NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 8 MARCH 1950

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100060009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 8, 1950
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ?
WORKING PAPER
MAR 8 1950
NOTICE: This docum8rit is a 'working paper, fliti
an official CIA issuslate. It. has hsen co-ordina-
ted within ORE, bit not with the IAC Aguries.
It represents current thinking by specialists in
CIA, a7Ild is designed grir use by otthers airlgaged
Iiri sirniltr or overlapping studie,s. The bpiniona
expressed herein inay be revised befro6'e Einti
and official publication. It is tntended solely
forthe information of thrl addressee:7, And not for
flivishAr. (11 ss e mination.
(.47,opy
1+/TENT NO. ?
ED
61
IN CLASS. 0
?DECLA
ASS. CHANGE i S S 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-
DATE? EviEwER? 006
4110440.116111141
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otiopors".
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8 113.1-da 19'7.0
TABLFO OATIMS
'yee0^3
Divided verdict..." . 00d00 .20,0 Q 0 001
laection results presage unstable coalition
-VuPkev
No concessions a. . 00 1
Turks turn down at least one U5 petroleum firm
The Iraai union issue > .a. . c a. 2
Mr.itsu. leaders seek to di5c7edit pro-unlon opooments
.;-a, 0-01er
Turkey, Palestine, .t.yria, Iran, .eakistan, Ceylon .
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NEAR EAST/AFAICA IfTeeatieleM0.6 SUMARY
eleeteet.
eiveded veralet.4 The spsie vexaeot returned by the Greek
people in the 5 Narch national elec:ions not only neceesit-
otes a continuation of eoaiiton government but also casts
considerable doubt on tno possebility ce! any table combin-
ation's being formed., The acttae aLlocateon of parliamentary
seats under the oomples prepoirtionat repreoentation system
has still to be made, au et ea ttue too early to tell ethethee
a chance to forma government vies. firat be offered to Con-
etantine Tsaldaris, who roteleists appear to have a elight
jead in the popular vote, or aue oi his two closest rival,
the left-centrist fitcholas elatteree and 6ophoc1es Venizeloe,
leader of the centrist elborel rarty. Alone of the three
leading parties, hoeever, is Jeezely to obtain more than 45-
55 seats in the 250-man parliaeent, and the possibility that
all three might combine forces 1e virtually precluded by
the mutual distrunt or elantires and esaldarie. Either a
Plastiras-Vinizelos comoinateon or another Populist-Liberal
eoalition might secure a majorsey--teteen the collaboration
et' several minor centrist and reghtist groups, Even if such
fe coalition could be formed, newever, something close to 45
percent of the chamber vouLd etlel oe left in opposition
(Inclusion in the government of the outright leftists under
*ephianopoulos or of any extreme reghtiet appears out of the
oueetlon.)
In the face or such stronf; opposition, the effectiveneee
and stability of a coalition government will be impaired by
the difficulty or reconciling ehe eurands of Its eeveral
nearly equal components. Indeed, it is quite possible that
no viable combination will eite-ge, in -which case the King
will rove speedily to mil amoener ejection. In such an
event, the formerly dordnant eeDerals and Populiets might be
temporarily eclipseo by a etreegee for support between the
emergent figureeof 41ant1res 4:ed Wrehal Papagos, the Kinges
favorite for the poeition or 'letrong man" in Greece with
the Issue of the King's role Le the government again becom-
ing a major one.
No concessioasg Apprehensive.ae ever or a revival of exces-
sive direct foreign paeticipateon in the national econouu
(such as obtained under the eapituaations of the imperial
regime), the Turks have rejected at least one UB fires
propoeals to develop Turkey's,eetroleum resources on a
tactiWOOM'T
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eonceseionary basis.. Me tempt eioe to aeuept mast havQ
an great, for the euekish Uoveeeeent is well aware that
efleh development by Tures, ever wit expert US technical
edvice and financial support, *ill he much slower than if
;he entire taelc were left--as et is elseWhere In the Near
end Meddle East--to foreign cowponles with imueirse finan-
eial reeourceeL One unconeetruad offer,moreovexereportedly
placed before the Turks the picasant prospect of obtaining
annual revenues in kind which might exceed in value this
learou total expected budgetary deficit. But the Turks
hmve not accepted, and are uniekely to accept even more
Lemptieg offers, fully realizing the cost to the country's
oconone of retarded developmbnt. 'Whatever the extent of
Turkevs petroleum reeources-eaud that they are really
eubstantial is by no mewls proved--ehe Turkz are likely
to guard their economic independence as jealously as they
cling to their political freedom,
The Irani unionlesue: 41th the potentially explosive
question of ayro-Iraqi union atill hanging over their
heads, certain members of ayria'm dominant military
group?notable hinister of Defenee Hawrani and Colonel
Shishakli, loader of the last eoup--are reportedly planning
reasures to weaken the position of their pro-union political
opponents. The preeeet dauraneeehlzhakli program cane for
no bloodshed; the plan ie to organize popular demonstrations
against those politicians auspeceed of pro-union sentiments
with the hope of forcing them out of public office and lessen-
ing their popular followieg Aowever, the Met prominent
objects of attack by the Eavrani-Shiehakli group?Dr. Nazim
Qudsi and Rushdi Nikhya of the eyrian Populist Party--have
large numbers of adherents evei thee& their pro-union
sentinents are not necesearile *hared by all of their fol-
lowers. If, as is ouete poasiole, the attack on them should
boomerang, Rawrani and enishakii might feel that their own
polities' survival demanded more drastic measures.
