WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 35-50 (Sanitized), CIA 29 AUGUST 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050035-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: August 29, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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INTIAL
Week Contributions 35-50
z9 August 1950
424674
Of the developments reported an this week, that regarding the
'posibility of trouble in Bolivia (p. h) is par icularly significant:
CUREIRIT Dornmaars
GE4FRAL: The US Sonatels committee report on coffee already- has resulted
in adverse reactions from Latin America (p 2),, A nerw? internation3l3
ntAr-Communist labor orn12,?ation is to replace the CIT as a force opposed
to Commurdst influence -among Iatin iircrican labor grams (p, 2),,
/I0i7,TITERN AllErtl, Th. Ouba, the seizure of the Can:mist newspaper ET: is
the rest important development to date in the campaign to suppmss Ccon-
_monism (p?, 2)? Cuba is launchine an extensive public 711Drks prog?am
(p? 3), The strengthening of Natemale is armed, forces 'will restore to
them considerable political, as well as m1litary-9 strength (p., ),. In
Panama prospects of trov.ble have increased because of unresolved dif-
ferences betmen Presidorxt Arias and Chief of Police flan 3),.
Panama s enthusiasm for support of the ULI cause :hi Korea has lessened
because offers of aid have not been accepted (p,? 14.)?
SOUTHERN AriFio_ In Bolivla,z serious consequences ne4- attend the critical
labor situation in that country mining area (p,? 4)? Chile ,s copper
industry may apain face a setback if strikes fellow the terrrthatiou of
tIipresorxt labor contract (p?
SPT.,',CIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Coloribia ,
CONFtDENTIAL
State Dept. review completed
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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DATEN a " ? REVIEWER:
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Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
tr.X. Of
35-50
29 August 1950
US Senate Coffee rt opted to Intone Anti-US
me
Miztinientiment mill be intensified inmost of the
coffee-producing nations of Latin America as a result of the unania-
mous approval by the US Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry
of the revised "Gillette Report/ a, Adverse reactions have already
appeared in Colombia and in Brazil mhere there was partioUlarly ?
strong feeling following the release of the earlier "Gillette Report'',
Latin American opinion thus far has bean that the report has done
a disservice to the "good-neighbor policy", and that the US Congress
has shown a lack of interest in the protests made last dune by the
14 Latin American coffee-producing nations. If the DS Senate accepts
the report of the committee, an even greater wave of anti-US senti-
ment can be expected.
2. American Re anal Affiliate of the ICFTU to be Formed
rna no ea ons
(ICF111), supported by both CIO and. AFL, together with the AFL-
sponsored Confederaoiaa Interemericana de Trabajadores (CIT)., is
planning a hemisphere-wIde labor conference inNexico City in Jan-'
wary 1951 to establish an American regional affiliate to take over
the CIT and probably also to include the Mexican CTM and a few
other unions not presently in the CIT.
The new organization shoed prove acre representative of
all non-Communist labor in the Western Hemisphere, and its affilia-
tion with the ICFTU would give now-Communist Latin American labor
increased influence In the ILO and UN because the IOFTU has con-
sultative status in the latter two organizations. The new affiliate,
eaten developed, should pravide more effective opposition to the
Communist-damirestedalail particularly in counteracting Communist,
propaganda among laboring groups.
CUBA: AntieCommnnist Caraii
lfirgniingt-STTE;biiikfibia-af-the principal Communist propa-
ganda vehicles the daily az, represents the most important develop-
ment to date in at noir appears to be a fairly widespread and
effective campaign to suppress Communist activities in Cuba. Other
current evidences of increasing public and governmental pressure for
Communist containment include the firing of Communist workers by the
Cuban Electric Company after authorizationbythe union IVIkr,
1 Aug 50); a vote by Syndicate of Habana Warehouse Tor re and
by the National Federation of Medical Workers permitting the expul-
sion of known Communists; and a newspaper campaign which resulted in
the repudiation by thousands of Cubans of their signatures on the
Stockholm "peace" petition. If the international situation remains
acute, further anti-Communist action is expected, possibly including
the outlawing of the Cuban Communist Party (FSP).
