GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NUMBER 87

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01005A000300080002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CONTENTS
Finland Straddles the Iron Curtain . . . . . . ... 25
Offshore Petroleum in the Persian Gulf . . . . . . . . 35
A Recent Series of Soviet Economic-Geographic Monographs . . 45
Polish Land-Use Mapping . . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? 50
The Minority-Area Policy of Communist China in Perspective . . 1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
DECLASSIFIED
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 783 and 784, the trans-
mission or revelatior.. of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by law.
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GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CIA/RR MR 59-1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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Page
The Minority-Area Policy of Communist China
in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Finland Straddles the Iron Curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Offshore Petroleum in the Persian Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A Recent Series of Soviet Economic-Geographic Monographs . . 4+5
Polish Land-Use Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Map s
Communist China: Autonomous Regions . . . . . . Frontispiece
Following page
Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region:
Chuang Settlement (27550) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Kansu and Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region:
Hui Settlement (27551) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Finland (27553) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Persian Gulf Area: Petroleum Concessions (27389) . . . . . 44
*The individual classification of each article in this Review
is given at the end of the article. The cut-off date for research
on all articles was 1 February 1959.
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THE MINORITY-AREA POLICY OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN PERSPECTIVE
I. Introduction
An estimated 35 to 4+0 million persons of China possess charac-
teristics sufficiently different from the Han Chinese* to be classified
as minorities. The largest concentrations of minority peoples occur
in the frontier areas of northwestern and southwestern China. Politi-
cally, the three most important groups are the Mongols, Tibetans, and
Muslims, of which some have traditionally maintained varying degrees
of independence from the Central Government. Numerous aboriginal
groups also inhabit southwestern China, where many of them have until
recently lived in isolation and seclusion from the Chinese. The major
conflicts between minority groups and the Chinese that have occurred
in the past were caused chiefly by the encroachment of Chinese
agriculturists on areas traditionally inhabited by minorities and
by attempts to secure political control over minority areas by every
Chinese Government in the past.
In Communist attempts to secure control of the minority-inhabited
frontier areas, the most striking feature of the early effort was the
unprecedented speed with which these areas were brought under the
*"Han" means Chinese by culture and language.
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domination of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Thereafter, the
most striking development has been the effectiveness with which "local
and regional autonomy for minorities," has been implemented as a
comprehensive program of administrative control. Each autonomous
unit is fitted closely within and subordinated to the Chinese Communist
administrative system at an appropriate level. The degree of
independence allowed an autonomous unit, however, is slight. It is
under the jurisdiction of an ordinary people's government (by
definition a Chinese body), from which it receives "leadership" and
"guidance."
Autonomy is not granted merely at the desire of the local
inhabitants. Its implementation has always been preceded by a
preparatory period -- sometimes prolonged -- of intense political
indoctrination by specially trained cadres (government or party
functionaries).* The selection, nurture, and correction of this
group -- in particular those cadres of non-Ran Chinese origins --
is of immense importance to the Chinese Communists. Propaganda
materials dealing with or directed at this group which have appeared
in the press provide a little insight into the workings of the
program, and were the chief source for the analysis that follows.
*In translations of Chinese Communist press materials, the
word "cadre" is used in the singular and normally refers to one
person only.
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II. Progress Toward the Unified State
Since 1954, when the last CIA map of "autonomous" administrative
units in Communist China (Map 13517) was published, the administrative
structure set up to implement the autonomy concept has moved from
what might be called a romantic youthful stage, which was designed to
appeal to local aspirations of non-Han peoples concentrated in various
parts of China; through a more intense mature stage, in which the
nationality cadres emerged as an actively participating force in
local government; into a repressive third stage, which cannot yet be
fully characterized.
During the first stage, lasting from 1952 into 1955, the
rudimentary forms of tzu-chih ch'U (autonomous areas) were in vogue;
but nationality cadres (government or party functionaries) probably
played a definitely subordinate part in their administration. Since
several useful studies of developments in this stage are readily
available, only a few selected aspects of the historical background
are referred to in this article.
The second or mature phase extended from 1955 to early 1958.
It was characterized by territorial expansion of many of the previously
existing units and rise in status of most. Virtually all of the
tzu-chih ch'U, as they met the preconditions for formal autonomy
(land reform, cadre readiness, mass acceptance), were elevated to
the status of autonomous hsien (counties) or chou (districts).
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The changes in numbers and administrative status of autonomous
administrative units during the past 6 years are given in Table 1,
which shows clearly the 1955 break. The degree of territorial expansion
of "autonomous" administrative units during the second phase of policy
development will emerge when Map 26970 (now in preparation) is compared
with the 1954 map.
The third phase apparently began in early 1958 after the
promulgation at the end of 1957 of a harder Party line, which was
closely geared to the much-publicized Rectification Movement of
1957-58. As it was implemented in the minorities problem the new
line stresses the obligations of minorities to the country and
deemphasized the significance of national differences. During this
third stage, the position of national minorities may decline further
in political importance as the country becomes more deeply involved
in communalization. Certainly, never before have the ultimate
objectives of the Communist regime been stressed with such consistent
candor as at present. This new and harsher phase is based on the
considerable achievement in constructing an administrative machine
and in building up reliable local cadres during the past 8 years of
organizational effort, when softer treatment was the rule.
The percentages of the minority peoples living under local
autonomy as of November 1958 are indicated by Table 2. At that time
the regime claimed that over 90 percent of the people of 36 minority
nationalities living in compact communities were living under adminis-
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Table 1. Number of So-called Autonomous Administrative Units
July 1952 to November 1958
Province Level
Special District (Chuan-ch'U) Level
County (Hsien) Level
t
Regions
-chih ch'U)
(T
Areas
(Tzu-chih ch'U)
Districts
(Tzu-chih chou)
Areas
(Tzu-chih ch'U)
Counties
(Tzu-chih hsien)
and Banners (ch'i)
Da
e
zu
1 Jul 52
1
6
--
5
--
20 Jun 53
1
11
--
17
--
Aug 51
1
25
--
33
--
1 Jan 55
la
25
--
15
1 (Hunan)
1 Jan 56
2
3 (Yunnan)
23
5 (Yunnan)
1l3
1 Jan 57
2
1 (Yunnan)
29
2 (Yunnan)
48
1 Nov 58
4
--
29
2 (Yunnan)
58
a. The Kuei-hsi (West Kwangsi) Chuang Autonomous Area was accorded the status of "administrative
office," which falls between Province and Special District in the People's Handbook for 1955.
