WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS DIVISION WEEKLY WORKING PAPER

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-01090A000400050003-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
November 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 27, 1998
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 6, 1950
Content Type: 
PAPER
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01090A000400050003-0.pdf419.13 KB
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Approved For Rele 1999/09/02 : ClA-RDP79-0109Eb00400050003-0 WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIVISION WEEKLY For week ending 5 December 1950 6 December 1950 NOTICE: !1ORKING PAP? R This document is a working-paper, not an official issuance, since it has not necessarily been coor- dinated with and reviewed by other components of 0/RR.. It represents the formulative thinking of one group of analysts in O/Kit and is designed to provide the medium for transmitting their informal views to other intelligence analysts of the US Government who are working on similar or over- lapping problems. It is intended for the use of the addressee alone, and not for further dissemina- tion. COPY FOR:- DOCUMENT NO. NO rHANGE I N CLASS. ^ DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: DATVt 7 REVIEWER: 37,1044 Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000400050003-0 Approved For Relehs6 1999/09/02 CIA-RDP79-0109000400050003-0 For week ending 5 Decerilber 1950 25X6A Approved For Release 1999/09/02: C),CRDP79-01090A000400050003-0 5X6A Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000400050003-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000400050003-0 Approved For Rele' 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-010900400050003-0 25X6A The municipal elections in the Soviet-occu-plied province o ir5en and on 27 Lovcmber re,-)resent a c.rastic reduction of CO::m nist. rruri cipc.l representation to its :roper proportions; (2) a further indication of a lull in Soviet interference with Austrian domestic affairs; and (3) the con- tinuod refusal of the Austrians in the Soviet zone to vote Co::r..unist. Before the elections the Co_riuniste occupied a much Greater number of municipal offices than their electoral stren-th warranted, because in 1945 those offices were dis- tributed amonc the Socialist, People's and Coi iunist -parties on the basis of inter-party agreements and not free elections. The elections, however, do not represent any recent decline in Co.uunist strei th in the province, because the gamy polled ap:?roximately the same proportion of total votes cast (3) as in the 3urgenland returns of the national elections in D40. Nevertheles , the elections do represent the failure of a Soviet-sponsored Comunist-front Group (' he wall Par ers' Party) to Cain favor with the politically-wise Austrian popu- lace. Another notable feature of the elections was the total absence of Soviet interference as contrasted to the Soviet attempts to prevent the holding of Burgenland municipal elec- tions in the sprinC of 1950, interference which delayed the oloctions until _lovember. A developinG food shortaGe in ilustria, prim^.rily of gra?Ins, may cause social unrest and pol tics disturbances within tho next few Lmonths. Anticipated domestic and _foreiLn Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000400050003-0 Approved For ReIe 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109000400050003-0 S E C R E T deliveries of broadgrains are at least 200 less than 1950-51 roquiroments. Along with the considerable labor dissatis- faction over last October's wage-price agreement, a food short- age would be an additional issue which the Corrr^.iunists might exploit to spark labor disorders. The current grain shortage is largely due to the farmers' reluctance to sell grain on the donestic market, cncch, in spite of a recent increase in the controlled prices, is still below world price levels. Lacking sufficient coarse Grains for their livestock, the farmers have fed their stock broadgrains, which they have also been soiling to the Soviet economic agencies in Austria. These in turn sell the -rain abroad at substantial profits. Another factor leading, to the -rain shortage is in- sufficient imports, presumably because deliveries hoped for or expected from Eastern Eh?ropo are not materializing. Even if the Goverment receives sufficient US assistance to prevent a serious economic crisis, it will continue to be faced period- ically with similar problems, which arc sy ipto: atic of the artificial and distorted subsidy price-wage structure, FIU. .?ICE Although the recently announced French military budget for 1051 falls eonsider~:bly below US expectations the French Government is prepared to begin implementing its plans both for placing 10 divisions in active status in Europe in 1951 and for stopping up defense measures in Indochina. The draft military budget amounts to 740 billion francs (includi -15 billion which are being transferred from the civil budget), compared to about 500 billion of actual military oxpondi tures in 1050. The US, however, is e.:pocted to contribute the equivalent of 140 billion francs of this sum in military aid, and hence the French are proposing to increase their share of the bud.-et only a,out 16;,. over actual military expenditures for 1050. At Washington in September, Defense :sinister Loch declared that a military budget of at least 650 billion francs would be necessary, including US military aid to the amount of 270 billions, if his plans for the 10 divisions were to be realized. The US subsequently indicated, however, that only 140 billions in aid should be expected, and the present draft budget reflects a similar cut below t:iochts estimate of the required military budget. