INTELLIGENCE REPORTING GUIDE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00963A000100150001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 81
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 16, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence Reporting Guide
AFRICA
IRC-Af-1972
15 Dec 72 - 14 Dec 73
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Classified by 5548
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of E.O. 11552.
Exemption Categories 58(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically Declassified on:
Date Impossible to Determine
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
The Intelligence Reporting Guide (IRG) highlights
longer range and continuing intelligence reporting needs
believed to be obtainable from human source collectors.
Although an effective means for making these needs known to
a wide variety of sources, the IRG is not a mandatory col-
lection document. As is the case with the Current Intel-
ligence Reporting List (CIRL), which details the analysts'
shorter range intelligence needs, collectors should view
this publication as complementary to any specific instruc-
tions they may receive from their respective collection
managers.
Beginning with this issue, longer range and con-
tinuing economic guidance will be published separately in
a publication to be known as the Economic Reporting Guide
(ERG). The ERG is sponsored by the Economic Intelligence
Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and con-
tains selected longer range economic information needs of
all participating members of the Washington economic
community.
Topics of current intelligence interest will con-
tinue to appear in the Current Intelligence Reporting List
(CIRL) and its new economic counterpart, the Economic Alert
List (EAL). These triannual guidance publications for Africa
are published on 15 February, 15 June, and 15 October.
In all of these documents, items have been classi-
fied separately and bear the classification (S) SECRET, (C)
CONFIDENTIAL, or (U) UNCLASSIFIED followed, where appropriate,
by the necessary control; i..e., NO FOREIGN DISSEM.
The IRG and its economic counterpart, the ERG, are
produced by the Information Requirements Staff, DD/I, CIA,
and are published annually on each of seven areas of the
world. Collectors in the field are encouraged to cite the
IRG and its companion volumes when reporting is responsive
to questions contained in these guidance documents. Comments
and suggestions are encouraged and should be directed to:
Human Resources Group, IRS/CIA, Room 2G40
CIA Headquarters Building, Washington, D.C.
Code 143, Extension 5577 or 5578
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
REGIONAL AFFAIRS
1
ALGERIA
5
ANGOLA
9
ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
(See Middle East/South
Asia GIRL)
BOTSWANA 11
BURUNDI, REPUBLIC OF
13
CAMEROON
15
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
17
CHAD
19
CONGO
21
DAHOMEY
23
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
25
ETHIOPIA
27
FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS
29
GABON
3
1
GAMBIA, THE
33
GHANA
35
GUINEA
37
IVORY COAST
39
KENYA
41
LESOTHO
43
LIBERIA
45
LIBYA
47
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
49
MALAWI
51
MALI
53
MAURITANIA
55
MAURITIUS
57
MOROCCO
59
MOZAMBIQUE
61
NIGER
63
NIGERIA
65
PORTUGUESE GUINEA
67
RHODESIA
69
RWANDA
71
SENEGAL
73
SIERRA LEONE
75
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
77
SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF
79
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
PAGE
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
81
SPANISH SAHARA
83
SUDAN
85
SWAZILAND
87
TANZANIA
89
TOGO
91
TUNISIA
93
UGANDA
95
UPPER VOLTA
97
ZAIRE
99
ZAMBIA
101
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Report on specific dangers posed to US airlines,
on attitudes of host governments to US proposals for inter-
national action, and on any incidents even though they do
not involve US aircraft or US citizens. There is always US
public interest in any hijacking or aircraft terrorist in-
cident; also, there is a surprising degree of interconnec-
tion between the occurrence of such incidents in one part of
the world and another. Therefore, posts should seek from any
available sources immediate details on such incidents and
should follow up with reports on the disposition of the
hijackers, including dates of trial, sentencing, release from
prison, etc. (U)
New Communist Chinese aid programs in African
countries probably will include underground water, road, and
geological-geophysical survey's, The Chinese recently have
completed cooperative agreements involving such surveys in
other areas and may soon initiate new operations in Africa.