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Table 2. Political Status of Minority Groups Under the Autonomy Policy; 1 November 1958
Percent under
Numbers of Autonomous Administrative Unitec
Approximate
Autonomous
Districts
Counties
Numbers
Governmentsb
Regions
Unshared
Shared
Unshared
Shared
Uighur
3,640,000
Nearly 100
1
Chuang
7,000,000
Probably over 95
1
1
2
1
Mongolian
1,463,000
80-85
1
2
le
6
Hui
3,559,000
Perhaps 35
1
2
--
9
le
Tibetan
2,775,000
Perhaps 40
--
9
le
2
--
Miao
2,511,000
Probably over 75
5
4
le
Yao
665,000
--
--
7
1
I (Yi)
3,250,000
Perhaps 50
1
5
2e
Kazakh
509,000
Over 85
le
3
-
Tung
712,000
Probably over 75
1
3
-
--
Thai
478,000
70
--
1
1
--
2e
Korean
1,120,000
Probably over 50
--
1
--
1
-
Pai
567,000
Close to 100
--
1
-_
--
Li-su
317,000
Over 30
--
1
--
--
Kirghiz
70,900
Perhaps 66
--
1
--
-_
--
--
Pu-i
1,247,000
65
--
--
1
--
--
Li
360,000
Close to 100
Ha-ni
481,000
Perhaps 55
--
--
1
--
1
Vu-chia
300,000
Close to 100
--
--
1
--
--
Ching-p'o
101,000
Close to 100
--
__
i
-_
_-
Ka-wa
286,000
--
--
.--
1
2e
La-hu
139,000
Probably over 75
--
--
--
1
le
Nu
12,700
--
--
--
--
--
1
Tu-lung
2,400
--
--
-_
--
1
Manchu
2,418,000
None
--
Tajik, Sibo, Yu-ku,
Tung-haiang,
Chiang, Shui,
T'u, Salar,
641,000
35 to 100
Oronchon, Daghor,
averaging
Evenki, Na-hsi
60 to 70
Russians, Uzbeks,
Tatar, Mo-lao,
Mao-nan, Yu,
Ch'i-lao, Pao-an,
396,350
None
A-ch'ang, Pu-lang,
Ho-che, Peng-lung
Total
35,021,350
4
Districts;
29
Counties;
62f
a. he Populations and Distribution of Minority Nationalities in China," Ti-li chili-shih,
No. 6, 14 Jun 1958, pp. 285-289. Translated in FDD Summary No. 1907 (221), i6 Sep 1956, PP. "59-65-
OFF USE
b. Based on fragmentary figures of various dates that have appeared in the press and to some
extent on distributions given in source a. Generally the error is on the low side.
c. Nationality townships (min-tau haiang) are not included since little is known about them.
In Fukien Province, for example, 45 have been established for the Yu, who number 210,000 but have
no nationality administrative units at higher levels.
d. Includes autonomous banners (ch'i) and 2 autonomous areas (chit).
e. One of the units included is shared with 2 other minority groups. For details see Map
26970.
f. Two multinational autonomous hsien in Kvangsi Chuang Autonomous Region are not listed
because the participating minorities are not definitely known. The total number of autonomous
units of county level is therefore 64.
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trative autonomy. Slightly over 1 percent of the minority population
had become reliable cadres and party members by early 1958, as com-
pared with 2 percent for all Communist China. Party membership is
further increased by the large numbers of Han cadres posted to minority
areas. Thus the political grip of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
on the minority areas is becoming increasingly firm.
Tibet remains an exceptional area. There, preparations for the
switch from genuine autonomy in the sense of self-determination to
"autonomy" in the sense of self-administration have been greatly slowed
by the postponement of the reform of the social system until 1963.
After a full generation of institution building, during which
the approach to minorities was worked out, the 38-year-old CCP now
stands on the eve of its tenth anniversary in power. It is difficult
to dismiss its long-standing regional autonomy policy for minorities
as a simple facade for totalitarian rule. The concept of adminis-
trative autonomy is now becoming institutionalized as a mode of
administrative control. It provides, within the framework of regional
autonomy, an orderly and equitable basis for effective administration.*
*It would go beyond the scope of this article to examine the
special features of revenue, disbursement, and budgeting procedures
under local autonomy, or their political significance. A new set
of provisional rules for local finance in national autonomous areas
(State Council, 13 June 1958) decrees a slightly greater degree of
financial decentralization and self-sufficiency than that decreed
for other local areas (State Council, 15 November 1957).
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III. Policy and Practice at the Province Level
A. Theory
Some of the intra-Party discussion of autonomous-area policy
that was publicized during the early months of 1958 revolved around
matters of definition and delimitation which merit brief review. A
nationality has recently been defined as "a body of people living in
a common area, historically formed, with a common language, a common
economic life, and a common psychology."* Few groups, however, possess
all of these attributes.
In the case of the Chinese Moslems (Hui), several of the criteria
had to be stretched. For the most part, the Hui are well Sinicized
but more illiterate than their Han counterparts. Religion, therefore,
forms the logical basis for the definition of this group, which requires
separate treatment for such practical reasons as their uncooperative
personal and social behavior and their turbulent history as a minority.
Although the Hui were officially estimated at 5 to 6 million in 1952,
the 1953 census gave their number as only 3.6 million.
