INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 28
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-01090A000100020024-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 13, 2000
Sequence Number:
24
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 12, 1949
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PERRPT
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INT rIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
? 'EEKLY SU.g?ARY NO. 28
For week ending 12 July 1949
The International 1'reek
Volume II
The eoonomio difficulties arising from Britain?s dollar short-
age and the US recession continued to dominate the international
scene and to menace the-European Recovery Program, 'N efforts to
arrange Israeli-Syrian armistice lines ran into difficulties along
the southeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. Tito's e:uivoeal
announcement that he would close .down the Yugoslav-Greek border
possibly foreshadowed some reduction in Greek border warfare In
this area.
A Lib an stalemate may continue. The opposition of France,
Italy an t e pro-- talia, t members to a united independent Lib a
-- a settlement which, but for this, would probably ce acceptable tr
the UK -- may well result in. oont.inued stalemate on the issue in
the fall General Assembly. Since no other solution is likely to
come so aloes to getting a two-thirds majority, further postponement
is a strong possibility.
:Meanwhile, Libyan federation activity has subsided somewhat
after its early upsurge when Cyrenaiob was granted a measure of
salt-rule.
self`-rule. Conversations between the Senussi Emir and Tripoli-
leaders have revealed Senussi willingness to unite the colony
under pertain oonditioni, but with the immediate pressure of pos-
sible Italian return to Tri, olitania withdrawn, the unification'
movement has lost momentum. It will revive, however, with the
slightest renewal of talk about an Italian trusteeship. To allay
native unrest in Tripoli.tanle, the British have decided to admit
natives to higher ad.mini-ztrative posts and also have dispatched are
economic mission to report on long-range economic and social pro" w
lems. By these moves and Cyrenaic an self-rule, Libya has probably
advanced too far toward independence for the population to accept
much less.
The Italian Government, doubtless aware of the difficulties
facing its GA friends in obtaining an Italian trusteeship for the
colony and ot the possibility of an uprising against present Italian
residents in Tripolitania should such a trusteeship appear iinminent,
is reportedly seeking a face-saving formula which would permit it
to remain in_.po;ver despite the abandonment of its claims to Tripol_i-
tania. Independent, particularly if it allowed some recognition
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to Italian interests in the now state, might therefore be reluo-
*r- tantly accepted by the Italians.
In feet, France, not Italy, is likely to be the major ob--
stac1e to Independence. For Libya, the mo't backward of all North
.frioan territories, to achieve independence before any of the more
advanced ?ren.ch areas, would aggravate an already delicate e side~end-
independ-
atiou. Consequently, the French have consistently opposed
ence or even a limited trusteeship or all or part of Libya.
re they predisposed to gran{. independence to any of their own
North Africai dependencies, the existit ; situation itself would
rlilitate against doing so since the French would be accused of yield-
ing-,to presr;ure. French hostility to the British inclination toward
an independent union is augmented by military weakness resulting from
diversion of FNA military unibs to aBrauldybendashed-byiLib3raMnoinda~r,
French am.iti~bn to annex the F2an
endenee
25X6
WFTtT warns UN of "economic crisis" in the ^Jest. The USSR is
vQr.rerr'M,/expand ng it p l}agari`ca-emphasis on the growing "ajeonomic
o is.is" in the '';rest through the UN any the "lorld Federation of
Tfade Unions. The recent W1i lnl3rorandum to the UN warning of' eco-
naraio crisis in the crapite.i:i.st cou.. tries will probably be fully
exploited by the Soviet and Satell.F.te delegations in ECOSOC as an
occasion for heavy attack on US ab '.lity to finance the Point Fcur
Program. The memorandum charged tl.at there are More than seven
million unemployed in 14 eapitalls'~ countries and that of this
total; "nearly" six and one-half million are in the US alone. 7 t
oa`*lls for aggressive action to raile wages and unemployment bene-
fits and to shorte:i hours, all meavarea which the ERP countries are
trying to discourage. In recant FCOSOC sessions the Sovif3 t delegate
also criticized the ILO for not rei3ognizing the more-than- season,3l
"'!,reemployment trend" in the 'lest and for approaching; this pr-^biem
at a "tortoise p;4ce." This errai;+;r..s .ant of capitalist ecol.o,flies re-
f:.%.eets the increasingly seripus Soviet propaganda effort to Under-
:sins confidence in US capacity to fulfill any Point Four corn.itraents.
'; vie t de.termifl t ion to make this an all-out effort is further
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reflected in the recent intimation by a top "IFTU officer that the
7,7TU might call a conference "to formulate economic plans to meet
the developing crisis of world capitalism."
IT[r fre uenc allocation difficulties. Conflicting natianal.
claims"cra o requency a ocaticns may destroy the present inter-
national framework built up since the war. Should the Provisional
Frequency Board find it impossible to prepare a consolidated list
of international radio frequencies under the terms of reference of
the 1947 Atlantic City Telecommunications Conference, it will prob-
ably be impossible to implement th Atlantic City frequency alloca-
tion tables In this case, it will be necessary either to modify
the PFB terms of reference or to draft a new allocation table.
Sinoe either of these alternatives would require convening a new
international conference (and since it is doubtful that any new
allocation table which could now be drafted would be as acc:er-,table
as the Atlantic City table), the US feels that every effort should
be made to attain PFB success under the existing terms of reference.
Praseat prospects for such success are, however, exceedingly dim.
