INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 32 15 DECEMBER - 23 DECEMBER 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000500010021-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 23, 1948
• Content Type: PERRPT

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FAR EAST/PACIFIC mica
OFF/CE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE =NWT
WORKING PAPER
CL
NE)'
AUT
DATE
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, NOT an
official CIA issuance, and has not necessarily been
coordinated with other ORE producing components?
It represents current thinking by one group of
upecialists in CIA, and is designed for use by
others engaged on similar or overlapping studies.
The opinions expressed herein may be revised before
final and official publication. It is intended
solely for the information of the addressee and not
for further dissemination?
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wpm WREPCIRTS AND ESTIMATES, CIA
PAR EAST/PACIFIC mem
INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. az
16 DECEMBER .0:88 DECEMBER 1948
SECTION I. SMEARY OF an EAST TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Far Eastern reaction to Dutch *police action" is particularly vehement
(page 2).
Japanese reaction to Chimes, Communist victories range from jubilation
on the part of the Communists to .deep anxiety, for security and economic
reasons, on the part of the center and right (page a). , The US strengthens
SCAPts powers in order to speed, eoohomio revival and for security considerw.
ations(page 8)0
?
Soviet withdrawal from Worth Korea will be completed by 1 January 1949
(page 4). Soviet policy, will frustrate the prinoipal objeotives of the new
UN Commission on Korea (page 6),
The North China Communist forces have encircled Peiping and Kalgan
and are currently in the process of surrounding Tientsin (page 8). Mil's),
newly appointed Premiers appears to.have been eueoesiful in the formation of
a new "pro#CBIANG" Cabinet (page B). its increasing instability of South
China is evidenced by reeent reports that boa). warlord CHANO FaAtivei is
oonoerting.with anti..80010 elements to overthrow the present Iwangtung regime
(page 7)0
In Indonesia strong RepUblioan resistance to the Dutch "police action"
his not yet developed (page 9)0
In the Philippines inoreaeing concern is being expressed over Chinese
ommunigt gains (page 9).
In Sian the PhibulGovernment has establiihed import controls (page 10).
In suseeedini'sectionaoethis Weekly. the following marginal notation is
used
(1) 7A",. "B*0-.or .-im -tasiati 13/PEt .the item, :with
por n op en of
*A* repretenting-the;most *portant Ones.
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SECTION U. DEVELOPRENTS IN SPECIFIED ARRAS
GENNRAI.
Dui** "pollee action" in Indonesia has brought immediate, and world-wide
'condemnation. Fenner oolosdal areas in the'Far Seethes been particularly
vehement in their denuneiation of the Delphi Th0Thilippines have proaised
to give satire support to the Indonesians in the 1116 Burma has urged an all"
Asiatic oonference to consider extending aid to the Indonesians-. India is
seriously considering breakingdiplomatic relations with the Netherlands and
denying the use of Indian ports and airfields to the Duteh. Ceylon and
Pakistan have often expressed their sympathies for the Indonesians* and
Ceylon has officially denied the Dutch use of it* harbors and airports* The
only refraction favorable to the Duluth has come from Freneh oolonial newspapers
in Indochina %thioh cite the danger of Indonesian Communism and *Jeer the
Dutch action as the only practical solution. One paper praises Dutoh courage
and energy, scorns protests ehich have been made in Europe, US, and India and
sarcastically depreciates posiible action by the =Security Council* Support
for the Indonesians has also been forthcoming from other quarters. The UN
Cood Offices Committee (000), in its report to the Security Counoils-severely
indicts the Dutch' for unilaterally abrogating the truce. Australia a
member of the 0000 has expressed disappointment in the US and UR for not
applying the pressure within their power whiehtte Australians felt would
have prevented the "police action." Australia has gone so far as to recommend
before the Security Council that the Netherlands be thrown out of the UN un-
less the.attaik on the Indonesian Republic is halted. The Arab League will
support the Indonehianss and there are indications that the League will
refuse to recognize any Dutch-established government in Indonesia. The
Soviet Union is gleefully stressing the feet that the Dutch are using British
and Mario= military equipment in their operations, and accuses the "Angles.
