WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WORKING PAPER DIVISION WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000400040003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 16, 1950
• Content Type: PAPER

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WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGEt1CE AGENCY
WORDING PAPER
DIVISION WE RMY
NOTICE: This document is a wozkth papor,
M'-an official CIA issuances it has been
co-ordinated within ORE, but not with the
IAC Agenc$es m It represent: current thi -..
ing by specialists in CIA, and Is designed
for use by others engaged in similar or
overlappir, studies. The opinions e: rossod
herein raa-y be revised before final and off.-
cial publication. It Is intended solo17 for
the informations of the addressoe and not fox,
further dissemination,.
DATE: 18 Anlrl 1950
IANGE IN CLASz'-C7
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: ' TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUT
DATE1V i 22 REVIEWER: ,j
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WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION
WEEKLY SURLY
VOL. VI - No. 15 For week ending
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18 April 1950
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S E C R E T
B The failure 6f-the People's Party. Austria's
larizes t
apparently stems from the desire by P arty learderehip to
strengthen the internal organization of the Party. The
Congress, originally scheduled for February and later set
for March, has still not been held. During this time,
however, Party leaders have held numerous provincial
conventions, ostensibly.stressing, party solidarity and
broad policies, but undoubtedly. concentrating primarily on
working arrangements between the various Interests which
make up the Peopleta Party and trying to mond all political
fences before a national Congress is held.
The need for fence-monding was obvious even before
the postponement of the Congress. The People's Party has
always been a heterogeneous organization largely composed
of three distinct groups: the Industrialist League, the
Peasant League, and tho Workers' and Employees' League. To
Juggle the interests and political aribitiona of these three
groups has always boon the major concern of Party leadorship.
Within the last several months, conflicts between them have
grown increasingly acute, with the Industrialists tryinp, to
weaken the position of the :Irs kers1 League in an offort to
gain greater power. Conflicts have also been apparent
between the Industrialists and the Peasants over the finan.
cial and other economic policios to be followed by the Party.
In addition, intra-Party strife has resulted from
the recent emergence and growing influence of a Young Front
within the Party, a new element, which is composed of the
ambitious younger leaders who, impatient with the older
politicians, advocate various chtanses and reforms in Party
policies.
Whenever the National Congress is held, the
People's Party will probably maintain a solid front, despite
the dissension within its ranks. None of its constituent
groups is likely to attempt soriously an independont
existence, as its chances for political success would be poor.
It is possible, however, that a trend away from the three
distinct groupings within the Party has begun which would
permit individuals to exert a greater influence in the party
councils.
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S E C R E T
SWITZEPLAND
The Swiss Labor Part (Communist) will continue
to lose groan in witser an is end, evident for
over a year, has become increasingly apparent in the re-
sults of various local elections and in the splitting off
of small dissident groups antagonistic to the subservience
of Party leadership to Moscow. Further losses by the Labor
Party can be expected as a result of the continuing swing
to the Right in Swiss political thinking, the growing
Socialist campaign against Communism, and the Labor Party's
own. recruiting tactics, which are directed at quality
rather than numbers.
Within the past several months, the Labor Party
has lost virtually all its local government offices of any
importance in Switzerland, and with the resignation of one
of. its members in the Swiss National Council, the-Party's
representation in the Federal Govornment has.been reduced
to six in the 194-neat Lower House. There has been a
growing tendency for former Socialist members to break
away from the Labor Party. 'The Socialist Party participated
with the reborn Labor Party in some joint election lists after
1944, and it was from the Socialist ranks that the Labor
Party initially drew a large percentage of its labor follow-
ing. The Socialist Party has, however, turned increasingly
against the Labor Party, denounc.ng its subservience to
the Kremlin and refusing to participate further in any joint
lists. It.is'campaigning vigorously to recapturo.its former
members.
Dissatisfaction with the domination by Stalinists
has been publicly: demonstrated in both the Genova and Basel
branches of the Labor Party. In Geneva,, the local section
adopted a resolution against the wishes of important Party
leaders present, and, subsequently, a small group withdrew
from the organization. In Basel, the Labor representative
in Parliament, who was rumored to have reservations to the
Moscow line, was not nominated by his Party as a candidate
in the local elections, and later resigned from the Party.
Despite their continuous losses, the Swiss
Communists have risked reducing their ranks further by their,
recently intensified efforts to develop a militant hard core,
devoted at any cost to the Soviet Union. The Party contains
a comparatively high percentage of members who, in a crisis,
wou]d undoubtedly be Swiss first of all. This factor is
apparently of more concern to the Communist leadership than
the fact that the Party. has been unable to acquire mass appeal.
