LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY NORTH KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01054A000100160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1974
• Content Type: STUDY

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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Law of the Sea Country Study
North Korea
Secret
BGI LOS 74-16
June 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declasslficat(on schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically ddeclassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
The Law of the Sea Country Studies are prepared to support
the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea. The
countries to be included in the series are selected on the
basis of priorities suggested by the chairman of the Task
Force.
25X6
Each study has two parts. Part I is an analysis of the
primary geographic, economic, and political factors that
might influence the country's law of the sea policy, the
public and private expressions of that policy, 25X6
Part II prove es
basic data and in ormation bearing on law o the sea matters.
This study was prepared by the office of Basic and
Geographic Intelligence. Biographic support was provided by
the Central Reference Service. The study was coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Depart-
ment of State. Comments and questions may be directed to the
LOS Country Studies Working Group, Code 143, Extension 2257.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
Summary .. ... ... ..................................
1
Factors Influencing Policy ..............................
2
Law of the Sea Policy ...........
4
Key Policy Makers .......................................
8
Part II - Background Information
Basic Data ...... .............. 9
Membership in Organizations Related~to LOS Interests 10
Present Ocean Claims ....................................
Maps: Regional map
Theoretical Division of the World Seabed
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NORTH KOREA
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
A. SUMMARY
North Korea has seldom commented publicly
on the upcoming Law of the Sea (LOS) Con-
ference and has begun only recently to
discuss some of the LOS issues in an inter-
national context. P'yongyang has largely
restricted its LOS-related statements to
matters of direct and immediate concern to
North Korea -- the "Pueblo" affair, the
events along the Northern Limit Line* in the
Yellow Sea, and the petroleum exploration
activities on the continental shelf off South Korea. While there is no
evidence that the North Koreans have given any thought to marine
pollution, scientific research, revenue sharing, dispute settlement
or many of the other issues to be debated at Caracas, they are
undoubtedly not completely oblivious to them. Their expansion of
distant-water fishing operations, increased trade with countries
other than China and the U.S.S.R., and stated interest in the
petroleum-bearing potential of the adjacent continental shelf
indicate that North Korea plans for greater reliance on the sea
and reveal a probable growing concern for the sea's orderly develop-
ment. When formulating its LOS policy, North Korea may consider
the often conflicting interests of its two close allies, China and
the U.S.S.R.; but by and large, P'yongyang's policy will be arrived
at selfishly, including, where practicable, positions that will
enhance its lesser developed country (LDC) image.
*The Northern Limit Line was established in 1965 by the commander
of the UN Command's naval component (a U.S. flag officer) to mark
the northern limit of routine UN naval patrols. The line includes
within South Korean "territory" five UN-controlled islands that
lie within a hypothetical North Korean 12-mile territorial sea.
The South Koreans regard the line as a seaward extension of the
Military Demarcation Line and a de facto boundary between North
and South Korea. The Northern Limit Line, in fact, has no basis
in international law, and is binding only on military forces under
the UN Command.
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North Korea is likely to support the 12-mile* territorial sea
limit. Although the government would undoubtedly prefer complete
coastal-state control over navigation in its territorial sea,
Pyongyang will probably approve the innocent passage regime.
North Korea may want some control over navigation and overflight
immediately beyond the territorial sea and will probably vote for
innocent passage in international straits that are overlapped by
a territorial sea. North Korea will want control of the resources
of the sea and seabed in a zone beyond the territorial sea -- out
to at least 70 miles from the baseline. Along with control of these
resources, P'yongyang will want to control pollution standards
and scientific research within the coastal state economic zone. Lacking
seabed mining technology, North Korea will look to the revenue-sharing
concept as the only means for getting a share of the deep seabed's
wealth. To secure a maximum share of the deep seabed's wealth,
P'yongyang will seek a one-nation-one-vote system, but would prefer
a weighted voting system favoring socialist countries or developing
countries.
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING LOS POLICY
Special Geographic Features
North Korea's two coasts front on semienclosed seas. The Yellow
Sea is less than 200 miles in breadth and less than 200 meters deep.
The Sea of Japan off the coast of North Korea approaches 600 miles
in breadth and exceeds 3,600 meters in depth, and the entire sea
is encircled by a narrow continental shelf. The North Korean portion
of the Sea of Japan shelf has a maximum breadth of less than 40
miles.
Although no international straits border North Korea, there
are several in which P'yongyang has vital interest. La Perouse
Strait (23 miles wide), between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, and the
straits in the Kuril Islands (all but three are less than 24 miles
wide) provide the North Korean distant-water fishing fleet access
between its home ports on the Sea of Japan and fishing grounds in
the Sea of Okhotsk, the western Pacific, and the Bering Sea. North
Korean fishermen also may use Tsugaru Strait (10 miles wide),
between Honshu and Hokkaido, to gain access to the Pacific. The
western channel of the Korea Strait (Western Korea Strait, 23 miles
wide), between South Korea and the Japanese island Tsushima, and the
eastern channel of the Korea Strait (Tsushima Strait, 25 miles wide),
between Tsushima and Kyushu, lie on the most direct sea route
between North Korea's two coasts. North Korean ships, however,
rarely pass through them.
