SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GEODESY AND CARTOGRAPHY FOR SUPPORT OF SOVIET GUIDED-MISSILE SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01009A000900030004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1954
• Content Type: IR

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_ NFI NTIAL
Gf OGRAPSYC ZYQ't'ELtICENCE REPORT'
Copy No.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GEOIIE sY AND CARTOGRAPHY FOR SUPPORT OF SOVIET
CMIDED-MISSIlE SYSTEM
Provisional Report
CIA/RR-GR-64
June 1954 DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLAS.S.j
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EXT REVIEW DATE.
Norfe
MATE ! REVIEWER: 37?Oq~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
4
Office of Research and Reports
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
03r EIRE TIAL
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This preliminary draft of the ORR/DGG contribution to RIS U-6-54 was
prepared to provide information on the geodetic and cartographic aspects
of missile guidance for other analysts engaged in the preparation of their
contributions.
This provisional estimate has not been coordinated with the surveying
and mapping components of the Department of Defense or with intelligence
personnel interested in the geodetic and cartographic capabilities of
the Soviet Union. However, estimates of geodetic and cartographic
positioning errors included are based in part on estimates provided by
the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and on preliminary estimates of the
U.S. Geological Survey. In addition the report has been reviewed, with
concurrence
who is a consultant to the Geography Division, ORR, on gravity
and higher geodesy,
The report is organized in three parts. The first section summarizes
the extent of the Soviet resource as reflected in the geodetic and
cartographic organization, personnel, research, and activities. The
second section describes in greater technical detail those Soviet
activities and standards of performance in astronomy, triangulation,
and gravity that bear directly on the range of error in the relative
locations of widely spaced, intercontinental points which we consider
attainable by the Soviets. The third section estimates additional
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cartographic errors that are inherent in the derivation of geographic
positions of targets on large-scale topographic maps.
Ca nto or questions concerning this report are solicited by
19 July 1954 for consideration in the preparation of a final draft of the
estimate. Cements are particularly solicited on the problem of deter-
mining the effects of gravity on the behavior of missiles and guidance
systems in connection with the variation of gravity with altitude and
with the geographic distribution of gravity anomalies over the entire
earth.
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CQwmw i
A. Appraisal of Soviet Geodetic and Cartographic Organization,
Personnel, Facilities, and Activities . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Geodesy and Cartography in the USSR . . . . . . . . .
a. Organization .
Personnel . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
c. Education and Training . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Soviet Research Facilities andPrograms . . . . ? ? 3
a. Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
b. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? ? . 4
c. Astronomy in Support of Geodesy . . . . . . . . . 5
d. Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Soviet Achievements in Geodesy . . . . . . . . . 6
a. The Astronomic-Geodetic Net . . . . . . . . . . . 6
b. The Krasovskiy Ellipsoid . . . . . . . . . . 6
a. A Soviet World Datum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
d. Gravimetric and Magnetic Surveys . . . . . . . . 8
e. The Soviet Gravimetric Network . . . . . ? . . . 8
4. Soviet Mapping Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . ? . . 9
a. Free Access to Data . . . . . . ? . . . . . ? . . 9
b. Soviet Cognizance of Developments . . . . . . . . 9
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d. Target location . . . . . - . 10
B. Soviet Capabilities in Geodesy Through 1965 . . . . . . . . 10
1. Soviet Triangulation ? . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . . . 10
2. Astronomic Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . 14
3. Deflections of the Vertical . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Ellipsoids of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Estimate of Soviet Capability in Geodetic Positioning 22
6. Eclipse and Lunar Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Positioning Submarine-Launched Missiles . . . . . . . 23
8. Positioning Air-Launched Missiles . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. Gravity Effects in Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . 24
C. Soviet Capabilities for Cartographic Location of Targets
Through 1965 . . . . ? . . . . ? . ? ? . . ? . . . . . . 25
I. Target Plotting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2. Estimates of Cartographic Errors ? . . ? . . ? ? . 25
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES IR GEODESY AID CARTDI APAY Ft SUPPORT OF SOVIET
-KISSILk SMMW
A. Appraisal of Soviet Geodetic erg
Faci 1t es, Ac ivi~rities`
tion, Personnel
The Soviets, building on a foundation of over a century of geodetic
and cartographic development, have succeeded in establishing a modern
organization sod. a corps of scientific and technical personnel sufficiently
competent in all aspects of geodesy and map production to provide dependable
support for the positioning of widely separated launching points and targets
for missile guidance.