An example of redefinition of a minority group involves the
merging of three groups -- known hitherto as Solun, Tungus, and
Yakut -- under a new label, Evenki (0-wen-k'o). The Soluns of the
vicinity of Hailar in northwestern Manchuria are a Tungusic tribe
speaking a Manchu-related dialect and resembling Mongols. Historically
*State, Hong Kong. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 176+,
5 May 58, p. 22. OFF USE.
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they were a stalwart limb of the Manchu Federation; and, hitherto,
their name was assigned to a banner (chi) within the Inner Mongolian
Autonomous Region (IMAR). In 1958 the 4,900 Soluns were combined
with 1,205 Tungus and 137 Yakuts to form a new "nationality" banner --
the O-wen-k'o Autonomous Ch'i. Meanwhile the Soluns in the Ili Valley
of Sinkiang have dropped out of sight. They may have become identified
with their more numerous racial cousins the Sibos (Hsi-po) in their
Chapchal Autonomous Hsien, whose number increased from 9,000 two
decades ago to almost 20,000 in 1958.
One of the showcase features of autonomy is the encouragement
given to the use of local languages in areas where the study and use
of Chinese would present a hardship for cadres and populace and hamper
achievement of political goals. By the end of 1958, 1 central and 10
local nationality publishing houses had been established and were
publishing books.and other materials in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur,
Miao, I, Chuang, Pu-yi, Korean, Kazakh, Thai, Kawa, Ha-ni, Li, Khalkha
(Kirghiz), Li-su, La-hu, Ching-po, and Salar. The CCP organ Red Flag
is now published in 4 minority languages -- Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur,
and Korean -- as well as in Chinese.
The geographical requisite for the granting of local or regional
autonomy to a people is its effective settlement and occupation of
enough territory to form a conspicuous concentration of settlement.
This elusive concept does not require numerical preponderance, since
other peoples may be more numerous but more scattered. In practice,
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a nationality group honored with autonomy is likely to be either
(1) a majority in its own area, even though the group is much more
numerous but less concentrated outside or (2) mostly included within
its own autonomous area but as a minority within the total population.
The generalizations discussed are illustrated by the current situations
in the four province-level autonomous regions of Communist China.
B. The Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region
In the former Kwangsi Province, for example (Map 27550), the
West Kwangsi Autonomous Area (KCAR) was first organized for the Chuang
people in December 1952, with 34 hsien and 1 municipality. It was
enlarged in the following year to 42 hsien and in 1955 became a thou.
In March 1958 the unit was further enlarged and elevated to provincial
status as the Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region (KCAR), taking in all
70 hsien of the former Kwangsi Province, and superseding that province.
From being a 66 percent majority within the 42-county autonomous chou,
the Chuang people become a minority of 37 percent within the autonomous
region; only 5 percent of their total number, however, now remain
outside the enlarged borders.
Before the establishment of the KCAR, an ostentatious debate
over unity versus partition of Kwangsi as a geographic entity was
publicized and quickly resolved in favor of making the entire province
the unit of regional autonomy for the Chuang. Financial administration
within the province was already difficult because the poorer and more
sparsely-settled Chuang areas of western Kwangsi needed more supplementary
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107 110
KUEI?YANG I I
KWANGSI CHUANG AUTONOMOUS REGION:
CHUANG SETTLEMENT I
FORMER-WEST KWANGSI CJ-IUANC
SCUT ' ,ESTERN R i E ARE
Boundary of former
-- West Kwangsi Chuang
Autonomous Chou
people
and other peoples
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funds for administration, education, and capital investment than did
the better-favored eastern areas occupied by Chinese. Unity perpetuated
the maximum degree of economic self-sufficiency for the KCAR as a whole
and probably served the best interests of the Chuang people themselves.
C. The Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region
The Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) illustrates a second
type of situation and is of especial interest because it was so
recently established -- on 24+ October 1958. Its formation, which
involved greater social and political difficulties, lagged behind
that of the KCAR by 7 months. Surprisingly, the NHAR was granted
province-level status despite its small size, which would seem more
appropriate to an autonomous thou (Map 27551). The new region has a
population of 1,822,000 and an area of 77,800 square kilometers, 11
percent of which is cultivated. It has only 3/4 the area of Chekiang,
previously China's smallest province, only 1/13 its population, and
is only 1/2 as extensively cultivated. Of Communist China's autonomous
chow, however, 8 are comparable in population, and at least 8 are of
comparable size.
The Hui, or Chinese Moslem, minority is in a class by itself
for truculence and dispersion of settlement but has had close ties
with the CCP for 20 years or more. During this period, local autonomous
administrations were established for the Hui in Kansu, old Ningsia,
and Shantung. Within the NHAR, anti-Chinese sentiment persists at
the community level, and mutual contempt and distrust are deeply rooted.
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Two village-scale "uprisings" or riots occurred within the last year --
one on 1 June 1958, involving two localities in the southeastern
portions of the new Region, and the other on 4 April in the nearby
Chang-chia-ch'uan Hui Autonomous Hsien.
The delimitation of the NHAR was difficult. To make the new
region a rational geographic unit, it was given as its core area the
irrigated agricultural lands of the Yin-ch'uan--Wu-chung Basin and
the Hui-inhabited highland areas to the southeast, extending to within
20 kilometers of P'ing-liang Shih, the seat of the special district
for easternmost Kansu. Only half of the 1,200,000* Hui in Kansu were
taken into the jurisdiction of the NHAR; those left out include an
estimated 80,000 in the adjacent Ping-liang area, 100,000 in the
nearby Chang-chia-ch'uan Hui Autonomous Hsien and 320,000 in the more
distant Lin-hsia Hui Autonomous Chou on the south side of the Kansu
Corridor. According to the official explanation, P'ing-liang Shih
and its environs could not be included in the NHAR without depriving
the P'ing-liang Special District of its "cultural and economic center,"
nor the Chang-chia-ch'uan Hui Autonomous Hsien without bisecting Kansu.
