WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 31-50 LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA 1 AUGUST 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050031-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 1, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Latin America Division, ORE, C/A
1 August 1950
=EMIT DEVELOMENTS
: Although Latin American countries have approved the decisions
of the Security Council on the matter or Korea, little aid p other than
economic, mgy be expected from them (p.
SCUM= AREA: Miles Communists have become more active recently with-
out encountering government resistance because at this time the adminis-
tration wants to avoid Communist-inspired opposition to its new economic
program (p. 2)Q
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Cuba
DOCUMENT NO.
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Sealy Contributions* D/IA.* 31-50
(CIA Werking Paper)
3, sejSRAls
All the nations of Latin America have approved the deceaions
ce:' the Security Council an the matter of Korea* but thew far only
DeSivia and Costa Rica have made specific afters of milttery aid
(ehirty officers from Bolivia and volunteers and naval and air bases
rem Ccata Rica) in response to ST1 Liels telegram of 1.4 Jul to UN
nenbers requesting effective assistance (including coabat force14
particularly ground troops) for the UN Unified Ccnrand in Korea, Eight
Leta American governments (Argentina t Brazil* ColoMbie* Cuba* Dominican
Pepublic * Mexico* Nicaragua* and Peru) have expresped their willdngness
ts entsuat with the Unified Command concerning the possibility of
teeSering military assistance. Some of these have also offered economic
ted, nnd three other nations (Ecuador* Paraguay and Venezuele) have
iedicated that although they are unable to send combat fercee they arC
rsedy to give general or specific econonic assistance, Caatemale's
reeler was eimply an acielowledgment a/ the telegram., Although Chile
t'ts not as yet responded to this particular UN request* it will grob-
etJes repeat its earlier offer of strategic eatcriuls* namely copper
nitrates.
The hesitation an the part of Latin Americans to, make military'
sesitmmits in the Korean struggle at this time is not unexpected
Of.A Wkly* 5 Jul 50). Contributing factors to such hesitation are;
initial confusion and uncertainty in reacting to an unprecedented
aSeation, including the difficulty of deciding what their role will
te in a conflict geographically ret e free the. Weetere reemietteere where
eeetously the US must aseume the major share of the burdep; 2/ domestic
eseeiderations within,certain Latin American countxise such ae Isolaaism in Argentina and elections in IheazIll 3) an apparent des re to
Seat and Pee" what neighbors will do; 4Vpoinee it iSeue, between the
and various Latin American governments (particularly Brazil) which
eeve aroused anti-US feeling in the postewar period; and 5) inability
eS? most of the other American republies to furnish any military aid
boyond token. contributions s As a results it is doubtful that much
concrete assistance* except economic* can be expected from Latin America
QUesta it becomes clearly evident that the Hemisphere is threatened
aed World War III at hand.
1 August 1950
2. CHILE:
Chilean Ccennniets are becoming more militant* and whenever
pcssible* less clandestine in their operations in an apparent effort
to test goverment and popular reactions to an all-out peepaign.
'Recent evidence makes it seem more probable that theeo active efforts
are centrally directed than was the case earlier (D/IA Wkly* 11 Jun 50).
Since formation in February of the present government coalition and
expiration of the Special Powers Act in March the former. Caumunist
technique of cevertlyereating trouble has been largely supplanted on
*Aim ; = . ; tP1. 314. '
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? Weekly Contributions* D/L11* 31-50 1 August 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
numerous occasions recently by more openly aggressive tactics. Com-
muniste have not only participated in the almost cortinuous succession
of strikes, but also have reportedly instigated strikes (notably that
of the Maria Elena nitrate mine). Communist Chairmanship and virtual
monopoly of a recent =TECH meeting indicates that they have infiltrated
this formerly apolitical white collar employee's federation. Communists
have openly and vigorously campaigned among leftist groups for repeal
of the Defense of Democracy Law, and are trying openly to identiiy them-
selves with political efforts to improve the situation of the working
classes in order to offset their failure to support the Vial economic
plan in Congress.
