FAR EAST/PACIFIC DIVISION OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES CENTRAL INGELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKING PAPER WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000500040010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 11, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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"Aft EkLiT'f PACIFIC DNT ,iO?
uri r 1;;': OF W P:) S AND ESTIMATES
C ::1 F.iL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
KIN PAPER
DATE: APR 11 1 i50
NA) Ca :.',NOE N CLASS. ^
CLASS. CHANG .:1. TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
/,UTI
DATC
"OTICE! This document Is a working paper,, not an official
"-'-!A docu.nnt -. It has been coordinated within ORE,
but not with the IAG agencies, It represents cur-
rai t thinking by epecialiets in CIA, and is designed
ro_r use by others engaged in similar or overlapping
sf.~idies. The opinions expressed herein may be re-
vised before final and official publication. It is
ini;ended solely for the information of the addressee
and not for further dissemination.
PACOM review(s) completed.
0
REVIEWER: 25X1
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OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES, CIA
FAR EAST/PACIFIC DIVISION
INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 95
5 APRIL to 11 APRIL 1950
SECTION I. SUNMARX OF FAR EAST TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
President Rhee has reversed his stand on the postponement of the
Korean Republic's forthcoming general elections (p. 3). Meanwhile,
it is estimated that the puppet northern Korean regime's air strength
now includes some 36 modern USSR fighter aircraft (p. 3).
An analysis of the current situation in Communist China leads to
the conclusion that a purge of "nationalist"-minded military leaders
is unlikely. for the present (p. 4). Meanwhile, the Communists'
first major amphibious operation -- against the Chou Shan archipelago is expected to take place with the benefit of Soviet aided air forces
in the immediate future (p. 5). The anticipated Communist success
will have a grave effect on the morale of the Nationalist remnant on
Taiwan where, up to the present, the problem of currency inflation
has been avoided successfully (p. 6).
The conceded failure of "Anti bandit Month" in Malaya to achieve
any substantial results highlights the deteriorating situation in that
vital UK colony (p. 7)o
Burmese "peace negotiations" with certain captured Karen insur-
gents are not expected to result in a complete collapse of Karen
resistance (p. 7).
The recent coordinated outbreak of Huk violence in the Philip-
pines presages intensified difficulty for the corrupt and inefficient
Quirino regime in the future (p. 8).
(NOTE: Section III contains a summary of present Chinese
Communist relations with the nations of Southeast
Asia.)
The marginal notations used in succeeding sections of this Weekly
"B", or "C") indicate the importance of the items in opinion
with "A" representing the most important.
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KOREA,
Rhee routed--0n 7 April, President Rhee reversed his position on the
postponement of Koreats general elections and informed the National
Assembly that he would set the election date for the and of Mq,
After distributin; copies of the US aide memoire expressing concern
both over Korea's serious inflation and over the election postpone-
ment, the. President told the Assembly that failure to hold the
elections in gay and failure to pass the "balanced budget" would
adversely affect the volume of US aid to Korea. Since the opposi-
tion Democratic-Nationalist Party (DNP) has already taken a strong
position in favor of early passage of the budget and May election
laws, passage of both measures should now follow at an early date.
Rhea's vacillation on the election issue has left his Assembly
following in the Great Korea Nationalist Party (GKNP) on an unpopu-
lar limb in support of election postponement and has probably dimi-
nished his prestige. DNP forces now stand a good chance of winning
a large majority in the May election. pith the GKNP not yet well
organized and with his own popularity diminished, Rhee will probably
react to the election threat by giving his trusted follower Paek
Song Ok - Minister of Home Affairs and supervisor the the Police .,..
responsibility for diminishing the campaign effectiveness of the DNP
and insuring a favorable climate for pro-administration candidates,
North Korea air strength increase--The offensive capability of the north-
ern Korean armed forces is being materially increased by the development,
of an air regiment. The existence of an air regiment in the People's
Army - believed to consist of about 800 men and 36 planes (including
Soviet trainers and obsolete Japanese types) .... was accepted early in
1949.