Another factor, candidly stated and possibly decisive, was that "more
time is needed for the complete elimination of the national differences"
in the P'ing-liang area -- admission that anti-Chinese feeling there
apparently remains explosively strong.
*FBIS, Daily Report (Far East), 23 Jun 58, pp. CCC6. OFF USE.
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SINKIANG
42
UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS
REGION /
0 so 100 200 Miles
i" , 'r
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
KANSU AND NINGSIA HUI
AUTONOMOUS REGION:
HUI SETTLEMENT
Province or autonomous region boundary
........... Chang-Chia-ch'uan Hui Autonomous
Hsien boundary
----- Boundary (conjectural) of adjacent
Hui-inhabited area not included in NHAR
102
MONGOLIA
108
1 NINGSIA HUI
YIN-CH'UAN ~J
?u-chu`ng, /
? ^ F-i
g-wei ?
?
-~CHANG-CHIA-CH'UAN HUI ?
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D. The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region
A third type of situation in which definition and delineation
becomes complex is illustrated by the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous
Region (SUAR). Within the province as a whole the Uighurs have a
75 percent population majority. They have an almost total predominance
in the southwestern half of the province, and are also found in many
parts of northern Sinkiang. In the SUAR the political interests of
non-Uighurs are formally recognized in 11 autonomous chou and hsien,
at least 7 of which show the familiar population-proportion anomalies.
Only the inconspicuous Tajiks in their remote Tashkurghan Tajik
Autonomous Hsien in the far southwest and the formidable Kazakhs in
their vast Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou on the northwestern frontier
have numerical preponderance and numerical majority of their respective
nationalities within their autonomous units.
The Kazakhs have been further recognized by the creation of two
other autonomous hsien in the eastern part of the SUAR. No other
nationality group in Sinkiang has been handled more circumspectly
than the Kazakhs since the completion of its sanguinary conquest by
the Peoples Liberation Army in 1952. The regime's present leniency
toward the Kazakhs has the earmarks of sound expediency, since the
subjugation of no other people except the Tibetans has cost the
Chinese Communists greater effort and since the largely nomadic
Kazakhs still remain sensitive to developments in the Russian sphere
of Kazakhstan, where the majority of their people live. The remaining
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bonds of mutual sympathy with the Kazakhs of the USSR are probably
both a theoretical help and a practical hazard to Chinese Communist
administration along the strategic Kazakh segment of the China-USSR
border, since it complicates the problem of controlling the traditional
hostility of the Kazakhs toward the Chinese. Recent indications
suggest that greater conformity and sterner treatment will be the
future lot of the Sinkiang Kazakhs. Several of their leading cadres
have recently been purged, and the Kazakhs have been publicly reminded
that their anti-Chinese excesses during the revolutionary regime of
1944-48 still sully their record.
E. The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region
Differing from the other three autonomous units at province
level is the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR). As it is
currently delimited, the Mongols are outnumbered by the Chinese by
more than 7 to 1. The region itself is not a single potential economic
unit (as it should be in the Communist scheme) but includes three
economic areas.* Historic, cultural, physiographic, and strategic
factors, however, give the IMAR some degree of physical and social
unity. The region was founded in 1947 -- 2 years before the PRC
itself. It is the catch-all for all the nonagricultural desert and
semidesert areas of the northwest border from Sinkiang to the Amur,
and includes those parts of traditional Manchuria that are sparsely
*State, Hong Kong. Extracts from China Mainland Magazines,
No. 141, 8 Sep 58, p. 33. U.
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populated by Tungusic groups. In the past, nomadic herding and
hunting at a subsistence level were the normal way of life throughout
most of this vast region, which insulated China from Outer Mongolia.
The agricultural areas along the southern margins have always been
highly vulnerable to the vagaries of climate and to political strife.
With the introduction of industrialization into the agricultural
areas, the borders of the IMAR are becoming less relevant and further
revisions would not be surprising.
IV. The Pattern and Objectives of Recent Developments
The new hard policy toward minorities that came into effect
after November 1957 represents a definite change of direction, and
not merely another passing phase. It is not a question of failure
of the more indulgent policy of the past; probably, having served
its purposes, it had simply become. outmoded. For 8 years, through
a variety of appeals, the sympathies of minority populations were
courted, and the Han cadres were under almost continual criticism
for unsympathetic ("chauvinistic") attitudes. In the present phase,
by contrast, the minorities cadres have come under severe attack for
excessive loyalty to the minority group and its interests ("local
nationalism") and for related conservative and negative sentiments
which for purposes of censure have been called "anti-Han" and "anti-Party".
A. Thwarted Nationalistic Ambitions
The attacks on the nationality cadres mesh closely with the
present overall objective of total participation by minorities in
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the construction of a Communist state, regardless of obstacles. Any
effort to mitigate the forcible break-up of old societies in South
China or to temper the impact of Chinese immigratio$ on the industrially
backward minority-occupied territories of the north must now meet the
test of whether or not such effort would hinder China's metamorphosis
into a socialized, industrial nation.
Some high-ranking nationalities cadres lingered too long over
the problems of adapting administrative autonomy to the existing
patterns of dispersion and intermingling of peoples, and consequently
were censured as deviationists. Several types of deviation of which
these nationality cadres were allegedly guilty were defined. One was
attempting to expand autonomous areas and increase their administrative
powers. Another was support of the once-encouraged principle of
more-or-less proportional representation in local government and
on local committees ("nationalization of cadres"). This principle
was set aside since, under the guidance of a new generation of local
leadership by Party members of local origin,* it might become the
first step toward resurgent self-determination of nationalities.
*The language of the warnings to nationalities cadres suggests
strongly that the emphasis was more on thoughts and suppressed aspi-
rations than on deeds. The primary target was those people who
permitted themselves to display "a pessimistic attitude . . . toward
the Han Chinese cadres and the resettlement of Han Chinese . . ., a
love for the old, backward things and a fear for the new, advanced
things . . . [and a desire] to set up Party organizations according
to the nationality status . . and discriminate against the Party
members from outside, particularly those in charge of leadership."