They have long been involved in these activities in Tanzania
and Zambia where unconfirmed rumors of Chinese missile-space
tracking facilities have been reported. Other Chinese projects--
the construction of a naval base in Dar es Salaam, airfield
surveys, and possible radar sites--could support future Chinese
missile-space activities. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
1. Furnish details of current or planned Chinese
survey and construction assistance in Africa, including loca-
tion and nature of the teams; Chinese names, specialities,
and affiliation; methods and instruments used; stated purpose;
and construction, descriptions, and specifications. (S)
2. Report activities of Chinese ships visiting
Africa or offshore islands, especially Tanzania, including
name, size, cargo, personnel, electronics, and places visited. (S)
3. Provide information on possible Chinese at-
tempts or successes in obtaining rights to construct radar,
optical, communication, or other facilities in or near
Africa. (S)
4. Continue detailed reporting of Chinese or
Soviet activities at the National and Aeronautics Space
Administration's old Mercury tracking sites on Zanzibar. (S/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
1
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
COMMUNIST CHINESE ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA (Continued)
5. Continue detailed reporting on the possible
Chinese radar sites, especially at Wazo Hill, near Dar es
Salaam. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
6. Report on electronic, optic, or other
unusual equipment associated with Chinese Embassies or
buildings in Africa. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
7. Report on Chinese scientific and technical
delegations visiting African countries, including names,
specialities, affiliations, and other activities. (C)
8. Provide photographs on the above questions
when at all possible. (C)
The USSR for the last several years has been
working toward establishing a worldwide network of optical
satellite tracking stations. Both overt and clandestine means
are being used to obtain precise geodetic-gravimetric data
which could be used to verify their existing geodetic informa-
tion and to possibly improve their intercontinental ballistic
missile targeting. (C)
In Africa, the Soviets have established overt
optical satellite tracking stations in Cairo (Arab Republic
of Egypt), Khartoum (Sudan), Fort Lamy (Chad), and Afgoi
(Somali Democratic Republic). (C)
1. Where are the Soviets negotiating for the
establishment of optical satellite tracking stations? What
is the status of negotiations for each site? What tracking
camera will be used? Describe related equipment at the
station? (C)
2. Is there any evidence that the Soviets are
using lasers at any of the established tracking stations? (C)
3. What satellites are being observed and
for what purpose (geodesy, gravimetry, atmospheric density
determinations, etc.)? (C)
2
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Africa IRG'-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
REGIONAL AFFAIRS
SOVIET SPACE TRACKING FACILITIES IN AFRICA (Continued)
4. Obtain names and affiliations of Soviet
and indigenous scientists and engineers associated with
the establishment and operation of the various tracking
sites. (C)
HEALTH
A. Key Personalities
1. Request information on the health of
key personalities in Africa to include chiefs of state,
heirs apparent, and the important civilian and military
leaders who have influence on the domestic, foreign, and
military policies of each country. In addition to general
information which would reflect the state of health of the
various individuals, reports should include, if possible,
such information as personal observations, medical and
laboratory reports, and reports of any significant changes
in appearance and personality. (C)
B. Public Health Activities
The impact of endemic-epidemic diseases is be-
coming a significant factor in political, economic, and
military affairs. Some diseases are important but have
limited distribution, others have worldwide distribution,
and still others threaten to become serious problems in
terms of incidence and distribution. (U)
1. Provide information outlining the major
disease and health problems. What is being done for their
control, and what is planned? Report on new approaches and
uncommon circumstances which influence their control, spread,
and eradication. (U)
2. Furnish information reflecting views on
the economic and political impact of disease problems. (U)
3. Report on the amount and effectiveness of
foreign assistance programs, including those of the World
Health Organization. (U)
3
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
HEALTH (Continued)
B. Public Health Activities (Continued)
4. Supply information on.statistical treatment
of incidence data showing cyclic patterns relating to time,
weather conditions, and other environmental factors. (U)
5. What is the relative ratio between official
disease incidence rates and actual numbers of cases? (C)
4
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
There is a long-term continuing need for information
on the political dynamics of the country. (U)
1. How large is the Presidential staff? How is
it organized? What interpersonal relationships contribute to
its smooth operation, and vice versa? How does Prime Minister
Boumediene use this staff? What degree of autonomy does it or
its principal officials enjoy? (C)
2. What is the size and composition of the Council
of the Revolution? How often does it meet? What is the ex-
tent of its influence? (C)
3. How much authority does Boumediene delegate
to his Council of Ministers? Intraministerial friction has
been reported. Do other ministers tend to ally themselves in
factions, or are the feuding ministers isolated? What is the
familial and tribal background of the ministers? (C)
4. What interministerial or other permanent or
ad hoc advisory groups have been created by Boumediene? What
are the functions of these bodies? How much influence do they
wield? (C)
5. What is the approximate membership of the
National Liberation Front (FLN)? What are the qualifications for
membership? How are members recruited? Are local, regional,
and national officials required to be at least nominal members
to hold their jobs? How does party-governmental liaison oper-
ate? (C)
6. Who are and where are the active political
opponents of Boumediene? How are their activities financed?
