WESTERN EUROPE BRANCH OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES WORKING PAPER BRANCH WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000400010015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 20, 1949
• Content Type: PAPER

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WESTERN EUROPE BRANCH
OFFICE OF REPORTS MD ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WORKING PAPER
I3 1I j'....e., . 1
j,Qjjga ? This document is a working paper,
NOT an official CIA Issuance. It has been
co-ordinated within ORE, but not with the
IAC Agencies. It represents current think-
ing by specialists in CIA, and is designed
for use by others engaged in similar or
overlapping studies. The opinions expressed
herein may be revised before final and offi-
cial publicationo It is intended solely for
the information of the addressee and not for
further dissemination.
DATE: 20 September 1949
DOCUMENT NO.
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S2CfET'
%' ESTEMI EUROPE BIWTCH
WEEKLY SCT MARY
VOL. V w No. 10 For week evading
,25X6A
r 1
20 September 1949
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25X6A
FRANCE
A The prospect for grave strike dam. a to the
French economy next 60 days is diminishing. Both
the non-Communist Force Ouvriere (PO). and the Communist-
led General Labor Coedera on `CGT) are developing
strike plans cautiously, well aware that a repetition of
the strike failures of 1947 and 1948 might destroy
effective worker support for the cause of labor organiza-
tion., On the basis of careful independent surveys still
in progress, these two labor federations have tentatively
decided that the workers are not ready to accept the
sacrifices Involved in sustained strikes.
The CGT, though convinced that the Government
is incompetent and that a united labor front can be
formed in the winter, is hesitant to take drastic action
in the near future, especially because coal miner senti-
ment---vital for a major strike offensive--is presently
undependable. Instead, the CGT will utilize its ablest
organizers to direct agitation through October in key
areas and industries.
The FO has found the workers antagonistic
toward the Government, but also cynical toward the (anions.
With dues dropping off, F0 leaders believe that they must
either launch a risky nation-wide strike--which they
believe would be well supported for a very limited period,
such as 24 hours--or suffer a further decline of member-
ship. Hoping to escape this dilemma, they have meanwhile
approached the employers' association with proposals for
joint action to appease labor. FO asks especially: (1)
that the Government approve an irimiediate provisional
increase in basic wages of at least 3,000 francs per month
(which would amount to approximately 25;; at the level of
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S 9 0 P t T
the present minim= wage); and (2) agreement by
industry not to raise prices. The employer, 4
association will probably not accept the F0's high
terms for joint action, inasmuch as the threat of
labor agitation Is less this year than In 1947 and
1948.
A round of lxnited, strikes, chiefly local,
is however indicated for the next two months, in view
both of the workers' acute dissatisfaction and the
Government's growing fiscal difficultieab solidifying
its opposition to labor's Rage demands. A Chore
dangerous labor offensive would be likely in December
or January should the Government continue to lose
prestigev especially In respect to its wa ;e--price
program, and, as now seems probable, real wages
continue their decline into 1950.
The reported Cotnlnform directive to the French
Coe unist Party permitting grew er" M .uc e to leaders
of the General Labor Confederation (CGT) in planning
offensives may offset recent developments adverse to the
CGT. The now rightist.-led General Confederation of
Independent Unions (CGSI) Is attempting to pirate members
from the CGT, and may have some success. Furthermore,
there are reports of growing Titoism among the workers.
Yugoslav workers particularly are quitting the CGT and
forming separate organizations, The authority of CGT
leaders to determine the scope and timing; of strike
campaigns may enable them to counter the effects of
labor's dissatisfaction with previous CGT subservience
to Kremlin-inspired directives.
French Government maneuvers for meeting,
France e s rain shortage of 1949e-50 will probaSTy not
Save over-a success* The Government consistently
declines to admit the need for substantial grain im-
ports; instead it has revised upward wheat production
estimates; it has reportedly turned dogn an offer of
300,000 tons of wheat from Argentina; and it has re-
duced the percentage of rye in bread flour. ECA,
nevertheless, has estimated that France will need in
1943.50 approximately 1 million tons of imported
breadgrains (equal to 13f of production) and 2.5 mil-
lion tons of additional feedgrains (74, of production).
