SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300050002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 12, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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USSR
12 December 1950
SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVE NTS
1. Soviet notes and declarations give no firm indica-
tion as to what course of action the USSR will pursue if its
current diplomatic efforts to forestall West German remili-
tarization are unseccussful. The USSR, realizing that large
scale West German remilitarization can not materialize during
1951, may feel under no compulsion tq take drastic action,
On the. other hand, there is a possibility that failure of its
diplomatic efforts will be used by the USSR as basis for an
ultimatum to the West in regard to West Germany rearmament.
(Page 5 )
2. The,tone of Soviet propagandaadduring the past week
revealed Moscow's uncompromising attitude toward the Korean
situation, and tended toward a stepped-up psychological
preparation for eventual Soviet partici ation in a war.
~._..~.._ (Page 8
3. Two recent reports ap e~ ar to indicate that Moscow
has sent out a new directive urging; West lr,,~uropean Communist
leaders to prepare the rank and file for thepossibility Qf
Soviet aggressive actien.
(Page 9 )
4, The Soviet Orbit countries have been develo ing2
both new and old routes for the acquisition of strategic
commodities. Anticipated and actual strengthening of Western
export controls has brought about this effort which has been
markedly successful in maintaining the flow of desired goads
to the Orbit countries.
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25X6A_
IDENTIAL
EASTERN EUROPE
FINLAND
6a Announcement has been made that the an ernment-
appointed Economic Committee has unanunousl reach a ree-~
went an a stabilization pro ramfcr Finland. While it is
known that the Prime Minister is displeased with this agree-
ment for political reasons, it is likely that he will be
forced to accept the plan and to broaden his cabinet to im-
plement it,
(Page 12)
BULGARIA
7. .'I'he_adoption of a Bulgarian law "for the settlement
CO~ENTIAL
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tNf1DENT IAL
of the status of Soviet nationals in Bulgaria" strongly sug-
gests that the USSR desires to provide Bulgarian legal status
for any number of Soviet citizens who may be required to im-
plement aoviet objectives in that country.
(Page 13 )
8, The Yugaslav attempt to renew and expand its military
machine will be difficult of fulfillment and will probably re-
sult in the Yugoslav government favoring military preparedness
at the expense of its general economic well-being. The re
sultant shortages of consumer goods, coupled with the poor
crops of this year, will probably create some popular un-
rest.
(Page 14 )
RUMANIA
9. The election of 80.000 Democratic Front candidates
to People's Councils throughout Rumania, completed without
incident on 3 December, indicates a significant accomplish-
ment for the Communist regime. The acknowledgement in elec-
tion campaign speeches that future consumer shortages would
be necessary to carry out the industrialization programs em-
phasizes Party confidence in its ability to control the
populace.
(Page 15 )
ALBANIA
10. The USSR apparently is uneasy over Albania's
strategic isolation from the Cominform orbit which has been
emphasized recently by im roved Yugoslav-,Greek relatio
Cominform propaganda regarding "aggression" against Albania
by a US?-backed Yugoslav-Greek alliance is probably meant as
warning that the USSR stands behind the Hoxha regime.
(Page i6)
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
11. It is p ob~ amble that following StalinIs death the
USSR will be ruled by a Committee. However, it is unlikely
that such a Committee can remain unified indefinitely. A
struggle among the leaders will probably result with one man
again emerging as dictator.
(Page 18)
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U S S R
Possible si nificance of Soviet di.10m,
tic ste-ps
regarding West German rearmament
In May 1950 the three Western Powers sent a note
to the USSR which stated that the Soviet Union was re-
militarizing East Germany. The USSR, in its reply of 18
October, 1950, denied the Western accusation and termed it
an obvious attempt to justify the remilitarization which the
US, Great Britain, and France had already begun in West Ger-
many. The note stated that the USSR could "not reconcile
itself" to the reconstitution of a regular Germany army.