Ameriean imperialists" of planning and instigating the whole affair in order
to make Indonesia 4 colony and its people slaves. The USSR, its satellites,
and communist parties throughout the worlds amy be expected to exploit this
opportunity to increase their vitriolic attacks upon the US, and this propa-
ganda may be more effective in the Fat Zest than in the past because of the
Dutch military action against the IndonesianBeptiblio. (See International
Organization (remp Weekly Summary No. 32 for further details on SC action.)
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WL
Cr"o1414 -sett r Car ipase Commist sweetie:1p. Reports or
CCP victories have beim received stth differ-
ing emotions ranging from Subilation o the part or the extreme left to
sasiotr on the part at the 'center and the right.' MURATA, Japanese
Communist daily, has repeatedly extolled CCP suoceeses and stated that
the establishment of the NaolTswitunges regime evad be the "first step
towards the liberation of the Japanese masses." The Japanese press
reports the Alamos. Coomunist Partes reoruiting program has been very
successful lament weeks. While this say, be merely coincidental, it
skald be recalled that the Japanese have always been acutely sensitive
to great movements on theAsiatio mainland.
The mom conservative press is deeply concerned with the security
*emits or Nationalist deterioration in China Some elements see the
situation as reflecting the larger UEKr0SR "cad War", with the un-
written interpretation that the China deka, represents a defeat for
the US, The Japanese would be fteppier* to have a Nationalist China,
even a corrupt one, for a neighbor than a China ruled by the CCP.
Believing US assistance lb vital to China, Japanese opinion in pessimistic
over the amount and the speed of the aid.; :Peeling the Bed sweep in China
will be followed-up-by Communist pressure on South-Nast AA0m4 Korea and
Japan, editorial comment sees Japan's'security closely bound to that of
the UR and the consequent need fOr adequate-US support of Japan. Deeply
perturbed 'by the Constitutional Prohibition on armed forces Japanese_
feel that in the event of hostilities Japan would be treated. by the
Cemmonists as an 'unarmed belligerent' associated with the US.
the economic aide, some elements in attempting to see an opti-
mistic future, forecast that the CC? will. be reeeptive to trade over-
tures In view of the CCP4a lack of industrial know-how and technicians.
Other comeent sees the Reds as being willing to do busimes only on
terse favorable to Communism, politically as well as economically. It
is felt that government and commercial interests will soon be forced
int0 the realisation that trade ulth Communist China can not be relied
upon from a long rause viewpoint, to substitute for Chines important
gees in Japan's pre...toad ter II Mawr.
The US Or
has limed a formal direotive to to the japaneee to "carry out
an effective' economic stabilisation program" as "rapidly as possible."
leasures are to be adopted, which will assure rigorous control of credit,
improve the tax collection programi.tchieve a true balance in the con-
solidated budget, establish an adequate wage and price stabilisation
OAS
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/Mg (Cont.)
programs laprove the eiffeetiveness of the allocation and rationing
system, particularly to this end of maximisiog exports, increase the pro-
duction seal essential indigenous ram' materials and manufactured
products, heighten the offictenmyof the food collection program,and
improve controls of foreign trade end foreign etchings. The tates
that the resultant stabilisation cal pave the way for the early estab-
liehment of a single cehange rats.
The formal directive is a signifLoant Implementation of US policy to
proceed firmly toward the revival of the Japanese soonavy, It strengthens
and broadens the discretionary powers of SUP who for acme tine has been
"suggesting" measures of this type rather than issuing formal orders to
the Japanese Government, SOAP may be expected to utilise the &real
directive as a "big stick' against the extreme forces within Japan obi&
have been hanpering efforts toward Japanese economic rehabilitation, At
the one pole are the conservatives atm desire early removal of controls
'tithe view to maintaining their traditional economic preeminence, At
the other are the Communists, who have bean increasingly open In their
defiance of SCAP efforts toward 000001d0 improvement.
The firming of US efforts to stabilise the Japanese economy represents
a. desire to bring about a revival III Japan as soon as possible so as to
curtail the continuing drain of costs of aid and, occupation. It is even
IWO a recognition that a stable Japan is of Increasingly urgent impor-
tance to US strategic consideration, especially in the light of recent
events throughout the Par East.
