GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 1, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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NT1AL , Copy No.._
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CIA/RR-MR-48
December 1955
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
1 DECLASSIFIED 61 tgl
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H M1,
DAT~ REVIEWER: 372044
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CONFiDENTL"
7 07 0
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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S-E -E-T
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
CIA/RR MR-48
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
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CONTENTS
The Pathet Lao Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Gulf of Aqaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Status of the Free Territory of Trieste . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Province of West Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
New Chart of Stations in Antarctica for the International
Geophysical Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Antarctic Aerial Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
New Bulgarian Railroad Map and Timetable. . . . . . . . . . . 35
A New Agricultural Geography of Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Atlas General du Congo et Ruanda-Urundi . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Following Page
Laos : Pathet Lao Area (25018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Israel (13890) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Province of West Pakistan: Administrative Divisions
(October 1955) (25076) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
*The individual classification of each article in this Review
is given at the end of the article.
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THE PATHET LAO AREA
Introduction
The Kingdom of Laos, with its long northwest-southeast extent,
has served as a shield protecting pro-Western Thailand from Communist
China and North Vietnam. In 1954 the unity of this buffer kingdom
was rent as a result of a provision of the Geneva Conference, which
granted temporary regroupment areas to the Communist Pathet Lao move-
ment in the two northern Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Houa
Phan (Figure 1).* Possession of these provinces was to be strictly
temporary, pending a general political settlement to be effected in
1955 through nationwide elections. Pathet Lao leaders, however, now
claim exclusive jurisdiction over the provinces, and all attempts of
the Laotian Government to reassert its authority are branded as
"attacks" and "violations." On the other hand, attacks of the
Vietminh-trained Pathet Lao troops against the Government occur almost
daily. In the Muong Peun area of Houa Phan the situation has been
described as "critical" by the American Army Attache at Vientiane.
Inconclusive negotiations have been underway since January. The cease-
fire agreement of 9 March 1955, as well as the recent (10 October
1955) truce providing that neither side shall reinforce its military
strength in the area, has been ineffective. If the present stalemate
*According to the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, the correct name
for the province is Houa Phan and that for the town is Sam Neua, al-
though Sam Neua has been popularly used as the provincial name.
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Figure 1. The main street of Sam Neua in you Phan, 1953.
Figure 2.
the Nam Northward view of the rugged mountains between
you and the tags-Vietnam boundary. terrace farming is more in evidence than the prevailing area
slash-and-burn method.
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in negotiations continues, the Royal Laotian Government will undoubt-
edly exclude the two provinces of Phong Saly and Houa Phan from the
nationwide elections scheduled for 25 December of this year.
Complete domination of the provinces by the Pathets would create
two extensions of Communist-controlled territory contiguous with the
western border of the Communist Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone. These two
extensions, like Scylla and Charybdis, would lie abreast the main
route between Luang Prabang and western North Vietnam -- the depres-
sion which extends along the Nam Hou (river) to the Plain of Dien
Bien Phu, the ill-fated French fortress in the Tai-Meo Autonomous
Zone. Since Phong Sally is bordered on the north by China, the
situation is especially ominous, representing a further physical
consolidation of Communist-controlled territory. Control of Phong
Saly would also be a definite psychological gain for the Reds because
it would certainly enhance the value of Communist propaganda directed
toward Thailand from nearby Ch'e-li, capital of the Tai Autonomous
District in southern Yunnan. In Ch'e-li, the Communist leader Pridi
Phanomyong could point to Phong Saly as one more step toward the
eventual goal -- the taking over of all Thailand by a "Peoples'
Regime."
Terrain
Phong Saly and Houa Than are part of the great massif between
the Red River and the Mekong. These mountains form a barrier that
makes travel difficult and, to a large extent, isolates the area.
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The elevation of the mountains averages between 3,000 and 6,000 feet,
but individual crests rise above the surrounding ridges. Although
the predominant trend is northwest-southeast, ridges and spurs extend
out in all directions, creating a confused terrain pattern (Figure 2).