Almost simultaneously with the sending of this npte,
the USSR and its European Satellites, including East Ger-
many, hold a. Foreign Minister's Conference at Prague. The
conference issued a declaration which stated that the
Western decision to remilitarize West Germany as announced
in the September, 1950 declaration of the three Western
Foreign Ministers constituted a "threat of fresh aggression
and of fresh war adventures in Europe." The Prague declara-
tion proposed that the Four Powers, as a matter of "immediate
necessity": (1) state that they would not permit the re-
militarization of Germany, the restoration of the German
war potential, or the inclusion of Germany in any aggressive
plans, (2) conclude a peace treaty with Germany which would,
"in conformity with the Potsdam Agreement", restore German
unity and result in the withdrawal of occupation troops
within one year after the conclusion of the treaty, and (3)
create an All-German Constituent Council, with parity repre-
sentation between East and West Germany, for the "purpose of
preparing the formation of a provisional all-German Govern-
ment." The Constituent Council would submit its proposals
concerning the formation of an all-German Government to the
Four Powers, and would, until an all-German Government was
formed, be consulted by them on the preparation of a peace
treaty.
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V 1
Shortly after the Prague Conference, the USJR pre-
sented a note to the three Western Powers which requested a
Foreign Minister's Conference to discuss the Prague Declara-
tion as a basis for settlement of the German problem. The
note, even though it requests a. conference on Germany as a
whole, is so worded as to indicate that the Soviet Union's
chief interest in such a conference is to discuss the Western
decision to remilitarize West Germany.
The recent letter of East German Premier Grotcwohl
to Federal Chancellor Adenauer is the latest step in this
series of diplomatic actions which the USSR began with its
note of 18 October, 1950. Tn,his letter, Grotewohl proposed
that each German Government appoint six representatives to
discuss the establishment of an all-German Constituent
Council. The Grotewohl letter, which proposes a Council
"formed on a basis of parity from representatives of East
and West Germany" and states that "under certain circum-
stances a plebiscite of the German people could be held",
closely parallels that section of the Prague Declaration
which deals with the formation and purposes of such a
Council, Both the Prague Declaration and the East German
proposal make vague reference to a plebiscite of the Ger-
man people. There is, however, no elaboration on this
theme and no indication as to what the "certain circum-
stances" might be,
Although the USSR has coupled its condemnation of
West German remilitarization with an apparent plan for Ger-
man unification in this series of'notes and declarations,
there is no reason to believe that the Kremlin is interested
at this time in German unity on terms that could possibly
be acceptable to the West. The USSR is undoubtedly aware
that its proposal, which makes no provision for free elec-
tions throughout Germany and which suggests a Constituent
Council with parity representation of East and West Germany,
is unacceptable to the West. The Soviet Union's "offer" of
unification seems, therefore, nothing more than a propaganda
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device designed to bolster its claim that the West is not
interested in German unity.
The real purpose of these diplomatic moves seems to
be to forestall, or at least postpone, a West German military
contribution to Western defense. They were undoubtedly'
designed to exploit opposition in Fance and West Germany to
West German rearmament, The USSR'may believe that these notes
and declarations, which serve as warning to the West re-
garding Kest German remilitarization and, at the same time,
give a surface indication of Soviet "willingnebs" to settle
the Garman problem in the interest of German unity and
peace, will increase French and West German fear of provoking
Soviet military action by West German rearmament and will
arouse hope in West Germany of obtaining unity by peaceful
means. The USSR might even believe, in view of Communist
military successes in Asia and Western European fear of
Soviet military aggression against Europe itself, that its
diplomatic campaign will force the West to postpone in-
definitely any implementation of West German remilitariza-
tion.