What is the source of their support? What are their objec-
tives? (S)
7. What is the composition of the National Economic
and Social Council? How often does it meet? What is the ex-
tent of its influence on internal policy? (C)
8. What is the status of the various national or-
ganizations that theoretically are subordinate to the FLN--
5
S E C R E T
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
labor, students, women, youth, etc.? (U) How are these
groups organized? How are members recruited? What policies
do they pursue? What activities are they engaged in? (C)
9. What religious groups exist? How do they in-
fluence the regime? (C)
10. How much direct control does the Government
exercise over the public affairs media? (C)
1. Since Algeria is the pivotal country with re-
spect to Maghrebian affairs, its attitude toward Maghreb wide
projects therefore are of much interest. What is Algeria's
attitude toward the Permanent Secretariat of the Maghreb,
which it chairs, but which is :Located in Tunis? What person-
nel does it furnish the secretariat? (C)
2. Algeria's bilateral relations with Morocco,
Tunisia, Libya, and the Arab Republic of Egypt are of particu-
lar importance. How are these relations evolving? (C)
3. Algeria seems to have revised its policy of
assistance to liberation groups. What specific aid does
Algeria supply to each such group? (C)
4. Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe
seem to have a lower priority than those with Europe. What,
if any, specific steps is Algeria taking to reduce the Soviet
and East European presence in Algeria? (C)
MILITARY AFFAIRS
1. What are the precise functions of the com-
manders of the five military regions? What authority do they
exercise over troops assigned to their areas? (S)
2. What is the line of command from Boumediene to
brigade or lower unit? (S)
3. Now that universal military training is well
underway, what plans are being made to provide for, equip,
and train a military reserve? (S)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MILITARY AFFAIRS (Continued)
4. How many Soviet and other military advisers
remain in the country? Where are they located? With what
service or unit are they associated? Do such advisers exert
any political influence over the units with which they are
associated? (S)
5. What military assistance--equipment and/or
training--is the Algerian military supplying to foreign liber-
ation groups? What are the conditions of such assistance? (S)
7
S E C R E T
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Africa IRG--Af--1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
We appreciate the high level of current reporting
maintained in spite of the difficulties in obtaining accurate
information. (C)
1. What are the plans, sources of aid, size of
membership and field strength, and rivalries among and within
the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the
Angolan Revolutionary Government-in-exile (GRAE), and the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? (C)
2. In what areas of Angola do the insurgents
operate? Which group is responsible for how much insurgent
activity within each area? What is the attitude of the local
population in such areas? What tribal groups cooperate with
or oppose each rebel group? (C)
3. How much and what kinds of assistance per annum
is Moscow giving the MPLA? Is Peking giving any significant
assistance to the MPLA? (C)
4. The implementing statute that defines Angola's
relationship with Lisbon should be promulgated in early 1973.
Does the statute alter in any way Lisbon's fundamental control
of Angolan affairs? Does it provide for the decentralization
of administrative and financial decisionmaking without alter-
ing the basic political relationship? Are officials in Angola
taking advantage of the statute to foster greater local re-
sponsibility? (C)
5. How are local administrations implementing
Lisbon's policies aimed at improving the lot of the Africans?
What is the status of the expanded social, educational, and
economic programs for the Africans? (C)
1. Have Kinshasa and Lusaka taken any steps to
restrict nationalist activities in view of Portuguese political
leverage that threatens the use of access routes vital to the
Zairian and Zambian economies? If so, how are such restrictions
enforced? (S)
9
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Continued)
2.
What is the degree of Portuguese cooperation
with the
Zaire
Republic? What are Portuguese plans for
in-
creasing
their
representation and activity in Kinshasa?