(State, Hong Kong. Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 130,
2 Jun 58, p. 20. U.
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Among the Miao, Yi, and Tung of the south, and among the Mongols
of the north, for example, there were apparently some who proposed
regroupings and boundary realignments into larger units of higher
status. One of these was the vice-governor of Kweichow, who was
accused in late 1957 of having "plotted to place the provinces of
Hunan, Szechwan, Kweichow, and Kwangsi under his thumb" within a new
autonomous region. Possibly he may merely have wanted to improve
upon the fragmented pattern of small autonomous units which characterized
all of South China prior to the establishment of Kwangsi as the KCAR.
In the IMAR, on the other hand, certain leaders were criticized
for having proposed a division into Mongolian and Han areas, and the
resettlement within the strictly Mongolian area of Mongolians from
the present mixed areas. Among the grievances of the so-called local
nationalists in the IMAR is the growing preponderance of the Chinese
which increased from 3:1 in 1953 to 7:1 by 1957 through immigration
and boundary extensions, and is expected to reach 10:1 in the foreseeable
future. The answer to the local nationalists in the IMAR left them
with little hope for the future. China's highest-ranking minority
cadre, Ulanfu, a Mongol by heritage, told them: "We Communists hold
that nationalities . . . run their own course of genesis, development,
decline and death." Within the next 4 years, all Mongolians in the
IMAR are scheduled for permanent settlement. At present only 8,000
households are still nomadic, and 25,000 seminomadic -- probably 200,000
individuals out of a total Mongol population in the IMAR of over
1,100,000. The threat to the traditional Mongol way of life, however,
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is partly tempered by a recently announced decision to stress intensive
agriculture, at the expense of extensive, within the IMAR and thus
release marginal agricultural land for pasture and fodder crops. This
decision may help preserve the pastoral areas by rolling back the
agricultural frontier.
In the Greater Khingan Mountains area, the Tahur (Daghor) minority
of 40,000 is divided almost equally between the IMAR and Heilungkiang.
In Lung-chiang Hsien of Heilungkiang, an autonomous subdistrict was
established for the Tahur in 1952. In 1958, their leaders in the IMAR
were found guilty of "local nationalism" when they requested establish-
ment of an autonomous chou, whereas the IMAR Party Committee had already
resolved to limit the Tahur to an autonomous ch'i, at the hsien (county)
level. Within the boundaries of the new autonomous ch'i only 14,000
Tahur are included -- only 22 percent of the total ch'i population of
64,ooo.
The complaint of the Manchus is lack of recognition as a
nationality group by the regime. Although thoroughly Sinicized,
the Manchus are historically distinct and in many places continue to
live in separate communities and think of themselves as Manchus. Alone
among the larger minority groups, they are conspicuously lacking in
autonomous units above the township (hsiang) level, despite their 2.4
million population. Manchus number some 640,000 in Heilungkiang alone.
A member of the Heilungkiang People's Political Consultative Conference,
allegedly dreamed of having two autonomous hsien for the Manchus and
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complained that "the brilliant light of the party's nationalities
policy has not shone on the Manchu people." Of 49 nationality hsiang
established in Heilungkiang prior to February 1957, only 2 were
Manchu.*
B. Rejection of the Pattern Established by the USSR
The common denominator for most of these examples of thwarted
nationalistic aspirations appears to be the desire on the part of
nationalities cadres for further development and expansion of the
autonomy concept and, in direct opposition, the intent of the CCP
to hold the line against over-expansion of autonomy. To hold this line,
the strongest argument of local nationalists -- the constitutional
precedent set by the USSR -- had to be refuted. In order to emphasize
that the right of national self determination, which is accepted in
form in the USSR and expressed in a federal state organization, is
completely unpalatable to the PRC, party spokesmen and apologists
laid great stress on the unitary state organization of China as the
basic principle of the constitution of the Peoples Republic of China.
Thus, in 1957 and 1958, to advocate self-determination for nationalities
and to hark back to the older Soviet model of "federal republics"
became deviationist, antiproletarian, and anti-socialistic.**
*The remainder were: Korean, 29; Tahur (Daghor), 6; Mongolian, 5;
Olunchun, 2; O-wen-k'o (Evenki), 1; Ho-chieh, 1; mixed, 3. See State,
Hong Kong, SCI 1492, 14 Mar 57, p. 25, U.
**A Russian commentator has recently agreed that the Chinese approach
is theoretically ideal, and that the Russian approach is exceptional,
confirmed as correct through practice and concrete analysis rather than
Marxist-Leninist logic. V. S. Petrov, The Type and Form of the State in
the People's Republic of China, Joint Publications Research Service,
JPRS DC-212, 8 July 58,, p. 14, U.
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The potentially embarrassing differences in viewpoint and polity
are not surprising when the lesser importance of minority people in
Chinese national life is recognized. Of the total Chinese population,
94 percent is Han Chinese. The remaining 6 percent (35 to 40 million
people) belongs to about 49 groups defined as minorities and is spread
over 55 to 60 percent of China -- in Tibet, the Chang-tuArea, Sinkiang,
Tsinghai, Inner Mongolia, and large parts of other provinces, including
Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, and ICansu. Some 'of these areas
contain resources essential to the economic development of the PRC,
and in some areas the intensive development of these resources has
begun. Nevertheless the areas occupied by minorities are generally
marginal to the economic heartland of China, which is centered in
Southern Manchuria and in the lowlands of Central and Northern China.
Only the Chinese Moslems, or Hui, have become widely dispersed within
this area. Since the minorities have a low potential for genuinely
autonomous political existence, it is both understandable and
strategically desirable for the Chinese Communists to define their
nation as a unified state, of which the territories of minority
peoples are inalienable parts.