In many places the extreme dissection of the mountains is con-
cealed by the mantle of dense subtropical rain forest that covers
most of the slopes. The steep slopes are dotted with agricultural
clearings that have been abandoned by the mountain tribes and allowed
to revert to a second growth of more open forest. The narrow mountain
valleys are often deep, almost impassable gorges. The lower slopes
of the steep valleys of the major streams are commonly covered with
open forest interspersed with areas of grassland. Small plains areas
at the mouths of major tributaries and occasionally at higher eleva-
tions near the headwaters of streams are prized as natural sites for
settlement by some of the ethnic groups of the area.
Climate
Day-to-day existence in northern Laos is geared to the seasonal
cycle of the monsoonal climate, in which the rainy summer and dry
winter are separated by shorter transitional seasons. The rainy
season extends from the middle of May to the end of August. Of the
65.9 inches of rainfall received annually at Phong Saly, 45.8 inches
fall during the period from May to September. During their first
invasion of Laos in the spring of 1953, the Communist Vietminh were
reportedly forced to retreat when they had almost reached the gates
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of Luang Prabang. Because of the heavy rains, their thousands of
supply coolies had been bogged down in mud along the jungle trails,
leaving front-line troops without rice supplies. The transitional
period during September and October is followed by cool, dry weather
that continues until February. During this season the days are gen-
erally sunny, with cloudless skies, but early-morning fog is common
in the mountain valleys. The spring transitional season, lasting
from March into May, is characterized by hot days and fairly frequent
storms, forerunners of the summer rains.
Temperature data for the Pathet Lao area are not available, but
the April mean daily maximum and the January mean daily minimum
temperatures for nearby Luang Prabang, at an elevation of 942 feet,
are 96?F and 56oF, respectively. Temperatures in the mountain areas
are generally about 30 lower for each 1,000 feet of elevation.
Transportation
In mountainous country, where travel by path and trail is diffi-
cult'and tedious, river travel is the "easy way," even though it is
often periled by rapids. As might be expected, trade to some extent
"flows with the current," and foreign ideologies from the more advanced
lowlands may be carried back upstream. It is therefore significant
that, although the rivers of Phong Saly flow toward Luang Prabang
(traditional residence of the King) and into the Mekong River, the
rivers of Houa Phan flow southeastward through the central part of
Communist Vietnam to the Gulf of Tonkin. Such orientation might well
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have its effect on the loyalties of the many Houa Phan villages,
isolated as they are from Luang Prabang. From 1893 to 1905, part
of Houa Phan actually was governed by Annam.
In Phong Saly, the Nam Hou, which joins the Mekong River about
18 miles above Luang Prabang, is the chief riverine artery. Fairly
large pirogues (native dugout canoes) navigate the river at all
seasons for some 150 miles upstream. Except when the river is in
highest flood stage, small pirogues able to carry a payload of 660
pounds can reach Hat Sa, the river port of Phong Saly. On the Nam
Hou the flood stage or high-water period lasts from May to September,
and low water prevails between December and March. The volume of
water may be 20 to 30 times greater at high water than at low water,
and its turbulence often makes navigation impossible for small boats.
In Houa Phan the two main navigable rivers are the Song Ca and
the Song Ma. Junxs can ascend the Song Ca only as far as Cua Rao in
North Vietnam, but pirogues can continue through numerous rapids to
the vicinity of Muong Peun, within 30 miles of the river's source.
The Song Ma is navigable for an unknown distance by pirogues, but
they must make their way through many rapids. The high-water stage
lasts from August to December on the Song Ca and from July to October
on the Song Ma. Low-water stage extends from January to June on the
Song Ca and from January to March on the Song Ma.
Transportation by land in this undeveloped mountainous area is
largely along trails, by pack animal and coolie. The major trails
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and connecting roads are indicated on the accompanying map, No. 25018.
Most of the trails are ephemeral; landslides may block them and flash
floods may wash out one or more of the primitive bridges along their
courses. Thus, a road that is usable today may be out of commission
tomorrow. Trails commonly avoid the major stream valleys, which are
too deep and narrow for easy passage, and instead follow the ridges
or the valleys of smaller tributaries.
