OIL AND PARTITION IN ALGERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01006A000100040001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 23, 1957
• Content Type: IM

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GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR-GM-4
23 August 1957
OIL AND PARTITION
IN ALGERIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission
or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SST
PS N
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Ne;om
OIL AND PARTITION IN ALGERIA
French plans for Algerian Partition have been complicated during the
past year by the discovery of oil in the Sahara Desert. From the French
standpoint, no partition without French control of the Saharan oil wealth
could be entertained. In fact, the French are so determined to retain the
wealth of the Sahara, no matter what the outcome of the struggle in the
north, that they have separated the two problems. They point out that
legally the Sahara has been and is separate from the north, that it forms a
separate geographic region, that it is under effective French military
control, and that no element in the north has exercised control over the
Sahara in modern history. The proposal for partition of Algeria, although
still evolving, appears to involve the establishment in northern Algeria of
several territories, largely autonomous units to be delimited on an ethnic
basis. The Southern Territories has become two departments, which remain
part of France.
From a nationalistic Algerian standpoint, military success without
Saharan oil revenue would mean abandoning the goal of an economically viable
state. Any nationalist government that accepted such a solution would
ultimately be subject to the charge that it had sold its birthright.
The French are now faced with the problem of getting oil out of the
Sahara. Although stability of the entire area is important, oil discoveries
during the past year emphasize accessibility to market as the controlling
factor. The French are reluctant to risk heavy investment in a pipeline and
rail route that would traverse the rebel-infested territory in northern
Algeria, and they are now making plans to take the oil to the Mediterranean
Sea by means of a pipeline through Libya. French West Africa to the south
is rebel-free, but distances to market are much greater than for any other
route, and independence for the area is conceded to be less than a decade
away. The French solution depends on the location of known oilfields and of
concessions where oil may be discovered.
The major oil discoveries in Algeria are confined to the Sahara, and to
date all concessions are in the hands of French-controlled companies. The
southernmost field consists of three structures in east-central Algeria
near the Libyan border and about 350 air miles from the nearest point on the
Mediterranean coast. The Edjele structure straddles the Libyan frontier and
includes 11 wells (of which 7 are producers) strung out for a distance of 1+3
miles westward toward the interior. The eastward extension of the field into
Libya has not been determined. On the immediate westward flank of Edjele is
Tiguentourine with 3 wells -- all producers and, like most of the Edjele wells,
all shallow. A third structure has been found at Zarzaitine, 18 miles north
of Edjele.
At present the field with the largest potential is Hassi Messaoud, 50
miles southeast of Ouargla. The French claim that this discovery has a
reserve of 7 billion barrels. Hassi Messaoud is only 200 miles from the
Libyan border to the southeast and could be tied into a gathering system
with the three southern structures.
Somewhat eclipsed by the discovery of oil has been the discovery of a
new gas field in the northern Sahara between Laghouat and Ghardaia. The
area also contains two oil pools of undetermined character. The French had
planned to build an atomic energy plant at Nemours, 300 miles northwest of
the field, to alleviate the power shortage of northwestern Algeria. The gas
field is noteworthy primarily because it reduces the urgency for installing
an expensive atomic plant and points to the development of cheap power from
local sources. The French plan to use 75 percent of the gas for production
of electricity; without doubt the rebels, also, are interested in the gas
field.
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PORT`jJGAL
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN
/ G C a ,Hassi R'mel
A F R I C A
G vaJ I CIIJ
100 200 300
Statute Miles
100 200 300
Kilometers
SECRET
A fourth area of potential oil production, the SAFREP* concession, is
as yet inadequately explored. It is located south of the Wadi Draa where
Algerian territory comes within 180 miles of the Atlantic Ocean. About
half of the concession lies in territory of unresolved sovereignty along the
Algerian-Moroccan frontier.
The French have taken concrete steps to capitalize on their oil
discoveries. These discoveries are separated from their markets by foreign
povers on the east and west, by rebel activity on the north, and by vast
distances on the south. The first major Saharan strike occurred at Edjele
along the undemarcated section of the Algerian-Libyan boundary. In fact,
at the time the strike occurred, there was fully as much evidence that it
was on Libyan territory as on French territory. For 37 years the French
had been content to let this boundary remain undemarcated, but with the
discovery of oil they set to work to obtain an agreement to demarcate the
boundary. For a time, Libyan concurrence was hard to obtain; but the
Prime Minister, Ben Halim, reportedly accepted a substantial bribe from the
French to settle the problem and is currently under investigation by the
Libyan Government. At any rate the French were able to move the boundary
eastward in places, thus definitely incorporating the initial oil strike
within Algeria.
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NOFORN
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With ownership practically assured, the French have announced that
they intended to terminate a pipeline from eastern Algeria at some point
on the coast of Libya or possibly Tunisia. The decision was buttressed by
the placement of orders for pipe.
The French have also taken steps to assure their possession of any oil
discovered in western Algeria. Although the French have always maintained
that no boundary had been agreed upon between Algeria and Morocco in this
part of the Sahara, they said in 1954 that, if cartographic portrayal of
the boundary were necessary, line "A" on the accompanying map would.be
satisfactory. In July 1957 the Institut Geographique National, the official
French mapping agency, became alarmed about the boundary portrayal it had
agreed to in 1954, which had begun to appear on maps made by U.S. Government -
agencies. The agency then took steps to disown its previous recommendation -
going so far as to say it might be forced to take the matter up with the
Foreign Office -- and now insists that no boundary be shown. The reversal
of French thinking resulted from the grant to SAFREP in .June 1956 of a
concession that extended as far north as line "B" and the desire to clear
the way for claiming any oil that might be discovered in the area between
the two lines.
In order to assure an outlet for western Algerian oil, France has made
a deal with Spain, preferring to build a pipeline through Spanish territory
rather than Moroccan. The sovereignty of the strip of land separating
Algeria from the Atlantic Ocean and lying between the Wadi Draa and 27?4O'N --
called Southern Morocco -- is not clear. On the basis of pertinent treaties,
the Moroccan claim is believed by the United States Government to be sound,
but the area is controlled by Spain. An under-the-table agreement with
Spain gives France increased assurance of continued Spanish control of this
corridor and, by implication, buttresses the French contention that the Draa
forms a logical natural boundary eastward from the corridor. Further
complications may develop from the interest of American oil companies in
obtaining concessions in the area between 27?40'N and the Wadi Draa.
Conclusions
The French Government is determined to keep the oil wealth of Algeria
under French control, free from any local nationalistic influence. It is
reluctant to firm up any plans for taking substantial quantities of present
or potential Saharan oil northward through rebellious areas but instead has
concentrated on assuring accessibility of the oil to the Mediterranean Sea
through Libya and to the Atlantic Ocean via Spanish Sahara. In the minds
of the French, Algerian partition is a question that is limited in area to
northern Algeria and does not apply to the Sahara.
Saharan Algeria and its oil cannot be ignored by the rebels or by the
rest of the Arab world, and whether they will tolerate any French pipeline
in the area remains to be seen. Accessibility without stability may be
fallacious French reasoning.
* Societ Anonyme Fran9aise de Recherches et d'Exploitations
Petrolieres.
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SfCM
RNOPMW
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