SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000300050001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~ December 1950
SU~:IMARIES CF TRENDS -AND DEVELQF'M~TS
USSR
1, The USSR apparently_ feels the urgent, necessity of
striking a blow at the ever-expanding US~-~oli.c;~,of containment,,
of which UN act~..on in k.orea is the most clear cut application.
There.f.ore, Communist China, bolstered by the USSR,, has accepted
the risk of full--scale war with the US in order to drive UN
troops out of Korea. The Kremlin would undoubtedly be satis-
fied if this objective can be achieved without extension of
the fighting.
If a war between the US and Communist China should
ensue, it is believed that the USaR would wish to refrain
initially from beconli.ng directly involved in the conflict.
Zt is probable, however, that the USSR recognizes
the strong possibility that it would be involved in a US-
Chinese war within a,relativaly limited period of time after
the outbreak of formal ho~~tila.ties, perhaps within one year,
and must have accepted the attendant risks of global war-
fare. Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders probably wish to
avoid, if possa.ble, global war row or in the near future
and calculate, that the odds to do so ~~,re still i.n their
fever.
~~age 5 )
2, There is an increasing possibility that the USaR,
overestimatinA~ thy; disunity a,mon~ the N1~.T pa~wersy is planning
further aggressive Communist action or diplomatic maneuvers
expecting a disunited and ineffective reaGt~;c~n f~?m the~Wset,
(Wage S )
DELL
CLASS. CHANT
NEXT FEE'JtEtti~ L1ATE:
G,.Ta=;
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~pDENTIAL
3. The ?,~Torld Peace Council created rec
tl
en
at Warsaw
bathe Communist-dominated Second GJnrlri U~~~o r,.~~..'-'~"TT.n,.,~
_ ---?~- ~~~ U~ Y~.~ ~ u~.~c r~ropa~anaa as an or~ani~ation
which will "assist11 the UDI~ in fulfilling .its functions. The
somewhat ominous threat is made, however, that if the UN
fails to fulfill these functions the World Peace Council.
will provide a more effeeti.vu international forum. The more
immediate purposE~ of this move is to impose pressure on non-
communist members of the UN not to adapt toc~ strong a
position against the USSR, and Satellite4:.
(Page 10 )
4
comp; involved in warfare on a global scale.
While remaining officially aloof from a Chinese->US
conflict, the USSR might hope that vetEran Communist-troops
equipped with Soviet nkataric:l and aided by Soviet technical
know-how will succ4ed in driving US-UN ;forces out of Korea
and avc;r-running Southeast 1~sia.. At laast the USSR might
hs,ve a. r?ason~,ble expectation of a stc,lc;mate between the
,warring powers and a passibility of forcing the US into a
"Portsmouth treaty" similar to that imposed upon Russia
after the Russo~Japanesc; war of 1g01~~-U~,
Furthermore,, there have been no significant i.ndi~
cations that the; USSR is planning for imminent Soviet military
action anywhere in Europe or Asia, although the USSR is al~
ready in a. state of advanced readiness for war and could eon->
teal troop dispositions and other late; measures .far global
war up to the vary outbreak of hostilities., The reported
move:izients of Soviet military personnel to key points in
China and Manchuria are be;lie;ved to be still limited chiefly
to advisory and technical personnel..
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an the basis of available evidence, it is cansidered
unlikel~r that the USSh would plan to intervene immediately
in hostilities between the US and. Communist China. The USSR
would probably prefer to refrain from avert interv?ntion un--
til: 1) It has had e.n opportunity to observ? US reaction
in the form of mobilization and political and military
strategy; ~) Communist Chinas military fortunes and the
success of gu?rril.la operations elsewhere in 1~sia can be
gauged; and 3) The international situation (particularly the
attitudes of the i~11~T0 powers: Germanys Greeces Turkey,
India ~~,nd Iran) has resolvt.d itself.
It i~~ probable, howevers that the USSR recognizes
the Strang passibility that it would be invol~rE.d in a ws,r
between the Ua and Communist China within a relatively
limited pt~riad of time after the outbreak of formal hostili-
tie s perhaps within one years and must have accepted the
attendant risks of global warfare. Nevertheless the Soviet
leadc,rs probably wish to avoids if possible, global war now
or in thy: near future and calculate that the adds to da so
are: still in their fs,var.
