Soviet merchant fleet vary widely between a lower limit of 38 billion
ton-kilometers and an upper limit of 84 billion ton-kilometers, It is believed,
however, from an analysis of data on Soviet shipping, that the lower limit, 38
billion ton kilometers, is close to. the actual performance,
III, _ ties,
,.Although the status of numerous Soviet - ships has not been reported for
some time and detailed information is not available on many port facilities, In-
formation is generally accurate and adequate for broad evaluations? A descrip-
tion of the gaps In intelligence material on merchant shipping is contained in
Appendix A.
ac e~A'^ Q 1 8s~ ~1~'~ +Jnnap
The considerable amount of basic data on Soviet port facilities and
installations is believed to be reliable.
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The USSR has a number of good ports on all of its sea frontiers,,
with the major exception of the Siberian coast. In the west on the Gulf of
Finland there is Leningrad, the leading port of the USSR. This port, severely
damaged during World War II by the long German siege from August 1941 to-early
in 1943, has largoly been repaired. Leningrad is the main terminus of Soviet
Baltic Sea traffic and accounts for half of all Soviet Imports. The city and
its surrounding area, moreover, produce almost oar=quartor of the industrial
output of the USSR, area,, which makes traffic through this port of major importance.
Leningrad also is the terminus of several of the small number of cargo and
passenger liner services of the USSR. Ships from Leningrad call at London,
Western European ports, and Scandinavian ports on fairly regular schedules.
The port of Leningrad has boon supplemented, and to some degree
supplanted, by the acquisition and expansion of tho ports along the Baltic.
Among these ports are Kronstadt, Tallin, Riga, Lspayay, and Kaliningrad. In
addition to their importance as ports for the Baltic traffic with Satellite
areas, some of these, especially Kronstadt, are of major importance as naval
bases,
In the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov there are a number of ports
of major importance to the Soviet Union, the principal ones being Odessa,
Novorossisk, and Datum, Odessa handles a large volume of general cargo for
the southwestern area of. the USSR, Novorossisk is a leading port for grain
exports, and Batum is the major oil port in the Black Sea. In addition to
these ports, Poti is important for ore exports, among them manganese, while
Tuapse exports oil. Mariupol, Kherson, and Nikolayev are grain ports, The
Black Sea ports are in relatively good condition, all major war damage having
been repaired.,
The Far Eastern ports were undamaged and have been considerably
expanded in recent years. The major port in the Soviet Far East at present is
Vladivostok, but it is likely that the building of other ports such as Sovetskaya
Gavan, Potropaviosk, Nakhodka, and Napaovo will gradually reduce Vladivostok0s
pr once. Control of the ports of Port Arthur and Dairen, nominally in
Chinese torritory, will further augment the Soviet potential for handling its
Far East maritime traffic. In the Far North the development of the Northern.
Sea Route has been a major goal of the USSR for a number of ,years. Ports,
notably Tikai and Provfdeniya, have grown up, and the continued expansion of
traffic along this route will make the ports of Mu,ank, Archangel, and
Molotovsk even more important than at present. Furthermore, a number of other
ports that in the past have been little more than anchorages along this route,
will become important ports, if present plans are carried out.
The principal factor limiting the capacity of Soviet ports is that
many of them are icebound for long periods of the Year, For example, Leningrad
is icebound for periods ranging from 15 to 20 weeks each year. Other important'
ports in the northwest also are inactive during winter. Most ports In the Far
East are closed for long periods because of ice, Vladivostok is kept open
only by the consent use of icebreakers, while other porta such as Petropavlosk,
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Sovetakaya Gavan, and gaevo remain closed, The limitations cave by
winter weather in the Far East have been offset to some degree by the ex-
tension of Soviet control over the Chinese territorial ports of Dairen and
Port Arthur, which are open all year. Black Sea ports are not greatly impeded
by ice conditions, and they too are open the year wand, although Kherson and
Nikolayev must be kept open by the use of icebreakers. Along the Northern Sea
Route, ice obviously constitutes the overriding limitation on traffic. Despite
all efforts, the navigation period still is confined to 3 or'4 months of the
year, and it is not likely that the n6 'igation season will be greatly extended.
The statistical information available on the Soviet merchant fleet
is believed to be accurate to within 10 or 15 percent. The nonstatistical
information is considered to have only a very narrow Agin of error, as the
size, condition,, and distribution of the oceangoing fleet is known with
considerable accuracy.