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FRANCE
A The results of the recent Twelfth National
congress o e en s ar ca a that
FoF will r n its resistance to the reconstruction
o
_ of French national defense and will vigorously continue to
weed out all members suspected of deviation from Stalinist
doctrine. From the tone of the speeches and resolutions at
the Congress, it appears that there is a growing spirit of
militancy among PCF leaders, and that the Party may
increase the number of violent manifestations, with the
intention of inviting repression, thus steeling its cadres
in preparation for fature underground activity.
Party leaders and militants will probably intensify
their "peace" campaign, and in their efforts to spread
military defeatism throughout France will continue to demand
that the atom bomb be outlawed. Communist leaders will
endeavor to instill greater fighting spirit among party cadres
In order that they may effectively disrupt French defense
efforts. Demonstrations provoked by the Communists in
Cherbourg against the first shipment of DAP equipment- were
ineffectual, indicating that Party leaders realized-they '
could not carry out their threats. This failure does not,
however; preclude'the possibility of sabotaging shipments in
transit, or at points of distribution. '
The reorganization of the PCF, vhich has been
developing at tbe.cell level throughout tho country during
the past few months, is now evidently taking place among the
higher echelons. The greatest shake-,up within the Party
announced at the Congress came in the reorganization of the
Central Committee, whose membership was dropped from 51 to
44. In order to encourage tougher elements, the Party will
place greater reliance on younger militants. The decline in
influence and prestige of Leon Mauvais, a top PCF leader, is
evidenced by his replacement in the Secretariat by a young
and relatively inexperienced militant, Auguste Lecoeur.
This toughening of PCF cadres, the development of a fighting
spirit, and a continuation of paring down to the hard core,
seem to Indicate that the PCP is- at least preparing to carry
out effective illegal operations, if it is eventually forced
to go underground.
T The French franc haa been ahowi? greater strength
12 as onth atrend which has already encouraged a
in'the
ce ove vernment security values and will consequently
aesist the Treasury in floating vital long-term loans in the
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near future. Prior to the hardening of the franc., a bond
issue involving a 30-year loan initially brought in only
about 10 billion of the 25 billion francs expected by
the Government o The 1950 budget requires the Government
to obtain 150 billion francs throwh such loans in order
to cover expenditures by non-inflationary means. In any
event, some inflationary sales of short-term securities to
the.banking system in the second half of 1950 may now be
anticipated, and a failure of the long-term loans would
increase the volume of the later inflationary borrowing,
The value of the franc has risen on neighboring
free markets, such as Zurich. Also, the decline of world
gold prices--induced by the lessening of Chinese demands
and the increase of supplies from South Africa--has been
relatively faster at Paris than elsewhere in the Westo
Until early 1950 the top price offerod for gold at Paris had
long been considered proof of the French peoplets weak faith
in their currency.. Though the declining price of gold has
been the chief factor underlying the recent virtual dim
appearance of the French black market in dollars, this market
has also boon dealt a blow by the strengthening of the franca
The Improvement in the francts standing has taken
place in spite of the serious political instability and
growing labor unrest. It has resulted basically from the
substantial over-all economic progress of France in 1949, as
reflected in higher production, exp anal on? of foreign trades,,
reduction in the foreign payments deficit, a sounder budget,
tax reforms, and an increase in savings deposits.
8 The French are unlikely to make an major modifications in their Indochina of ciee in the near future,
despite US pressure for an "evolutionary" statement which
presumably would set a timetable for the withdrawal of French
troops and complete independence for the Indochinese, rather
than autonomy within the French Union. The French contend that
the irmnediate grant, or even the promise, of greater indepen
donee to the Associated States of Indochina is unrealistic
under existing conditions, which require the presence of French
troops in Indochina to establish Internal order and to defend
the northern frontier against a possible Chinese Communist
invasion. The French believe that such a promise would
encourage the Vietnamese in their growing tendency to disregard
the 8 March Agreements and to evade. joint action with the other
Associated States (Laos and Cambodia .and with France, leading
to increased friction between the four parties which could
jeopardize both the military and political situation in
Indochina.
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Policy on Indochina has long been a subject of
disagreement within the French Government, with differing
views generally being held by the Foreign Ministry and
Overseas France officials, both concerned in formulating
and' executing such policy. As a result, the reaction of
France to the problems presented by the growing nationalism
in the Far East has been slow and vacillating.
Illustrative' of the uncoordinated French action
is Minister of Overseas Prance Letourneauts recent press
statement on policy in Indochina about which the Foreign
Ministry was not consulted. M. Letourneau announced that:
Cl) political evolution in the Associated States is frozen
within the framework of the 8 March Agreements; (2) the
provisions for the creation of national armies must be
implemented as soon as possible; (3) Indochinese affairs
will be removed from the Ministry of Overseas France to
another agency as yet undesignated: (4) US aid will be
distributed by a quadripartite organization including the
three Indochinese states and France.
