WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200040009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 29, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Yee Contributions
Latin America vis on . CIA
29 November 19f49
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
NORTH= AREA: In Martinique., repent election results show a decline
in Communist influence (p. 2).
C.EtdTRAL AREA: Brazil is reported to have obtained permission from
the International Manetarg Fond to withdrew $22.5 million (p, 2).
In zil, the resignation of party leader Nereu Raw s u-ay split
the government party (P. 3). In Venezuela, Communist influence may
increase in oil workersI syndicates (P. 3).
SOUTH= AREA: Peru's government has offered Communists a "none
aggression" pact (P. 4).
The ~v SPECIAL SUBJECTS
?phe
T Current Situation in urag. a . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . 5
The Current In _ `r--American Situation . s e 7
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Li
I i DI LAS S!^!SD
CLASS. VICEW DAT TO: 7S S
NEXT F;E VaEW DATE:
A111"K
DAT)6- REVIEWER: 372044
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o ]pan
mw-an
Weakly Contributions, DA 29 November 194,
(CIA Working Paper)
1. VARTlQUE: Communists Lose PplaI on
_ October nera ouncz (legislature) elections
In ?6artinique, the Communists polled 4O% of the popular vote and
elected 10 of the 36 Councilors as opposed to 67% of the vote and
15 seats in the previous (1945) elections. While the election results
indicate that the Communists are still a potent force, they also dem-
onstrate the gradual but steady decline in Communist strength in
Martinique during the past two years (see D/LA Wkly 26 Jul 1i9).
The election results can be attributed in large measure
to the fact that Communists have not participated in metropolitan
French Governments for some time, This fact has enabled the pro--
Socialist French Prefect to weaken the Conmunistsf position by re-
apportioning the electoral cantons in a manner decidedly unfavorable
to the Communists., by suppressing their attempts at strong-arm methods
of influencing the electorate, and by effecting an anti-Communist
coalition among the formerly mutually antagonistic non-Communist
splinter parties. Further, the Com=ists came before the electorate
virtually empty-handed, while their opponents could point to such
benefits as the French National Aseemblyas recent extension of full
social security to the overseas departments,, An additional factor
in the Communists' decline undoubtedly was the direct intervention
in the campaign, for the first time in any years, of the Roman Cath-
olic Church which reminded "its faithfuls that those who favor Communism
may not be admitted to the sacraments.
The elections are not a completely accurate index of
Communist political strength inasmuch an the total vote represents
only about one-half of the number of registered voters, and because
fraudulent electoral practices are prevalent. It is apparent, however,
that even though the present trend could be reversed rapidly by the
renewed participation of Communists in the metropolitan Government,
Communist influence in Martinique is on the decline at least for the
present.
2. BRAZIL: The International Monts Fund ants Brazil permission to
w 5million, according to a press. This money
will be allocated to a payment of Brazil's commercial backlog, which
is estimated to be in excess of US$100 million. D/LA estimates that,
with the aid of this loan, the increased income of dollars because of
the current high price of coffee (which is expected to remain high for
at least one to two more years), and continued strict adherence to the
Import-export regulations, Brazil should be able, by January, to place
much of its commercial debt payments on a currents basis. D/IA estimates
further that this improved financial condition will enable Brazil to
relax its controls on imports from dollar countries during the second
half of 1950.
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Weekly Contributions, D/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
29 November 1949
A serious lit in the government r result from the
resignation Nereu Ramos as lea o the Parts o Social Demooratico
(PSD). Ramos, who had hoped to receive the government nomination as
presidential candidate, resigned when the party directorate decided
to select its candidate from a list of four Minas Gerais PSD leaders.,
a solution believed to be agreeable to the Unioo Democratica Nacional
(UDN) and the Fartido Republicano (PR). The "Minas solution" was the
one advocated by President Dutra (who has consistently urged his party
to join with the ON and the PR in the selection of a joint candidate)
despite the opposition of the pro-Vargas wing of the Party led by
Ramos. Since the pro-Vargas faction is still strong, Ramos' resigna-
tion may lead to a serious split in the party which would redound to
the benefit of the principal non-government candidate, Governor
Adhemar de Barros of Sao Paulo. If Governor Barros actually has an
electoral agreement with Getulio Vargas (as he has privately asserted
to a US official), it is even possible that the disgruntled Ramos may
take his followers into Barros' camp, a development that could well
insure the election of the very candidate against whom the government
coalition is aimed.
.
