WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS(Sanitized)ORE, CIA 28 MARCH 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: March 25, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Weekly Contributions
PNE, CIA
28 March 1950
Of the items reported this week? finds one -- that on the
official stand taken by Cuban Communists (p. 2) -- of particular interest.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
NORTHERN AREA: Nicaragua has proposed a ncollective security pact" to
Honduras and El Salvador (p. 2). In Cuba, there are rumors of revolu-
tionary plotting, but it is unlikely that an attempted coup before
elections mould have supperb necessary far success (p. 2). Cuban
Communists finally have officially stated that they will refuse to
fight against the Soviet in event of a US-USSR war (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA: Colombia m5 president-elect Laureano amez ray be influ-
enced to accept a Liberal proposal for collaboration (p. 2),
SOUTHERN AREA: Bolivials government claims to have suppressed a new
revolutionary plot, the second withisl the month (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in the Dominican Republic
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1, CENTRAL AMERICA: Interest in Collective Security
eecr7ilarEcTiriFEZValon in Central America may
lead Honduras and El Salvador to consider a Nicaraguan proposal that
the three countries join in a tripartite (anti-Guatemalan) defense
agreement. Salvadoran relations with Guatemala have recently deter-
iorated, stile Honduran relations with Guatemala may be adversely
affected by the current exodus from Guatemala of armed groups which
have entered Honduras near CopAn. Although Guatemala has offered
Honduras "full cooperation" in the matterg the possibility remains
that these armed groups nay be able to establish themselves in
Honduras before corrective action can he taken.
en El s that Honduras, Salvador, and Nica-
ragua may considL;;;Ib(aliagreement, whether official or informal in
nature, to be of immediate value and help in discovering, publicizing,
and possibly counteracting the activities of exiled revolutionary
groups,
2. CUBA: Rumors of Plot to Oust President Frio
NOTiliumairraiiisTiWirigtilow the present administra-
tion Wklies: 21 Feb, 7 Feb, 10 Jan 50) are now widespread in
Habana. I 'believes that junior army officers may in fact be
plotting against the government, but that, prior to election day in
June 19500 an attempted coup is unlikely to receive needed support
from leaders of the political opposition 'who have good prospects in
the coming by-election.
3. Communist Poll in Event of US-USSR War
IiirCarn"T -FaiVITgrrrairaffic`ially stated as its
policy refusal to fight against the Soviet Union in event of a tE-USSR
war. This definite statement, after two years of avoiding a showdown,
may mean either that the Communists are feeling very confident as a
result of their new electoral ties with the moderate conservatives
Wkly., V4 Mar 50) and/or that Moscow has issued express orders
jiiring a statement of policy.
Li. COLOMBIA: Liberal Pr osal for Collaboration With GiSmez
Increasing unrest minialleircrin-TeTaraii -17-61ect Laureano
&Suez to accept a proposal for collaboration which is being formulated
by the Liberal Directorate.
GOnez had apparently' hoped that the organization of a new
police force in conjunction with the placement of strong Conservatives
in important and strategic army posts would increase his ability to
prevent subversive outbreaks. He apparently now realizes that such
measures have tended to strengthen anti-G6nez sentiment both in the
army and among certain elements of the civilian population, Increas-
ing unrest is shown by guerrilla warfare in the western plains, by
clashes between the police and the army, by continued arms smuggling,
and by various revolutionary-plots.
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On the other hand, orthodox Liberals have apparently
abandoned the idea of gaining power by revolution, Under the influ-
ere* of Alfonso L6pee, the Liberal Party Directorate is now preparing
a.plan?-probably involving a livited degree of collaboration, to meet
Cosset' desire for a 1950 session of Congress. The Liberal proposal
will probably have limits and conditions which amez would prefer
to reject, but his desire for at least a facade of democracy and
the constantly recurring threat of insurrection may well combine to
make his feel that acceptance of the Liberal proposal is most expe-
dient if not necessary.
Such an agreement between Game and Liberal leaders would
be favorable not only to the US interest in stability but also to
the US interest in democracy in Colotbia.
BOLIVIA: "Communist Plots
Pr?araita?r?Eurree Wklies: 28 Feb, 21 !Far 1950) con-
tinues and the second "plot" this month hap been "nipped in the bud".
It is not clear which opposition group was responsible. Press reports
quote Bolivian government statements that the plot was Communist
inspired under direct leadership of a Communist expert fresh from
RuBsia; Anbassador Florman? on the other hand, stated on 23 Narch
that The Communist problem in Bolivia is nil".
