WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 44-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200060005-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 31, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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EilL312.1S2ItEibutin--2-12-4449
Latin America Division, ORE, CIA
31 October 1950
42 /! 674
D/LA finds of particular interest this week the item on Ecuadoran,-
Peruvian relations (p. 2).
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENERAL: Recent ratifications of the Rio Treaty mark an important point
in the development of inter-American relations (p. 2). Relations between
Ecuador and Peril have improved (p. 2).
NORTHERN AREA: Mexican Communists in the mining industry are seeking
a showdown with the government (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA:. DispenSion in Colombia's Communist Party has resulted from
a struggle for power between party leaders (p. 3).
SOUTHERN AREA: Peru will be faced with a vexatious problem, whatever the
decision of the International Court of justice on the Hays de la Torre
ease (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Cuba .. .. 6 ....?.......... 5
rill.....4
DOCUMENT NO.
NO HANGE IN CLASS. Li
DECLASSIFIED
SS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH:e
DATEIN" 44er REVIEWER 372044 imisi
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Weekly Contributions, 0/LA, 44e50 31 October 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
1. GENERAL:gium__,...itStn,L...atoftheRioTzdthOASCha
The recent ratifications of the Rio Treaty by Guatemala,
Peru, and Ecuador bring the total number of ratifying states to twenty-
one, thus marking an imnortant point in the development of inter-
American relations, since it is the first time that any inter4merican
instrument has received unanimous ratification. * In depositing its
instrument of ratification with PAU, Guatemala attached a reservation
concerning Belize which is expected to bring objections from some
other American republics4 Although such objections would not neces-
sarily prevent formal acceptance of Guatemala's ratification, they
could rake the Rio Treaty inoperative between objecting states And
Guatemala and therefore impair its complete effectiveness. /f this
one potential impediment to the operation of the treaty is removed,
however, unanimous ratification of the instrument which provides the
legal basis for the mutual defense of the Western Hemisehere will be
of real significance in demonstrating inter-American solidarity,
particularly during this difficult neriod in international relations.
Shortly after Ecuador ratified the Rio Treaty it became the
eleventh state to ratify the Charter of the OAS. Prospects that this
fundamental document will likewise receive unanimous ratification are
very good. Inasmuch as the Charter is the constitution of the OAS,
its ratification by all the American republics would also further US
interest in Eemispher3 solidarity.
* Two other Pan American agreements may be regarded as having nracticalt
though not technical, unanimous ratification because several nations
adhered to rather than ratified them.
2.
The softening of Peru's attitude toward Ecuador will probably
reduce the recently heightened tension between the two nations. Armed
conflict, which was considered unlikely a few weeks ago (D/LA Wkly,
10 Oct 50), appears oven more unlikely at this time. Desnite the lack
of factual evidence regarding Ecuador's aggressive intentions toward
Peru, Peru notified the guarantors of the 1942 Rio Protocol -- Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, and the DS -- that, unless concentrations of
Ecuadoran troops on it bee-dere were withdrawn, it would disnatch its
forces to the frontier. Further, on 25 October, Peru refused to grant
clearance for a routine shipment of aviation gasoline for the Ecuadoran
army6 Nevertheless, within three days Peru's attitude had softened,
and the gasoline shinrent was released. It is believed that this sudden
shift in Peres stand resulted Prom the exnresnion on 27 October of
US concern regarding Ferule attitude and from the adoption on 27 October
by the guarantor nations of the Peruvian proposal that military commis-
sions be set un to observe the situation on both sides of the boundary.
3. VEXICO:
Mexican CoMmunists,who have lost ground continuously in the
labor movement during the past year, apparently have decided to have
a long-posteoned ?showdown! with government forces in the rining industry.
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Weekly Contributione, DiLA, 4440
(CIA Working Paper)
31 October 1950
The Communists have been staging strikes accompanied by sabotaee and
violence in the coal fields and other parts of the mining industry,
their objective being to force government recognition of Communist
mine leaders. They have made no attempt to camouflage their support
and purposes, since they have declared publicly that they are guaranteed
financial support by WFTU and that they are also supported by Russian
and Czech organizetions.
