WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 14, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release2002/O.r /11 :~1A-RDP79-01090A000264050011-3
.. T
tmlcU Contributions
Latin mericaDivs on, , CIA
34 March 1950
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
GENERAL: Latin American reaction to visits of high tS officials
and Habana and Rio meetings is very favorable (p. 2).
NC TEERN ARF&: In Cuba, the Comnmiat Party has gained in polit-
ical influence (p. 2). In Mexico, the administrationis
tactics against UO0CM unions may further antagonize non ommunist
members (p. 2); Sinarquistas use violence in demonstrations which
are both "anti-Com wist" and anti-government (p. 2).
CENTRAL AREA: The position of Colombia -s presidents-elect may be
less secure because of growing dissatisfaction in the arnr (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation In Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . .
DOCUMENT No. -
NO _
NO CHANGE IN CLAS . ^
DECLASSIFIED
ASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-
DATE, &2.117. REVIEWER
25X6
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA000200050011-3
 Approved For Releas'002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-0109OA0002 0650011-3
SECRET
Weekly Contributions, D/LA 314 March 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
1. GENERAL: Latin American Reaction to Visits of h US Officials
a ana an Mee s
The recent visits o Assistant Secretary of State Miller
and Ambassador Austin to some of the American republics, as well
as the Habana and Rio meetings of US chiefs of faissions, have pro-
duoeci favorable reactions throughout Latin America. Fooaept for
the Communist papers, all concerned received a good press, and
their activities have been interpreted by the Latin Americans as
an indication of renewed interest by the US in Western Hemisphere
affaira.
2. CUBA: Communists Gain Political Influence
Me- dozmmist- ar o a Par o Socialista Popular),
by announcing its support of the Orau-Batista candidate for mayor
of Habana (D/LA Viklyt 7 March 50), has established ties with the
moderate conservative parties and has thus gained in political
influence. The Communists can now use the electoral campaign for
propaganda purposes and may win support on certain issues from
their temporary allies. Some minor Communist candidates may even
be able to ride to victory on non-Communist coattails, and the
Communist Party will almost. certainly gain some votes, which would
offset some of the losses that have resulted from its former polit-
ical isolation.
3. MEXICO: Government Bears Down on UGOCM Unions
e governmen s ng o recent-strikes and slow-downs
in the mining industry and irrigation projects by unions affiliated
with Lombardo 'a UG0C4 are examples of the administration's tactics
in attempting to keep labor in line. Alleging Communist sabotage
by the striking miners, the government has continued to exploit
the anti-Communist theme by which it has courted popular support
for suppression of strike threats (D/LA Wkly, 20 Dec 49). 1r per-
mitting the use of troops to break the irrigation project strike,
the government has also continued tactics toward the 25X6
opposition labor groups - such as were used previously in the
taxi drivers' strike (D/LA Wkly, 7 Feb 50). Although the Communist
tendencies of the union leaders involved are well known, D/IA esti-
mates that the continued use of force by the government in its
dealingswith UGOCM-sponsored strikes and the use of the Communist
label rather than reference to arbitration or conciliation will
antagonize further the non-Communist elements in the UGOCM and
make it difficult to retain the loyalty of those syndicates now
lined up with the administration.
4. Sinargui.stas Use Violence
Recent disorders involving Sinarquistas in various parts of
the country indicate the implementation of the change in their policy
Approved For Release 2rf : CIA-RDP79-01090A0002000509~11-3
 Approved For Releas 1002/W&TCIA-RDP79-0109OA0002GO650011-3
Weekly Contributions, D/LA it March 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
from passive penetration to armed "resistance" announced last December.
Unauthorized "anti-Communist" demonstrations held by the U? (Union
Naclonai Sinarquista), characterized by violence and attacks on the
administration. began with a meeting on 5 February when Sinarquistas
attacked armor barracks causing the death of the commanding officer
and several soldiers. All the demonstrations resulted in the deten-
tion and arrest of scores of Sinarquistas by military and civilian
Renewal of Sinarquista activity at this time is aimed at
taking advantage of the anti-Communist drive recently launched by
the government and of its tolerant attitude toward the Church.