The Soviet merchant fleet totals 1,952,822 G tT, of which 517,725
GRT comprise US Lend Lowe vessels to which the. USSR dda%i not have a clear
title. Cargo ships and combination ships comprise the major portion of the
fleet, tankers accounting for only about 125,150 CRT, Combination ships,.
which now form an important segment of the fleet, are. especisally important
because of their adaptability for use as troop transports. However, the fleet
largely consists of old and slow vessels of small and medium size which are " _
far below maritime standards generally accepted throughout the world for economic
operation and which are too slow to compete with foreign bottoms. Seventy-five
percent of Soviet merchant vessels are under 5,000 GRT, while 95 percent are
under 7, 500 GRT. &elusion of US-owned Lend. Lease tonnage, moreover, would
raise the "under 5,000 tons" percentage even higher, Of the 104 ships in the
5,00( to 7,500-ton group, 72.are Lond Lease ships. Loss than 2 percent of the
Soviet tonnage is made up of ships over 10,000 GRT. About 57 percent of the
total tonnage, including Lend Lease chips, is over 20 years old, and about 9
percent is over 40 years old. If the US-owned tonnage is excluded, about 61
percent of the tonnage is over 20 years old and 12 percent over 40 years old.
Sixty percent of the ships are in the 10- to 12-knot category. Only 9 percent
of the ships., amounting to 13 percent of the tonnage, are capable of more than
13 knots. Of the Land Lease ships, 75 are in the 10- to 12-knot group-, and the
remaining 8 are in the group under 10 knots.
The Soviet merchant fleet is distributed as follcrus: 510,239 GRT
in the Baltic and Pdorthern Sea Route areas, 354,662 GRT in they B3 ,wk Sea, and
19087,921 CRT- in the Far East. Concentration of Soviet shipping in the
Far East has been going on steadily for several years.. , previous yes the
fleet was divided rather evenly between the three a'cnnentiond areas, and
the build ap of the Far Eastern fleet appears to have been btu;; ht about by.
fairly equal withdrawals from both the Baltic and the Black new. Analytic
of the fleet disposition reveals that most of the loge ships in the Far
East and In the Black Sea. The majority. of loge passenger ships which might
be used for troop movements are a oneenntrate a in the Par East
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The Soviet merchant fleet was coal as fuel to a greater degree
than that of any other major power, About 62 percent of the ships, represent-
ing 45 percent of the total tonnage,, depend upon coal for fuel,. There is a
significant variation in the type of fuel used, by the various Soviet fleets.
Coal is used by 60 percent of the Northwestern fleets, while only 40 percent
of the Black Sea ships depend upon coal, In the Far East, 56 percent of the
fleet uses coal. It appears that instead of converting to oil or disposing
of coal.-burning ships, the USSR, insofar as possible, has merely shifted ships
to those areas where suitable types of fuel are available. ~2 .
The Soviet merchant fleet operates primarily in Soviet and Satellite
ports,, engaged principally in routine trade operations. -Baltic Sea trade
probably accounts for the major portion of all trade, with the Black Sea trade
next in importance. A large part of the Far East fleet ordinarily is engaged
in supplying the requirements of the industrial conplexes north of Vladivostok.
Exports in Soviet ships. gsnoTally consist of such raw materials
as lumber,, grain,, and ores, while Imports largely are finished goods. The
Soviet fleet, however,, participates to only a minor degree in USSR trade with
non-Bloc areas,, for which the USSR pre omI tly uses Satellite and foreign
tonnage,
Although the present traffic level of. the Soviet merchant fleet
is not known, there probably is at least a theoretical capability of considerably
increasing performance without additions to the present fleet.. Many vessels
do not operate at maximum efficiensy? because of such probl aas poor cargo
=
has dling and inordinately long iaycups for repairs;. The capacity of the fleet
may be increasing very slowly by .l acquisitions of tonnage abroad.. These
i
?
ncs
ents,, ,however, do. not much more than retard the increasing, obsolescenc
of the present float o
C LJ9?AV~$ ~v ~s floo~t~ e~f P~aaintexz~f c
According to fairly reliable information, maintenance of the Soviet
merchant fleet is poor, being lover than the standards of Western nations.
Consequently, the actual potential of the float is limited to veil. below its
theoretical capacities 4 Press reports and articles in technical publications
constantly harp on the deficiencies of the various fleets and individual ships.
Ships operating without major ' repairs or performing excellent feats of cargo
handling are praised extravagantly,, Indicating that the Soviet authorities are
keenly aware of deficiencies and are interested in improve sent0
Actual observation of Soviet ships while In foreign ports shows
that conditions vary widely from one ship to another? While some' ships are
obviously dirty and neglected, others are clean and well cared for, One
reason for this variation, aside from the temperament and attitude of the
individual shipmaster, is the absence of repair and maintenance facilities in
various parts of the USSR, It appears that some ports lack facilities for;
even routine repairs, so that ships in those areas are in-poor condition, while
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ships operating in other areas where facilities are available are likely to
be in much better condition,
d,, ~ i cv a~f oaer+at Wag.