Soviet eva9aeg94 orpprth prat is amycechine its fiWoltaget General
Nerkulow Commanding General of Soviet Forces in North Korea, has official-
ly notified General Coulter, Coming General of US Forces in South
Korea, that withdrawal of Soviet Forces from North Korea will to completed
by the end of December. Arrangements call for crossing the 38th parallel
by the respective liaison officers" trains on 23 December 194g? The
withdrawal indicates that the Sovietisation of North Korea has 12011 been
consolidated. The Soviets are leaving behind a North Korean Peoples
Army capable of invading South Korea and reliable reports of the issue
Of nee citizens' certificates is an indication of tho adoption of strict
control measures over individual freedom of movement in true police state
tradition, It is anticipated that upon completion of the Soviet with
drama]. from North Korea there will be a marked increase in border incidents
and guerrilla raids into South Korea by tends trained to stir up unrest
and to weaken the government in South Korea,
s, posiostrVit'''Imai.j'ims----ma
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Ma (Conte)
Egligajdakm igjaLamtjajalest...- Communiet polio, for Korea 'du
te otratheefforteellthenewiCommiselon on Korea to promote
uniflostioa and to observe Soviet troop eithdrawal, The Soviets intend
that all Korea shall eventually be unified under their North Korean
oemnunist regime and win continue their unilateral intervention in
Korean affairs through the facade of the North Korean People's lepublio.
The Soviets probably till have announced the completion of their troop
withdrawal before the Commission arrives in Korea and will state that the
03117ProPmr authority inlets& is the People's Republic? The North
Korean efticiale, following the Soviet line, have announced that the RN
Commission on Korea is an illegal body and the Commission undoubtedly
will be refused permission to enter North Korea to ohedi on the actuality
of Soviet troop withdrawals, Although the promos of the Commission in
? South Korea will increase the prestige and morale of the Republic of
Korea, it is extreasAy doubtful if the Commissioes arrival will deter
the Communists in North or South Korea from initiating lazy plane they
mey have for violent action against the Republic,
MI?.?'EGRII"raiwgra""
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CHINA
Communists invest Pei n threaten Tientsin. The focal point in the "0
civil war at d - or.ins ere the supposedly powerful
Natiobalist armies of PU Sao-yi have been segmented and compressed into the
environs of Nalgan, Peiping, and Tientein. PU 'a forces are outnumbered;
Communist Genersle hag Jung-ohen and LIN Piao have 470,000 troops opposed to
FO's maxim= 300.000. He is further weakened by the refusal of Govern-
neat troops recently assigned to hin4 including nearly all of both
the Peiping and Tientsin garrisons, and tbe Chinese Air Force to
obey his orders. Mance, PU has withdrawn onside ths city walls of
Peiping, perhaps on the assumption that the Communists cannot shell
the ancient city without damaging its historical landmarks and there-
with their propaganda position. At present the Communists have some
12 columne around Peiping, where both airfields have been rendered
inoperable and the major source of the oity's electric power occupied
by the Communiste. Manchurian units of LIN Piao, moving south along
the railway from Tangshan and southeast from the Peiping seotor.have
reached the approaches of Tientsin. Inaanuch as Tientsinfs airfield
has been lost, overland traffic 'with Peiping cut off, and Tangku
reported taken, the early loss of this important North China industrial
center is indicated.
Central China was relatively quiet, the Communist* having all
bat finished mopping up the isolated Natioralist units between the ?
Huai River and lisuchou. Communist forces are currently moving south
toward the Buai River area and as a consequence the Nationalists are
withdrawing all but two armies south from Pangfou and the Huai River
front. Also, the Nationalist High Command appears to have lost track
of a large number of the Communist columns formerly in this area.
Meanwhile, east of Rungtse lake, 40,000 COMMUlliat6. under SU /U4
captor of Tetuan, have reportedly driven as far south as Kaoyu. The
Nationalist defenders in this area have withdrawn to Tangkou and
Chinkiang, the latter an the Yangtze Elver 40 miles northeast of Nanking.
Formation of a new Cabinet headed by SUN Po evidences CHIANG Kai.
shek's determination to continue resistance to the Communists despite
general unwillingness of his high officials to support this program
without assurance of extensive US aid. The Cabinet includes an inner
policy-making group which represents various Kuomintang cliques but
its decisions on vital questions are expected to reflect OHIANG's wishes.
