WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 46-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA 14 NOVEMBER 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200060007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 14, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Weekly Contributions 46-50
tli America Division,, (E ~ CIA
U ficWemtaer 1950
42 674
D/L& finds of particular Interest this vreek the Item on the effects
of the Delgado Cbalbaud arasaseination,, that on 'Latin American reaction to
the e r to Rican reitolt9 ann that on repression of Cunt sm in lAtin
Arica.
CURR T DEVEi PT ENTS
GENERAL. Latin. American reaction to PUPrta Rican revolt ,sho considerable
iaioutkderstandi of situation (pn 2) General repression of C unism in
itin. America Is Intensifying (po 2) 0
flO }IEI T AR EM In GM?tem la,, the election of the government candidate,
Arbeuz4 rakes nossible a more conservative government (p,.. 3)
C iTRAL AREAS In Brazil, the move to Invalidate Vargas" election Is
unlikely to gain much support (p. 3) In Venezuela, the assassination of
tto Col. Delgado Chaibaud v presifient of the military junta y may have a
1i: tinctiy unfavorable affect upon CAS interestSQ
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The Current Situct on in Nicaragua ?
Ma It r = " } _.
Pas 11"tE 11 -
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Weekly Contributions, fl/LA, 46-50 14 November 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
1. GENERAL; Latin American Reaction to Puerto Rican Revolt
Perhaps the most significant asnect of the Latin American
reaction to the recent N'.tionalist Party uprising in Puerto Rico is
the considerehie amount of misunderstanding shown to persist among
the nenble of the ether American renuhli.cs regarding the situation in
this US territory. While it is true that all the Latin American
countries deplored the att^ck on Prncir?ent Truman and a majority
revealed some understanqir_g of the US nositirn in Puerto Rico, never-
theless, official and unofficial reactions disclosed widespread. syn.-
c thy for the idea of Puerto Rican ind.enendence, though few nersons
condoned the violent methods emnioycd by the Nationalist Paxty. In-
asmuch as the aspirations of dei encdent neoplee for independence has
always struclr a syrpeathetic chord it Latin Arierica, It was to he
expect^d that desires for indenendence on the part of fellow Latins
would provoke, as in the mast, a strong emotional response. Although
in no Latin American count has this response been as sharp as in
Cuba I I all the Latin American remublics vil.l
continue to observe closely US handling of the Puerto Rican situnti.on,
and many will continue to view with suspicion US activities in the
island until its peonle are given the opport"pity to vote sped fically
on the question of in(lependence. Moreover, anti-US and Communist
elements in Latin America will persist in their attempts to exploit
the US relationship with Puerto Rico so as to make the Ua apneas a
tyrannical, imperialistic power.
2 a Repression of Ceunisr2 in Latin America
Against a `)ackground of considerable repression of Communism
in Latin America, a trend toward even greater repression has been
de~*elopiny, wring recent months. This is narticularly evident in sate
of the Latin American countries where Communists have been the most
active. In Argentina, police action has substantially reduced attemp-
ted Communist demonstrations as compared. to several months ago. In
Brazil, continued police repression orovented any large scale Communist
demonstration during the 3 October general elections. Cuban Communists
are still not allowed to print a daily paper to replace the recently
suppressed Hobo In addition, the government recently arrested a large
number of local and foreign Ccm nuni'ts who were having a meeting for
delegates on their way to the Sheffield "peace" congress. The Guate-
malan government has annarently been behind the move which resulted
in Communist Pinto Usagals lose of influence over the railway union,
S ndicato c i6n y Meioramiento Ferro arril ro (SAPS'), the most imnor-
tant union of the country. In Mexico, in addition to the arrest of
several Communists collecting signatures, government maneuvers in
labor have been largely responsible for the separation of Communists
at least cartially from the leadership of the intnortant miners'.,
petroleum workers' and railway workers' unions. In Peru, customs
officials have been ordered to crnfiscate all "peace" propaganda
los"i-ML
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(CIA Working Paper) 14 November 1950
arriving by air. Private groups in Uruguay have started to counter
Communist pro anda, while the police have recently begun to break
UP Cc munjst street corner meetings,.