VENEZUELA: Possibility of Increas Communist Influence in Petroleum
Workers $ ca ems
The former ceion nocr+ tica-controlled, or "blue",
petroleum workers' syndicates in Lagunillas, San Lorenzo, and 2Mene
Grande (Western Venezuela) have given increasing evidence of willing-
ness to collaborate with the Communist "red" unions, a CIA source
reports. The "red" and "blue" syndicates in this area have been
jointly presenting claims to the oil companies, and on 7 October 1949
the Union de Obreros y EWleados Petroleros (UOEP) and the Sindicato
de Trabajadores Petroleros (STP), "blue" and "red" unions respectively
of Lagunillas, issued a joint manifesto attacking the Union Republ.ieana
Democratica (URD) party, which is currently attempting to establish a
third syndicate in. the area.
Until recently., the "blue' syndicates have resisted Commu-
nist pressure for collaboration, but now two factors appear to be.
drawing the "blue" syndicates closer to the Communists. The threat
of a third union in the area sponsored by the URD party offers ample
justification for collaboration. Secondly., the collective labor
contracts now in force can for discussions of wage scales, salaries,
and commissary agreements in February 1950. In such discussions, the
"blue" syndicates will be at a distinct disadvantage because they have
been permitted to function only as local units since the abolition of
their federation last February. Lacking the strong bargaining position
inherent in a federation of their own, the "blue" syndicates may find
it expedient, if not necessary, to work with the only existing petro-
leum federation, the Communist Coraiti Sindical Unitario do Trabajadores
Petroleros de Venezuela (COSUTRAPET).
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E N TIAL
Weekly Contributions, D/IA 29 November 1949
(CIA Working Paper)
Evidence of a tendency towards cooperation has thus far
been limited to areas where the "red" and "blue" unions have roughly
equal membership. It is probable that In such areas as Tia Juana
and Qabimaa, where the strength of the "blue" unions is preponderant,
a more independent position will be maintained. D/LA estimates that,
unless the government permits the "blue" unions to reorganize a federa-
tion of their own, these micro will find It necessary to collaborate
increasingly with the Communist unions, thereby facilitating the
realization of syndioal unity which would greatly widen the scope of
potential Communist influence.
5. PERU s Government Offer to Communists
rea-m has secre offered Peruvian Communists a
"non-aggression" pact,, providing for tolerance of Communist activities,
although not fo legalization of their party.. in exchange for covert
Communist support for the military junta. Negotiations have not ad-
vanced very far, because the orthodox Communist group is very doubtful
of the governm ent f s good faith.
While this offer illustrates the opportunistic character of the
Odr{a regime and raises a serious question regarding the extent to
which Odrta would be a reliable al3y of the US, it must also be. recog-
nized that the present Peruvian government rightly regards APRA as its
most important domestic enemy against which all support is welcome.
The fact that Peruvian Communists at this time do not represent arty
considerable threat to US security interests is also a circumstance
that makes the government offer less significant than it otherwise
might have been. Thus, D/IA finds that the truce offer is essentially
a reflection of the juntas immediate need for popular backing, sig-
nificant mainly in the local, rather than in the international,
setting. D/IA estimates that, despite possible improvement in the
Party's position, Peruvian Communism will not become dangerous within
the short term; any increase in the Communist potential, however,
could very wall be of serious concern to US security interests in
the longer term.
"'D ENTIAAM
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situation Memorandim u 67-49
The Current Situation in Urugu
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29 November 1949
( -r The Battle Berres government remains stable. The coun-
try s economio position has improved since the raid year slump. The
armed forces continue to support the goverment, Comm i.stsi continue
to exert more influence among intellectual groups than among the
masses. There has been no significant change in Uruguayo s relations
with other countries.
--- None of the current developments in Uruguay adversely
affects US security interests.)
Political
e atlle Berrea governu nt remains stable despite strong pressures
and various criticisms leveled against it quite consistently by the
Berrerista opposition party and occasionally by the minority groups of
the Colorado party. Cabinet resignations, some provoked by Herrerista
censure and others by Colorado factionst maneuverings, have been numerous.
Six out of nine ministers have resigned within six months. Criticisms
from mangy quarters concerning the govermrm ient0 s. economic and financial -
as well as political -- policies created an atmosphere of slight uneasiness
and dissatisfaction which was relieved only recently when general economic
conditions began to show some improvem at. Pressures and criticisms are
certain to continue to an increasing degree as part of the pre-election
maneuverings. Although the elections will, not take place until Novembeer,
1950, evidence Of political tension is already discernible and msy be
expected. to increase progressively during the coming year. The stability
of the present administration, however, will not be seriously affected by
such activities., which are considered normal political maneuverings.
;Economic
T `-rug e s economic position has improved considerably since a mid-
year slump, The market for wool, the country0a most important source of
dollar exchange., is again active after mi.d--year sluggishness which had
caused concern. The sales of meat, next in importance to wool as a source
of income, are maintaining a satisfactory level. Basic exports have not
been affected by a modification of the exchange system, which occurred
after Great Britain and Argentina had devalued; only a few secondary ex-
ports are affected, their competitive position having been improved by
their having bssn assigned a more favorable exchange rate In the multiple-
rate system.