The TYSSR has consistently refused to cooperate, even to the extent
of supplying a list of its frequency requirements, and the UK,
pessimistic on the outlook for achieving anything, is no longer
participating in PFB work nor does it apparently intend to return
its delegation to Geneva prior to the PF'B report in mid August G
Therefore, unless the UK can be induced to furnish active support
for a common US UK-French policy, there seems little likelihood
of early implementation of an international frequency allocation
table.
Pro a anda or confession of weakness? A confession of weak-
ness n mass estruct on weapons mayy lie behind the Soviet resolu-
tion presented at the current Geneva conference for the revision of
conventions for the protection of war victims and civilians in war
time. The proposal would require all. governments to prohibit the
use of atomic weapons as Means of raess extermination; it also urges
prompt ratification of a 1925 Geneva Protocol barring bacteriological
warfare and poison gas and chemical attacks.
On the other hand, the Soviet resolution may b.e pure propa-
ganda. The civilian protection convention, in its present form,
would establish security zones for women, children, the sick and
ages;. The various UN debates on atomic energy have diverted at-
tention from developments in the field of bacteriological and lethal-
chemical weapons, which have never been the monopoly of any one
nation or group of nations. The Soviet proposal is the first formal
one made by any UN member for the outlawing of their use,, It will
doubtless be defeated at Geneva, but a tangible propaganda ad-
vantage will almost certainly accrue tbroad mass of the popul~tionk-
ing to safeguard the interests of the
against "imperialistic warrzongers.?f
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G/I0 NOTES
Gaza ro osal orl received. The US proposal to give the
Gaza strip to Israel n return or accepting 230,000 Arab refugees
presently crowded in the tract appears unacceptable to Egypt.
Even the Israelis, who had previously put forth the Gaza sugges-
tion, now deprecate the territorial value of the strip, although
they may be feigning for bargaining purposes. In any case,
further clarification of the US pror~osal to the effect that Israel
would be expected to give territorial compensation elsewhere,
e.g., the Southern Negeb, for the Gaza strip is certain to sour
Tel Aviv's reaction to the plan.
ERP agricultural programs weak.. ECA is increasingly con-
cerned over the relative lack of emphasis on agricultural develop-
ment in the investment programs of the ERP countries. Since
foodstuffs, especially grains, form a major part of ERP dollar
imports, the ERP programs call for a large increase in local crop
yields, which in turn requires substantial investment. However,
agricultural investment is being neglected for industry in many
cases and production already lags behind the program goals.
Shift in IRO. J. Donald Kingsley, Assistant Administrator
of the TTS a e= Security Administration, has been elected
Director General of the International Refugee Organization (IRO),,
succeeding W. H. Tuck. The IRO General Council has adopted a
schedule calling for winding up all activities by 30 June 1950
at which time it is estimated there will remain in Germany and
Austria a "hard core" of 172,000 persons who are too old, too
ill, crippled or otherwise incapable of being reestablished. outside
of some sort of institution. No plan for dealing with the problem
.of these persons has as yet been formulated.
French To-pose arms census -plan. France has proposed to the
Secur y Coupe ss Comm ss on for Conventional Armaments (CCA) an
international census of armed effectives and conventional arma-
ments, urging that such knowledge is a necessary step toward arms
reduction. Stressing the importance of having some method of
verifying the data submitted by member governments, the French
propose a control and inspection group upon which all SC members
would be represented. Although under the SC, this body would
operate without a veto. The USSR has attacked the French suggec,
tion as a "spying device for the Atlantic Pact nations." It also
objects that the plan does not include inventories of atomic
weapons, and that it does not conform to the Soviet proposal for
a one-third reduction in Big Five armed forces. Since the Dropch al
is subject to a Soviet veto, no result -- apart from propaganda --
is anticipated.
ILO ads tp s compromise on admission of 'pest German "observers."
The In ernational Tabor Or;a~ nizationTs approval o associating
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German representatives with ILO i__n all activities of intere
to Germany is apparently a co promise `.etwe
th
US
en
y:
posit: o.a
(full German participation) and tha Belgian-French view th, ; th ?s
havo been agreed upon by the SM . Australia and Czech
l
"s
o .a
doted against the compromise whi e the Chinese deleqate supp or"El
tod
postponement, privately :tat x.ng `+is fear that any action t 3ks
prior to German unification wiFghk result in two delegation:: fro.-:
one country.
USSR calls upon 'WFTU to support rv' .peace com m ? ttees" in
adusLrz ,ants 7'he role whi ch t ;Fl SR has ass3.gr. ~ e
wW 'fin theme ease of the peace" was concretely defined last.
wsek when the Soviet delegate at the WFTU Milan Congress p2ouost d
the formation of "peace committees" at factory level. This pro,
posai, like similar instructions to the Communist-front World
Federation o:" Democratic Youth and International Democratic ",bms?n y
Federation, is apparently designed to organize wider and more
effective support in Western countries for Sow iet attacks on tn-
Military Aid Program and the Atlantic Pact, To achieve such
support the Soviet r?epresen.tative urged that the peace comj:ai;:,Oi s
not be confined to ':'JFTU-affiliated unions but include non-17:7;
unionists and unorganized norke.rs. His call for observance of
"'World Peace Day" and or aria-by-erap organization of the
"struggle for peace" confirms that, ra ith. the CFM negotiations
nor.cluded,, gaze USSR hati decided to accelerate its offensive
anAnst Western "instigators of ware"
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