WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA DIVISION, ORE, CIA 18 OCTOBER 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200040003-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 18, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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teekcly Contributions CIA
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18 October 1949
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CENTRAL BrkNCH: Both of 2ratts prospective presidential candidates
are reported to be friendly to the US (F. 2). In Brazil pressures for
devaluation can be oxpected from textile manufacturers (p, .1olom1)1als
Conservative party has selected an anti?US candidata for president (p, 2).
The death of Fcuadorts vice president is not likely to rose any sorious
problems for the government (p, 3).
SOUWERN BTZANCH: Argentinats now minister of the army is reported to
favor the US (p. 3). Chile,s prospects for stability will be improved
by the recent Eximbank credit extended to that country (p. I'eruts
military junta, which is now makinE election arran7enent, evidently
considers itself strong enough to control the outcome (p. 3).
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"Neekly Contributions, D/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
18 October 19249
1. BRAZIL: War Minister Likely to be Government Candidate for President
After some months of negotiations, the major pro-eovernment
parties (the PSD, the UDN, and the PR) still have not agreed on a
presidential candidate, and the basic conflicts of party interests
continue to be a serious obstacle in spite of the need to present a
united front against the potent candidacy of Governor Adhemar de
Barros of sao Paulo.
Under the circumstances, it appears that only if the govern-
ment parties can agree on sone "non-political" military figure will
they have a good chance of uniting and thus retaining the numerical
advantage which their- combined voting strength represents. At the
present time the most likely choice for a coalition candidate is
7tar Minister General Canrobert, who, although lackinE, in popular
appeal, has in his favor the supoort of a majority of the nation's
high military leaders. Both Canrobert and Adheeer de Barros are
friendly to the US,
2. Brazil's official resistance to devaluation was further eel-
denc41-7672-76toberb'i-------:its resumption of quotations on the
pound sterling and other devalued currenciee at rates 30% lower than
those existing prior to 18 September. Continued pressure for devalu-
ation or alteration of the par value of the cruzeiro by the textile
industrialists can be expected, however, as their products, sold
primarily to soft-currency countries, will not be able to compete fa-
vorably in price with the textiles of certain of those countries,
Should Brazil find it necessary to revalue its currency at a later
date, it mould probably establish a system of multiple exchange rates
rather than an outright devaluation.
3. COLOMBIA: Anti-US Presidential Candidate Selected le Conservatives
niCrel-167761767,7671767707E1 Conservative Party since t e
early 130fs, has been selected by that party as its candidate for
the presidential election to be held 27 November 1)10, Gomez has
been openly hostile to the US since 1921 -- the year of the acrimo-
nious debates on the US-Colombia treaty on Panama. During -rorld.
War II he ceased denunciations of the US only when it became clear
that the Axis was losing the War. He has been consistently pro-Nezi
and pro-Franco.
Should. Gomez be elected, internal political tension would
be aggravated since Gomez, a Conservative extremist, is violently
disliked by many Colombiane. US ability to count on Colombia's
cooperation in international matters would be weakened; opposition
to US principles of international trade would be greater; and chances
of eliminating present obstacles to the expansion of the petroleum
industry would be diminished.
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Weekly Contributions, 1)/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
14.
18 October 1949
ECUADOR: The death of Vice President Ilanuel Sotosa or Luna
Oc ober occurring while congress was in session, has
saved the gpvernment from an embarrassing situation. Had Sotomayor
died after congress adjourned, the anti-Plaza President of the
Chamber of Deputies, Augusto Alvarado (flea, would have succeeded
to the vice presidency. Under the present circumstances, congress
will select a successor. At the time of Sotomayor's heart attack
(26 July), the government did not have the support of congress
(see D/LA Wkly., 9 August '49) and his possible death was then con-
sidered a grave threat to the administration's stability. Events
subsequent to the earthquake have greatly improved the president's
position vis-a-vis congress, and D/LA estimates that the selection
of a successor is not likely to pose any serious problems for the
government.
5. ARGENTINA: Drisadier General Pranklin Lucero stron l uro-Peron
ecre ary o tie A. has been a ointed rinister
of the Army, a posftion temporarily hele unti this time by Deiense
Minister Sosa olina. Lucero's close ties with Peron and Sosa
his long association with other top-level Army and political leaders,
and his reported admiration for the United States, probably will re-
sult in this appointment's proving favorable both to the stability of
the Peron government and to US-Argentine relations.
6, CHILE: The 25 million dollar ISxiMbank credit extended to Chile comes
at a very opportune time or the Chilean government. The
loan will assist in financing 1949 purchases from the US of materials
necessary for the continuation of Chile's economic development pro-
gram. Continuation of the program may be expected to result in a
stepping up of employment, which in turn should reduce popular dis-
content over the sradually deteriorating economic situation. There-
fore, it is likely that, by assuring certain benefits to the Chilean
economy, the loan nay provide a slight improvement to the general
stability of the Gonzalez sovernment.
7.? PERU: Possible Election
tecent reports indicate that General Odria, head of Peru's
governing military junta, is endeavoring to arrange natters so that
an election may be held within the next six months, possibly in
March 1950. Not only did Odria issue a decree providins for the
re-registration of all voters (a convenient means of pursing the
rolls of Apristas and others), but he is also reported to have reached
an agreement with exsPresident Prado by which Odria or his designate
mould be named president until the expiration of the present consti-
tutional term in 1951 when Prado would be free to seek the office, for
himself. Whether or not this asreement actually exists, it is prob-
able that the election, when held, will be only for members of a
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!ieek1r Contributions, 1)/LA l Dctober 1949
(CIA 7;orking Paper)
cOnstitutional asse7blywhich w111 atend the ccnstitution, designate
a president for the country., and then resolve itself into a con]rc:s.
This procedure, conforming to Peruvian practice in similar previous
situations, would avoid the embarrassment of electin,:, another presi-
dent for 2ustamante's unexpired tern under the tems of the sane
constitution that sanctioned Bustamante's ropular election.
the holdinc; of any election IrK) be considered a ,-,esture
towards fulfillin certain demoeratic and constitutional require-
xents, the democratic effects ?)f tnis election in Pcru cannot be
expected to be very :Teat. The lax-mast political zreup? Al'Al will
be disenfranchised, and strict controls will probably be used to
insure the election of an assembly a:reeablo to the objectives of
the present military junta. 111e principal si:nificance of the elec-
tions would be to demonstrate that Lhe if5 stronL. enou:h to
risk an election and to co/FA-A iLi lte)MC,
?
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