In isolated areas such as Phong Saly and Houa Phan, air trans-
port would be a logical method of maintaining contact with the outside
world, but the rugged terrain limits the development of airfields.
The airfield 2 miles east of Sam Neua, which has a grass cover over
a base of gravel and rolled earth, will accommodate C-47 type planes
in the dry season (Figure 3). Most of the other fields -- such as
those at Phong Saly, Sam Teu (20?02'N-101+?38'E), Sop Hao (20?34'N-
104?27'E), and Nong Khang (20o371N-104004+'E) -- are usable only during
the dry season and can accommodate only light planes. The mountains
that surround the fields make approach and takeoff hazardous.
People
Of the estimated 1,300,000 population in Laos, more than 100,000
live in the provinces of Phong Saly (1.6,200) and Houa Phan (63,300).
The population is a veritable mosaic of ethnic groups, subgroups, and
tribes. In general, however, the people may be divided into three
major ethnolinguistic groups -- Tai, Indonesian, and Sino-Tibetan.
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Centuries ago the Tai moved southward out of China. In Laos
today, they include a large group of Laotian Tai and small groups of
so-called Tribal Tai. The latter differ from the Lao Tai in minor
dialectical variations and in their places of origin or historical
affiliations in China. In general, they are less literate than the
Figure 3. This airstrip under construction
in a narrow valley outside the town of Sam
Neua will accommodate C-47 type transport
planes.
Lao Tai and occupy subordinate positions politically and commercially.
Ethnically the Lao Tai are identical with the great group of Laos in
northern Thailand, and contact between the two groups of Laos is
maintained to some extent through trade and migration across the
border. Tribal Tai in the Pathet-Lao area are chiefly the Red Tai
(Tai Deng), White Tai (Tai Khao), Black Tai (Tai Dam) -- named for
the color of the women's clothes -- and the Lu. The first three
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speak closely related dialects and are collectively called Phu Tai.
The Lu speak a dialect showing Burmese and Chinese influences.
Reportedly, almost all of the Tai dialects are mutually intelligible.
In the Pathet Lao area the Lao Tai are found chiefly in a belt
extending northward along the banks of the Nam Hou, and the Phu Tai
(Red, White, and Black) in southern and western Houa Phan and along
its northern border. The Lu occupy a wedgelike area extending south-
ward from the northern border of Phong Saly, as well as isolated areas
in the west-central part of the province. The villages of the Lao
Tai are in valleys and on gentle slopes; those of the Tribal Tai are
usually at low altitudes, but occasionally they may be found at
elevations as high as 1,000 feet.
The Indonesian group consists of the Kha,* a name loosely applied
to any of the primitive mountain peoples who are not distinctly of
the Meo tribe. They speak a Mon-Khmer language, which has many dia-
lectical variations between villages. Where the Kha are in contact
with the Tai, Laotian Tai words have been borrowed. The Kha are found
throughout large areas of west-central Houa Phan and throughout the
southern half of Phong Saly. Traditionally, they have been manual
laborers for the more advanced Laotians. Kha villages are generally
found at elevations of about 3,000 feet.
*"Kha" is the Laotian word for "savage," and its use is resented
by the people. The Laotian term "Puteng," meaning "men of the up-
lands," is used by the Kha people in referring to themselves.
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The Sino-Tibetan group consists of the Meo (Miao) and the Lolos.
The Meo (Figure 4+), like the Tai, are divided into a number of tribes,
each having an individual costume for the women, which gives rise to
the names White, Black, Red, and Flowery Meo. The Meo speak a
Figure 4. People of a Meo tribe.
language of the Miao-Yao-Pateng stock. Although they have no writ-
ten language, they place great value on their oral literature --
chants, songs, and narrative poems. Small groups of Meo are found
in the western and southwestern parts of both Phong Saly and Houa
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Phan. In the northeast and southeast of Houa Phan, relatively large
areas -- extensions of the Meo stronghold in Xieng Khouang -- are
occupied by Meo. The Meo are mountaineers, and their villages are
rarely located at levels below 3,000 feet.
