LAW OF THE SEA COUNTRY STUDY SINGAPORE
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CIA-RDP79-01054A000100110001-8
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S
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Publication Date:
May 1, 1974
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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Law of the Sea Country Study
Singapore
Secret
BGI LOS 74-11
May 1974
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
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FOREWORD
The Law of the Sea Country Studies are prepared to support
the NSC Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea. The
countries to be included in the series are selected on the
basis of priorities suggested by the chairman of the Task
Force.
Each study has two parts. Part I is an analysis of the
primary geographic, economic,
might influence the country's
public and private expressions
basic data and information
and political factors that
law of the sea policy, the
of that policy,
Part II provides
the sea matters.
?earinq on aw o
This study was prepared by the Office of Basic and
Geographic Intelligence. Biographic support was provided by
the Central Reference Service. The study was coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence and with the Depart-
ment of State. Comments and questions may be directed to the
LOS Country Studies Working Group, Code 143, Extension 2257.
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CONTENTS
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
Summary 1
Factors Influencing Policy 1
Law of the Sea Policy 4
Ke Polic Makers, LOS Negotiators and Advisers 9
Part II - Background Information
Basic Data 14
Conventions 15
Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interests 15
Present Ocean Claims 16
Action on Significant UN Resolutions 17
ANNEX
Draft articles submitted by Singapore to the Seabed Committee
Maps: Map of Singapore
Regional map
Theoretical Division of the World Seabed
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SINGAPORE
Part I - Law of the Sea Analysis
A. SUMMARY
Singapore, a tiny state with jurisdiction over
only 100 square nautical miles of continental
shelf, has directed most of its Law of the Sea
(LOS) lobbying efforts toward promoting the
narrowest possible coastal state resources zones
and an international deep seabed regime with
jurisdiction over the greatest possible seabed
area. Singapore has suggested that a coastal
state resources zone of 40 nautical miles or to
the 200-meter isobath (whichever is farther) will
be fair to all parties. If a broad exclusive
resources zone is adopted at the LOS Conference, Singapore will demand
special consideration for the economic interests of geographically dis-
advantaged states. Singapore, along with five other disadvantaged states,
submitted draft articles in Subcommittee II that proposed granting rights
on an equal and non-discriminatory basis to such states for the explora-
tion and exploitation of the living resources in an economic zone under
the jurisdiction of neighboring states.
Singapore is a strong advocate of free transit through international
waterways, especially as it is Southeast Asia's busiest port and its
economy is reliant on continued free access to its port facilities by
all ships through the Malacca-Singapore Straits. But, because Indonesia
and Malaysia have demanded an innocent passage regime through the
Malacca-Singapore waterway, Singapore has been circumspect in stating
its straits position.
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING LOS POLICY
Special Geographic Features
Singapore comprises a main island of 225 square miles and a sprinkling
of about 40 smell islands that lie to the south in the Singapore Strait.
The main island is separated from West Malaysia by the narrow Johore
Strait, and the two countries are linked by a 3,500-foot highway-railway
causeway. The Singapore Strait--the southeastern extension of the Strait
of Malacca--separates Singapore from the Indonesian-owned Riau Islands,
the nearest of which is less than 5 miles away. The Malacca-Singapore
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passageway has long been a vital link in the international shipping
route between the northern Indian Ocean and the Pacific.
Uses of the Sea
There has been no exploration for or exploitation of any nonliving
resources from Singapore's small sector of the continental shelf, and
the contribution of Singapore's domestic fisheries production to the
GNP is small. Land reclamation and industrialization along Singapore's
shores have had a deleterious affect on the exploitation of living
resources from its territorial sea; the nearshore fish catch, never
large, has declined steadily in recent years. Most of Singapore's
production comes from distant-water fisheries in the South China Sea
and the Indian Ocean. There has been a government effort in recent years
to increase this distant-water capability. Its fishing boats have been
seized in the territorial waters of Indonesia, India, and Burma.
Singapore, consequently, wants a narrow exclusive fishing zone to be
adopted at the LOS Conference and wants special rights granted to
states with distant-water fishing interests.
Singapore port, with one of the world's largest and best natural
deep-water harbors, is Southeast Asia's busiest and the most important
on the shipping lanes between Europe and East Asia. The rapidly expand-
ing port facilities include miles of docks that can accommodate the
world's largest ships, Southeast Asia's only container terminal, and
drydocks that can handle 230,000-ton supertankers.
