ADDRESS BY MR. ROBERT AMORY, JR. BEFORE THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISIE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 25, 1955
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Approved For Release,
ADDRESS BY Mt. ROBERT AMORY, JR.
BEFORE THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA
25 AUGUST 1955 Document No. __.___________.
CURRENT WCRID INTELL ?NWARR0? In Class. 0
^ Declassified 25X1
Class. Changod to: TS S ( )
General Eddleman, General Dunn: text Review Date: - - --tr
It's a pleasure to be back here. bath.: 111170?3
Date:
I do think I might correct one date in a introduction
the class spends some time figuring out how all known promotional
regulations have been violated in my career. I was commissioned
before Pearl Harbor; otherwise, I think it would have been a little
bit difficult to get on. But I agree with you that it was the finest
theater. It was the best fun theater in the war, too. There were
always little fights, and the high command was so far removed from
you, you were never particularly worried by it. I remember at one
point, for amusement, putting my battalion radio net down in the
same distance on a map of Europe and I would have had one company
in Copenhagen and one in Biarritz and one in Milan, and that was
slightly bigger than General Eisenhower's spread-out at that par-
ticular time.
Well, what we've got to cover this morning is just as badly
and widely spread as a little engineer battalion was ten, twelve
years ago. What I propose to try to do is to focus, for the first
part of the talk, on the situation in the Soviet Union and the other
states that with it comprise, as we call, the Sino-Soviet bloc, 25X1
where they are now, how in recent past they got there, and then take
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a tour around selected areas immediately outside of the bloc in
the Free World, or the doubtful area, to indicate some of the
situations of weakness from our point of view, of opportunity
from their point of view, that may be exploited even during your
current school year or in the period immediately following. I
have no objection in the question period to try to respond to any
questions on areas I do not cover, as well as those that I try to
touch upon.
First,, let's look at the internal economic conditions in the
Soviet bloc. There's been so much talk, frequently misquoted, but
at any rate getting out in the press about an internal crisis, a
possible economic collapse, depression and so on, etc. in the
Soviet Union that it's important at the outset to get our facts
straight on that.
In the first place, 1954 as contrasted with 1953 was a genuine-
ly successful year for the Soviets. It enabled them early in this
year, in May, to announce, and I think to have announced correctly,
the completion of their fifth five-year plan some eight months
ahead of schedule. This means that what they set out to do, in a
certain amount of time, they succeeded in doing in about 7/8's of
that time, a clear plus from their point of view. Moreover, look-
ing back at their longer ranged plans,. I've been taking as a datum
point to Stalin's first major postwar address in 1946 in which he
set certain goals for key elements of the economy: coal, steel,
oil and electric power, as required for what he called "the economic
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basis of socialism!' and said those should be accomplished by 1960.
They are now either at that point or within striking distance this
years or early next year, of that. Thus, from their point of views
to say that their system has not proceeded at least according to
their plans, and their plans are optimistic and ambitious, is to
kid ourselves.
Admittedly, heavy industry continues to get favored probably
more now than it did in the early Malenkov period, but light indus-
try is by no means ignored. But the emphasis on the investment
sector of the economy is, as professional would call its gives
them a relative accretion, net accretions over any year, that is
quite different in proportion to ours and one would gather from com-
paring gross national products we're inclined to says "Look, great
prosperous Americas what is it now, they're quoting 380 billion
dollars a year GNP's, Soviet's a hundred and some plus, approxi-
mate 1/3 or less!!. However, when you take and throw away., out
of those big piles, all the hair-dos, all the baseball games.. all
the nights spent in motels and things., and find out what's left over
in terms of physical hardware., or plant, or something like that.,
you find that the ratio of investment is 80% Soviet to the United
States; thus, in terms of enduring power that an economy gives a
country, they are a lot closer to us than a superficial look at
their gross would indicate.
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Turning for a second to agriculture because many people cor-
rectly call that the Achilles heel of the Soviet system drid its
economic potential. The prospects are that 1955 will be a better
year than '54 and,, in fact., probably the best.year in their history.
Ukrainian crops are already coming in, they are bumper, already
they've been delivered to the barns.. as they call it., some 70 million
foods, it would be about 5 million tons more than was received in the
barns in the bumper year of 1952. Conversely, the new lands program
is not as good acre-for-acre as it was last year because the rain-
fall that they got in nuch unusually plentiful quantities last
year hasn't hit them this year.. but they've sown so much more land
that that will net out alright.
Thus it's wrong to look at their agriculture as a current crisis#
something that causes them to change their policies in the immediate
future; rather it is a long-term problem that confronts them., a
problem of continually adding to the industrial labor force. We
have gotten great in this country because we can now put only 8 out
of every 100 working people to work to feed us. The Soviet still
have pretty near 50% of their people inefficiently working to feed
the rest of them, and that is the problem to which Khrushchev and
his friends are addressing themselves so intentionally. And in the
talks that some of our people have had, and some American people
have had with the Soviet Minister who has just been over here look-
ing at the farms, you see that that's what their working on. Time
T
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and again the thing that impresses them most is that this could
be mechanized, this could be done, this, and we could save a laborer
as compared with our way of doing it. Soy it is a big problem., it's
a long continuing one that they will not solve right away, but it
is not something that gives them any sense of immediate urgency or
alarm, and certainly the idea that they are starving and that our
great wheat surpluses or something like that is something they are
begging for., is;not true. Their present program is to add to the
zone area of the Soviet Union and the equivalent of all the agricul-
tural lands of Canada, and they realize that they're dealing with
lands that could be ruined by erosion and overcultivation just as
the Dakotas and parts of Colorado and Oklahoma were ruined in the
past in this country. But they're aware of that and they're doing
lots of interesting things to plow shallowly., etc.., etc. And the
they're going about this in a sensible and likely in a success-
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ful way; therefore., the prospect is at least an even bet that in four
or five years, instead of being in a worse agricultural crisis.,
the Soviet Union will return once more to the world's economy as
one of the great wheat and grain exporting countries.