The operating efficiency of the Soviet merchant fleet appears at
times to be hampered by conflicting directions from various authorities. Ships
often are given Impossible tasks to perform by administrators who are far re-
moved from actual operations,, Such uninformed ' supervision greatly.,reduces
the capabilities of the fleet to perform even at the low level which the
generally poor state of the ships would permit,, Under efficient direction
the present load performance of the Soviet merchant fleet could be greatly
increased,
e, ab' o+' For?fn n,
Data on the present availability of foreign tonnage to the USSR
are only general in nature, but fairly accurate statistics probably could be
obtained,
Zn.recent years, foreign-flag tonnage has been a major factor in
meeting the shipping requirements of the USSR,, Despite the efforts under the
various Five Year Plans to make the Soviet economy self-sufficient, the USSR
still depends upon foreign ships to carry almost all of its foreign trade with
non=Cc unist areas, They USSR, uses its am and Satellite ships primarily
for domestic traffic? while foreign flag ships are used principally for trade
between non-Bloc countries and the Soviet Bloc, The present employment of
foreign tonnage by the USSR can be estimated only very roughly,, with a margin
of error possibly as high as 50 percent, Estimates of foreign tonnage now under
a%harter to the USSR n for example,, range from 200,000 to 500f,CC0 GRT,
National policies and the attitudes of private shipping interests
in the charter countries toward the chartering of shipping to the USSR are
the determining factors in the as unt of such tonnage made available,
2, seint Cam ts,'
XQa
The total lift capabilities of the Soviet merchant fleet have been
estimated at about 2.3 million long tons, IV This over-mall figure is based
upon the actual known capacities of a number of Soviet ships and is considered
ti be .a reascnable estimate,
bo r r
Soviet water transport capabilities for personnel and dry cargo
generally are greatest in the Far East, with the Black Sea fleet nett, Tanker
lift Is about the saute in the Far East and in the Black Sea,, The Baltic and
Arctic areas have virtually
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c . LY_'I~r?~ Y)e 2 Lr 2,
The capabilities of the Soviet merchant fleet are greatest with
respect to dry cargo, the lift capabilities of the ocean-going tanker fleet
probably being the weakest aspect of the Soviet maritime potential.
3 PoteatlaA Crab,
a o Ccs~nst ctiona o
Rough estimates of Soviet capacity for construction of new merchant
ships range from 25,000 to 50,000 GRT annually of ocean-going shipping (in
eluding only vessels of 1,000 GRT and over). On the other hand, a brief study
made in 1949 of over 400 Soviet shipyards engaged in construction and repair
of ocean and inland craft.resulted in the conclusion that even the figure of
25,000 GRT was well above Soviet capabilities at that time, Actual capabilities
at present are believed to be insignificant for either replacements or additions
to the fleet. Soviet capabilities for construction of new merchant ships in
wartime is not believed to be a factor of Importance, since? as at present, ship
construction capabilities will be almost entirely devoted to naval construction.
b, Fore Ae~uis~to
The USSR at present is not acquiring any significant mount of
merchant ship tonnage from foreign sources, probably not more than 50,000 GRT
annually. The Satellites are building a number of small craft for Soviet
account, and plans have been made for the construction of ships of about 5,000
GRT each in Satellite yards, but such vessels are likely to stay on the drawing
board for some time to come. Foreign acquisitions will not alter the Soviet
maritime potential significantly, with the possible exception of some slight
improvement in tanker transport capabilities. For example,, in January 1951,
Lloy s_ Ra i--stor reported that 39 ships totaling 41,664 GRT were under con-
struction in Western shipyards for Soviet account.. Some of these were ocean-
going ships of value to the fleet, but it is evident that on the average they
were too small to be of any great importance. Poland is acquiring considerable
merchant tonnage abroad, however, including acme tanker tonnage, and it is
possible that some of these vessels eventually may be transferred to the Soviet
fleet. In any case, they are likely to'be'operated under Soviet control. The
USSR has Indicated its interest in obtaining ships from Western owners, but very
few thus far have been acquired., In the past the reluctance of Western govern-
ments to deal with the USSR, combined with US pressure against such transactions,
has halted the transfer of any appreciable-tonnage. At-present the high price
of ships and the general dmand for tonnage has militated against Soviet ao-
quisitions of foreign shipping.
In the event of ,a war in which the USSR.overran Western Europe and
thereby acquired the shipyards substantially intact, the Soviet shipbuilding
capacity would be increased at least twentyfold, even excluding the capacity
_
of the. UK (about 3 million GRT annually),,
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c. isa a pd. .