The Soviet notes and declarations give. no firm
indication as to what course of-action the USSR will pursue
if its current diplomatic efforts to forestall West German
remilitarization are unsuccessful. The USSR, realizing that
large scale West German remilitarization cannot materialize
during 1951, may feel under no compulsion to take drastic
action. On the other hand, there is a possibility that
failure of its diplomatic efforts will be used by the USSR
as basis for an ultimatum to the West in regard to West Ger-
man rearmament, The USSR might believe that an ultimatum
would force the defenseless continental members of the
North Atlantic Treaty to abandon the issue. The USSR might
also believe that the US and Great Britain, in order to
preserve NATO and to avoid an immediate global war, would ac-
cept the Soviet ultimatum.
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The USSR must either accept West German remilitari.
zation'or take action, such as an ultimatum, which would
presuppose Soviet willingness to involve the USSR directly
in a military conflict.. As long as Soviet troops remain in
Germany, it is almost 'mpossible for the USSR to instigate
Satellite military action ag-4inst West Germany without in-
volving its own military forces. (SECRET)
New trend in Soviet propaganda regarding Korean situation
The publication on 3 December of a PRAVDA editorial
denouncing President Truman's press conference statements of
30 November marked a departure from Moscow's recent propa-
ganda policy of playing down the Korean war, espcially to
the domestic audience. This editorial, Moscow's first
authoritative policy statement on the Korean situation,
acridly denounced President Truman and US ruling circles for
their "promise of continued imperialist maneuvers in Korea
.and with regard to China." For the first time, the domestic
audience was made aware of the numbers of Chinese "volunteers"
and the scope of Red successes in Korea,
The tone of this most widely distributed article
and of subsequent TASS reports on Western press reactions to
President Truman's statements) revealed the uncompromising
attitude of the USSR towards the Korean situation. It im-
plied that this "war hysteria trend" le' `sons the possibility
of a prevention of the outbreak of hostilities on a larger
scale, and implied imminence of a possible full scale con-
flict between the US and China. In this connection, there
has been a noteworthy trend away from the customary "peace"
line., namely, that the vast numbers of Peace Partisans and
their cohorts will prevent such a conflict, At the same
time, however, the Russian people were told that the West was
weakened by disagreements among the Western governments and
between the people and their governments,
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Thus, Soviet propaganda continues to condition the
Russian people for eventual hostilities and can be expected
to exploit every event and utilize any medium to label the
US as aggressor and attempt to split the Western camp, there-
by laying the moral groundwork, both at home and abroad, for
Soviet-initiated war. (CONFIDENTII:.L)
'gviet Orbit continues to acpuire strategic
aQLQodities from Western sources
The Soviet Orbit countries have been developing both
new and old routes for the acquisition of strategic commodities.
Anticipated and actual strengthening of Western export con-
trols has brought about this effort which has been markedly
successful in maintaining the flow of desired goods to the
Orbit countries, Such activities as the recent stoppage
of shipments by the US authorities in Salzburg and at the
borders in the US Zone of Germany, plus the fear of tighten-
ing controls which may follow the present meeting of the
COCOM, have caused the Orbit countries to improve their
procurement techniques
As a direct result of the US action in Salzburg,
which stopped the diversion of a shipment of strategic goods
from the US to Hungary, the US Zone of Austria is now being
frequently by-passed. Some goods are now being routed from
Chiasse (Switzerland) to Tarvisic (Italy) to Arnoldstei.n
(British Zone of Austria) and thence to Hgyshalom (Hungary).
This route has been used for the shipment of French ball
bearings, The present and probable future success of the
use of this route is a result of the lack of supervision of
transit traffic in both Italy and the British Zone of Austria,
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Particularly sensitive purchases can be shipped to inter-
mediaries in Spain, Italy, or Portugal, and then routed by
water to Gdynia, and through Poland to Hungary. The extra-
charges involved would not be a serious problem, because they
could be paid in zloties.
An illustration of the extremes to which the Commun-
ists will go to circumvent the security control program has
developed in connection with the methods of procurement used
by the Chinese Communists. In cases where goods would be
denied them, they plan to have cover companies arrange pur-
chase of full cargo lots. When the ship is at sea, the
Chinese Communists plan to purchase both the cargo and the
ship, and then divert them to Taku Bar, or_to other con-
venient ports.