The population of the USSR, in contrast, is more heterogeneous.
The leading group, the Great Russians, constituted only 53 percent of
the population in 1926. The three dominant peoples -- Great Russians,
Ukrainians, and Belorussians -- together constituted only 77 percent
of the population, and a total of 87 percent of the population belonged
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to no less than 11 nationality groups which were historically associated
with European Russia.* The structure of the Soviet Union reflects this
situation. It is theoretically a voluntary union of republics -- each
of which nominally retains the right of secession. The formal
legislative function is bicamerally divided between the Soviet of the
Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.
Even the original revolutionary leadership reflects the differences
between the USSR and the PRC. The top leadership of the CCP is almost
entirely Han Chinese whereas, among the old Bolsheviks, such homogeneity
was lacking from the start, with Lenin a Mordvian, Trotsky and others
Jewish, and Stalin a Georgian.
It was quite natural for the CCP, once in power, to turn its
back on the classic Soviet formulas for the government of minority
nationalities. From self-determination of nationalities, the watchword
of the PRC after the takeover became solidarity among nationalities.
The candid elaboration of this issue is a strong indication that the
PRC has permanently reversed its nationalities policy. The case of
the dissenting comrades was far from weak. They could cite not only
the Soviet example in proof of their own orthodoxy but also the
historic CCP commitments to some form of self-determination for
minorities, which dated from 1922 to at least 1945, the date of
*Recent estimates provide comparable figures of 75 percent and
83 percent.
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Mao Tse-tung's report "On Coalition Government". Finally, some
veteran nationalities cadres could voice an emotional plea -- that
of their own loyalty to the CCP long before victory was assured.*
V. Prospects
From the viewpoint of Western strategists, the minorities of
Communist China represent a real, albeit diminishing, weakness in the
organizational framework of the country and a potential source of
embarrassing doctrinal difference between China and the USSR. With
a few exceptions however, notably Tibet, the geographic distribution
of the minorities and formidable linguistic barriers will make Western
exploitation of this vulnerability extremely difficult.
The social sifting that the Chinese people have been enduring
since the war-induced migrations began more than 2 decades ago is
reaching a climax in the current phase of communal collectivization.
The minorities have become increasingly involved in the larger program
as the regime's nationalities policy has brought them, step by step,
in the direction of political and social communization. As long as
the. central government of the PRC remains strong, it is unlikely that
the weak and outnumbered minorities of China (excepting the Tibetans)
can long resist final, crippling overhaul of their original institutions
*Some Tibetans, Hui, Mongols, and Koreans have served the CCP for
20 years or more, and Hui autonomous areas at the township level were
being organized as early as 1942. See State, Hong Kong, Survey of
China Mainland Press, No. 393, 9 Aug 52, p. 39; Current Background,
No. 195, 25 Jul 52, P. 7, U.
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and attitudes. They are apparently destined to become whatever the
Chinese people become in the next few years, unless some new resistance
element enters the picture,
There is a possibility, however, that nationalities cadres as
such may be developing an incipient sense of mutual interest among
themselves that transcends their concern for the specific minority
groups they represent. This is suggested by the many recent warnings
to the larger minorities against the display of anti-Han attitudes
and by the new trend in the education of nationalities cadres. In
early 1958, the deans of the several nationalities colleges, at the
direction of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, decided to abandon
the stress on national consciousness ("patriotism" and "nationalities
solidarity") which had characterized their work of the previous 8
years. They decided, instead, to stress proletarianization ("class
education") and the inevitability of ultimate denationalization
("Marxist-Leninist view of nationalities"). This new stand reflects
the familiar Communist ideal of proletarian assimilation into an
ultimately classless, homogenized, internationalist society in which
all nationality loyalties are finally submerged. It also suggests
that the institution of local and regional autonomy for minority
nationalities, as now established in Communist China, is not designed
to be a permanent structure. Changes and revisions will undoubtedly
continue. The present situation may represent virtually the maximum
territorial extent of autonomous administrative units.
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Under the assimilative pressures now being imposed upon them,
probably only a few of some of the larger, more virile, or more
adaptable minority groups -- such as the Kazakhs, Tibetans, or Hui --
will be able to retain some intrinsic integrity. Contacts between
nationalities cadres, however, will multiply in schools, committees,
and conferences. It is these men who are the core of potential
resistance to total conformity and assimilation. The more capable
they are, the more hope there is that mutual sympathy may develop
and perhaps survive, and that a new sense of identity among cadres
from previously dissimilar peoples may make them a perceptible
political force within the framework of the PRC itself. (OFFICIAL
USE ONLY)
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FINLAND STRADDLES THE IRON CURTAIN
The strategic importance of Finland lies in its unique position
geographically, politically,, and economically. It is a land bridge
between the Soviet Union and the Scandinavian Peninsula (see Map
27553). So far, Finland has survived as a free nation despite its
adverse strategic location on the periphery of the USSR and is the
only European state bordering the Soviet Union that is outside the
Iron Curtain (if the northern tip of Norway is excluded). The northern
third of Finland lies beyond the Arctic Circle but Helsinki, on the
southern coast at approximately 600 north latitude, is closer to
Moscow than any other non-Communist capital. Finland's position
means its probable involvement ii. any conflict in which its neighbors
might engage, since the country's lifeline can be cut by the closing
of the Baltic Sea or the blockading of Finnish ports. It is evident
that Soviet control of Finland would give the USSR an additional
foothold on the shores of the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland. Recent
Soviet propaganda aimed at the creation of a Baltic "sea of peace"
has been viewed with alarm by all the Scandinavian countries as an
attempt by the USSR to make the Baltic a "Russian lake." The
recurring tragedy of Finland is that as a frontier state, with a
790-mile common border with the USSR, it has been subjected to the
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alternate control of Eastern and Western Europe and has been used
by the Russians as a buffer against the West.