The fact that Communist China cannot fight this
ws~,r w~.thout subst=~ntial quantities of war mat riel and large
numbers of technicis,ns from the Soviet Union involv~:s one
such serious risk, It cannot be estimated whether the US
-will b~; able to ignore this flow of materiel and military
personnel from the USSR to China while enga~;c;d in a struggle
of large dimensions which is known to be instigated and en-
coura~,ed by Soviet leaders.
k~nother serious risk for the USSR is possible ad~-
vers? d?v~;lopment of the war for the Chinese Communist
regime. 7'he Kremlin can hardly delude itself that a com~
binatla.on of US air and naval operations supported by guer~
rilla activities on an ever-~grawing scale might not reduce
the arF~~a, of eff~7ctive control of the Communist regime ands
if unchecked, ultimately result in its overthrown If tha
Chinese Communists find themselves confronted with a critical
_7_
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situation, the USSR would then have to decide whether or not
to give the: regime direct support both in maintaining itself
internally and in depriving the US of bases from which war
would be waged a~,o.inst the Chinese mainland. In determining
the probable Soviet reaction to this situations a considera-
tion of the: motives for the original. Chinese intervention
in Korea is Emtailed. It now appears reasonably certain
that this intervention was motivated by unwillingness on
the part of the Soviet bloc to ace~pt the significant loss
of International Communist prestige: and ~.mportant strategic ?
territory involved in abandoning North Koree,.3~ The same
elements era even more strongly present in similar situation
with. respect to this Chinc:so Peoplers Republics and it is,
therefare~ seriously to ba doubted that the USSR could af--
fard to dishonor the Chinese-Soviet pact of mutual assistance
or refuse ~.Ldditi.onal assistance to the CPR. (SECRET)
T4TC~Rrs overestimation, of disunity among Western "~"
Powers may result ixz new Communist a~ ression
A major ob~~}ctivc of the Soviet Union has boen to
divide; the Western Powers with regard to both political and
military policy toward the Soviet orbit and prevent the de-
velopment of a force in Western Europe: capable of presenting
effective military opposition to the 6oviet Union. To'this
end3 the Soviet Union has recently: (1) attempted to ag--
~;ravate; differ?nces between the US, Great Britain and other
non-Soviet nations with regard to questions involving Commun-
ist China ands (2) issued the Prague Communique and proposed
~, Four power conference on Germany partly to d3.ssu^.de France
from support of German rearmament and Germany from partici-
pati'on in ~Testern ~~,irapean defensUs.
3~In this connection, it should no'k. be overlooked
that the USSR, mindful of J=.pan' s past role s,s an important
balance of power ixi areas ~~c~ jacent to the Soviet Far East
sees the danger of a karean economic vacuum being filled by
Japan a~ a stabilizing ir~fluenee in the area.
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SECRET
Tha most important Soviet newspapers have also
recently published extensive US press comments asking the
question: "~~i11 not the war in Korea lead to the complete
disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance and to the inter-
national isolation of the United States?".Although there
wac? little editorial comment, it should be remembered that
Communist ideology forec~.~?sts inevitable and deepening con-
flicts of interest among capitalist, imperialist powers,.
There may be a tendency, therefore, for the Kremlin to
over--estimate the degree of disunity existing among the
~~tlantic Powers and to miscalculate accordingly.
It is possible i~hat the Kremlin actually expects
as a result of-Chinese intervention in the Korean war, to
achieve two ab~ectitires. (1) to break thE: cammoal Western
front with regzrd to the war ita Korea and isolate the US
in at least ~, limited war with China,.(2) to weaken the
North 1'~tlanta.c ~^~llianae through disagreements over courses
of action and from fear that the US will be unable to ful-
fill its commitments,. and (3) to undermine generally the
US policy off' containment of Communist expansion. In order
to achieve these object:i.v. sy Soviet policy may be; to .con-
tinue i?ts current policy of pressure without aggressive
action with regard to Western :Europe end Yugaslavia..?The
Soviet Union may believe that a relatively moderate policy
in this aria may bring about a widening split between the
US and its Wc;starn ~;uropean allies.