1. Geodesy and arto in the USSR
Early recognition by Lenin of the basic importance of geodesy erg
cartography to Soviet economic development and military defense led to a
program of geodetic and cartographic development and activity unprecedented
in the world history of surveying and mapping. Huge capital investments were
made available for surveying and mapping and their allocation at any given
time was limited only by the availability of scientific and technical
personnel.
a. Organization
Basic surveying and mapping of the country at large is
centralized in the Chief Administration of Geodesy and Cartography (commonly
referred to as GUCK, from the Russian form of its name),,which works in
conjunction with the Military Topographic Administration (VTU) of the Army
General Staff. Other surveying and mapping units function as parts of
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individual ministries, administrations, or trusts, but all are subject to the
centralized plans, programs, supervision, and specifications of 0 and V1V.
The aK is a vertically integrated organization coWising, in addition
to the conventional technical and administrative units, the following: two
policy bodies, one of Which coordinates the work of other napping organiza-
tions, including that of the, military; a central archive for. the custody of
all data; a publishing unit for geodetic and cartographic literature; a
central research institute; a factory for the production of geodetic and
other mapping instrumeenta; 12 aerial-photography and geodetic plants, and
12 cartographic plants. The VW comprises a production service (YTS), a
faculty for advanced geodesy at the Engineering Academy, a scientific research
institute, an instrument-production plant, 12 topographic units, 7 geodetic
units, 3'aerial-photography units, 12 geodetic and cartographic unite, and
a field training and testing camp.
b. Personnel
Heavy emphasis on training, dating back to 1779, has produced
a corps-currently estimated to number 6,000 engineers and 10,000 technicians
in geodesy and cartography. The personnel of the Chief Administration of
Geodesy and Cartography alone has increased from 469 is 1924 to 5,058 in
1940 and to an estimated 9,000 in 1953.
c. Education and. Training
The training of engineers in geodesy and cartography is on a
very high level, both in theoretical and practical aspects, and Soviet
instruction and facilities compare very favorably with the best in Western
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Europe. The Soviet effort, however, exceeds in magnitude that of any other
country, and probably of all other countries combined.
Advanced scientific and technical education in surveying end. mapping
is provided by the largest system of special educatiomt institutions in
the world. Civilians and military personnel are given training in indepetd.-
ant facilities. Advanced civilian training at a university level (With one-
third of a 5-year course devoted to higher geodesy) is given in two
institutes, which confer engineering degrees at the rate of about 400 per
year. Graduate training is given'nat only at these two institutes but also
at several scientific research institutions. Graduate degrees are awarded
at a rate in excess of 7 doctorates and 21 predoc tes.(water?a degrees)
per year. In addition, intermediate education for production personnel
(topographers and cartographers) is provided by nine special schools with
4-year programs.
Military training in surveying and mapping leading to advanced degrees
is given in the engineering and air academies. With engineer officers
graduated in geodesy at the rate of 100 per year, the supply of highly
trained officer personnel will be adequate to maintain a corps capable.
of supporting staff and operational requirements for all phases of guided-
missile operations.
2. Soviet Research Facilities and Programs
a. Facilities
High-level research institutes in geodesy, photogrmrmetry
snd cartography function in both the GUGK and the VTU. These agencies in
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turn are supported by a vast array of scientific research institutes attached
to the astronomical and geophysical observatories of the Academy of Sciences
as well as in universities, in technical schools, and in the production and
resource-development components of Soviet industry. QUGK alone has over 100
highly qualified scientists who devote their entire attention to the problems
of geodesy and cartography.
b. Sccop
The availability of unlimited funds combined with a large
number of highly qualified geodesists, photogrammetrists, and cartographers
has developed a scientific resource capable of undertaking any problem in
geodesy and cartography. Current trends in Soviet research in higher
geodesy reveal unmistakable evidence of a determined continuing program to
increase geodetic precision and accurdey`significantly in excess of practical
domestic requirements, without any apparent regard to man-hour costs. This
ever-present drive for refinements in precision and accuracy -- considered
excessive by American standards -- may be designed to obtain the benefits
of distance measurement and position determiuMMOn on a worldwide scabs, which
could materially enhance the accuracy of Soviet intercontinental geodetic
positioning.
A dynamic and widespread effort systematically surveys all foreign
literature which then is widely disseminated to Soviet theoretical and
practical geodesists and cartographers. As a result, Soviet
scientific research reveals not only a thorough knowledge of Western
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geodetic advancements, but also indicates the willingness and the mature
ability to pursue independent lines of study and experIm entation.
c. Astronomy in Support of Geodesy
Vigorous Soviet scientific investigation of the earth as an
astronomic body has provided significant support to the study of the size
and shape of the earth. In addition, a large amount of Soviet astronomical
research has been directed to the support of Soviet geodesy and eartogra~hy.