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wookly contributions r?f11PATIAL 1950
3(5).57 !S August
(CIA Working Paper)
Internal Bond Issue for Public Works
new p c works bond issues mill
be limited. The present bond issue is for 045 million and an addle
tional $75 million issue is eventually to be sold for similar
Pur130. 154e3 Imaye 1 Aug 50). There is no doubt that large
eXpenditures are needed far roads, water vorks and electric power
tacilities and to facilitate agricultural and industrial develop-
ment, and also that there is an acute enter shortage in several
urban areas. However, real benefits fram the new bond issue will
probable* be relatively snail since graft and inefficient expendi-
tures eey be expected to prevent proper application of these fends.
5. dUATMALAs Stre the Armed Forces: Political lications
can c poi s ua or mar-
e; at e d by 0ateuelar army and air force negotiations for the purchase
of arms to be delivered? it possible, before the presidential elec-
tions in November. The sudden, availability of funds for the armed
forces, after a long period of adninistrative neglect, suggests
that President ArSvalo has overcome his inherent distrust of the
military (now-purged of strongly conservative officers) and is pre-
pared:to use the army to maintain order during the elections, if
net to influence their autoome. Heretofore, the military has
suffered uhile the National Police and the militant, Communist-
directed labor unions (both believed loyal to leftist candidate
Arbenz) have been permitted to accumulate arms. However, Ar4valo's
decision to place the eouatry under army control during recent
disturbances demonstrates the existence of mutual confidence be-
tween Arvelo and Major Paz Tejada? Chief of the Armed Forces.
Mbreover, because the labor unions have been partially disatu by
ed
the arne: and because the leftist pro-krbenz Partido Awl& Revolu-
oionarla and the National Police are the only other organizations
(besides the army itself) capable of forceful, organized interference
with the electione, the strengthening of the ertlitary suggests an
effort by the adminiatration to redrew the political balance in
favor of the moderates.
In general, it is believed that the strengthening of
the armed forces will benefit US interests, since at the present
tine, these forces are the most moderate of the organization capable
of effectively influencing political developments,
PANAMA: Political Tension
ERM-PZETTartension has grown out of a struggle for
power between the president and Felice Chief Rem& and by a rap-
prochement among factions opposing Arias, Immediate causes for the
current tension are the president's efforts to avoid the reappoint-
rent as comptroller general of Remem's brother-in-law and to
strengthen his regime a inst a possible opposition nejority in
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(CIA Working Paper)
Co
35-'50
29 August 1950
the National. Assembly scheduled to meet on 1 Cctober. Underlying
causes of the continuing political tension are Police Chief
Derhais key position in politics and big interest in supporting
opposition to Arias in order to further his aun political position.
The as yet unresolved differences between, Arias and Bean continue
to constitute a threat to stability, (Substance in CIA
25 Aug 50.)
Press Criticism of UNINALin Acce t Caws of Lt
liaema's enthusiastic support of the UN moves in Korea is
being somewhat shaken by UNte delay in, accepting the offer of aid
made several weeks ago. The government's offer of bases for the
training of UN troops, or its norchant marine, and of other forms
of aido had received the eupport of all political elements in
Panama exeept:bhe Communists, Panamanian volunteers for. military
service with the UN no number over one thousand, a large nunber
for this sifted country,
S, fl(T ??.e Disorder ia UlnIn Area
AO rep dalige in the critically un-
stable labor situation awe last week when the US EMbasay at Ia Paz
recommended eVaduation? of Americans on the trouble area (CIA Dalin,
23 Aug 50), DisContent has recently been general among ham? labor
because certaintommitmenta made to it by management have not been
net and because students and teachers, who reoently.went aa strike
in Le Paz at the alleged instigation of the Pin, and possibly the
MR, have been inciting the miners, Further, CemMunists, who have
reportedly dchedaled ant uprising it the mining areas for the near
future, continue to be a potential threat because of their denonc
strated ability to aggravate any critical situation,
As there is no evidence thus tar that the government has
taken proper precautions against the occurrence of a second nGatavi
incident, it appears quite possible that the very volatile-natured
miners may engage in violence which, combined with current disorder
in La Paz, my lead to a serious politicalceoonomic crisis,
9. CHILE t Possible Labor Troubles in the Incittata,
.; fEtTlAar by two serious
tro-fir?'1;Mr-v-erplonit a
strikes at Chuanicanata (the world's largest copper mine and process-
ing plant), mgy face another setback when the existing labor contract
with the Chile Exploration CoNpagy expires on 31 August. Although
there are no indications that discussions of grievances are immi-
nent, it appears likely that the two chief demands that touched off
the former strikes ? that overtire be eliminated or reduced and
that the five pesos per day bonus currently paid be considered a
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Weekly Contributions, 35-50 29 August 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
permanent wage in:Crease -- nay be used by the Communist leaders of
the sindicatos as a Springboard for prolonged labor troUblee.