Under present conditions the USSR can charter dry-cargo tonnage
without much difficulty. If its efforts in this regard should be'greatly in-
creased, however, a resulting rise In world prices might well aot as a brake
on Soviet charters, World tanker tonnage at present Is rather tight, and it
is unlikely that the USSR could increase its tanker tonnage through chartering.
On the other hand, the charter of even 10 T-2 tankers, or their equivalent,
would double the present ocean-going tanker fleet.
In the event of war, cost would be no object, and the USSR
theoretically might be able to acquire enough tonnage to double its present
merchant fleet if it moved quickly and bought or chartered tonnage from neutral
countries before the West could counter such a move,
d. 5gjg Foreaiam Tonnage in Soviet- Ports.
In the event of a -sudden outbreak of war a considerable amount of
foreign tonnage probably would be found in Soviet ports. On the basis of
available data, estimates of Western shipping in Soviet ports at any given time
could be made to indicate the tonnage which might be seized.
e~C' air~eSsir+~ad!' ~7il~l{8K thea~{~..vrav~a~m^L1II49r'*~
The amount of shipping which the USSR would acquire by occupation
of Western Europe cannot now be accurately estimtiateed. Barring a complete
dispersal of foreign shipping from Continental ports before Soviet occupati.'ari
of Western Europe, however, the USSR would almost certainly 'acquire a large,
amount of tonnage; On the basis of rough estimates, it appears that there are.
about 5,5 million CST of ocean-going shipping in Western European ports, ex-
cluding the UK, at any given time. A large part of this tonnage would escape
or be sunk or scuttled, but the remainder probably would be sufficient to more
than double the present Soviet merchant fleet,
f, Um t o a-M the West,
The extent of possible defections from the merchant fleets of the
West is difficult to estimate. The risk of defection probably would be greatest
in the merchant fleets of France and Italy, which now total about 51,8009000 CRT,
or nearly three times the size of the Soviet fleet, Coz unist members and
sympathizers are strong in the merchant shipping iustry of those countries,
Scree steps probably would be 'taken in the event of war, however, to minimize
the risk of vessel defections to the USSR, and.these measures, if carefully
organized, might be effective, Even a small percentage of the combined French-.
Italian fleet, however, would represent asubstantial addition. to the Soviet
fleet,
12
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a?r-S + z
g.ivQrs,on ooff
..,o.'o
It is not possible at present to estimate, except in a most general
way, the potential capabilities of the USSR to divert ocean freight traffic to
other moans, The possibility that the USSR could divert much traffic from
coastal.or ocean shipping to land routes is not great, but some traffic might
be diverted in certain areas. The railroads might be utilized to absorb some
of the traffic that now moves by water along the coasts. This expedient would
be necessary in the event of an effective blockade of Soviet ports.
At present, much traffic goes north out of Satellite areas to
Baltic ports for tranoship?ant to the USSR. It is unlikely that existing rail
lines could handle all of this traffic, which would have to be rerouted from
the Baltic in case of a tight blockade or air attack. In the Black Sea,
possibilities for the diversion of ocean traffic to rail lines are equally poor.
Domestic traffic in this area consists largely of oil, grain, and ore movements
across the Black Sea to Odessa and other ports for shipment inland, The rail
lines in this area probably could not handle the bulk cargoes that would be
thrown upon than by effective hostile action against shipping.
In the Far East the absence of a rail network capable of handling
bulk coariodities in large quantities over and above normal comitments would
preclude any large-scale diversion of ocean=borne freight to overland rail
lines.
ism ed MSaintera-. .
Some degree of improvement in ship maintenance and repair could be
brought about, but unless Soviet planners assign a higher priority to ocean
transport than it apparently has at present, it is unlikely that there will be
any substantial change in the near future. In wartime, on the other hand, and
particularly if no general blockade were in effect, water transport might be
so important that the USSR would be forced to improve maintenance and repair..
In that event, merchant ships probably would come under direct military control,
as in World War II, and efficiency might increase considerably.
3 Ia?creaedf{ c- .ear of
C toP
Soviet concern with the poor performance of the merchant fleet is
evident in press criticism and also in official Soviet data, obtained fran various
soureeso A priority high enough to rcaedy this situation apparently has not
been decreed, and? therefore, there is little prospect for improvement. In any
event, it is extremely doubtful that efficiency in merchant marine operations
would increase in time of war unless merchant shipping activities were placed
under naval capxand.
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eny
IV. `rat s arzd ooy
1. Priatcitaa]L Material ~s.
Present annual steel requirements of the Soviet merchant fleet are
estimated to be 46,500 metric tons of finished steel, broken down as follows:
ship construction, 15,50 tons; ship repair, 31,000 tons.