A large-scale program for the compilation of an astronomic catalog listing
about 20,000 stars was begun in.1932 to replace Western catalogs (Boas and
FK3), which have been declared obsolete for Soviet requirements. Ten
centers of time service have been established for the determination of
longitude through an extensive program to increase precisions over the
yes.
TheEurope Satellites are being integrated into Soviet astronomic plans
and programs for geodetic purposes. The Poles have been incorporated in the
Soviet astronomical program and are now engaged in the compilation of a
catalog of "weak stars" to help "topographers to fix points on the earth?s
surface." Research on the notion of the terrestrial poles also has been
begun in Poland.
Six Soviet observatories participate in a domestic research program
on the variation of latitude. In addition, several conferences on this
problea have been held. The 1949 conference at the Poltava Gravinstric
observatory was attended by representatives of 13 astronomic and geodetic
organizations, including the military engineer acadeny and the hitherto
unknown "Arktikrazvedka."
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d. Instrumentation
We believe that the Soviets have the scientific and
technical ability to design and construct geodetic, ptrotogrrmletric,
and cartogrsyiic instruments. Information is laekJmg on the productive
capacities of Soviet industry to meet requirements independent of
Satellite or Western sources of supply.
3. Soviet Achievements in Geodesy
a. The Astronomic-geodetic Net
The Soviets began a modernization of their geodetic net in
1928.. Computation of this modern astronomic-geodetic net, extending across
the 1ESR to the Bering Strait and Vladivostok, eras completed in 19b6. It
is based on the new Krasovskiy ellipsoid and referenced to a new datum,
"Pulkovo 1942." This new geodetic system may give the Soviets a.con-
siderable potential advantage in the form of a reliable, widespread
network to which Soviet launching bases could be referenced. We are
unable to evaluate this advantage because the new catalog of the astronomic-
geodetic net is not available to us. However, there are indications that
high standards of accuracy are prescribed for field observations and that
unusual, rigorous methods of adjusting triangulation observations are
used. If these high standards have been successfully applied, the
advantage to the Soviets of this new modern network could be significant.
b. The Krasovskiy Efliipeoid
The Krasovskiy ellipsoid has been computed from more
geodetic arc measurements than have been utilized in the derivation of
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the ellipsoids used by the remainder of the world up to the present time.
The Krasovskiy ellipsoid is recognised internationally as an outstanding
geodetic contribution. Notwithstanding the completion of this laborious
task, however, Soviet geodetic and astronomic theoretical research
continues to determine a general terrestrial ellipsoid that will beat
represent the earth as a whole. In this connection, the Soviet goal to
improve its values of size and shape will be significantly advanced, by
the free access to the observational data of the Inter American Geodetic
Survey of South America, the data from the completion of the 30th
meridian survey of Africa by the Armory Map Service, and the data of the
gravity program being conducted at the Mapping and Charting Research
Laboratory for the U.S. Air Force.
c. A Soviet World
The Soviets have taken further steps in the direction of
establishing a Soviet world datum. Plans for this achievement date back
to 1936, when work was begun along the Sea of Okhotsk area to tie with
North America via Alaska. In 1952 the Soviets pressed a program on the
European Satellites to transform the diverse national geodetic systems
to the "Pulkovo 1942" system and to recompile the various national
topographic map series to bring them into accord with the Soviet series.
This program is scheduled for completion by 1959, and it is estimated
that it may be achieved by 1965. We can further assume that by 1965
the Soviets will also have readjusted the geodetic networks of western
Europe. Thus, since it is likely that a tie with Alaska has been
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achieved, the Soviets will by 1965 have a cc on geodetic datum, encom-
passing all of Europe, northern Asia, and Worth America.
d. Gravimetric and Magnetic Surveys
Systematic graviastric " nwgnetic surreys, initiated in
1932 and 1931, respectively, are outlasted to cover the entire US=, and
work is now continuing on increasing the density of these observations.