In the past, it has been a normal procedure for the
shipments from West Germany to be diverted en route to Berlin.
This system is also used in Austria, where a car loaded with
goods consigned to a Vienna firm is dropped off at the Sovzone
border. The goods are paid for and unloaded at that time,
and the car is later attached to a train returning to the
Western Zones of Austria.
In addition to these innovations, the usual trans-
shipment points such as the free ports at Basle, Antwerp,
Zurich, and !tscha:?fenberg continue their operations unabated.
In Western Germany, where repeated. official protests
have been heard against tallied--imposed controls, which are
alleged to be 'stricter then those in force in 6t her &wopean
countries, there is a complete mockery of the security con-
trol policy. Against the background of a volume of smuggling
(estimated in hundreds of millions of dollars) three firms
are presently cooperating on the production of a seamless
tube mill for the Soviet Zone, and for similar equipment for
Czechoslovakia. A blooming mill for Czechoslovakia is also,
under production, but this may be stopped by US intervention.
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The global aspects involved:in trying to constrict
these operations are indicated by a recent increase in appli-
cations for controlled equipment from Germany by India, Egypt,
and South America, and, the suspicion that the goods will be
diverted to the Soviet Orbit as they pass through Switzerland.
The variety of methods and routes and the particular
problem represented by free ports, demonstrate the difficul-
ties involved in trying to stop the acquisition of strategic
goods by the Orbit countries, Individual end-use checks by
the US and the Frankfort authorities are fairly effective,
but the alternative sources of supply and the relative
success of procurement of even US ;equipment and supplies
through transshipment procedures demonstrate that unilateral
action is insufficient to deny strategic conmmodi..ties to the
Soviet Orbit. A recent transaction involved a shipment of
US bearings diverted to the USSR, although dual end-use
checks had been made. Only if all sources of supply co-
operate and exercise control of the commodities at the point
of origin and, in addition, assume the responsibility of ex-
ercising surveillance over transit shipments through their
ports, will the existing export controls achieve their pur-
pose of denying the Soviet Orbit those goods which con-
tribute directly to its economic potential for war. (SECRET)
EASTERN EUROPE
FINLAND
Political-Economic stabilization near i.nFinland
A Government appointed, four-man Economic Committee,
consisting of two Social Democrat and two Agrarian Party
representatives, has announced its unanimous agreement on an
economic stabilization plan for Finland. It is likely that
Agrarian Prime Minister Kekkonen will be forced to accept the
plan, and to broaden his minority cabinet to include Social
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Democrat, Progressive, and Coalition Party members in order
to implement it successfully.
Kokkonen is known to be displeased (for political
and party reasons) that an agreement has been reached, but
it is difficult to imagine a suitable pretext by means of
which he might gain rejection of the plan. Several Agrarian
Ministers are known to support the plan and to desire a
broadened cabinet. Because of his overweening political am-
bition, it is very improbable that Kekkonen will place him-
self in a position which could lead to his parliamentary
overthrow.
Should Kekkonen be able to obtain the unqualified
support of his party for rejection of the unanimously agreed
program, it is expected that he would lose the parliamentary
support of the Swedish People Party. It was only the un-
expected support of this party which was responsible for
Kekkonen gaining a confidence vote last month. Under the
new circumstances, Kekkonen would face a certain non-
confidence vote and loss of the premiershi - a most un-
palatable prospect for him. (CONFIDENTIAL
BULGARIA
Soviet nationals granted legal status in Bizl a ria
The enactment on 3 November of a Bulgarian law "for
the settlement of the Status of Soviet nationals in Bulgaria's
indicates Kremlin desire'to provide legal status for any
number of Soviet nationals who may be required to implement
Soviet objectives in that country. For at least three years
Soviet "specialists" in increasing numbers have enjoyed not
only equal but preferential treatment in Bulgaria without
necessity for social legislation. The raising of the
"status" issue at this time strongly suggests that the number
of Soviet nationals already present or to be imported no
longer can be covered by the protective screen of the
specialist classification.