In general, the economic outlook for the intermediate term is favorable.
Uruguayyan. exports will probably continue at the present satisfactory level
during the remainder of the calendar year but the total value of exports
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Weekl py Contributions, B/IAA
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Situation Memorandum 67--49
29 November 19149
for the year 1949 is expected to be ten percent less than in l918 As a
result, Uruguay will probably have a deficit in its balance of inter--
national payments for 19149. This was not unexpected, however., and current
favorable developments may, at the end of the year,, be found to have reduced
the amount of the deficit to a point lower than that for 1948. Prospects
for wool sales are good, and a new meat contract with Great Britain assures
Uruguay of a share of that market at prices equivalent to those paid Arc?gen-
tins. The market for hides and skins has been strengthened by increasing
sales to France and Germany, who were important customers before the wary.
Uruguay~e economic controls should help to improve the general economic
situation as they have limited imports from dollar areas and at the same
time have encouraged sales to sterling areas. A strict system of quantita-
tive controls will probably keep imports from the US to the desired level
during the remainder of 19149 while a series of trade agreements with Sweden.
Italy, and Western Germany, added to a long list of previous agreements,
should facilitate commerce with those areas.
Military
die Uruguayan armed forces continue to support the government, There
is no evidence of army participation in politics or of any plans by the
military to overthrow the Batile Berres government.
Subversive
"communists continue to exert more influence among intellectual groups
than among the masses. They have sent delegates to all important interna-
tional Coromtnist congresses but have been forced - for financial. reasons to postpone for the fourth time their national. congress. It is doubtful
that the congress will be held in late November as scheduled.
International
There Figs been no significant change in Uruguay vs relations with other
countries. In general the government"s friendly attitude toward the US
prevails despite the annoyances and embarrassment caused by the last-minute
awarding of a substantial meat contract to Argentina, the closing of the
US Naval Attache office in Montevideo, and the curtailment of US Military
Attache activities and personnel. Participation in UN activities has gener-
ally followed the US line, and the US-Uruguay Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Economic Development was finally signed. Relations with Argentina are
somewhat strained but have shown signs of improvement in recent months.
,r . T1AL
SS.E,CL'?-- 6.
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CO "*~NTIAL
Weekly Contributions, D/M
(CIA Working Paper)
Situation Mn:orandum 6'4L9
29 November 1949.
Ths t Xnte -American situation
(s -- There ham been no signi toant recent developments
Innt aa-~Mmisphere organisational affairs; The mach1noery of
OAS and of recent a nisei -American treaties for the maintenance
of the peace of the Hemisphere has been tested, bit not to
the oxtM6 necessAT7 to provide a clear-cut indication of
their of#ectiveise% ni feeling exists among several Latin
Anerioan countries tAhich, 1I some oases, has even involved
the sorerance of dip].at aiie rentions. C rierally speaking,
countries in Latin Amerioa cou'vinue to support ITS policies
in world affairs,, Although they are disappointed by what
they 'Onsider ids neglOot of the economic needs of the Western
1~emieph~e.
~~- Inter-Axerican solidarity has, if anything,
deteriorated recently, other US security interests, however,
an not seriously affected. )
Inta?a-Hemipphere Issues
OAS and inter-Aftrinari treaties: The on3Fy recent development of
nom . ire s en the minor incident caused by the public state-
ment of its Secretary General, br, Alberto L1eras Cana=go, deploring
the disturbing political situation, existing in his native country,
Colombia. Despite coisiderabie actirlty by the OAS since its creation
at Bogota in 1948, the Charter remains unratified by the great majority
of American states (1v xico, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic are.
the only ones which have deposited ratification)., and activities are
caxried on by virtue of Res. XL of the Final Act of Bogota which pro-
vided for the provisional functioning of the Charter until its ratifi-
cation had been completed.
The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio.Tr.eaty) has been
ratified by-s .xteon American nations and has been in force since Decer6er
1948; it as invoked during the same month by costa Rata in its dispute
with Nicaragua, The American treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes
of 1949 (Pact of Bogotg) has been ratified by only Mexico and Costa
Rica, but Nicaragua has agreed to be boimd by it an = 7 dispute with
Costa Rica as a result of the Pact of Ftiondship be- seen the two counn-
-tries signed 21 February 1;049.