None of this group wanted to serve and all, except possibly CRIX Li-fu,
strongly favor attempts to make peace with the Comeunists. SUR 's
public statement regarding the possbility of an "honorable peace"
may reflect CRIANG's hopes for temporary stabilisation of the military
situation and for future US aid. Although both the Cabinet peace group
mosulkia,-."-Err
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and other pato* advocates such as Tice President LI Tsunguijen want
an immediate truce, they apparently ate at a loss to find the means
by which a satisfactory settlement might be reached with the Communiets.
Slave the Cabinet includeo NightistilUomintang leaders in prominent
posts, it say be unable to negotiate a truce in any went. Its
leaders, therefore1 may consider a resort to some farm of international
action desimed to huttress the National Government's weak bargaining
position. Possible courses of action include proposals for some form
of mediation or diplomatic' activity by the US, by the USSR, by these
rears Jointly, by the Dig Three signatories of the *moo* Declaration
of 1045, or by the Dig Four whoa in addition to China, have permanent
seats in the UR Secerity Council. Any such diplomatic initiative an
the part of the National 00111)11=912t would be consonant with Chinese
diplomatic traditions which are characterised by efforts to shift
responsibilities to the international realm and to profit by bringing
into focus the 'conflicting interests of the great powerao
AL growing trend toward instability in South China is evidenced by
recent developmeniio Despite Governor T. V. SedkG's year-long efforts
in Kwangtung, Comausist and other guerrilla activities have not been
suppressed and recently have increased. General CHANG Pa.-kw:it:100a/
warlord whoseveral times in the past resisted the National Govern-
ment,-is again in Centen. Although ostensibly planning to organise
Nationalist troops, GUANO reportedly is concerting with local generals
to overthrow the SOONG regime. In this venture be may cooperate with
Communist and other dissident forces whioll already control considerable
areas in'Kwangtung and Seinen. Suchen uprising would be facilitated
by SOONG's unpopularity as well as by the military weakness of discredited
Nationalist elements which may be transferred to Canton when Ranking
falls. A further factor is the recent escape to Bong Kong of LUNG Tun,
former warlord of Unnan, whose name has been linked with various
dissident groups., including the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee.
Although LUNG's interest in Yunnaness autonomy would cause him to
favor establishment of a een-Communist regional government in South
China, considerations of expedienty might dictate his collaboration
with a.Communist-supported movement there.
Influx of National CovernmenVenite and refugees into Taiwan
will sharpen existing tensions there :and intensi popular anti-
Chinese feeling. Despite 80MA erfoiI41:0 the, provincial government
to discourage the movement, tens of thousands of refugees, including some
officials, are seeking safety in Taiwan. *weever. Nationalist naval
and air forces are being transferred to the island. Communist activities,
hitherto of slight isTortanOe, reportedly are increasing It has been
reported that Communists are infiltrating the unpatrolled coasts
and that the Communists may attempt to geese some Chinese naval veseelso
000005,r6C4--ET
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However, general anti-Communist feeling and increased Nationalist military
strength in Taiwan make difficult any early seisure of power by the
Conmenists,
Soviet tredswith China in 1948 has been characterized by exports
of important strategic materials from South China, and a large volume
of trade with the Communists in Manchuria. Chine's 1948 exports to
the USSR have been sizeable, although most of the trade is unrecorded
and must be estimated. Recorded exports consisting of bristles, tea,
silk and goat skins will amount to V8 $3 million to US $4 million.
1to equal value of strategic metals (tungsten end antimony) has been shipped
under the 1938 Sino-Soviet barter agreement. long Kong's exports
(U8 $3 million for the first half of 1948) to the USSR were largely
strategic materials re-exported from China. An additional undetermined
quantity of these strategic items., anuggled out of China, are ultimately
purchased by the USSR throughout the Par Mast.