However, th? Soviet Union has often used intimi-
dation and strong-arm tactics whore a deceptive peaceful
appearance might have succeeded in .preventing or forestall-
ing Western unity. The possibility increases, therefore,
that Camtnunist forces, estimating; a disunited and in~
affective reaction from the West,. will take: further ag--
gressive actions for example against West Berlin or Yugo--
slavia.. Chinese Communist pledges to "liberate" all former
Chinese territory may result in conflicts in Burrna or Hong
Kong, and the Soviet bloc will intensify aggressi-Te actions
against Indo~China snd.Nlalaya despite the danger of arousing
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greater hostility from ~~rance and Britain and in Southeast
l,sia itself. The aoviet Union, in supporting large-scale
Chinese intervc;ntion in the Korean war, has evidenced in--
creast;d willingness to accept th? risk of war. This fact,
in combination with the Soviet estimate of th'c~ weakness of
Western unity and US weakness in s,ctual forces available
for resistance to limitc,d a~;~;ressions, could cause the
Soviet Union to undertake ventures that it previously.
avoided b~;cause of the risk invalved or because of an es-
timate; that the undertaking would not succeed in the face
of Western counteraction. In the meantime, it is probable
that the USSR will at-least attempt to capitalize on its
estirnat e of the situation by diplomatic approachPS to
countries such as France,. r~ustria, Iran, India or Indonesia,
desigmed to frighten ar lure them aw~~,y from support of US
policy toward the Soviet Union. (SECRET)
USSR using World Peace Congress nAn
~~ bolster its UN op sition
The ?nTorl.d Peace Council recently created at Warsaw
by the Communist-dominated Second World Peace Congress (SWPC)
has bean h~~~iled in Soviet bloc propaganda as an organization
which will "assist" the iJN in fulfilling its functions. The
somewhat ominous threat is rrxade, however, that if. the UN
fails to t'ulfill these functions (from the paint of view of
the IJSSR, and its Satellites), the World Peace Council will
provide a more effc;ctive international forum. ~~s the
:Literary Gazette expresses its "The nations of the world
now possess an instrument by means of which they can arrive
at a mutu?.l understanding cve;n without these: gentlemen (the
UN majority L;raup) if ne?d be." Pr_ ~vda st~~tes that this nsw
Peace Council "wil:L be a more ?representative agency than the
General ~;ssembly."
On the other hand, Radio Warsaw denied on 27 November
that the World Peace Council is intended to "supplant the
Uni~Ced Nations." The general line, as ,stated far example
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in a proposal of the St+;TT'C Political Committee, is thrlt the
organization will act in the capacity of "alert observer
and critic" of the UN, with the assistance of states not
yet UN members and regions which are now colonies of the
big pow?rs,
These facts suggest that an alternative inter-
national body has bean creat~:d in case the Soviet bloc
deems it necessary ar desirable to withdraw froth the UN..
However, in order to utilize the World Peace Council as a
competing organization to the UN, it_wauld probably be
necessary to carry out a fundamental structural change so
as to n~~,ke it an organization o:f. states. In view of the
shadowy distinction in the Soviet world between non-
governmental associations and governmental agencies, such
an oltcrhaf-ion of the structure of the Peace Council would
bP a relatively simple mattero The mare immediate purpose
of this move is to impose pressure an nonwCotnmunist members
of tYt~: UN not to adopt too strong a position against the
USSR and aatelJ.itesa (SECRET)
Communist pur.?chases of rubber rive sharpl:~ "~'~
With the outbreak of war in ki:orea, Communist pur->
chases of rubber, as well as other strategic materials, be-
gan to rise sharply, especially in the Far Fast. In the
first half of 1950, Communist imparts of rubber were can-
siderably belo?~r the lev~;l of 1949, except for the USSR,
whose purchases remained at approximately the, same rate.