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The unpublicized decree grants to all Soviet citizens
in Bulgaria full rights of employment and the "rights and ob-
ligations under the law on social security and the other
laws on an equal basis with Bulgarian nationals." Soviet
nationals are specifically exempted from any Bulgarian
restrictions established, for aliens.
Since a large part of Bulgaria including border
areas is a.rostri_cted zone, not only to foreigners but to
most of the Bulgarian population, the opportunity exists
for the infiltration of large numbers of Soviets with little
Unger of detection. Recent reports indicate large scale
evacuation of Bulgarians from areas adjoining the Greek and
Yugoslav borders and of Bulgarian-Turks from the strategic
Dobrudja area. The possibility that Soviets are being in-
troduced into these areas should not be overlooked.
The loose wording of the law whereby Soviets assume
the same obligations as Bulgarian citizens under "other
laws" of Bulgaria could also prove a convenient device for
camouflaging the presence of Soviet nationals in the
Bulgarian army.
The attempts to provide a "legal" status for as
many Soviets in Bulgaria as Soviet policy demands, concur-
rently with the strengthening of the Bulgarian army and the
heightened campaign of invectives charging the Western Powers
with intent of immediate aggression through the Athens-
Belgrade axis, confirms Soviet intention to build up Bulgarian
potential for aggression as quickly as possible. (SECRET)
YUGOSLAVIA
Tito faces problem of buildink armed strength while
maintaining precarious economic stability
The Yugoslav attempt to renew and expand its military
machine wili,be difficult of fulfillment and will probably
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result in the Yugoslav government favoring military pre-
paredness at the expense of its general economic well-being.
The resultant shortages of consumer goods, coupled with the
poor crops of this year, will probably create some popular
unrest. Despite these conditions, however, the Yugoslav
populace will probably back the Tito regime rather than suc-
cumb to Soviet pressures.
Current Yugoslav commercial negotiations with the
French and Belgiums have included sizeable amounts of
military plant equipment and end-items. These products,
relieving pressing short-range Yugoslav military needs, are
being obtained on long-term credits. Thus Tito plans to
spread payments on his immediate military requirements over
a longer period when the Yugoslav economy may be in a better
position to meet such commitments,
It is obvious that a strong Yugoslav military
establishment is needed to stave off Soviet pressure and
possible aggression. Yugoslavia's ability to meet her mili-
tary needs is limited, however, and is already overtaxed by
the maintenance of a large army and a large investment
program in capital industry. The internal support of the
regime could be considerably strengthened if the 'Yugoslav
government were free to divert its efforts to the improve-
ment of the living standard instead of utilizing its
resources for non-consumer goods. Under currently growing
Cominform-Yugoslav tension, however, the Tito regime is
forced to assume the internal problems resulting from main-
taining its military strength in spite of economic diffi-
culties. (SECRET)
RUMANIA
Local Rumanian elections reflect
Communist control of Po-Pulation
The election, without incident, of 8O,000 Democratic
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Front candidates to municipal, district, and regional People's
Councils in Rumania on 3-December was a significant accomplish-
ment for the Communist regime. Results show that the highest
percentage was obtained by the relatively popular Gheorghiu-
Dej in a Bucharest precinct, while the poorest showing (94.7%)
was made in the oil district of Prahova. The announced results
showed a small percentage of votes "against" (ballots con-
taining names scratched out) or "void" (ballots improperly
folded).
The successful performance was the result of a
carefully staged campaign, in which intensive propaganda
work was carried on throughout the country. Although most
of the election speeches followed standard lines calling on
the people to vote for a new life under Socialism aided by
the Soviet Union, the speeches of some leaders occasionally
touched upon more lively themes, Ana Pauker admitted that
present consumer shortages are the result of emphasis on in-
dustrialization and large construction, and Gheorghiu-Dej
went even further by attributing some supply difficulties to
bureaucratic tendencies in the Communist Party and Govern-
ment.