The fuel oil requirements of the Soviet ocean-going merchant fleet
were estimated in 1949 at approximately 924,180 metric tons annually. This
figure was derived from a detailed.study of the composition of the fleet in
1949 (there has been no significant change since that time), to which was
applied by adjustment the 1937 figure for oil consumption in the merchant
fleet as reported in the Soviet official publication pad onva stv
coAga) ? This estimate of the fuel consumption of oil=burning ships,
which constitutes 55 percent of all Soviet ocean=going tonnage, was checked
against actual known consumption figures of, certain Soviet merchant ships and
is believed to be accurate to a high degree,
2. jpq~M.
Few data are available upon which to base estimates of the. manpower
employed in other industries supplying the requirements of the Soviet merchant
marine. Insofar as ship construction is concerned, it is known from US
experience during World War II that for every 100 workers in the shipyards
about 138 wore emplojel in producing the materials required in the shipyards,
T1 s. e" tilosr~ t
b,,
On the basis of data given in the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42),
total employment In the Soviet merchant marine is estimated to be about 30,000
persons, a figure believed to be accurate within 10 or 15 percent,
c., 1Aist bton..
On the basis of reports by prisoners of war and other observers,
it may be concluded that Soviet shipyard workers generally are not highly
skilled in ship construction or repair work, Fragmentary data contained in
POW reports and Soviet press and official statements indicate, moreover, that
technical skills and job aptitudes in the merchant marine are of a lower
caliber than in the Western merchant fleets, The tables of organization of
Soviet ships are known to be comparable to those of Western ships with one
Important exceptions they generally are , ovarma ed in the lower ratings,
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A. .0
V. ~a- S.x. ~Ylt 0E1 - and Vuo3'8.bi
1. fanitat i a .
Its modest size, its inefficiency, and the adverse weather conditions
under which it operates are Important limitations of the Soviet merchant fleet.
Possibly the principal single weakness in the composition of the fleet is the
shortage of tankers, which sharply limits the capability of the USSR to draw
upon available sources of supply in world petroleum markets or to transport
its own oi1 production by sea to distant areas of consumption. The tanker
shortage, however, is of importance mainly in peacetime because the Soviet
ability to move oil in tankers during hostilities would be limited basically
by lack of naval power to protect tankers on the shipping lanes. Throughout
the Soviet merchant fleet, operating efficiency is substandard, largely because
of the abnormal average age of the vessels, the low level of training, and
inadequate repair facilities. Weather limits Soviet maritime operations, mainly
because of the severe ice problems encountered in'Soviet northern waters but
also because of bad fog conditions in various areas, In fact, the Soviet
merchant fleet operates under the worst weather conditions confronting the
fleet of any world power. Divided into segments separated in acme cases by
thousands of miles, the fleet also suffers in peacetime from inflexibility.
This disadvantage would be more critical during hostilities, when the fleet
probably would be unable to transfer vessels between its isolated areas of
oporation7except In occasional instances.
It is difficult to explain why the Soviets have adopted a merchant
shipping policy which allows such limitations restricting Soviet freedom of
action, particularly in terms of any large-scale global strategic commitments
for merchant shipping requiring the transportation of large armies across the
seas. It is true that the failure of the USSR to play a major role in world
wide trade is consonant with its determination to conceal the gaps in its
economic self-sufficiency program and to limit international contacts to those
activities which are indispensable to its economic existence or which directly
further its world political objectives. Furthermore, the USSR may not desire
at present to promote maritime trading, because international. tensions subject
its commercial relations to constant rebuffs throughout a large part of the
weld. Another factor delaying expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet has
been the preoccupation of Soviet planners with other commitments that take
priority in requirements for steel and shipyard capacity over merchant shipping.
The wide disparities in priorities clearly indicate that large tonnages of
merchant shipping will not come off the ways in the USSR until. Soviet naval
expansion has reached some undisclosed level of development.
These considerations do not explain, however, the Soviet lack of
aggressiveness in purchasing vessels abroad or in contracting for ship construc-
tion in foreign yards. It may be that the USSR had not foreseen, at least
until recently, intercontinental warfare and, accordingly, had geared its
economic and military development to the possibility of hostilities -on the
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Eurasian land mass only. If so, this is of great significance to the US, for
it would mean that the USSR has admitted, to itself at least, that it cannot
invade and conquer the US and that a stalpmats,is.its maxim= capability at
this time. In this case the Soviets might view the merchant marine as a
relatively impotent weapon which would be quickly driven by enemy blockade
from the high seas into the shaky security . of Soviet harbor and the restricted
waters of the Soviet perimeter. Such an attitude. on the part of the Soviets
would no doubt be somewhat tempered by their hope that a rapid advance. to the
Channel and the Bay of Biscay at the outset of hostilities would result in
extensive captures and defections of merchant vessels, thus securing sufficient
ready tonnage to carry out whatever shipping activity the Soviet Navy and Air
Force could protect as well as acquiring shipbuilding-capacity.