With the Communist invasion of South Korea, Communist pur--
chas?s began to mount, and by the end of September had a1--
ready approached the level of 1949.
The outstanding feature of this trend has been the
:increasing emphasis on China. Unofficial figures on Soviet
s.nd Chinese purchases in October not only indicate an in-
tensification of this trends but suggest the diversion to
Chins, o:C purchases originally intended .for Eastern Europe
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Also to be Hated is thy; increasing proportion of Chinese im-
ports of rubber which e,re coming direct from Malaya instead
of being reexported by Hong Kong. While further evidence
is ne?d~:d for substantiation, this is in kedping with re~
cent reports of a Chinese decision to cut down on trans-
shipments from Hong Kong.
The fo~tlowin~; incomplete table gives the principal
rubber-importing Coinmun,ist countries-and their major sources
of supply:
MAJOR COMMtTNIST SOURCES OF RU}3BF~~Z
M~"laY~.
UK Re~:Exports
Ir}donesia
Hong; Kong
USS1=t ;
1949
63,414
540
1950-1st half
3 5,#300
54
-3rd ga?~a*ter ~ 2$, OOO 3 , X82
--Octobers, 1,?"r2
~ ze choslovakiz~,
1949
4,641
3,917
1950-1st half
1,197
X71
--3rd quarter
4, 50~
319
Poland:
1949
7, 909
11,.9
.709
1950-1st half
lu
16?3
4E3$
-3rd quarter
-2,415
342(July)
Ch a:
1949
6,99O
20,510 (e~
1950-1st half
250
4,900
-3x?d quarter
9,334
12~OOO
--Oc~ober3E
12,061
3~ -- Unofficial
(e) ~ Estimx~,te
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. SECRET
In addition, UK re--exports provided another 2190
tans to Hung7.ry in the first g months of 1950, while Dutch
re-exports to the Soviet Orbit in the first half of the
year azrlountfod to 2,5$~ tons, exclusive of the USSR.
Effective measures to curtai~_ Communist purchases
of rubber, as of other strategic commodities, must deal
with the problem of t:ransshiprtient. One difficulty is the.
price Factor. In January-Septa..mber 1919, for example,
the Uli received an average of E11O per ton for the rubber
rem-exported to th? USSR. In January-September 1q,~0, the
average price received was avor E20?3 per tan. Even when
the devaluation of the pound sterling is tak~;n into con
sidera,tion, this rE~presents an increase of f rozn ~1~1~0 to
X552 per tan. Increased Cozzzmunist purchases despite such
increases in prices emphasizes the?urgeney of their need
for rubber. (CONFID:~NTIt~,L)
Renewed effort t0 a.m,,,,,prov~ consumer ~iaods in USSR
An active> drive to increase cotton cloth production
in the USSR durinU the fourth quarter of the 1950 Plan was
launched in the ~~ascow area during the past month. The in-
tended aim appears to be. a renewed effort to improve lagging
ava,ilrb5.lity to the consumers of textile products,
During the first three quarters of the current
year total output of cotton textiles recorded the lowest
percentage, increase of all reported consumer items. The
basic reason for this ddf.iciency was the lack of raw
zzza.tcra,als, but, paradoxically, gres~,ter emphasis has been
placed on inefficient labor G,nd machinery requirements. As
a result of these combined factors the textile industry has
bocame the subject for application of a modified Stakhanovite
movement. '
There are several existing deficiencies in textile
products in the USSR. 'resent production has not ~s yet
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attained the prewar levels and only marginal gains have
been reported frorn supplementary Satellite production, Tn--
creased consumer consumption is impossible without further
investment in the supply of both machinery and raw materials,,.
~. drive at this time is primarily an attempt to
achieve planned goals? but long rangy possibilities do in~-
dicate increased confidence in the recently expanded cotton
px'ogram, pecause the utility of cotton for clothing and
indi~.strial purposes represents the bulk o~ texti.le require
menu , any sizeable incrr~ase resulting from this present
drive would be noted by corresponding gains in availability
to the constuners of other textile products, Resulting
.larger supY~lies could provide present and future production
incentive to the urlaan and farm population, and under
emergency ~eriocls must be weighed as a plus factor toward
satisfying military needs.