Communist Manchurian trade is probably several times greater
than Nationalist trade, with the USSR, although Manchuria's agricultural
and lumber surpluses are less significant to the Soviet Union than
the minerals the USSR gets from South China. If the soybean and grain
surplus north and east or the Sungari River all goes to the USSR,
ehich is probable, its value eould be around US $30 million. According
to reports, Communist imports into Manch:aria consist largely of
munitions, textiles, petroleum products and trucks. The Manchurian
pattern of trade with the USSR, exporting food and agricultural
raw materials for finished goods, appears to be fairly well stabilized
and will continue next year, poseibly oa a larger scale if agricultural
production continues to be expanded in, Manchuria.
Communist oftupation Of Chinese large cities, such as Tientsin
and Shanghai, if it oCcOrs this winter, will not present the Communists
with insurmountable fuel problems since almost all of China's large
coal mines are now in their hands. The Rail= mines can easily supply
all of North China. In addition Tiesntsin has coal stooks adequate
for several months and Peiping has the nearby Montoukou anthraoite
mines. Fuel rot Shanghai and Nanking, presently very abort. of coal,
will come from three sources: 1) the Nailaamines will be able to ship
much coal to Shanghai despite any attempted Nationalist blockade; 2)
the Alain= mines in Anhwei can move large accumulated stocks to the
Yangtze when the Tientain-Pukae Railroad is reopened; 3) :Shanghai
has petroleum' stocks on band sufficient for several months at the
present high rate of consumption. If Shanghai receives enough coal,
its industries, particularly the Shanghai Power Company, would probably
reconvert to ooal. It is estimated that with minimum consumption
present oil stocks would last for one or two years.
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INDONESIA
R blican resistance to Dutch mili drive. Dutch forces met "An
with t e ree tame po e action against the
Republic which began at midnight on 18 Decekber. Jogjakarta, the cap-
ital, fell to Dutch paratroopers in the first few hours of fighting.
Although Dutch forces now occupy 'Jogjakarta and Soerakarta, the second
ranking Republican city in Java, Republican military resistance in
surrounding areas appears to be developing. Strength of the regular
Republican Army (TNT) is estimated at 100,000, with 7 of its divisions
in Java and 3 in Sumatra.
It is believed by pro-Republican sources in Indonesia that the
Republic is withholding application of its most effective weapon,
"scorched earth," until the UN Security Council has made its decision.
Republican elements, however, have, already resorted to a limited scorched-
earth policy by firing its oil center at Tjepoe before it fell to
Dutch troops.
In view of the fact that ranking military and political leaders were
captured by the Dutch at the beginning ot the action, it will be some
weeks before Republican nationalists will be able to organize an effective
campaign against Dutch installations. Maanwhile the danger exists that
former Republican groups will support the alleged irotskyite., Tan Malakkal
who had made considerable headway as a left-ming leader in the Republican
political circles.
PUTLIPPIMPS
increasin concern ressed over Chinese Communist ins. As a re- "B"
sult of ommunist successes n C a, P ippine officials and the press
are showing increasing concern oVer the Philippine Government's position
vie-a-vis China and Communist activity within the Philippines. Both Secre-
tary of National Defense Rupert() Kangleon and Nero iso Ramos, newly appointed
Master 60 Argentina, have warned that developments in China constitute
a threat to the security of the Philippines. Editorial opinion in the
nanila Press has recently expressed the fear that a gradual. US military
withdrawal from the Philippines may leave the country open to aveaci; by
Communist forces, Meanwhile the House Committee on 1111-;Filipino Activities,
which has been conducting hearings to determine the strength of Communists
in the Philippines, has stated that a series of bills designed to combat
communism and to tighten immigration restrictions will be introduced in
the Congress in January.