The Lolo, known as Ho in Laos, speak a language that differs
dialectically from that of the Lolo in Yunnan. Today, many of the
Ho speak a Tai dialect, which has become the lingua franca of the
hills. They are concentrated largely in an area in north-central
Phong Saly. Southwest of the town of Phong Saly are the related
Akha (Kho) tribes. The villages of the Ho and Akha are generally
at altitudes ranging from 3,000 to 4,500 feet, often displacing
Meo villages in the lower areas.
Economy
The economic importance of the Pathet Lao area is negligible,
even in the primitive Laotian economy. The agricultural subsistence
economy of the mountain tribes is based on a slash-and-burn practice
called "ray." The forest is cleared and burned, and crops such as
maize, dry mountain rice, tobacco, indigo, squash, cucumbers, taro,
bananas, and sweet potatoes are raised for a few years. The Meo,
in particular, raise poppies for opium, chiefly as a trade commodity.
When the fertility of the soil is exhausted, the tribe moves to a
new location and repeats the slash-and-burn technique. Some livestock
are raised by all tribes, but the poorer tribes reserve such animals
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for religious ceremonial sacrifice and obtain most of their meat
supply by hunting. The lowland Lao bases his economy on rice, which
is grown under irrigation in the valleys or on the terraced lower
slopes. Total rice production in 1952 was 31,100 tons in Houa Phan
and 21,1+50 tons in Phong Saly. The total of 52,850 tons represents
about 10 percent of the total Laotian harvest.
Mineral production is negligible, but there are some deposits
of lead, zinc, and pyrites in Houa Phan and of salt, gypsum, copper,
coal, iron ore, antimony, and gold in Phong Saly. In the latter
province, only salt, gypsum, and copper are present in commercial
quantities.
Attitudes
The prejudices of the tribes of the Pathet Lao area are many.
From the standpoint of their possible effect upon loyalties toward
Luang Prabang, some of these prejudices are of particular interest
at this time. The Laotian Tai have a traditional dislike for the
Vietnamese. Undoubtedly the 1953 invasion by the Vietminh intensi-
fied this feeling. This dislike is probably shared by some of the
Tribal Tai. As recently as the spring of 1954, a large group of Red
Tai on the southeastern border of Houa Phan cooperated with the French
in guerrilla warfare against the Vietminh. On the other side is the
possible effect on the Tribal Tai of propaganda from the Vietminh-
sponsored Tai-Meo Autonomous Zone in nearby North Vietnam. To the
freedom-loving Tai mountaineers, disillusionment should come quickly.
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Among the widely spread Kha, who have served as corvees (forced
laborers) on the lowland Laotian ricelands, there is often a strong
feeling of resentment against the Laotians, which the Communists can
be expected to exploit as a divisive medium. The Meo tribes, tradi-
tionally fiercely independent, are generally anti-Communist. Meo
tribal leaders, such as the almost legendary Touby I.yfoung in nearby
Xieng Khouang Province, should exert a strongly anti-Communist
influence upon Meos within the Pathet Lao area.
Overshadowing the interplay of all these prejudices is the dismal
fact that the Laotian Government is unprepared for a major conflict
with the Pathet Lao movement, which would certainly receive logistical
support from the Vietminh and Communist China. The Laotian Government,
therefore, is faced with a continuing dilemma. Permitting the Pathet
Lao to continue their occupation of the two provinces, with less than
an all-out attempt to dislodge them, gives the Pathets additional
time to achieve complete control of the populace and to improve their
military position. On the other hand, calling for a general insur-
rection of the populace against the Pathet Lao and simultaneously
starting an all-out military effort (probably the only chance left
to dislodge the Reds) would most certainly involve active conflict
with the Vietminh. (SECRET)
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trance -- Tiran and Sanafir.
THE GULF OF AQABA
An Emerging Trouble Spot
The Gulf of Aqaba
is rapidly emerging as
a trouble spot in the
Israel Arab struggle.
