QUANTUM THEORY AND PARAPSYCHOLOGY

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• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2014
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 1, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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2d-t.t.41--= Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/01/09 : CIA-RDP79-00999A000200010009-6
41V
y for Psychical Research
'hysiological correlates of
Unpublished manuscript.)
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L PROBLEM. Pamphlet
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tl evidence are indicated.
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology
J. H. M. WHITEMAN
INTRODUCTION
In recent years a number of attempts have been made to sketch
explanations of certain psi phenomena along lines which the authors
consider to be compatible with modern physics. There is held to
be a special need today for such attempts, since "many scientists
reject psi because of its apparent nonphysical nature" (28, p. 84),
or since rejection of the "naturalistic" world-view by prominent
writers on psychical research "is responsible for a good deal of
the current prejudice on the part of natural scientists against
parapsychological research" (12, p. 226). A "physical" theory of psi,
it seems to be argued, might convert many opponents; but pre-
sumably the authors would not put forward such explanation
unless they believed it to be the right kind of explanation to aim for.
Nearly always the basic assumption seems to be that modern
physics is naturalistic, i.e., one-level deterministic (9, p. 17), and
thus the need for compatibility with modern physics demands the
production of a naturalistic theory for psi. An opposing view, which
I maintain is in its broad lines the view of the great majority of
quantum physicists and also of philosophers of science oriented to
theoretical physics, is that modern physics, far from being natural-
istic, has overthrown the naturalistic world-view. This "opposing
view," which became fairly general nearly fifty years ago and has
become much more compelling still in recent years, unfortunately
receives little publicity outside the specialist journals. Consequently
it has received so far almost no attention in parapsychology. But
presuming that it is as widely accepted by authorities as I am
maintaining, it is clear that the task for parapsychology, in coun-
tering attacks on its alleged "nonphysical" character, is not to try
to devise naturalistic explanations, but to show how the critics
might see that parapsychology is compatible with modern physics,
if only they knew enough about both.
It is chiefly the problem of precognition that has called forth
attempts at explanation along substantially naturalistic lines. Pro-
fessor C. T. K. Chari, in a timely and extensively documented
paper (10), has set out to rebut these insofar as they propose to
modify the formalism of quantum theory or its interpretation. With
his general conclusion, that "all attempts to crack the riddles of
psychical research by relying on quantum mechanics are, for the
2
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342 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
present, premature and hazardous" (10, p. 203), I am in agreement,
and would even express the conclusion far more strongly if the
attempts referred to have the purpose of reducing parapsychology
to physics. Nevertheless, after the elimination of "partially baked
ideas" (in I. J. Good's sense [17]) and other formalistic proposals
against which more positive objections can be laid, there still remain
certain fundamental questions. How far is the experimental basis
of "main-stream" quantum theory (2, p. 1) still virtually un-
challengeable? What is the nature of the "epistemological problem"
raised by it? Why is quantum theory considered to have overthrown
the "classical ontology" ? And what is the relevance, if any, of the
epistemological problem and the overthrow of the classical ontology
to parapsychology?
It is clear, I think, that this last question must be strictly attended
to if parapsychology is to be placed on a sound scientific basis; and
the others are of course involved in it. I shall try to answer each
of the questions in as concise a way as possible, and then to show
how, compatibly with the answers, we may build the beginnings
of an axiom system for parapsychological phenomena.
"MAIN-STREAM" QUANTUM THEORY
Distinguishing, for the present, "elementary" quantum mechan-
ics from quantum field theory, one can say that "main-stream"
quantum mechanics is a mathematical language devised basically
to formalize certain remarkable experimental results with which
the classical "language" appears to be quite incompatible. "I know
from my own experience," Max Born wrote, "and I could call on
Heisenberg for confirmation, that the laws of quantum mechanics
were found by a slow and tedious process of interpreting experi-
mental results" (8, p. 86). And Bastin, more recently, has said,
"One can scarcely deny that the quantum theoretical formalism
took the form it did precisely to accommodate those puzzling
aspects of the quantal state of matter which [the] realist position
seeks to find an excuse to ignore" (2, p. 8).
There are four questions which need to be put concerning main-
stream quantum mechanics. Is the mathematics always rigorous and
consistent within a certain postulational framework? Does it always
work out in satisfactory agreement with experimental results? Are
the remarkable experimental results just referred to, from which
the character of the formalism is inferred, beyond dispute ?And is
the inference justified?
The answers to these subsidiary questions, I suggest, are as
follows: The mathematics is rigorous and consistent if developed
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203), I am in agreement,
far more strongly if the
reducing parapsychology
ition of "partially baked
her formalistic proposals
be laid, there still remain
s the experimental basis
). 1) still virtually un-
pistemological problem"
lered to have overthrown
relevance, if any, of the
of the classical ontology
must be strictly attended
und scientific basis; and
;hall try to answer each
isible, and then to show
ly build the beginnings
phenomena.