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : -01090A000400050003-0 T Approved For Rele 1999/09/02: CIA-RDP79-010000400050003-0 Me assertion by the ITS that it had considered granting any military aid only on the assumption of a mili. terry budget aTp roxima tL*Z 850 billion francs, has boon rat by strong assurances from Premier Pleven and Finance I.Unister Petacho that France will fulfill its eormailanents to activate 10 divisions and intensify the defense effort in Indochina. For this purpose, French, Govcrmmont officials have increased the budgetary figures for Ietropolitan France at the expense of In~.ochina, apparently expecting that in the course of the year the perennial resort to extraordinary financing, of the Indochinese budgetary deficit would perm. it the greater de- fenso effort in that area which is presently contemplated. Furthermore, for political r a sons French of~:icials may have found it expedient to ar.blo that the rapid march of world events might per t a major recasting of their financial needs by late 1951. ",bile the suItstantial vote of confidence ,Which the French Assembly has just granted the Ploven Govcrn:ront gives the Premier initial ac vantage in the debate on the 1951 budget, coalition solidarit~r has been seriously weak- ened as a result of the secret ballot against the Socialist Defense :'inister Jules foci Which led to this vote. Premier Pleven demanded, in his declaration prior to the vote, that acceptance of additional tax Measures be implicit in the vote of confidence, thus insuring; ca no support for the now budget. The Socialists bitterly charged that the size of the anti- I.Toch vote was due to the dupolicty of those Popular Republican (,.TRP) r:ic_ bers who, influenced partly b-17 their poreonal animo- sity towards the Defense 'sinister, had abetted the Communist scheme to embarrass the Government. The vote against 'loch revealed a serious split not only between the dominant parties of the coalition, Taut also within the ranks of the QUIP. The anti-IToch vote which precipitated tai s sudden political crisis resulted from loch's association with the Revers-I:Tact Scandal, involving a breach of natl onal security. The Government attom_-)ted to rosin when the opposition polled a lame vote against _Toch, but President Auriol refused . to accept the resignation -and prevailed on the Premier to as}; for a vote of confidence. Pleven realized that Parliament would be reluctant to face dissolution before electoral re- form had boon agreed on, and in the face of the critical international situation. Ho also saw in a vote of confidence the opportunity to exact support for a tax program which the Socialists had boon expected to op, ose. Although the` Assembly cleared the integrity of Defense Tinistor Hoch and approved the general poll ties of the Cabinet, the hostility engendered during, this politic,-:1 crisis may sufficiently weaken the pro- eariously balanced Third-Force regime to hasten the holding of U,or-.eral election-,-, now scheduled for the fall of 1051. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 05A RDP79-01090A000400050003-0 Approved For Ruse 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-016 A000400050003-0 NFMIEZUUDS To protect Dutch economic interests in Indonesia the Netherlands probably v-1111 find if, necessary to accede to some of the Indonesian demands for sovereignty over Netherlands New Guinea (lING) at the special bilateral Dutch- Indonesian Conference on 11110 beginning 4 December. Any re- treat from the Dutch Government's publicly announced deter- mination to maintain sovereignty over ITITG will be op. used by a substantial and vociferous monority of the people in the Netherlands, but the threat of a non-official boycott of Dutch inter cts in Indonesia probably will cause the Govern- ment to modify its 11110 policy. Although both the Netherlands and Indonesia are unwilling to allow the Now Guinea question to receive international consideration, a bilateral compromise probably will be exceedingly difficult to achieve. The most likely con-,:romise will follow the lines of the solution pro- posed by Indonesia's Foreign Affairs Minister Rum. Under this agreement, 1110 would be under Indonesian sovereignty and the island would be leased to the Netherlands for a period of years, with the Dutch gradually turning the administration over to the Indonesians. At the same time, the Netherlands would have dominant economic privileges, and defense probably would be under Dutch jurisdiction. If extremists in Indonesia proclaim anything loss than complete Indonesian control over 1r.G as unacceptable and carry out a boycott and sabotage of Dutch holdings, the Netherlands Government will be faced with strong op-position at home to any appeasement of Indonesian donanes4 The Dutch Government probably will receive sufficient support for a compromise agreement, but then its ability to i iplement other important ?olicies, such as defense, may be jeopardized. ME VATICAN? The opposition to can ;es in thc pr sen measure for -inter- nationalization of Jerusalem. if such a modification becomes clearly inevitable, hovevor, the Vatican will probably accept Approved For Release 199 f2 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000400050003-0 Approved For Rele 1999/09/02: CIA Q229.L1.1.09 00400050003-0 a suitable con : r o ., i so . in the epr' r~ ; of 1050, there wore indications that :ie Vatican leaders, including; the Pope himself, were becoming; aware that the TTITts internationaliza- tion plan could not be enforced. Just prior to the meeting of the UIT Assembly in the fall, however, the Vatican resumed its militancy in favor of internationalization, and reitera- tions of to Vatican position have been published periodically in such organs as the so:-.ii-official newspaper, Osservatore itio:::iano . A pos iblo com: romise, soon to be considered by the UIN, would provide for supervision of the Iloly Places by a UN Coi iissioner, leaving Israel and Jordan to acaninister their respective areas of occupancy in Jerusalem. Such a solution would permit the Vatican to modify its earlier stand in favor of total internationalization of the area A.thout sacrificing its primary aim of protecting, the Holy Places. Such a corn-- promise on the part of the Vatican might be encouraged by the' current world tension and the increasing necessity for buttressing the authority of the UN. Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000400050003-0