INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030026-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 17, 1950
• Content Type: PERRPT

Approved For Rase 1999L0.9504?CIA-RDP7941490A000100030026-0
ENT NO.
IN CLASS. 0
mAs
LA.CHANGED S S c INTERNATICNAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION
NEXT REVIEW
AU1Fj 72 WEEKLY SDIMARY NO. 2 ?
DAT
REVIEWER; 00
For week ending 17 January 1950 Volume III
The Internat tonal Week
Problems incident to the collapse of Nationalist China domi-
nated not only the entire international scene, but also the UNQ
The USSR and its satellites boycotted all UN meetings after the
SC had refused to oust the resent Chinese delegation. In the
Kaehmir case, the informal nikt4Mitions which General McNaughton
(Canada) had been conducting were broken off by IndiaQ The first
hints of a possible Italo-Ethiopian rapprochement appeared on the
horizon.
-
Soviet tipshaal_pl_the UN. The Soviet withdrawal from the
Security Council is in effect an attempt legally to blockade the
principal UN enforcement organ until it complies with the USSR's
bidding by ousting the present Chinese delegation. It remains
to be seen whether a legal airlift to overcome this blockade can
be devised. Abstention has come to be a recognized form of vote
in the UN, separate and distinct from a nay. Furthermore Article
28 of the Charter requires all SC members to be represented at
all times so that the council may function continuously; These
arguments may well be invoked to sustain the right of the SC to
take even substantive decisions in the absence of the USSR on the
theory that such absence amounts only to an abstention. .
Meanwhile it becomes more apparent that the Soviet bloc has
adopted a concerted strategy in dealing with the Chinese recogni-
tion problem. Not only are the satellites participating in this
UN boycott, but it is being extended to other UN organs. 4ean-
while in China itself, the seizure of the US Consulate property in
Peking may be deliberately calculated to delay rather than accel-
erate US recognition of the PBC. A number of objectives may under-
lie these actions. The USSR probably seeks to capitelize the
propaganda opportunity for bringing home to the Chinese Communists
its outstanding and boundless championship of their regime. At
the same time by inducing abstentions'from such members as the DK
and Norway which recently recognired the PRC, Moscow may hope to
highlight the lukewarm attitude of the "Johnny Come Lateliesu for
the benefit of the Chinese. Possibly the Kremlin is trying to
bring about a situation whereby the US will be confronted with an
unfriendly and hostile Chinese government in the SC which for
Approved For Release 19 CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030026-0
Approved For Release 1999 CIA-RDP794f090A000100030026-0
prestige considerations, it cannot afford to recognize. Thus it
may result that USSR can pay back the US in kind for the election
of Yugoslavia to Uge SC last October, for which this country is
held resDonsible in Moscow. Finally the USSR may wish emphatically
to signalize its deep and basic dissatisfaction with the UN which
during the recent GA session affronted the Muscovites not only by
Its choice of Yugoslavia for the SC, but by its adoption of the
sharply anti-Soviet "Essentials of Peace Resolution." By arrang-
ing for a boycott of the whole UN by the entire Soviet bloc, the
Kremlin may seek to serve a warning on the UN that there may be
limits to what it is willing to accept from the organization.
tal Eth o an r..1 rochamt? Prospects for the estilbg h-
ment o be ter re at ons between Italy and Ethiopia have increased
as a result of their recent informal conversations in Geneva. The
key factors tending to promote a rapprochement are Italy's fear of
the Ethiopian reaction to Italian trusteeship over Somaliland, and
Ethiopia's distrust of Italian aims in Eritrea, which is the true
motive for Ethiopian pressure on Somaliland issues. Thus, basic
to any real settlement is the future disposition of Eritrea, which
the UN has failed to award to Ethiopia in two successive General
Assembly sessions and which a CoMmission of inquiry is to visit in
preparation for a third.
The first concrete step toward a settlement is the Ethiopian
suggestion, agreeable to the Italian delegation at the Trustee-
ship Councils Somaliland committee, for a provisional administra-
tive boundary line, pending the final demarcation of a Ea lam line.