THEORY
:ary" quantum mechan-
ay. that "main-stream"
guage devised basically
ital results with which
: incompatible. "I know
:e, "and I could call on
of quantum mechanics
of interpreting experi-
tore recently, has said,
theoretical formalism
-nodate those puzzling
11 [the] realist position
).
e put concerning main-
:ics always rigorous and
lework ? Does it always
wrimental results? Are
;ferred to, from which
eyond dispute? And is
ons, I suggest, are as
;onsistent if developed
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 343
in a certain way (not usual in textbooks of physics [33, pp. 319 f.]),
up to a certain point, where additions and adaptations are made,
often prompted by classical ideas and open to various mathematical
or phenomenological objections?a small qualification, since every
scientific theory has a dubious fringe at its growing points. The
theory is in quite extraordinary agreement with experimental re-
sults, again up to a point, where the adjustments made begin to
look very artificial, the phenomenology becomes very confused, and
the experimental results are not predicted with entire accuracy or
completeness (but quantum field theory, within its range of ap-
plication, goes a long way toward rectifying these deficiencies). The
experimental results which the consistent core of the theory is
designed to formalize have been tested repeatedly in the most
thorough way, and it does not seem remotely possible that they
could ever be overthrown. As regards the question whether some
other kind of formalism might serve equally well, I think we can
confidently answer that the features of the formalism which seem
most surprising, because quite foreign to classical physics, could
not be dispensed with because they correspond to features of the
experiments to be explained; but the formalism might possibly be
expanded or replaced by a nearly equivalent one if those features
are preserved.
It is part of main-stream quantum theory, and essential for
understanding the objections to the classical ontology, that one
should realize what the basic experimental results are and con-
sequently why the formalism has to be of the kind it is. All this is
exemplified most clearly in various thought-experiments, of which
two kinds call for consideration here.
These are diffraction or interference experiments in which a beam
of monochromatic light is directed into the apparatus and certain
effects are eventually detected on a sensitized screen. If the beam
is of strong or average intensity, bright lines or bands are seen in
certain positions; but if the intensity is greatly diminished, the
continuous effect breaks up into single scintillations or absorptions
detected by a photomultiplier. This fact strongly suggests that the
beam "really" consists of particles, though the sense in which the
term "really" is used remains obscure. It is to be noted, however,
that interference and diffraction effects involve the canceling out
of the intensity in certain regions, and this seems quite inexplicable
unless the intensity is structured as a wave (for neither mass nor
energy can cancel themselves out). The question as to what it is
consistent to believe "really" happens in the apparatus before the
screen is reached thus becomes acute.
In the "grating experiment" (25, p. 18) the beam is directed at
a diffraction grating from which one half can be removed, leaving
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344 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
half as many lines, spaced as before. Simple geometrical theory
shows that such removal should greatly worsen the resolving power
of the grating (line-breadth), assuming that the wave meets the
whdle of the grating in position on each occasion; and this theo-
retiCal conclusion is accurately verified experimentally for normal
intensities. If, now, the intensity is very greatly reduced, and the
waVe then breaks up into small wave-packets, the resolving power
wall similarly depend on the size of the packets and not at all on
how far the grating extends on either side beyond the packets as
they impinge on it. Thus we have a clear test whether the wave
whi0 is producing scintillations can or cannot logically be consid-
ered to have broken up into separate packets. The verdict of experi-
i
ment s that, however weak the intensity of the incoming beam, it
belt,,es as an unbroken wave, not as an ensemble of separate packets.
In the variant of the two-slit interference experiment carried out
by Janossy and Naray in 1957 (21, pp. 2 f.; 33, p. 316) the beam
was!split by a semi-transparent mirror into two beams which were
caued to interfere. The intensity was reduced until less than one
quantum of energy was in the apparatus at any time. Single ab-
sorptions were nevertheless still detected, and their statistical
distfibution was conspicuously the same as for intensities ten
thottsand times greater, being always in agreement with what
geoMetrical theory predicts for a complete wave not broken up into
wave-packets.
Although in these two cases the arguments proceed along quite
different lines, the same conclusion seems to follow inescapably.
As Messiah puts it: "On [the] way up to the detecting apparatus,
eve0thing happens as if light were propagated as a wave [and
definitely not as an ensemble of either wave-packets or particles];
the !corpuscular aspect manifests itself only at the instant of de-
tection" (25, p. 20).
Thus the formalism needs to contain two distinct kinds of
elethents: (a) The mathematical expression for a sinusoidal wave
tha.t does not break up into packets and is not detectable in loco (for
if atnew detector were inserted to explore the effect at any place,
thisj would make a new experiment and bring about a new corpus-
cular effect); in short, the wave is physically unobservable as such.
(b) A mathematical operation for deriving from this wave, on the
t
occasion of an observation, a statistical distribution which individual
abs4rptions must fall into, although individually their place and
timing cannot be predicted. The theory of linear operators in a
Hilyert Space fulfills precisely these conditions, and with appro-
priate choice of wave-function and identification of operators it
proyides the basis for main-stream quantum theory and all its
immensely varied and accurate confirmations.
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ale geometrical theory
en the resolving power
Lt the wave meets the
:casion; and this theo-
t..rimentally for normal
eatly reduced, and the
:s, the resolving power
Acets and not at all on
beyond the packets as
test whether the wave
lot logically be consid-
The verdict of experi-
the incoming beam, it
tble of separate packets.
experiment carried out
; 33, p. 316) the beam
two beams which were
:ed until less than one
t any time. Single ab-
and their statistical
as for intensities ten
agreement with what
ave not broken up into?
ts proceed along quite
to follow inescapably.
te detecting apparatus,
gated as a wave [and
3-packets or particles];
at the instant of de-
two distinct kinds of
for a sinusoidal wave
)t detectable in loco (for
the effect at any place,
ig about a new corpus-
y unobservable as such.
from this wave, on the
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ions, and with appro-
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urn theory and all its
ns.
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 345
Von Neumann, to whom the rigorous Hilbert Space formalization
is principally due (31), wrote at a time when it was not known that
absorptions can continue even when there is less than one quantum
in the field, and also long before the development of high-energy
physics. In trying to present a complete mathematical theory of the
"measurement process" he was led to introduce, over and above
the basic analysis just given, several assumptions, techniques, or
interpretations which have since been ruled out, disproved, or
widely and seriously questioned. It is necessary to give some
attention to these here, since the redundant assumptions of von
Neumann rest on presuppositions of the classical ontology and are
still often adopted (by those unfamiliar with the situation in the
philosophy of science) as the basis for attempted solution of the
"epistemological problem" arising.
