WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA 24 JANUARY 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200050004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 24, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Wee. Coributions
Latin ATi:ia.ca Cm
24 January 1950
CUIIREN-2 DEVELOPMENTS
GENERAL:1 Steps are being taken to organize a Communist-orlonted confer-
ence of South American trade unions (p, 2). The investigating committee
of the Organization of American States is now studying the Caribbean
situation (p. 2).
NORTHERN AREA: In British Eendurat civil disorders may develop into a
general strike accompanied by (p. 3).
CEN1MAL AREA: Colombia's government is extending its influence with
labor (p. 3).
SPECIAL SUBJECTS
The Current Situation in Bolivia
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:klar Contributions, WIA
TA Work:1.113 Paper)
24 January 1950
1 GENERUI Cammunist-oriented South American Trade Union Conference
ra-derweive-in Mon vi mmunis or n ? eou h
American trade unions being organized by Roberto Morena,
Brazilian Communist member of the ConfederaciOn de Trabajadores de la
Amirica Latina (CML) executive committee. Its avowed purpose is to
renew waning South American trade-union interest in the CTAL; to
develop union interest in the trades departments of the World Federa-
tion of Trade Unions (WFTU); and to counteract the Influence of the
ConfederaciOn Interamerioana de Trabajadores (CIT). Although the
conference is said to be tentatively scheduled for the first week of
March 1950, past CL-sponsorod conferences were in process of
organization for much longer periods; consequently, it does not
appear likely that this conference will take place before June,
2# Ok3 Investi ation of the Caribbean Situation
he investiga ing c6M-E-7-ap-poler-e-d-Tit-ret' Chairman of the
provisional organ of consultation under the Rio treaty (see D/LA
10 Jan 50) has initiated the second step of its task in leaving for
the Caribbean in order to complete the taking of testimony in Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Guatemala regarding disputes in
that area. Prior to its departure, the committee (composed of the
representatives to the COO of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, the United
States, and Uruguay under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jose; Mora of
Uruguay) had taken the first step, namely the hearing of teetimopy in
Washington, The fact that many prominent officials testified (including
the Haitian Foreign Minister, two special representatives from the
Dominican Republic, Ambassador Quell of Cuba, and Sebastiin Rodriguez
Lora, the Dominican charge in Haiti at the tine of the recent plot
against the Haitian government) indicates the importance attached to
the investigative body. The IntereAmerican Peace Committee has made
its records relative to the Cuban-Dominican altercation (D/LA Wkly,
4 Jan 50) available to the new body which will examine extensively
the whole Caribbean situation, studying the Haitian and Dominican
charges separately. It is noteworthy that, in addition to the three
parties directly interested in the disputes under the terms of the
Rio treaty namoly Cuba, the Dominican Republics and Haiti --
Guatemala? which has not ratified the treaty but was named as an
interested party by the Doudnican Republic, has asked the committee
to include Guatemala. in its itinerary.
D/L& believes it probable that after the committee has care-
fully investigated all charges presented to it the Council of OAS,
acting in its capacity as provisional organ of consultation under
article 12 of the Rio treaty, will be able to handle the entire case,
thus making a meeting of the foreign ministers unnecessary. The
possibility of such a meeting remains, however, should the investi-
gating committee discover that very serious threats to the peace exist
in the Caribbean, and that the sanctions envisioned in the treaty would
hams to be imposed.
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Weekly Contributions, WLA. 24 January 1950
(CA Working Paper)
3. BRITISH HONDURAS: Civil Disorders
6-71,WaoiiTiurrrations against the government may
develop into a general strike accompanied by considerable violence.
These disturbances are symptomatic of the territory's acute economic
distress. Mass unemployment has resulted from the virtual collapse
of the two leading industries, lumber and chicle. Crops and livestock
have been decimated by a disastrous drought. The situation has been
aggravated by a rise in the cost of living following revaluation of
the local currency (fl/LA Wkly, 3 Jan 50). Further, the government has
announced that price controls will be imposed in February, infuriating
the merchants. I
Such disorders would also provide Guatemala with propa-
ganda with which to press its claims to the territory. (Substance in
CIA Wkly? 20 Jan 50.)