Moreover, Italy has indicated to the UK its desire to consider ways
and means by which it might attain general agreement with Ethiopia
on all questions, including Eritrea. Since this is the only possi-
ble basis for establishing normal relations, it has been interpret-
ed in some quarters as indicating Italy's willingness to renounce
its claims to Eritrea, if a general settlement could be achieved
thereby. Informal Italo-Ethiopian discussions continuing at Geneva
offer some prospect for amelioration of tension between the two
countries, provided that adequate concessions are rade on both sides.
o
CatholicA1-13-129.ne dtglaimm_ankti_Elth_RIE
internation4. The Christian Tradi-Dilion Confederation (CISC),
representing a to 3 million workers, has postponed for at least
three months any final decision regarding affiliation with the
newly formed Free Trade Union International (ICFTU). Simultaneous-
ly, leaders of the Christian Confederation stressed that all
national Christian trade unfons would decide as a group. Although
2-
Approved For Release 1991:CIA-RDP79-0:1090A000100030026-0
Approved For Release 1999/ A-RDP79-tK090A000100030026-0
attributed to CISC's desire for time to recoup dues and to resent-
ment over an AFL threat of public attack if the CISC refuses to
affiliate, the postponement probably also reflects a division bet,
tween two groups of Catholic unions. One, led by Tessier, the
CISC president, is apparently seeking a plausible excuse to avoid
disbanding the Catholic labor organization. The other, represented
by the Italian Pastore and supported by a minority within the French
Christian federation maintains that organic unity with the ICFTU
is needed for effective countermeasures against Communist labor.
The Tessier group, currently in the saddle, favors some form of
cooperation between the two labor internationals but is unwilling
to be pressured by the two-year separation proviso, which it re-
gards as an "ultimatum." Although continued efforts will probably
be made to develop working cooperation between the two inter-
nationals, their success is uncertain. Should these efforts break
down, the pro-ICFTU elements may withdraw from the Christian con-
federation and adhere independently to the new international.
Ing_AllinAmtamAsYsl h ? thee The
Peiping Asian Liaison Bureau, recently ormed y the orld Federa-
tion of Trade Unions, is currently seeking closer liaison between
Chinese Communist labor and the labor force of Southeast Asia,
This development is reflected in the visit of a large Indonesian
labor delegation to Peiping and in the Burmese Trade Union Con-
gress'es reported affiliation with the WFTU. The visit of the
Indonesian workers organization (SOBSI), folic:ming its failure to
obtain transport to the WFTU Peiping Conference, indicates the de-
termination of its Communist lehiers to establish contact with Ins
WFTU Asian Bureau. Other signs of the Bureau's expanding capa-
bilities were: (1) a reported OBSI reouest for a WFTU "observer"
in Indonesia; (2) indications that the WFTU will distribute its
publications in native languages throughout Asia, particularly in
Indonesia and India; and (3) a reported plan for a WFTU office in
Hong Kong for liaison with the Chinese seamens and dockers organi-
zations. WFTU determination to pursue its drive for the "libera-
tion" of Southeast Asia was further evidenced in the adoption by
its Executive Bureau last week of a "plan of work" for carrying
out the Peiping Conference's decisions. At this meeting the
Bureau directed the WFTU Secretariat to accelerate aid to the trade
union organizations in colonial areas.
Igglaimliaxicajimung1L3oviet Agmination of the WFTU. Yugo-
slav labor, until now ideologically loyal to the World Federation
of Trade Unions, has denounced what It terms "Cominformist" efforts
to evict the Yugoslav trade unions from that organization. The
Approved For Release 1999/ A-RDP79-01090A000100030026-0
"Approved For Releasari999/09/02 : COO16179-01090A100100030026-0
denunciation, rade by the officially-inspired Yugoslav trade
union paper RAD, follows he soviet ban on Yugoslav participation
in recent conferences hela to organize WFTU departrents for the
Food and Agricultural Workers, Postal and -Radio Workerst and Farm
Workers, RAD condemns such "Oisruptive activities" against WFTU
unity and stresses that the correct response of the international
workers is to fight for lthe free and independent activities of
the national trade union.?movements." This blast by the same
Yugoslav trade union organization which only u month ago reasserte
ed allegiance to the WFTU indicates its strong resentment at Soviet
dominetion of that body and suggests that it may be seeking to
associate itself with other Communist elements within the WFTU in
a splinter movement..