One of the inadmissible assumptions is that the probability
density which is ultimately derived (1012) refers, even before any
observation has been made, to an "ensemble" of "systems" to be
regarded as present in space at the time in question. It is thus
conceived of as a classical probability density in the space of the
apparatus before anything is detected, and is declared to yield the
"probability of finding a particle" in the region specified and at the
time in question, the particles being (contrary to the experiments
just mentioned) already in existence as such. Now such a proba-
bility can only be verified by repeating the experiment many times
under identical conditions and in each case exploring the region in
question with detecting apparatus. But this of course destroys the
conditions of the experiment. Verification by such means is im-
possible; the kind of verification actually obtainable in quantum
mechanics applies only at the final stage (where absorptions occur)
and not in the intervening field. Thus the postulate is "definitively
ad hoc" (33, p. 120) and scientifically inadmissible. Reference may
also be made to Messiah's further objections to the "ensemble
theory" (25, pp. 158-159) and to Feyerabend's remarks (15, p. 98).
What is called "von Neumann's Theorem," that quantum me-
chanics is "complete" in the sense that there can be no "hidden
variables," is by common consent today considered to fail because
of the over-stringent postulates imposed (3, 6, 14).
The Projection Postulate, or theory of "reduction of the wave-
function," is the assumption that "measurement" abruptly reduces
the state of the "system" being measured to an eigenstate corres-
ponding to the eigenvalue which appears as the measure. This has
come in for sustained criticism on various grounds, chiefly because
the concept of "measurement" is vague (the measure being the
outcome of an experiment extended in space and time indivisibly),
and because the postulate is clearly false if, as in absorptions, the
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346 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
photon presumably indicating the measure is destroyed (24, 30).
The chief confusions in the use of the term "measurement" seem
to arise from the lack of distinction between a first interaction, as
I between a field and two slits, and a second interaction, as at a
sensitive screen (34, p. 73). To suppose that the measure at the
screen tells us that a certain "system" at the slits had that measure,
again runs counter to the basic analysis detailed above. If it is not
clearly understood, as Bohr never tired of insisting (7, 29), that a
particular measure cannot be attached to a wave or "system" until
after the final interaction, continual pseudo-problems and paradoxes
arise. (Similarly, in parapsychology we could distinguish a "first
interaction" between an agent and some physically unobservable
and probabilistic connecting means, and a "second interaction"
betwecn the connecting means and the observation by a particular
percipient, as specified by the total conditions on some particular
indivisible occasion.)
I omit discussion of von Neumann's "theory of mixtures" as not
being immediately relevant to parapsychology.
Still another serious point of criticism concerns von Neumann's
attempts to formalize the "measurement process" as a single en-
counter between a "system" and the "apparatus," presumed also to
have its wave-function. The proposed attachment of a wave-func-
tion to the macroscopic apparatus has led to absurdities, as in the
example of "Schrodinger's cat" (16, p. 14). It is perhaps sufficient
simply to repeat von Weizsacker's remark that "the problem of
measurement certainly is not sufficiently described in von Neu-
mann's way, because there is not the confrontation between one
object which is the quantum object and another object which is
either the measuring device or the human being" (2, p. 71).
(Similarly, in parapsychology there could be no "confrontation"
between a general psychical connecting means and a measuring
device or percipient, since this would at once produce something
specific.)
As regards the meaning of the term "Copenhagen Interpreta-
tion," the difficulty is that many writers interpret this "interpre-
tation" as including some or all of the questionable von Neumann
assumptions, while others?Messiah, for instance (25, pp. 48, 152,
158 f.)?keep close to the basic analysis above, and thus to the
original views of Bohr in regard to the "wholeness" or "indivisi-
bility" of an experiment on the occasion of an observation. Even
Heisenberg seems to accept von Neumann's ideas on "mixtures"
(20, p. 125), while arguing for the "Copenhagen Interpretation."
It is misleading to say, however, as Ballentine does (1, p. 361) and
is quoted by Chari, that "Heisenberg combines the 'subjective
interpretation of probability' with the Aristotelian notion of
I
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is destroyed (24, 30).
"measurement" seem
a first interaction, as
d interaction, as at a
at the measure at the
;lits had that measure,
iled above. If it is not
lsisting (7, 29), that a
!aye or "system" until
-oblems and paradoxes
!d distinguish a "first
iysically unobservable
"second interaction"
-vation by a particular
ns on some particular
ry of mixtures" as not
gY?
cerns von Neumann's
ocess" as a single en-
:us," presumed also to
ment of a wave-func-
absurdities, as in the
t is perhaps sufficient
that "the problem of
!scribed in von Neu-
ontation between one
other object which is
71 being" (2, p. 71).
e no "confrontation"
ans and a measuring
:e produce something
penhagen Interpreta-
erpret this "interpre-
onable von Neumann
ance (25, pp. 48, 152,
ove, and thus to the
)1eness" or "indivisi-
an observation. Even
ideas on "mixtures"
agen Interpretation."
does (1, p. 361) and
ibines the 'subjective
ristotelian notion of
? ?
?
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 347
potentia" (10, p. 195). Heisenberg's position, in accord with the
theory of mixtures, is simply that uncertainty may be due to
inadequate preparation as well as to the "objective" limitations of
the uncertainty relations (15, p. 92; 20, p. 53; 23, p. 22).