Possibly reflecting encouragement from Chinese Communist gains was a
defiant report written by Mariano P. Balgos, Secretary General of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), and distributed to the press
following his .appearance before the House Committee on Uri-Filipino Activi-
ties. Balgoe stated that the WP hopes ultimately to establish communism
throughout the Philippines but is willing to compromise 'at the moment. On
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40-
PHILIPPINPS (continued)
a coalition government. He said the PKP seeks to achieve its goal by
constitutional means but will not hesitate to use force if necessary
to restore democrttic liberties. Declaring that, ?We are aiming at
the overthrew of the imperialietic-ifeudal-fascist domination of the
Country," he further said that the main enemy of the masses is US
imperialism, and that the chief ?getters,' Of the Philipnines are
the PS troops based in the islands. He stated that the Communists
intend to keep their total membership secret and warned that the party
will go underground if outlawed. Balgos is reported to have told the
Committee that there is no connection between the PIP and the Chinese
Communist Party or the Tominform,fl but that in case of war between
the PS and the Soviet, he himself would side with the USSR,
ILipor.r,,controlsestablished. The recent proclamation of a Royal
deorsi-iiitiSIIihEi-iiiit7-6-6ntrol licensing system by Siam appears
to be another step in the evolving economic nationalism of the Phibul
regime,; The controls cover, among other* the importation of cosmetics,
& l* of foods, automobiles, cement, and linseed and tung oil. Vhiie
the success Of the licensing system is considered dubious unless strong
exchange controls are considered, the import controls were believed
established: (1) to strengthen the baht preparatory to a single exchange
rate for participation in the International Monetary Fund and a possible
request for a 7orld Bank Loan; (2) as a Slap at the Chinese; (3) to ex-
pand the activities of the Government Purchasing Commission; and (4) to
provide a profitable traffic in import permits. ?
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SECTION I//o DIGEST OP IMPORTANT STUDIES AND ESTIMATES
SOVIET -CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS
The USSR appears to have approved once again certain Chinese Communist
tactics which, while at variance with. present practices within the USSR,
are recognized by the USSR as those most suitable to the Chinese situation.
This process began in 1931, fellowing the failure of. LI Li.stut's "protetarian
revolution" in China; the USSR, ribologising the inapplicability of the
Marxist formula to China, removed LI to Moscow, and MAO Tse.tUng continued
to build the Chinese Communist Party (COP) upon an organized and armed
peasantry.
The most recent Soviet evaluation of CCP domestic policies appears in
a speech by one Comrade Burzhalo*, a funationary of the Section of Agitation
and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party
(Bolshevik), whose prenouncomente maybe regarded as authoritative. Burshalov
remarks that the Comintern, "a single eentralized and international Communist
Party," was dissolved because the *arious,Cemmunist Parties had grown stronger
and"Were leading indePendentlived6" *saver, because "the Communist move.
ment is, in iti essinoe, an international movement," the various Parties must
"work out a single tactical program." To this end, the Cominfons was organised.
Burshalov celebrates the stumps Of the Communist effort in Eastern Europe,
and remarks that "the New Demooraoiee fait* the same -road ea...our own country,
...although in a.someehat,different-manner." There has been one great betrayals
the leadership of the Yugoslav_Commuaist Party "chose to break away from the
united Communist frent...and adopt .e nationalist position." Nationalism is
all verywell? says Burshalov, but "in ,to otee should lead to a severing of
international tiei." To speak trankly "the touchstone for all Socialists is
the attitude they assume toward the Soviet Union." (Burshalov himeelf makes
it clear that the "single taotieal program" is not a primary consideration;
the essential question it Whether the given Communist Party can be relied
upon to subordinate the national interest to the interests of the USSR.)
Of China, BurZhaloV Says: *Everyone knows the tremendous successes...
(of) the People's Liberation Army of China...These successes may be explained
not only by the military valor of the Chinese Communiste...but primarily by
(their)oorreot The revolution in China is leading to "a People's
Democracy," which "isnot, however, identical with the People's Democracies
of Eastern...Europe." Burshalov quotes MAO on: the goal of the CCP; "'the
extermination of mOnopoly (bureaucratic) capital and of the landlord ?last
and the big (bureaucratic) bourgeois class, but not the extermination of
capitalism in general or... of the small and middle bourgeoisie.' The baok.
wardnese of the Chinese economy makes it necessary to allow the capitalist
system...to continue to exist for a long time yet." Burshalov Credits the
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CCP litith having "jarred into motion a gigantic nation." and states that,
"following the example of thu Chinese Communists, the Communists of other'
countries of the Far East have also been waging a self-saorifioing battle...."
HurshilovcOnoludes by exhorting all Communist Parties to study carefully
"thetriumphent experience of our (Soviet) Party."