Singapore's merchant fleet is of vital importance to its economy
and is growing rapidly. The function of the fleet is to link Singapore
with suppliers of raw materials for processing in Singapore facilities
and, to a lesser extent, with the markets of its processed goods. Most
Singapore-registered vessels sail no farther than ports in Malaysia or
Indonesia. In April 1972, the fleet comprised 143 vessels of 1,000
gross register tons (g.r.t.) or over, totaling 763,338 g.r.t. or
1,022,918 deadweight tons (d.w.t.). Most of the ships were old, small,
and slow. Eighteen more ships totaling 429,100 d.w.t.--including dry
cargo, tankers, and container vessels--were on order at that time.
Singapore's goal is a merchant fleet of 1.5 million d.w.t. by 1975.
The missions of the Singapore Maritime Command are to defend
Singapore's territorial waters, assist in maintaining customs and
maritime laws, and provide waterborne support to the Singapore Army
and Air Defense Command. While its modern gunboat fleet can adequately
patrol its territorial waters and provide support to the marine police
in law enforcement, it could not defend against a naval attack by
either Malaysia or Indonesia. The fleet is small and personnel
limited. The nucleus of the fleet comprises six modern 110-foot
motor gunboats and six guided-missile patrol boats.
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Political and Military Factors
Singapore is a tiny Chinese city-state sandwiched between Malaysia
and Indonesia, two relatively large and potentially hostile countries.
Relations between Singapore and its two neighbors were strained during
the 1960's: Indonesia's policy of "confrontation," 1963-66, was aimed
at the Malaysian Federation which, at that time, included Singapore;
Singapore withdrew from the Federation in 1965. Relations today, while
still containing an element of distrust because of the anti-Chinese
bias of the governments of both Indonesia and Malaysia, are generally
good. Singapore does, however, consider Malaysia to be the major out-
side threat to its security.
The three states have cooperated in such regional ventures as the
formation of a consortium to survey the Malacca-Singapore Straits. All
three countries along with Thailand and the Philippines are members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), formed in 1967.
While ASEAN was originally intended to promote regional cooperation,
Singapore feels that it is increasingly being used as a political
forum; it wants a de-emphasis on politics and increased stress on
regional economic development.
Since its independence in 1965, Singapore has followed a nonaligned
foreign policy. Trade and cultural relations have been promoted with
the U.S.S.R., European Communist Countries, and North Korea; by 1972,
relations had been established with all of the European communist
states except Albania and East Germany. Singapore, however, has no
diplomatic or consular relations with either the People's Republic of
China (PRC) or the Republic of China because it fears that links with
either might hamper efforts to redirect domestic loyalties internally.
Singapore is, nonetheless, moving slowly in the wake of its fellow
ASEAN members to develop a more positive China policy. Singapore
supported PRC admission into the UN but felt that U.S.-PRC rapproche-
ment in 1972 was premature.
Great Britain ended a 150-year security role in Singapore and
Malaysia in 1971, when the Anglo-Malayan Defense Agreement was per-
mitted to lapse. Economic and cultural ties remain close, however, and
Singapore is active in Commonwealth affairs. Singapore questions the
effectiveness of the Five Power Defense Arrangement that replaced the
British military commitment and is, consequently, beefing up its own
military capability. The arrangement, signed in April 1971 by Singa-
pore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, calls
for consultation by all five powers in the event of an armed attack or
externally aided insurrection and for token Commonwealth military forces
to be stationed in both Malaysia and Singapore.
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Singapore-U.S. relations are generally good. Singapore supported
U.S. involvement in Indochina which, it felt, diverted Communist
pressure from Singapore. Singapore has expressed doubts about the
Nixon Doctrine and favors a continuance of U.S. economic and strategic
presence in Southeast Asia so as to prevent any power from gaining
complete hegemony over the region.
Economic Factors
Singapore, the most prosperous country in Southeast Asia, is the
commercial and transport hub of the region. As the region's leading
entrepot port, it processes and re-exports the raw materials of
neighboring countries, particularly of Indonesia and Malaysia. But
Singapore's entrepot trade, although increasing in volume, has declined
in importance in recent years because of the rapid expansion of its own
export-oriented manufacturing industries and the increasing tendency
of its neighbors to develop their own trading channels. Petroleum
products are Singapore's most important export with Indonesian crude
oil processed in Singapore refineries. The petroleum companies engaged
in offshore exploration in Southeast Asia use Singapore as an operations
base. Malaysia and Indonesia are Singapore's most important trading
partners. A small amount of the trade between them goes unrecorded,
particularly raw materials smuggled on small boats from Indonesia's
Riau Islands.