V. T
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Indications now are that the air regiment has been expanded to 1500
men and that the original 36 aircraft have been added to or replaced
by some 36 YAK 9s, obsolescent World War II fighters which compare
favorably in performance with the USAF F-51.
The North Korean air force has become a potent psychological
and military threat to the southern Republic of Korea. With its
Soviet-trained personnel and Soviet-supplied aircraft, it possesses
complete air superiority over the southern Korean token air force,
which has no combat aircraft. Although small, the northern air
regiment could materially assist northern ground forces in any at-
tempted Invasion of the south.
CHINA
Purge of Communist military leaders?.4
many observers have cons stently distinguished between "nationalist"
and "internationalist" leaders of the COP. In recent months, a nwn-
ber of Chinese Communist military leaders have been reported as being
antagonistic to the dominant Stalinist bloc of the Party, and as
seeking Western support in order to survive or combat a Party purge
which they anticipate this year.
It is not known whether any of the major field commanders are in
fact preparing to revolt against, or are out of favor with, the GOP's
Stalinist leadership. It does seem, however, that any significant
challenge to the position of the Party's present leadership would
necessarily depend upon the support of, if not be initiated by, the
military. Moreover, apart from the truth or falsity of reports at-
tributing anti-Stalinist views to Chinese Communist military leaders,
the non-military leaders are presumably aware that, in the event of
a break at this time between the Party and any major field commander,
a large part of the commander's forces might accompany him and he
might, in addition, obtain considerable popular support.
The non-military leaders of the COP, who control the central
government apparatus, have localized the power of the military and
are gradually reducing military authority, but army leaders do not
yet appear to have lost any great amount of strength. CHU Teh is
still Commander-in-Chief and s till eulogized as Chairman MAO Tee-
tun-,'s closest comrade. PEN& Teh-huai, commander of the let Field
Army, with a greatly increased command, is in a .stronger position than
ever as Chairman of the Northwest Lilitary and Administrative Commit-
tee. LIU Po-cheng, commander of the 2nd FA, with most of his old
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forces, is Chairman of the Southwest MAC. CHEN Yi, commander of the
3rd FA, has perhaps lost some stature as a result of being replaced
as Chairman of the East China MAC by his former political officer,
JAO Shu-shih, but CH 'V still has his own troops and has been entrusted
with the operation against Taiwan, the Chinese Communists' most im-
portant-remaining military task. LIN Piao, commander of the 4th FA,
apparently was transferred from Manchuria for military rather than
political reasons, and is Chairman of the important Central and South
China MAC. The 5th FA no longer exists, but its ex comma nder, NIEH
Jung-ohen, is Deputy Chief-of-Staff and commander of the special forces
in the North China Military Area.
These military leaders Ftillappear to be in a sufficiently strong
position, in consequence of their various commands, to impel the
Peiping regime to proceed cautiously in any effort to restrict and
reduce their authority further. It is not believed that the non-mili-
tary Party leaders are prepared, at this time, to attempt to purge any
of these commanders. No one of them seems a likely purges at least
until the completion of present military operations against the Nation-
alists. moreover, the non-military would probably be reluctant to
take action against any one of the military leaders, unless assured
of the fidelity or neutrality of all the other military leaders and
unless convinewd that political indoctrination has made the rank and
file of the Communist armies loyal primarily to Peiping rather than to
their old leaders. The Peiping regime is not likely to be in this happy
position within the present year.
Coming invasion of the Chou Shane-The initial step In the Communist
amphibious campaign against Nationalist offshore positions - an at-
tack on the Chou Shan archipelago -- is expected within the next two
weeks. Air support by the newly-activated Communist air force is
anticipated. CM U's 3rd Field Army, which totals some 355,000
men and is to provide the ground forces for the Chou Shan assault..
already has some 140,000 in position opposite the Nationalist holdings.
These forces have painstakingly assembled junks and other small craft
for transport and the Nationalists-now fear that the Communists are
adequately equipped in this res ard.
The most important factor in the coming operation,, however, is the
anticipated air support from the Soviet-assisted Communist air force.