Ills statement indicates that those officials who
interpreted the 8 March Accords as only the first step in
the political development of the Indochinese states have now
apparently been overruled by those who believe that the
agreements represent the limit of the political "evolution"
of Indochina. Support for the latter view has probably in-
creased because more and more officials look upon the threat
of Chinese expansion from the north as the decisive considera-
tion which should govern future French actions in southeast
Asia.
B Current efforts b the Communists will_obabl
fail tomake poi oil-
a cap a out a the unemp oymet
situation, which is unlikely to become critical in the next
few months, Although the number of unemployed has-risen
steadily during the past ear, and is now near 200,o00this
figure represents only 1% of the total labor force.
percentage*in smaller than that of any country in western
Europe except Switzerland,
The Public concern over unemployment is 'mainly
psychological and is fomented partly by employers who wish
to convince prospective strikers that they are apt to lose
'their sobs, and partly by the Communists, who want. the
workers to strike against ECAss "exploitation cf labor."
The Workers, being primarily pre-occupied with their pressing
economic needs, are for the present more likely to heed the
employers,
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Several factors show that the seeming trend
toward unemployment is illusory. First, the actual
number of employed persons has increased since 1946 by
about 1,000,000. At the same time, many who used to work
only part time now work more hours a week. Also, more
jobs are expected to be open soon as a result of: (1)
attempts to "catch up" on production lost by strikes; (2)
the beginning of the tourist season; and (3) increased
building activity as a result of rising rents.
Much genuine concern is expressed in France that
trade liberalization and the consequent increased competition
will cause mass unemployment, as inefficient producers are
forced out of business. As seen by ECA, however trade
liberalization would put pressure on the French to convert
over a period of time to more specialized production in order
to export a greater volume. The conversion rate would be so
slow that any unemployment would be merely temporary until
the workers were absorbed by new or onlarged industries.
French labor circles also warn that the program to increase
productivity will cause a reduction in the number of jobs.
Again, the ECA view 3s that greater production of export,
commodities, together with a large-scale housing program,,
could absorb many workers. A considerable expansion of
housing construction, moreover, is essential in order that
the workers may be rapidly absorbed. Into new jobs, and the
program is being given increased attention by'the Government.
ITALY
A enera3. strike of farm AM laborers (braccianti)
in Italy is being. prepare y e ommun s, and may erupt
tco;nsiderable violence during the next month. VIhile spring
strikes by the braccianti have been virtually annual affairs,
this year e s action maY prove sacra serious than the past
strikes, and may be accompanied by violence so widespread as
to tax police power, especially in the Emilia region.
Such an eventuality is suggested by various factorso
In the first place, the Communists are relying extensively on
direct action in their offensive against the Government and
the MDAP. In this connection, the braccianti, the poorest
and most underemployed class In Italy, are predominantly
controlled by the Communists and are easily susceptible to
excitation. The second factor is the flare-up of sporadic
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local agricultural strikos and violent incidents In the
Po Valley during the past month. In one recent incident
3,000 Coamunist-led braccianti attacked 26 workora of a.
non-.Comiunist cooperat ve a in3ured a number of them
in tho fields.
Finally, the developing situation is made more
conducive to violence by the presence this year of
strengthened neo-fascist contingents near Comunist strong-
holds, and b7 the more frequent clashes between the two ex-
tremist groups. It is probable that these neo-fascist units
have received financial aid from large landholders and
farmers, who fearful of the rising tide of agrarian unrest
and upset by the 20% ? decline -in atholesale agricultural prices
during the past year, will probably hotly contend the expected
demands of farm workers for wage increases and national con-
tracts* ?
On the basis of current capabilities. the Italian
police will probably-quoll the anticipated disturbances with
suppressive measures, but only under conditions of considerable
public agitation.
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SPE~ ARTICLE
SHIFT IN COTtMu NIST'STRATEGY IN FRENCH AFRICA
A The US interest in the maintenance of friendly
control of French Africa will be favored In the short run
by a stiffening. of the Communist attitude on collaboration
with balky native movements. The new Communist emphasis
.on hard-core strength,. an African reflection of a world-
wide trend, Is characterized by a willingness to slough
off political allies if necessary. In the long run, the
effect on US security will depend on how successful the
Communists are in selling their goods "straight," and on
how quickly advantage is taken of the opportunity to
deepen the wedge between them and the natives.