(S)
3. What subversive intentions and plans do
the Portuguese have regarding Angola's neighbors? Who are
involved, and what kind of training and equipment is involved?
What is local official thinking on "hot pursuit" raids or other
punitive incursions into Zambia? (S)
4. What is the extent of cooperation with Rhodesia
and the Republic of South Africa? How much support has South
Africa furnished for the Portuguese counterinsurgency effort? (S)
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C R E
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
President Sir Seretse Khama's Botswana Democratic
Party (BDP) came to power in 1965, a year before the former
protectorate of Bechuanaland received independence from the
United Kingdom. The BDP was returned to power with a slightly
reduced majority in 1969. Although Khama is the de facto chief
of the country's largest tribe and his party relies mainly on
the traditional tribal structure, Khama has striven to give
his government a modern political and administrative structure.
The BDP is opposed by three weak and factional groups. Because
the economy is poor and dependent upon the Republic of South
Africa, Khama has had to follow a policy of accommodation with
Pretoria. Diamond, copper, manganese, salt, soda ash, coal, and
nickel deposits have been discovered, which should make the
economy viable sometime late in the 1970's. (U)
1. How effective is the Botswana Government in
administration and in responsiveness to popular aspirations?
How popular is the Government? (U)
2. Who are the potential successors to President
Khama? Do factionalism and personal rivalries impair the ef-
fectiveness of the BDP or the Government? What is the current
standing and effectiveness of Vice President Masire? (C)
3. Are there any significant changes in the
objectives and activities, particularly subversive activities,
of the various opposition parties? (C)
4. Continue reporting on problems relating to
the construction of the Bot-Zam Road, including the border
question and Zambian cooperation; Botswana attitudes toward
regional cooperation, especially with regard to such institu-
tions as the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
(UBLS) and the Regional Testing Center; and Rhodesian sanc-
tions problems. (C)
1. What is Botswana's policy on dialog with
the Republic of South Africa? How effective is the Botswana
Government in convincing other African governments that its
present ties with South Africa do not constitute dialog? What
are the political implications of the Rhodesian railroad that
runs through Botswana to South Africa? (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
BOTSWANA
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
2. To what degree do South African, South-West
African, and Rhodesian subversives use Botswana as a haven
and way station? How much material and money pass through
the country, and who are the sources and end users? How
much does Botswana cooperate with South Africa and Rhodesia
in dealing with guerrillas? (S)
3. How extensive are the operations of South
African and Rhodesian intelligence and security agencies in
Botswana? (S)
4. In what ways are Zambian-Botswana relations
improving? What are the political implications of the Nata-
Kazungula Road, increasing trade, etc.? Are there any under-
standings between Botswana and Zambia on the control of southern
African subversives? (S)
5. Are there any new developments in the dispute
over where the borders of Botswana, Zambia, Rhodesia, and the
Caprivi Strip come together? (C)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Following the violence of the summer of 1972,
what is the Government doing, and planning to do, in order
to rebuild? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. Political factionalism has always been strong
in Burundi. How has this factionalism been exacerbated by
the events of last summer? Are there any signs of potentially
open opposition to President Micombero by ousted Tutsi extrem-
ists? Are there any signs of a potential Hutu oppo-
sition? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. On at least two occasions within the past year
or so, the Government has alluded to the possibility of plan-
ning a new Constitution and preparing for national elections.