The Communist appear to have regained some of their farmer
efficiency to instigate and maintain labor distrubanees, but do not
appear to have so improved their position as to be able to paralyze
vital industries, or to overthrow the government alone or with the
cooperation of other leftist groups. It is believed that this in-
crease Communist activity is being tolerated by the government because
this activity is so far of minor proportions, and possibly because
of the government's desire to avoid left-wing disturbances at the in-
ception of its new economic program. In the event of an outbreak of
serious violence, however, the government?still basically anti-
Communist?could. reimpose strict repressive measures.
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Weekly Contributions s WM, 31-50
(CIA Working Paper)
SitmatianLbmorandem47-50
The Current Situation in Cuba
1 August 1950
The Frio government remains stable, but its
?apace.v for positive action in support of US security
objectives has been somewhat -weakened. The econamic situ-
ation remains favorable. The armed forces are not well
prepared for anti-Communist action. Communist capabili-
ties in Cuba are still substantial, The Cuban government
has indicated its approval of the UN action against the
Communist aggression in Korea and IS considering action
to limit the activities of the Soviet Dmbassy in Habana.
? US security interests are threatened by Com-
munist capabilities in Cuba and by the inadequacy of
present governmental action against Communism.)
Political
acineinistration remains Stables but Its capacity for posi-
tive action in support of US security Objectives has been somewhat
weakened by the outcome of the June by-eleotione and by the continued
tolerance of Cammeitma in Cute. The defeat of candidates that the pres-
ident sponsored in tho election adversely affected his position as leader
of the Aut4ntico Party, which is the major support of the Prfo government(,
Furthers increasing rivalry within the Aut4ntico Party for leadershiv and
for the 1952 presidential nomlnation has increased the incipient Autentico
disunity within the administration and in congress.
During amine months the PrIo governmentlaill remain stables but
these disturbing factors plus the opposition of parties not allied to
the Frio government will oontinne and will at the same time decrease
the chances for prompt action on important preblems. During the present
period of semi-wars govemaxatal action is, and will continue for same
time to bes hampered by local politics and by the inadeqpate recognition
of the threat Cnhan Ccommalem presents to Cuban political and economic
institutions and to Cuba e5 capacity to fulfill its defense obligations.
In the event of an outbreak of general world hostilities however) all
political parties except the Communists would rally around the president
in matters affecting national defense.
Economic
Mg economic situation rename favcrable. Industrial and mineral
production and commercial trade are fairly satisfactory; reports have
indicated a probable budget surplus of several million dollars at the
end of the 1949-50 fiscal year and, a new exchange agreement with Spain
has ended the break in commercial relations (dating from early 110)0
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SECRET
Weekly Contributions, DA/1, 31-50
(CIA Woridnes, Paper)
Situation Memorandum l7-50
1 August 1950
thus ensuring a renewal of Spaints purchases of Cuban products, the par-
vent of comnercial.dobts owed to Cuba, and the unfreezing of Cuban
exchange in Spain. The Korean war has stimulated sugar sales and all
of the unexpectedly large 1950 sugar crop of 6.1 million short tens
-- the third largest sinee 3.930 will probably be pad at favorable
prices.
The government may try to carry out agrarian reforms and public
works because of the seriously increasing unrest among the farm popu-
lation (a result of mass evictions of tenant farmers and share croppers
under loopholes in a land law passed by the present gavernment) and
also because the administration could improve its prestige bysiniti-
ating sone popular econemic projects between now and the 1952 presi-
dential election. It is believed that the present favorable economic
situation will continue in coming months.