D/LA estimates that the, trend toward increasing repression
of Communism in Latin America will probably continue at least for the
next few months.
3. GUATt iALA; Arben action Makes Possible More Conservative G rnment
The victory of Lt. Col.- J'acobo Arbenz in the Guatemalan
presidential election held last ueekenec (1o 31-1.2 November) trras the
generally expected result of a campaign controlled by the Arbenz forces
.in combination with the Ar4valo administration. Throughout the campaign,
the strong# !ell-financed Arbenz organization, sunnorted by Guatemalaes
militant labor movement, %As aided by arbitrary and coercive measures
on the part of the administration 'rhich served to outlaw, split, and
confuse the opposition.
The.eloction of Arbenz will not greatly alter the immeriate
political situation or the policies of the Present government, since
his inauguration will not take place until March.1951. However, his
election releasfls him from a situation in which he was forced to rely
on Communists for political support and may enable him to take positive
steps toward conciliation of the moderate and conservative opposition.
It seems probable, in vier of his character and his off-the-record
remarks, that Arb'nz will follow such a policy ape? that his administra-
tion will be somewhat more conservative and more acceptable to US
business interests than that of President .Ar4valo..
40 BRAZILS r4ava to Inv yMate Vargas? action Not Lika7
... to Gain P?iuch Sum
The move by some of th defeated candidates to have Vargas'
election invalidated on tho basis th?t he did
not rani. a an absolute majority of the votes - he has received about
48 percent of the total votes counted - is not likely to gain suffi-
cient support to became effective,. The silence of the constitution.
as to the kind of majority required and the apparent willingness on
the part of the political leaders prior to'the elections to accept
either a Games or Machado victory by a more plurality would tend to
militate against the plans of this small but articulate groli, of "die-
hards". Also, the large ma jorit,* that swet t Vargas and many of his
supporters into office would probably deter a political move to nullify
the electiom of the former dictator. b/LA estimates that Vargas will
be inaugurated as scheduled on 31 January 1951.
5? VEEMUSLA: Eeots _gf_DD_e_1jLado Assasainati"The assassination Delgado ChalThud yesterday,, 13 November, of Lt. Col. Carlos
president of the Venezuelan military junta of govern-
ment, is expected to have'a distinctly unfavorable effect upon US
interests in Venezuela.- Of the three junta members who had governed
Venezuela since the coup of 24 November 1948, Delgado Chalbaud was the
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Weekly Contributions,, D/LA, 46-50 lt* November 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
most astute politician. Not only had he exerted a moderating influ-
ence upon the-other two junta members, Lt. Cola Mrcos Perez Jimmnes
and Lt. Col. Line Felipe Llovera Pdez, (both of when tended to favor
harsh repressive policies) but also he had displayed a distinctly
cooperative attitude towards the US.
It has been officially announced that the leader of the
gaup of assassins was retiree' General Rafael SIm6n Urbina (who had
plotted in 1928 against dictator G6mez and in 1946 against Acci&n
Democr''tica leader RcSmulo Betancourt), and all available information
indicates that the attack was motivated by personal antagonisms It
is possible that dissident groups, notably AD, may relay up the alleged
rivalry between Delgado Chalband and Pdres Jianez, even to the extent
of charging the latter frith responsibility for the crime, in order to
create division within the armed forces. Nevertheless, it is to be
expected (as is already evident from the oromnt susnension of consti-
tutional guarantees and the institution of a state of emergency) that
strict and effective measures will be taken to avoid internal disorderse
It Is probable that the two surviving junta members will remain in
power,, and a third member may be added, possibly the armed forces
chief of staff Lt. Col. Felix Roman Moreno. D/LA estimates that no
maior disturbanc.-s will occur in the immediate future, but that the
loss of the restraining influence of Delgado Chalbaud will probably
lead to the institution of a harsher more repressive policy,, which
may in the long run provoke a violent reaction and which would nullify
the slight progress already made towards the establishment of a
constitutional regime.