Ballentine's paper argues for von Neumann's "ensemble theory"
(without considering the evidence and arguments ruling this out)
and against what he calls the "Copenhagen Interpretation." For
this purpose he produces Bolir's very argument of "wholeness" on
the occasion of observation, and supposes that in consequence the
reference can never be to an "individual system," and so must be
to an "ensemble." I agree with Peierls (26) and Feyerabend (15,
p. 310) that the confusions have gone so far that the term "Copen-
hagen Interpretation" would be better dropped, provided it is
realized that there is a core of main-stream quantum theory which
is scarcely open to dispute.
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM
What are here called the "redundant assumptions of von Neu-
mann" are the basis for his "theory of measurement," about which
Jauch, Wigner, and Yanase say: "As has been pointed out many
times before, von Neumann's theory, if followed to its ultimate
consequences, leads to an epistemological dilemma" (22, p. 145).
In their view the alternatives are (a) to refrain from making any
definite statement about "physical reality" and to concern oneself
only with experimental results and the formalism simply as a
summary of these (this is the positivist position), or (b) to assert that
the wave-function is indeed a description of "physical reality," but
may change discontinuously and erratically as a result of the act
of measurement. Neither of these points of view, they say, seems
satisfactory.
A third course is to abandon the redundant assumptions of von
Neumann and the ideas on "classical ontology" in which they
originate. Even after this has been done, however, an epistem-
ological problem remains, centering around the concepts of "reality"
and "completeness." It arises from two interrelated difficulties.
Firstly, there is the fact that we have no way of predicting the place
where an absorption is to take place, or the time when an absorption
or emission will occur. Secondly, there is the peculiar ontological
status of the wave-function inasmuch as it is unobservable in loco
and has no one specific form out of many possible, yet it is posited
as a part-cause (along with the experimental conditions in their
wholeness) of the specific measure found on the occasion in
question. There is thus a double hiatus of ignorance or experimental
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348 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
incapacity at the observational level, and, correspondingly, of pre-
dicting incapacity at the causal level represented by the formalism.
Attempts to solve this epistemological problem usually amount to
attempts to fill in the hiatus in the formalism with further hy-
potheses, hoping that the experimental hiatus can then be con-
sidered to have been sufficiently accounted for.
The existence of this double hiatus reveals a striking similarity
between the epistemological problem which arises in parapsychol-
ogy and that which arises in quantum theory. In each case there
is the impossibility of accounting for a very wide field of evidence
in terms of the "classical ontology"; there is the question of the
peculiar ontological status or "reality" of the physically unobserv-
able causes which are postulated as an explanation; and there is
the question whether it is right or not to demand, as explanation, a
complete system of laws which are acceptably "physical" in
character. In each case there is a crisis, a problem of "reality," and
a problem of "completeness" at the physical level.
I shall deal first with the problems in quantum theory, noting,
however, that both in quantum theory and in parapsychology any
solutions offered must rest on some fairly definite world-view, and
that the same kind of world-view should serve for both cases.
All the solutions that have been offered appear to fall into one
or the other of two categories, according to the kind of world-view
assumed. In order to bring hidden assumptions to light it will first
be necessary, I think, to state in explicit terms the more familiar
world-view. This seems to be still commonly assumed by most
scientists other than quantum theorists, although, as I shall main-
tain, it is definitely ruled out by many powerful considerations,
apart from its incompatibility with main-stream quantum theory.
It has been given various names. As a basis of nineteenth-century
physics it is called the "classical ontology." In Whitehead's
terminology, and viewed as a basis for conceptions of space and
time, it is the theory of "simple location" (32, p. 72; 33, p. 289).
Where space alone is concerned, it has been called the "container
theory," following Einstein (13, p. xiv). And as a general philo-
sophical standpoint it was described above as "one-level na-
turalism."
In this "classical" nineteenth-century world-view everything in
nature is characterized by a precise position and a precise time in
a unique space and a unique time. It is admitted that experimental
measures of space and time only approximate to the (presumed)
precise theoretical measures; but this fact, it is claimed, needs no
other explanation beyond saying that the divergences result from
unpredictable deficiencies of the apparatus or personal differences
on the various occasions of measurement. The origin and action
f
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rrespondingly, of pre -
ited by the formalism.
em usually amount to
lism with further hy-
tus can then be con-S
for.
Is a striking similarity
arises in parapsychol-
ry. In each case there
wide field of evidence
is the question of the
physically unobserv-
lanation; and there is
land, as explanation, a
ptably "physical" in
blem of "reality," and
11 level.
antum theory, noting,
:n parapsychology any
finite world-view, and
ve for both cases.
.ppear to fall into one
he kind of world-view
ms to light it will first
-ms the more familiar
nly assumed by most
augh, as I shall main-
werful considerations,
earn quantum theory.
of nineteenth-century
nr." In Whitehead's
zeptions of space and
I2, p. 72; 33, P. 289).
called the "container
.d as .a general philo-
re as "one-level na-
id-view everything in
and a precise time in
tted that experimental
tte to the (presumed)
: is claimed, needs no
vergences result from
personal differences
rhe origin and action
_
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 349
of these personal differences are supposed to be brought within the
scope of this theory of "simple location" in the following way:
In the strictest form of this world-view it is supposed that a
complete system of laws exists for objects or fields characterized
in this way, including objects or fields corresponding exactly with
everything of the personal life of individuals, so that, given any
situation, the outcome at any future time is, in principle, exactly
predictable. Such a system of laws is of course not known, but it is
supposed that it nevertheless "exists" in such a way as to be
effective for exactly limiting the outcome at any future time. The
view that such an exact and complete correspondence exists
between everything of personal life and the fully determined placing
and motion of simply-located objects and fields is known as
psychophysical parallelism. This is the metaphysical system which
, Behaviorism seems to presuppose.
