INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 10, 1958
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030003-2
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030003-2
 Approved For Release-4900/08/2 P79-01048A$ $100030003-2
Extract from Speech on World Situation delivered
by the DD/I at the Army War College, National
Strategy Seminar, 10 June 1958 on
(Re-dictated from speaking notes, 16 June 1958)
For a considerable period of time prior to the opening
of this year there has been a serious slippage in the position
of Indonesia and its leadership. Sukarno returned from his
visit to China vastly impressed with the order and progress
there and opted for a semi-paternalistic system called "guided
democracy." This gave the Commies a rare opportunity and
they made the most of it.
This Communist Party is not to be sniffed at. It has
been the dominant party in Java and possibly the #2 party in
Indonesia as a whole since the 1957 elections. They have an
excellent grass root organization through labor, veterans and
e organizations. They are careful to identify the Party
such popular issues as the return of West Irian and current
s to repress the dissidents. Meanwhile on the outer islands
were legitimate complaints that they were being milked
e Javanese. The most powerful individuals, who were the
al military commanders, together with some patriots from
ntered into a conspiracy to supplant the present government.
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These people badly miscalculated both the degree of support
they would receive from the mass of the people and the reliability
of certain key commanders who had been nibbling at their ideas.
Essentially, they underestimated the basic lack of popularity of
any effort which could be characterized as fragmenting the Republic.
Militarily, they bit off more than they could chew -- jumped
the gun, and ignored the tremendous importance of having some
air and naval capability.
On the other hand, the national military forces not only
IdA
turned out to be largely loyal to the government, but S
more
capable, at least in terms of logistics, than we had been wont
to believe.
Padang was in a sense the Richmond of the revolt and its
loss was more or less the equivalent of the South's loosing
Richmond to McClelland in the Spring of '62. From that point
on the war was lost though M nado remains to be reduced
probably next /this/.week.
A protracted stalemate could. have taken place with very
substantial outside support in the area centered around North
Celebes, including the bulk of the Moluccas.
But the clearly emerging facts were that only the National
Army gave any hope of having the capability and will to deal
-2-.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030003-2
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with the mushrooming Communist Party and that if the US
became identified with the dissidents, the leaders of the
National Army would reluctantly return to the Bloc and Java
and the bulk of the Archipelago would go down the drain --
a shattering blow to the free world's position. in the Pacific.
Only time will tell if the Communists' mass infiltration
thrust there can be effectively checked by Nasuti Jani, and
the other good military types, many of whom have been trained
in the US and are behind the scenes profusely pro-US. These
same people, it should be noted, effectively though ruthlessly,
suppressed the armed Soviet threat at Madiun a decade ago.
They will require time and firm US resolve to help them
despite wails from the Dutch and their close friends in NATO.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 RDP79-01048A000100030003-2
 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030003-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intelligence
As per discussion at meeting this morning.
I include the four minutes worth on Indonesia I
16 June 1958
(DATE)
FORM REPLACES FM10-101
IAUG54 WHICH MAYBEUSED.
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100030003-2