WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 48-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, O/RR, CIA 28 NOVEMBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200060009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 28, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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CONFIDIENTIAlls,
Weekly Contributions 4S-50
Latin America Division, 0/RR, CIA
28 November 1950
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
S74
GENERAL: Comma:lists are retaining labor influence in spite of some losses
and increasing opposition (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA: In Venezuela, no compromise canrlidate to succeed Delgado
Chalteud has yet been found acceptable to all important groups (n. 2)*
SOUTHERN AREA: In Argentina, economic necessity figures largely in the
recent extension of diplomatic and coomercialrelations with the Soviet
Union (pe 3)* POT1108 uncompromising attitude is compaicating attempts
of the guarantor nations to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
Peru-Ecuador border dispute (p. 4)0
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Colabia . * . . . . OOOOOOOO 0 0 0 0 . 5
The Ourrent Situation in Guatemala . . 0 OOOOO 6 OOOOO 0 6 0 0 g
CONFIDEPATIAL
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TO: TS
NLXI DATE:
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NSA+ H
OAT TW
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA, aCONFIDENTIAL 28 Novem al. 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
1. GENERAL ists Retein Labor Influence in Sn te of Recent Renross on.
Although there has beer no significant over-all change in
Communist labor iefluence, Communist labor forces in a number of Latin
American countries are an the derensives fncirg continued or increas-
ing renression and in some eases increasing opposition of nen-Communist
labor groups. Comunist leaders, howevenoven when on the defensive,
are parrying nntieCommunist moves and in certain cases, despite same
losses, have mainteined their influence or control over irportant labor
groups.
In !lexica, the strugele has intensified between Communists
and non-Communists in important industrial syndicates. Communist
lenders, after being removed from office or expelled from important
unienss have formed competing unions or pro-Communist committees within
the unions and have attempted through these rump groups to force their
way back into pmeer by strikes and sobotage. Although unsuccessful
in their attempt to regnin power, the Communist leaders hnve revealed
their continuing ability to incite local disturbences in mining, petro-
leums railways ane electric power industries. In most other Mexican
industries, non-Communist organizers have been making some progress
in lining un an important contingent of labor unions interested in
becoming a part of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU). The Guatemalan Communist labor leader, Pinto Usama, was
expelled from the politically powerful railway union, though he con-
tinues to be an official of one of the two major labor federations
(FSG). As a result of pressure brought by Somoza against the Nicara-
guan Confederaci6n General do Trabejo (CGT) for disseminating Communist
nronaganda ane partioinating in politicn1 affairs, the CGT split into
Communist and Somooista factiones and the Communist group now faces
a possible cracked by Somoza at any time. In the Panama Canal Zone,
Communists; have lost labor influence to the nev CIO union but continue
to maintain a small local union. Venezuelan Communist petroleum union
officials, fancying some months of inactivity imposed by government
repression and illegalization of their fedorrefion? are beginning to
attempt organizational work and propaganda against government-sponsored
unions, Argentine Communists in imnortant positions in the government..
controlled labor federation (CGT) are faced with close police surveil-.
lance. However, by masquerading as Peronistas, they retain considerable
freedom of action,
At present there is reason to 'ellieve that Latin American
Communist lebor leaders will continue to retain influence or control
over importent segments of the labor movement despite some looses and
mounting opposition.
2G .9.117,zu3LA: Y.9292111923-25-211,SaMlati-PAJWARAPANQIWI
The failure of the. Venezuelan junta government to announce
the appointment of a successor to the late Lt. Col. Carlos Delgado
Chalbaudi as expected on the second anniversary of the coup of 24 Novem-
ber 1948, is probably indicative of considerable backstage maneuvering
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Meekly Contributions, AAA, 48-50 28 November 1950
(CIA rrorking Paper)
and disagreement among groups influential with the junta ? For several
days prior to 24 November the appointment of Dr. Arnaldo Gabald6n
(distinguished malariologist and director of the autonomous institute
for the control or foot and mouth disease) appeared almost certain,
but his candidacy is not believed to have been eliminated? Among other
candidates reported to be under consideration are Lt. Col. Felix Roan
:toren?, armed forces chief of staff; Jorge Maven?, retired air force
colonel; Luis %ilia Gdmez Rufz? nresent foreign minister; Germin Sudrez
Flamerich, Venezuelan ambassador to Peru; and Cdsar Gonzalez, chief
of the Venezuelan delegation to the UN. An additional possible candi-
date is the governor of the Federal District, retired General Juan
de Dios Cells Paredee, who had been mentioned frequently in the past
as a strong candidate for provisional president and who would undoubt-
edly have the support of the influential conservetive Andino group?