What steps are being taken toward these goals? (S/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
4. What election role is likely to be played by
the National Party of Unity and Progress (UPRONA) and its
youth wing, the JRR? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
1. Relations with Belgium have been strained
since the summer of 1972. What are the two sides doing to
ease relations? How has the Belgian presence in Burundi
been affected by last summer's violence? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. How are relations with the Hutu government of
Rwanda being affected by last summer's violence? Is the
Burundian Government contemplating any actions against Rwanda
beyond verbal attacks? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. What is the status of the Chinese presence in
Burundi? Are the Chinese maintaining any contacts with
governmental or party figures or ousted politicians? (S/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
4. Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko apparently
has cooled toward President Micombero since last summer
because of the violence in Burundi. What is Micombero doing
to improve relations with Zaire? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
13
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
REPUBLIC OF BURUNDI
1. The army long has reflected the political
factionalism rife within the Burundian Government. How is
the army likely to develop in the wake of its role in the
violence of last summer? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
1.4
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NommiWiffin
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. President Ahidjo is trying to revitalize
the Cameroonian National Union (UNC) party by expanding
membership, strengthening organization, and finding com-
petent leaders. It would be helpful to us if an annual
progress report on the UNC is prepared. (C)
2. In May 1972, Cameroon, which joins French-
speaking East Cameroon and English-speaking West Cameroon,
was transformed from a federal to a unitary republic. We
would appreciate a quarterly review of the ongoing govern-
mental and legal changes caused by this constitutional change-
over. (C)
3. A nationwide trade union confederation is
being gradually forged by the Cameroonian Government. Can a
yearend wrap-up of the labor unification effort be forwarded? (C)
4. The revolutionary Cameroon People's Union (UPC),
though dying, is not entirely extinguished yet. If possible,
furnish a year by year assessment of the UPC's activities and
leadership, both in Cameroon and abroad. (S)
5. Popular dissatisfaction with the Ahidjo
regime is known to exist, but it is difficult for us to
gauge. Could reported signs of discontent among Cameroon's
various regional, tribal, and special interest groups be
evaluated annually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)
1. The annual review of Cameroon's relations
with Communist countries is very helpful. Could this review
be broadened along the same format to include Cameroon's rela-
tions with Western nations, neighboring African states, and
international organizations such as the United Nations, European
Communities, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-
Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)
2. Cameroon is among those French client states
which are seeking to revise their basic cooperation accords
with Paris. Provide reporting as developments occur regarding
the changes sought by Cameroon and the status of negotiations
with France. (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary
(MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally
are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Cameroon.
Would it be possible to treat Cameroon's civil police and intel-
ligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)
2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of
personnel changes in the various Cameroonian security and intel-
ligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly listing of
the heads of these organizations. (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
The Central African Republic is dominated by
the impulsive and suspicious President Bokassa, a widely
feared military strong man who seized power in 1966. Pre-
occupied with internal security, he has suppressed all political
institutions and political activity. (C)
1. Popular dissatisfaction with the Bokassa
regime is known to exist, but it is difficult for us to gauge.
Could reported signs of discontent among the Central African
Republic's various tribes and special interests (particularly
the military) be evaluated annually as to their extent and
seriousness? (C)
1. The annual review of the Central African
Republic's relations with Communist countries is very helpful.
Could this review be broadened along the same format to include
the Central African Republic's relations with Western nations,
neighboring African states, and international organizations such
as the United Nations, European Communities, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), and the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common
Organization (OCAM)? (C)
1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary
(MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports are
generally adequate to cover our long-range military reporting
needs for the Central African Republic. Would it be possible
to treat the Central African Republic's civil police and intel-
ligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)
2. We have no reliable way for keeping abreast
of personnel changes in the various Central African security
and intelligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly
listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)
17
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. President Tombalbaye is trying to correct
the administrative abuses and lack of social services that
have contributed. to Chad's 7-year-old Muslim insurgency. Can
a yearly overview of these efforts be forwarded? (C)
2. The two principal Muslim exile groups in
opposition to the Chadian Government are the National Libera-
tion Front of Chad (FROLINA) and the Chad Liberation Front
(FLT). Can an annual assessment of their threat in terms of
leadership, organization, activities, and foreign support be
provided? (S)
3. The monthly situation reports of the Muslim
rebellion by region and prefecture are very useful. Continue
such reporting, with ongoing attention to Libyan aid to the
rebels, Sudanese counterinsurgent cooperation with Chad, and
French military aid for Chad. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
1. The annual review of Chad's relations with
Communist countries is very helpful. Could this review be
broadened along the same format to include Chad's relations
with Western nations, neighboring African states, and inter-
national organizations such as the United Nations, European
Communities, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the
Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)
1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary
(MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally
are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Chad.