;'0141:13-no TY",
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA, 46-50
(CIA Working Parser)
Situation Memorandum 6?-50
The Current Situation in NicaraMg
14 November 1950
(S,ummar;Z -- The political situation remains comparatively calm,
with General Somoza firmly maintaining his domination of Nica-
ragua. The economic position h .s been steadily deteriorating,
and the country now faces a dollar exchange crisis. Somoza
keeps firm control of the Guard.i ,,,Nacional. The small Commu-
nist group continues to suffer setbacks and has bn?n weakened
further by dissension within its ranks. In the foreign field,
the Nicaraguan government shows continuing concern over the
political situation in neighboring countries.
-- The ratification of the OAS charter and the Pact
of Bogota together with Nicaragua ' s support of the Ulf and US
actions in the Korean affair have strengthened US security
interests.)
Political
The political situation remains comparatively calm with General Somoza
firmly maintaining his position of potrer. Somoza will complete the unex-
nired term of the deceased president Ran6n y Reyes and then, on I May 1951! ,
will commence his six year term of office for which he was elected
The Constituent Assembly, organized in accordance with the terms of
the Somoza-Chamorro Agreement I I and headed by Luis
Soiroza, the president's elder son, was forrally Inaugurated on 4. June
Most of the political activity of the country since then has centered
around animated discussions in the Assembly over the new constitution.
The Assembly has approved a second reading of the new constitution and,
after the anproval of a new electoral law now under consideration, will
be prepared to dissolve itself and become the new Congress.
Although the political scene remains suuerficially undisturbed, there
has been in progress within the Conservative Party a struggle for power
between the Arguello Bolanos an. the Gustavo II nzanares factions, tthich
is believed to be merely an internal affair and in all probability will
not produce a party rift. Desmito intra-arty disputes within the Somo-
cista and Conservative gron.'ns, T)/LA foresees no aenreciable chance in
Nicarag+aua.l s political situation during coming months.
Nicaragua)s economic nositi^n has been steadily deteriorating, and
the country is now faced with a dollar exchange crisis. At the invitation
of the governmment, two technif-al missions of the International Monetary
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Situation Memorandum 6550
14 November 1950
Fund (IJ!) have made a. thorough study of Nicaraguans balance of nryr?ents
problem and its general econa^ic and fiscal policies and have rn.~nde recom-
rzenr'a.tions concerning future exchange control policies and organization.
These I"T proposals have produced considerable disagreement in government
circles and President Somoz . has submitted an alternate plan for a. new
exchange control system whose salient feature is an increase in the sell-
ing rate of the co . It is felt that by raising the selling rate,
the der^anr' for i--aorta wiz 1 be sufficiently re'ucer' so as to enable the
country to balance its exchange exc-eneitures with its exchange income.
The new budget for fiscal 1950-51 balls for exnendi tures of cordobas
65,992,197 --- an increase of C)11,500,763 over the previous year. The
main beneficiaries of the enlarged budget are: office of the president
and commander in chief, un .0e; ministries of agriculture am labor, un
114%; develonrent szd -public i forks, un 43%; and nubll.e education, -tin 261"".
The implementation of the new exchange control law could nermit the
country to achieve a current position in its international balance of
payments and prevent further deficits. HIoi.'ever, in D/LA's opinion, there
is only an even chance for its efficient adm_f.nistration.
Mi=
The only significant changes in the military have been the transfer
of top ranking Colonels Gaiton, Telleria, and T"onterrey to different
assignrients and the elevation of Colonel Anastasio Somoza Jr. (Tachito)
to e?9:inf of staff of the Guardia I'acional. These moves presumably have
been made not only to weaken. the personal influence of these three leaders
-- renortedl=r contending wth each other for power striving toward even-
tual control of the Guy^. aria -- but also to assure Tachitots control of
the Guardia, should Somoza. visit the US for medical treafinent. The
meteoric rise to power of Colonel Anastasio, cor.-pled with Somozats rwruted
desire to have Lis son succeed him as nresident, has nroc?uced general
dissatisfa?ctien in the military and has increased resentment toward the
Somoza regime. However, since no e" fective omoss Lion to Somoza exists
in the country and n.s long as he continues to grant the Guadis certain
nrivilegns, there is scant possibility that Somo