His appointment, however, eould very likely be opposed by Prez Jimdnez,
since the latter would be overshadowed by the age, nrestige,? rd rank
of Cells Paredes.
The delay in announcing a successor to Delgado has in all
likelihood been accompanied by e lively jockeying for position, which
may well have intensified factional rivalries within and outside the
army. Unless a compromise candidate can be found who is acceptable
to all important groups, there will probably be sporadic manifestations
of discontent, such as were common during the first months of the
present regimes
ARGENTIVAt amicnballEILLUMEnaelEggInianngiqlons with th9jSR
The P&i government i anpieial of the appointment of a
new Soviet ambassador as well as its encouragement of expanded trade
with the satellites is consistent with Peremds neutral "Third Position"
foreign policy, which has been reasserted since the negative domestic
reaction to early intimations that Argentine troops might be sent to
Korea. A more compelling reason, however, may be the urgency of Argen-
tine imnort requirements -4. in the face of immediately adverse affects
on terms of trade of western rearmament (D/LA Wkly, 21 Nov 50) -- lead-
ing the government to seek fuel and machinery from the East desnite
consnicuous failure of the satellites to fulfill export commitments
In the past.
The USSR, on its part, evidently- homes that present Argen-
tine economic needs will make possible a commercial agreement which
it can exploit later for political purposes., There are also indications
that the satellite states will expand their trade with Argentina
negotiations involving substantial Shipments of Czechoslovaktan
tractors ane Polish coal have already been undertaken -- and that they
will enlerge their commercial missions to handle trade matters and to
engage in covert nolitical
Although the Soviet Union may go to considerable lengths,
including token industrial shipmentspin an attempt to reduce Argentine
support of US global objectives and to facilitate covert political
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(CIA Working Paper)
activity, any basic Argentine alignment with the Soviet orbit" rather
than with the Weett is considered highly unlikely.
4, PERUs St Att Is LikelzAp_uar_lorLIe,nerl,
e recent stiffening of Pan-attitude toward Ecuador is likely
to renew tension in Peruvian-Ecundoran relations and may, if unchecked,
lead to more serious border incidents than earlier seemed probable
(D/LA Wkly, 31 Oct 50). On 16 November, President Odria stated to the
guarantor notions that Ecuadoran troops had not withdrawn from the
frontier and that, if such troops were not vitheirawn within 48 hourso
Peru would send equal farces to the frontier. Two days later Peru
despatched a transport from Callao to the north, which, according to
the Peruvian General Staff, carried only a contingent of the first
battalion but which allegedly carried armored units. On 21 November,
Oriria informed the guarantors that Peru will insist that the main body
of Ecuadoran troops be withdrawn to Quito, whereupon Peru will also
return the main body of her troops to Lima. Ecuador has not been
informed of Peres more recent ultimatum.
Peres uncompromising attitude will unnecessarily complicate
the attempt of the guvrantor nations to bring abyrt a peaceful settle-
ment of the border disnute and Will greatly antagonize Ecuaaer.
ANIFIDENTIAN
RET
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Weekly Contributions, DAA, 48-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 72-50
nt Sitnatimatljlalmkta
28 November 1950
(22gam -- Barring the incapacity of Gomez, the government is
expected to revain stable. The economic situation is good.
Plane are being formulated to reorganize the army in accordance
with US Tables of Organization and Equipment. Communist capa-
bilities remain slight. Colombia hes given concrete supnort
to the UN in Korea.