Is armed forces, which are pro-US and anti-U and loyal to
the present adninistration in Cuba, are strong enough to maintain the
authority of the State under ordinary circumstances but are nava:Ill
prepared far efficient action against Communist sabotage or psycholog-
ical warfare, The armed fortes have excellent morale, are well disci-
plined, and are trained in the WC of firearms and experienced in the
type of military duty ordinarily needed in Cuba. HOOeute., the absence
of any welleformulated anti-Communist policy in Cuba probably has pre-
vented adequate training of the armed forces in the detection and
suppression of dangerous Communists. In addition, the efforts of the
chief of the national police to increase police efficiency have re-
portedky been hampered by the interference of government officials and
politicians on behalf of gangster or other subversive elements.
Subversive
-----TaWnist capabilities in Cuba are still substantial and the Comm-
nists constitute. a direct threat to US security interests at this tine.
It is true that-anti-Communist feeling in Cuba has greatly intensified
since the Communist aggression in Korea and public demands for anti-
Communist action are increasing. Anti-Communist action was recently
taken by the National Federation of Electrical Workers which has author-
ized member unions to oust Communists from strategic jobs in the elec-
trical industry. The government has taken various actions against
individual Communist activities since the start of the Korean war, and
is considering means of cutting Communist propaganda media such as the
newspaper aryj in addition, the president has discussed with military
commanders problems related to the prevention of physical sabotage. On
the other hand, the president has expressed his intention to delay asking
the congress to outlaw the Communist Party (Partido Sr:tele:lista Popular)
until he is absolutely sure of majority backing for such action. Such
acticaAipapinagagtargakiefi %RiM131,191691AabeL0tarb0teffiln?7 of
5.
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1VoakJr Contributions, 1)/IA, 31-50 3 1 August 1950
(CIA Viorldng Paper)
Situation Llenerandum 47-50
politicians of all parties (except the Ortodoxos) to make advantageous
deals with the 0mm/stet and also because many people nintat concider
the outlawing of the entire Communist Party at this time as unfair to
the large nurber of non-militant nembers (probably about 100,000 out of
127,000) rho are not necessarily unequivocably pro-USSR. It is belieeed
that the president may consider it necessary to delay action to outlen
the pariv until the ageoUt of the UN-DZSR ear mny split the non-militants
ofi from the militant Conmunicts (a poscihility in event of all-out mer
or of phyeical sabotage in Cuba), or until the worsening of the inter-
national situation removes present political obstacles to effective anti-
Communist action by the government.
The Connunicts have conziderable political influence at present, and
are reportedly being given positions in the Habana city govgrnment as a
renard for the prominent part they played in electing Nicolas Castellanos
neyot in the June elections. In addition, the Communists still have enough
labor influence in key industries (sugar, neritire, transport) to create
decisive labor agitation and strikes, their propagamda appeal to lan-income
groups is effective, and physical sabotage is a possibility since dangerous
Conmunists are still at large and the present police surveillance may not
prove adequate
Internatianal
---"ffireWai government has indicated its complete approval of UN action
against Communist aggression in Korea has instructed its delegate to the
Security Council to support any UN initiative to contain present aggression
in Korea and has indicated its willingness to fulfill its militaryobliga-
tions unAer the UN Charter. It is estimated that the present cooperative
attitude will be maintained in cawing months.
President Prio is considering action against the Soviet Embassy in
Habana by limiting the number of persons on the embassy staff and restrict
ing the entry of Soviet couriers to about one every three months rather
than one a teek as at present. As this embassy is important in Russian
activities in the Caribbean area, such action by the Cuban government
would definitely favor DS interests.
Relations with other Latin American countries are soneehat improved.
Thole appears to be a lessoning of the strain in relations with Venezuela
that had developed late in May because of the Venezuelan Junta's sensitivity
to the derogatory remarks of the Cuban press and of some Cuban officials,
Relations with the Dominican Republic have temporarily improvedl and that
countryls claim against Cuba because of the abortive Cava Confitee ex-
pedition have been settled through the return of the Dominican vessel,
Angelita, It is thought that, barring: unexpected events, Cuban-Dominican
MA:Ma will remain relatively restrained in coning nnnths and that, if
the semi-war situation continues, intra-Caribbean activities in general
will have a relatively minor place in Cuban foreign affairs.
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