FAR EAST/PACIFIC DIVISION OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES CENTRAL INGELLIGENCE AGENCY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 102

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000500040004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 31, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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~~~r~.AL INS"~.~~G:~i~tC~ AG.~,~~~
s~r~CCI.Y :~~`T~L~:CEi~C~ ii~i~HL~:CrH1'S
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~~~~: MAY 3
AUTtI; ~~
DAT I~~V1ry+~R:
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~~. ~L~e ~~5 ~~averaament. 1vi~ are warkin on sznri.l~r or ovsrls,pping
~~,~.e~ ~ :fit is t.ntt~n~ed Sor the use of the addresse? al.oc~s ~ arttf
r ~~? :t3aa t~her disserrrS.nation.
Mate Dept. review completed
naxur~ AIiA f Va CY
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aFFICE 4F REPQRTS A~3D E.STTt~ATFS, GIA
FAR EAST/FACIFTC DIVT5I4~i
INTELLIGEI3CE IiIGl~LI(~HTS N0. I(!~
~ b~A~ to 31 MAX 19 ~D
SECTION Io SU~d~dARY CF k'A13 EAST T~i.~iVI7S ArA3 DEVIsLOF6dFNTS
R~c~,~r~?ndations of ttie r~avnt ~3ag~xia Cortferanc~ cif rxan-Cvmmuni.st
Asian ne.ticans (].~ emphasised that Asians be heard in v~orld councils an
lnattere affecting Asian intereste and {2) suggested the n~ir-ation of
a continnic~ 1i~-ison officer rich the ,gavernmvnta x'?preger:tesd mt the
Can fe:renGe { p o ?) .
The Chin+~ea Cor~anni.ets pasaesa sutfiu~.ant petroleum stacks to eug-
~,c-rt their ~ni.litary activiti4s but not enough to ou~p]-g tho requ~,r~+nnenta
of industry and trmnspart {p? d-) m
YVEnS NCfTES
ezect~an resu.~te~
PVO leaders to its fold.
Earlg Korean
urr~so CcvBrncs~.eat adding
NQTS: Sect~n III cantaica~- s diJecuesion of tk~e trs.d~-
poee~.biJ.it~.ee for Japan ~ur- Sosxth a nd Sit theaa~t
A,sis.s
The marginal nota,tion~a used in succeeding s-pctione of this areeklg
"A", "$"~, Qx' "C") .fix~diuate the ianport~snae of the items 3.n, Df 1~`E s~pinion
Faith "A" repre4enting the ~5t important
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SECTION IIo flk:VEZAPi~TS I!'1 Sp~Ii:`XEI? ARE~~
GE.~
Ba uio Con!'erence recommendations--The Baguio Canference of seven non-
communist Asian nations, which stet 26,-30 Jlday, recommended further consul
Cation on matters of common concern but Failed to establish formal ~na--
chinery for an Asian union -w apparently because of Indian intransigence.
However, it reaffirmed faith in Cho UN and recommended point action of
Asian nations in order to saert "due influence?t in that body
Several recominendatians v~ith respect to economic and cultural prai~-
lems in the area wero approvedp The conference su~;gestert adoption of
measures to ensure fair, stabilized prices for ex#~orts; expansion at re--
gional trade; consideration of possib~.e scanomic specialization; Cho ex
change of teachers and students; and establishment of international study
Centers.
As ex~rected, Conference recommendations carefully avoided an~+ aren~
tion of the "cold war" or the menace off' Communist subvers3,on and aggres-
sion, thereby indicating that non-Coracaunist Asian nations ri11.]. continue
attesapts to remain aloof i'rom the .fast=~~est struggle Tha rmdst eigniti-~
cant recommendations (1) emphasized the common detaxruination of these
nan-Communist Ar~i.an natiions that they be heard in a~orld councils on
matters affectiag Asian interests, and (2) spec3.fied Philippind UN repra-
sentativ? Carlos Po Romulo as a continuing liaison officer with the
governments represented at the Conferenceo -
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Chinese Goa~uunist petroleum position---~ spite of the fact that the Corr- "A"
monist par East is a petroleum deficit aroa, the Chira:se Communists have
at their disposal sufficient $toclcB to sustain their present activities
agair~t the Chinese National.ista. Ho~rever, the i~aediate denial of pe-
trol~um products by the Yiest would, as prey?nt stocks become exhauatad
and requirements increase,, seriously ha~aper future plans of the Chir~se
Communists to develop their economy.
Tho Chinese Communists are believed to have enough aviation gasoline
and other fuels to carry out their planned campaign against Tairoran.
