NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 15 MARCH 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 15, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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NEAE EAST/ 14'1/1C/, DIVINiON
OFFICE OF REPOIITS Al:?4D 'ESTIMATES
cENTRIa, INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1.-VDRIUNC PAPER
MAR 15 1950
NOTICE: This dcn s a. NO 1:111.ing pape; VI Di
an official CIA issu.T.ke,i. been rdth
ted -within ORE, but nut with i IAC Agencies.
tepresents cut rInkirg by sPaCilliStS
CIA, anti is desir-fv,id ki use by ofhcrs Gagned
sitni17.1L-orc.,..-2-tlal3pize, Tilt.: opinions
express;qi tivir:;1:;1 my be rer,ii-L,A beioil-er)
and oifictla.1 pub.f..L:1Y41::)n, ItL solely
for the informal:lord ( 41 nhdresse,t., ta!:,,,d not for
further
NO MENT NO. I.P---------.
1N CLASS. 0
DECLA
CLASS. CHANGED S S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: Ailli t70-ZIA.
DATE:L:12v ON_._ REVIEWER: 006
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unT. V Vv. 10
4.0c4xAkit
Y7.7ir Week 1h1r?g
March..-.L.950
--4.bLE Ole liTkiATb
Thunder on the right .
Wing and ultra-rightists bitterly oppose Plastiras
Coalition runors
Imminent mergJr of PRP and DI roderates appear', doubaul
The assault on Riad 3u111 2
Attack on prewier reflocts gcneral dissatisfaction
Anti-Ethtopian bloc disintegrating ,
Independence forces now at only fraction of former trength.
s
11,
_
Nazmara and the preAoz4a140
Demanaa for a nutong urn" vill continue
*NAJfk-,akisn
jJ.
(lehru under fire . , . , .
Patel gi,.oup ikL2.i criical of major lines of po
The Bengal situation .
citoment decramsing at present but area still explos:i.ve
25X6A
Turkey, 5audt AraL4f zsusranalc.G.,
Iran, Africa . 0 4 CJ 4 6
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1?1&;i UI1UiI
GL11;4Cit
tebender212_ etroevee%.ive eautriet coalition
lMd by the b3-year old Republican revolutionary hero, General
nastitas, is encountering bitter opposition from rightist
circles. The three center leader's, Venizelosr Papandreou,
and Plastiras--who appear assured of the support of some
e5-60 perceat of the 250 membees of the new Parliament?have
agreed un a moderato program welch specifically recognizes
the conetitutional posLtien of the Crown and promisee a contin-
uation of a firm prc-Weetern aeel anti-Communist policy. These
guaraatees, however, have not allayed rightist, and specifi-
cally Palace, dietaste for Plestiree, whom Xing Paul sees as
a traditional foe of monarckw, a potential Communist appeasers
and a rival for the strong-mat rola the Xing has envisaged
for flarshal Papagon. The Falece tee already made an unsuc-
cessful attempt eo enliet OD support in thwarting the forma-
tion of the centrist bloc. The Xing ray still try to delay
the appointment of a 7'lastirae Government until just before
the convening of Parliament on 30 Aarch in the hope that
the delay might waken the coalit!,on materialiy, thus noces-
sitating new elections in -which Papagos could participate.