!~ further paint of conjectures viewed in the light
of decreasing emphasis in light industry in some satellite
areas, offers plausible evidence ths,t a continued expansion
of the textile industry in U::~~;R riiust be promoted irz order
to meet necessary requirements. (CONI'TDr;NTTAL)
Geneva Grain Co_nfer~nc~ closes ~~8~~
with avorabl~ resresults ~'ax Soviet Union
The results of the ECF grain trade conference that
has just closed in Geneva were quite favorable to the Soviet
Union from both political and economic points of view,
Although na .immediate ar lori~;--term grain agreements
were concluded at Gcnev~,, the: way has beon opened for bilateral
negotiations between the Soviet Union and five prospective
West European ampartersp
The original intention of discussing long.-term multi->
lateral tradr; agreements similar to the international Wheat
. >14..
s~c~,~T
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Agreement was pushed to one side when the Saviet Bloc offered
only small quantities of coarse grains and no brc;ad grains.
The concrete results of the meeting were; (1} bi-~
lateral negotiations will begin between th? Soviet Union and
the importing countries of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Nethei^-~
lands, and France for the remaining SQa,Q00 to 1,000,aaa
tons of coarse grains the Soviets have indicated to be
available for trade; (2) confirmed the; f~~,ct that the Satellites
have only small quantities ava.ilabla for export; (3) the USSR
refused tea discuss bilateral grain trc,a,ties with West Germany
and 1~.ustria; {t,,) the Soviet Bloc. favored longterm agree
rnents of three to five years, estimating that 1.5 to 2 million
tons of coarse grains would be available each year; (5) the
cha:i.rman suggested that another ECE sponsored grain meeting
be held next su~mler when 1957. crop d~~,ta beCOrnES availab7.~~,
From the Soviet point of view the results of this
conference: have been quite satisfactory, They have sucaceded
irz keeping; the nRgotiations an a bil~~.teral basis, thus
de~~ling with the W4st European countries individually.
Because of the: lar~?;e Euro~aean demand for the; world r s
supply of non dollar coarse grains, the Soviets will be in
abetter pasita.on to exact a z^elative;ly high price and may
well causer the a.mporters embarrassment if they da not agree
to reciprocate with strategic conunoditi?s.
The apparent willingness of the- Soviet Bloc to talk
in terms of long-term agreements could add fuel to the propa~
Banda theme of "pEaceful~~ intentions.
HUNGARY
Hun~:ari~in Corrunuxzists fac,~, difficulties in ~~B"
~,tmentin~ education y.~ro~;ra,m
Problems arising from the Communist program for
.,15~
SECRET
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education of. the youth are again receiving prominent at-
tention in Hungary. The same problems were widely publicized
last spring when the Central Corrunittee of the Communist Party
passed a resolution describing the serious difficulties and
outlining necessary corrective measureso Despite efforts to
.overcome the failures of the education program and despite
repeated boasts of achievements along this line, it is ap-
parent that the Communists are not meeting with success in
their plan to tra3.n a politically reliable potential corps
of technical and administrative specialists from the sons and
daughters of workers and peasants.
llmong the problems still faced are: (1) a shortage
of teachers indoctrinated with Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist
ideology; (2) failure of ~3~,000 children of school age to
enroll in school; (3) completion of minimum education re-
quirements ($ years) by only 1~0-1+5 percent of the students;
(4) a decrease in the number of workersr and peas~;ntsr
children who contz.nue into secondary schools and universities;
(5) overcrowding in some secondary school courses such as
engineering and economics and a shortage in the faculties of
law and teaching.
A number of. measures aimed at solving these problems
have been taken. ThE~ pariod of train~.ng for teachers. has
been reduced from three to t,wo years through the elimination
of all "superfluous" subjects. The ideological reorienta-
tion of present teachers was provided far in summer courses
which all teachers ware forced to attend, The need to educate
pupils in the spirit of Communist morality and love for the
Soviet Union and Stalin was emphasized in these courses, In
addition, a two-.year past-graduate course is required far the
teacher '~to acquire the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninist
ideology and unify his knowl~;dge with the application of Ma.rxist-
I~eninist ideology."