Singapore receives only limited foreign aid, most of it in the form
of technical assistance. The UN Development Program contributed about
$7 million in 1970, including technical assistance. Some $10 million
in bilateral aid was disbursed in 1970, mostly from the United Kingdom
and Japan. The United States does not have a bilateral aid program
with Singapore.
C. LAW OF THE SEA POLICY
Territorial Sea
Singapore claims a 3-mile territorial sea. Squeezed in by narrow
straits that separate it from the territory of its neighbors on all
sides, it could claim no more than 4 miles before an equidistant-line
principle would apply. Despite the limitations imposed on its terri-
torial sea by its own geography, Singapore will support a 12-mile
limit at the LOS Conference.
Straits
Singapore's prosperity is dependent on continued free access to its
port by all oceangoing vessels through the Malacca-Singapore passage-
way. Its position on the straits issue is a delicate one. On the one
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hand, it supports a free transit regime in all straits traditionally
considered to be international waterways; on the other hand, it is
reluctant to openly support a free transit regime in such straits
because it would contradict the straits policies of Indonesia and
Malaysia, who have demanded an innocent passage regime in the
Malacca-Singapore Straits.
Singapore, stressing harmony with its Straits neighbors, signed
the 1971 joint statement that assigned responsibility for the safety
of navigation in the Malacca-Singapore waterway exclusively to the
three states. In the second part of the statement, however, Singapore
simply took note of the Malaysian-Indonesian proclamation that the
waterway is not an international one. Singapore has cooperated with
Malaysia and Indonesia in forming a consortium with Japan to survey
the Malacca-Singapore waterway and to establish a navigation improve-
ment program, including a traffic separation scheme first proposed by
IMCO in 1967. Singapore has avoided openly airing its differences with
its neighbors on the straits issue and the three countries have main-
tained united fronts at international forums. But, while Singapore
continues to speak of freedom of navigation in the straits, Indonesia
and Malaysia still talk of innocent passage.
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in an August 1973 speech, said that
the Indian Ocean and its entrances--Malacca, Good Hope, and Suez--
should be open to all "peace-loving ships." Malacca has been an
international waterway for hundreds of years. If this status is to be
changed, he contended, it should be changed by international acclaim
at the LOS Conference. Despite Singapore's endorsement of free transit
in the Malacca-Singapore passageway, four maritime command ships and
an air defense command transport aircraft followed a Soviet naval
task force that transited the Singapore Strait in November 1973.
Continental Shelf
Singapore is a shelf-locked state with jurisdiction over a conti-
nental shelf sector of only about 100 square nautical miles, most of
it in the Singapore Strait. Singapore, along with other landlocked
and shelf-locked states, charges that the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf favors both developed countries and countries with
broad continental shelves. They are particularly anxious to delete the
exploitability clause from the convention because it favors the
interests of the technologically advanced countries and, if carried
to the ultimate, could mean the end of the common heritage concept.
They also are concerned that, according to the Santa Domingo Declara-
tion, states with shelves that extend farther than 200 miles from their
shores could exploit the seabeds beyond 200 miles to as far as the 200-
meter isobath.
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Coastal State Jurisdiction Beyond the Territorial Sea
Because Singapore fishermen fish extensively in the high seas of
South and Southeast Asia, broad economic zones that would not make
allowances for such geographically disadvantaged states as Singapore
would be catastrophic to its fishing industry. Singapore is strongly
opposed to broad economic zones, such as the proposed 200-mile
exclusive resources zone, and will lobby hard for the narrowest
possible zone at the LOS Conference. Singapore feels, however, that
if a broad coastal state economic zone in the high seas contiguous to
the territorial sea is adopted, special consideration must be given to
the economic interests of the geographically disadvantaged states in
the zone. Singapore has suggested several options for the accommodation
of such states: 1) neighboring geographically disadvantaged states
could have equal rights to exploit the living resources in the
exclusive resource zone, observing all regulations of the coastal
state; 2) such a zone would not be an exclusive one but, rather, one
of preferential rights of the coastal state to exploit resources;
3) the zone adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal state in one
region would be considered a reserve for the exclusive use by all
states in that region regardless of geographic position.