The conduct of the elections was a manifestation of
increased Communist control in Rumania. Communist leaders
not only staged the mass spectacle without incident, but
were so confident of their ability to manipulate the popula-
tion that at the height of the campaign they acknowledged
that their program would work further hardships on the
people. (RESTRICTED)
ALBANIA
USSRreveaks increased concern over Albania In
view of Yugoslav-Greek rapprochement
Soviet anxiety over maintaining the pro-Soviet
Hoxha regime in Albania has become more noticeable following
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the successful rapprochement recently achieved between the
Greek and Yugoslav Governments. A mounting campaign of
Cominform propaganda is attempting to "document" a strong
case of Yugoslav-Greek plans for imminent aggression against
Albania with US backing. Yugoslav and Greece are accused
of plotting to dismember Albania.
Albania's geographic isolation from the remainder
of the Soviet orbit was recently emphasized by the Yugoslav
closing of the Albanian Legation in Belgrade, rendering
difficult any Comi.nform air traffic to Tirana via Yugoslavia
because of the involved negotiations now required to obtain
transit visas. The USSR was recently forced to submit an
"urgent request" to the Italian Government for a special
flight over Italian territory in order to transport
officials to Albanian Liberation Day festivities, Some
surreptitious Cominform flights from Bulgaria to Albania
apparently have occured along the Yugoslav-Greek border,
but with the steady improvement in Yugoslav-Greek rela-
tions, such clandestine flights will become increasingly
hazardous,
Yugoslav obstruction of air flights to Albania, how-
ever, has not materially affected overall links between
Albania and the Soviet orbit. Available information on
Soviet-Satellite shipping to Albania indicates that it has
maintained its frequency of approximately six ships monthly
over recent months, and this may even have increased slightly,
Cargoes consist of tools and supplies for light industry,
consumer goods, and military equipment.
The current Cominform propaganda campaign regarding
Albania is probably designed to warn Belgrade, Athens and
their alleged backer, the US, that the USSR stands firmly
behind the Hoxha regime. While this campaign may represent
heightened concern over Albania's isolated position, it is
probably also aimed at enlisting the support of the non-
Communist Albanian population on the issue of preserving the
territorial integrity of their country. In the event that
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the Kremlin decides on aggressive action against Tito, the--
ratter's alleged machinations to overthrow Hoxha and parti-
tion Albania would provide ostensible justification for "de--
fensive counteraction" by the Cominform. (SECRET)
SPECIAL ARTICLE
S]agcessito power in the USSR
With each passing year, the question of who will
succeed Stalin as the ruler of the USSR becomes increasingly
acute. It is most unli~ely that Stalin will voluntarily
relinquish his power while still alive, and it is improbable
that he could be compelled to do so. Therefore, any settle-
ment of this problem will presumably. be postponed. until his
death, following which the two most probable alternatives
would'be: (1) the transfer. of his power to an individual,
thus continuing the one-man dictatorship) or (2) the division
of his powers among several of the present Politburo members
who could then rule jointly.
The continuation of a one-man dictatorship has
strong historical precedent. Life under both the Tsarist
and Soviet regime, while perhaps not preconditioning the
Russian people to the concept of. the autocratic ruler, has
served to prevent the Russian people from gaining a first-
hand understanding of a less dictatorial type of government.