A "weakened" one-level naturalism would result if the rigors of
this definition were slightly relaxed in order to admit free will,
human intention, memory, and so on, in such a way that while the
operation of these factors is wholly confined to physical objects and
fields (for nothing else is supposed to exist, on this theory), the
laws which they obey are considered to be not suitably put in the
same category as "physical" laws.
The problems arising in main-stream quantum theory for those
who believe in a one-level naturalism seem to be (a) that the
experimental hiatus negates the assumption of a complete system
of laws from which prediction is actually possible; this negation
is also echoed in the formalism; (b) that the wave-function is, in
principle, physically unobservable and moreover expresses only a
range of possibilities; and (c) that there are many independent
arguments, which some philosophers of science and mathematicians
consider conclusive, against one-level naturalism.
In respect of these three difficulties, the policy of those who
believe, consciously or unconsciously, in one-level naturalism may
, be (a) to claim that the experimental hiatus will be removed by
new discoveries, or is in principle removable; the wave-function
will then merely have to be changed or supplemented; and (b) to
ignore the philosophical and mathematical arguments as mean-
ingless within the language of the assumed naturalism.
Thus de Broglie's proposal, also touched on by Bohm (4, p. 80)
in 1957, that all fields consist of simply-located particles and that
these are guided by the 0-field (denominated a "pilot wave") to
positions in accord with the known probability distribution, seems
to be aimed at preserving the Newtonian concept of particle trajec-
tories along with that of simply-located fields. It fails in many
ways: for instance, because the particles are "definitively ad hoc"
?.
1
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350 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
(33, p. 120), because the difficulty is only transformed into the
worse difficulty of accounting for the right steering of the particles
by a general wave into particular positions, and because it is
incompatible with the occurrence of absorptions when less than
one quantum is in the apparatus at any time.
It is not possible here to review in any adequate way the philo-
sophical and mathematical arguments against one-level naturalism.
They are developed at length in my book, Philosophy of Space and
Time (33). Three points may perhaps be noted: (a) Practically
nothing of the "naturalist's" program can be actually put into
effect, even in principle. The conditions at any given time cannot
be measured with absolute accuracy, nor can an infinity of measures
for them be formulated; the time itself cannot be measured with
absolute accuracy; and the laws, even if they were known, could
not be applied to an infinity of initial observations. In any case, the
initial measurements would need to be made in other experiments
at previous times, and thus would not in fact determine the experi-
mental conditions as a whole for the particular experiment in
question. The fantasy that this kind of prediction is possible results
from a wrong analysis of what is actually done in applications of
quantum theory. (b) There are continual "category mistakes." The
representations of objects and fields are mathematical constructs,
and the laws are conceptual relations between conceptual events,
but these are supposed to operate on non-conceptual objects. In
other words, the laws are a priori exact, but their field of application
is empirical and inexact. (c) The theory presents only an impersonal
and unknowable substratum of nature, as if given by a God-like
allocation of space and time labels regardless of operational possi-
bilities.
Let us now consider the fact that the wave-function, insofar as
it is a plain description of the phenomenological situation, is a
conceptual structure corresponding with a range of possibilities
(each with a certain mathematical probability) and not with any one
specific measure; and let us put with this the fact that a specific
measure is yielded when, corresponding to a specific occasion in
its wholeness, a certain operation is made on the wave-function.
These facts seem to be little more than an explicit demonstration,
in the field of physics covered by quantum theory, of a fundamental
distinction between what is in potential and what is actualized
according to the occasion.
As soon as we accept such a world-view (or such feature in our
world-view) and abandon ideas of simple location, the difficulties
posed in the epistemological problem begin to evaporate. It is not
to be expected that we should at once attain to a complete and
detailed justification of the foundations of quantum theory. It
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r Psychical Research
transformed into the
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ns, and because it is
ptions when less than
e.
lequate way the philo-
a one-level naturalism.
'hilosophy of Space and
noted: (a) Practically
be actually put into
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ations. In any case, the
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to evaporate. It is not
kin to a complete and
F quantum theory. It
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 351
should be sufficient, for the time being, that the conceptual diffi-
culties previously encountered are largely overcome. Some further
remarks on the "potentiality" or "hierarchical" view are needed,
however, since although I believe something of the kind is accepted
by nearly all quantum theorists, the essentials are easily misunder-
stood or associated with unacceptable presuppositions such as those
of von Neumann.
What is in potential is to be thought of as normally subconscious,
general, conceptual-formative, time and space comprehending; but it
enters into specific manifestations (actualization) by a limitation of
the potentiality according to the total conditions on the occasion
of manifesting. A useful illustration is to be found, I think, in the
Pythagorean formula for the length of the hypotenuse of a right-
angled triangle. Since this is true wherever Euclidean geometry
is true, it could be said to permeate local space, though the exactly
deduced result is made approximate by the operation of additional
potentialities. But nature does not secure the results by making the
sort of construction with squares in the space of the physically
observed phenomenon, or by any other of the constructions of that
kind used in proofs. On the contrary, the result comes about by
the fact that (local) concepts of space are organized conceptually
according to the Euclidean Isometry Group, and (local) space is
inconceivable except in those terms.
Thus potentiality acts by an internal logic, inherent in the
phenomenon itself, but not at the same "level" because not in
the same category of existence. Another illustration of this is in the
expression of emotion and thought in the features of the face. Here
it is even more evident that the potentiality (i.e., logically prior
causes) and the manifestation are in different categories, and that
the potentiality is not strictly in the same space as its manifestation.
The actualization takes place, moreover, not by a mechanistic
fitting together of geometrical constructions simply located in the
one space, but by a direct rule of correspondence.