14. COLOMBIA: Dissolution of CTC Expected
--.1%71liiro.,?':ngcrAUrernanii attempting, with some success,
to increase its intluence with labor by moving against the Liberal
sponsored Colombian Workers' Confederation (CTC? a CTAL affiliate),
by encouraging the church-and-Conservative-sponsored Colombian Workers'
Union IUTC)0 and by issuing pro-labor legislation. Apparently the
final stage of the administration's campaign against the CTC is
approaching. The court action to dissolve the CTC (see D/LA Wk1y,
13 Sep 49) has been held in abeyance until the terms of Liberal mem-
bers of the court of appeals expire. Furthermore, it is expected that
the Conservative judge who heard the case will render a decision adverse
to OTC, which will be upheld by the court of appeals, On the other
hand, the U7C, which was officially recognized last fall, (see D/LA
Wkly, 27 Sep 49) has reportedly increased its already substantial
membership.
It now seems possible to delineate the pattern for coming
labor developments. DILA estimates that, after the dissolution of MC,
the UTC will probably continue to gain members. UTC is expected to make
minimum use of strikes and other forms of labor federation preasure;
the government will probably grant benefits to labor as political
expediency any dictate.
Although the substitution of the UTC for the Communist-
affiliated C7C maybe advantageous to US security interests the
Increasing government control over labor and consequent limitation of
checks on arbitrary or dictatorial government action is contrary to
-such interests.
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
Situaticn Memorandum 4-50
The Current Situaticn in Bolivia
ee January 1950
(Summary,-- The government has lost further political strength.
The economic situaticn has continued to deteriorates principally
as a result of a drop in the price of tin* The .rmy has made
further gains in pclitical influence. While the strongest sub-
versive group, the MR, has stepped up its revolutionary activi-
ties against the government, the other principal subversive
group, the PIR, has not increased its revoluticnary potential.
Bolivia's relations with the other Latin American republics
remain substantially unchanged.
-- US security interests have been affected to some
degree by recent Bolivian events. Generally unfavorable factors
include the continued weakness of the Bolivian government, its
increasing economic difficulties, the doubt as to the 4.,rmy"s
policies, and the,failure of the Bolivian Congress to ratify
the Rio and Bogota treaties or to approve the dollar debt
settlement plan.)
Political
The government has lost further strength despite its apparent
success in controlling a revoluticnary attempt by the VeR by the reime
position of a state of siege on 14 January* This loss has resulted
principally fro?: the disaffection of the -rmy based on its reaction to
the government's ineffectiveness, particularly in dealing with a
deteriorating economic situaticn, and to its continued inability to form
a democratic coalition government. The government has also been weakened
by the following factors: continued dissension within the government
party (PUSR); the setbacks suffered by the PUSR in the recent municipal
elections; charges of administrative malfeasance, graft, corruption,
and mistreatment of political prisoners; and b; the almost total lack
of accomplishment by the congress in its ordinary session which ended
on 15 December. Since it is unlikely that the democratic parties wile.
twee effectively and since there is considerable doubt as to the
achievements of the special session of congress in relation to the pro-
blems created by the expected decline in nnticnal and governmental
income, D/LA estimates that the government eill become increasingly
dependent on army support during the coming mcnths. .As the 4rmy's
influence increases, its attitude toward the ?TR becomes more important.