Now for a second, let's also look at the condition of the internal
25X1 populace,
last few days you probably had a lot of this. All I would do to
summarize it up is that the police terror that was so terrible in
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the late 1930s, that appeared again for a while in '48, that looked
as if it were coming to a head in a particularly vicious form in
the time of the doctor's plot, just before Stalin died, in the
winter of 152, 153, has significantly relaxed.
the people now feel safe to go about their daily life free from mid-
night knocks on the door so long as they obey the "keep off the
grass" signs. Sure you can't go around doing things that are posi-
tively verboten or otherwise against the regime, but you can enjoy
your own life insofar as one can there and know that capricious
police terror is a thing of the past.
Moreover, with all the talk of heavy industry and other things,
the consumer's lot is a constantly improving one. It would be a
ghastly thing for any American housewife of no matter how relatively
low on our standard of living go there and try to make do in the
Soviet Union. But, after all, the thing that counts in the terms
of the satisfaction and relative acceptance of a regime by its
populace, it's how their welfare of that sort coipares with what
they had in the past; and, approximately 4 or 5% gain in general
standard of living; not in food, that's one thing, the food is dull
but there's enough of it. But in terms of not only the consumer durables
they can buy, housing they can live in, but particularly the ser-
vices there: hospitalization, the vacation possibilities, the
chances of travel and entertainment, are constantly up, up. It's
a controlled process in which the leaders, pressing for the rapidest
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possible economic growth, are doling out just what they think is
enough to keep them sufficiently popular so that they don't have
a repression problem.
Now let's look for a moment or two on some detail as to the
costs of what we call "the evolution of Soviet leadership" over the
past 22 years. It is important, I think, that we understand, and
I'll let the cat out of the bag at the outset, we understand their
understanding of collective leadership all too much, particularly
in the early days of the period right after Stalin's death. Every-
body was trying to figure who the next Stalin is, whose got the
knife out for whom, and how is this tournament going to work out
to produce one man leadership on the assumption that nothing other
than one man leadership could possibly run a dictatorship? I think
we are now not predicting that there never will emerge an Napoleon
or Stalin or something like that in Russia, but we are not as sure,
I've never been so sure and the others are not as sure, that it
can't run for a prolonged period of time on this directorate basis
that it now shows. Malenkov, there's no question that Malenkov
was an able man, in a way, but he was no Stalin. None of them
are Stalins in the sense that: of demonstrated ability to inspire
terror and control in their others. He was a collective choice,
he was put forward. He may have made a preliminary lunge by trying
to hold both the premiership and the first secretaryship of the
party, but that only lasted five days, and I'm more inclined now
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to say that in retrospect that was probably all part of the plan,,
they just got the papers five days apart, but there was a balance
maintained.
Now the first thing that confronted this group, then., was the
question of the secret police, and you will remember that all through
the latter part of Stalinrs era the ghershoffs of the barriers re-
ported directly to him, to his private secretariate, they came under
no other ministry and it was a one man's show and, of course, a
terrible menace to anybody if he made a mistake, if he talked out
of turn - Bang! The higher he was the quicker he fell. And the
one thing they're all agreed upon was that that form of latent
threat to each and everyone of them was thenceforth intolerable.
And there are stories
hat Beria was actually planning a quick lunge for supreme
dictatorial power. I'm reasonably convinced that that is not true,
It is more likely something like this happened: they called Beria
in, or just in a meeting., said, "OK boys, now we got to talk about
reorganizing the secret police. The secret police is going to be
under a committee and we're going to break away its big economic
monopolies that give it extra power, the running of Dahlstroy,
the gold mines and uranium mines in the Far Eastern Siberia, that's
not a legitimate police function, that's going to come under the
ministry of nonferrous metals, etc., etc." and Beria resisted, and
it was his resistance to that that made them suspicious, not that
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he was going to do something next week or next month, but that they
couldn't leave him there; and so, he got his.'
The group also, I'm sure' can be likened to a group of American
executives who have lived under a guy like George Washington Hill,
you've probably, many of you, remember reading, five or six years
ago, the novel, "The Hucksters", a rather delightful piece, and an
old tyrant, an old so-and-so who spit on the Directors' table and
made people like it, and that kind of thing, just gets awfully
obnoxious; and also, they got very tired of his tiradic, capricious
actions. And so there was a tendency to liquidate the things that
they thought were completely foolish, they liquidated a lot of
grandiose schemes to cut canals where canals weren't needed, to
move mountains, etc., etc. And, they liquidated the Korea War and
I believe really, in a sense, liquidated the Indochinese War because
any military analysis in the spring of 1954 would show you that if
the Communists had kept the pressure on, the French had had it, and
barring our intervention, and we showed obviously in April that when
we couldn't bring our allies with us we weren't going to intervenes
they could clearly, by military means, have gotten South Indochina
now. I don't mean that it was all out of the goodness of their
hearts, but they just decided this was a kind of risk we're not
going to take, we'll pick this up in good time by political and
other means. And so they out their bets back on the board and started
to look around for ways to improve the situation.