U" 3 a
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The Government's attitude is probably
Intended: (1) to Justify the fixed wheat price and
convince the Wheat Producers Association that the
Drop is too large for the Association to control in
opposition to the Government's p?ice policy; (2) to
encourage collections by creating a psychological
climate of abundance; and (3) to avoid the political
disadvantage of introducing the problem of a grain
shortage into parliamentary discussion in the coming
two months which will be politically critical.
The shortage of fsedgrains may be somewhat
alleviated by the decision of the Government to halve
the amount of rye used in bread flour, effective
3 October. Aside from having a beneficial political
effect by improving the quality of bread, this
measure also will curb somewhat the incipient ten-
dency to slaughter livestock, farmers preferring to
fatten their cattle on the increased supply of feed-
grain. As a net result, however, the Government's
measures will probably not avert continued farm
demands for higher prices, considerable hoarding, and
some feeding of wheat to livestock.
FRM.TCH A1TD SPANISH NORTH AND VVEST AFRICA
C Persistent attempts to dislodge General Juin,
key French political and military gure in Africa-, from
his position as Resident General of French Morocco are
likely to be ineffective because of French Government's
reluctance to displace him until a suitable Socialist
citilian replacement can be found. The strong Socialist
faction within the Government, having succeeded in
placing civilians of its party in three of the four top
French posts in Africa--those of Resident General of
Tunisia and Governors General of Algeria and French West
Africa---undoubtedly would like to capture the fourth,
and dominant, position held by Juin. But lacking a
likely candidate of their own, they will not contribute
to the pressure against Juin being exerted by other
political parties, which believe they have qualified men
for this important and desirable post.
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3 E C R E T
THE NETHERLANDS
It is probable that the views of the more
cancil3,atorv Dutcho_ c a a, who rea ze that e
grate Con erenoe a ors the last opportunity for the
Netherlands to maintain some influence in Indonesia,
will prevail during the next few weeks over those who
foal that the Dutch demands must be upheld. if
substantial progress is made in the negotiations
during the next week, with the Indonesians meeting the
-Dutch part way, the conciliatory group will be able to
continue its dominance of the Dutch delegation.
Some progress has been made in reconciling
Dutch and Indonesian views on the important Netherlands--
Indonesian Union statute, but the most difficult phase
of negotiations is expected to arise when the economic
.and financial agreement is discussed at a high level,
The Indonesians seem inclined to accept partially the
Dutch views for a permanent council of Union Ministers
and a Union Court as a part of the Netherlands-Indonesian
Union. If a compromise on the Union is reached, it is
evident that then the Netherlands will have to modify its
rather extensive economic and financial demands in order
to obtain a complete settlement of Dutch-Indonesian
differences.
ITALY
C Pros eats for the De'Gas eri administration in
the genera municipal elections and in regional elections,
both scheduled for 1950, would be materially improved if
there should be a continuation of the voting trend revealed
in the 1949 municipal elections. A comparison of the re-
sults of the 1946 and 1949 municipal elections for 116
commmunes throughout Italy during the first half of this
year shows a general trend away from the Left. The parties
of the Government and those of a rightist orientation in-
creased their representation in the municipal councils by
one-third, whereas Communist and left-Socialist membership
declined by one-half o In about a quarter of the communes
the extreme left lost the majority it had won in the 1946
elections, and in only three communes was it able to be-
come a now majority.
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Since the 116 cotnrnumes comprise less than
2% of the nation's total and include none of the
larger cities---traditional centers of leftist strength--
it would be incorrect to draw conclusions as to support
for the national policies of the Government parties.
There is, however, some increase in the willingness of
voters to accept members of the Government parties as
leaders in local affairs.
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