*Distances and areas throughout this study are in nautical miles
unless specified otherwise.
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Mineral Resources -- Recent Chinese petroleum strikes in Po
Hai and the petroleum exploration activities off South Korea in
the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and Korea Strait have prompted the North
Koreans to look hopefully to their own continental shelves as sources
for petroleum. North Korea now imports virtually all of its petroleum
products, the great bulk of them from the U.S.S.R. In an attempt
to reduce this dependence on foreign oil, North Korea recently
entered into an agreement with China to carry out jointly the
resource exploration of their common shelf in the Yellow Sea. The
North Koreans might also look to their Sea of Japan shelf for
petroleum; the Japanese are developing a field on the opposite
shelf just off Honshu's west coast.
Living Resources -- Marine products, largely fish, but also
shellfish and seaweed, constitute important segments of the North
Korean diet and exports. Although both of the seas bordering North
Korea contain rich fishing grounds, the Sea of Japan has historically
been the more productive. The warm Tsushima Current flowing north-
ward through the Korea Strait carries numerous fish species to the
cold waters of the Sea of Japan and keeps ports ice-free. Additionally,
the Sea of Japan coast does not experience the extreme tidal ranges
common to the Yellow Sea (nearly 40 feet in some localities). Both
of these seas, as well as the Sea of Okhotsk, the Pacific Ocean, and
the Bering Sea figure in P'yongyang's plans for expansion of its
fishing industry, plans that call for a nearly 100% increase in
production between 1969 and 1976.
Marine Transportation -- North Korean-flag ships ply only
coastal and inland waters, and are not known to circumnavigate the
peninsula between coasts. Although these vessels carry some
commodities between North Korean and nearby Chinese and Soviet
ports, the bulk of North Korea's seaborne trade is carried by
foreign ships. Trade between North Korea and its major trading
partners, China and the U.S.S.R., flows mainly by rail.
Naval and Air Transportation -- The North Korean Navy is
primarily a coastal defense force. It is separated into self-contain-
ed Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan fleets by the 1,500-mile coast-
line of hostile South Korea. North Korea's small civil airline,
run by the air force, operates only one scheduled international
route -- between P'yongyang and Peking. The aircraft probably fly
by way of Shen-yang in Northeast China, however, and would not,
therefore, go over the sea.
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Political and Other Factors
History has shown the Koreans to be independent-minded and at
times impetuous. North Korea's LOS policy can be expected to
follow a similar course, but tempered by several political realities.
When formulating its LOS policy P'yongyang will have to weigh
carefully the often conflicting LOS interests of its two close
allies, China and the U.S.S.R., though in most cases North Korean
interests have led to closer identification with Chinese views.
North Korea must also consider its role as an LDC and at least
pay lip-service to the LDC line -- a function that P'yongyang,
like Peking, has performed willingly as evidenced by its defense of
the extreme claims of Latin American and African countries and by
its condemnation of the LOS views and marine activities of the
developed countries, particularly the U.S. "imperialists" and the
Japanese "militarists." North Korea may use the LOS Conference
as a forum in which to promote its self-assumed role as leader of
the "united-Korea" movement. Despite its many attacks, verbal and
otherwise, on its southern neighbor, P'yongyang has spoken in
defense of South Korean fishermen whose fishing grounds were being
"plundered" by the Japanese. North Korea also looks on the resources
of the continental shelf adjacent to the Korean Peninsula as
belonging to the entire Korean people and, hence, has protested
loudly against South Korean deals on continental shelf oil
exploration with Japan.
C. LAW OF THE SEA POLICY
Territorial Sea
The North Koreans define territorial sea only as a "certain
area of sea over which sovereignty is exercised by the competent
state." North Korea claims 12 miles, and in light of the "Pueblo"
affair and the continuing incidents along the Northern Limit Line
in the Yellow Sea -- unequivocal demonstrations of sovereignty
exercised, it is unlikely that North Korea will accept anything
less for the international territorial sea standard. Adoption of
the 12-mile rule will place the Western Korea Strait within the
territorial seas of Japan and South Korea, leaving North Korea with
the adjacent 25-mile-wide Tsushima Strait as the only high seas
gateway to the most direct route between its two coasts.