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Now Malenkov and Mikoyan and others went off rapidly in the
direction of increasing consumer goods, they talked about advancing
the goals of consumer, certain goals there by 7 league strides.
And that undoubtedly set off the first major internal dispute in
the Soviet Union. And the old timers like Bulganin and Kaganovich,
and others, had drilled into them and believed as the elemental
part of their total Marxian beliefs that heavy industry producing
goods must le ,? and also they were backed in that.. I am convinced,
by the army and the military people who said that we've got to have
a war base, we've got to have a strong military defense and pap
for the populace must come second.
That disput broke out into open, public print around Christmas.
last year when you found, for the first time in the history of the
Soviet Union, Isvest a, the government paper, and Pravda, the party
paper, taking opposite sides of a crucial issue in very ruggedly
written editorials. Everybody knew that that couldn't last very
long, that was going to be resolved one way or another. And the
interesting thing about it was how it was resolved. We know that
there was a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party. Normally, 25X1
that has been a pure rubber stamp organization, normally in the past
that has been a rubber stamp organization
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Malenkov lost.
given a third-rate job., or two-and-
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a-half-rate job.
Getting a little out of sequence with the thing., but stressing
this Central Committee thing,, it is also evident that it was the
Central Committee that finally settled the issue with respect to
Yugoslavia., that Molotov held out that Yugoslavia was bad, that
Yugoslavia was a fascist running dog of the imperialists and Yugoslavia-
we_.might have to wait for a generation., but it ultimately had to be
crushed. The more pragmatical boys said., "Now look., old Tito was a
Communist all along even with the Americans in there all around him.,
he's still running a pretty ? rxian states why not play this thing
the easy way?" And that went down and Molotov was, in fact, censured
by the Central Committee of the Party which backed the majority of
the presidium on it. So, to make the parable complete, there are
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some people who rather anticipate that Molotov will not be around
very much longer; in fact, there's some predictions which, in the
way of evaluating them other than report them, that he will be gone
by the time the foreign ministers convene in Geneva the end of this
October,
Now I reported here, when I was here in the end of March, that
the other manifestation of this change in February was one of a
very much increased bellicosity toward the West, And I still say
that the manifestations of that were numerous and clear. It looked
to me, and to many at that time,, as if the Soviet's had been worried
about several things: worried about our aggressiveness; they had
seen us in the Far East make a firm commitment for the first time
of treaties with Chiang Kai-shek; they had seen us succeed, after
they thought they had licked EDC, in pulling the fat out of the fire
with Germany and NATO and the Western European Union formed; they
had heard bellicose speeches by high-ranking military and civilian
people, and they were worried, worried not that they would start
something, but that something might be started against them. And
at the same time they were worried that their side-kicks, the
Chinese, were not anywhere near as controllable as they would like
to have believed. The mere fact that they gave them all these
arms, and without those arms the Chinese could have done nothing
in Korea, still didn't give them the form of brake that they needed
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intransigents of the Chinese, of the Chinese firm intention to
of &., caaa ~ ~:A
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have a go at Formosa even if_it was militarily infeasible and in-
volving all kinds of possibilities of at least a general war in the
Pacific. Therefore, they batten down the hatches for a hard stormy
period. The kind of things they did that were facts, that confirmed
these things, they cancelled a great mass of consumer goods contracts,
the first time in many,
many years that the Soviets had ever reneged on a firm contracts
they frequently make mouth bets of how they like to trade with us,
etc., which never materialize into a firm contract, but this was
the first time where they had the specific thing and just wrote and
said, "Don't ship. We won't pay". Secondly, they raised their
military budget by about 12% to a new postwar high; and, of course,
the speeches too, Molotov's speech of February 8th was as mean,
nasty, as anything that had ever beeia said in the whole history
of the cold war. And they reversed, you remember, the Malenkov's
statement about the nuclear war being the end of civilization, aid
said, "No, it would only be the end of the rotten capitalistic period."
Well, that got me more worried then than I am now, I'm frank
to admit, about the near-term future, but somewhere between March
27th and April 9th there was another thing. Now whether this was
just a correction of an impression, some of the wisest people,
students of this, believe that in fact Bulganin and Molotov thought
that the group's common purpose had shifted more than it had and
in their speeches in February they got more bellicose than the
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collective view would really justify, and so, they were brought
back closer to a middle course. Others believe that the Army,
Zhukov, Vasilevsky and others said, "Now whoa boysl; Let's keep
this thing down on a low key or back burner stuff, we're a long
way from ready yet. You can't give us really more strength just
by adding more rubles to the budget in this year; that doesn't put
modern equipment in the hands of trained troops, etc,, etc. But,
whatever the explanation is, there certainly was an entire differ-
ent atmosphere starting with the proposal that they have an Austrian
treaty and, of course, that went through very rapidly, the move on
Belgrade, a friendly move on Belgrade and, of course, Geneva, and
it's the post-Geneva stuff, the trend has been constantly in that
direction since, it's the biggest piece of fancy we've ever been
subjected to.