We come now to the crucial question: Does a thoroughgoing
recognition of the distinction between potentiality and actualization,
besides being prima facie implied by the nature of the wave-function
and by the philosophical and mathematical arguments mentioned,
relieve the difficulties involved in the epistemological problem in
quantum theory? If it does, there would not seem to be any ground
for refusing to apply it also to parapsychology.
First and perhaps most urgently, there is the question how
absorption can take place even when there is less than one quantum
in the apparatus. A partial answer is at once provided by saying
that the quantum is not to be located in the apparatus, any more
than the Euclidean Isometry Group is to be located in the lengths
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352 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
being measured. We cannot go further without tackling the more
positive question whether it is now possible to conceive how
absorption can take place in distinct quanta at particular positions
and times, although the wave which we use to represent the
potentiality is extended in space and time; in other words, is there
really a sudden "collapse" of the wave-front into a point-absorption?
In the view which we are now considering, the wave-function
represents a control-mechanism for absorption, and not anything
which is simply located in actuality. It is constructed by "back-
ward extrapolation" (34, pp. 73 f.) from the observational results,
and since we have no way of predicting the place and time of
individual absorptions, our construction must be of a general kind,
like an average. But while it is impossible (for the reasons given
above) to carry out such prediction in full and precise detail, other
potentialities, individually formalizable perhaps, but not capable
of being handled mathematically in their infinity, must have an
effect on the manner of actualization. Every slight irregularity in
the production of fields and construction of the apparatus must
have some effect.
One may occasionally narrow down the range of choices by fresh
discoveries; the wave-function thus becomes less general, but still
stands for a potentiality (34, p. 76). This is not therefore a "collapse"
on actualization, but only a more refined extrapolation.
In the further study of actualization it is necessary to distinguish
between overall potentialities and small-bias potentialities. When,
for example, a large number of throws with a six-faced die are
classified, certain overall potentialities are seen to dominate until,
when the representation has become continuous, the effect of the
small-bias potentialities has almost disappeared. In a single throw,
on the other hand, it is the small-bias potentialities which dominate,
and the effect of the overall potentialities cannot be distinguished.
The mathematical probability 1/6 for each face (called "objective")
is only a convenient measure of the overall potentiality in the
experiment as a whole.
It is clear also that a special kind of potentiality is operative on
the instant of actualization in order to integrate or consummate all
the other potentialities, and that this results in the manifesting of
a "choice" (of the particular molecule to be affected, in the case
of the two-slit or grating experiment). This, we can say, is the chief
reason why the experiment must be treated as a whole when we
attempt to draw conclusions from what is observed. (A similar
integration or consummation of all potentialities clearly takes place
?
in psychological responses.)
It may be remarked that quantum theory has no way of formu-
lating the integration and choice otherwise than as the bare un-
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Li)
gr Psychical Research
hout tackling the more
sible to conceive how
a at particular positions
use to represent the
in other words, is there
nto a point-absorption?
?ing, the wave-function
ition, and not anything
constructed by "back-
:C observational results,
the place and time of
ist be of a general kind,
(for the reasons given
ind precise detail, other
rhaps, but not capable
infinity, must have an
ry slight irregularity in
of the apparatus must
Inge of choices by fresh
:s less general, but still
)t therefore a "collapse"
L! x t ra p ol ati n.
accessary to distinguish
!.s potentialities. When,
ith a six-faced die are
wen to dominate until,
mous, the effect of the
'red. In a single throw,
ialities which dominate,
annot be distinguished.
ace (called "objective")
rail potentiality in the
mtiality is operative on
:zrate or consummate all
s in the manifesting of
)e affected, in the case
we can say, is the chief
d as a whole when we
3 observed. (A similar
lities clearly takes place
? has no way of formu-
, than as the bare un-
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 353
predictable result of a mathematical operation; for it has no way
of formulating all the small-bias potentialities. There are two pos-
sible views in regard to the bringing about of single absorptions
by such integration, but further discussion here would take us too
far afield.
Lastly, it may be asked why one quantum only is absorbed.
Quantum theory assumes this in order to "save the appearances,"
and no deeper explanation seems forthcoming. A clue, however,
may be provided by the fact that quantum-mechanical energy is
measured by frequency of pure sinusoidal constituents in the wave-
function. Hence interaction would appear to occur not by the
transfer of localized packets of energy working into one system
from another, but by a process analogous to resonance in "stationary"
(i.e., stabilized) states of the atomic systems reacting to a "free
field." In quantum field theory, interaction between fields has in
fact to be conceived of in such a non-localized way.
Much space could be devoted to examining the views of Heisen-
berg on potentia (18, pp. 13,27 f.; 19, p. 149; 20, p. 53), of Bohm
on "potentiality" (5, p. 241), of Popper on "propensity" (27), and
of Dobbs in interpreting Popper's "propensity" as a "potentiality"
(11, pp. 323-327), and to considering how far elements of the
simply-locational view, belief in the redundant assumptions of
von Neumann, and varying usages of such terms as "subjective"
and "objective" have confused the issue. I think it is more helpful,
however, simply to bear in mind that the exposition of potentiality
presented here is a further articulation of Bohr's insights (rejecting
a few incompatible elements) and, as such, is already latent in
main-stream quantum theory.
THE RELEVANCE OF QUANTUM THEORY TO PARAPSYCHOLOGY
The analysis of the epistemological problem in quantum theory
? leads inevitably to an extension of the findings (notably the dis-
tinction between potentiality and actuality) beyond the limits of
physical experimentation to experience in general.