The land frontier of Finland has been described as "geographically
demilitarized," its very nature being a deterrent to any large-scale
conventional military campaign. The extensive forests, combined
with the countless lakes and swamps, have played a significant
defensive role, especially in summer. They have provided this low-
lying country with an eastern barrier more effective in some ways
than a mountain range.
Since the end of World War II, one of the cornerstones of
Finnish policy has been to avoid provoking the Soviets. Such a
policy has been part of the price of a precarious national survival,
but it has succeeded largely because it suited Soviet purposes
to leave Finland free politically but closely linked to the Soviet
bloc economically. As an economic unit, Finland had been oriented
to western markets until the Moscow settlement of 1944 saddled the
country with heavy reparations, the problem of resettling the entire
population of the ceded territories (see Map 27553), and the re-
construction of devastated Lapland. Finland not only lost about
12 percent of its prewar territory to the Soviet Union but also some
of its most valuable economic assets, which were included in this
territory. In the southeast, Finland lost the greater part of
Finnish Karelia, including large tracts of the best forest, fertile
agricultural land, and nearly one-third of the country's harnessed
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waterpower. This area also included more than one-tenth of the
industrial facilities of the country and the vital port of Viipuri
(Vyborg). In the north, it lost valuable nickel mines -- the largest
in Europe -- and the ice-free Arctic port of Petsamo (Pechanga).
Despite this severe blow to its economy, Finland met all of its
wartime obligations by the end of 1952.*
At the end of the Winter War of 1939-4+0 the USSR leased the
winter port of Hanko (Swedish, Hang3) for a 30-year period, thus
realizing in part the long-standing Soviet desire for ice-free ports
and naval bases. Later, as a result of the Finnish defeat in World
War II, Finland was forced to grant the Soviet Union a 50-year lease
on the Porkkala Peninsula, to be used as a naval base; but at the
same time the Soviet Union renounced its lease of the peninsula of
Hanko. The fact that Porkkala was also returned to the Finns in
1956 even though it guarded the sea approaches to the important
industrial complex of Leningrad, was probably motivated by the Soviet
premise that in the present nuclear and missile age Porkkala may have
lost some of its military and strategic value. As a part of the
postwar settlement with the Soviet Union the Finns were forced to
construct the Salla railroad from Kemijarvi to the frontier railhead
It is estimated that between 194+ and 1952 shipments of timber
and woodworking products, locomotives, ships, electric-cable products,
machinery, and other equipment from Finland to the USSR for war repar-
ations amounted to $226,500,000 computed in U.S. dollars at pre-World
War II value.
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at Kelloselka. This single-track line, which has the same broad-gauge
(5'0") as Soviet lines, connects with the Murmansk railroad south of
Kandalaksha, in the USSR. The Salla railroad provides the Soviet
Union with a continuous route from its own rail net to Tornio on the
Swedish border, a strategic outlet to the Gulf of Bothnia (see Map
27553).
Forest industries, agriculture, and -- since World War II --
heavy metallurgical industry are all important elements of the Finnish
economy. For a long time, however, Finland has depended largely
upon its forests. Although wartime negotiations and the Peace Treaty
of 194+7 deprived Finland of much of its best wooded area, forest
acreage in Finland still is surpassed in Europe only by acreages in
the USSR and in Sweden. Some 71 percent of Finland is covered by
forests (see Map 27553), the highest percentage of any European
country. Pine predominates, providing nearly a half of the total
timber stand; spruce furnishes about a third, and birch one-fifth.
Lumbering and logging give winter employment to a large number of small
farmers and agricultural workers; and the sale of pulpwood, pit props,
poles, and timber brings in a sizeable income. Thus, the forest not
only is the chief natural resource of the country but also is its
"green gold," the main source of wealth. Most important of all, the
output of the wood-processing industries -- pulp, cellulose, plywood,
wallboard, cardboard, prefabricated houses, and newsprint -- constitutes
one-third of the total industrial production and provides employment
for approximately one-quarter of the workers.
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Two-thirds of the Finnish population lives in rural areas, but
only one-third obtains its livelihood from farming. The cultivated
area covers less than 10 percent of the land; and, since the climate
is best suited to the growing of fodder crops, animal husbandry predomi-
nates. Hay and oats are by far the main crops, followed by rye,
wheat, barley, and potatoes. Three-fourths of the value of the
agricultural output is derived from dairy products and pork. As in
other Scandinavian countries, most Finnish farms include adjacent
woods large enough to provide fuel and also timber for building
needs (see Map 27553).
Having no coal or oil of its own, Finland, like Norway and
Sweden, has turned to waterpower. Even though the Soviet Union
acquired one-third of Finland's hydroelectric plants through annexation,
the Finns now produce a great deal more hydroelectric power than
before World War II -- and only one-third of the potential waterpower
has been harnessed. Many factories and some of the steam locomotives,
however, still burn wood as fuel; and a large part of the total
cuttings from the forests is consumed in heating homes and buildings.
Finland imports about 2-1/2 million tons of coal annually, the major
part of which (about 1,500,000 tons) comes from Poland. In the past,
oil imports were supplied by the West, but in recent years the bloc
countries have provided an increasing share of the expanding re
quirements; the Soviet Union alone supplied more than 1 million tons
of petroleum products in 1958. Since the loss of the nickel mines,
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copper is the only mineral resource of major importance in Finland
and the Outokumpu copper mine is the most important mining operation
in the country. In Europe (excluding Soviet bloc countries) the
copper production of Finland is surpassed only by that of Yugoslavia.
Although industries are scattered throughout central and
northern Finland, their density is greater south of a line drawn
from the town of Kokkola on the Gulf of Bothnia to Jyvaskyla and
continuing in a southeasterly direction to Imatra close to the
Soviet border. By far the most industrialized part of this southern
area lies south of a line drawn from Pori through Tampere to the
Kymi Valley region; and within this area the Helsinki-Turku-Tampere
triangle forms the most highly industrialized complex in Finland.