Singapore, along with Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, and
Nepal, sponsored Draft Articles on Resource Jurisdiction of Coastal
States Beyond the Territorial Sea in Subcommittee II of the Seabed
Committee on 16 July 1973. The articles attempt to reconcile and
accommodate the vital needs and major interests of all states,
including coastal, landlocked, disadvantaged coastal, and distant-
water fishing. The articles express the right of coastal states to
establish resources jurisdiction in a zone beyond their territorial
sea and of geographically disadvantaged states to participate on an
equal and nondiscriminatory basis in the exploration and exploitation
of the living resources of an economic zone under the jurisdiction of
neighboring states. Arrangements for the regulation of such exploita-
tion should be made bilaterally. Distant-water fishing states not in
the region would then be permitted to exploit that part of the maximum
allowable yield of the living resources of the zone that the states
primarily interested therein could not harvest. These states would
have to observe regulations set by the coastal state and make appropri-
ate payment for the right to fish.
Coastal states would contribute to the international authority out
of revenues derived from exploitation of the nonliving resources of its
zone. "The rate of contribution shall be.. .percent* of the revenues
from exploitation carried out within 40 miles or the 200-meter isobath
*Percentage rates not specified in the articles.
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of the zone, whichever limit the coastal state may choose to adopt,
and.. .percent of the revenues from exploitation carried out beyond
40 miles or the 200-meter isobath within the zone." Different percentage
rates should apply to developed and lesser developed states. The Inter-
national Authority would distribute the revenues on the basis of
equitable sharing criteria.
Deep Seabed Authority
As a geographically disadvantaged state, Singapore is a strong
advocate of the common heritage concept for seabed resources. It
favors an international treaty that will allocate the greatest possible
part of the seabed to an internationally administered regime so that a
fair share of the revenues from its resources, especially those at
depths shallow enough to be currently exploitable, are distributed to
the geographically disadvantaged states--landlocked, shelf-locked,
narrow-shelved, and short-coasted. Singapore feels that an exclusive
coastal state zone, extending either 40 nautical miles from its base-
lines or to the 200-meter isobath (whichever is farther), will leave
an international area reasonably rich in immediately exploitable
hydrocarbon resources.
Singapore advanced specific proposals for the administration of an
international deep seabed regime in a preliminary working paper in the
Seabed Committee in August 1971 (cosponsored by Afghanistan, Austria,
Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, and the Netherlands) and again in a unilateral
statement in Subcomittee I in March 1972. Singapore proposes that the
regime, comprise two organs, the Assembly and the Council. All states
would be represented in the Assembly that would meet only once every
2 or 3 years. It would decide general policy and have the authority
to establish ad hoc bodies. The Council would be responsible for
implementing policy decided by the Assembly and for supervising
administration of the deep seabed regime. It would meet regularly and,
like the Assembly, have the authority to establish specialized ad hoc
committees. The Council would determine procedures for the exploration,
exploitation, and management of the resources under the regime's
administration. Rules and regulations established by the Council would
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and be binding on
all members. Membership in the Council would be designed so that all
interests are adequately represented. For example, "primarily coastal
states" and "primarily noncoastal states" should, according to Singapore,
be equally represented and, within each category, lesser developed
countries should be "adequately represented."
Singapore favors vesting the international regime with the right to
explore and exploit the deep seabed directly, engage in joint enterprise,
and grant licenses to states or corporations. The regime, moreover,
should administer not only the mineral resources of the seabed and
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subsoil but also those living organisms belonging to sedentary species
mentioned in Article 2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.*
Singapore feels that lesser developed nations should be granted
special consideration in the allocation of the resources and techno-
logical benefits from the deep seabed regime. Allocations should be
based on population and per capita income as well as on the extent of a
state's offshore resources production within its jurisdiction. The last
criteria would permit greater allocation of resources from the deep
seabed regime to such geographically disadvantaged states as Singapore.
Allocations should be reviewed every 5 years to accommodate state's
economic and demographic changes.
Singapore wants internationally agreed measures to safeguard the
markets of lesser developed countries with economies heavily reliant on
minerals production should the rate of exploitation of the international
seabed exceed that at which seabed minerals can be absorbed into the
world market.