The over l strategic limitations of Soviet merchant shipping will,
not be overcome until a radical charge. in Soviet policy occurs. The present
rate of acquisition of new tone does little more than offset the advancing
obsolescence of the fleet and in no cab o represents substantial progress toward
building up a powerful merchant marine comonsurato with the stature of the
USSR as a major power.
Potentially,, however, the USSR could make rapid progress in merchant
marine development. Shipyards now occupied with naval order are capable of
turning out merchant vessels, and shipbuilding capacity could be expanded
considerably from domestic resoles. In addition, if the USSR were will.
to pay world prices, more foreign tonnage could be acquired. The. USSR, evidtly
is more interested in obtaining tanker tonnage abroad than dry cargo ships,
and enough tomeo.aay be acquired through construction or purchases abroad
in the not 3 to 5 years to improve petrroln lift capabilities considerably.
On the other hand, any great progress in overcoming present operational
limitations within the next few years is unlikely, principally because the
Soviet merchant fleet does not have the requisites economic priorities, Prospects
for Improving the present inadequate repair facilities do not appear bright R
The repair of merchant ships requires a high degree of. skill and much specialized
equipment, frequently requiring more skill than is necessary to build a n
ship. The USSR appears to be greatly deficient in both the skills and the
equipment required for the very substantial repair and maintenance progri
essential to placing the present merchant fleet in prime condition or for
maintaining a mini level of operational effic1ancy in the event of war.
Training faci],itios may be Improved and greatly a 'spanded to furniBh,techhica31y
competent crews,, but such progress will take time.
In spite of the great strides which the USSR has made In overcoming
the physical iftations of weather upon merchant shipping operations, Lee
a w e a t h e r w i l l Inevitably r a n a major problem.
m16-
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2. wit . n og.
Among the various Soviet shipping developments which might be
indicators either of changes In shipping policy or of broader political
and military policies and intentions are the following:
a. Sudden una plains d departures of Soviet merchant
vessels fin foreign ports;
b. Continued absence of Soviet shipping traffic frrc
certain foreign areas;
c. Steady build-up of the Soviet merchant fleet in
the Far East;
d. Possible covert meetings at sea of Soviet merchant
vessels with Soviet naval craft, perhaps for fuel
transfers;
e. Acquisition of potential trsoop carrrying vessels;
f. Transfers of Soviet floating dry docks to the
Far East;
g. Expansion and improvement of port facilities.
Most of those activities have in the past rreflected purely economic
factors. Some have merely revealed Soviet a inistrat o confusion. They
' , at be continually surveyed, however, because tho rc reourronco in combination,
or in more extreme form, might provide positive indicators of military develop-
sets. '
The Intentions of the USSR with respect to its merchant marine also
would be frequently revealed by careful observation of Soviet chipping opera-
tions. For example, accurate knowledge of large-scale acquisitions of now
tonnage, changes in the criteria for the retirensnt of obsolete vessels, build-
ups In given areas, modifications In the volume or pattern of Soviet shipping
activities on routes to non-Comrunist ports, and alterations in the chartering
policies of the USSR on both "out" and "in" charters ,usually would permit
definite conclusions to be dawn
To translate such conclusions into useful estimates concerning broader
courses of Soviet action will 'not always be possible, particularly with respect
to the intentions of the USSR In terms of localized or large-scale hostilities
The Soviet merchant fleet at present is essentially an economic inst a nt and,
as such, will probably. expand somewhat in keeping with the general, economic
development of the USSR. It also will be subject to occasional sudden. and
severe readjustments, as are the merchant fleets of any country, to satisfy
unanticipated localized raquirsmeuts or other purely economic demands. Shipping
de velopmenats of an innocuous nature and those carrying dangerous strategic
implications must, therefore, bey carefully differentiated if they are to serve
as indicators of Soviet Intentions. Probably the most Important indicator of
ma jorr Soviet moves would be a Soviet shift from a passive to an ag?essive
shipping policy, a development which would have Important, and possibly smi sous,
Implications,,
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a. Ec_Qc_jdj&o_.
The economy of the USSR, could be dislocated seriously by a general
Western refusal to construct, charter, or sell tonnage to the USSR or to per-
mit Western vessels to carry any cargoes for direct or indirect Soviet accounts.
The US, in particular, could bring, strong pressure on numerous other maritime
nations to take such action. Such action by the West would make the continua-
tion of Soviet foreign trade impossible on the present basis, because the
Soviet Bloc now depends upon Western ships (in terms of numbers of vessels)
for 90 percent of all of its maritime traffic with the rest of the world.