There is as yet no clear indicaticn as to this attitude, but it is
possible that the high command may entertain the idea of a modus vivendi
with the MNR, which -- if effeetive -- would reduce tension but might?
change the real character of the governeent,
Econonic
Bolivia's ecoeomic eituaticn hen further eeteriorated during the
past three ma-the, principaLly as a result of a 25 cent drop in the
price of
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Weekly Contributions, fl/LA - 2 - 24 January 1950
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 4-50
December). Tin mining operations have already been reduced; and greater
reaueizonf are expected, which will cause lessened income for the nation
and for the Bolivian government, which obtains most of its revenue from
taxes on tin exports. Corollary to these effects will be increased
pressure on Bolivia's domestic and foreign exchange budget and, ultimately,
possible labor troubles as mining companies find it necessary to reduce
personnel. Since world production of tin is increasing and US stockpiling
funds are reduced for fiscal 1951, Bolivia's tin prospects -- and there-
fore prospects for a measure of general prosperity -- appear to be
extremely poor.
Attempts by the Bolivian government to meet this situation have been
limited thus far to foreign exchange concessions to the mining companies
and to consideration of the feasibility of relaxing general exchange con-
trols. The concessions granted the mining companies do not seam to be
adequate to exercise any great influence on Bolivia's competitive posi-
tion in the metals markets and the devaluation program is still in the
conference stage -- except for certain piece-meal shifts of commodities
from one exchange category to another. What little has been done has
been by the executive authority as the Bolivian Congress adjourned until
1 February without approving the 1950 budget or making any of the needed
economic reforms suggested. It also failed to pass legislation for the
vital petroleum industry, which holds the greatest promise as a factor
which might insulate the economy from the effects of unfavorable develop-
ments in the metals situation. D/LA estimates, therefore, that it is
unlikely that the government and the congress will take adequate measures
within the next few months to prevent the Bolivian economic situation
from becoming even more serious.
Military
the army has increased its political influence, a trend first
noticeable in December when ea army group forced the government to
replace the incumbent army commander-in-chief with General Ovidio
Quiroga and to oust the army chief of staff. A now indication of the
extent of the army's influence is its reported ultimatum to President
Urriolagoitia regarding the cabinet. The promotions of three brigadier
generals and ten colonels in December, reportedly as a result of army
pressure, followed by the annual promotion list of the army and the
national police, have had little effect on army morale. Some progress
has been made in the reorganization of the air force, but the army
remains the only effective fighting force. The Growing political
influence and restiveness of the army constitute a possible threat to
the stability of the government.
Subversive
The MIR, the strongest subversive group in Bolivia, has resumed
its revolutionary activities and reportedly attempted outbreaks on
24 December and 13 January, which the government forestalled. If the
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reekly Contributions, D/A
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Memorandum 4-50
- 3 - 24 January le'e)
economic situation continues to deteriorate, D/L A estimates that popular
discontent and army disaffection may well ploy into the hands of this
militant group, whose revolutionary time-table SOOMA to have been
accelerated rather than retarded as a result of the failure of its all
-
cafe attempt in August.
The Pill has demonstrated its usual strength in Cochabamba where
it won eight out of twelve seats on the City Council despite an internal
schiam over the questions of acknowledging its Communist ties and
cooperating with the MNR. Further, the 8 December decree issued by the
shop of Cochabamba, excommunioeting all Catholics who retain membership
in the PIR, has had little apparent effect on its membership as yet.
Nevertheless, the PIR's ability to subvert the government continues to
depend upon its ability to unite with other groups, toward which goal
it has made no reported progress to date.
Communism has made no significant gains in recent months.
International
official relaticns with the US centinue to be cordial,
and the attitude of the Bolivians toward the US has improved since the
last large-scale revolt (Aug 49). Although the Bolivian Congress
approved the Bretton Woods Agreemeq in the session just ended, its
failure to ratify the Rio and Bogota treaties and to approve the dollar
debt settlement plan is of concern to the US. With regard to the Arias
regime In Panama, Belivia has displayed its usual reluctance to recog-
nise a regime established by force. Although Bolivia's relations with
Argentina are officially friendly, the Bolivian public remains generally
distrustful of Argentine intentions. The increasing friendliness of the
relations between Bolivia and Spain are indicated by the elevation of
the Bolivian Legation in Madrid to an Embassy and by the appointment of
ex-President Hartzog as Ambassador to that capital.
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