-- US Interests have been favorably affected by
Colombia's evident willingness to participate in UN police
action.)
latkisa
Barring the incapacity of Gemez (U/LA Wkly, 19 Sep 50), the Colombian
government will remain stable in the canine months. The change-over from
the Liberal dominance of Colombia (1934-46) to Conservative dominance is
practically ccmplete. With the decree supnlanting Eduardo Santos as
presidential alternate and the resignatlons of Comptroller General Ordoilez
Ceballce and of Colonel Hernando Herrera, the administration has virtually
achieved the elimination of potentially dangerous Liberals from important
government and army nests. The decree on the nresidential succession has
been the most violently protested of recent administration actions, and
the Liberal Part" has asserted that, in the ovnnt of Gemeze incanacity?
Liberals /a3eld not recognize the decreeto provision for succession by the
minister of government but would support Santos as the only legitimate
successor. Plans have been made to organize the Liberal Party on a
cellular basis for this eventuality. Revolution against 06moz himself,
however, is not seriously considered any longer.
Colombiaos economic situation, which denends almost exclusively an
conditions in the coffee market, is considered good. Although coffee
nrices have failed to show the customary year-end rise, they have been
extremely favorable to the coffee-producing countries for the ynar as a
whole, and no significant decline is expected.
The development of a more favorable climate for private foreign invest-
ment in Colombia is indicated by the government os modificetion on 14 Novem-
ber of the unsatisfactory petroleum decree promulgated in January of this
year. The modification, which liberalizes the regulation of exploration
activity, is a result of Welmez-initiated consultation between government
officials and representatives of netroleum companies and may well mark the
beginning of a Colombian government policy of increased cooperation eith
foreign investors.
CONIFIDENTIAL
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CON NTIAL
Weekly Contributions, DifLA, 48-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 72-50
28 Nevem r 1950
The governments recognition of the Liberal-backed CTC (Confederation
of Colombian Workers) on 5 October nrobably reflects an adminietration
estimate that it can now control the labor situation easily and can afford
to grant this concession to its opponents? The recognition had apparently
been delayed until a dncision was secured from the Council of State
(30 Sep 50) that the decree of 1946 which prohibited parallel syndicalism
has been c-nstitutionally abrogated by the decree of 19490 The administra-
tion is expected to continue to favor the Conservative-sponsored UTC (Union
of Colcrbian Workers) over its rival, CTC?
MU=
Plans are being formulated for the reorganization of the Coloibian
army. These plans call for the formation of three infantry divisions.
The chief of the general staff of the armed force sa General Rojas Melilla,
avowedly desiros to follow US Tables of Organization and Equinment in his
reorganization plan, which would call for a definite Increase above nresent
army strength of approximetely 25,000 and would require US financial aid?
The general stated that he is very anxious to exchnnge the Skoda artillery
now on hend for US 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers? He also suggested that
Colombies two destroyers should be exchanged for two later type US de-
stroyers Be mentioned that he was thinking of offering the destroyers
for use by the UN in Korea and explained that, if the conteepleted exchange
were made, the nroblem of logistical support would 7)e reduced since the
requirements for the Colombian ships would then be generally similar to
those for US ships?
While it Is obvious that the chief of staff has high hopes of using
the nresent international situation to make a considerable improvement
in CeloMbiaos military establishment, the US interest, if such there be,
in an increased manpower reserve is favorably affected ir, the attitude of
the chief of staff. ColaMbia has already offered one battalion which has
been accepted (see kt,maimal.). If further offers of concrete assistance
are made and accented, and if the US continues its current policy of logis-
tical oupnort, Coloebiags actual power as well as its prestige in Latin
America will be such as to provide very strong incentive for other Latin
American countries to provide manpower in the expecttation of similar benefits?
cesunist capabilities for subversive action remain slight. It is
ee true that six Communists vent to Europe in early November for the World
Congress of Partisans of Peace and that some of the passages were naid
from Paris. The group was reasonably representative of the Colombian Commu-
nist Party and the trip may increase the zeal or these members However,
the expulsion of Augusto Duran from the party marks a setback for the
organization (D/LA Wkly, 31 Oct 50) which will probably outweigh any advan-
tages which thn narty may derive fram the attendance of the six at the
Peace Congress?