Let us return first to a consideration of the small-bias potenti-
? alities which cannot be formalized in their completeness. These are
evidently of two kinds. One kind will be operative when an ex-
periment, after having been set up, proceeds without human
influence and the results are recorded photographically. Another
kind will be operative when human influence is unavoidable, as for
instance if the experimenter is breathing into the apparatus or
walks about in the laboratory during the experiment. If the ex-
perimenter sees, hears, or feels the result, still other potentialities
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1
."?
354 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
must be operative to bring about his sensing what he actually does
sense.
The state of affairs then appears to be that potentialities of the
apparatus and of the experimenter must intermingle, so to speak,
and mutually adjust themselves in the act of integration which is
observation. This is also an actualization (since at a particular place
and time) derived from what is potentially extended over space
and time, and also from what is dispositional in the observing
individual.
The admission of a sphere of potentiality where human con-
sciousness is concerned is nothing more than a theory of the un-
conscious made explicit, with paradoxes removed, and confirmed as
a viable theory by the existence of its analogue in quantum theory.
It needs to be further remarked, however, that individuals are not
in that case sealed off from one another, for their ability to observe
"the same" physical objects shows that there is a common potenti-
ality ("intersubjectivity," or "common unconscious") involved in
all human observation. We must therefore admit a double aspect
of human potentialities: first, as originating in one individual and
specially referring to him or his physical body (the "subjective"
aspect), and second, as being involved in any integration with
potentialities of other objects or individuals in the wholeness of an
occasion of actualization for him (the "intersubjective" or "ob-
jective" aspect).
Continuing further over the range of human experience, we come
to the consideration of states of thought, mental imagery, dreams,
and ESP (including precognition). Consistently with the above
analysis, we must admit "spheres of actualization" and corres-
ponding potentialities in each case, not necessarily all different. But
even though the spheres may be different, the same human potenti-
alities may be actualized in them in different ways. Thus fear may
manifest itself in one way in the physical state and in another way
in the dream state because the additional potentialities required
for actualization are different in the two cases.
When all kinds of awareness (each with its sphere of actualization
and potentiality substructure) are admitted as subjects for scientific
study, the world-view that results is of the kind called hierarchical.
Natural science results from the arbitrary limitation of attention to
the effectively impersonal physical sphere, with human observation
of the events in question replaced by recorded artifacts. Discarding
this arbitrary limitation, we have now to examine how the hier-
archical world-view may help us toward an understanding of
phenomena in parapsychology (as well as those in more ordinary
psychology). Since I am attempting here only an introductory
sketch aimed principally at showing the relevance of quantum
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- Psychical Research
what he actually does
at potentialities of the
.trmingle, so to speak,
f integration which is
ce at a particular place
extended over space
mai in the observing
where human con-
in a theory of the un-
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iat individuals are not
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tdmit a double aspect
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nd called hierarchical.
iitation of attention to
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tamine how the hier-
an understanding of
Lose in more ordinary
only an introductory
elevance of quantum
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 355
theory, I propose merely to develop the hierarchical view a little
further, in places again appealing to quantum theory for illustration
so as to show how room is definitely found for telepathy, clair-
voyance, and precognition, which are notoriously inexplicable on
the simply-locational world-view.
In order to be as definite as possible in a compact space, I shall
now set down the chief points argued for above along with further
suggestions in the form of axioms, with definitions of "technical
terms" shown in italics, and accompanying comment where it seems
necessary:
AXIOM 1. There is a potentiality-sphere for events in the physical
world, whether or not they are observed by any individual. An
individual can participate in this, and it can be called his physical-
perception sphere. Actualization of physical phenomena for him
results from integration of potentialities of that kind with his
subjective potentialities.
AXIOM 2. Every individual has a potentiality-sphere of thought
and images, to be called his thought-image sphere.
Amom 3. The various levels of potentiality for an individual
include a level of values and higher intentions (the ideal sphere)
influencing the thought-image sphere, and this in turn influences
the sphere of physical perception and action there. Actualizations
at any one level act as potentialities at a lower level, so that the
lower the level, the lesser the generality and the greater the speci-
ficity.
Axtom 4. Objects and individuals, singly or in consociation,
have distinguishable potentialities, which continually develop. Such
development is not in physical time, but in what may be called a
conceptual or quasi time.
COMMENT. (a) Compare the two-slit experiment, where "at the
slits" only the wave-function is determined, as an "overall" po-
tentiality; but it is determined precisely in conceptual space and
time. When a screen is placed in front, the manifestation becomes
specific. Such working-out of potentiality proceeds, by its inherent
logic, as far, and in as much detail, as is possible until further
actualizations occur to specify the development more precisely
(34, pp. 76 f.).
(b) Conceptual time becomes actually observable when, for
instance, a melody and all its structure in notes of various time-
values is perceived by "stopping of time." The relative durations
retain their cognitive character in spite of the fact that the com-
prehending of the whole melody, when correlated with physical
events, is comprised within a few moments of physical time
(33, p. 293).
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356 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
AXIOM 5. After actualization of an event in any sphere has taken
place, there exists a new and fulfilled potentiality in regard to that
total event, with a past-coloring, in the thought-image sphere of
each individual who has experienced it; this is his individual
memory of the event. If no individual has experienced the event,
there is still a general fulfilled potentiality established in the physical
potentiality-sphere; this may be called a comical memory.
COMMENT. Without such a "memory," how could the "whole-
ness" in quantum theory comprise events at different times?
Axiom 6. Before actualization of an event has taken place, par-
ticular stages in its working-out constitute potentialities which may
be called provisional, and have a future-coloring. Actualization of
any of these in an individual's thought-image sphere may occur in
integration with his subjective potentialities. If this is relatively
free from subjective distortions and is not the result of (subjective)
reasoning from theories, regularities, etc., it is called a precognition.