Aviation gasoline stc~dts are probably sufficient to sustain the nem Com-
munist air force for four to five months at peak operations; diesel and
fuel oil have been steadily imported by t!~ Communists during the peat
year in quantities adequate for the supply of the Coaxnuniat iti~rasion
flesto
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~ ,.
The rYeatern nations, will.ir~ thuafar tc export petroleum products
to meeE the essential civilian requirements of China, have shipped- over
]C)0,000 tons to Comrcttnist China during the past year. Tn additian, the
Soviet orbit has provided 56,000 tar`s (ass Table II). The principal
ityeatern suppliers, IIS and British companies, have agreed, ho~rever, to
deny the Chinese Comariunists products such as aviation gasoline which
have a predominantly military value atxi it is probable that tl~ only
important imports of aviation gaaaline during the past year consisted
of 19,000 tons from Rua~nia -- lt-p000 of vahich were delivered to Dairen
in a US-owned tanker w~.thin the last t~aa ~eeeks and thus area not included
in Table II. Possibly amal.2. quantities mi.slabelsd as motor gasoline
have been shipped xrom Hong Kong? Since aviation ,gasoline for the 3,mmery
diets requirements of the air farce is not believed to bo in short supply,
it appears likely that recent preaiatent Corarnunist inquiries far aviation
gasoline in bong Kong stem from a desire to reaua~e civil air aativi ty?
Table II
Petroleum imports into Communist China, Syr 19/+9 to April 1950
191-8 Comma Currant Anrua~
Kong
r
~
~'
1'1o
Thera
Exr-Rumania ~c-0
Tom
rte R~u~r~~ s
..
..
..
-
,
~
~)
Avlgas
=--
~?o
--
?
0 }
]
x50.1
200e0
Mogas
20.2
2U.S
---
$
,4
Keraser~e
12a~
1x0.0
..r
5~a4]
102` (
2
0
? --
Diesel & Fuel 51+
1101
b5.8
992p9
0
?
0
35
0
Iubaila
1000
w.
~-
1060
1}30
e
TOTALS
97x5
Ei5?g
11?1
174.+1
1s/-+?3
ry
/oOoV
These are preliminary oa].sxtlationa based an pasaib>,y incamplste data, but
they are nevertheless roughly indicative of the cp:antities imparted4 Imports
Smm the Soviet Far East have been mall, if ac'Ly+, and no eetiroate of th~-~a is
included. Domectie production has been omitted as a source of supply, since
the output of the two ma~ar praducara, at Yuman in Kansu, and Foshan in Msn-
churia, hoe been small and mostly limited to local. distribution`
Current annual requirements (1) assume that the !Carnraunists will continue to
reduce conswuption wherever possible by strict rationing to essential. uses
and by converting, where Feasible, power and other plants to the use at coal
and (2) take into account the airtsiLnent aF pail-burn ireg shipping and the
conversion of the Shanghai Pots?r Company ~ which consumed a fourth of 1948
Imports -- to coal far its fuel
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Althaugh the Gocununist regime ie believed able to mast its imasediate
military requirements far petroleum products, it wilt fall far short of
fulfilling the needs of the Chinese econoa~r, It is astiraated that current
annual civilian requirements total 700,000 tans of ail ,products while the
Communists are only. ,importing at a rate of about ~OOg000 tons, thereby
necessitating a considerable curtailment of Ghina+s industries and trans-
portation, Owing to the Cammunist~a~ tilt foreign exchange position and
the inability of the Soviet Union to provide a mayor share of China+a
current annual petroleum requirements of 700?000 tones it is estimated
that the Communists will be unable to restor? industry and transport to
full. operation in 1950.