Now the reasons given for this new policy, back in the spring
and we were getting ready for Geneva, involved several - there
were rumors that the intolerable burden of military expenditures -
the new weapons, they just couldn't see how they could get enough
of as good weapons as they needed, thEre were statements to that
effect in Vienna. There was also a feeling, with some evidence,
that they really, for the first time, saw the meaning of nuclear
war, They had blown up their own
pretty big bang; and, they realized
that this was something that they couldn't contemplate with any
degree of happiness, or acceptance. A person like Kaganovich and
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and Saburov and Pospelov, and they build bureaucrat administrative
tycoon types, they don't build dams just to see them blown up, so
their feeling was nuclear war is not a way of solving the struggle
in the West.
China's requirements and demands have already met: that China
was just an endless rat hole down which they were pouring things all
to no long-term Soviet benefit, only towards something that ultimately
would make China more of a problem for them than otherwise. And, of
course, the feeling that the Western cohesion, which they thought
was breaking up, had taken a new strong turn in the decisions in
Paris.
Now all of these obviously played some part, but there was vast
difference of opinion as to what the net meaning was, what was the
Soviet's conclusion in its estimate of the situation in the spring
that led it to take this course? And there was great pressure on
the intelligence community to come up with one answer: UAIC, Intel-
ligence Advisory Committee of the NSC which you all know has as its
members the Intelligence Chiefs of the services and the Joint Staff,
State, and ourselves and others. And fortunately, that was resisted;
instead of which, we put to the President and the Secretary of State
four hypotheses and said, "Now these things that we have noted, and
the events that are obvious to all, are consistent with any of four
major possibilities." And you can split it up three ways or five
ways, but fourseem to be a good logical form of cubbyholing.
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The first you could say was that the USSR had no willingness
to alter its previous positions in any substantial respect but was
playing for two to three, it may be slightly more - a year - period
of time, a diplomatic maneuvering during which they would make good
their very substantial current deficits in military preparedness,
and then, boys, watch out; in other words this is a big thing,
that's the worst, the roughest of possible estimate.
The second was that, it's not unlike the first but rather more
specific, that the USSR was really preparing to sae war break out in
the Far East, if not general war, at least war over the Formosa
Straits and possible renewal of war in Indochina, and therefore
was making a hasty effort to solidify its European rear: Austria,
German neutralization, etc., etc., so that if we, the U.S., got
tangling with them out there it would be almost impossible for us
to persuade our European allies to let us even operate from there.
That thesis had its strong backers.
The third was that, the middle one you might say, the USSR just
thinks this is a good propitious time to explore a few isolated
issues, If it can settle those it will then formulate its next
courses of action, a complete policy of expedience.
And finally, there was the most pleasant of them: that the USSR
based primarily on this impossibility from their point of view of the
challenging us to nuclear all-out struggle was determined to bring
about a substantial and prolonged reduction in international tensions,
and, to that end would be willing to alter previous negotiating
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positions, thus, the delegation that went to Geneva went with an
open mind, exploring. It was, in a sense., a great big intelligence
exercise. Here was the chance for the first time to sit down and
talk., in many instances the first time in ten years to talk to
their seniors, and many times the first time in history that some
of those Russians have been to the Free World or a Free World
Conference.
Behind, but a little under the table, are these things: first.,
that 'I think the President succeeded in convincing them once and
for all that we were not going to get into war irresponsibily, that
he was genuinely a man of peace and was looking for a solution
short of fighting. I think that was a very major reassurance than
an argument to those who had been saying, "Well forget a Senator Knowland's
speech now - or this, that, or the other statement, these boys aren't
going to jump us, so, don't be so jittery and don't think you have
to be in a position to go off at a moment's notice."
Secondly, they're awfully worried, and this ties in with the
first one, about our misapprehension as to their basic strength.,
and I'm not talking so much militarily now as to the strengths of
their system. They went time after time, Zhukov alone to the Pre-
sident, and Bulganin to the Secretary of the State, etc. to stress
their strength and how their system was working and how they could
handle their own problems and don't worry about us, but don't push
us around.. Now you can say that, apply to that the old statement:
me thinks he doth protest too much; and that's an indirect admission
of great weakness. But the Bohlens and the other most astute
4 i>
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observers of the Soviet scene are convinced that they, the Soviet
leaders, are 90% convinced that this is true, or 90% of the sub-
divisions of this issue of strength, they are strong. On the 10%
where they've got problems, some productivity in the agricultural
thing I mentioned earlier, they think they've got the answersp it
will take time but they isolated the problem and they have applied,
or are applying the solution to it. Therefore, they want to be
sure that they convince us that they will not stand a real pushing
around, that while they might be awfully badly blooded, they feel
that if they got into a fight in which they were genuinely on the
defensive, they would have a good enough chance of winning so that
they will not take, lying-down, a liberation of the satellite pro-
gram or something like that.
Thirdly, that there's no question in retrospect that the
Soviet's got the main thing they came to Geneva to get, put pithily
by one European statement: they got socially rehabilitated. They
had been outcasts, they had been pharoahs, they had been the skunks
at a lawn party, now they were recognized as equals, as decent
gentlemen, as leaders of the world's people, and they got this
strictly for nothing. It goes very much to the statement, again,
of Ambassador Bohlen FS: Peace at no price. They paid nothing for
getting a basic, if unwritten, understanding that there would be
peace-for a reasonable period from this, and therefore, they didn't
give up a single thing except to agree to sit down and do some more
talks. It was clear from that too, I mean one of the reasons we
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feel so strong about that is the obvious isolation of Molotov, Old
Stone-Ass, as he's been called by diplomats all over the world,
was clearly unhappy. He'd been saying the other way was the way to
play it:. never be nice to them, spit in their eye, etc., etc. And
there were people trying 1800 different tactic and being singularly
successful.
