WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS 23-50(Sanitized), ORE, CIA, 6 JUNE 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050023-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: June 6, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Weekly Contributions 23-5O
0 CIA
6 June 1950
Of the developments reported this week, believes that on the 25X
emerging trend toward uniformity in recognition policies among the
American republics is partioularly important (p, 2).
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENERAL? The trend toward uniform recognition policies in the Hemisphere
teen important gain for Hemisphere solidarity (p, 2),
NORTHERN AREA?, In Mexico, the mine workers' union has withdrawn from
the Communist-dominated 000CM (p. 3). See also report on the current
situation in Costa Rica (p? 5),
CENTRAL ARRA s US-Colombia relations may be troubled by a rate mar
between shipping lines.(1% 3). In as119 a aeries of labor-syndicate
elections will not seriously affect Brazilian politics (p, )?
SOUNERN
AREAt See report on the current situation in Peru (p,
SPECIAL SUT.J.lriCTS
The Current Situation in Costa Rica .....?...... . . . . 5
The Current Situation ill Peru , ,, , . . . 0 0 a C 4
C ? 0 a 0 a g
DOCUMENT NO. 3
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DECLASSiFIED
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DATE/ ?r lEViEWER:_
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(CIA Working Paper)
1, GENERAL: Trend Toward Uniformi in Reco tion
re has en no good reason i doubt that the
other American republics would be basically aligned with the US in
ease of a US-USSR mar, there have been weaknesses in the peacetime
materials out of which a structure of perfect collaboration would
have to be built in time of war. One such weakness has been the
divergence in ideas as to the connection between the quality of
a new government and its recognition as a member of the American
Dismily of nations. During recent months a trend toward general
acceptance of the DS view-- that non-recognition of a possibly
undemocratic new regime is not the most suitable method to further
the development of democracy within the country -- has signaled an
approach toward Hemisphere unity on the leportant matter of recog-
nition of new governments brought to power by coups d'etat, and has
therefore marked a distinct gain for Hemisphere solidarity.
Although the Final Act of Bogot4 laid down certain prin-
ciples regarding continuity of relations among American states, no
agreement was reached at that time on a common policy relative to
the recognition of de facto governments, and subsequent events
showed that certaid7caliles -7 particularly Bolivia, Chile, Cuba,
and Uruguay ? had reservations even on the Bogotel principle that
recognition did not imply approval or disapproval. Recently these
countries have become less adamant. All of them have extended
recognition to the Arias regime in Panama. alba and Uruguay (the
latter being a leader of the "democratic" group upholding non-
recognition of de facto regimes brought to power by non7constitu-
tional overthrew orWernments) have indicated a willingness to
accept, at least as expedient, US recognition policy. Although
the recent Haitian coup deetat does not provide a clear-cut test
on recognition, it does afford some clues that the trend toward
unanimity is continuing. Practically all of the Latin American
countries have now recognized the Haitian junta, while Chile in
the only country which has insisted that Haiti east show signs of
returning to "normal democratic processes" before the new gavern-
ment is recognized. There is also the possibility that, of the few
countries which have as yet refused to recognize the Peruvian and
Venezuelan juntas, some may decide to do so in the near future,
The whole problem of recognition of de facto regimes is
now being studied by the Inter-American CouncircinEasts. The
recent trend toward uniformity may enable the Council in the report
it is preparing for the Tenth Inter-American Conference to agree on
certain recognition principles, thereby moving toward formally accept-
ing, as a matter of principle, the procedure that is now becoming
standard practice on recognition of new governments among the Ameri-
can republics,
2.
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Weekly contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
25-50
6 June 1950
2. MEXICO: Miners Re udiate Communism
TiMican nine workerTrrepudiation of Communism and
their withdrawal from Iombardo's Unin General de Obreros y
Caupesinos de mixicio (uoccm), are inline with recent labor trends
inspired by administration maneuvere. Firmness of mine workers'
adherence to mom had been a quest2on for some time ars
9 Aug 49); their recent action, for owing the petrolj;;;;t0
withdrawal in December, leaves U0001 with no affilivted national
syndicate although it still has tb) support of individual sections
of important unions. The mine worlurs' action also constitutes a
blow to CTAL and TIPTU strength in tits Hemisphere and dins the
prospects for the establishment of i WFTU-sponeored Inter-American
Miners" Federation.