These data will (a) probably lead to an earlier eogpilation of a more
representative world. map of gravity anomalies and undulations of the
geoid than can be attained by the Western nations, and (b) provide the
means to establish related geodetic positions in difficult regions devoid
of triangulation, without resorting to the time-consuming methods of
triangulation.
e. The Soviet Gravimetric Network
The Soviets have established a unified network of gravity
stations that is somewhat similar to a triangulation network. With an
available gravity net the Soviets can.extend new positions (in conjunction
with astronomic observations) more rapidly than can be done by conven-
tional triangulation. This technique can increase the Soviets' range
and mobility in the choice of additional launching sites. Although the
interaont1 tel accuracies of such positions cannot be ascertained at
present, it is possible that reported Soviet surveying of the China-Burma
frontier may provide a triangulation chain to which the gravitmetrioally
derived geodetic positions could be referenced and adjusted-
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4. Soviet Napping Intelliasosae
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a. tree Access to Data
Soviet geodetic end oartopqbio a pebilities have prat'ited
materially over the years by tree ecaeq to A'a os Wasters r:rch
and and to Western squipasat ad pddetia data. In marked con-
trast to Western liberality, keen BOVfret plalc'awsa of the vital >~oa~tance
of geodetic end cartographic astsricla has bees reflected In as effective
security system that has prevented this vital iatorssatian from reaching
the West.
b. Soviet Cognisance of Developnnts
The Soviets are well informed on the basic organisation
of United States and other surveying and mapping organisations. There
is no significant Western geodetic development or program (including
the Tn9AF gravity program) that is not thoroughly known to Soviet geodesists
and cartographers. This has resulted from an avid and thorough Soviet
collection effort that included an extended visit to the United States
25 years ago by three Soviet geodesists for the study of U.S. methods.
The information obtained has been thoroughly assimilated in the evolution
of Soviet geodetic. and cartographic development.
c. Soviet Collection Efforts
Collection of readily available Western geodetic data
and large-scale maps probably spans the length of Soviet history. Such
materials have been used in the production of large-scale maps of
foreign countries dating as far back an 1930. Since World War II the
Soviets, using the Satellites in some instances, are again reported to
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be collecting large-scale maps of Western Europe. Reports also indicate
that production of Large-scale maps of European countries bordering on
the Satellites is now in progress.
d. Target location
In view of the advanced geodetic and cartographic educs-
tional p and facilities in the Soviet engineer and air academies,
we believe that the Soviets have a corps of officers available for duty
as military attaches ubo are highly qualified not only for, the .collection
of geodetic data and large-scale maps but especially for accurate plotting
of the locations of targets. Soviet military attaches have been active
within the past year in such widely scattered areas as Texas, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Nov York, California, Ohio, Illinois, and. Wisconsin. Soviet
Embassy personnel have recently purchased ca late topographic map
coverage of the states of Michigauti, Illinois, e'A Kentucky. Whether
these persons are specifically engaged in target location has not been
ascertained.
B. Soviet Capabilities in a22estiy Through 1965
1. Soviet `griangu~lation
The initial point for geodetic control of first-order triangulation
in the VBSR is in the Rotunda of the Pulkovo Observatory, with geodetic
coordinates 59?46'18'55 N; 30019e42".09 E. First-order triangulation
extends the full breadth of the Soviet Union from its western borders
with the Satellites to the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the
Bering Strait on the east. The network is extensive throughout the
European HSSR, but east of the 90th meridian it narrow in the south to
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essentially two east vest area., laterally connected at intervals, extending
to Nikolayevsk and Vladivostok. As of 194, a single are extended north-
ward from Khabarovsk to beyond Magadan. There are very good reasons to
believe that Soviet triangulation now extends from Magadan to the Bering
Strait. Although this extension has not appeared on Soviet maps available
to us or been confirmed in Soviet literature, it was the announced plan
as far back as 1936 to make this extension-and eventually to connect across
the Bering Strait with the North American datum. There are several arcs
of lover-order triangulation along the northern river valleys and the
Arctic coast.