, 0 -
IndopeplapegiaemeTberehip In what would be a shretedly timed
move, Indonesia is reportedly considering applying for UN member-
ship during the current Soviet boycott of the SC. Sine* Indonesia
has not previctsly appliet for UN membership and been vetoed by
the USSR, the Indonesians could contend that they were not trying
to sneak in while the Sovaets were absent,
cureent status of the Kashmir case. Despite a sharp prod to
India by the US. India still =obdurately refuses to modify its stand
on Keshrir. Nehru hen flatly stated that he does rot consider thst
further negotiations on the Kashmir case at Lake Success "are likely
to lead to any fruitful result." It is expected that Nehru will
remain uncompromising and will continue to avoid any real prorress
towards the over-all plebiscite in Kashmir to which both Pakistan
Ad India are committed, Pakistan holds firm for the agreed over-
all plebiscite but India in eonversaticns with the US, :as boldly
suggested partition of rbet of the disputed area, with tee agreed
eease-fire lire as the bounderyt and a plebiscite limited to the
Vale of Kashmir. GOI's protestations that it favors a continuation
of mediation can be irterareted as a maneuver to hold open a way un-
til such a partition-plebiscite deal is suggested or arranFed.
Meanwhile in order to keep some rachinery for settlement open
NeNaughton (Canada) has agreed to keep himself available as mediator
Stroe there is no evideree that India will soften its attitude.
Naughton will be compelled to report his failure to the Sc whose
next move will then be to irvite the contenders to make etatements
before the Council. At this stage only a major change lu policy on
the part of either GO1 or GO.Pwill bring the SC any neater to a
settlement of the dispUtel.
Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030026-0
Approved For Ot1ease1999/WRCIA-RDP792e090A000100030026-0
OPPOSITION TO 1950 ECA PLAN
As OELC experts begin a detailed examination of ECAs new
intra-European trade end payments liberalization plan, it is clear
that ECA will face substantial opposition in getting many of its
features adopted this year. Initially, the ERP countries have
the plan as a whole favorably, but many of them will prob-
ably be unwilling to proceed as far or as fast in all respects as
the US desires. Althcugh ECA hopes for complete elimination of
bilateral ouantitetive restrictions by mid-1950, some OEEC members
are balking at even the 50% reduction already called for. The.
French, while barely meeting the 50% goal, have adopted a strong-
ly protectionist attitude in their reluctance to remove QR's where
domestic producers might be hurt. It will be much more difficult
to secure elimination of QR's on the remaining 50% of intra-
European trade, where strong vested interests will object, than
it was on the first try.
ECA's parallel objective of intra-European currency transfer-
atillity through the operations of a proposed European Clearing
Union also faces numerous obstacles.- Perhaps most important is
the conflict between debtor and creditor nations as to the terms
ni settling trade defItits, The UK and probably others will be,
In the past, extrerely hesitant about any clearing system
tklrough which they risk losing gold or dollars in case Of persistent
rge deficits. On the other hand creditor countries like Belgium
eell be reluctant to extend further large credits to debtor nations.
apecial eroblem will arise from the large sterling holdirgs of
ERP countries. lt will be difficult to include the sterling
atoa in the currency trensferability arrangenents if these coun-
tles seek to unload too large te volure of their sterling holdings,
Oes making the UK a persistent debtor forced to settle eartly'in
.cid or dollars Another problem will be the reluctance of most
o A.0 countries to see any substantial amount of ECA dollars sub-
oeted from their own individual aid allocations for use in the
oaring Union's stabilieation fund. In addition, Denmark and
'way fear that too drastic a trade and payments liberalization
11 jeopardize their full em loytent policies.
-Finally, ECA_ will meet greet difficulties in securing a sys-
which vill endure after the artificial stimulus of US aid ie
? -drawn in 1952. ECA believes that this requires not only a
--ftem of eutomatic ircentives and deterrents through gold and
lar payments or credits but some adecuate mechanism for coopera-
adjustment of national economic 'policies. But it will be
J to sell the BHP rations on such an organization to consult
oe rational policies and recommend modificat;:on. While marked
4-ress toward continued freeing of trtele and payments will un-
-:o.obtedly be rade during 1950, the Europeans ray well balk at
oietine sufficiently drastic teasurea to ensure survival cf the
clearing system after the end of the ERP.
Approved For Release 1999.CIA-RDP79-01090A000100030026-0