3, COLOMBIA: Probable Rate Ur Betsy n US and Colombian Shi in Lines
riteVaiITTEr7b7pro re 8 ? 0 a announce'
withdrawal
mithdramal of the Gran Colombia Mcpchant Fleet from the Shipping
Conference, The Colombian line's tbject in thin action is to obtain
freedom to collect payment for fre!ght in Colombian currency. The
Gran Colombia Merchant Fleet had pactously agreed to collect pay-
ment for freight in dollars as reqp5:ed by Conference rules, but
had apparently believed at that tiny that Grace Line, its chief
competitor, mould then agree to divide its cargo with Gran Colonbia,
When Grace Line made clear that surh a division les impossible, the
Gran Colombia line decided that it could not forego the advantage
of collecting payment for freight In Colombian currency, and there-
fore should withdraw from the Corierence. This decision is likely
to be followed by a rate war,
These developments ard expected to have a somewhat adverse
effect on US-Colombian relations both because of the probable rate
mar and because Gran Colombia 'a alvertising is likely to be highly
nationalistic.
/4. Mans
Labor Syndical Electiory of Minor Political miortanee
elections
elh in Ce a o e a.sr a ratites
on 12 June, the first of such e:ectione since the government took
control of the labor unions in 3i,t7, will not seriously affect
Brazilian politics. Although at this time only about 5 percent of
the syndicates will hold electiots, there seems no good reason to
question the government's promisi that all syndicates will hold
their elections by the time of too presidential election on 3 October.
The Communists, who for almost tree.years have been loud in their
demands that these elections be :old, now oppose them, since the
regulations mould seem to preven6 the Communists from either holding
office or voting. Even should CDmmunist voting be permitted, this
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(CIA Working Paper)
23-.50 6 June 1950
group, who during the past year have lost =eh of their prestige
among the rank and file of labor, would probabl,y make no subetan-
tial gains. Vargas' supporters, on the other hand, may yoke some
gains. It is not expected, however, that any change in labor
leadership resulting from these elections will in ararimgralter
the prospecte for an orderly presidential election.
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25X1 Weekly Contributions* 23-50
(CIA. Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 34-50
The Current Situation in Costa Rica
6 Jure 1950
(8 -- The Mate government appears reasonably stable.
been no significant change thus far in the un-
favorable economic situation, but the outlook for the
future is mcce favorable, Communist strength, though
small, is a constant problem for the government. The
Guardia Civil appears to be loyal to the administration
but could not suppress a large-scale subversive attempt.
International relations remain unchanged in regard to
major matters but lesser refinements in policy appear to
be in process of formulation.
? NO development in Costa Rica has significantly
affected US security interests.)
Political
"gb1ate government appears reasonably stable, It is tree that
political agitation against administration policies, which has been at
a 212131110UM since Mate assumed the presidency, shows signs of increas-
ing. For example, there are indications that the Social Democratic
Pareqy and ex-junta-president Figueres will offer greater resistance
to administration policies. It is not likely, however, that this
opposition will threaten the mtability of the government during the
next few months.
Bconomio
1E31e there has been no significant Change during the last six
months in the unfavorable current economic situetion, the outlook for
the future is improvwd. The principal unfavorable factor at this time
is the difficulty of restriuting imports sufficiently to improve the
ocantryus foreign exchange situation. Favorable factore include:
the gradual elimination of a large backlogof payments due on past
imports; the paynent Of govermnentel expenses from cement revenues;
preparation? to renew payments and to refinance portions of the public
debtl and the Oonsideration of plans to advance the 'economic develope
? it of the count', partiou/arly by improwtmente in the cattle and
eoffee industries and in the fiscal edminintration, The predominance
pf favorable domestic factors, together with the fact that world mar-
at conditions continue to favor Costa Rican exports, rakes the imme-
diem econonio outlook swe favorable than it has been in recent years.
It le estimstad? thereforet that unless the Mate administration fang
to enforce its strict financial controls, an improved economic situation
sill result within acting months,
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25X1 Week3y Contributions, 23-50 - 2 ?. 6 June 3.950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation bemorandum 34-50
TE Guardia Civil appears to be loyal to the president, despite
some personal dissatisfaction among the officers. This sole military
body of Costa Rica is not at present 'adequately trained or equipped
to suppress any large scale subversive attempt, and, in spite of some
indication>, that the government intends to provide additional arms
and training, eill probably rennin of rather law military capabilities,
Subversive
---nrnArent Communist political strength in Costa Rica is insignifi-
cant, but the potential influence of this group in organized labor is
important, and the continual attempts by the Communists to increase
their strength constitute a constant problem for the government.