Soviet first-order triangulation arcs generally run in the direction
of geographic meridians and parallels with no regularity of spacing,
which may vary from 150 to more than 500 kilometers. The total length
of all known first-order arcs exceeds 75,000 kilometers and today may
actually be as much as 100,000 kilometers. The intersecting arcs of
first-order triangulation form a pattern of polygons or loops, about 90
of which are known to exist. Base lines and Laplace stations are
located at all vertices of the polygons to maintain uniformity of scale
and proper orientation of the net. Some insight into the general
accuracy of Soviet first-order geodetic triangu3.atiok can be had from
their specifications controlling field work. A comparison of specifica-
tions limiting the probable errors:for first-order triangulation in the
USSR and the USA follows:
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in angle measurement and astronomic azimuth, Soviet specifications
for accuracy exceed those of the U.B. It would be most desirable to
check Soviet computations and adjustments of observations, starting with
raw field data. Unfortunately we are lacking the data as well as the
computations. We know that in 1947 the Central Computing Bureau of the
Chief Administration of Geodesy and Cartography completed the compilation
of a catalog of 4,733 control points in the astronomic-geodetic network
of the USSR. The catalog fills five volumes and represents the last word
in current Soviet first-order triangulation. For each control point are
given
(1) Rectangular coordinates
(2) Geographic coordinates
(3) Astronomic coordinates and components of
deflection of the vertical
(11) Description of the triangulation point
Our inability to obtain the catalog is a serious handicap in
estimating Soviet geodetic capabilities. The extreme care that the
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Soviets have exercised in preventing a basic work of this kind from
reaching the outside scientific world indicates their appreciation of
the military potentialities associated with geodetic control.
Soviet capabilities in triangulation may be estimated after first
considering the accuracy obtainable in any well-adjusted first-order net.
Observations of angles and measurements of distances With modern instru-
ments lead to a very highh order of precision in the positioning of widely
separated points of a net. At a distance of several thousand miles the
error may be as small as 1 part in 200,000. The European part of the
Soviet first-order net very probably has such accuracy.
claims that accuracy of 1:350,000 in the measurement
of 200-kilometer area of the first-order net has been attained. In view
of the character of the trans-Siberian arcs and the rugged nature of the
terrain, it is doubtful, however, if better than 1:100,000 accuracy is
held in that part of the net.
Assuming that 1:200,000 accuracy is possible everywhere on the
earthss surface, the msximurm.probable error in the relative positions
of two points diametrically opposite on the earth's surface would be
about 300 feet. If the continents were wholly covered and connected by
veil-adjusted first-order triangulation, no more serious error in
positioning than 300 feet would be expected at any distance. Only a
small part of the land surface is covered by first-order triangulation,
however., and the continents are far from being satisfactorily connected.
A tie-in with the North American datum across the Bering Strait
was suggested by Krasovskiy as far back as 1936. We believe the
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Soviets have made this connection across the Bering Strait -- probably
years ago, when suspicions were less easily aroused and our Alaskan
geodetic information was readily available.
The westward extension of the Soviet geodetic system to include the
widely divergent systems of the Satellites was initiated in 1952 at a
geodetic congress held in Sofia. In view of the fact that adjacent
countries. sometimes find their border positions in disagreement by as
much as 200 meters, it was not unnatural that the USSR undertook to
correct the situation with respect to the Satellites. The readjustment
of all Satellite geodetic control to conform with the Soviet system is
now under way, and the major part of it is scheduled for completion by
1957, Aside from the obvious advantage of replacing many small obsolete
systems with a single system, this integration of geodetic systems will
make it possible for the Soviets to establish launching sites for
long-range missiles anywhere in the Satellites with all geodetic and
cartographic hurdles already behind them.
2. Astronomic Observations
Determining the precise geodetic coordinates of positions on
the earth?s surface is a problem closely related to positional astronomy,
which measures very accurately the right ascension and declination of
the stars. Stellar proper motion in general is so small (the highest
proper motion of any star is about 10" of are per year) that the
relative positions of the stars as seen from the earth remain practi-
cally unaltered from one year to another. Thus the stars provide
essentially a fixed frame of reference with respect to which the
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angular separation of positions on the earth's surface can be measured.
It is necessary, of course, to know accurately the celestial coordinates
of the bright stars. In general use throughout Europe and the United States
are the star catalogs of Boss end M. These catalogs are known to be
subject to systematic errors sometimes as large 013, corresponding to a
displacement on the earth?s surface of about 30 feet. This is awe error
than the Soviets considered tolerable with first-order triangulation in
the USSR.
Recognizing the shortcomings of Bose and FK3, the Soviets in 1932
undertook an extensive program at five large observatories to redetermine
the right ascension and declination of bright stars for a more accurate
star catalog. In 1948 they published a "Catalog of 2957 Bright Stars
between declinations -10? and f90?." This catalog is now used exclusively
in Soviet geodetic work, but it is not available outside the USSR. It is
reasonable to conclude that it represents improved accuracy over Boss
and FK3. Since the probable error contributed by inaccuracy of star
catalogs may be in the order of only 10 or 15 feet, the asking of a
new catalog by the Soviets is important as another example of their
constant effort to achieve greater accuracy.