Adoption of such a policy by the West might affect the USSR as follows:
(1) Reduce the flow of atratogic materials from
overseas areas;
(2) Force a realignment of stockpiling operations
In the Far East and possibly other areas;
(3) Weaken economic ties with the Satellites by
reducing the ability of the USSR to supply
intra-Bloc maritime transport as required;
() Complicate Soviet economic pling by our-
-tailing the receipt of foreign exchange
through worts;
(5) Roq?e withdrawals of shipping from that
portion of the fleet now engaged in domestic
traffic, if any foreign trade of consequence
were to be maintained This wculd have roper
sions on other domestic forms of trans-
portation.
The US alone could cripple the maritime operations, of the USSR if
effective action to repossess the US=ow ned Lan. Lease ships now operated by
the Soviet Union were possible. These ships account for slightly more than.
25 percent of Soviet oc ,goi tonnage and act y represent an even larger
part of the USSR maritime transport potential, since they are,, ?n the whole,
bettor the the average Soviet vessel. Repossession, however, its dependent
upon so many factors that it is unlikely.
The West could further harass and hamper Soviet shipping operations
by refusing to furnish fuel, especially oil,, at Western-controlled b err
stations, by such techniques as slowdowns against Soviet ships in Western ports,
by holding up papers, and by searching ships thoroughly. While these latter
tactics might be trivial in isolated Instances, a determine campaign of
harassment on the part of all Western nations would have a damaging effect upon
Soviet shipping.
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Western surface and air attack against Soviet shipping would
reduce its operations on the high seas to no more than occasional vents.
With Western air supremacy, attacks could be made in strength against even
the relatively protected closed arcs, such as the Baltic, Black, and Caspian
seas. Economic warfare measures, such as preclusive buying and chartering of
vossols, would deny to the iSSR materials useful in shipbuilding, intenances,
and repair and would rceduee the tonnage available to the USSR for use In
whatever areas it right at any time still be able to protect. Various
transport. control noasures, cor er- such as the wart#Re.navicart syst
or. an extension of it greatly reduce the volme of block err ing
by teas Soviets.
As a result of such Western military action and economic warfare,
substantial Soviet trading with overseas areas could be interdicted, the USSR
would be incapable ,of mounting and supporting overseas operations requiring
these of "large military contingents, and closer--in shipping operations in
support of nearby nilitary campaigns would be in constant danger of insupportable
losses. Thus .Soviet transport capabilities eventually would be limited to the
interior Eurasian lines of emmmIcation in the USSR.
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APPENDIX A
am-INUMNIU, "Mr-11
The pros&nt lc of detailed and acctratq data cz soviet merchant shipping
traffic during, World liar II -is a serious defiici,er-? is estimati actual Soviet
capab l,itie s Per both war and peace. Data on officio= of morchnt shipping
opcrataevrs, pamtieuia ?ly are iiet -Bloc operations, afro poor and co titir4e an
important def} clency. ? Tho l1.ek of intelligence on Sarlet capabilitie,. for con-
st rctiing rn;erchont ships M,4.-Os it difficul-t to estf .to Sov of ability to re-
place war losses from demestie resources. Lek or ,cc ato kwwJ.e .ge on the
oxtant to which nor.-Soviet shipping i stores s have c -h6r? . s amps g to the
US M leaves a -gap in .ov1edge of Soviet peacetime tr ns< rt capabli Llea.
Moreover, the lack of detai ed ? forrz..at o on "h'arial s Ir ad particularly on
tzanpowor, cra&:ites a sGTious di,f'fi .ty in appraising d? ds of the na: rc1mnt
shipping ioat upon the ovso. eco=W However,, adequate info ,a,a ?ova is
available on the cconeamic a i, ifica nco of the Soviet orchant float, although
serious gaps exist in traffic data.
Data are r vrail? sable for de tall studios, a .tho gh this subject is not
of sufficient interest to via ant an exhaustivro wesaarch project.
A thaugh the broad ?rganizaMLonal features of the S0v7int M,e chrnit
fit e p eR , there is little rah-able infor &ationn.en the i s ?~l is sn~~ps
of tho v riomr; agoncioc or tho =t wt of Gantrol a; 'tc in th? Soviet , -m
"orcen, ' T h e r e Ina g o a d deal of appnr anthly latcd da"ba ~Q fir enp ~z ti e s
by indivicp Soviet shipping ? gmacies, bu thir, irn a=uatier d ;r d co-
orrdiRpation a n? sin z hrre ova1c tionm
Ccnzid able statistics' 'data it for a st r of the 701=0 of YsOrrvla ?'
shipper traf'f'ic b forro War ld Warr Tt n, al th? r h befcra pftrid War 11 the Soviet
policy of secrecy on traffic statistics F: an? stricter a data filol vdith
the Loogaro of Mationa are scanty.