Despite two years of suppression, the Commdnists have retained the?
loyalty of many of their militant followers (nuebered at 2000 in 1)
and have now reestablished provincial political committees in nearly
all provinces. In addition they have some eight hundred medbers in
local Communist labor unions and are capable of increasing their labor
influence still further, because the non-Communist labor federation --
designed to supplant the Communists as the leading labor force of the
country -- has not really taken their place as the champion of the
lower classes. On the other hand, barriers to the development of
Communism exist in the opposition of most Costa Ricans to the inter-
national phases of Communieny in the anti-Communist animosities growing
out of the 194Scivil war, in the lack of sufficient well-trained local
Communist leaders, and in the political isolation and defective disci-
pline of the Costa Rican Communists, It is estimated that, ahead the
constant geranium:eta (police) action against Communist activities prove
inadequate to prevent a further increase in Commuhist strength, the
government will take more aggressive measures,,
International
el"----Thflonal relations remain unchanged in regard to major matters,
but important policy refinements appear to be in process of formulation,
Unchanged are Costa Ricags friendly attitude towards the US and its
support of the US in East-West rivalries. Unchanged, too, are its
strained relations with Nicaragua, a situation that caused tempers to
flare when it appeared to President Clete that the US EMbassy in Nica-
ragua vas unduly favoring Somoza in recent conversations, President
Mate continues to enforce the Costa Rican policy of remaining aloof
from Riddle American politics and Caribbean Legion adventures, but his
task is complicated by the disturbing factor injected into intra-Caribbean
relations by the activities of ex-junta-president Figeeros? Activities
ouches Figueresg attendance at the Conference itr Demooracy and Freedom
6..
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25X1 Weekly Contributions, 23-50
On Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 54-50
6 June 1950
In Cuba and charges that Figueres sent arms to President Arias of
Panama and that he remains interested in Caribbean revolutionary activ-
ities, particularly against Somoza, make Mates policy of aloofness
from Caribbean squabbles difficult to maintains
The most important refinements in policy are: a policy regarding
recognition of other American republics closer to that stated and applied
by the US, maintaining, hasever, a distinction in favor of the recogni-
tion of governments created as a result of revolutions which had, as
their purpose the defense of threatened constitutional or democratic
institutions; and a policy-- for the announced purpose of encouraging
honest elections in other American republics of permitting Costa
Mean diplomats to act, together with other Latin American diplomats,
as witnesses in electoral proceedings when requested by the countries
Involved.
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Weakly Contributions, 23-50 6 June 1950
(Clk Working Paper)
Si a stion Memorandum 35-50
The Current Situation in Pert
-- The present stability of the Odria regime will be
t )11/ ? June. The economic situation has deteriorated
sightly? Capabilities of the armed forces have dropped.
A:bhough the subversive potential of the Apristas has increased
alghtlys they are unable -- independematlar-- to make a major
ave9 the Communists do not at present constitute a signifia,
ea..% force. Peru's relations with other countries are
amicatble.
-- The situation as to US interests has been improved
by pimulgation of a new mining oode, which is expected to
faeiltate the investment of foreign capital tint/11.11G enter-
prises with caeca:event increase in availability of strategic
minera:30)
Political .
------1115-0drit regime, though facing a critical period during June, has
continued St:ale up to the aliment, and the balance of gains and losses
does not indillte materially changed prospects. Political opposition is ,
stronger. 04Va has alienated the support of the influential Pedro Beltran
leader of the Ilion= Nacional and has been unable to obtain the backing
of the straag tairSnRevolucionaria,(U6); his strength in the south has
been undermined ty the Lig. Derecratica, which enjoys covert Communist
support In addi%ion, ?drift's army support may have been reduced by the
fact that a retirel general has been norldnated by UR and the Lisa as
opposition presidcatial candidate. Odria has countered these reverses,
however, by tightatung his control over the electoral machinery, by obtain-
ing limited supper: of labor leaders, by taking firm measures against
opposition political figures, and by forming a new political party-to back
his candidacy. Fulther? the National Electoral Board has refused to
recognize the UR as a legal party, some IR leaders have defected, and the
Apristas have been leenfranohieed.
