OFFICIAL DIARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020096-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 96
• Publication Date: October 21, 1952
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2000/ P79-OU41A000100020096-8
Security Information
Official Diary
Tuesday, 21 October 1952
1. Cleared with DCI the dissemination within CIA of a sanitized
version of his memorandum to General Eisenhower on Stalin's speech.
2. Sat in a meeting attended by General Samford, Mr. 'Whearty and
Mr. McConnell, representing the ICIS, and of O/NE, at which tir e 25X1A9a
we agreed upon amendments to the summary evaluation paper, is 25X1A9a
transmitting the agreed amendments directly to for inclusion in25X1A9a
the summary evaluation as distributed to NSC members. We did not clear these
relatively minor amendments with DCI since, on the basis of his initial-
clearance, we understood that he was leaving such details to General Samford,
25X1A9a and myself.
3. DCI discussed with me the following:
a. In view of the budget situation, he requested that the over-all
Russian estimate be expedited so far as possible. I later Ib` JQ%
mentioned this to Sherman Kent, who informed me that the estimate ~'~
would be ready Thursday week, although it might be possible to
have it cleared in time for a special IAC meeting on Thursday next.
I later spoke to the DCI and he approved a special meeting on
Tuesday, if this proved practicable.
b. DCI indicated that it would be necessary to have a more detailed
25X1 X7 commentary on
I later discussed this with Dr. Kent and he indicated. a u
a paper would, perhaps, be best developed as a commentary on
or corollary to NIE-64, Part II. In the light of our previous
discussion I agreed with this view and Dr. Kent is going to
have such a paper prepared.
c. DCI requested me to investigate the scope of dissemination of
25X1A9a the recent= study on thermo-nuclear developments. I dis-
25X1A9acussed this with of NKD/OSI, who undertook to inform
me as to such dissemination and also to forward a commentary on
the study itself.
25X1A9a
25X1A9a 4. Discussed with of NED/OSI the proposal of Dr.
- that he be given a special assistant, relatively free of adminis-
trative duties, to do some planning and evaluating in the AE field. Dr.
25X1A9a very much appreciated the need for such assistance and indicated
that t ere was a particular individual presently employed as Research
Director at Los Alamos, who would be well qualified for the position.
25X1A9aI indicated to that at some appropriate time we would be glad
to have this individual brought to Washington, at which time DCI, D/DCI
and I could talk with him. I also indicated to the necessity 25X1A9a
(CONTINUED)
Approved For Releas - 13067 II?1'2 : CIA- a 7e ft, Af-an
A d l i A96-8
Subjected to individual systematic review,
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Approved For Release 2000/09i1i2r InC4AtiRDP79-01041AO00100020096-8
Official Diary
21 October 1952
for doing some advance planning_on AE collection and stated that the priority
of AE was such that we would not permit personnel limitations to interfere 25X1A9c
with any development of our intelligence program on this subject.
indicated that he was not limited by ceilings; the real problem was to secure
individuals of appropriate caliber for this job.
5. Attended O/CI briefing on the Soviet Party Congress. My over-
all reaction was that the substance of this briefing was that the Soviet
policy and activities would be vmore of the same.' I felt that there was a
reasonable possibility that there would be a major change of course in
Soviet policy, possibly in the direction of encouraging or staging Czecho-
slovakia-type coups. At any rate, I felt that this point should be kept
under constant study. Also discussed this point with Dr. Kent and warned
him against the Board1s inclination to treat everything in terms of whether
or not the Soviets were going to use physical force. The contacts in which
a moderate amount of force was employed were very important. Moreover,
in the case of Czechoslovakia, the only force employed was throwing one or
two people out of windows; yet, this coup was wholly distinguishable from
national front approach.
25X1A9a
6. Had an extended discussion with at which time
I assured him that we would secure some trading material, and also
undertook to have a talk with Mr. Wisner with a view of having a review
group look over the '1no dissemination< policy of the FI reports staff.
25X1A9 is extremely upset over this policy and I am satisfied, from
the examples he has given us, that FI is asserting its prerogatives in
determining not to disseminate a large volume of reports they are receiv-
ing. In many cases this appears to be done on grounds that would be
appropriate for an evaluation unit, but not appropriate even for a reports
unit in an office of collection.
Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP79-01041AO00100020096-8