Failure of children, especially peasant children,
to register for school ..s blamed on the lack of previous
educational opportunities, distances to school, bad roads, and
"the undermining work of the enemy.' Continuing efforts
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,, ,
to weaken the ties between children and their parents and
between the children and the Catholic Church are part of the
battle ag~.~inst thc~ "enemy. ""
Inducements for wox?ker and peasant children to con
time school includes (1} elimination or reduction of tuition
fees; (2} enactment of Students- Health Insurance; (3) holding
of special coaching classes during the summer for students
who failed their exanu.nations.
A recent shake-~up in the i~~.na.stry of Education was
directed at those officials who allegedly hack sabotaged the
Communists efforts to increase the proportion of workers and
peasants among, the students. Forcing the sfiude~nt to cope
with textbooks that were toe difficult for him was the
charge leveled st the: Educe~.tion officials.. Children of the
former ruling classy according to the Communists, had a
better cultural taurldation than those of worker and peasant
descent and so were bettor able to mast the higher requ3.rei~-
menu.
ri'he present grave situation and the seriousness of
the difficulties encountered in establishing a Communist
system of education were; revealed by Minister of Education
~7ozs?~f Darvas in a lecture on 22 November, Addressing a
conference organized jointly by the I~~inis~tries of Education
and Pe;aple:s' Culture, he stated.: "The school has always
been the most acute weapon in the political battles, and it
will always rerztain so .,,. I a~m confident that by making the
utmost effort wc; will be able to improve production in the
field of public education," (RESTRxGTED)
~a~AND
Polandd ~l~,nnin~ c3.oser coordinat~.on between mil tar.,y
requirernents grid industra~al x~roduction
Greater coordination by Poland betwcaErn military
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SECRET
requirements and overall industrial produet:ian under the
sic--y~;ar plan ma,y come into being following the appointment
on 25 Novcamber of Gc;neral Piotr JaroszeWicz as Vice-Chairman
of the all-important State. Economic Planning Commission.
That such emphasis may be under consideration is also in->
dicated by an unconfirmed report th~lt new recruits of the
Polish Artny are being given non-tn3.litary industrial assign-
ments.
General Jaroszew3:cz has sei?vc:d since February 19G.6
as V~.e~=.--Minister of Natiori~~.l Defense in` charge of Supply
anc`~ Finance far Polandis .C~rmed Forces, Hc: is presumably
well acquainted with the zi~i.litary requirements of the Armed
Forces ~,nd the possible a#fe:cts upon Poland of rising in-
dustrial requirements for rr~ilitary purposes. Aside from
this military service, Jaraszewicz has .been a Cor~ununist
Party activist, and an army political commissar, which would
a,dd to his qualifications for strengthening the St~~te Eco?
nomic Planning Cozruna.ssion. (GONFID~.~~NTTAI,)
lZuma,nian__Goverrun~nt ,~i,~,htens ~ '~B"
control of peo~,,ale1s brand supply
The a~urnani~n Council of i~iinistars has arinaunc~:d a
taken incrc;asa 9_n bread rations to th? lowest category of
card holders, while at the lama time putting into farce
stringent centrals over the processing and distribution of
brand. Brown bread rations distributed to ration categories
D ~. and D 2 (members of fartd.lies and persons not employed)
Yaave been increased from 250 to 300 grams per day. White
bread, end flour will now ba sold only on 'the free market; "
although the price has bean-reduced it is still a prohibitive
price for the rna,jority of people. Before thi;~ order, white
flour had been obtain~.~ble on ration cards, at reduced prices.,
twice a year.
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k
In thw same order increasing bread rations for one
category of the populat3.on, it was announced that all procc~ss~
ing of broad as well as of other flour products will take
places only in State enterprises. This, in effects prevents
independent b~~.kers from ~5roduca.ng and marketing breath ax--
cept under strict Government supervision. Since bread
rations are inadequate and the bread is of such inferior
quality, most people have been forced to supplement their
rations through purchases of bread on thr~ blank and free
markets.- By eliminating the- private bakersi the Gavern>
ment wi11 be in a mare favorable position to control the
amount of bread available an the free market and can-use
this as both an economic or political waapon against the
people -~-- partieui,ar]..y those classes forced to purchase all
of their bread an the free market.