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III. Q~
a. Fri, Facilities axed Ins~t~.
Although there are many detailed studies by the Departments of the
Army and the Navy, the sources generally are somewhat out of date and therefore
not necessarily accurate. Although deficiencies are remedied to some degree
by reports from ship personnel calling at Soviet ports, the strict security
regulations at these ports severely restrict the coverage of such reports.
Detailed analysis of existing information on Soviet ports and facilities
probably would, be of considerable value in raising to some degree the overall
reliability of basic data, but a major Wollection effort would be required to
improve present information.
The capacities of Soviet ports have been studied in detail, and
reliable estates have been made. In addition to the ability of a port to
load or discharge cargo, these studies also take into consideration the
clearance facilities, such as rail and road routes, and capacities. Available
data are believed to be reasor-tbly accurate, although some information is old.
20
so ~,
Much more information than is presently available would be required
to prepare a detailed etatemae nt 0 Such data are available in ONI and are believed
to be accurate to within 10 or 15 percent.
b?
Estimates of capabilities by areas can be made within a small range
of error, adequate information being available in ONI. To arrive at an accurate
figure at any time would require merely statistical treatment of the characteristics
of the ships known with reasonable certainty to be in a given area,
3. ,fit C-a,bil hies
a.
Although there is little valuable information, this deficiency is
not serious. Partial surveys have been made by ONI and other agencies.,
I L,
b9 owe
Ae~~u;sitionsro
Infoh-maation is fairly good. on . this important subject, Although
considerable information is available to CIA and ONI, no definitive studies are
possible. A detailed list of requirements has been issued for collection, and
it is hoped that additional data will became available.
210
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Irafortion is only fair.
d.Sere Toasaaae~ ipa Seth.
No studies a" known to have been made. If the detailed data cew
tained in mrAg Shies on vovaaote of merchant ships can be appro-
priately proposed, a serious gap in information will be s9abata=aztiafy eliminated.
9. Aiiog oL,Tf c too ham.
No studies area known to have been o. The potential capabilities
of diversion in peacetime, however, could be estimated roughly. This would
x'eequiro detailed studies of traffic moves mats a capabilities by rail, highway,
s wester, both inland and coastal. While same data of reasonable reliability
are available, tho over-all data, required for this survey area not belie stud to
be available in sufficient detail.. Any Infos'ination which might be obtained,
furthermore, probably would be subject to considerable error, since the informa-
tion could cote only from derived data or Soviet published reports. Even data
based upon official reports which might be covertly secured wuld not be
completely reliable, since it has been show that such statistics often area
substantially untrue. It Is estimated that the best astudieas which cold be
made might be as much ass. 20 percent In error.
A sufficient number of reports from scattered areas are available
tom o possible a more detailed analysis' of Soviet capabilities regarding
Improved maintenance and repair.
i~ ic M9 M ? L -On at a-?A
Althc a a considerable a ou t of fr onta arateriaal Is available,
no detailed studios are knew to ejcisst.
iV~ we$r.
2.
ev. 1-111 ~~ NIC ?@F@
No ce prehe ivc data or detailed studies are knomm to exist,
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1,
2,
3. Mitchell., Maf.rin, jtgj&jge Hi g_ o R ees A 1949.
4.. Ba aak, Vaautin, Feigin, o c~ is Ceo cax ~ of t ry IIu, .191a9;
5. Mitchell, Iar3n, ~? Iat~r a , 1949-
6. Sae a 1a above.
7.. T&Ld.
8. CIA, National Intelligence Survey., Section 36 MSSR Merchant M._rlae,
May 19,49; CIA Library No. 492743, FDD Docent No. 27,
Mitchell, x?+ ~i ar~p Pay ?y.9. Mitchel., MLfrm,, 3~_ 4?Y. ~5f? l7 S e9 194..9
10, Same as 1, above.
11. .
12; CIA,. National Intelligence Survey, Section 36, CIA Libra
No. 4927,43v 22, lit.
13; CIA, National Intelligence Survey, Section 36,, g2, a;Lt.; CIA Libra>
No 4927g43p,, . 9_1_t.
t,{ 9 Doe IM;
14. CIAO 5~ Q~E D/TR No.. IA2, 19 Do150;
No, , 28 Nov 1950; N'o.- 139, 14 Nov 1950; h"o. 128, 29 Aug 19950;
Nob 126, 15 Aug 1950; No. 120, 5 Jul 1950; CIA, ,E D/TR
' M :' aan ~n~ a >a i a Soric p ja,, Appendix to ORE Report
No. 15-=49, Jan 1949;
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26.. CIA, n&,-IM, 20 SOP 1949.
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