Axiom 7. The kinds of potentiality affecting an individual in any
actualization are those of (a) his individual disposition, needs, and
memory at all levels; (b) events at any level: fulfilled, presently
actualized, or provisional; and (c) other individuals: their dis-
position, needs, memory, or events in their lives.
COMMENT. Again, "wholeness" in integration is not possible if
the potentialities of individuals present are to be absolutely cut off
from each other.
Axiom 8. The development of potentialities and their inte-
gration as necessary in any actualization take place by various kinds
of resonance, i.e., special relevance or resemblance. Resonating
potentialities have various degrees of intensity and stability, and
various kinds and degrees of openness.
COMMENT. (a) Resonance may be conceived of as a mutual adap-
tation of developing potentialities to each other. It would occur
by some almost instantaneous or automatic logical process, prior to
actualizations in physical space and time, as the molecule to absorb
a quantum from a field is "chosen" almost instantaneously. Each
potentiality may be conceived of as structured out of categories of
archetypal ideas (the Euclidean Isometry Group is such a structure;
by it, equal triangles can be "congruent," wherever placed); the
adaptation would then be essentially by conceptual sameness of some
kind causing a link or transfer of characteristics.
(b) Relative lack of openness for an individual results when he is
fixated on other potentialities. The chief fixations are emotionality,
fixed ideas, absorption in physical phenomena, and absorption in
discursive thinking (accompanied by emotion and words and faintly
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`4.weir
for Psychical Research
nt in any sphere has taken
tentiality in regard to that
thought-image sphere of
it; this is his individual
as experienced the event,
established in the physical
. cosmical memory.
" how could the "whole-
ts at different times?
vent has taken place, par-
e potentialities which may
-coloring. Actualization of
'nage sphere may occur in
lities. If this is relatively
t the result of (subjective)
, it is called a precognition.
ecting an individual in any
'al disposition, needs, and
level: fulfilled, presently
er individuals: their dis-
ieir lives.
egration is not possible if
re to be absolutely cut off
ntialities and their inte-
ake place by various kinds
resemblance. Resonating
tensity and stability, and
eived of as a mutual adap-
Ai other. It would occur
ic logical process, prior to
as the molecule to absorb
ost instantaneously. Each
tured out of categories of
.3roup is such a structure;
," wherever placed); the
nceptual sameness of some
.eristics.
ividual results when he is
ixations are emotionality,
imena, and absorption in
ion and words and faintly
\ wow
Quantum Theory and Parapsychology 357
merged in a general impression of the physical world and body).
The last two of these characterize the normal physical state.
(c) There is an analogue of fixation in physics, better described
as limitation or exclusion; namely, the exclusion of all resonance
between objective physical and individual potentialities, direc-
tionally from the individual to the object (save indirectly, by
muscular action). Such exclusion may be considered normal, but
cannot be absolute, since voluntary mental action can initiate
electromagnetic action and thus observable physical changes. It is
not known precisely in what ways individual potentialities can
combine with impersonally physical ones so as to effect physical
changes.
In terms of these axioms, telepathy may be explained simply as
resonance between the thought-image spheres of individuals. Clair-
voyance is resonance between the potentiality-sphere of a physical
object or event and the thought-image sphere of an individual.
Precognition is resonance between a provisional potentiality in the
physical sphere and the thought-image sphere of an individual. In
each case one individual (the percipient) must be in a thought-
image state, and his potentialities there for resonance of the respec-
tive kind must have a certain degree of openness and stability.
SUMMARY
Endeavoring now to sum up the relevance of quantum theory to
parapsychology, I think we can safely say that this does not lie in
the inducement which its formalism offers for extension by means of
mathematical theories of imaginary time or mass, joint probability
distributions, homology, etc., while phenomenological analysis of
the basic experimental situations in quantum theory is not at-
tempted. Indeed, phenomena such as telepathy, clairvoyance, and
precognition, which can only be observed by an individual human
being and cannot be recorded photographically or by any other
direct physical means, are reasonably held to be not "physical" and
thus not within the province of quantum theory.
What I have tried to show is that there is an intimate episte-
mological relevance of quantum theory, rightly understood, to the
problem of providing a scientifically acceptable conceptual frame-
work within which parapsychological phenomena make sense as
part of nature and human life in their entirety.
In short, the hierarchical world-view, although supported by
powerful arguments from philosophy, is likely to prove so puzzling
for people brought up in the traditions of "one-level naturalism"
that they might ordinarily be excused for saying: "This is hazily
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358 Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research
unscientific word-play, unconvincing as an account of telepathy,
clairvoyance, and precognition." The clear content of the words
is missed because of a natural conservatism which tries to adhere
to quite another system of ideas.
But now we have seen, in quantum theory, a supremely scientific
theory which in its foundations is not a "saving of appearances"
but a direct phenomenological analysis of experimental data; and
this theory presents a precise mathematical formalism of the very
points considered most hazy and difficult to grasp; namely, con-
ceptual structures having the character of "potentiality," a "non-
actual" (but nevertheless "real") category of existence and thus a
"degree of reality" transcending the "simply-locational" in time
and space, and the production of an actual phenomenon from that
potentiality according to the whole conditions on the occasion in
question.
Hence in quantum theory we have an explicit nature-given
illustration of how these conceptions which are being offered are
not only perfectly feasible and precise, but have been tested out
and found to yield results scientifically confirmed, where "older
world-views have conspicuously failed.
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L.4)
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ms on the occasion in
explicit nature-given
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Department of Applied Mathematics
University of Cape Town
Rondebosch, C. P., South Africa
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