Having always been professed anti-Conmiunists, but never distinguish-
ing between Communism and the revolutionary program .of the present
administration, the Sinarquista "anti-Communist" movement is in
itself subversive. D/IA estimates that, because of this essentially
subversive character of Sinarquismo and because of the Sinarquistas'
present policy of violence, the government will not only refuse to
register the UNS as an opposition political party for the next elec-
tions but, should Sinarquista violence continue, may outlaw the
movement alt
t
oge
her.
5. COLOMBIA: Grow3 Dissatisfaction in the .A
_
The Colombian army, antagonized the current Conserva-
tive government's actions in transferring Liberal officers from the
more important posts and in creating a large, presumable pro-goverment
police force, has now been further alienated by a decree permitting
the government's arbitrary retirement of any officer. Although the
Colombian army has not participated in politics for many years,
President-elect Laureano Gomez apparently feels that he needs an
arxi of unquestionable loyalty for use in any emergency. The meas-
ures taken to secure reliable military backing for the government
may backfire, however, by providing a focal point for civilian and
military dissatisfaction with the president-elect and thereby pre-
cipitate an insurrection. The possibilities of success for such an
attempt would be increased, should it receive support from anti
conservative forces in the Caribbean area (such as the Venezuelan
Aecion Democratica) or from the Caribbean Legion. (Substance in CIA
Wkly, 10 Mar 50.)
Approved For Releas 1 CCIA-RDP79-0109OA00020005(%11-3
 Approved For Rele a 2002MMIT CIA-RDP79-01090A0d00050011-3
Weekly Contributions, D/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 14-50
The Current Situation in Guatemala
(Summary - The activities of Colonel Arbenz as presidential
candid., a now dominate the current political scene., The
national economy remains stable, The importance of the army
as a political and military force appears to have diminished,,
No change in the basic objectives of Guatemalan foreign policy
is apparent.
-- The possibility that the Communists may increase
their influence in Guatemala is the most significant
development affecting US security interests.)
Political
The activities of Colonel Arbenz as presidential candidate in the
elections to be held late in 1950 dominate the political scene.,
Arbenz, a member of the 1944 revolutionary triumvirate and Minister
of Defense since 1945, has recently resigned his post to run for the
Presidency, He has the backing of three political partieas the
newly formed PIN (Partido de Integridad National) and two of the
pro-administration parties -- the leftist PAR (Partido Aocion Revolves
cionaria) and the PRN (Partido Renovation National). PAR support
indicates that Arbens controls the militant labor faction, which
may decide the outcome of the election,, Reputedly, he has also
obtained the services of a group of Caribbean Legion members to sup-
port his candidacy by force if necessary. Moreover, he apparently
has the support of various high army officers. It is to his advantage
that army leaders capable of leading a revolt have been exiled, and
that the capabilities of the army as a whole have been reduced.
Although a break between Arevalo and Arbenz has been rumored, the
likelihood that the former will remain aloof from the presidential
oar.paign should also favor Arbenz.
At present no strong candidate opposes Arbenz, the only other
candidate being Jorge Garcia Granados who as yet has no strong
support. It is true that the FPL (Frente Popular Libertado r),
largest and most moderate of the pro-administration parties, has
not yet chosen its candidate. The anti-administration parties
likewise have not named candidates= conceivably, those parties, if
unified, might be strong enough to defeat Arbenz in an honest election.
Similarly, the FPL could defeat Arbens with conservative help. However,
an anti--Arbenz candidate is unlikely to gain the presidency without
strong army support to counteract the forces of the militant labor
movement. There is no evidence as yet of such a porsibilityo Rumors
of anti--Arbenz plots continue, however, and his assassination must
always be considered as a possibility that could radically alter the
political situations
Approved For Release 2002/0 1J-;,~BR79-01090A00020005Q011-3
 Approved For Rabe 2002/06/11 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000050011-3
SECRET
Weekly Contributions, A/IA
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum '14-50
D/Lk estimates that, .if Arbe'nt is elected, US security interests
would be adversely affected to the degree that he is pro-leftist and
that Guatemalan leftists are pro--Russian,
Eaoncmio
There has been no significant change in the economic situation,
Guatemala's economy, largely dependent upon the production and export
of coffee, remains .basically sound. Labor disputes continue, but the
employers' position appears stronger because of a less agressively
pro-labor attitude on the part of the administration,
D/L& foresees no substantial change in the economic situation in,
coming months,
Milita
he morale and strength of the armed forces have decreased.