In preparation for any long-range missile attack on the United States,
the Soviets would surely determine the astronomic coordinates of the
launching point by repeated observations with the best field equipaaent.
Standards of precision for astronomic work in the USSR Indicate the
probable error that might be expected at the launching point.
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These specifications of accuracy are relaxed in lover orders of triangu-
lation. In the Soviet Arctic, climatic conditions affect the instruments
so adversely and present such obstacles for observation that precision
of astronomic gnark is considerably lose. Our estimate of probable
circular error in Soviet astronomic work, including errors in the star
catalog, expressed as displacement upon the earth's surface, ranges from
30 feet to 150 feet, the smeller figure being applicable to a launching
site.
3. Deflections of the Vertical
The small angle between the direction of the norm l to the
ellipsoid and the plumb line is the station error, or deflection of the
vertical. Usually mounting to only several seconds of are in flat
terrain, the deflection angle may become even greater than 1 minute of
are in mountainous regions. In the Soviet Union, the value of the
deflection angle ranges up to 75 seconds. The geodetic coordinates of
a point are obtained by subtracting the components of the deflection
angle from the observed astronomic coordinates of latitude and longitude.
Since 1 second of are at the center of the earth subtends an are approx-
imately 100 feet on the surface, geodetic positioning is directly affected
by knowledge of the station errors.
When the spirit levels of a theodolite are in final adjustment, the
direction of the plumb line (the normal to the geoid) coincides with the
vertical axis of the instrument. The direction of the plumb line thus
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can be established anywhere on the earth's surface, On the other hand,
it is Impossible to observe or not up an instrument in alignient With
the normal to some arbitrarily selected ellipsoid. In short, deflections
of the vertical depend upon the datum and cannot be observed in the field.
These must be computed: from MeJW astronomic observations at control points
of the triangulation net, or from gravimetric observations at many points
in the surrounding area. In the - United States, deflections of the
vertical have been computed almost entirely from astronomic observations.
The Soviets derived. deflections of the vertical from gravity determinations,
of which more than 20,000 are known to have been made in all parts of the
USSR. Although there are more than 8,000 astro stations in the USSR, some
asociated with the triangulation net and others existing as isolated
control points in remote areas, reliance is placed upon gravity determi-
nations for the computation of station errors.
It is beyond the scope of this estimate to indicate and weigh the
relative merits of these two different methods" for calculating station
errors. Of greater significance is the question of how well station
errors are knom in the UU and in the USSR. It to obviously necessary
that the Soviets consider our probable error of deflection angle in any
calculation that involves e3 target in this country.
The values assigned by the United States to the geodetic coordinates
at Hendee Ranch, Kansas (selected as thee initial point because of its
central location) are:
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According to recent reliable estimates by U.B. geodetic authorities,
the deflection angle at Meades Ranch may be in error by as much as 1
second of are, or 100 feet. Uncertainty in the magnitude of this error
is due in part to the chronology of geodetic development in this country.
There was extensive triangulation along our eastern seaboard long before
station errors were realized to be of such magnitude that they necessitated
geodetic recognition. At the time of the selection of Meadee Ruch as our
initial point, there was no practical need for Independently determining
with great precision the ccaspoaents of the deflection angle at the datum
point.
When the Kraaovskiy ellipsoid and the geodetic system of "Pulkovo
2942" were adopted for the Soviet Union in 1946* the components of the
deflection angle at Pulkovo were given me:
Soviet estimates of accuracy in determining deflections of the ver c
for the UR by gravimetric methods indicate a probable error of 0".4
of are. A considerable number of gravity stations exist in the area
around Pulkovo, so that it is quite possible to accept this order of
accuracy at. the datum. point. The astronomic coordinates of the Pulkovo.
Observatory are known with high precision. In preparing to not up the
datum at Pulkovo the Soviets would determine the deflection angle as
precisely as possible in order to insure the smallest error in the .
geodetic coordinates of the initial. point. In areas of less.con-
centration of gravity measurements the probable error in determining
deflections of the vertical may increase to 2 seconds or more. At any
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launching point for long-range missiles in the UBSR we would have to
assume that the most refined preliminaucy geodetic observations of all
types would be- made, so that 0".4, or 40 feet, is the probable error
we my associate with determining the deflection of the vertical.
Recently announced technical Improvements in timing the meridian
transit of stars at the Pulkovo Observatory indicate a longitude shift
of the datum point there of about 7 feet. Although accurate observations
at farce observatories reveal slight variations in longitude for reasons
as yet unkaovn, it is uncertain whether such studies at Pulkovo are
routine or we possibly motivated by Soviet desire for further refinement
of values at the datum point.