Singapore believes that, in order to bar a coastal neighbor from
preventing a landlocked state from exploring or exploiting the inter-
national seabed by blocking transport from the coast, the Treaty
should declare that a landlocked state has the right of transit or
access through the land territory, internal waters, and territorial sea
of the coastal state to the international seabed area for the purpose
of exploration or exploitation. Precise arrangements between neighboring
coastal and landlocked states, however, would need to be worked out
bilaterally.
Singapore wants a compulsory settlement system but favors some
intermediate step involving compulsory conciliation and mediation
before requiring that states take disputes before a LOS tribunal.
Marine Pollution
Singapore has only a small domestic fleet fishing in its coastal
waters and no tourist beaches to be fouled by oil spills. Marine
pollution, therefore, has taken a low priority among the LOS issues.
Malaysia and Indonesia, on the other hand, have large fishing fleets in
the Malacca Strait and have voiced strong concerns about the threat of
oil spills by supertankers sailing through the crowded and hazardous
shipping lanes of the strait. Their efforts to bar supertankers larger
than 200,000 deadweight tons from the passageway have, however, gone
unheeded. Singapore does not want to impose high pollution standards on
*u organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile
on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant
physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil."
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ships sailing through the Malacca-Singapore passageway because it
could reduce the number of ships calling at its port facilities.
Singapore has made no proposals in the Seabed Committee for inter-
national mechanisms to control marine pollution. Singapore is, however,
generally agreeable with the U.S. approach to marine pollution issues
and supports proposals designed to develop objective standards
established by an international authority.
D. KEY POLICY MAKERS, LOS NEGOTIATORS AND ADVISERS
Ambassador Shunmugam Jayakumar, Singapore's Permanent Representative
to the United Nations, has been Singapore's chief LOS spokesman. He has
been one of the most effective and constructive negotiators in the LOS
preparatory stages, an extremely able advocate of the landlocked and
shelf-locked position, and a strong influence in opposition to proposalE
by coastal states for broad economic zones. He is to return to the law
faculty at the University of Singapore before the Caracas Conference
convenes and is to be replaced at the UN by Tommy Koh*, Dean of the Law
Faculty of the University of Singapore and a former ambassador to the
UN. Like Jayakumar, he is well versed on LOS matters and generally well
disposed to the United States.
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Name and Title (as they appear
on the latest UN listing)
*Mr. CHAO Hick Tin
State Counsel
Attorney-General's Chambers
Mr. Michael CHEOK
Legal Officer
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. CHOU Tai '(un
Ministry of Defense
*H.E. Mr. Shunmugam JAYAKUMAR
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotenitary
Permanent Representative to the UN
Mr. KAN Ting Chiu
State Counsel
Attorney-General's Chambers
Mr. KOH Eng Tian
Legal Officer
Attorney-General's Chambers
Mr. TAN Peng Boo
First Secretary
Permanent Mission to the UN
10
Seabed Committee Session Or g.
Mar
71
Jul
Aug
71
Feb
Mar
72
Jul
Aug
72
Mar
Apr
73
Jul
Aug
73
Conf.
Dec
73
X
X
X
X
XX
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Part II - Background Information
Geography
World region: Southeast Asia
Category: Island
Bordering bodies of water: Johore Strait,
Bordering straits: Johore Strait (1 n. mi
Area of continental shelf: 100 sq. n. mi.
Indonesia
Area to 200 n. mi. limit: 100 sq. n. mi.,
Indonesia
Area to edge of continental margin: 100 sq.
Coastline: 120 mi.
Land: 225 sq. mi.
Population: 2,204,000
Singapore Strait
.), Singapore Strait (5 n. mi.)
, shared with Malaysia,
shared with Malaysia,
n. mi.
Industry and Trade
GNP: $4.0 billion; $1,802 per capita (1973)
Major industries: rubber processing and rubber products, petroleum
refining, processed food and beverages, electronics, shipbuilding
and ship repair, entrepot trade
Exports: $3.6 billion (f.o.b., 1973); 60% reexports; petroleum products,
processed rubber, manufactured goods
Imports: $5.1 billion (c.i.f., 1973); 25% reexports; major retained
imports - manufactured goods, petroleum, food products
Major trade partners: exports - Malaysia, Indonesia, U.S., Japan, U.K.;
imports - Japan, Malaysia, U.S., U.K.
