OFFICIAL DIARY (ACTING DD/I)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020054-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 29, 2000
Sequence Number: 
54
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 3, 1952
Content Type: 
NOTES
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020054-4.pdf95.04 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP79-010VA000100020054-4 Security inform.=.tion Official Diary (Acting DD/I) Wednesday, 3 December 1952 1. At the morning meeting, presided over by D/DCI, brought up alarming cable from Military in New Delhi regarding possible coup in Nepal within the next two weeks. 25X1A9a 2. Received from D/DCI State policy paper for regarding the North Atlantic Treaty meetings. Read same and passed it to Sherman Kent with in- structions to return to me after appropriate members of the Board had seen it. 25X1A9a 3. Conferred with - 25X1X7 on the following matters: 25X1A6a b. Question of appropriate Ap- 25X1 A9a parently, recommendations once agreed to by had 25X1 A9a been administratively gutted by one in Fl. Authorized 25X1A9a 25X1 A9j.irect liaison by in an attempt to straighten this out. c. Question of getting access to Camp Dietrich was again reviewed and brief discussion held with General Porter over the phone. He undertook to be helpful in the matter. d. Flying saucers: Received capsule briefing on recent indications which have caused us to take a far more serious view of unexplained 25X1A5a1 25X1A5a1 iewed the course the Director should take and the 25X1 A9a5, Met with Messrs. Kent, on 25X1 A9a the question of drafting terms of reference for the new summary evaluation. In- formed them that a preliminary paper must be available by Thursday, December 11, so that DCI could study it before his meeting with the Joint Chiefs on 15 December. The chief points I stressed were the necessity of working backwards from critical objectives in the United States, determining these, the number of twenty or fifty Kiloton bombs necessary to damage each "critically" (whenever that may be), then considering the ability to deliver bombs on target in terms of percentage and fi- nally bringing into play the limitations of the Russian stockpile probably using Approved For Release -0100ADMI a2Q1064n4grate4 ry infornzaticr; file. It separated from the file it must b1 Subjected to individual systematic review. Approved For Relapse 200 ~,EE& DP79-01 QQ?1 A000100020054-4 Security Information 25X1X7 Official Diary Wednesday, 3 December 1952 5. (cont'd.) three or four alternative hypotheses as to the size thereof. As a final cut an estimate of the amount needed to neutralize our overseas retaliatory power should be considered. Left the meeting before it was fairly underway, but believe there was general agreement on the scope of the study. Approved For Release 200.('IEMTt DP79-01041 A0001'0T1O 0Ov94-4 J` ? rarity Information 25X1X7 a _ I....h ~. OCI T4 Approved For Release 2000/09/12 : CIA-RDP79-01041A000100020054-4 Official Diary Wednesday, 3 December 1952 6. (cont'd.) 7. Attended P}IC Meeting. nt* SECRET 25X1A9a -3- Approved For Release 20.E 9/it?' 'IAA-RDP79-01041 A000100020054-4 i0iormahon