Should the Kraaovekiy ellipsoid replace the Clarke 1866 ellipsoid
at Meades Ranch in some Soviet ca lc Lion, the c -nent of the
deflection angle in the meridian at Meades Ranch would change by a few
tenths of a second of are. For this reason alone the geodetic latitude
of our initial point would chaa nge, as would the geodetic coordinates of
all points in our system. These shifts in position are =all as compared
with other probable errors and and will not be considered further.
if. 912ipaaoids of Refer
Although geodesy as an earth science should be removed from
the influence of arbitrary international boundaries on the eaarth? s
surface, the history of its growth indicates close attention to the
requirements of individual nations. Every country engaged in geodetic
work has computed or borrowed some ellipsoid of reference that supposedly
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agrees very closely with the geoidal configuration throughout its area.
In. the United States the Clarke ellipsoid of 1866 is used for referencing
all triangulation control, starting from Meades Ranch as the initial point.
In the table below are listed the parameters which determine the Clarke
and Krasovskiy ellipsoids, as well as the Bessel and. International
ellipsoids, which are, all that need concern us now:
By comparing corresponding values in the table, some Insight into
the magnitude of error to be expected in selecting an ellipsoid is gained.
The Bessel, although appearing often in the literature and still in use
in some parts of the world, was considered too small by the Soviets, who
abandoned it for the Krasovskiy ellipsoid. The semi-major axis of the
Clarke ellipsoid is just 39 meters shorter than that of the Kraeovskiy,
and present opinions based on American experience are that the Clarke is
too small rather than too large.
Determining the earth e s semi-major axis from are measurements in
various parts of the world presents a problem of such a nature that it
is hardly possible to reduce the probable error below 60 meters. The
question of which measured arcs to include and which to reject in any
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attempt to compute an ellipsoid becomes of less practical concern when it
is realized that there are no are measurements representing the vast ocean
areas that cover more than two-thirds of the earth's surface. In using
any of the four ellipsoids it will be understood that the semi major
.axis may be in error by- 100 meters.
The flattening of the earth can be ascertained by astronomic,
geodetic, or gravimetric.methods. There is considerable range in the
value of the reciprocal of flattening, as noted in the table, but it is
a reasonable estimate that 297 is not in error by more than 1 unit.
Although every one of the ellipsoids has been found usable when confined
to the needs of some particular country, we must keep in mind the concept
of',a "best fitting ellipsoid" for world geodetic study, even though such
an ideal is out of our reach. When dealing with problems hemispheric in
scope, such as relating the positions of two points which might be the
launching and target points for long-range missiles, the values used for
the parameters of the ellipsoid of reference affect the accuracy of
positioning very considerably.
Changing the value of the semi-major axis of any ellipsoid by 100
meters while retaining its. flattening would change the relative distance
between two points 5,000 miles apart by 1400 feet. If the Krasovskiy value
of the semi-major axis is retained but the flattening is changed to 1:297,
the distance from Pulkovo to Meades Ranch (approximately 5,000 miles)
would be less by-about 300 feet. In the absence- of triangulation
connecting the Soviet and American triangulation nets, it is impossible
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to escape the large probable errors in long-range positioning due to
uncertain knowledge of the earthes equatorial axis and flattening.
The uncertainty might very veil be in the order of boo feet for the
Soviets should they attempt to launch 5,000-mile missiles toward the
USA today.
5. Estimate of Soviet Capability in Geodetic Positioning
The following estimate of current and future Soviet capability
with respect to positioning of long-range intercontinental missiles is
based on the assumption that the highest attainable accuracy in geodetic
field observations and computations will prevail at the launching point.
We are led to two different estimates of positioning accuracy by consid-
ering the alternatives of a possible Soviet connection of their first-
order triangulation with the North American datum across the Bering Strait.
In the event that such a connection has been made, which we believe
to be probable, the Soviets would benefit from the considerably greater
accuracy inherent in first-order triangulation. Launching sites
established several hundred miles back from the Bering Strait could
cover every part of the United States with missiles of 5,000-mile range.
Triangulation on the Soviet side of the Strait could be referenced to
the North American datum for the short distance to the launching site.
By this method, the best positioning the Soviets might be expected to
achieve at the present time at 5,000 mile range between the USSR and
the USA would be a circular probable error between 300 and. 500 feet.