NEIYS NOmES
Ear and Inca lets unofficial r8 is from Koreas First rode er}-
dent- election indicate that: 1 guerrillas and underground agents in
southern Korea directed from northern Korea failed to prevent orderly
conduct of voting; (aj nearly 90 percent of th4 eligible voters went to
the polio; (3) several "moderates" riho boycotted the UN-sponsored election
in 191x8 and who here puial,ialy acauaed by the administration last we0k of
havir~; Communist bactcing apparently won victories in Seoul against lead-
ing candidates of the two mayor conservative parties; and (~) many incum-
bents mnd regular candidates of the two rna~ar per ties were dofeatedn It
now appears that Yua Chiyung, leader of the Great Korea ~tational3,at Party,
and one of the rru~at exfectiva supporters of the President in the Assembly
has been defeated by a "moderate~~, iYon Sea. Iioan? However, thct balance
of power between fthee supporters and the Democratic-Nationalist Party ~-
which desires to acquire more influence through the ~astablishment of a
?responsible cabinet" type governorent --- ~ril.l. not be clarified until same
time after the near Assembly convenes and the political alignraQnts at sno-
+cessful "indepand?nts" are morn apparenta
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Ne~-otiatione b the Burmese Government with the Psoplets Volunteer
Organisation PYO leaders far a cessation of the PVQ rebellion have
been virtually completed and a formal annauncemant to that effect is ax-
pected soono Although they cannot speak far the~.r ~eidely dispersed
fallow?rs, the return of the PQO leaders to the Government fold could
represent a significant step toward the restoration pf la~+ and order to
Burma and the reassertion of Governmental authority over considerable
territorya
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SEC~'ION iii. Trade Possibilities for ,~a-aan ict South and 5cxz theaat Asia
iri the aprin~; of 1950, s US rr~sion under Stanley Andrews was diet
pa.tchad to the Far East, "in an offort to make a broad appraisal of the
food and trr~d? situation as it rela#~s to a Toad and raw material supply
for Japan in exchange for Japanese gadded" Noting that the possibi?.ity
of eucpanding Japanese trad? wiL-h Southeast Asia, is dependont upon that
areafs political and military situation, the Andrews Mission set forth
the follo~ning conclusions:
Japan is proeently producing 84-65 of its total food coneusnptiono
Hocause a rar-x~s deairabio ration, nutritionally, should be psnvided and
because it is doubtful that the Japar~e$e aan increase their 1oca1 food
production sufficiently to offset the rate of population increase, how-
evaz~, Japan cannot reaaanab].y expect to rRa.i,nta3.n its present recardo
Given reasonable etabilf.ty in certain Southeast Asia countries (Burma,
Indochi.naa, Thailand} xndoneaia, Korea, and Formosa}, by 1952, Japan
should be able to procure food supplies from that area sufficient to
most some two-thirds or more of its basic food import requir?menta. 7n
turn, the Southeast Asian taarl~et for Japanese goods, especi$1ly textiles
and small canaurn$r itoma, is ?ubstantia7ly in excess of the amounts con-
templated in present trade agreeaents? Furthermore, Japan can assist the
development of Southeast As9.an a;riae~.ltura by ~l} preventing an assured
narrket for increased food production, (2} supplying fertilizers and farm
machinery, arad (~) providing technicians to assist in the improvement of
agricultural techniques and the servicing of Japanese agricultural equip-
ment.
Selectod observations of the Andrews.Miasion on several Southeast
Asian cautntriea follow:
Thailand--Ric? production and exports, wh~.ch aampare favorably Frith
pre-roar levels, reflect an apparent economic and political stability.
Prospects for increaaino production era encouraging. Thailand~a mayor
greaent imports from Japan consist of cotton textiles and industrial ma-
chinery. In turn, fouir-fifths of Japans imports item Thailand will. ba
rice (3~0,00o tans}A
Ind Althou;h a food deficit area since 1945, largely as a re-
sult of transportation difficulties and internal disturbanees, the coun-
try is expectod to beao~ue aelPw$ufficient in food within two yearso ~-
danesian snd Japanese representatives are n>gatiatir-g atrade agreoment
whereby, for the most part, Indonesia mill impart Japanese textiles while
Japan will reeeivr~ crude rubber.
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i~a].apa--Rubber and copra product~.on has been ~omphasi~ad at the ax
penes of food crops for many years, ?>tind rice production in 1945-49 was
only some half of the local requiramenta Crudo rubber is t~alaya~s ].ax-
gent single export to Japan; imparts are chiefly oatt~on textiles.
-Although approximately 72 percent of the cultieated land Sa
deYOted to rice, civil disturbances hate considerably curtailed rice
production for exports. As a result, availabl,o exports fsam the 191+9-
54 crop are estimated at only somewhat over 6t~,004 torte as compared to
annual exports of about 3 million tans in the pre war ~1935-19~) period.
Under present trade agreements, four-fifths of Japanrs purchases in Bur-
ma will be rice. Tn turn, Burma will import cotton and small-scale
-rCOttage induetrq rr equipment.
The PhilipQ,ines--Present food praductLan runs s ome 8~ of consump-
tion and the remainder is made up by rice iaipartae principally from the
United Staten. Principal Philippine imports Iran Japes in 1958 ~+~ ~
iron and steel. products, textiles and rolling s took: eacports ~o Japan
will be abaca, copra and iron ors.
Taiwan--Before ~7orld i+1ar II, the island t~s8 a ma,~ar source of Jspa-
nese foods especially sugar and rise. Sinca the w~-r, sugar has been ex-
ported to Japan, but rwt rice, A aide variety of Japanese goods are iat-
ported, priaaar ily cotton textiles and machinery.
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