Although Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Israel, and
Jordan border the gulf,
only Egypt can be said
to control it, chiefly
because of Egyptian
possession of two small
islands athwart the en-
Before Egypt occupied the island
s in
1950, reportedly at the recommendation of German military were uninhabited. Although z'3' advisors,
Egypt gave assurance that peaceful
passage into the gulf would continue
unhampered, observers noted that
artillery was moved onto the island of Tiran. Since then the Egyp-
tians have monitored shipping bound for the Jordanian port of Aqaba
near the head of the gulf and have at times seemed intent upon stop-
ping British vessels bound for that port. Under these conditions,
few vessels have attempted to reach Eilat, the nearby Israeli port.
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 Approve or Release
The fact that the Gulf of Aqaba remained quiet during this
period can be attributed to a combination of factors. The Israeli
port of Eilat was little developed and had poor connections with its
hinterland. Furthermore, neither Asia nor Africa, the areas most
accessible from the port of Eilat, offered markets for Israeli
products. The nearby Jordanian port of Aqaba also lacked satisfactory
connections with the interior, and consequently most of Jordan's trade
was directed to the Mediterranean. Aqaba, however, is more active
than Eilat. It is the seat of the only British garrison in the area
and has been a port of embarkation for Muslims making the pilgrimage
to Mecca.
Early in 1955, when world attention was focused on the recurrent
Gaza incidents, Egypt announced that passage through the Gulf of Aqaba
was forbidden to all ships bound for the port of Eilat. Israeli
Defense Minister David Ben Gurian promptly gave sharp warning to the
Egyptians of the serious consequences that might follow, and the
Israeli cabinet was known to be interested in freeing the mouth of the
gulf by "suitable means." More important than the threats was the
fact that Israel planned to develop a better port with deeper water
near Eilat. The Gulf of Aqaba assumed new importance to Israel,
which is faced with the necessity for circumventing the Suez blockade
and the need for expanding trade in order to bolster the national
economy. At the same time the hinterlands began to open up, and
Israel began thinking in terms of trade with Asia and Africa.
 Jordan also began to show greater interest in the Gulf of Aqaba
coincident with the planned revival of the Mayan (Jordan)-Medina
(Saudi Arabia) rail line and the exploitation of phosphates in the
interior. The plans will probably include the construction of a
branch line to Aqaba to provide an adequate outlet for the minerals
of Jordan. (See "Ma-an-Medina Railroad," Geographic Intelligence
Review No. 40, April 1954, pp. 40-46.)
Strategic Importance
Although the Gulf of Aqaba is bordered by barren land, it has
retained one strategic asset throughout history -- position. The
lands to the north, the Israel and Jordan of today, can be reached
by way of the gulf.' If an enemy controlling these lands launched
an attack on the Suez Canal, any counterthrust would probably include
an attack northward through the Gulf of Aqaba. These tactics were
used in World War I.
In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Sultan of
Turkey made an effort to extend his boundary midway across the Sinai
Peninsula in order to include all of the Gulf of Aqaba within his
territory. But the British ultimately forced the Turks to agree to
a boundary between Sinai and Palestine that did not encompass the gulf.
In formulating the boundaries of Israel the Zionists, keenly aware of
the geographical position of the state, provided for an outlet on the
Gulf of Aqaba, as well as at Haifa on the Mediterranean.
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Israel's interest in the Gulf of Aqaba is also closely related
to the boundary problem. The present boundaries of Israel are merely
armistice lines and will remain unsettled until a treaty of peace is
signed with the Arabs. Meanwhile, the expansionist idea is not,dor-
want among Israeli politicians. Like the early Zionist leaders, some
of them would place-the boundary of Israel eastward far enough to
include the Hedjaz railway, which passes through the Hawran of south-
western Syria and continues south into Jordan past Amman to a point
south of Ma'an. Israel therefore has a vital interest in the
projected reextension of the Hedjaz railway from Ma'an to Medina and
an even greater interest in the possible extension of a branch line
to Aqaba, which would become an outlet for the minerals of Jordan.
Economic Importance
As a trade route, the Gulf of Aqaba occupies an ironic position.