The government, having sent armed treons to the critical
areas to nrotect non-Comounist workers, is being placed in an extremely
difficult position, in that use of force might give grounds to Communist
charges that the current case is like that of the Cananea affair under
Porfirio Dfae (a bloody mareacre of organized labor early in the
century, one of the rallying points of the Mexican Revolution),, T4
date, however, instructions forbid troops the use of force to put down
Communist agitation:,
It is possible that Communist sabotage and violence might
emerge from thie situation; and that it might reach such proportions
as to threaten injury to the national economy; in such an event the
government would feel compelled openly to use force to restore order.
It is much more likely, however, that the present strikes will be
settled through cooperation between the non-Communist majority in the
union and the mine owners (with sutrosa advice from government authori-
ties). Also it may be expected that the Communists, in their attemeted
"showdowe, will not succeed in extending further their influence over
Mexican labor.
COLO/BIA: sion of Our& ran the C
.1st Part
The recent expulsion of Augusto Dine from the Communist
Party will probably weaken the Communist potential for organized action
in Colombia. The expulsion is a result of the long-standing struggle
for power between Ourin and Vieira White. Of the two men, Owen is
apnarently more aware of world Communist trends and has far better
international Communist connections; consemently? his expulsion from
the party ie a strong indication that international influences are and
will continue to be relatively inconsequential to the Colombian Commu-
nist Party. The expulsion will further weaken the Communist potential
as it will leave leadership of the party in the hands of the rather
ineffective Vieira White and pill probably increase internal party
lissension, since a small faction can be expected to retain its loyalty
to DurAn.
PEHUs Ha
a T
e a lirexati
? e
Pr bl
Whatever the decision of the International Court of Justice at
the Hague concerning the ease of Raul Haya de la Torre, Peru will be
presented with a vexatious nreblem- If the Court decides against Peru9s
contention that Haya de la Torre is only a "political crieinal" and
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Weekly Contributions, DAA, 31 Octobe.- 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
that therefore Colombia was correct in granting him asylum in the
Colombian Unbasey in Lima, Peruvian national pride will be severely
wounded. If, on the other baud, the Court recognizes Peruus contention
that Rays de is Torre is a "common criminal" and directs that ho be
turned over to the Peruvians for trial on the criminal chargee against
him which are considered extremely tenuous by fl/LA -- President
Odria will then have an extremely difficult problem on his hands. A
trial of Hays de is Torre in Peru would probably do more to regenerate
dying popular enthusiasm for the Aprista cause than anything the
Aprista leader himself could do, and conviction and punishment would
so clinch his "martyrdom" that Apriamo would have a strong rallying
cause for many years to come, not only in Peru but in some other
Hemisphere countries,.
While no doubt the Peruvian government is well aware of this
situation, 1)/LA believes that if the decision is in favor of PerOs
contention, the government will follow through on its policy against
Rays de is Torre regardless of consequences, but that it would secretly
be relieved with a decision against its contention, although it would
undoubtedly protest loudly for home consumption,
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA? 144e50
31 October 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 66-50
The Current Sitpationjn Cuba
(p -- The Frio administration remains stable. The
er56ag'ic situation continues favorable. There has been no
significant change in the armed forces during the past three
months. Communist capabilities are still substantial. Cuban
international relations remain., in general, unchanged.
-- US security interests continue to be adversely
affected by the substantial capabilities of Cuban Communists.
Political
The Prio administration remains stable, although governmental ac-
tion has been made difficult by the intense political pressures that
have arisen in recent months. The administration's majority in congress
has been reduced and rendered unreliable by the new rift (Suarez-Pro)
in the AutZetico Party (D/IA May, 10 Oct 50), by the strong rivalry
between the Orau and Prio factions of the party, and by the continual
jockeying for position among other political factions that are already
seeking advantageous alliances for the 1952 presidential election. In
addition? the president has been having other difficulties. He has been
under continual pressure between public demand for honest and efficient
government (D/LA,Wklee 3 Oct 50) and the selfish demands of Autialtico
politicians, Frio has been trying to compromise the various demands in
such a way as to increase the adminietrationts prestige and to strengthen
his owe position as party leader, His concern for his party leadership
has weakened his actions as president,. As a result, he has contributed
to the general lack of public confidence in both the honesty and come
petence of the administration.