Further defining the exercise of sovereignty in the terri-
torial sea, the government stated that the "seaboard state" can
"seize and deal with in accordance with its law any warship
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violating its territorial water, or any commercial vessel violating
its law and order" -- a rather negative and belligerent definition
of innocent passage. North Korea's current practice of requiring
South Korean military ships -- but not nonmilitary ships -- to seek
P'yongyang's permission before visiting the UN-controlled islands
in the Yellow Sea that lie within a hypothetical North Korean 12-mile
territorial sea is consistent with the innocent passage rule. This,
together with its public statements, imply North Korean support,
reluctant though it may be, for the innocent passage regime in the
territorial sea.
The straits issue probably is of little concern to the North
Koreans. North Korea has no bordering straits, and the overlapping of
certain straits by the territorial sea with the possible accompaniment
of innocent-passage regimes would have no adverse effect on present
operations of North Korean fishing and merchant ships. The limita-
tions of the North Korean Navy remove from Pyongyang's thinking on
straits any consideration of the implications of innocent passage
on military transit. With nothing to gain or lose economically or
militarily from the straits issue, Pyongyang may seize on it for
political gain. North Korea could look on the issue as a means of
enhancing its LDC image and thus vote for innocent passage. Innocent
passage in the Western Korea Strait also would fit in well with
Pyongyang's plans for its eventual control of the entire peninsula.
Semienclosed Seas
The establishment of special semienclosed sea regimes that
incorporate jurisdictional division among the bordering states by
median line boundaries in both of North Korea's bordering seas would,
from North Korea's viewpoint, be superior to any of the standard depth
or distance plans for coastal state jurisdiction now being considered.
While the Yellow Sea's less-than-400-mile breadth could not accommodate
200-mile coastal state jurisdictional zones, the Sea of Japan's
600-mile breadth off North Korea would add to North Korea's jurisdic-
tion a strip of sea up to 100 miles broader than would a 200-mile
coastal zone. All of the states bordering the Yellow Sea and the Sea
of Japan would benefit from the special pollution control, resource
management, and other standards that would be tailored to the
peculiarities of the two seas.
Continental Shelf
North Korea is likely to support a distance rule for coastal
state jurisdiction of the adjacent continental shelf. The country's
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narrow, sharply sloped east coast shelf would make P'yongyang's
support for a 200-, 500-, or even 1,000-meter-depth limit foolhardy.
North Korean public statements imply some claim to the shelf
and shelf resources adjacent to the entire Korean Peninsula. In
March 1973 when commenting on oil exploration activities off South
Korea, P'yongyang denounced Seoul for "selling the nation's resources
to U.S. and Japanese aggressors," saying that South Korean authori-
ties had no right to "strike a bargain with anybody about our con-
tinental shelf." The following January, North Korea condemned South
Korea and declared "null and void" the agreement that Seoul and
Tokyo had just signed to develop jointly a portion of the East
China Sea shelf; P'yongyang declared the resources of the "south and
west seas" the wealth of the entire Korean people.
Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea
P'yongyang will probably support the establishment of a wide
coastal state exclusive economic zone -- 70 miles at the minimum.
The distance between the North Korean coast and a median line in
the Yellow Sea is less than 90 miles, but in the Sea of Japan the
distance is approximately 300 miles. That North Korea feels entitled
to. exert some jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea is illustrated
by North Korean seizure or rerouting of foreign fishing and
merchant vessels as far from shore as 70 miles. Of particular
interest in this regard, coming as it does on the eve of the LOS
Conference, is P'yongyang's 11 June 1974 announcement of its claim
to Dak-do (Liancourt Rocks), two barren, rocky islets in the Sea
of Japan some 130 miles from the coast of South Korea. South Korea
maintains a small police detachment on the easternmost island. Japan
calls the islands Take Shima, and is one of three claimants to their
ownership.
I. is reasonable to assume that North Korea would want complete
ownership of the resources and complete jurisdiction over research
activities and pollution control standards within its coastal zone.
The North Korean position on regulation of navigation and over-
flight beyond the territorial sea is unknown, and, with P'yongyang's
seemingly reckless acts there as a guide, any prediction would be
of little value. The North Korean delegation will probably oppose
revenue sharing in the coastal zone. North Korea will depend on its
continuing friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. to maintain its own
distant-water fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and those areas of
the Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea that could conceivably become part
of a Soviet exclusive economic zone.
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Fisheries
North Korea can be expected to favor complete coastal state owner-
ship and management rights over fisheries within the exclusive coastal
state economic zone to assure continued growth of its own fishing
industry. These rights would probably include the freedom to satisfy
its own needs from available fish stocks, as well as freedom to parcel
out the remainder to countries of its choosing. President Kim Il-song,
in his public statements, has often mentioned the need for proper
management and conservation of the country's fishery resources. In
light of its plans and efforts to increase fish production, North
Korea will probably want assurances of access to the fish stocks
beyond the coastal state economic zone, but P'yongyang may be
satisfied with a form of access that is governed by an international
fisheries control organization.