Oppositioniat army leaders have been exiled or jailed, and an atmosphere
of suspicion and distrust pervades military circles. Some officers
fear arrest on trumped.'-up charges or assassination at the hands of
arbenz-employed thugs. The armed forces have also been weakened
through withholding funds and equipment, It is unlikely that the new
Minister of Defense, Colonel Rafael O'Meany, appointed to succeed
Colonel Arbens, will initiate any changes in administration policy
toward the military,
In contrast to the neglect of the armed forces there is evidence
that the effectiveness of the Guardia Civil (police3 has been increased
through the acquisition of small arms. The police, under the control
of Colonel Victor M. Sandoval, Arevalo's brother--in- lew, have supported
the administration and are oriented toward the left.
Subversive
The consolidation of leftist]abor and political groups behind the
candidacy of Arbenz may favor Communist influence. Arben& has, for
obvious political purposes, sought the support of pro--Communist labor
leaders. Guateralan labor, in turn, has strengthened its ties with
the international pro-Communist labor movenent through the recent
decision of the FSG (Federation Sindioal do Guatemala) to affiliate
with the CTAL (Confederaoion do Trabajadores de America Latina) thereby
placing both major Cuaton.alan labor federations within the pro-Communist
labor confederation led by Lombardo Toledano (DJLL Wkly, 7 Feb 50)
The CTRL is. therefore, in a position to wield its influence in the
coming presidential campaix.
In these political and labor maneuvers, the Cor..munists have so .
successfully identified themselves with ideal issues that it is difficult
Approved For Release 200~bIA-RDP79-01090A00020005(11-3
 Approved For Releas 2002/06/11 .CIA-RDP79-0109OA000 050011-3
Weekly Contributions.. D/L&
3 --
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 1440
to isolate then from other groups. In propaganda, for examples, the
Communists have used the nationalistic theme in attacking the US--sponsored
Institute. of Inter-American Affairs calling for the removal of the
influenoe of "foreign capitalism" in Guatemalale "cultural problems"
and the replacement of Minister of Education Osegueda -by a leftist.
D/LA estimates that the Communists may increase their influence
and that they will continue to operate through the leftist political
parties in anticipation that, if elected, Arben$ will establish an
administration favorably disposed toward the Communists.
International
Guatem ass foreign policy remains basically unchanged. Opposition
to military dictatorships has been evident in renewed repudiations of
the Pranoo regime in Spain. The government remains unfriendly toward
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. It is true that the activities
of the OAS Committee investigating unrest in the Caribbean have led
Guatemala to deny that it has supported the Caribbean Legion; however,
the government has indicated that it will continue to give sanctuary
to political exiles from other Caribbean countries. Although Legion
activity which continues in Guatemala and elsewhere-probably has the
moral support of the government, there is no evidence that it is
currently aiding the Legion, except perhaps individual members who
may be in the employ of Arbenso
Opposition to "colonialism" continues. Guatemala has strongly
protested the granting, by Britain of petroleum exploration concessions
in British Honduras (Belize). US Aoolonialism" has been attacked,
unofficially,, during the opening of the Caribbean Olympic Games, when
the flag of a nationalist Puerto Rican political faction was displayed
rather than the US flag, and a popular Puerto Rican tune played rather
than the Star Spangled Banner --- thus symbolizing Guatemala's recog-
nition of the alleged aspirations of the Puerto Ricans for independence.
It is also indicated that the Guatemalan representative on the UN Eritrean
Commission will favor an independent Eritrean
D/LA anticipates no change in Guatemalan foreign policy in coming
monthse
Approved For Release 2002/0 g -RBP79-0109OA00020005O i1-3