ResiariOnithe conpany, which would be almost certain, would
cause a tieraup of the industry that might be damaging to Chilean
economic and political stabilitr as well as to the US interest in
safeguarding the production of this strategic commodt4r.
ZDEDITIAIL,
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Weekly Contribetions, 35-50
(CIA Warkingfter)
Situation Memorandum 53-50
-RD E/ 24,119gAte6200050035-7
DEM I Wee
ZataStazistUltamtlamktlalcabta
29 August 1950
(8 eel The stability of the Colombian government has
a iMproved. The economic situation has deteriorated
elightly in recent months bet is probably still favatable.
The ergs' as a whole has remained lova to the governmemt.
Capabilities at the Colombian Communist Party remain slight.
International relations remain good.
-- US security Interests have been favorably affected
by the improved stability of the Colombian government.)
La1=4
The stability of the Colombian government has apparently improved as 0.
result of the peaceful inauguration of President G6mee on 7 August.
. The official Liberal Party position in regard to the new regime is one
of passive civil resistance. In the period preceding the inauguration, the
stibversive elements of the Liberal Parte together with an undetermined number
of army officers tried unsuccessfully to organise a revolution before the how
president should take office. Moderate Liberal elements were attempting.dur-
ing the sOme period to persuade the party to unite an some positive program
through Ohl& the Liberals would be able to exert some influence on the Dames
regime. At the National Liberal Convention on 10 August, however, it became
clear that the Liberal Partes intransigent elements (which include the National
Directorate) had euemeeded in preserving the Directorate's Nloenothine policy
for the party as a whole.
The avowed intentions of the newly-inaugurated president are 1) to strengthen
Colombianet8 friendship, 2) to insure fair treatment for foreign capital, and
3) to eliminate violence. In those statements, GAmez is believed to be sincere.
In regard to constitutional guarantees, amee has been less explicit.
The important actions taken by the Occeervative regime during the preeinangurae
tion period were* the indefinite postponement of Congressional sessions; the
scheduling of new Congressional and municipal elections for June and Septedber
respectively of 1951; and the semi-official pronouncement that the state of
siege would continue until after June 1951. These decisions were undoubtedly
taken with the concurrence of Gidez and will continue to be effective under
the new regime. In addition, prose censorship has been tightened, telephone
taps have been instituted, and selective censorship of the mails has been re-
sumed. Although the Liberals' freedom to ansaiible was apparently not limited
in the case of the National Convention on 10 August, the meetings of the Liberal
Confederation of Colombian Workers have been hampered by government action,
estimates that the present restrictions on civil liberties will be
continuedat least for the immediate future; that G6mez will make a sincere
effort to control the most violent webers of his party; and that the govern-
ment will remein relatively stable for the next several months.
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25X1 Weekly.Oontributions, 356%50 29 August 1950
(01A Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 53-50
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IMMO-4
The economic situation has deteriorated slightly in recent months, but
is probably still favorable. It is true that weather eonditions have been
unusually poor for both food crops and coffee. Consequently, cost-of-living
increeeee have been: amelerated, particularly for the working class, and
coffee Production for 1950 win be at least 10% bele* normal. The ovrrent
high level of coffee prices is, however, a counterweighing favorable factor.