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BRIEF
143cumenica1 Patriarch Athenswores of the_Greek Orthogoa_Sjuirell,
has avoided comment on the Hungarian Orthodox Ohurch,s report-
3d shift of allegiance from him to the Patriarch of Moscow
by denying that he had hee.rd the report. Obviously, he would
be opposed to any such transfer of a/leg/canoe, in spite of
the fact that, as the "first ameng equals," he would continue
to outrank the Patriarch of MC3COV. Athenagoras gave some
hint of his feelings, however, tri warning a Greek Orthodox
Church congregation In Istanbul about propaganda aimed at
disuniting kindred Orthodox churches,
The UN TxUSIVPshlo Council's recant decAgUn to abide by the
7,etter of the Genera/ AssombWs resolution and draft a statute
internationalizing the entire .J'erusalem municipal area has
finally destroyed all possibility of its achieving a compro-
mise solution acceptable to Isreel and Jordan. Most of the
Trusteeship Council members realize that anything they now
do on Jerusalem wi/1 be largely meaningless and are conse-
quently looking for the bast method of stalling until the
issue can be turned back to the General Assembly for recon-
sideration at its next regular session in t$eptember.
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73.yria's ambitious preikree t e pOzt of Lataklia.
presently little more than an open roadsteadp should pleaze
5yrian businesEmen (particularly in the important northern
city of Aleppo) and should appeal to Syrian national pride
7.n general. The recently announeed project (which will
require some 24 milliou Syrian pounds?about $8 million?
up to to-third e to be obtained from public subscription) ?
uill also help the opentrg vp of tho undeveloped Jesirah
!section and other retarded Z..reeEl in the north. It is
questionable, however, whether Syria should spend its money
on port development rather than agricultural rehabilitation
at this tine, and, from a regional point of view, whether
there is sufficient econonde justification for the scheme.
Aside from Israeli Haifa, the Levant coast already possess:ea
two adequate modern ports which etand to loos by the enlarge-
ment of Latakia's traffic: Beirut in Lebanon and the Turkleh
port_of Iskenderun (Alexandretta). Lebanon sees in the .
scheme yet another exanple of Syria's uncooperative attitude
In the economic sphere. Mesewhile, Turkey is reported to
have offered Syria free port facilities In Iskenderun,
presumably with the dual motive of discouraging work on
Latakia and of securing tacit Syrian abandonment of its old
oIains to Hatay province, or which Iskenderun is the principal
city.
"t
The stormy recepLion given .',1,1mg.3 Einister Stied by the Eallis
when he attenpted to preeent hip new cabinet portends troubled
tines for the present governnent. Facing a new Majlis, Seed
was attacked for forming his governaent in an unconstitutional
manner (i.e. not consulting the Majlis first) and also for
delaying the opening of parliament longer than the law
allowed. While Saed, who Las hown remarkable tenacity in
office, nay weather this opposition and eventually obtain a
vote of confidenoe, Ile has undeniably gotten off to a bad
start at a time when Iran cannot afford to allow political
bickering to tilterfere with the prompt provision of economic
relief measures.
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5.
Relations between Iran and eass.11 may be expected to iiecome
wore cordial than ever as a reeuit or. the Shah's current trip
to Pakistan, even tnough the Shah, in his public utterances,
tlas been careful to advocate nothing more controversial than
joint efforts for furthering economic and social progress in
the two countries. his demonstration of friendship, which
akistan undoubtedly hopes will impvess Afghanistan and India,
can be expected to cause furdiec ireiiation between Iran and
Afghanistan and might hinder the work of anentral oommiseion
just starting to survey the jolatly shared Helmand River basie,
which has long been the subject of Irano-Afghan friction. The
Lrip might be questioned on the ground that the Shah is needed
in Iran at present, although hs two weeks' absence probably-
will have no significant effect on Iran's internal eituation?
Fnfthqr_eyAmeg_toet raxistan intends to exert economic
2res3ureoni is provided by its blocking of
Morrison-Knudson supplies now An Pakistan, awaiting ship-
ment to Afghanistan. The stopge of gasoline to Afghanitan? ostensibly due to the fact that the Afghan Petrol
Conpang trucks do not conform with Pakistan petroleum re-
gulations, has caused Afghanietan to threaten to purchaee
oil from HU3Sia, In fact, a saall quantity of Russian oil
bas reach Kabul.
The Revel Pakistan Air Force_2ea4s, by 1954, an air force
with ?ront line strength of tea full fighting squadrons.
Orders for planes were placed after India has ordered its
planes, with the result that Pakistan is to have technically
superior aircraft, larGely compensating for numerical infer-
Ceylon vi. I eliminate 1mut_s2pIre4s on gooas from soft
aurreim countries but controla will remain on inports from
bard currency countriee except for non-luNury items which
may be imported under coiling The exchange controller has
stated Oeylon's balance of payments in 1949 vas more un_
favorable than in 1948.
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