The centrist leaueess nudaUttLin-opared eo work in
harmony on imporeaet nat'Lone0 policies, could expect ade-
quate initial support from Pvrliament. Their coalition,
however, would probably become incroaeingly subject to
undercutting, not only from ;he right wing which, 2ed by
the plurality Populists, vil% control some 30-35 Percent
of the (hamber but aleo from the Communists, who will
probably be able to influence about 10 percent of the new
deputies, including perhp a=call but significant fraction
of Plastiras own backing. In their attempts to fruatrate
and divide the coalition) the opposition may be able to take
advantage of exteenal presoures on the government. The wage-
price issue, Which might weJ1 furnish the government's
first real test la view of the recent sharp rise in infla-
tionary tendenciee, provide. a partieularly good opportunity
for a joint onslaught ou the government by the right wing,
which dominatee the top trade union leadership and the Core
munists, who are currently attempting to encourage labor
=reset. The failure of a cenerLst government under this or
atsy other of the numorous ppee-election stresses would
fteeost certainly leave Greece vit-eoet any otaor viable
governmental combination w%thin the present l'arliament, New
election would then be U4 ienlinent orobabllity, Cale time
under a aajorite system ef voting 94) that a "strong" govern-
ment could more eaelly be f'oread
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MIRMIMPITWIL
oaJLjtjcyi rUUDIV: CUkrWitt Ui ae impending coaon
of the opposition Democratic Peete (DP) and the ruling
People's Republican Party (FRPI probably deserve little
eredence, at least foe the present. Some grounds for a
possible regrouping of Turkey 'e tem major partiee does exiet.
Democratic leader Cele' Bayer, for example, probably feels
R certain sense of feuetrationeover occaeional defectiome by
aome of his more active supportere, who accuse him of arbitrary
leadership and lack of anti-government vigor, and over the ?
adeptness with which the PRP moderates have enacted and taken
the credit for legislation the DP has demanded; he might
veil feel more comfortable enaconeed In the cabinet alongeide
Deputy Prime Minister Heim and other PRP moderates than with
some of the more fiery gentlemen in his own group. A3 for
the PRP, there is even less in =moon between the moderate
wing and such diehards as ex-Premiee Poker than between Bayer
and the malcontents who bave been dropping out of the DP;
a coalition of the moderate element in both parties might
make good political uense. Vevertheless, the factors militat-
ing against a coalition appear Ulu, far to be compelling.
With tho elections nov expecteC to take place in May, Bayer
would hesitate at this late date to riek the alunst certain loss
of much of the DP support he has built up, while the PRP
moderates, mindful of the advantages of having a smoothlr
operating political machine at their disposal, may well be
more tnclined to party regularity than ever. Perhaps all
conceened may prefer to wait and soe how the elections go
before deciding on the advantages or otherwise of any pos-
sible re-alignmente,
1.1BA140-1M
The eesault on Riad 6uth: The unsucceusVul attempt on the
life of Prime Minieter Riad Selh made on 8 Merch can pro-
bably be taken as eymptomatie of the general dissatisfaction
with the government, even though the motives of the would-
be assassin have not been definitely eatablished as political.
Opposition to corruption and dietational methods of the en-
trenched Lebanese Government has been increasing, and various
elements have unsuocessfully advocated a general political
house-cleaning and the holding of new elections. The Inability
of the various anti-government splinter forces to forma
united front has left the oppesition particularly ineffective,
however. Although Zulh's assailant is reportedly a member
of an illegal organization, 'tee 5erian Popular Part yt members
of other groups KayaL b terpted to resort to violence.
The Lebanese Government'a expected efforts to cighten anti-
opposition controi 1LU. probably only make the political pot
boll more violently.
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_Hqi-Tr01.4
Anti-Et41.22141a group,die e le apg; Aecent wholesale
defections from theti-Ethlopiein) Eritrean Independence
Aloe leave the organized independence movement at a fraction
of Its former strength. In part, the falling away of pro-
independence elements refleots a growing realization that
the Italians?who are backing the independence movement, would
eventually dominate an independent Eritrea--an idea ae dis-
tasteful to nationalists as union with Ethiopia. The defec-
tions, however, mainly represent a belief that some sort of .
union with Ethiopia is now inevitable; the majorite of the
Independence Bloc have decideclto jump on the Unionist band-
wagon, hopiog to salvage some eonoessions from Ethiopia
through a compromise plan. Representatives of the hgra Liberal
Unionist Party, composed of Copts and Nbslems who split
from the pro-independence Liberal Progressives have already
been in Addis Ababa for several wke ee reportediy securing
concessions from the Ethiopian. Government; they are said to
have agreed on somethlog simalar to the UB federation plan
euggested during the last General Aesetb1y.
