WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA BRANCH, ORE, CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200030006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 9, 1949
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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!eeky Contributions
Latin caHznoi,qa
9 August 19149
CURRENT D
Di
PEEMS
CENTRAL Davls/m4 Death of serio4r ill Ecuadoran Vice President
Sotiumgyorr Luna would mean a crisis for the Masa administration
(13. 2). The UK-Brasil trade agreement avoids features the US
termed objectionable in the UK-Argentine agreement (p, 2).
SOUTHERN DIVISION; 0.,...sitiono-par4r activity is a fabtor in recent
Argentine moves (p. 2 Closing the US Naval Attach/Os office in
Uruguaravould be a blew to the i government's prestige and damelAS
to US6-UruguAy relations (p. 3).
SPEC/AL SUBJECTS
2a,A1950 Jamaica Elections
?
DOCUMENTNO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
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DECLASSIFIED
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AUTH: IF11703,7
04-52-1- REVIEWER. 37204
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Weekly Contributions, B/LA
(CIA Working Paper)
9 August 19)49
1. ECUADOR: The Plaza administration will be faced with a crisis if
PresIn r- 110 o oraayor y una a onserva ve)
should die of the heart attack induced by the armed attack on his
house during the recent unsuccessful Mancheno coup. His successor
mould be chosen by (convening 10 August) which consists
of three nearly equal groups : Conservatives, the Liberal Socialist
coalition, and the pro-Plaza independents (formerly the ECDN coali-
tion). The governnent consequently holds the balance of power and
will alienate important groups no matter haw it uses this power.
To complicate the situation further, it is anticipated that the
Guayaquil contingent in congress would insist upon the election of
a Guayaquilelio since Sotomgyor is a native of that city. The phy-
sicians attending the vice president report he has a chance to re-
cover, but his condition continues grave.
. BRAZIL: The limitation of the An lo-Brazilian trade aereement to
one yearns pre 3.0 e ee p avo
the long- ern channeling of trade to which the US Department of
State and US business officials objected in the ease of the recently
concluded Anglo-Argentine agreement. While the terns of the new
agreement have not yet been thoroughly-examined, a preliminary
analysis indicates that the amount and pattern of trade between the
two countries will approximate that of the 1910 agreenento
3. ARGENTINA,:
sition A ssiveness a Factor in Administration
Re orms
BM-1,776cent weeks increased aggressiveness of the
RadidaLopposition minority in the Argentine Congress and more
outspoken criticiamby the opposition press have caused the Per6n -
administration to take definite measures to strengthen the position
of the Peronista Party in anticipation of political repercussions
from current economic adjustments and to asenre:it0 succeee in the
1952 elections. The Peronista leadership has undertaken'vigoroue
measures to purge disloyal and incompetent adherents. The adninise.
tration has intensified its efforts to reformandTperganize in it
attack on the politico-economic crisis. Although the Padiee1zpar4
holds less than one-third of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies
(the Senate is entirely Peronista), it has rade impressive gains
in recent provincial elections and it evidently counts on exploit-
ing current difficulties of the regite for its own advantage in the
1952 presidential and congressional elections.
The Radicals and the opposition press have recently
prodded the administration with charges of permitting police to
Oa ?
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Weekly Contributions, EVLA 9 August 1949
(CIA larking Paper)
employ electric needles to torture confessions from criminals and
alleged subversives, laxity in envorcement of immigration rules per-
mitting Nazis to enter the country, and violating freedom of the press.
But most effective have been the recent Radical attacks on IAPI? the
state trading organization, which resulted in a reluctant agreenent
by the congressional majority to an investigation. This organization
was the instrument of Argentina's post-ever high-price international
trade policy -- a policy whichthe US frequently urged the hrgentines
to modify. It is true that Peron 's recent drastic curtailment of the
scope of IAPIls activities and his placing it under the direction of
the Ministry of Economy mas in line tith his new trade policy (see
EVLA Wkly? 26 Jul h9). But both the thoroughness and the timing of
this reform measure appear to have been influenced bye desire to
minimize the political effects of the Radicals' charges against the
institution.