The month of Jule will be +=Meal for the regiee. tlhile Odrials
handing over of hi ffice on 1 junto to Minister of War, Zen& Noriega,
permits him to &mots himself fully to his campaign, the relaxation of
his csoutrol over the ;overnmont may encourage disGruntled military or
civilian groups to at- ptto unseat him. There are disaffected groups
in the army, and contiaual reports of subversive plots among influential
officers indicate the Odria maybe exposing his lifg to real danger dur-
ing the short time he relinquishes his control. Cdria has, however,
reportedly been assured by the army command that the army ag a whole will
support him, and any general revolt ZOOM unlikely. If Odria can avoid
assassination and continue to command general arnedaTerces support during
the critical onemonth period prior to the 2 July elections, his chances
of returning to office appear excellent.
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15X1 Weekly Contributions, 23-50 6 Jane 1950
(CL( Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum. 35-50
Economic
Yorufs economic situation has deteriorated slightly. It is true that
the gold and foreign exohango holdings of the Central Reserve Bank increased
slightly from February to March; and that on 12 May there wee promulgated
a now mining code, whioh is expected to stimulate the investment of foreign
capital in mining enterprises and to aid in the restoration of pre-1040
levels of mineral produotion. Nevertheless, little or no progress has been
made toward the solution of Pares immediate economic problem, the increase
in production for export. Total exports in 1949 seem to have declined both
in volume and value as compared to 1948 exports, while imports reached an
all time high during the past year. (Figures are not exactly comparable
because of changed exchange rates.) Etrals adverse trade balance was about
USO14,000,000 in 1969*
The general agricultural outlook is new less favorable as a result
of a ladk of irrigation waters and production of important export crops,
such as (when and sugar, may be adversely affected* The present rice
shortage in. Meru is the most serious in recent years*
Largely as a result of the absorption of the previous over-supply of
exchange certificates, the strengthening trend evidenced by, the Peruvian
sol in regard to the dollar in receet months was reversed at the end of
Wch. The sol baa continued to depreciate slightly.
In general, economic prospects for the next quarter do not appear
particularly promising.
Alati
abilities at the Peruvian armed forces remain limited, particularly
in the fume where morale, training, and efficiency are at present at a-
low ebb. The resulting disaffection has increased the iaoidenoe of sub-
versive plots, though the arey as a whole is believed loyal to Odrla (see
Political section).
Subversive
--TIPPI1-. the most numerous group opposing the present mine has
been further disorganized by intensified government repressive measures*
It is true that the subversive potential of this outlawed group may have
been increased to some extent by attempts by, various military and civilian
groups to obtain its support for revolutionary movements. Further, in view
of Odriala vylnerability during the pre-election period, the next month
appears especially propitious for subversive attempts by any group* APRA
has, hoevver, consistently rejected attempts by other groups to gain its
revolutionary support in the past and is too weak to make an indeeendent
major move at this time. There appears to be little basin to ()dries
charges that APR& in attempting to. incite a border incident batman. Para
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25X1 Weekly Contributions, 2350 6 June 1960
(CIA liorking Paper)
Situation Namorandum 36-60
and Colombia and prevent the holding of the eleotions by creating disorders.
Therefore, AfRA's potential for causing difficulty in the next critical
month is small and will remain so in the future unless changed policies
should lead this party to unite with other subversive groups.
Despite the regime's toleration of Communists, there are so few of
them that they are unlikely to constiftte a significant force during the
coming months.
International
POITgr?yrelations with other countries are, in general, amicable,
though relations with Brazil and Colombia have been someWhat strained
because of an extradition ease and the continuing Raya controversy, respeo-
tive1y; the Ecuadoran boundary dispute remains a source of difficulty with
that natien. Commercial relations with the US have been adversely affected
by certain Peruvian trade policies; but US-Peruvian relations, in general,
remain on a high level of friendship. Relations with Chile have increased
in cordiality. Ties with Argentina and Spain remain extremely olose.
Peru's continued interest in the expansion of its trade with Urope is
indicatod by its recent signing of a trade agreement with West GermalVo
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