Driven by a desire for quicker results and better-
disciplined militants the Communists in French North and
West Africa'aro swinging to the direct promotion of Communist
doctrine, placing less emphasis on themes of more immediate
popular appeal. Indications are that local Communist leaders
have boon ordered to concontrate more on their own party
interests and not so much on nationalism and racism: The
swifter and easier process of undisguised prosolyting now
appears to be superseding the earlior Comnunist,method of
collaborating at almost any price with indigenous movements
in the hope of eventually capturing their leadership.
It may.be expected that the Com$nunist Parties In
the area Will in the future even more openly advance the
doctrine of the class struCCle as the primary plank in their
program for all the masses of Bench Africa. Nationalism
and race feeling will, of courso, continue to be exploited,
but will be adapted to the' orthodox Communist revolution line
rather than constituting the principal line, as in the past.,
There will be less attempt to conceal the Identifi-
cation of local Communist aims with those of the USSR, and
less effort will be ,pant on conciliating; nationalist leaders
and more on winning; away their followlnZ by direct appeals
based in.large part on, class consciousness.
this Thearp conflict with nationalist parties which
policy will produce Is presaged by the editorial clash
which recently took place in Algeria-between the Communist
Libertd and La R ubli uo Al erienne, organ of the nationalist
Democratic union of e gcr an .!anifosto .(UDMA). The latter,
In an open letter responding to a year-lor; Communist campaign
to induce the nationalists to. line up with tho USSR against
the US, made crystal clear the- awarenoss of true nationalist
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leaders that they could never accept the Communists as
reliable partners. The UDMA statement accused the Co anunists
of taking their orders from Moscow without having any sincere
.thy for nationalism and of trying to split the UDMA or
dominate it. It went into the history of Communist betrayals
of Moslem nationalism (coinciding with the period of the 1935
Franco-Soviet alliance) and concluded with-the clear impli.
cation that while the U?MA was interested first and foremost
in obtaining an Algerian republic, the Communist aims were
simply part of a vast scheme of Soviet domination into which
UDMIt refused to be drawn.
Instead of their customary renewed effort at rapprocho.
sent? the Coz fists roactod to this rebuff by virtually dropping
the veil and appealing to nationalist sympathizers to desert
their present leaderal ip. Libertd claimed that the UDMA was
losing; control of the rank ia-nd.flle nationalists and was making
an "anti-Communist attempt to divide them. The Algerian
Communist Party, it declared, would not allow itself to be turnod
aside from the path it had chocon,. but on the contrary mould
"continue the campaign of knowledge among the masses in order
to make a break from all dangerous illusions." The Communist
article concluded that there is a "necessity for united action
on Algerian soil, and an alliance with all anti-imperialist
and peace forces directed by the U:'SR."
Probably the. chief Communist weapon in a campaign
to undercut the nationalist leaders would be the unions
affiliated with the General Confederation of Labor (CGT),
whose overwhelmingly Moslem membership is not permitted to
Join nationalist unions. This ban allows the Communists to
control fairly large native blocs presumably having nationalist
predilections but peculiarly receptive to class-struggle
propaganda.
In. French West Africa also, Communist doctrine is
being spelled out and pointedly placed ahead of racism, long
the main Communist mask in this area, where the primitive
Negro masses-have little conception of nationalism. The new
Cozmunist strategy is well illustrated by a recent pronounce-
ment of Gabriel d'Arboussior Secretary-General of the
Communist-front Rassemblonent Domocratique Africain (RDA).
Published on the front page of the Communist weekly, Action
d'Arboussierts "exclusive interview" has the earmarks or a
somewhat hurried move to pull the RDA into line so as to mako
it a more dependable Soviet instrument, even at the risk of
some loss of mass followings The Interview boldly proclaims,
"For us, the Pan-Negro movement conatitutos a dangerous hoax.
In our action we shall never separaa.te the principle of the
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S E _ -E-r'
union of Africans from our alliance with the international
proletariat and in particular r!ith thr Fronch working class,
which has the same opprossors as we. It the racial f&etor
is an Important factor in tho national movement, it is not
the essential factor."
Almost simultaneously with the Acton interview,
the Tunisian Communist Party weekly, L'Aven r e la Tunisia
expressly points out that the RDA of enoh Wes t R ca is
linked with the Communist Party of Tunisia in a common
struggle. The paper charges that the French campaign of
r'presaion against tho RDA is being carried out at the behest
of "US imperialists" w'ho are trying to defend their communi-
cation lines and bases in Africa, L'Avenir claims to see a
close relation between what is happo ng"'1 n French West
Africa' and the "attempts of the war camp to transform
(Tunisia) Into a springboard for aggression."
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