Would it be possible to treat Chad's civil police and intelli-
gence organizations more fully or separately? (S)
2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of
personnel changes in the various Chadian security and intel-
ligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly listing
of the heads of these organizations. (C)
19
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
amem6wdimm
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. There is an ongoing struggle for power
between President Ngouabi and his northern tribal sup-
porters on the one hand and southern tribal and radical
elements on the other. Can a biannual assessment be made
of who appears to have the upper hand? (S)
2. President Ngouabi is striving to revitalize
the Congolese Workers Party (PCT) in order to make it an ef-
fective instrument for reducing French influence by careful
degrees and for implementing a gradual program of "socialism."
A yearend wrap-up of the PCT's leadership, organization, and
activities would be appreciated. (C)
1. Can the apparently suspended annual review
of the Congo's relations with Communist countries be renewed?
Could this review be broadened along the same format to in-
clude the Congo's relations with Western nations, neighboring
African states, and such organizations as the United Nations,
European Communities, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and
the Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)
2. The Congo is among those French client states
which are seeking to revise their basic cooperation accords
with Paris. Reporting is desired as developments occur re-
garding the changes sought by the Congo and the status of
negotiations with France. (C)
1. The existing military Intelligence Summary
(MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports general-
ly are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for the
Congo. Would it be possible to treat the Congo's civil police
and intelligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)
2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast
of personnel changes in the various Congolese security
and intelligence services. We would appreciate a quarterly
listing of the heads of these organizations. (C)
21
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
DAHOMEY
A military junta composed of junior officers ousted
the civilian three-man Presidential Council in October 1972 with
promises to end governmental corruption and cure Dahomey's eco-
nomic ills. (U)
1. What is the new Government doing to fulfill its
promises to end corruption and get the economy moving? (C)
2. Who are the strong men within the new regime?
Is there any challenge to the new President, Major Kerekou,
from within his own government? (S)
3. Are there indications of continued plotting by
the senior military officers who were left out of this coup,
by former civilian politicians, or by other disgruntled seg-
ments of society? (C)
4. What is the ideological complexion of the new
regime likely to be? Several members of the new Cabinet re-
portedly are leftist. Are these members sufficiently strong
to influence others, or are they likely to be isolated? (S)
1. Is the new Government likely to recognize
Peking and other Communist countries? (C)
2. Is there any change in overall foreign policy
foreseeable? (C)
3. Is the new Government likely to view its rela-
tions with its regional neighbors differently? Is the mili-
tary government likely to become closer to the anglophone
military regimes of Ghana and Nigeria at the expense of rela-
tions with francophone civilian regimes like Niger and the
Ivory Coast? (C)
23
S E C R E T
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
1. Popular dissatisfaction is known to exist
with the erratic and forceful President Macias, but it is
difficult for us to gauge. Could reported signs of discontent
among Equatorial Guinea's tribal and special interest groups
be evaluated semiannually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)
2. President Macias seems to be forging his
single National Unity Party of Workers (PUNT) into an ef-
fective instrument for mobilizing mass support. Can a yearly
progress report on PUNT's leadership, organization, and activi-
ties be submitted? (C)
3. President Macias' intimate associates are
divided into a number of competing palace cliques. Can a
quarterly assessment be made as to which factions appear to
be ascendant? (C)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. The annual review of Equatorial Guinea's
relations with Communist countries is very useful. Could
this review be broadened along the same format to include
Equatorial Guinea's relations with Western nations, neighboring
African states, and international organizations such as the
United Nations and the Organization of African Unity? (C)
2. Equatorial Guinea is embroiled with Gabon
in what promises to be a long-term dispute over the owner-
ship of several tiny Atlantic Ocean islands in Corisco Bay.