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Tentatively, the Communists are estimated to have over 50 planes,
mostly fighters and liht bombers of World War II types, in a position
to support a Communist landing in the Chou Shane. The Nationalists,
in turn, have about 20 combat craft operating from Tinghai and the
archipelago provides only one alternate field. The Communists, opera-
ting from widely scattered bases probably can either neutralize the
Nationalist naval and air units in the Chou Shans or force their
withdrawal to Taiwan before the invasion starts. The effectiveness of
.Nationalist aerial strikes against the Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo area,
if staged from Taiwan, some 350 miles away, would be greatly reduced.
The Communists would then, for the first time, enjoy tactical air
support and their junks could probably land a sufficiently large force
to overwhelm the Nationalist positions.
Loss of the advance Chou Shan bases would have extrenly serious
repercussions on Taiwan. The air and naval blockade of Shanghai would
be virtually terminated. The belief in Communist amphibious impotence,
so large a factor in the recent rise in Nationalist confidence and
morale, would be abruptly destroyed. If Nationalist morale and will to
fight were then to slip back to the previous low ebb, the Communists
would have moved closer to their main objective -- Taiwan in both
time and essence.
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MAYA
Concern over "lati-bandit Month!; f1oE The Malayan Commissioner of
Police has reported that the "Anti bandit Month" campaign, completed
last week, has achieved no improvement in the terrorist situations
This depressing statement, together with the fact that casualties in-
curred by the security forces tle- augmented by 400,000 volunteers --
were greater than those suffered by the bandits, has focussed increased
attention on the deteriorating situation in Malaya. Sharp criticism
has been expressed from many quarters in Malaya and UK concern over
the inability of security forces to suppress the 3,000 bandits now
active in various parts of the colony was also voiced in Parliament.
The UK Government has acknowledged the seriousness of the situation
and has announced plans for the permanent incorporation of the best
features of the "Anti-bandit Month" operations into future efforts.
It also planned to develop an auxiliary police force to relieve regu-
lar forces for operational duty, to reinforce present troops with
Ghurka units from Hong Kong and to obtain additional aircraft, in-
cluding heavy bombers, from Great Britain.
BURMA
Burmese seek peace with Karen.-The Burmese Government is now attempting
to negotiate a settlement with certain Karen leaders who were captured
during the recent campaign in the Toungoo area. The Government ap-
parently desires to formalize its victory, by means of an official
Karen surrender document signed by these Karen captives, and thus in-
duce those Karens stil1 in the field to cease fighting. Such-a peace
agreement would probably be damaging to Karen morale and may - if im-
plemented with magnanimity - succeed in achieving its purpose with
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a sma7ll proportion of the insurgents still at large. Most of the
Karen forces, both in the Toungoo region and in the Irrawaddy Delta,
however, have not been destroyed and are not likely to consider
themselves committed to any settlement in which they did not parti-
cipate. Therefore, although a KarenBurman speacen - which may be
announced in the near future -- should not be considered as completely
devoid of constructive possibilities, neither should it imply a
rapid restoration of stability to Burma.
PHILIPPINES
Huks pose increasin threat--The effectiveness with which the recent
(28 March ? 3 April) Huk raids were conducted presages increasing
anti government operations and poses a mounting threat to the Philip-
pine Government's stability. Although the actual tactics used were
similar to those used in scores of Huk raids since the and of World
War II, individual actions were' larger in scale than those in the
past, were coordinated with actions in other areas, and were sustained
over a period of several days.
Chief factor believed responsible for the new character of Huk
raids is the activity of two top Philippine Conxnunia is -- Mariano Balgos,
Secretary General of the Philippine Comm nist Party and Guillermo
Capadocia, the Party+s propaganda specialist -- both of whom joined the
Huks in the field in Janutar 1950. Since January, the two leaders
have been in central Luzon., apparently
contacting local Huke in an effort to coordinate plane, to tighten
the entire Huk organization? and to intensify Communist indoctrination,
A second reason for dissident effectiveness is an apparent in-
crease in Huk numerical strength. Active recruiting is believed to
have been undertaken during recent months and now areas have been in-
trated. F- I
Steps taken to date by General Castaneda, C-in-C of the Philippine
Armed Forces, have been relatively ineffective. Castaneda, however,
faces a difficult problem. He must counter guerrilla tactics with
poorly-disciplined troops and generally incompetent officers. He must
operate in an area where the people, through fear of link retaliation
and distrust of Government troops, will volunteer no information.