Although the majority of.ie.witreana appear to favor a
loose form of federation with ilthiopia as a workable compromise
plan, the 'ON Commission of Inquiry appeare to be too violently
nplit to come out with a unanimous recommendation to that
effect; the Guatemalan and Pakistani representatives favor
Independence, and the Norwegian, South African, and Burmeee
representatives favor some form of union with Ethiopia. In
any event, however, it will b, up to the GA to make the fin&
decision, and a great deal of oressure can be brought to
bear between 15 June vbet the Commission must deliver its
findings, and SeptemLer, when. the GA meets. Deepite the
Commission's possible split recommendationa? a compromise
favorable to Sthiopia is still likely to be reached in the GA.
Rezmara and the premierehipt The spreading belief of maue
lranians--that their country's economic woes call for strongev
leadership than can be found among the shopworn group of
politicians who have thua far rotated in office--was strikinely
illustrated when 35 members of the Najlie recently called on
Chief of Staff Razmara to urge him to eeek the premiership.
General Razmara, who has recently been proclaiming that
drastic economic, eoelal, aad admenistrative reform is the
only alternative to revolution, gave the deputies a non-
committal reply despiee his peeviouz assertion that be collie
bring order out of oliace eiLhtle six months; in view of the reported
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?
eppositian of the 6han to hie esnendeeyi anuary, when Ise
indicated his availabilite to hued the eovernment, it Is
entikely that Razmara will make tee direct attempts to seek
the premierahip. Indeed, there la considerable question as
to how he fits Into the political picture despite his
eeformist statemente, Ais most better opponents are the
liberal elements of the Dr. Roseedoe group, and hia present
eupport may well come from coneervative members of the ruling
elass wore interested in checkin6 the current disintegration
in Iran that in carrying throue4 the long-range reforme
Aaemara has advocated. Nevertheeesse demands for a "strong
eeln" will undoubtedly increese usiese something drastic is
done to improve Iran's economic.' lot, and (as Razmara may
well hope) the course of events may eventually lead the
Shah to bring his chief of etaff to power.
nehZU vuder fIxe: rrime NJ-alto-se senreee conduct or 1ndi3'8
affairs is evidently encountering strong opposition from
both within and without the government. Recent reports
indicate that Deputy ?rime Minister Patel, supported by a
majority of the cabinet, ha a become sharply critical of
ueveral major aspects of cuerenl Indian policy, reportedly
cnarging that Nehru has (1) toed away the potented bene-
fits of closer ties with the U3 and UK in the unrealiutic
hope that India might achieve lnsting friendship with Com-
munist China and the USSR as weel; (2) failed to make a
eufficiently determined effort to come to term* with Pakietan;
and (3) frightened away foreign and domestic investors with
the spectre of socialism at a time when India has urgent
need of private inveetments aboee and beyond the fundn the
government itself can obtain. Aeanwhile, Nehru is belng
pressed to take a more oe11izer3nt attitude toward Pahletan
be extremist anti-Ebslem elements, notably in West Bengal
and among the Sikh and Punjabi refugees.
These outcroppings 04 oppoki.ltioa Lo Nauru do not proeag,,,,
his fall from power. iatee's &roup, despite the sweeping
nature of its criticises, has been attempting to persuade
she prime minister rathe.o than eo displace him, and, in
general, Nehru seem aeeered o: remaining the outstanding
single influence in the countre unless some catastrophic
development completele discred:.ss the Indian Government.
Nevertheless, this doulae etesek on la:Ls policies has un-
doubtedly shaken a sen s'eo bad hzvcd that his leadership
would be accepted :41oL, tiriy 'wit 11.0 %ndia but throughout Asia.
His current mood iu seeereetly co of frustration and
.11111=li.