Israel, the nation most actively concerned with unobstructed use of
the gulf, has neither an adequate port on the gulf nor commodities
to export through such a port. Jordan, the nation with relatively
free passage through the gulf to its one port, uses these waters for
only a minor portion of its imports and for almost none of its
exports. These situations, however, could change. In the case of
Jordan, a change is actually in progress. In the case of Israel,
exploratory work is underway, but the economic aspects of the
problem have not yet taken shape.
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The Gulf of Aqaba's hinterlands -- whether in Sinai, Saudi
Arabia, the Negev of Israel, or southern Jordan -- are all alike in
lacking proved economically exploitable mineral deposits, population
in numbers sufficient to provide markets, and satisfactory transpor-
tation. Agriculturally the hinterland is equally barren. Along the
southern part of the gulf the mountains that border the coasts of
Sinai and Saudi Arabia extend inland over 50 miles. Farther north
the barren, heavily dissected plateaus of both nations extend
northward into Israel and Jordan.
Agricultural possibilities of southern Israel are slight,
despite the much publicized plans for agricultural development in the
Negev. In the area south of Beersheba, the Negev receives less than
4 inches of rainfall annually and to the north only slightly more.
In the entire Negev there are only 250,000 acres of true soil accord-
ing to the most optimistic estimate, whereas nearly 10 times as many
acres are too stony or salty for cultivation or are dune covered.
Without large-scale mineral exploitation, an environment of this type
would scarcely attract enough population to justify converting Eilat
into a deep-water port.
In the case of Jordan, phosphate deposits in the interior could
be exported through Aqaba if transportation were improved. As long
as the phosphate deposits remained unexploited, however, there was
little reason to develop the port. Furthermore, Aqaba is Jordan's
only port, but hinterland connections have been so poor that trade
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has been directed largely to Beirut, Lebanon. In 1953, exports from
Aqaba amounted to only 3,500 tons out of a total of 50,000 for the
entire country; imports normally amount to about 70,000 tons out of
a total of 260,000 to 300,000. The exploitation of mineral deposits
of the interior coincides with the idea of extending a branch rail
line from Ma'an to Aqaba. Even with present poor connections to the
hinterland, cargo unloaded at Aqaba reaches Amman, the chief popula-
tion center, in 2 days, whereas cargo unloaded at Beirut takes 10
days (see Map 13890).
As of May 1955 the proposed expansion of the port of Aqaba was
nearing the end of the planning stage. Two quays costing nearly 3
million dollars were planned, and construction time was estimated at
2 to 3 years. The phosphate quay was planned to handle 1 million
tons per year, the cargo quay a mere 200,000 tons. Clearly, Aqaba is
being developed as a raw-material shipping port.
The neighboring Israeli port of Eilat at present has an estimated
500 civilians, but plans call for a future population of 15,000 to
20,000, depending upon the extent of development within the Negev.
Eilat today is actually a military settlement with better housing and
recreational facilities than similar settlements elsewhere in Israel.
Although fishing is the only economic activity of the town, the small
fishmeal factory is not currently in operation. Under these circum-
stances, speculation is aroused by the recent launching of two
"fishing vessels" -- Tiran and Sanafir -- by Achdut Avoda, the
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left-wing activist political party favoring a strong line against
the Arabs.
The development of a satisfactory port at Eilat poses diffi-
culties. In Israel the terrain at the head of the gulf consists of a
flat beach 2 kilometers long and a 9-kilometer stretch where the
mountains of Sinai border the shore. Although offshore conditions
along this mountainous stretch present port possibilities, storage
space is lacking. The flat northern stretch has offshore reefs that
endanger approach by ship, and nearshore waters are shallow. From an
engineering standpoint, it is both difficult and expensive to compen-
sate for these disadvantages. Two years ago it was stated that con-
struction of an open wharf 150 meters from the present shoreline was
the only solution; no later information is available.
The development of ports at both Eilat and Aqaba might raise
serious boundary problems that thus far have pass unnoticed. United
Nations and Israeli interpretations of the Armistice Line differ
radically. According to the United Nations interpretation, Eilat is
left with flat terrain a mere half kilometer in width for the landward
part of its port. At the time the Armistice Line between Israel and
Jordan was agreed upon, the United Nations negotiators were supplied
with the wrong map and erroneous data. (For further details, see
"The Israel-Jordan Armistice Line," Geographic Intelligence Review
No. 40, April 195+.
roved For Release 2000/0
 piproveg For el*
RBP:Fg
3
36
l
ISRAEL
BEIRUT
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Acre
? National capital
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Nazareth
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.
recognized by the U.S. Government.