We certainly have reason to believe that the satellites will be
hard held; they made no possible yield. A very interesting little
conversation took place between either the President or the Secre-
tary and Bulganin in which the Ana rican involved tried to says, "Why
don't you try and get along with your borderland countries the way
you get along with Finland. Finland is no menace to you. You get the
trade out of Finland you want. She builds ships for you, and furniture and
whatever else - machinery - and yet you don't run the same police oper-
ation and other things." And Bulganin just wouldn't even pursue the
subject. You'd have thought, the way other conversations went, that
they had been speculating around with the thing, but the minute you'd
touched on their belt, their cordonne sanitaire from Poland to Bulgaria,
they just froze up; and, almost equally strong on East Germany. Time
and again they made it clear in various ways what can be sunned up in
one brief sentence: that the price of the reunification of Germany is
the effective dismemberment of NATO. It doesn't mean you have to tear
up NATO as a scrap of paper. It doesn't mean that you can't have NATO
and a European Security Pact, but NATO as a real force, an employable
military power, will not be allowed to have added to it East Germany.
They are willing to accept the fact that West Germany is presently
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minded to go that way, they're saying, "You're awfully foolish
because all you've got to do, you can have all the freedom in the
world and we give you 18 million more Germans, but not if you play
with NATO."
Now that's a flat prediction, and I could be proved to be very,
very wrong, very soon because Adenauer is on his way to Moscow in a
week or so, the 9th of September I believe, and there are some people,
a minority, that feel that the Russians will offer him a very major
and surprising package which would include unification at something
less than that price. I'm willing to state that I think the odds
are very strong against that.
Now, post Geneva, there is no question but that the Soviets are
going along in a propaganda way interestingly enough, and most in-
teresting to me, internally, keeping the warm wind blowing; for ex-
ample, the entire type of sematics applied to the, United States has
changed in a matter of a couple of months. The old thing didn't
catch up at the time of the Austrian treaty and I have picked out, and
made a little study before coming up here, of just two issues of
Pravda: one on 15 June, and one on 1 August which are only six weeks
apart. In the 15th of June-the issue of Pra a had 35 derogatory,
3 favorable and 15 neutral statements about the United States; and
the derogatory were awful - Wall Street War Mongers, Merchants are Dead,
Aggressors, Imperialists, etc., etc., the old standard line. On
the first of August there were only 6 derogatory, somewhat milder, 25 were
favorable, in other words from 3 favorable to 25 - Life in America is
really pretty nice - This is how they work it on the farms, this is the
a the D P79 01048A0001u0b30010-4er yL?uge, etc.
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And the editorial is showing even a more marked switch, thus showing
the low-man down on the copy desk doesn't get the word as fast as it
should peel off for somebody at the top.
And this is a very real factor in the world situation because you
can't turn that back on again with great speed. I mean there's a
certain number of G's turn that a people, even a dictatorship people,
will stand is limited; and so, in terms of the immediate future, I
think that is something which we will follow compliantly but which
is quite significant. They also are extremely sensitive about the
Western attitude now, and here I'd like to tell the story that wraps
two of these things together and that is the precise reactions to the
President's blueprint mutual photography verification type of dis-
armament proposal. Of course, there were no leaks in that, in fact
there were no leaks to the Pentagon, as I understand, but, so the
Russians caught it by surprise in the open session, and, as the session
closed, Bulganin was the Chairman and he made a very polite, appreciative,
gracious statement indicating that this came as a surprise to him but
it was well worthy of our consideration, and appreciated the President's
good motives in making it. Immediately outside, it was the last word
spoken, they filed out into buffet for a caviar and snops and vodka
and whatever, and Khrushchev just grabbed Bulganin and the President,
got them right together, and said,;"I want you to understand, Mr.
President, I do not agree at all with Mr. Bulganin on this. I think
this is a phoney, it's a fake, it won't work, and it's no good" - just
the roughest statement he made to the President in the entire six days.
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Then we skip to the - a couple of weeks later when Bulganin makes
his report to the Supreme Soviet on Geneva' and, in that he takes an
attitude of ridicule toward the President's proposal and there was lots
amount of laughter in the hall; well, that was very annoying to the
Government in Washington, and the Chief thereof, and certain sharp
statements were made immediately in rebuttal. Absolutely unexpected,
the next day Bulganin returned to the podium of the Supreme Soviets
and corrected the impression, he didn't eat any words but he said,
"Now, I was misunderstood on this. Of course we like our proposal
better, but we are being very serious in considering the President's
proposal."
When they issued, through Tass* the transcripts of the proceedings,
they always you know, put down: applause, prolonged applause, pro-
longed applause with stamping and cheering, etc., and so for the
first time since I've been following these things, and I'm trying to
check back to see how - the thing runs back a long time in history, in
the first session they eliminated all of those so they could eliminate
the laughter in parenthesis; in other words, they - now - well, how
did that come about? Well, I can only feel on this thing that again, this
collective is uncertain of what it's trying to do, that it is in a
constant set of debate and that Bulganin was overruled by Khrushchev at
Geneva, that lasting till he made his thing and then Bulganin recovered
the play, he came back and said, "Now look, we just fouled this whole
ball game up, we were going along fine and now we've got the President
mad at us, we've got everybody in Western Europe saying that we're
just as bad as ever, and so they had a new count of votes and instead
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of 6 to 4 for Khrushchev's thing it went 6 to 4 the other way and he
went back. Now that is a sign of weakness, in a sense, but afterall,
I can assure you the NSC has occasionally reversed itself in, not
quite that rapid order but - -.