The policy of the CCP, in ?adducting a revolution Whit* has been prima-
rily a national movement, based on the peasantry, and tentatively conciliatory
toward man-Communist fordo., has in fact been endorsed by both Lenin and Stalin,
But such justification was provisional* the revolution, to continue in Soviet
favor, amst subordinate the eational Movement to the international and the
peasantry to the proletariat, and evintuallydispose of the non.Communist
forces.. Long ago. Stalin wrote that the USSR will support "those movements...
of the peasantry...ahloh assist the emanoipatton movement of the proletariat...
(and) help to transform the peasantry into a reserve and ally of the working-
olass." Likewise, "support must be given to such national movements as tend
to weaken and overthrow Imperialism. (However, "when the national movements...
come into conflict with the interests of the proletarian movement." i.e.. with
Soviet interests. "support is, of agorae, entirely out of the -question.") In
regard to conciliatory tactics, Stalin quotes Lenin, "To carry an a war for
the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie,..and to refuse beforehand to
maneuver, ,to utilize the conflicit of,intereste (even though temporarily) among
one's en:Atos, to refuse to temporize and to compromise with
mould not this be ridiculous...?"
Often, in the past year, COP leaders proclaimed that, the OCP, because It.
recognises the USSR as its prinoipel friend and the US as its principal enemy,
deserves the approval and support Of the USSR. In MAO'. Christmas Day speech
in 2947 (frorawhich Burshalov quoted), MAO defined the CCP economic program
lie one of gradual oolleotivisation of agriculture and the preservation of '
independent small business and Capital.... The guiding principle," said MAO..
"(will be that of) developing production and a flourishing economy, taking
into account both public and private interests and bonen* to both labor and
'capital." The USSR is aware, however, that the "bourgeois capitalist" period
in China is a temporary conoession, and that MAO plans, both by releasing'
capital for industrial development end by collectivization of agriculture, to
release peasants from the land to form a docile and dependable proletariat.
In the above speech, MAO emphasized that theorists" whioh is "menauing American
imperialism" has. compelled the US to "plan for enslaving the world," specifi-
cally by organizing an "imperieliet anti-democratic front against all dame-
oratio forces headed by the Soviet Union." MAO endorsed the establishment of
the Cominform? and declared that the'"anti,imperialist forces or the various
Eastern countries should also unite..."
- In July 1948 the Central Committee of the CCP resolved that the Cominform's
condemnation of the Yugoslav Communist Party was essential, in order "to defend
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the people of Yugoslavia from the deception, and aggression of American
imperialism." The COP observed that "the Tito bloo...adopts an anti.Soviet,
attitudes.., and continues to regard international Communisv with hostility.*
MAO stated his views even more aggressively in the Cominform journal in
October: that events have "proved the titter hyproorisy and bankruptcy" of
those whe seek "a middle road...between imperialism and the Soviet Union."
Not merely the bountries of Asia, but "all revolutionary foroes...must
organise an anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union."
The OOP's leading Marxist theoretician, LIU Shao-chi, wrote last month
that the "Aeerioan imperialist plan for world enslavement accelerates the
development of the general crisis of oapitaliss." Communists everywhere will
resist such a plan, and will particularly encourage the resistance of "colonial
and semi.colonial countries." In this world crisis, "people must stand either
on the one side or on the other."
The happy unanimity suggested aboire, while probably genuine at the
moment, is not necessarily permanent. It will be no simple matter to trans-
form Chinese nationalism into Soviet internationalism. In addition, the USSR
has frequently called for the purification of all Communist Parties, and certain
00P leaders and their followers would resent and perhaps resist a Soviet. ,
inspired purge. Moreover, it is possible that the 'USSR seeks direct control of
a "People's Republic" of Manchuria, and will also attempt to annex Inner
Mongolia and Sinkiang, restricting to China Proper the authority of the less
dependable COP leaders. Another important consideration might be implicit in
MAO'S phrases "AO (Orientals) should hold our destinies in our 'awn hands,'"
It is probable that the COP aspires to lead the Communist movement in Asia;
this might lead to a contest with the USSR for control of the Coramunist move.
merit, particularly in Southeast Asia; Such a contest might well wipe out,
on both sides, much of the cordiality and common, cause which have been expressed
and evident to date.
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