32 Base 13890 7-55 33 34 35
36
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 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9
S-E-C-R-E-T
Thus, the Gulf of Aqaba area presents two threats to the peace
of the Near East. The development of the Israeli port near Eilat
may raise new boundary problems, with resultant "incidents." There
is also danger that Egypt may do what the Turks failed to accom-
plish -- convert the Gulf of Aqaba into a closed sea -- and so con-
trol both economic and military access to Israel and Jordan from the
south. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9
S -E-C -R -E -T
STATUS OF THE FREE TERRITORY OF TRIESTE
After protracted negotiations, the Italian-Yugoslav dispute
over the Free Territory of Trieste was provisionally settled in
London on 5 October 1954. The agreement -- entitled "Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Governments of Italy, the United Kingdom,
the United States and Yugoslavia Regarding the Free Territory of
Trieste" -- provides that the future civil administration of the area
will be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. Italy has taken over
Zone A from the Allied Military Government, which had administered the
Zone since the end of the war; the task of administering a slightly
augmented Zone B will continue to rest with Yugloslavia. The city
of Trieste remains within the Italian sector but will retain free-
port facilities.
Since the memorandum of understanding does not alter the de jure
political status of the Free Territory of Trieste, which is provided
for in the Italian Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947, neither Italy
nor Yugoslavia has legal sovereignty over its respective sector. No
limit, however, is set by the memorandum to the duration of the de
facto administration.
The discrepancy between the legal and actual situations is
complicated by actions of the Italians and Yugoslavs. Although
technically the Free Territory of Trieste is still an international
area, the boundary lines separating Italy and Yugoslavia from their
S-E-C-R-E-T
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 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9
S-E-C -R-E-T
respective sectors of civil administration are not international
boundaries in actual practice. This is especially true of Yugoslavia,
where the former Zone B districts of Koper (Capodistria) and Buie
(Buie) have been administratively incorporated into the Republics of
Slovenia and Croatia, respectively. This situation is already
reflected in statistics and on maps published by Yugoslavia. The
situation in Italy is somewhat different since, for political reasons,
the government must emphasize the provisional aspects of the settle-
ment. Therefore, Italy has not made a similar effort to integrate
its sector of the Free Territory into its administrative framework.
The boundary separating the two, however, seems to lack customs
stations and consequently cannot be regarded as truly international.
A cartographic solution of this problem for maps of wide distri-
bution would involve the representation of the de facto situation
within a framework of de jure boundaries. There will be an increasing
tendency for maps of Yugoslavia and Italy to contain information on
their respective civil zones. On a recent map of Yugoslav adminis-
trative divisions (CIA 13681, 4-55) the Yugoslav-administered districts
were included, together with an international boundary line separating
them from Yugoslavia. With one modification, the procedure used on
Map 13681 seems the most suitable for maps of both Italy and Yugoslavia.
To indicate the international character of the Free Territory of
Trieste, the boundary between the two zones should be a provisional
S-E-C-R-E-T
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 Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9
S -E -C -R -E-T
line rather than an international line. Besides being technically
correct, particularly if the notations "limit of Italian [or Yugoslav]
administration" are added along the provisional line separating the
sectors, the procedure would make alteration of existing maps rela-
tively simple. This approach may be necessary to prevent duplication
of mapping in the NIS program, wherein the entire Free Territory is
included with Italy.
The few maps that might require representation of the de facto
situation, including boundaries, should be for limited distribution
only since the Free Territory of Trieste would not appear as an
international entity. Even so, it would be advisable to add a
standard disclaimer. (UNCLASSIFIED)
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 Approved For Release 2000/OgLl7c_PISA,FDP79-01005A000300010003-9
PROVINCE OF WEST PAKISTAN
The dream of the late Mohammed All Jinnah, founder of Pakistan,
visualized a united Muslim country untorn by interprovincial strife.