Merchant merine: 143 ships (1,000 GRT or over) totaling 763,338 GRT;
95 dry cargo, 7 bulk cargo, 12 tanker, 19 combination passenger-cargo,
2 refrigerator, 5 passenger, 2 car carrier, 1 timber carrier (April 1972)
Marine Fisheries
Catch: 14,700 metric tons (1972)
Economic importance: insignificant internationally; provides about 25% of
domestic needs
Other fishing areas: Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Burma, Thailand, Khmer
Republic, South Vietnam
Species: tuna, shrimp, lobster
Marine fisheries techniques: near-shore - seines, nets, traps, and stakes;
distant-water - troll lines and trawl nets
Other countries fishing off coast: slight fishing by Malaysia and
Indonesia
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Navy
Ships: 6 guided-missile patrol boats (2 have missiles installed; all
6 to have missiles installed by end of 1974), 6 fast patrol boats,
1 tank landing ship, 3 river/roadstead patrol boats
Government Leaders
President: Dr. Benjamin Sheares
Prime Minister: Lee Kuan Yew
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Sinnathamby Rajaratnam
Multilateral Conventions
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea. Signed February 1969.
International Convention of Load Lines. Signed December 1971.
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed July 1964.
Bilateral Conventions
Agreement on Stipulation of Territorial Sea Boundary Lines between
Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore. Signed May 12, 1973.
Multilateral Declarations
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore joint statement on the Safety of Navi-
gation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, 16 November 1971.
Membership in Organizations Related to LOS Interests
ADB Asian Development Bank
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Colombo Plan Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development
in South and Southeast Asia
ECAFE Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMCO Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization
WHO World Health Organization
WMO World Meteorological Organization
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Present Ocean Claims
Type Date Terms Source, Notes
Territorial 1878 3 n. mi. Territorial Waters Jurisdiction
Sea Act (U . K. )
Continental No law
Shelf
Exclusive 3 n. mi.
Fishing
Fisheries 1966 Within & be- Act No. 14, 1966, Apr 29, 1966
Conservation yond tern- Published May 11, 1966; operative
tonal sea Jan. 11, 1969
Pollution 1971 Within & be- Prevention of Pollution of the
yond tern- Sea, Jan. 12, 1971
tonal sea Implements International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution
in the Sea by Oil, 1954
16
SECRET
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SECRET
Action on Significant UN Resolutions
Moratorium Resolution
(A/RES/2574 D, XXIV, 12/15/69)
Pending establishment of international regime, States
and persons are bound to refrain from exploiting
resources of or laying claim to any part of the
seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
LOS Conference
(A/RES/2750 C, XXV, 12/17/70)
Convene in 1973 a Conference on Law of the Sea to
deal with establishment of international regime for
the seabed and ocean floor, and enlarge Seabed
Committee by 44 members and instruct it to prepare
for the conference draft treaty articles embodying
international regime.
In favor
In favor
LOS Conference, Timing and Site Adopted w/o vote
(A/RES/3029 A, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace
(A/RES/2992, XXVII, 12/15/72)
Called upon littoral and hinterland states of
Indian Ocean area, permanent members of the
Security Council and other major maritime users
of Indian Ocean to support concept that Indian
Ocean should be zone of peace.
Landlocked/Shelf-Locked Study Resolution
(A/RES/3029 6, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Called for study of extent and economic signifi-
cance, in terms of resources, of international
area resulting from each proposal of limits of
national jurisdiction presented to Seabed Committee.
Peruvian Coastal State Study Resolution
(A/RES/3029 C, XXVII, 12/18/72)
Called for study of potential economic signifi-
cance for riparian states, in terms of resources,
of each of the proposals on limits of national
jurisdiction presented to Seabed Committee.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(A/RES/3016 XXVII, 12/18/72)
Reaffirmed right of states to permanent sover-
eignty over all their natural resources, wherever
found.
17
SECRET
In favor
In favor
In favor
Abstain
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
GENERAL
A/AC.138/55
19 August 1971
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
CCITT a as Tim PEACEFUL USES
OF THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR
BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
Dual Distribution
Preliminary working-Paper submitted by AfAtanistan,
Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Nepal, Netherlands and
Singapore
Introduction: The present working-paper contains suggestions with respect to a
number of specific matters to be regulated, inter alia, in an
International Sea-bed Convention.