Now, I've got to hurry along here and I'd like to turn now for
just a second, just to put in balance before I try and answer which of
these hypothesis we should carry forward, let's look for a minute at
the high points of the real power picture in a military sense. I've
mentioned the fact that military budget was up in February. You all
know about the cut announced to 640 thousand personnel. I don't believe
for a second that they can get away with the total take on that;
there's just too many Assistant Adjutant Generals and G-l's and other
things have to either be in on the play or out of the play and there-
fore, it is probably that there will be approximately a 16% reduction in
their gross forces. If it were all applied to the ground forces it would be
up to 25% and, of course, their Navy and Air Force is considerably smaller
than ours, so undoubtedly the ground forces will take the lion's share
.where the proportional is slightly more than that. Those two things
are just in conflict for the moment.
25X1
But there is also a very interesting new evidence of a complete
change in strategic doctrin
whereas in the days of Stalin they pooh-poohed surprise, surprise was
the great error of the blitzkrieg, it was the permanently operating
factors: the strength of the rear, and this, that, and'the other, you
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can all read this and classify it and unclassify it, versions that
counted ultimately in war; now they are saying, and writing in their
military press and occasionally in their more widely circulated press,
that surprise is all-important and that surprise blows must be delivered
at the very outset of hostilities using, interestingly enough, atomic
weapons and chemical weapons; and, there's no doubt about the translation
of "chemical". They mean chemical in the sense that we use CWS in our
service, and, they talk in detail about how the two can be complimentary
in both attack and holding operations.
Now if you look at their present equipment of major items, and in
the ground force they are strong - there's no question - their new
tanks are good, they've got a thousand more of them in East Germany
than they had a year ago replacing the old T34's, but, if you look at their
Air Force, their Air Force is in a position-of powerless weakness now
compared to what it will be in about 2 years or 3 years, say early 158, they'r
in a transition, their long-range Air Force is partly TU4's and mostly
TU4's with just a few up-to-date modern types; on the other hand, by
1958 they will have virtually eliminated the TU4, they'll have 700
Badgers, the B47 equivalents, 350 Bisons, we figure, and that's a
very fast thing, and that is probably more unless we do something
more about it than has been done yet then we will have B52's and
plus 250 of these thermo-prop Bears. Their submarine force is ex-
panding at a fantastic rate, and it is expanding - new orders we know
have gone out to kick it along even further giving them by 1959, I
think the estimate sticks in my mind, 450 modern long-range Snorkel
subs. The Germans started World War I with 39 operational subs. If
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the Navy knows how to handle that, God bless them, for that looks
like an awful problem, if the war is going to last any length of time,
And most important, and most startling and most worrisome to me, 25X1
is their progress in guided missiles. I can't tell you very much of the
detail of it~
afterall, being ahead in an R&D program doesn't mean you can start
a war tomorrow, but, all I say is you put this together plus their
general technological ability, and what they're doing about that; for
example, you've read, or heard about, tt:e terrific drive they have
for the highest type of scientific education: starting when the tots
are little by making them learn their algebra, and learning it right,
right straight through to their production eandidote, as they call
them, we call them Ph. D.'s, our equivalent Ph. D. They already have
70 thousand Ph.D. type scientists alive and in action as against our
55 thousand; and, this year, in this June, they graduated S thousand
and we only graduated 42 hundred, so, the gap is widening, not narrow-
ing there. Now that means that in pure science, in the frontiers of
25X1
performance of weaponry and other things, the ball game's going to
get tougher, not easier
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So, when you come down to saying: which of these hypotheses
can be discarded now and which can be carried forwards I think the
only one you can throw oit with some confidence for the moment is
that they were doing an immediate job of securing their European
rear in preparation for trouble this year in the Formosa Straits,
but I'd still keep one white chip on that square; it's not by any
means certain yet.
But as between the basic ones of: are they just playing for a
short haul breather to get our guard down and then get tough agains
I don't mean necessarily "jump-us" with a set D-Day and H-Hour, but
reheat the war very rapidly when their strength is at a maximum peak
and in maximum balance; or, whether they have decided that global war
is forever no solution, the returns just aren't in yet. We will have
important returns shortly. First, of course, we will see their
reaction starting next Monday to - in the UN disarmament talks - if
those proceed constructively from any objective point of views you
can lean somewhat more heavily toward the happier or more decent of
the alternatives.
There is also the Geneva meetings of course., if they absolutely
refuse to budge on Germany and so on and so forth, that will be a
C Pa
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pessimistic thing because if they were to give up East Germany
they'd give up so much of technical skilled manufacturing, so much
uranium ore, and that kind of thing, that it would hardly be con-
sistent with a current plan to be ready for hot stuff in the mid-
term future.
And finally, and I think to my mind almost most significant?
you have convened for February the 20th Party Congress and the pro-
posal promised to put out at that time the 65-year plan which will
be very early, that will be putting it out in the second month of
the quinquennium as compared with not getting the fifth 5-year plan
out until I believe it was August 1952, or lg months after the
period had started; so, they got that pretty well set, at least they
think they have now.