In a move intended to bring this goal closer to realization, an Order
of the Governor-General of Pakistan was issued on 5 October 1955,
under which the various political divisions that comprised West Paki-
stan (with the exception of the Federal Capital Area of Karachi) were
to be merged into the single Province of West Pakistan, effective
14 October. Since the merger includes the Pushtoon areas of Pakistan,
the possibility of violent reactions had been anticipated from Afghan-
istan, which had been agitating for an independent Pushtoonistan. The
only formal protest to date, however, has been the recall of the
Afghan charge from Karachi.
Prior to the merger the political divisions of West Pakistan were:
1. Governors' Provinces
a. Punjab
b. Sind
c. North-West Frontier
2. Chief Commissioners' Provinces
a. Baluchistan
b. Karachi (formally known as the Karachi Federal
Capital Area)
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 Approved For Release 2 Vq%4f 1 j-TCIA-RDP79-01005A000300010003-9
3. Princely States
a. Bahawalpur
b. Khairpur
c. Baluchistan States Union
d. Dir
e. Swat
f. Chitral
4. Miscellaneous political units
a. The 2 small states of Amb and Phulra,which had
been closely allied with the North-West Frontier
Province.
b. Tribal areas and agencies, which are found
chiefly in the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan
areas.
The new Province of West Pakistan includes 10 Divisions, each
of which will be administered by a Commissioner. The capital of the
Province will be at Lahore in the Punjab. The Federal Capital Area
of Karachi will continue to be centrally administered. Although it
will send its representatives to the Province of West Pakistan Legis-
lative Assembly, the Capital Area will not be affected by the laws
passed by the Assembly. Thus the entire national administrative
structure of the country now consists of the two units of West Pakistan
and East Bengal (East Pakistan), which has 3 Divisions.
Current information relevant to the details of the change is not
complete and includes apparent contradictions concerning the components
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 Approved For Release 2000/0#147C_F1~4tDP79-01005A000300010003-9
of the new divisions. The accompanying map (No. 25076) indicates,
by a magenta overprint on the 1951 administrative divisions., the
approximate boundaries of the new divisions. This map should be
considered provisional and is subject to revision upon receipt of
additional information.
According to information received from Pakistan, the 10 Divi-
sions and the areas included in each follow:
Division Areas Included
1. Peshawar The districts of Peshawar, Mardan,
Hazara, and Campbellpur; the Tribal
Areas attached to the districts of
Peshawar, Mardan, and Hazara; and
the Agencies of Malakand, Mohmand,
and Khyber.
2. Dera Ismail Khan The districts of Dera Ismail Khan,
Bannu, Kohat, and Mianweli; the
Tribal Areas attached to the districts
of Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, and Kohat;
and the Agencies of Kurram and North
Waziristan.
3. Rawalpindi The districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum,
Gujrat, and Shahpur.
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 Approved For Release 29V
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1.. Lahore The districts of Lahore, Shekhupura,
Gujranwala, and Sialkot.
5. Multan The districts of Multan, Jhang,
Lyallpur, and Montgomery.
6. Bahawalpur The districts of Bahawalpur,
Bahawalnagar, Rahimyar Khan,
Muzaffargarh, and Dera Ghazi Khan.
7. Khairpur The State of Khairpur and the dis-
tricts of Jacobabad, Sukkur, Larkana,
and Nawabshah.
8. Hyderabad The districts of Hyderabad, Thatta,
Dadu, Mirpurkhas, and Sanghar.
9. Quetta The Agencies of Quetta, Zhob,
Loralai, and Sibi.
10. Kalat Baluchistan States Union and Chagai.
The Tribal Areas of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
Province as well as the States of Amb, Chitral, Dir, and Swat have been
designated as "special areas." There will be no change in the internal
administration of these units.
Through the establishment of the new province the Pakistani hope
to create a country that will be politically more coherent and econom-
ically more nearly viable. Politically, it is hoped that the merger
will facilitate agreement with East Pakistan -- separated from West
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