I. Limits and status of the international area:
A. The international area shall comprise all sea-bed and subsoil outside the
area of tbe territorial sea (the maximum breadth of 'which is 12 miles measured
from the base-line) and beyond the submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of
States. For the purpose of this article eixbmarine areas are considered to be
adjacent to the coast of a particular State if
- either their depth does not exceed 200 metres,
- or they underly a belt of sea the bread.;11 of which is 40 Liles measured from
the base-line of the territorial sea, according to the choice between the two
methods of delimitation to be made by that particular State at the moment of
ratification. The choice shall be final and the method of delimitation chosen
shall apply to the Whole of the coastline of that particular State.
B. In the international area all powers relating to the exploration and
exploitation of its mineral resources are exercised either by or an behalf of
the International Authority. "On behalf of the International Authority" means
that (a) any State Powers within the international area are based an and defined
In a licence given by the International Authority and (b) are exercised under
supervision of the International Authority, While (c) disputes relating to
GE. 71-17862
71-18635
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existence and exercise of these powers are to be settled by an impartial
tribunal at the request of any meaer State or the International ieuthoity.
C. Within the international area a belt of sea-bed and subsoil contiguous
to the adjacent submarine area as determined in accordance vith paragraph
above, and having a breadth of 4( miles measured from the outer hilt o. such
adjacent submarine area, shall contitute the coastal .,tate .1riority zone'.
In this zone the International Luthority cannot either explore and exploit
diisctly (see point III below). or license exploration and exploitation by a
State, without consent of the coastal State.
II. RepresentatiOn
hember States to be di-yided into two eategories, Cate7or..,,I consists of
primarily coastal States: category of primarily non-coastal Status. Each
member State shallindicate at the moment of ratification to which eatecorz- it
beloncs. In any ?lean of the International Autholity, in which not all States
uembers are represented (such as the Council) there shoul0 be an equal number
of representatives of cate:ory and. el category 13. each catecory
developing countries should he adeouately represented.
III. PoWers of the International 1,uthority
The Assembly uay upon recoumendation of the Council decide to establish
a body charced with direct expla..ation, exploitation ane. marlzetinc (including
the direct licensing o: a pri:ate or public enterprise, joint-ventures and
service-contracts) of a specified. part of the international area.
I . Facilities for landloemd States
l!hen the Council of the International Authority licenses a 1endlocl7ed
State, actinc alone- or together with another State, to exploit a narticulea-
part of the International area it shall - in accordance with the rieht of free
access of land-locked countries to the sea - recommend arrangements between
the landlocked State and on or .Acx!e other member States derigned to ensure
effectiVe freedom of communication between the landleC:ed State and the area
under licence, for the purpose of expla,ation, exploitation, includinu storage
end processing and maezeting of the uineral resources of that area.
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V. Speciftl interests of developing countries
In the exercise of its powers the International Authority shall at all
times take duly into account the primary purpose of promoting the development
of developing countries, inter alia by (a) avoiding or compensating, idlers
necessary, possible adverse effects of exploitation of any part of the
international area an such development (2) contributing an appropriate part
of its revenuee to such development, and (c) furthering participation of
developing countries in the activities undertaken by it or an its behalf.
Sharing of benefits shall be equitable and, in principle, related to need,
taking into consideration the stage of economic development of each
member State.
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
LINITE)
5"?
A/AC.138/SC.II/L.39
16 July 1973
Original: ENGLISH
COMTATE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF TIE
SEA-BM AND TIE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND
TE LDAITS OF NATIONAL JUR/SDICTION
SUB-COMMITTEE II
(1)
(2)
DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESOURCE JURISDICTION OF COASTAL STATES
BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA
proposed by the delegations of Afghanistan, Austria,
Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal and Singapore
in the context of the discussions on the recognition of the jurisdiction of
coastal States over the resources in a zone adjacent to their territorial sea, and
as a formula attempting to accommodate the vital needs and major interests of all
States, which does not necessarily reflect the final views of the sponsoring
delegations.
ARTICLE I
(1) Coastal States
territorial sea, a
the baselines from which
(2) Coastal S.Gates
jurisdiction over the
shall have the
Zone which may
the breadth of
right to establish, adjacent to the
not extend beyond nautical miles from
the territorial sea is measured.
shall have, subjec-G to the provisions of Articles II and III,
Zone and the right to explore and exploit all living and
non-living resources therein.