SECP W'"'
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Two basic factors: (1) the centuries-old agrarian dieccnterit, which
the Hake exploit effectively, and (2) the currently unhealthy politi-
cal and economic climate, deriving from a corrupt government under
incompetent leadership, further complicate the military situation.
It is probable that the Finks will be unable to stage farther
operations on the scale of the March raids for some weeks, That they
will raid again, perhaps on a slightly inarea ed sale, is entirely
probable. In addition to this future Hak threat, meanwhile, the
Government faces serious financial problems and a grave lose of pub-
lic confidence, both as a result of coercive tactics during the
November elections and as a result of its inability to contain Huk
depredations, Unless the Quirino regime can develop more effective
tactics in dealing with the problem of dissidence, and unless it con-
scientiously implements corrective social, economic, and political
measures, it will undoubtedly face ever-increasing instability,
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SECTION III. CHINESE CO?A1 UNIST RELATIONS 4ITH SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Peiping regime has openly declared its sympathy for the
"national liberation" movements of Southeast Asia and has stated
that it will render "moral and material aid, wherever possible."
Current trends in Chinese Comnmunist relations with the several
Southeast Asia states, summarized below, indicate the manner in
which this strategy is unfolding. In general, it may be said that
in all areas the Chinese Communists are strengthening their ties
with the local Communist movements and are gradually welding the
Overseas Chinese communities into, useful instruments of Chinese
Communist policy.
Current evidence indicates that the Ho regime has been re-
ceiving some support from the Chinese Communists in the form of
arms deliveries and the free movement of Resistance troops back and
forth across the China border. more is no firm evidence that the
Chinese Communists are moving their own troops across the border,
however, or that they plan to do so in the near Future. Politically,
the Chinese Communists and the Ho regime have accorded each other
de uro recognition, but have not as yet exchanged diplomatic mis-
sions or concluded any form of treaty or agreement. There are, how-
ever, some indications that steps may soon be taken (or may already
be in process) to formalize these relations. d/hen this occurs,
Chinese Communist support for the Ho forces may be expected to in-
crease. Meanwhile, Chinese Corn nist recognition of Ho has created
a condition of sharp political hostility between Peiping on the one
hand, and the French and Bao Dal on the other.
THAILAND
Thailand has not recognized the Peiping regime and has shown,
of late, a rather firm disposition to resist Communist psychological
pressure. The Bangkok authorities do not appear to have been inti-
midated by recent Chinese Communist propaganda charging them with
all manner of "fascist" and "imperialist puppet" crimes, particularly
the persecution of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand. More recently,
the Chinese Communists failed to attack Thai recognition of Bao Dai,
although good propaganda use might have been made of this move. It
does not appear that the Peiping regime is especially interested in
Thai recognition, even though diplomatic relations with Thailand
could facilitate the acquisition of Thai rice, which, presumably,
the Chinese Communists would like. 4ithin Thailand, as elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, the Overseas Chinese co.munity continues to be a special
"fin rr*1114~
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?'.Erp'et of Chinese Conuaunist propaganda and orgu nizational activity.
Y~l~ G%.nd ahoUld. re celvo
United States military aid (which acems likely), or participate in a
r on--Cou'uUulia?Z association of Asiatic states, the Chimse Communists
an be ogeated to increase their prossaro on Thailand through propa'
ganda, at the least, and po: sibly through the stimulation of internal
disturbances.
i,,LAIA
In late
February 1950 the Peiping radio resumed its propaganda in favor of
armed :struggle In Malaya and, in early April, Peiping attacked the
British "anti-bandit =*,pai, rn", although in a comparatively mild
manner. The Malayan Chinese, who make up nesrl.y half the total popu-
lation of the Mayan peninsula, are responding favorably to Choose
Communist efforts to in support and sytapathy for Peiping, and the
mrale of the terrorists appanrs to have risen somewhat as a result
of the growing prestige and aggressiveness of the Chinese Commsuaista.
