OFFICIAL DIARY (ACTING DD/I)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020060-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: November 26, 1952
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release ?,QPO/09/12 : CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020060-7
NOW,
Security Information
Official Diary
(Acting DD/I)
Wednesday, 26 November 1952
25X6A 25X1X7
1. Discussed at the morning meeting, dismal appreciation of the situation in
Iran received from This led to general discussion 25X6A
during which DCI asked for my curbstone opinion I gave
as my opinion that any effort to unseat Mossadeq and replace him with someone
would be more than likely to deliver the works to the Tudeh.
2. Briefed DCE on yesterday's Senior Staff Meeting regarding his proposals
in letter of transmittal of the Summary Evaluation. He accepted the minor changes25X1A9i:
worked out in Paragraphs A and B and announced his,determination to press indivi-
dually for Council action on his C as revised by myself,
He asked me to prepare a brief, pungent oral statement ac this up. I did so,
checked the draft with and presented it to him together with brief
set of notes. He accepted these and after reading the JCS memorandum, he appeared
more determined than ever to press the point. d. 25X1A9a
3. Colonel Baird called and was very put out with DD/A's high-handed action
in continuing the limitation of GS-11 and below in the terms of reference to the
Selection Panel. Baird feels very strongly that when the Career Service Board
voted 7 to 1 (General Morris dissenting), DD/A had no authority to ignore that
vote. I told Colonel Baird I would associate myself with his protest. 'r-V-1A f)-
4. Showed DCI the O/RR-0/SI contribution to Air Force's
consisting of a detailed target map of primary areas to bee lofted if th
overflight-photographic capabilities envisuaged in are brought
to fruition. 25X1A2g
25X1A9a 25X1A6a
s
e
e
.va.
y
ag
gai u.i.n
his activities about which State Department desk is somewhat concerned
though fortunate y put some stiffening in their backbone.
25X1A9a 25X1A9a
6. Lunched wiity Henderson and Kent, - Wisner, and Hender-
son is very frank and very useful going over much of the detail of problems that
are still puzzling to the Board. He underscored the infiltration of the Tudeh in
the Army, particularly in the junior officer and NCO level and said it was hard to
distinguish between this and Kasharni's infiltration which was merely designed to
stir up resentment among the juniors so that they would be amenable to national
front actions again~ senior officers. He stated that the MinistrydE Education was
badly infiltrated back during the Qavam Ministry and no real attempt had ever been
made to root out the Commies put in by the Tudeh Minister of Education in those
days. He felt that Point 4, although acknowledged, privately to do some good, was
invariably a whipping boy in all public statements; that Kasharni was particular-
ly vitriolic. against it because of the female Moslems working under American
Christians which to his low mind meant only one thing. Henderson was emphatic
that unless America undertook some really substantial major public work that the
Iranians would never feel that we had lived up to our Teheran declaration under-
takings to "do something" for them in return for their "laying the carpet" in
1942-44. Suggested taking over the Kur River project which will produce hydro-
electric power and create 750,000 acres of fertile land in what is now desert.
Approved For Release 2000/0 1041 A00eAQQp?Q7pari of an Integrated
file. If separated from the file it must br
subjected to Individual systematic review:-
 Approved For Releas 2,000/09/12: CIA-RDP79-01041A0001000 0060-7
Official Diary
Wednesday, 26 November 1952 25X1A9a 25X1A9a
25X1 A6c 7. Conferred with together with
on problems of liaison an co-ordination, brougit particularly to light by in-
coming cable- took detailed notes and undertook to prepare a 25X1A9a
memorandum for DD/P on t 8. It seems quite clear that the complaint was not
of any local problem during the but was a much broader general 25X1 A6a
one of focussing the liaison between the operation of offices of CIA, both in
Washington and the field, with the EDO offices---clearly a problem for DD/P.
I agreed to act as an honest broker in bringing the two together.
25X1A5a1
8. Conferred with very briefly. He is troubled by O/NE's
reluctance to be the point of contact with respect to 25X1 A5a 1
Vulnerabilities. I did not have time to explore the suo~ec-c in ceta~.~. with
him but will do so the next time he is in town. He also had some concern with
the O/RR overall program--although states it is directed to details rather than
to broad concepts. He undertook to submit his thoughts in writing.
25X1A9a
25X1 A62S. Conferred with on the subject of high- 25X1 A6a
level recruiting contacts. Discussed personnel in the
and briefly mentioned as an ideal fellow for the25X1 A9a
Southwest. I stressed the point that this must be carefully co-ordinated with
the DD/A people because while it was all right to spread stratospheric structure
over the present personnel procurement, it would not be very sensible to have
us create one and the DD/P offices another one to do the same thing. It was
agreed that we would continue as planned by Mr. Becker but that once any of the
arrangements in the various regions were operational, DD/P should be invited to
submit its particularly difficult high-level recruiting problems to the same
people.
25X1A9a
10. Attended PRC Meeting during which undertook for Frank Wisner to have
a memorandum by outlining his apprehension regarding Argentina's
apparent tactics of nominally wooing US with a few liberal actions at home on
the one hand while maintaining aggression on the the neighboring South American
countries and acting as a conduit for Russian agitational funds on the other,
reviewed by OCI and ONE, with the end in viewof having an intelligence paper
for the Department of State as armor against any naivete when Peron approached
us for loans, etc.
25X1A5a1 25X1A9a
11. Sheldon reported a 3-1/2 hour discussion with in which the most
specific advance was the willingness shown by- to exp ore the possibility
of having CIA take over his I undertook to explore
on a very sensitive basis what the reactions of Service and State would be to
such an arrangement. 25X1A5a1
25X1A9a
Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020060-7