ARTICLE II
(1) Landlocked and coastal States which cannot or do not declare a Zone
pursuant to Article I (hereinafter referred to as the Disadvantaged States), as well
as natural or juridical persons under their control, shall have the right to
participate in the exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the
Zone of neighbouring coastal States on an equal and. non-discriminatory basis.
For the purpose of facilitating the orderly development and the rational management
and exploitation of the living resources of particular Zones, the States concerned
may decide upon appropriate arrangements to regulate the exploitation of the resources
in that Zone.
CE. 75.-4O576
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(2) in the Zone the coastal State may annually reserve for itself and
such other Disadvantaged States as may be exorcising the right under the preceding
paragraph, that part of the maximum allowable yield, as determined by the relevant
international fisheries - organisation, which corresponds to the harvesting capacity
and needs of these States.
(3) States other than those referred to in paragraph I shall have the right to
exploit that part of the remaining allowable yield subject to payMents, to be
determined under equi-Cable conditions, and regulations laid down by the coastal States
for the exploitation of the living resources of the Zone.
(4) Disadvantaged States shall not transfer the right conferred upon them in
paragraph 1 to third parties. However, this provision shall not preclude the
Disadvantaged States from entering into arrangements with third parties for the
purpose of enabling them to develop viable fishing industries of their own.
(5) A developed coastal State, which establishes a Zone pursuant to
Article I, paragraph 1, shall contribute .... per cent of its revenuesa/ derived
from the exploitation of the living resources in that Zone to the International
Authority. Such contributions shall be distributed by the International Authority on
the basis of equitable sharing criteria
(6) In exploiting the living resources the States referred to in paragraphs 1 and
3 of this Article shall observe the regulations and measures pertaining to management
and conservation in the respective Zones.
ARTICLE III
(1) A coastal State shall make contributions to the International Authority out
of the revonuesa/ derived from exploitation of the non-living resources of its
Zone in accordance with tho following paragraph.
(2) The rate of contribution shall be per centh/ of the revenues from
.exploitation carried out within forty miles or 200 metres isobath of the Zone,
aj The word "revalues" shall have to be defined.
12/ It is understood that different rates should apply to developed and
developing countries.
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whichever limit the coastal State may choose to adopts and .... per aentli of the
revenues from exploitation carried out beyond forty miles or 200 metres isobath
within the Zone.
(3) The International Authority shall distribute these contributions on the
basis of equitable sharing criteria.
ARTICLE IV
Any dispute arising from the interpretation and application of the provisions of
the foregoing Articles shall be subject to the procedures for the compulsory
settlement of disputes provided for in the Convention.
jil It is understood that different rates should apply to developed and
developing countries.
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UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
Distr.
LIMITED
A/AC.138/SC.III/L.22
31 July 1972
Original: ENGLISH
COMMITith ON TBE PEACEFUL USES OF THE
SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND TBE
LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION
SUB-COMMITTEE
Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Indonesia, .Japan, Malaysia,
New Zealand, Peru, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand: draft resolution
The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction,
Recalling the suggested statement of views submitted to Sub-Committee III at the
8th meeting of that Sub-Committee,
Further recalling the resolution on the subject of nuclear testing adopted by the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, as well as Principle 26 of the
Declaration on the Human Environment adopted by the same Conference,
Acting in furtherance of the principles of the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
Having noted the concern of the nations and peoples of the Pacific at, and their
opposition to, the conduct of the nuclear weapon tests in that region,
Bearing in mind its obligation to propose legal norms for the preservation of
the marine environ_ent and the prevention f marine pollution;
1. Declares that no further nuclear tieapons tests likely to contribute to tho
contamination of the marine environment should be carried out;
2. Requests its Chairman to forward this resolution to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations for referral to the appropriate United Nations bodies,
including the Conference of tho Committee on Disarmament.
24-1 (A/8421, Annex V)
GE.72 -14559
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INDIA
KER.:
' THEORETICAL DIVISION
OF THE SEABED
Seabed less than 200 meters
jJ (656 feet) deep
'
L
Continental platform deeper
than 200 meters; plateaus,
or slopes steeper than 140
-
Continental rise, with slopes _
flatter than 140 and steeper
than 11000 (outer edge
approximates the seaward
limit of the continental margin) ,
1 Area beyond 200 nautical
, mile seabed jurisdiction
' ? Equidistant division of the
, seabed (to 200 nm or edge
of the continental margin)
, ; I
,
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