Bolivian dilegations of Communist plots and claims that
Bolivia has become an international Comnist center probably repre-
sent an attempt to impress the US in the hope of obtaining rich''
needed financial assistance. It is true that Bolivia's serious
economic difficulties, the veakness of its government, and 'general
discontent among labor groups make conditions ripe for Communist
agitation. Nevertheless, estimates that Communism, -which is
weak in Bolivia, is of importance only as it might represent an addi-
tion to an already powerful opposition,
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Weekly Contributions,
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Momorandum 17-50
The Current Situation in the DondnicanR2public
xw..,ta...essamsemawscraacza.a.h.meageesivarasrasHmsee Uaqamesommen.m
(Sunna -- Trujillo remains in full political control of
tiinican Republic, Despite sone falling off of commer-
cial activity, 1949 was a fairly prosperous year,. There is
no Communist problem in the country. The armed forces are
steadily improving in efficiency.
--While the Dominican government is pro-US, it has
become increasingly the focal point of unrest in the Carib-
bean, To the extent that the Trujillo regipe exerts a
divisive influence in the Caribbean, it adversely affects
those US security interests dependent on the solidarity of
all twenty-one American Republics,)
Political
Trujillo 's control over the Dominican Republic shows no signs of
wakening. As long as this situation obtains, there is no possibility
of organized opposition within the country. Maneuvers abroad of exiled
oppositionists and other anti-Trujillo groups have not impaired Trujillofs
control because of the people's indifference and the strength and loyalty
of the armed forces. The situation will be altered only by the death or
incapacity of Trujillo, and neither eventuality appears imminent.
Economic
-IV Dominican Republic was fairly prosperous in 1949c It is true
that commercial activity declined from the peak years of 1947 and 194E,
and that imports declined from $66 million in 1e.8 to 643 million in
1949. This 40 percent drop in the value of imports is attributable
largely to the merchants" reduction of inventories in anticipation of
the country's reduced purchasing power. Also, the loss to the govern-
ment of customs revenue caused a sharp curtailment of public 'works
projects and necessitated other administrative economies. These cutbacks,
however, have not seriously affected the economic situation, which con-
tinues to be generally favorable,. Exports, valued at $74 million during
1949? were at about the same high level as in 1948, and accounted for a
favorable trade balance of $30 million, Coffee shipments ($10,7 million)
represented an increase of 62 percent in value and 28 percent in velem,
Exports of sugar, the Republic's most important crop, were satisfactory
although lower world market prices nere than offset the increased volume.
The Dominican Replabliclhovever,is now worried that the UK, its principal
sugar market, will not be able to take as much sugar in the future and
will be unable to make payment in dollars, As an indication of the
seriousness of this problem, Trujillo himeelf has asked the US to grant
the Dominicans a sugar quota comparable in terms of production to that
allocated to Cuba, These possible difficulties in disposing of the sugar
crop do not impair the generally good foreign trade prospects of the
Dominican Republic, however.
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Situation Memorandum 17-50
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28 March 1950
The financial situation also continues to be favorable. Gold and
foreign exchange holdings remain anple. The government has enacted a
new tax program in order to amortize its modest funded debt, an internal
obligation of about $20 nillion, While specific revenue and expenditure
figures are not published, the government appears to be living within
its current income extimated at about $70 million a year,
There are no factors in the present situation which are likely,
during coning months, seriously to impair the generally favorable eco?
nomic outlook,
armed forces are steadily becoming more effective, Morale is
excellent, and all services can be counted on to cooperate loyally in
support of the regime., The training of the navy and strengthening of the
air force are being given particular attention. The light bomber and four
fighters recently purchased in the US (Vat not yet delivered) will appre?
ciably augment the capabilities of the air force, Government eccnomy
moves have not affected the military establishment. For the calendar
year 19500 25 percent (UM million) of the total budget is allocated to
the services, a substantial sum as compared to current fiscal appropriations
in neighboring countries --- 10 percent ($5 million) in Guatemala; 20 per?
cent ($3 ellion) in Haiti. and 18 percent ($40 million) in Cuba. Included
in the army budget is $2 million for the operation of the small arms plant
at San Cristobal. This plant, which produces machine guns of good quality,
has increased the countnfts military potential significantly.
Subversive
-----gfre-re are virtually no Communists in the Dominican Republic. While
a few individuals in the armed forces and much of the population object
to Trujillo, their opposition is purely passive.
International
-----DEMFin relations with neighboring Caribbean Republics have been
dominated in recent months by Trujillets concern over attack from abroad.
This concern led him to request special war powers from Congress --- a
superfluous gesture designed to focus attention on Guatemalan and Cuban
encouragement of anti?Trujillo activities in those countries. At the
same time, this concern caused hint to countenance the involvement of
Donioan officials in last Decembers plot to overthrow the Haitian
government so that it might be replaced with one subservient to hien
Although relations with Cuba, Guatemala, and Haiti remain strained, the
recent report of the OAS investigating committee --which censured the
Dominican. Republic, Guatemala and Cuba ? will tend to prevent those
countries, at least temporarily, from interfering in the internal affairs
of other countries.
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