CONFIDENTIAL
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Weekly Contributions, WU, 48-50
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memoranaum 12-50
28 November 1950
Intstadima
Concrete support to US military action in Korea has dwarfed in impor-
tance all other developments in Colodbials international relations during
Umezo first months in office. The acceptance of the frigate "Almirante
Padilla" by the Unified Command on 2 October was followed by a firm offer
of an infantry battalion (1080 men) to be umeR by the Unified Command for
operations in Korea. The US had agreed to equip, train, and give logistic
support on a reimbursable basis provided that the troops were regular armed
forces and not volunteers. The Colombian troop offer was accepted on
14 November.
Although relations vith the US are good, the question of persecution
of Protestants under the new regime hns been a potential source of serious
friction. Further information has corrected D/I,Aqs estimate of 19 Sen 50
that anti-Protestant actions in recent months were sanctioned be President
Gdmez. It is now estimated that the official actions against Protestant
schools reporteRly taken in several of the departments of Colombia were
initiated at the departmental level. The telegram sent on 23 October by
Goliale0 Minister of education to the depertmental governors requiring that
future orders in connection vith Protestant schools must have nrior approval
of the central government ahould go far toward minimizing the tensions
inherent in the situation.
In snite of the fact that Colombiaos nosition in the Haya de la Torre
case was not accepted by the Internetional Court of Justice, Colombia is
not expected to take any action seriously prejudicial to its otherwise
good relations with Peru.
CONFIDENTIAL.
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Situation Homorandem 71e50
Ilejpmmualimlausup_gmEtgegla
28 November 1950
(2gEmece
Colonel Jacob? Arbenz has been elected president to
succeed Ardvaloo The economic situation remains satisfactory.
Communists made slight gains immediately prior to the presiden-
tial election. The armed forces remain loyal to the adminis-
tration and capable of maintaining internal order. Guatemala
has demonstrated its desire to align itself more closely with
the US in internntional affairs.
-- US interests were temporarily bermed by the
presidential campaign, which developed and exploited anti-US
feeling. The possible development 'of a stronger anti-Communist
movement once Arhenz has taken office may benefit the US.)
et21211,01 -
The Ardvnlo administration has remained in newer desnite two revolu-
tionary attemnts in recent months. Its control has been further evidenced
ey the election of Colonel Jacob? Arbenz (unofficial administration candi-
date) to succeed Juan Jon Ardvalo as nreeident in Wrch 1951. The elections,
held 10-12 November, climaxed a campaign in which major candidates opnosed
to Arbenz were forced into hiding, were deprived of orgenized narty support,
-were confronted by arbitrary legal obstacles to their candidacies, or (if
able to campaign) were threatened by hostile Arbenciste crowds. Therefore*
even though widespread opposition to Arbenz existed in moeerate end con-
servative quarters, this opposition became split and coeused, ehile Arbenz'
electoral majority as assured through control of the labor vote (orgnnized
with the help of Communist labor leaders), the bureaucratic vote (organized
within the government), and through control of the National Electoral
Board (which supervises elections nne adjudiontes disputes)-
D/LA estimates that similar political techniques, and the same campaign
alignments, will probably bring victory to nro-Arbenz candidates In the
December coneresel-nal eleetions, thus continuing control by the administra-
tiono
E22002
Arb economic situation remains satisfactory, thanks to the continued
favorable market for coffee, Guatemalea major export. However, the lerge
expenditures and inefficient precticen of the b4reaucratic Ardvalo adminia-
tration continue as unfavorable factors, and government regulation cene
tinues to caune concern eithin the business community.