Chinese Communist support for the "liberation" movorsnt in Malaya,, how-
ever, is complicated by the fact that the terrorist organization is
composed almost exclusively of Chinese and is opposed as much by the
native Malayans as by the British, with the result that Coamauniat propa-
ganda in favor of Malayan nationalise has a rather hollow sound. The
current outlook is for continuing Chinese Communist propaganda support
for the Malayan terrorists, augmented by such material and organisa--
tional assistance as is possible within the limite imposed by googr?aphi-
cal and other considerations. The campaign to win the Chinese half of
the population to the Communist cause will continue in vigorous fashion
and wi.. succeed in proportion as the Peiping regime can solve its in-
ternal problems and maintain the prestige of a dynamic political move.
ment. There is, however, the early prospect of the Chinese Communists'
recognizing the terrorists as the 1Igoverranont" of the Malayan peninsula.
PURDLA
Burma recognized the Chinese Communist regime on 17 December 1949,
but the establishment of diplomatic relations betvaeen the two govern-
ments has not yet been accomplished, The Chinese Communists responded
rather cooll ! to Eurmeoe recognition and have so far pr ocs astiaated on
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their offer to provide transportation for the Burmese consul at
Kunming, who was ordered by the Burmese Gov'brnment to proceed to
Peiping for discussions on the exchange of diplomatic representa.
tivoss. There is a possibility that the recent establishment of a
"purified" Burmese Communist regime at Prome will influence the
future of Sino-Burmese relations. The Peiping regime, which now
appears to be stalling on the formalization of its relations with
Burma, may well decide to wait until the Proms regime demonstrates
its ability or inability to survive and flourish. If the Burmese
Communists show real promise, Peiping may decide to recognize
their regime as the "government') of Burma, and ignore the Rangoon
authorities altogether. tieaowhil o, the Chinese Comnwnisto will
probably establish liaison with the Burmese Coaniuunists3 and continue
to temporize on the exchange of diplomatic representatives with the
Government of Burma.
INDOIND NFSIA
On 4 April 1950, the USI announced receipt of a comamani,cation
from Peiping expressing the Chinese Communists' willingness to estab-
lish diplomatic relations with the new republic. At the same time,
USI Premier Hatta stated that his Government was agreeable to this
step. The fact that the Chinese Communists have given no publicity
to the matter may be related to the disdain with which they greeted
the founding of the US1 in late December, 1949. At that time, world
Communism took the position that the USI was just another anti-popular
"imperialist puppet". Since then the line seems to have changed (the
USSR recognized the USI in February 1950, for example),and the Chinese
Communists apparently feel that nothing is to be gained by calking
unnecessary attention to the change. Despite internal instability,
the USI does not appear to be vulnerable in any important degree to
armed Communist activity, nor could such groups receive significant
assistance from the Asiatic mainland. Communist strategy for the
USI appears to turn on the establishment of diplomatic relations with
Djakarta and the eventual staffing of Soviet and Chins Communist mis-
sions there, from which organizational, and propaipnda work will be
carried on among both the Overseas Chinese and native Communist and
leftist movements. There are indication a that the USI will delay the
actual exchange of diplomatic missions with both the USSR and the
Peiping regime as long as possible, since there is, among many USI
officials, a keen awareness of the disadvantages of bringing Commu-
nist officials from abroad into direct contact with local dissident
elements.
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PH LIPPINES
The Philippine Government has not recognized the Chinese Comrna-
ni.st regime and has given no indication that it will do so in the near
future. The Philippine response to the establishment of a Communist
state on the Chinese mainland has been mainly one of fear that the
overseas Chinese in the Philippines would align themselves with the
Chinese Communists and become a menacing fifth column within the is-
lands. The Quirino regime has taken steps to restrict Chinese im-
migration sharply and to deport Chinese who are under suspicion for
illegal entry or subversive activities,, There are some indications
that the civil liberties of the Chinese community may be in danger of
serious abridgement, a development which, if it occurs, will draw
the full wrath of the Chinese Communist propaganda, machine. While
conclusive evidence of direct Chinese Communist support for the local.
Huk rebellion in the Philippines is lacking, it in considered almost
certain that some liaison exists.
COMF
jDgpo"A I
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