(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: February 26, 1953
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
 Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
26 February 1933
Adainj
Received from
ve Mice, Office Chief of Staff, a fire-
page outline of a talk given by Mr, Allen Duller at
the Pentagon on 23 January 1933,
Ent Na ---_____________.-___.
peter ._. .5_ f --a d By: Q,
next Review Date: ----------
AM.: Auth.: fill 70-3
Class. Changed to: TS
3ecw#Blft
No Car Glass. ^
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
 pprgvqJl if ox F~eIpase 2000/05/30: CIA-RDP79-01048A000100
I. LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR
History shows when two great alliances arm against each other
war is usual outcome.
This historical precedent reinforced in present situation by:
1. Basic incompatibility of Western and Soviet systems.
2. Soviet pronouncements as to inevitability of war,
their suspicions of Western intentions and fear of encirclement.
IT. FACTORS MITIGATING LIKELIHOOD OF GENERAL WAR
1. Soviet belief in Western collapse without war.
2. Historical Soviet caution to openly provoke war (contrast
with Hitler).
3. Both sided possession of atomic weapons and possibility each
side might receive knock-out blow.
III. FACTORS MITIGATING LIKELIHOOD EARLY WAR.
1. Soviet success in cold war. ~~~~ ~s ~.e a.tM /LL tv.,% -
2. U. S. atomic superiority - Soviet does not yet have "enough."
3. Apparent lack sufficient long range bombers.
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 CIA RD 7 -0 048A&6~068~86? -'P ' our "knock-out"
might exceed theirs.
 Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A00010002QQ09-7
IV. WAYS IN WHICH WAR MIGHT COME
1. Deliberate Soviet initiation (unlikely at present time).
2. Soviet miscalculations in cold war actions.
3. Soviet reaction to Western action rearmament (Germany and Japan).
.. Accident in critical area--Berlin, Iran, Indochina.
V. DEVELOPMENTS THAT AFFECT LIKELIHOOD OF WAR
1. Soviet unlikely deliberately provoke war unless they feel able
deal knock-out blow again U. S. and its bases, i.e., deal knock-out
blow without receiving one.
2. Hence, will not deliberately move unless they have superior
long range striking power which not the case today.
3. This situation might change if Soviet felt balance was
definitely turning against them and that this could be righted by
offensive action in Europe and Asia even at risk of U. S. attack.
VI. CONCLUSION - APPRAISAL OF IMMEDIATE FUTURE
Intelligence community does not anticipate early aggressive Soviet
attack involving general war, but world in such grave condition that
Approve or Release 2& 05/Y30 1 -RDP~l 0I04 Ao00100010009-7
 Apprpved For Release 20W05/30: CIA-RDP79-01048A0001000209-7
VII. WAR WARNING MECHANISMS
Systematic and a current review of Soviet intentions and study
of key war indicators.
1. Domestic purges (as before 1938).
2. Soviet propaganda (already at new heights against us).
Shift in industrial production to military production.
This largely a fact today.
I. Shift in character aircraft production from interceptor
to long range bomber types.
5. Production of guided missiles. (In general should get some
medium range warning use of these indorses nothing definite as to
timing).
6. Atomic and thermonuclear production.
VIII. WARNING OF GENERAL WAR, ESPECIALLY SURPRISE ATTACK ON U. S.
1. Unlikely able to pinpoint surprise attack of Pearl Harbor
type but might get some long range clue as to potential to make such
an attack (assuming such an attack would be made with the use of
forward observable bases).
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
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2. We should get prior warning of ground attack in Europe or
Far East, if attack on scale requiring mobilization or forward
concentration of troops and supplies. (But this unlikely method of
procedure).
Approved For Release 2000/05/30: CIA-RDP79-Q1 08A000100020009-7
 Approved For Release 20005/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A00010002000009-7
VIII MACHINERY FOR SHORT TERM WARNING
1. WATCH Committee
2. IAC
3. 24 hour watch by coordinated intelligence services
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
 Approved For Release 2000/0 /30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7
25X6A U N
Approved For Release 2000/05/30 : CIA-RDP79-01048A000100020009-7