The failure of five nations (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala,
and Peru) to ratify the fio Treaty wo kens its effectiveness, and these
states, with the possible exception of Ecuador, have given little evidence
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Situation Memorandum 64.9
29 November 1949
of intent to ratify in the wear future. The failure on the part of
the great majority of American states,, including the US, to deposit
their ratifications of the Pact of Bogota made certain nomtbers of
CCAS reluctant to use it in the most recent Costa Rican-.iicaraguan
controversy. As a result, neither the invocation of the Rio T'x'eaty
nor the attempted invocation of the Pact of I3ogota demonstrated any
great strength on the part of our inter-Araerioan machinery, and US
security, to the extent that it depends upon this machinery for unity
in the Western Hemisphere, will continue to be vulnerable in the event
of future disturbances.
Relations among American states: Revolutionary changes in govern-
ment or charges of ix ervent -M-InTntornal affairs made by some nations
against others have caused strained relations between certain members of
OAS, and in some cases even diplomatic breaks. Panama has not been
recognized by the US; Colombia has not resumed normal relations with
Paraguay; Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, and Uruguay have not recognized
the Venezuelan Junta; Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, and Uruguay have not
accepted the legitimacy of the Peruvian military government; and Bolivia,
Chile, and Uruguay have not restored to normalcy their diplomatic rela-
tions with El Salvador since the recent revolution. The whole atmosphere
of tension existing in the Caribbean - of which the disputes between
Costa Rica and Nicaragua and between Raiti and the Dominican Republic
have been symptomatic - has also resulted in ruptured or strained diplo-
matic relations between the Dominican Republic and four of its neighbors,
Costa Rica,, Cuba, Guatemala, and Haiti, as well ae bet men Guatemala and
Nicaragua.
This situation has created a decided breach in Western Hemisphere
solidarity and has weakened the US security.positioa in the area. Many
of these countries feel that the US policy of recognition of governments
which have come into being through force is not in accordance with the tra-
ditional US policy of encouraging democracy in the Hemisphere.
Extra-Hemisphere Issues
UNN and necialized agencies: Generally speaking, Latin American
countries can nue osupp orb policies in the UN when issues hinge on
some aspect of the East-West struggle; hovmver, in other matters, these
countries often agree in their caucus to sponsor a program which may not
in every instance accord with the position assumed by the US. For example,
on the question of the disposition of the Italian colonies, the Latin
American countries formed an effective bloc and managed to get some of
their views accepted in the UN. Their interest in and sympathy for
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Situation memorandum 6&-49
colonial peoples have made them more outspoken than the US in the
Trusteeship Committee; this sometimes embarrasses the US in its rela-
tions with Western European colonial powers. These differences between
the US and Latin America, however, do not appreciably impair US security.
Latjn.American nations have been very interested in the. work of the
specializod agencies of the UN because they hope to obtain help from,
them organizations in developing their economies. They have, however,
taken issue with the US on certain economic matters dealt with by these
agencies. These countries want to industrialize and feel that they can
not do this unless it is possible to protect industry in its embryonic
state; therefore, the majority of Latin American countries have not
supported the US in its campaign to lower trade barriers. This divi-
sion of opinion on the approach to a vital world economic problem,
coupled with the failure of the US to make extensive loans to Latin
America in the posh period, and the consequence of that failure in
terms of Latin American attitudes':-Ftoward the US, will continue to obstruct
the full realization of.US international economic policy objectives dur-
ing the coming months.
Relations with nations outside the Western Hemisphere: Spain: At the
third sass ono the , o iv , Colombia, Brazil., and Peru joined to
sponsor a resolution to allow full freedom of action as regards diplomatic
relations with Spain. Although the DA did not adopt this resolution,
Brazil and Peru have resumed their normal diplomatic relations with Spain.
Others, such as Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay: and Venezuela, either had normal relations
or had completed preparations for a return to normalcy before the vote
in the GA. Venezuela has not actually dent an ambassador as yet. In
this matter, Latin American countries took the lead rather than waiting
for the US. US security interests, however, are not affected.
ico, Uruguay,
USSR: At the present. time, only Argentina, Cuba, Me
and Venezuela have representatives in Moscow, although some of the smaller
countries have technical diplomatic relations. Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,
which broke with .the USSR within the past two years, have taken no steps
to renew relations. None of the Latin American countries., however, is
expected to exploit its relations with the USSR in such a may as to impair
US security interests.
Sup port ofiortant US, forei oli.cies : The vast majority of Latin
American nations continues to stand behind the US in its cold war with the
USSR and to support EGA and the Atlantic Pact. While they realize that
Europe and Asia are much more crucial in the East-West struggle, they still
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Situation iemorandum 69-149
29 November 1949
are of the opinion that the VS should give more consideration, bspecia11r
along economic lines, to its neighbors in the Hemisphere since it, is to
the interest of the OS that a politically democratic and econom?cal9y
sound Latin America exist. Such attitudes on the part of Latin America
weaken our intro-Hemispheric policies and US security in that area,
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