The rise of coffee Prices in recent months and the Consequent reaumPtion of
coffee exports had reduced the unfavorable balance of trade during 1950 to
US014 million by 8 u13r. It is estimated that the high coffee prices will
prevent serious halal= of payments difficultiee in Colotbia in 1950 despite
the recently increased importation or merchandise, machinery, and rAterials
which might become searce because of the conflict in Korea- despite the ine
creased food importe; and despite the smaller volume of coffee production
and therefore of coffee exports.
A possible favorable indication for US foreign investment in Colombia
(in addition to the attitude of 06mea -- see tiattW) is the rumored arrange
ment.by which Tropical 011 Company may be offered 40g of the stock but full
nanaeerielcantrol in the DeMares petroleum concession which reverts to the
' Colcalan government in August 1951. .
111.21Mtt
The army as a whole has .remained loyal to the goVernment. The:20 jay
plot F7ikly, 13 Jul 50) Was .offectively thwarted, and anly:a few civilian
arrep an minor bloodshed occurred. The army offensive against he Insurrec-
tionary moveMent in the 'lanes has had a fair degree of success as is indicated
by the flight to Venezuela of the moat important leader, Eliseo lel$eques.
The National Police, though unquestionably Conservelives, are a. dubioue
-asset to the Admirietration. Having .had at least a Share in cane:Ing the ooh-
tinned conflict in the hence, the police are now a factor of unrest in Antikula.
Army-police hostility, which has. led to several Minor armed clashes in recent
months, has been.incromed by a report that soma of the police divisions have
received rapid-firing weapons, presumably in order to oppaeo-.the army if the
occasion should arise.
Air force capabilities will be substantially Increased bY the-ceraplation ?
of contemplated Colombian purchases in the US of twelve new aircraft and US$270,000
worth of spare parts. -Approximately 85 of the AirForce :s 145 aircraft are
non-operational at present, primarily because of a lack of spare parts.
aftwalyst?
?The Colombian Communist Partyle capabilities for subversive action reMein
slight.: Although party pronouncements and press had followed the Soviet line,
on -8 Jlay-party loaders were :It'll awaiting instructions or orientation on the
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(CIA Uorking Paper
Situation Memorandum 53-50
35-50
29 August 2950
Korean conflict from either Bucharest or Paris. During reeent Months the dis-
tribution of the Cominform release: Egnam_altAumftzl,az.,maAaranda
apziakz has been initiated. Subscrietions are boitig sold for the equilreent
of approximately US07.50 per year and this money should slight1 alleviate
the extremely pocr financial condition of the party, since the nublications
are received without charge.
Jakca22.4,1;1310,
The ColoMblan government and press have wholeheartedly supported the US
and the TIN in the Korean situatian, at the same time condemning the Soviets
for the invasion or southern Korea. It is true that, when conversations with
the US Aar to determine the needs of the unified cemMand were held shortly
before the inauguration of amez, it was decide that ne commitmonts ?or
Colombian assistance could be made until after the 06men government had been
instal/8d on 7 Augusto However, as early as 27 June, the ColoMbian navy
requested information as to possible coordination with the US. Furthermore,
the Foreign Office position has been that any military action Colombia might
take should be coordinated with that of other nations, but this statement was
avowedly not meant to indicate that Colombia necessarily would not send troops
unless other Latin American countries did so.'
It is considered possibly significant for US-ColoMblan relations that
Laureano Camez, in conversation with Ambassador Beaulac on 24 jay, stated
that he feared that the Communista would mako a concentrated effort in Colombia,
and that iven a million. dollars, they Could bring about a successful revolu
25X1 tion. .,-
stimates that this statement is completely unfounded in fact, and
that its txpression was designed exclusively to enhance, in US eyes the impor-
tance of good relations between the US and Laureano amez.
CONFIDENTIAL,
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