Developing political rivalries /sill probably delay or prevent
effective congressional action on problems having political implications,
and tease rivalries, plus possible administration failures, may further
weaken the president 'apolitical power, It is not expected, howevere
that these developments will be of such magnitudo as to threaten the
continuance of the regime.
Economic
The economic situation is favorable. The 1950 sugar crop has been
sold at favorable prices and commercial, industrials, and private cone
struction activities are operating at a high level. A substantial
program of public works is being initiated with a new internal loan of
0120 million e of which funds amounting to $45 million are to be expended
in the near future for the construction of farm-to-market roads, water
-works, bridges, aeworse and tourist facilities, Other plans are being
u' ted for agricultural and tourist developments,
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Weekly Contributions, p/m, 44-5o - 2 - 31 0ctr 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Ibmorandum 65-50
Costs of livings especially prices of staple foods, have been ris-
ing more rapidly than wages Government enforcement of price ceiling
and food distribution regulations have not prevented black mariet
conditions. Dissatisfaction mdth the high costs of living may find
expression in new demands by labor for higher %wages, probably OCCOM"
panted by labor disturbances. In that events, the Prfo administretion
can be expected to favor labor.
WIA. estimates that the economic situation will remain favoreble
during the coming months,
Milita
has been no increase in size nor apy improvement in the equip-
ment of the armed forces during the past three months. The armed forces
are not adequately equipped and trained at present for effective air and
naval support of the US in the Caribbean area or for military aid to the
UN (see International). The governuent has indicated its desire to
obtain afiWarTrirvarious other arms and equipEent and to have a US
Air Force Training Mission assigned to Cuba. In the near future. a US
Joint Military Survey Mission will be sent to Cuba to make a survey of
the armed forces and of Cuban defense needs,
WIA. estimates that the armed, forces are loyal to the Prlo adminis-
tration and are strong enough to maintain the authority of the state
under ordinary circumstances, but that they night have some diffioulty
in preventing sabotage if it were attempted on a large scale,
Subversive
-----Maianist capabilities continue to be substantiala notwithstanding
the suppression of Communist publications and the intensified police
repression of Communist activities, Although the governmentrs anti-
Communist measures have frightened increasing numbers of nonemilitant
members away from the party, the Communists still retain their capacity
for effective labor agitation and their influence in politics (D/IA Malys
3 Oct 50)0 in the youth movements and with womenos groups,. As yet the
government has taken no effective action to remove Communists from the
telephone and electric industries from other parts of the communica-
tions system and from government positlons, Indeed, the House of Repre-
sentatives has refused to act on a bill authorizing such action, The
president, re of the political strength of the Communists has as yet
made no request either for anti-Communist legislation or for a clarifi-
cation by the judiciary of the constitutionality of basic pointe involved
in the governments anti-Communist activities,
It is estimated that for coming months the Communists wLLI remain
a substantial force in Cuba,
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Weekle. Contributions, D/LA, 44-50
(CIA Working raper)
Situation Memorandum 65-50
3 VIA
31 October 1.950
Intemetlonal
--deEeiErriiternational relations remain generally unchangeds rela-
tions aith the Dominican Republic are still strained; relations with
the US remain cordial; and the Cuban government continues to support
the UN, .The Dominican Republic, Which has made new accusations against
Cuba, now appears unwilling to regard the Cayo-Confites issue as settled
by the return of the Dominican vessel Angelita (D/LA WkIy? 1 Aug 50),
At the sane time, the Cuban government has stated its intention to main-
tain normal diplomatic relations if poesible,. The over-all cordiality
of Cub-US relations has been occasionally marred by resentment of
Cuban officials when US policy has been interpreted by them as an eco-
novec handicap or as an insult to Cuban nationalism, The government
has continued its support of the UN action in North Korea. Although
Cuba has been reluctant in the past to offer military aid, it has of-
fered economic aid to the UN and the government is now in the process
of determining the typeo and conditions of possible Cuban military
assistance to the UN (see MilitNay).. in addition, the US and Cube are
negotiating an accord simiS716-fhat of World War It, allowing Cubans
to join US armed forces eithout losing Cuban citizenship., The currently
negotieted accord mey facilitate Cuban participation in UN military
activitiere
Dim estimates that, during coming months, Cuban-Dominican relations
will remain strained, that relations with the UB will continue to be
generally cordial, and that Cuba will continue to support the Ult.
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