The experience of the Stalinist regime indicates that the
structure of the USSR can best be administered by a single
head, The fact that the present dictatorship has successfully
withstood the strains created by the collectivization of
agriculture, the purges of the 1930's, and World War II must
appear to Stalin as a convincing argument for one-man con-
trol. It would seem logical, therefore, that Stalin, in
planning the USSR's administrative future, would give serious
though to the continuation of this principle,
However, the substance of Stalin's power is such
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that automatic transfer to another individual would be dif-
ficult. Although machinery exists in both the Party and Govern-
ment for choosing Stalin's successor as Secretary General of
the Party and Chairman of~ the Council of Ministers, there is
no such machinery for the transfer of those oth=er powers he
has collected, which though less tangible, are in fact more
effective than those derived from his titular positions.
These less tangible powers are based on his success over a
period of years in eliminating all rivals, both real and
potential, and replacing them with men who owe their advance-
ment solely to his favor and who presently hold high office
by his sufferance. Today, the members of the Politburo, the
highest policy organ of the USSR, seemingly function as a
selfless, dedicated, and unified group because of Stalin's
supreme control. .
Owing to the high degree of compartmentaliza-
tion both of knowledge and authority below the Politburo
level, it would appear impossible for nonmembers to figure
prominently in the succession. It is extremely unlikely
that this group would automatically transfer this allegiance
to another member simply because he had been designated by
the departed ruler. It would appear that any one man
aspiring to Stalin's power would have to 'tcreate9 anew his
own claims by eliminating his rivals and forging his own
"unified" Politburo.
There is, of course, the possibility that Immediate
ly after Stalin's death, one man might take over the state
apparatus by force. Beriya is usually mentioned as the in-
dividual who could accomplish this because of his control of
the secret police. This all-power organization with its
vast and pervasive network of informers, security troops,
and system of slave labor camps is generally considered to
supply those components of coercion and fear without which
the present regime could not operate. Beriya, though no
longer ministerially responsible for the police set-up, is
undoubtedly that member of the Politburo charged with its
direction. However, it is an over-simplification and a
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fallacy to consider the police as a self-sufficient force,
separate from and opposed to the Party.. The responsible
officers of the secret police are almost all Party members.
Not only is their allegiance primarily to.the Party, but the
Party organizations within the various administrative sub-
divisions of the police have such importance that the
organization secretary ranks with the administrative chief
of his division in prestige. Furthermore, many MGB workers
are assigned to their jobs by the Party, and there are in-
dications that a section of the Party's Central Committee
Apparatus ratifies appointments of police officials on at
least the responsible levels. In these ways the police
organization is controlled by and becomes responsible to
the Central Committee Apparatus, over which Malenkov, as the
leading Party bureaucrat under Stalin, probably has the most
control. Under such conditions, it would appear impossible
for Beriya to plan and organize a coup in the necessary
secrecy. The possibility that at the crucial moment
Malenkov and Beriya might undertake such action together
is also unlikely, Mutual trust is not stimulated by the
Soviet system, by the history of the Party, nor by Stalin's
technique of playing off one lieutenant against another in
order to avoid just such a contingency.
The most likely alternative would, therefore, ap-
pear to be a division of Stalin's powers among several of the
present Politburo members. Recently received evidence on
the administrative setup within the Politburo up to 1939,
suggests that a committee, composed of Molotov, Malenkov, and
Beriya, may already exist which could immediately take over
after Stalin's death. During the late 30's, the Politburo
apparently handled most of the basic political decisions
through a "Political Commission" consisting of Molotov,
Beriya, and Zhdanov. Beneath the "Political Commission"
were a number of specialized, functional committees each
headed by a Politburo member, and probably containing Party
experts from the Central Committee Apparatus. For example,
the Foreign Affairs Committee was headed by Molotov; the
Comintern Committee by Zhdanov; the Security Committee by
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Beriya; and the Military Committee by Voroshilov. Policy
problems in foreign affairs would be discussed in the Foreign
Affairs Committee, and recommendations passed on to the
Political Commission which normally decided on the action
to be taken. However, if the problem were particularly vital,
or if agreement could not be reached between the three members
of the Commission, the matter would receive Stalin's arbitra-
tion in a plenum of the Politburo. There seems little reason
to suppose that this system has been materially altered, and
assuming that Malenkov has now filled Zhdanov's vacancy,
Stalin's three top aides appear to be the logical group to
run the empire after Stalin's death.