As in recent years, the transfer of revenues from the national coffee
nlantatione (nominally "antonomoue) has permitted the government to over-
come a budgetary deficit. Although the final 1949-50 budget settlement
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Situation Memorarsdum 71-50
28 November 1950
is expected to show a surplus of same $2 million, this surplus will be
smaller than the $4.6 million of 1948-49 or the $604 million of 1947-480
Inefficient management of Aviateca, the government-operated airline,
has recently caused its reorganization as an autonomous agency free from
government fiscal control. Proceeds from an increased coffee export tax
(expected to add $3.7 million to 1950e51 revenues) will be used, among
other things, to liquidate the debts incurred by the corpany. In the
chicle industry, agreement lith the Wri-ley Corpany was exnected to revive
the trade. However, bickering within government agencies eith respect to
financing has delayed initiatice of the hervest, and prospects for a good
1950-51 crop have diminished considerablye
No easential change in the economic situatien is foreseen for coming
months, though a gradual downward trend in foreign exchange reserves is
likely to continue.
Milk=
The armed forces remain loyal to the administration and capable of
maintalning internal order,. This has been demonstrated by the sunpression,
in late August, of a plot among army sergeants reputedly engineered by
retired Col. Miguel Mendoza (an entleArbenz nresidential candidate) and
by the supnression in early November of an attenpted coup led by Col. Cas-
tillo Armnel who had retired from the army in 1949 following the assa-si-
nation of Col. Arena.
There is no evidence thnt the armed forces have receetly acquired
significant quantities of arms or areunition, though efforts have been
made in this direction. Hovever, other tynes of equipment (inclu4ing
clothing and motor vehicles) have recently been obtained on the US surplus
market.
No significant change In the military situation is foreseen.
POYerelYe
Slight gains were meads by Guatemalans Communists innediatoly prior
to the presidential elections. Partly as a result of their active and
vociferous opposition, ilinister of Government Monzon, who had suggested
a repressive anti-totalitarian law, was forced to reel , The Communist
publication 02tUbm (nreviously banned by Monz6n) reappeared, the Commu-
nist-sponsored labor school "Jacob? SAnchez" renewed its activities, and
Communist leaders reappeered at Arbenz political rallies. A Communist-
organized observance of the 33rd anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution
was well attended by representatives of organized Inbar and the three
major political parties. Although it is true that Communist labor leader-
ship suffered a major setback when Manael Pinto Usaga was mreellea from
the potnnt rail7my workers union in early October, no further anti-Communist
moves developed in other unions.
4C_
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Situation Memorandum 71-50
28 November 1950
The Guatemalan government continued to nrofess that it is net oriented
toward Communism and in foreign affairs has opnosed the international
Comrunist line on Koreae The army appeers to be increasingly active in
gathering data an Communists, and high ranking army officers are known to
favor an anti-Communist policy. However, it is fairly obvious that, in
domestic affairs, Colonel Arbenz (with government aPprovel) found it
politically expedient to accept the supnort of Communists In the recent
presidential campeigne
With the presidential cempaign over, the goverment and president-
elect Arbenz mill nrobebly be less in need of Communirt suneorte !however,
although Arbenz is likely to move toward eventual renudiation of the
Communists, this will probably be a gradual develonmente
`internatIma
Guatemala's apparent desire to align itself more closely with the US
in international affairs has been demonstrated by its centinued support
of the US in the Korean matter and by its ratification of the Rio Treaty
over the protests of domestic Communistse However, Guatemelals ratifica-
tion of the Rio Treaty was accompanied by a reservation which emphasized
Guatemalan claims to British Honduras, In addition, some disparity per-
sista between Guatemalan and US views on udictatorships" and "colonialism".
Indicative of its continued opposition to Franco's dictatorship, Guatemala
refused to support the recent UN resolutinn (sunnorted by the US) mmeifying
the 1946 resolution against Spain.. Guatemala's desire to effect an "anti-
colonial bloc" within Latin America has again been evident in its supnort
of the recent Chilean declaration concerning Chile's Antarctic claims.
No essential change in Guatemala's foreign policy is entioinnted in
coring months.
CON ODENTIAL_
rperww-- 10,.,
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