And you can get from the analysis of that a pretty good idea whe-
ther they're basicly peace-bound or basically war-bound. But still it's
one of those things where I worry terribly about the degree of oscilla-
tion between doom - tact next week, something like that, and then
everything is wonderful - "You.Fourier," as Mrs. Luce called him in
the very effective cable she sent him from Rome after Geneva. We've
just got to develop more of an ability to stand there and say: Let's
wait for the hard facts and let's let the propaganda blow by our ears
noting it for what it will have in a real sociological effect but
not getting kidded.
Very briefly now, I've used more time on this than I expected,
I'd like to hit certain points on the rest of the bloc: The satellite
situation is troublesome to them but they think they can clean it up,
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as they say; they're letting certain people out of rail in Rumania
and Czechoslovakia and Poland and otherwise the old parlor pink lefts
that they played with at first, then clamped down on, they're trying
to dress it up but they're not going to really let their hold go,
they want to try to put the kid glove back on the male gauntlet.
Secondly, they are forcing the satellites, somewhat against certain
of their leaders' will, to go along on the: not being nice to America,
and for the first time, just the day before yesterday I think it was,,
in Bucharest on Liberation Day, by gosh, the Americans and British got
some credit; and, afterall, if there was one place where the Russians
really did win the war pretty nearly single-handed, it was driving the
German forces out of Rumania, but there they said this was a three-
way allied thing and we can be thankful the fascists were driven out
by the democracies.
Now the Yugoslav situation deserves some mention and it's some-
thing that is impossible to be firm on yet, but the evidence is very,
very alarming there, that much more happened in Belgrade than we were
willing to admit at first, or, probably than Tito was prepared to admit
at first. Khrushchev got off that very bumbling statement when he
hit the airstrip and there was obvious resentment. But, what we've
seen in retrospect indicates that the Russians made a very fast recovery
in the secret talks that they had there, You cannot appraise certain
of the facts such as these, they have a flat cut-off of any more intel-
ligence to us from the satellites and perfectly openly, just saying,
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25X1
"They're our friends now, it's alright, we played with you from 148
to 153 but you Just don't unders-tared the situation, there is peace
and we're no longer going to tattletale on Hungarian, Rumanian friends".
There are statements that we can take the battle act and stuff it, as far
as they're concerned, they're going to go into East-West trade and none of
s nonsense about keeping strategic goods from the Soviet.
And finally, and much more alarming is the indications that
their secret services and their party
are starting to
play together; therefore, I believe that we must at least estimate now
that Yugoslavia is a potential foe, or hostile neutral, and no longer
shall we say she is a potential ally with some question mark on it.
And that, of course, presents tremendous problems to General Gruenther in
the whole concept of the NATO defense plans when you've got now Austrian-
Swiss neutrality across here instead of what you hoped would be a nice
five division army group a little beyond an army group here facing this
way, pretty resolute fighters, if you think of them turning and facing
the other way and, knowing the general status of the Italian Army, it
would give me nightmares if I were in SHAEF 3 --
On Red China, I wish I had an hour to talk about Red China because
I think it's the most fascinating, most misunderstood,.. part of the
world today. I don't mean, by any means, it's good or there are a lot of
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of lovely little agrarian reformers that have just been misunderstood
by hard-shelled Formosa lobby types, but, on the other hand, the
pendulum, I think, has swung too far, it's swung too far in this way-.
that, by constantly talking about Red China, and I believe it's a
dictate in the State Department that you must never not modify main-
land China for fear of getting mixed up with things and purporting to
say that we would recognize them., we have gotten to think of them
too much as pure Communists, as just part of the international Communist
conspiracy.
We must recognize that they're the oldest nation in the world in
terms of actual continuity, a nation that's had five major swings of
great peaks of civilization, great disasters, physical, mental, moral
collapses and that China today is emerging willy-nilly from one of those
great moral collapses.
I'll go back just to take the last two swings: you had the col-
lapse of the Mongolian Conquest, they gradually - their basic native
ability wore down to a quick revolution but actually a process of
attrition, the Mings rose and throughout the Mongols killed them all
off or else absorbed them, then you had a great high period there.
Then they got tired and old and useless and they were, in turn, this
time captured, but taken over by vIriually the ship, the } nchus, in the
1600's and interestingly enough, just as a footnote to history, it took
the Manchus 30 years to-get Koxinga off the off-shore islands in Formosa;
the last Mace that they succeeded in establishing their authority was in
the same hot area of the world today. They had a great hey-day in the
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late 17th and 18th Century and then, starting with the Opium Wars
in the 19th Century, they were flat on the carpet, walked-over, abused,
cut-up spheres of influence, open doors, that, that, and the other
thing, and they say, "Alright, they just didn't know how to run them-
selves, it was their good fortune to have some smart missionaries
in Shanghai, bankers and other things around them." But they are a
proud people and once they get their strength back, as they have now,
they look back with an intense feeling of hatred at all occidentals for
just that.
Now the only point of this is to say that you've got to recognize
that the present make-up, the driving force, in China is a combination
of Chinese patriotism, seemingly the counterpart xenophobia, and
Communism. It 's our very bad luck, as the heirs of western civiliza-
tion, that two such great historic forces as Marxism and Chinese patriotism
were married at just this time, that Sun Yat-sen didn't succeed or
Chiang Kai-shek didn't succeed. If he had been a wise and evil fascist.,
or a democrat or,anything else, we might have problems with China now.