In general, the industries are located adjacent to existing railroads
mainly on the coast and the shores of rivers and lakes.
Since the basic economy of Finland is centered on the two chief
natural resources -- forests and hydroelectric power -- the country,
before World War II, had been geared to the export of forest products,
both raw and finished. One of the worst aspects of the war indemnity
for the Finns, however, was that they were required to pay so much of
it not in forest products but in ships and machinery, which had never
before been included in their major industrial output for export. In
order to meet Soviet demands, Finland had to expand manufacturing not
connected with wood, and to build up an entirely new machine and
shipbuilding industry (see Map 27553), which it did not need and
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which eventually upset its economy. The expansion of the newly
established heavy manufacturing industries has been most significant --
particularly the expansion of the metal industry, which has become
the largest in Finland and which in 1952, when the indemnities had
been paid off, employed about one-third of all industrial workers.
This growing industry turns out ships, locomotives, railway cars,
motors, complete woodworking plants, powerplants, electronic gear,
and hundreds of different kinds of machines. Altogether the metal
industry accounts for a little more than a quarter of the total
industrial production.
Among Finland's important trading partners, the USSR normally
ranks below the countries of Western Europe. In 1953, however, the
Soviet Union for the first time in history temporarily replaced Great
Britain as Finland's best customer. Between 1950 and 1957 the
proportion of the total trade that was conducted with the Soviet
bloc rose from 19 to 29 percent. Finland is therefore extremely
vulnerable to Soviet economic. pressure. During the last few months
of 1958, such pressure mounted considerably as evidenced by the
cancellation of large orders of wood and metal products from Finnish
manufacturers. The largest shipyard in Finland was forced to close
when the Soviet Union canceled orders for a 22,000-horsepower
icebreaker, two 8,500-ton freighters, and several small ships that
had kept the shipyard busy. Moscow also canceled orders for paper
and other goods "not yet boxed for delivery." Negotiations for a
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Finnish-Soviet trade agreement for 1959 were suspended, and Satellite
trade with Finland was curtailed. Hungary reportedly issued instructions
for the diversion of its timber purchases from Finland to Austria.
East German-Finnish trade talks were delayed, and Communist China
postponed its annual Finnish trade negotiations. Finland's troubles
were further aggravated by a trade surplus with Moscow, which developed
because of a new payments system for the purchase of ships and because
of a limited market in Finland for Soviet autos, canned vegetables,
crab meat, and caviar -- the only items that the USSR will sell to
the Finns in quantity. Meanwhile, a Finnish offer to buy more coal,
oil, and gasoline was rejected. On 23 January 1959, however, it was
officially announced from Leningrad that the USSR and Finland would
resume the trade negotiations broken off in the fall of 1958 and that
a long-term trade agreement linking Finland's postwar factories with
the new Soviet Seven-Year Plan probably would be drawn up in the spring.
Since the Sino-Soviet bloc is the major purchaser of many
Finnish products, trade with the East is mandatory if Finland is to
alleviate its critical unemployment problem. Because of the decrease
in exports and a slackening in building construction, approximately
80,000 workers were unemployed at the end of 1958. This is the
highest number of jobless workers since the 1930's and the situation
usually becomes worse in the spring, in part because thawing weather
affects the lumbering industry and in part because of other seasonal
factors. A total of 100,000 unemployed can be expected by March 1959
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unless the recently signed trade agreement helps solve the unemployment
problem. It is estimated that 6.3 percent of the male working
population of Finland is now unemployed and that in part of northern
Finland, which has been subject to chronic unemployment for some
years, the ratio is as much as 17.7 percent.
If the general drift of Finnish trade to the Soviet Union
continues, there is danger of Finland becoming so economically
dependent on her eastern neighbor that her political independence
will be critically jeopardized. Largely because of internal domestic
problems, especially the increase in unemployment, the Communists
emerged from the elections of July 1958 as the largest single party
in the Finnish Parliament. Gaining 7 seats, they now have a total
of 50 or exactly a quarter of all the seats in the Chamber. Of the
7 parties taking part in the elections the Communist Party polled
1+20,803 votes or 23.7 percent of the popular ballot, and they
therefore agitated for a left-wing coalition government. The complete
absence of Communists in the newly formed Finnish Government, and the
Soviet belief that it signified a new orientation in Finnish foreign
policy, caused the Soviet reappraisal of trade negotiations and
resultant economic pressure and led to the Finnish cabinet crisis
of 4 December 1958. This issue was temporarily resolved by the
formation on 13 January 1959 of an Agrarian minority cabinet whose
efforts will be directed toward improving foreign relations with the
USSR. Thus Finland has already paid a price for an economic truce.
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 Approved For Release JC/QW9j.$-cfCIA-RDP79-01005A000300080002-3
Despite the growing web of ties linking Finland to the Soviet
bloc and the uncertainty of whether their country will ever emerge
from the Soviet shadow, the Finns feel that their chances of surviving
as an independent nation are good. They base their conclusions on
the fact that the USSR obtains more economic benefits, especially
in terms of greater productivity, from a "free" Finland than it
would from a captive country. Geographically, Finland would be
difficult to control as a satellite because of the long western
sea frontier and extensive forests that facilitate guerrilla
activities. Strong measures against the Finns would harm the
Communist cause on the world propaganda front, since it suits
Moscow's policy to have Finland exist as a showpiece to prove that
a small capitalist nation with an essentially western outlook can
live in peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. Finally, the
absorption of Finland by the USSR would jeopardize Swedish neutrality
and, in all probability, force Sweden to join NATO and the rest of
Western Europe in creating a stronger defense union. Soviet treatment
of Finland, therefore, should be closely watched since changes in the
Kremlin line toward Finland could foreshadow major changes in Soviet
policy. (SECRET)
- 34 -
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 ppr vend - Rel~e 2001108/08 :'CIA-R P79-01 05
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