High Seas
North Korea's interception and seizure or rerouting of foreign
fishing and merchant vessels beyond its territorial sea and the
seizure and shooting down of U.S. intelligence-gathering craft are
illustrative of P'yongyang's desire to exert some control over
navigation and overflight of the high seas adjacent to its territorial
sea. Any prediction on this point, as stated earlier, would be of
little value; nevertheless, whatever P'yongyang's final high seas
policy, it will have to be formulated with due consideration given
to the effects of a too restrictive regime on its own growing
merchant and distant-water fishing activities.
Deep Seabed
North Korea has no indigenous deep sea mining capability and
is likely to look upon a unified, international regime as the only
way to get an equitable shareof the seabed's resources. P'yongyang
would probably want an international regime to have broad powers to
manage, explore, and exploit the seabed; would favor maximum
revenue sharing; and would want to exercise maximum control over
the regime's activities -- a one-nation-one-vote system, but preferably
a weighted voting system favoring socialist countries or developing
countries.
Pyongyang probably has not thought very much about landlocked
states. Mongolia, its nearest landlocked neighbor, is 600 miles away
and would not have to deal with North Korea for transit rights to the
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sea. North Korea would probably willingly vote landlocked and other
geographically disadvantaged states a share of the revenue from the
resources of the international seabed, but would be reluctant to
let them share in the resources of the coastal state economic zone.
Marine Pollution
North Korea will view its authority to set the pollution control
and enforcement standards for its economic zone as another vehicle
for exercising national sovereignty. There is the possibility that
North Korea will agree together with its neighbors to special
standards for the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan that incorporate
coastal state or regional enforcement measures.
In the interest of national security, North Korea will undoubtedly
vote for measures that: 1) require coastal state consent for and,
perhaps, participation in scientific research in the zone of coastal
state jurisdiction and 2) place scientific research in the
international area under control of an international regime.
Regional Arrangements
North Korea has already entered into regional arrangements with
China that cover resource exploration and fishing in the Yellow Sea.
D. KEY POLICY MAKERS
Political power in North Korea is concentrated in the hands of
Kim I1-song, president and party leader. President Kim is jealous
of his country's sovereignty and sensitive to its place in world
affairs. He will surely be the decisive voice in formulating North
Korea's LOS policy, and will exert tight control over the North
Korean delegation to Caracas.
Mr. Kim Hyong-ik, Minister Plenipotentiary in the North Korea Office
of the Permanent Observer to the UN, is the only North Korean to
have attended a preliminary LOS meeting -- the December 1973
Organizational Conference. Mr Kim's observed reticence at that
conference should not be interpreted as North Korean disinterest
in LOS debate. He may have been using this first North Korean
international LOS experience as a learning situation, an opportunity
to gain background and knowledge for a more verbal participation
and, perhaps, to prepare for some hard-bargaining at Caracas.
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Part II - Background Information
Geography
World region: East Asia
Category: coastal
Bordering states: People's Republic of China, U.S.S.R.
Bordering bodies of water: Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, Korea Bay
Bordering semienclosed sea: Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea
Area of continental shelf: 13,200 sq. mi., shared with People's Republic
of China
Area to 200 mi. limit: 37,800 sq. mi., shared with People's Republic
of China
Area to edge of continental margin: 20,400 sq. mi.
Coastline: 1,500 statute mi.
Land: 47,000 sq. statute mi.
Population: 16,005,000
Industry and Trade
GNP: $6.0 billion,
Major industries: machine building, electric power, chemicals,
mining, metallurgy, textiles, food processing
Exports: $400 million; minerals, chemical and metallurgical products
(1972)
Imports: $640 million; machinery and equipment, petroleum, foodstuffs,
coking coal (1972)
Major trade partners: total trade turnover $1 billion (1972); about
one-fourth with non-Communist countries, three-fourths with
Communist countries (almost one-half with the U.S.S.R.)
Merchant marine: 9 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 47,400 GRT;
7 cargo, 2 tanker; North Korea beneficially owns one cargo ship
7,400 GRT which is operated by a Polish shipping company under the
Polish flag
Economic importance: fish, shellfish, and seaweed are exported;
locally important as a source of animal protein
Other fishing areas: U.S.S.R.
Species: whiting, pollack, many coastal species
Production: 20,000 tons (synthetically from coal)
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Government Leaders
President and General Secretary of the Korean Labor Party, Kim
Il-song; Premier, Kim Il
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ho Tam
Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interests
IPU . . . . . . . . . . Interparliamentary Union
UN . . . . . . . . . . United Nations (observer status only)
UNCTAD . . . . . . . . U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
WHO . . . . . . . . . . World Health Organization
Present Ocean Claims
Type Date Terms
Territorial 12 mi.
Sea
Exclusive 12 mi.
Fishing
Source, Notes
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