They would be tough to deal with, but we wouldn't have the problem we
have today of this capture of what would have been a great revolution
by an additional revolutionary movement.
A lot of people say Chip Bohlen keeps talking about them being in
the marijuana stage of the Communist revolution and therefore, there is
great danger of them lunging ahead and doing things that the wiser, more
mature heads of the Kremlin won't do. I think that's very truer but I
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think you've also got to recognize that the drive to complete the
revolution, to make China integral once more, stems from the other
source too. And that's particularly true with respect to the off-
shore islands. I'm not at all sure, despite all the propaganda,
it's 100% consistent that Formosa belongs to China and Formosa must go
back, that you have a possible chance of some kind of a long-term solution
on Formosa that is acceptable to the United States. You do not have
that chance of ever selling them on that so long as you say that Formosa
also includes these off-shore islands, and, which nobody denies, a
part of metropolitan China and that you're holding them just because
there's going to be a war, and so on and so forth.
Now if I may violate, by about five minutes, the time, I'd just
like to tap a few of the spots that we think are most troublesome and
with a comment or two on them.
Obviously, you don't need me to add anything to the newspaper head-
lines on the blowup in North Africa. We had seen it coming; every-
body had seen it coming for a long time. The French, just as they were
in Indochina, are at least a year too late; they barely got on the train
in time in Tunisia, but, Tunisia being small, I am worried that it
will get swept up in the cataclysm that exists there. The French, in
this thing, are complete hypocrites in one sense; they have a lot be-
hind them in the sense that they brought certain well-beings, schools,
hospitals, and other things to North Africa, but this nonsense that
they will integrate Algeria into metropolitan France, that it is a
part of the metropole, they don't really mean that. There are 8
million Arabs down there, they give them 15 delegates in the Chamber
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of Deputies, they'd have 120 if they really treated them as part
of the thing.,
The actual runners of Morocco, the operating people, are the
so-called Political Agents. Those jobs are handed down from father
to son; The nearest counterpart to it that I know in my superficial
history reading is exactly the way William the Conqueror ran England:
you had a hereditary right to be a Baron of the March of Shropshire
or something like that, and they had no more feeling of the kind of
professional Colonial office, bring these people along toward national-
ism that characterizes the current English management of almQat all of
its colonies.
Now in the Middle East we're seeing an interesting development,
in Egypt and Arabia particularly, that is combination, or a taking
advantage of their annoyance with the West, based on their misunder-
standings of our attitude toward Israel, etc., etc. and a very great
drive to give large quantities of Soviet arms to these countries and
it is sorely tempting.
tent with what they're doing in the rest of the world, internally, they
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would be only too happy to let large masses of this obsolescent
equipment get into troubled areas like this, thoroughly consistent
with what Stalin said in 1952 where he for the first time said, "There
isn't going to be a war as old Lenin said in the sense that ultimately
the West is going to fight a unified capitalistic bloc - no, there are
going to be recurrent wars within capitalism which will weaken it,
the Soviet Union will stand on the side lines and pick up the pieces
as appropriate.",
Now it presents us with a very serious problem. Secondly, the
so-called Northern Tier: Turkey, Pakistan and in alliance Iraq added
to it, Persia knocking on the doors, sort-of, a little bashful,
Afghanistan as a possibility, not as good as it was a year ago.
Turkey is in trouble, serious financial trouble. They're getting
very annoyed with us telling them how to run their banking and their
imports; and Pakistan, also, sadly misses the hand of the wise old
Mohammed, whereas still nominally in power but hets becoming more
and more driven to run the place like a dictator. If he does, Itm
convinced that East Pakistan, Bengal part, will go, it will go its
separate way and shortly be absorbed in India. I'm very worried about
the so-called situation of strength there.
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And finally, I'll add just a word, and maybe somebody will ask
me a question I can develop a little more in the question period,
the situation in Formosa and the Islands is deteriorating from a morale
point of view from a point of view of confidence in America (you dontt
blame them), in a sense they wanted World War III, thatts their only way
out, Geneva puts that further and further away, they think the next
"sell-out" is going to be the off-shore islands, or them totally.
The result is that they're quite suspicious of us and at the same
time are engaging in overt acts and I think the pinching is
partially explained by this but they're also launching raids up
to company strength backed by naval gunfire on the Chinese mainland
just hoping that they'll get something started we'll have to get
in and help with; and, of course, they moved a whole additional division to
Quemoy against the strong advice of the I4AAG. We wouldn't quite - the
State and the Chiefs could not get together, or would not get together, and
say this was a violation of their agreement in October not to make a major
redeployment without consent. Well, what's one division out of 21? Well,
the fact is now that 35% of the MDAP equipment that we have given them
has arrived in Formosa is on those islands: Matsu and the Quemoy groups,,
at some couple hundred million bucks, well, the way a Chinaman thinks,
I'm convinced, we're not going to let go of 200 million bucks., he's
got a good gauge out there, he's got the family silver out there and
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that's his best guarantee, he isn't going to take our words for it.
So, in closing, I would only say that the immediate danger point
is still the off-shore islands; the long-term danger point is that we
let down our guard; the longest-term danger point is that we do not
do enough in the way of scientific training and other things; and, that they
ultimately just have a better technocracy than we do.
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