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Should there be no connection across the Bering Strait, the problem
becomes a matter of transforming the geodetic coordinates of one system
to the other, encountering the uncertainties connected with the datums
end the parameters of the ellipsoids. Other smaller errors resulting from
observations, calculation of deflection angles, geoidal heights, and
variations in latitude and longitude contribute further to the over-all
uncertainty. It is very doubtful if by this method the Soviets at present
can do better than a circular probable error of 1,000 feet at the target.
This estimate of error would apply to a launching point in the Moscow
area of the USSR fora target in the United States.
6. Eclipse and Lures Methods
The possibility of improving the accuracy of intercontinental
geodetic connections by using methods involving eclipses, osculations
of stars, and lunar photography is now being investigated. Active programs
for observation and photography are now in progress under the auspices of
the United States and other Western nations. It is not to be expected that
any improvement in intercontinental positioning by these methods will
exceed the accuracy of first-order triangulation.
Only slight Improvement in Soviet positioning capability from present
levels can be foreseen by 1965-
7. Positioning Submarine-Launched Missiles
The possibility of attempted missile launchings from Soviet
submarines deserves attention from the standpoint of positioning. Under
the most favorable conditions, a submarine beyond the horizon from land
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by stellar observations might establish its position relative to a
coastal target within 1,500 feet. The star-tracking method which the
U.S. has recently developed gives more accurate astronomic positions,
~. Positioning Air-Le-unched Missiles
Low-level launching of a missile from the air, pre-supposing
release a an IP (initial point) (which may be a specified geodetic or
astronomic position, or visually identified feature, within 50 to 100
miles of the target), requires accurate referencing of the initial point
to the target. Granting .02 inch maximum relative cartographic error
between initial point and target on topographic maps of the United States
at the scale of 1:24,000, the positional error at the target would be in
order ' of the 40 to 100 feet. For launching from an airplance over ocean .areas,
the errors would be comparable to those estimated for submarine positioning.
9. Gravity Effects in Flight
The effect on the flight of a missile of the varying force of
the earthee attraction due to gravity anomalies is still an unsettled
question among geodesist. A more precise knowledge of the earthns
exterior gravitational field is required to solve this problem. It is
significant to note that the Soviets have been devoting considerable
effort to the study of the external gravity field of the earth. A recent
Soviet study"reveals,a lack of sufficient observational data. It is not
possible to make this theoretical extension of the 4h's gravitational
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field with accuracy sufficient for the guidance of long-range missiles.
The great need. is for representative gravity values for the whole earth,
now principally from the vast ocean areas, where submarine measurements
will be necessary. Since it is known that the Soviets have made gravity
surveys at sea, employing not only submarines in the Black Sea, the Sea
of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan but ice floes in the Arctic Ocean, it is
possible for a survey of principal oceans to be completed by 1965.
C. Soviet Capabilities for Cartographic location of Targets Through 1965
1. Target Plotting
It can be assumed that the Soviets have a corps of officer
personnel specially trained in geodesy and cartography available for the
field plotting of targets in relation to geodetic control in Europe and
Worth America. The accuracy of this plotting is essentially a cartographic
and cartometric problem, dependent on the quality and available coverage
of large-scale topographic maps or town plans referenceed to a standard
geographic or military grid. In cartometry, the Soviets have devoted
considerable ' study to the problem of determining the relative accuracies
of control points on maps and the cultural and physical features
related thereto. Such specialized interest in mathematics, usually in
teatern cartographic practice and experience, is especially advantageous
to the targeting function of locating targets to control points on maps.
2. Estimates of Certo hic Errors
All printed maps have a cartographic positioning error that
arises in the compilation and drafting of the original copy and is
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contributed to by paper stretch and possibly by imperfect registration
in the printing. On first-class topographic maps, this cartographic
error is seldom more than 0.02 inch at any scale for 90 percent of the
cultural features shown. It is a fair assumption that the majority of
potential targets in the United States are to be found on first-class
topographic maps.. At the scale of 1:24,000, the positional error would
be 40 feet. Although some targets might be located on older, less
accurate, or smaller-scale maps, it is quite unlikely that the cartographic
error would ever exceed 100 feet for any military target in the United!.
States. We estimate that Soviet use of our maps for the purpose of
establishing the geodetic coordinates of targets would result in a
positional error ranging from 40 to 100 feet, with probability favoring
the smaller figure.
Western Europe is veil covered with large-scale topographic maps,
which it Is believed the Soviets have succeeded in obtaining. The
cartographic error in relating targets to geodetic control on maps of
western Europe would generally be the same or slightly less than for
the United States.
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