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indecision: although he privatela concedes Patel 's contention
taet India has no real friends he stubbornly refuses to change
ii 'oreign policy, and althougi. he arts that capital has
nothing to fear from his government ha fails to support legis-
lation which vould make those assuranees convincing.
That a powerful group in the eaeinet favors a more
realietic Policy--a view which evidentle utens from the aober
fears of the business community about continuing political
and economic tenzion--gives promise treat a more etable and
sore Pro-Western India may eventually emerge. Until and
unless Nehru can be persuaded to cone to terns with Patel 's
groups, however, the present intra-governnental dissention
will dissipate the energie* of Irdia's leaders and will make
the government more vulnerable than ever to pressure from
those who oppose any compromase pith Pakistan.
The,Bengal pituatiohe Excitement over the situation in Bengal,
cuivently the focal point of tenvion between India and Pakistan,
seens to be decreasing for the moment, India, 'which at one
point appeared to be seriously eoneidering the stationing of
troops so that they could easily be sent across the border
to protect at Bengal Hindus, has sent some additional troops
Into the Calcutta area but appears thoroughly aware of the
grave military and International conzequences which an inva-
sion of Pakistan would entail. _Pakistan, for its part,
realizes that it would have little chance of winning the war
Which would ensue.
Tte two Bengals, however, remain a uource of almost
eertain disturbance. Over population, the existence or large
religious minorities In both provinces, and the effect of
economic warfare on their inter-deperdent economaes provide
a strong basis for social unrest; in addition, the Bengalis
are a people noted for a volatile temperament and a predis-
position toward violence, Thus far the persecution of Hindus
has apparently been more 'widespread than the ma/treatment
of their Ebs/em counterparts across the border, and resentment
Is strongest among the West -Sengal hindus. The principal
danger, consequently, is that new anti-Hindue outbreaks In
East Pakistan may not only provoke new retaliations In West
Bengal but also enable the Bengali leaders and various reace
tionary Hindu groups to bring etrong pressure for interven-
tion on the part of the Indian Government. There are a
number of West Bongali groups wieh irridentist aims in Beet
B.;ngal 'which would welcome such an opportunity to press for
action, and it is even poseiole that acme of their members
might act as agents prevocateure
IIPMW
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.2COTED IV fatiEk?
The Turkish ;Legation 131 *cfla has just been handed strongly
worded Bulgirlan note in vhich the Turics are reportedly de-
nounced for their alleged failure to safeguard Bulgarian
representatives in Turkey and ror their generally "scandalous
attitude" in the matter. Obviously, it will be difficult for
the Turkish Government to continue in its current attitude
of forbearance toward Bulgaria; the language of the note
leaves the distinct impression that the Bulgarian Government
is aiming, if not at a total break in diplomatic relations,
at least at the recall of Turke5i'a repreeentatives in Bulgaria,
In order to avoid obliging the Bulgarians, however, the wily
Turks might temporize by once acaln suggesting that ciftference:
between the two countries be referred to the Internet:A:1ne1
Court or Justice for adjudication,
In according de jure recognitien to 4grael, the Turkieh
Government undoubtedly hopes to promote peace and stability
in the Near and Middle East. The Turks are realistic enough
to realize that their Arab neighbore will not promptly follow
Turkey's lead. However, Iran has just decided on dpq_EAsast_
recognition of Israel ,and the Turks may well expect that
other states of primarily Moslem population may follow suit.
25X6A
Jaw
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Tenston in_the Jeyis,h community 91 lpaq_may_ease if the fiegent
signs a pending bill which legalizes emigration, on conda.tion
Coat nationality is forfeited and VD more than !-NO dinars
($140) is withdrawn by am. emigre. The prospect oi tnus
ei;arting life afresh in Israel will probably not appeal to
the more settled majority of the Tevieh community, particu-
larly eine? the government has recently relaxed a regulation
prohibit Jews from disposing of property valued at over 2,000
dinars($5, 00). Neverthe/ese, tha bill does provide a way
for malcontents to depart without resort to deception and
bribery, and the effect on the mOrale or the Jewish community
in general should be a salutory one.