Molotov, who is now 60 years old, is Stalin's
closest and perhaps oldest associate. He is always ranked
next to Stalin in the Soviet hierarchy, whether in official
photographs, public appearances, or in the press. He present-
ly occupies the post of First Deputy Chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ministers, the most important governmental position
in the USSR next to that of Chairman Stalin. During the
year since he was relieved of his position as Minister of
Foreign Affairs, there have been several indications, cul-
minating with his preelection speech in March, that Molotov
has been concerned with the widest range of Soviet internal
and external problems,
Malenkov, at 48 one of the youngest members, is
presently considered third in the official hierarchy. His
background is almost exclusively that of the Party bureau-
crat. His responsibilities in the fields of Party organi-
zation and the development and control of Party cadres have
given him a good opportunity to build a personal following
among the middle and lower Party bureaucracy, an opportuni-
ty markedly similar to that which Stalin exploited in the
1920's. According to reports, he is shrewd, capable, ruth-
less, and is gifted with a remarkable memory. During the
war he gained experience in industrial management, reputedly
being in charge of tank and plane manufacturing. As Chair-
man of the Committee for Restoration of National Economy in
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areas liberated from. Germany,he must also have been concerned
with agricultural matters. In this position he had as sub-
ordinates Khr4shev,.Ponomarenko, and Suslov, the three other
present Secretaries of the Central Committee beside himself
and Stalin; His outlook is apparently that of a practical
politician rather than a theoretical Marxist, a factor which
may account for his partial. eclipse in 1946 by the late
ideologist Zhdanov. Since the latter's death in August
1948, however, Malenkov has rapidly gained ground and last
November was accorded the unusual honor, reserved in the
past for Stalin, Molotov, and once for Zhdanov, of making the
principal address on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion.
Beriya, with his responsibility for the secret
police, would undoubtedly be a necessary addition to any
inner committee. Although both Malenkov and Beriya are com-
paratively recent members of the Politburo, having attained
their status of full membership only in March 1946, they now
hold between them the two major components of control and
force (Party and police) upon which the stability and
security of the present regime are based. Without their
active support, Molotovts "committee" could not exercise even
nominal power.
It is possible, of course, that other Politburo
members might be co-opted to the Commission in order to al-
leviate dangerous jealousies and gain a majority in the
present Politburo, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, and per-
haps Khruschev would all be possible candidates, but it is
unlikely that the Commission would contain more than seven
members. Such older members of the Politburo as Kaganbvich
and Mikoyan, with their long experience in heavy industry and
foreign trade, could provide the working, economic components
of the colletive leadership.
It is possible that Bulganin might be included for
his general ability and his contacts with military leaders
resulting from a two-year stint as Minister of the Armed
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CONROENI1A
Forces, Although Khruschev has not generally be considered
among the most capable of the top leaders, his recent'appoint-
ment as a member of the Party Secretariat and his shift from
the Ukraine to head the important Moscow Party organization
has increased his prestige to the point where his membership
must be considered a possibility..
It does not seem likely that the ensuing period of
rules by committee would be long lasting. Jealousies,
rancours, and disagreements among these top leaders most
certainly exist today, even though reliable evidence is
lacking. The possibility that these discords will remain
dormant and that personal ambition will bow to altruistic
motivations or even uneasy cooperation is not borne out by
the past. history of the Party. A struggle for power will.
almost certainly result. If one man, such as Molotov, can
act as a unifying force, this struggle might conceivably be
postponed, coming to the fore only after his disappearance
from the political scene. In any event, it would appear
that this rule by committee would in time be again replaced
by an individual dictatorship. At present, it would seem
that Malenkov with his authority over the Party apparatus
and reputed ability would be the most-likely to emerge as
victor, (SECRET)
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CO~NTIAL
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