Li. URUGUAY: Clo ? of US Naval Attache's Office
avy 11-13 announCEORMat budgetary limitations
mould force the cloeing of the naval attache office in Montevideo on
30 August and the transfer of its functions to the naval attache in
Buenos Aires brought, according to the US AMbassador? expressions of
"dismay aad disappointment" from the Inspector General of the Uruguayan
Navy, who intimated that the macre would be regarded as US "neglect" of
Uruguay. The official said also that the accrediting of the naval
attache in Buenos Aires to Uruguay as well mould not be particularly
helpful, in view of the present state of Uraguwarr-Argentine relations;
moreover he claimed that the US Secretary of State in 1947 had given
assurances that the office would be maintained and that there was no
time limit to these assurances.
EVLA estimates that the move would be a severe blow to the
Uruguayan government's prestige and damaging to US-Uruguayan relations,
coming as it does immediately after the misunderetanding created by
Urugugy's loss to Argentina of a substantial US meat contract.
3.
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Weekly Contribntions, BVIA
(CIA Working Paper)
Article 16-49
The 1950 Jamed.ca Elections
9 August 1949
The FebruarY 1990 Jamaica general elections following a campaign
that is expected to be bitter and close, may det:rmine the fate of the
proposed British West Indies federation and fix the local-government
attitude toward US wilitary forces in the island, US security interests
in. the Caribbean area will be favored if Alexander Bustamante's Jamaica
Labor Party vans these elections.
The campaign wil center about domestic issues and the personali-
ties of party leaders. Public opinion is at present about evenly divided
between the incunbent Jamaica Labor Party (iLP) -- the personal party of
William Alexander Bustamante ? and the People os National Party (PNP)
under the leadership of Norman Washington Manley. Bath are closely af-
filiated with labor organisations. Bustamante's flamboyancy appeals to
the masses, and his vigorous advooatiy of capitaliem has won him the sup-
port of commerce and the prosperouS planters. Manley's left-wing Soc-
ialist PMP derives its adherentsIra the educated, "riddle and lower
classes who admire Manley's intell genoe and qualities of statesmaaship.
Manley has decried the "dictatorial" regime of,the whioh has been
in powar Sinee 1944, while Bustamante'has labeled the PNP ocammunistic.ft
The Campaign will be bitterly contested, One person has already
been killed and several injured in preliminarY Political skirmishes.
Security forests though apparently adequate to prevent the outbreak of
large-scale die:orders are unable to control scattered disturbances.
The strehgth of tha liPan parties appears evenly matched at present.
Bustamante's reelection chances will be favored, however, if his current
trip to the UN in quest of a long-term UK sugar policy vis-a-vis the
British West Indies results in benefits for Jamaica, and if? as seen
likely, his government can amid raising taxes before the elections.
The outcome of the elections may determine the fate of the proposed
federation of the British West Indies and the nature of Jamaioa's politico
-
economic wean. Vanloy is one of the foremost advocates of a federation
of the British West Indies, while Bustanante, primarily because of his
hatred for Manley, is cool toward the idea. Since Jamaica is the largest,
most populous, and politically nost advanced of the British Caribbean'
colonies, Bustanantels reelection would hinder the federation movement,
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Weekly contributions, p/LA.
(CIA Working Paper)
Article 160-49
9 August 2949
The reelection of BustaManta, who is impaacably hostile to any fora of
eoeialization whatever, would probably discourage any move on the part
of the UX Labor government to nationalize the British lest Indies auger
industry.
US aecurity interests will be favored by Bustamantels reelection.
There is oonniderable anti-US sentiment in ban:lees
among itt color-conscious leaders. The PUP, if elected., would doUbtless
propose and pass resolutions opposing the peacetime presence in Jamaica
of US military forces and imputing aggressive designs against Jamaica
to the US, thereby platting the US in. the position of occupying base
sites with the consent of the UK but in opposition to the expressed
desire of the local government. The disadvantages of continued US oc-
cupation of the base sites under these Circumstances might then outweigh
the benefits. Buetamantets JLP has a consistent record of opposition
to such M.-sponsored resolutions and can be expected to continue this
opposition if reelected.
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