The tightening of distribution facilities, which
.was ~:xpected in view of Rumanians current corn shortage' can
in the long run effectively reduce the total consumption of
bread among the urban populations Because of the shortage
of other staples,- it was probably necessary to increase the
bread ration far the people only r~;ceiving 250 ~;raans per
day. Thug the move is not regarded as politically motivated
despite the fact that it was made six days before the elec>
Lions for peoples councils.
The most significant aspect of -the pub~.ished order
is the Staters assumptiein of control over all production
~~nd distribution of bread-and other flour products? which
will prab~a~bly d~;creasa the total amount of grain used far
bread, eliminate competition to State breed enterprisesy
and strengthen political cantrol.by giving the Government
complete control over all marketing channeld available to
the urban population. (CON~'ID~ITIkL)
_lq..
SECRET
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YUGOST.AVIA
Yugo-Greek rat~prochement evokes heightened
Cominform nropa~anda attack
Com3.nform propaganda organs have recently seized
upon the Greek--Yugoslav rs.ppx~achement and the US emergency
aid program to Yugoslavia, as a basis for 'renewing specific
charges that Yugoslavia, in conjunction with Greece, plans
direct aggression against tsl'~ania "within rx matter of days."
Bulgaria, is also cited as a target of joint Yugoslav--Gre~ak
military operations, to be carried out under US direction.
Reference is mxd~ to recant visits into Gx?eek Macedonia of
a number of prosaxi.nent Gre?k political lea~lers~ including the
King and queen, and an alleged visit of US Ambassador Peurifay
to Salonika for military consultations is compared to the
tour of the Korean frontier by Mr. Dulles prior to the "South
Korean a~;gression't.
However, simil~.r charges have been periodically
launch~;d against Yugoslavia ever since the end of the Greek
civil war, Beginning early in 1950, when the question of
an ~;xcha,n~=;e of Ministers batween Greeca and Yugoslavia-was
first raisedy Cominform organs clamordd that the US was
organizing a 'Belgrad~~Athens Axis" in preparation for a
war in the Balic
merit and criticism of it, The miners do-not favor pneumatic
pick hrners because they are too heevg'4 On 1'7 august, the
first USSR, coal combine and the first machine of such type
used in Hungary was put into operation. This machine, which,
outs and loads coal simultaneously, w~,s claimed to be idle
too much of the time, but ~.t did not receive a fair trial
because it was used in a thick coal seam for which it is un>
suitable., =lctually, it proved to be satisfactory in the
US~~R when used in the thickness of coal for. which it is
designed.
The Hungarian coal industry is handicapped by the
scarcity of mechanical equipment, The majority of the coal
is extracted manually. Probably little more: than 36 percent
is cut with machinery and this mainly with pneumatic pick
hammers v~rhich-are extremely tiring for the user. The amount
of coal mined underground that is mechanically loaded is
virtually nil. A partit~l solution of Hungaryss coal problems
depends on the obtaining of equipment. Three times more
cutting machines are planned for 1951 than in 1950 and, if
obtainad, they will alleviate some of the labor shortage.
It is doubtful whether the USSR or the Satellites can pro-
vide much mining equipment because of their own urgent re->
quirements.
Until recently miners wages have been lower than
those in other industries. This situation .has probably eon
tributed to mi~;ratian to other work, scarcity of new lobar,
absenteeism and ganeral discontent, The status of the
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SECRET
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CENTIAL
miner hs,s now been raised to that of the highest paid worker
although increased norms minimize the overall pay raises.
The solution to Hungaryrs coal problems depends
primarily on .furnishing suffici?nt financial incentive to
increase labor productivity and to hold as well as attract
the right type of new labor.- The current prevalance of
grievances and absenteeism would indicate that wages are
still not high enough to compensate for bettor working con->
ditions elsewhere, (SECRET).
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