Poor Iraqi7Egystian_relations--more tie rule than the excep-
tion since the war--have again been underscored by two recent
incidents. When Iraq prevented a 'Misr" plane from continu-
ing from Cairo to Tehran, Egypt retaliated by grounding an
Iraq civil plane. Last week the dgyptian Voreign Minister
raised another issue when he stated that Egyptian school
teachers would soon be withdrawn from Iraq, ostensibly be-
cause ggypt needs their services, but actually because Egypt
is displeased with Iraq's foreign policy. Behind these in-
cidents, stands a long-term rivalry for power in the Arab
area. At the Arab League meeting in Uairo last fall Egypt
proposed a general "collective security pact," mainly to
thwart the development of an enlarged Hashimite kingdom in
which Iraq would be the dominant influence. Iraq in turn,
as eager for the replacement or the Egyptian Secretary-
General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, and the eetablishment
of an entente involving the emile Crescent nationm alone.
The recent fall in Baghdad of the Jawdat Government, whose
relations with Egypt were on a reirly cordial basis, and the
subsequent formation or a pro-buri Cabinet terminated a brief
honeymoon. It is unlikely that am firm friendehip can be
developed between the two countries however, as long as
basic rivalries remain unresolved.
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8.
25X6A
Prime.1044ster Onar_Eansour Aeicnia c4Ija_Eggt1.2a has resigned
following charges by thu adviso-;1-61raneican rational Council
that he was guilty or represeivo ac ',,ions and "old style"
Turkish) methods. The Znir plans to wait for the
new Wational Assembly to nomlua',e a new prime mtnister, fol-
lowing the elections scheduled for L0-25 Parch. It i3 dif-
ficult to See how the iesembl ,.3an be elected and meet by
its scheduled date or .i?) March, however, in viev of the conplete
lack of electoral machinery and a modern communications system.
As a result, Cyrenaica my be without a prime minister for
longer than the Emir expects.
U4_po1i2v toward Iran vie reci.y attacked during a Najlis
debate on the program of the *tced Government. Deputy Ashtiani
Zadeh, an ex-Qavandet, aoeused Premier Saed of placing Iran
In an antagonistic position tovaxd the USR by surrendering
Iranian independenoe to ',G11.U3 witheut receivin6 a sl.ngle
concession. He also expreese4 eviews of a number of Majlis
niemhers %MD wish to stop the 11c.dlo Teheran relay of VOA, by
..10111
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:Accusing the US broadcasting unit of attempting to create
cAeorder in Iran.
Increased pro-Soviet_activity has been noted in several
areas of 'Iran. Martial. law has been established in the
Gurgan area (adjoining TuriacentibR), where a group of fifty
Persians and Turkmen has been arrested on charges of espionage
and subversive activities. At Shahi in the Caspian Province
of Mazanderau eight Tudeh agitators have been arrested? In
Khorassan, the US Consulate at Neshed reports that an increase
In leftist activity hae been marked by the appearance of
several leftist newspapers and oi a new Soviet-sponsored
party (HIZB,AZADKHAH, party.of freedom lovers). A well-placed
US observer visiting itheeaz, seat of Iran's oil industry and
an important transportation center, reports that Communist
Influence is also spreading there,
3uspicion of DS participation in A:Crime affairs was evidenced
at the inter-goverhmentel African Teansportation Uonference
recently concluded in Paris. DeJ_egates from the states
having African dependencies showed an unwillingness to discuss
rtCA suggestions for a comprehensive survey el* transportation.
needs in Africa south of the Sahara, apparently in the belief
that acceptance of an WA proposal for such a survey would be
used by political opponents as evidence that the us is diatat-
Ing in the affairs of their overseas territories.
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