Report on the progress of efforts to resolve the dispute
peacefully as developments occur. (C)
1. The existing Military Intelligence Sum-
mary (MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports
generally are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs
for Equatorial Guinea. Would it be possible to treat Equatorial
Guinea's civil police and intelligence organizations more fully
or separately? (S)
25
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
MILITARY AFFAIRS (Continued)
2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of
personnel changes in the various Equatorial Guinean security
services. Forward a quarterly listing of the heads of these
organizations. (C)
26 T
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. According to the Constitution, Crown Prince
Asfa Wossen, the Emperor's oldest and sole surviving son,
will become Emperor upon the death of Haile Selassie. Although
the Emperor has designated Asfa Wossen as his official heir to
the throne, he has given the Crown Prince little chance to
demonstrate his capacity or gain experience in governmental
affairs. Is there any evidence that this policy is changing
and that the Emperor is permitting the Crown Prince a greater
role in governmental matters? (C)
2. In succeeding to the throne, the Crown Prince
reportedly would enjoy the support of key figures in the mili-
tary, the nobility, and the church. Is there any indication
that this situation has changed? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. Would the Crown Prince continue the con-
servative policies of his father, or would he attempt to
quicken the pace of political and social reforms? Is he
interested in seeing Ethiopia become a constitutional
monarchy? (S)
4. The 10-year-old insurgency in Eritrea
grinds on with no end in sight. Is there any evidence of
resentment toward the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) among
Eritreans? Is the ELF expanding its operations, or has it
reached a peak? (S) Is the ELF making any progress in healing
its internal divisions? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
5. Has Sudanese, Yemeni, and Chinese Communist
support for the ELF been cut back? Where does the ELF get
most of its support? (S)
1. Is the Emperor interested in improving rela-
tions with the Somali Democratic Republic? (C)
2. Does the Emperor have some kind of an under-
standing with the French that they will not leave Djibouti
without first insuring that Ethiopian interests in the ter-
ritory will be preserved? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
27
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
3. During the Emperor's trip to the People's
Republic of China in October 1971, an $84 million aid agree-
ment was signed providing for agricultural development and
other projects. Is the Emperor satisfied with the implementa-
tion of the agreement? How many Chinese laborers or techni-
cians will arrive in Ethiopia as a result of the agree-
ment? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
28
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
FRENCH TERRITORY OF AFARS AND ISSAS
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. Is there any evidence that the territory
is becoming an unacceptable burden to the French because
of the continued closure of the Suez Canal? (S/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
25X6
3. Are relations still relatively peaceful
between the territory's Afar and Somali inhabitants? (S)
4. Is there any evidence that nationalist
groups, such as the Liberation Front for the Somali Coast
(supported by the Somali Democratic Republic) and the
Djibouti Liberation movement (backed by Ethiopia), are
again becoming active? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
29
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Popular dissatisfaction with the Bongo
regime is known to exist, but it is difficult for us to
gauge. Could reported signs of discontent among Gabon's
various regional, tribal, and special interests be re-
viewed annually as to their extent and seriousness? (C)
2. There are indications that some of the
Gabonese exiles who have rallied to the Bongo regime and
serve it in a diplomatic capacity retain their opposition
sentiments. We would appreciate a yearly assessment of
the subversive attitudes and activities of Bongo's former
enemies. (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
1. The annual review of Gabon's relations with
Communist countries is very useful. Could this review be
broadened along the same format to include Gabon's relations
with Western nations, neighboring African states, and inter-
national organizations such as the United Nations, European
Communities, Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the
Afro-Malagasy and Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM)? (C)
2. Gabon is among those French client states
which are seeking to revise their basic cooperation accords
with Paris. Reporting is desired as developments occur re-
garding the changes sought by Gabon and the status of nego-
tiations with France. (C)
1. The existing Military Intelligence Summary
(MIS) and Foreign Military Assistance (FOMA) reports generally
are adequate to cover our long-range reporting needs for Gabon.
Would it be possible to treat Gabon's civil police and intel-
ligence organizations more fully or separately? (S)
2. We have no reliable way to keep abreast of
personnel changes in the various Gabonese security and intel-
ligence services. If possible, provide a quarterly listing
of the heads of these organizations. (C)
31
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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ON&MONOM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
THE GAMBIA
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. For a long time, there has been much talk
of a Senegalese-Gambian union of some sort, but very little
motion in this direction. Are there any indications that
this is a serious consideration among Gambian politicians?
Are there any practical steps short of full union that might
be pursued by The Gambia? (C)
2. There is considerable smuggling of peanuts
and other items between Senegal and The Gambia. What is the
trend in this illegal trade? Are there any signs that it is
changing? What is the Gambian Government's attitude toward
smuggling, and what has it done to curtail it, if anything? (C)
3. Now that The Gambia has agreed to establish
diplomatic relations with Peking, what, if any, changes in
Gambian foreign policy might result? Report any changes in
the status of the Taiwanese agricultural and technical mission
in The Gambia and any indications of local groups maintaining
contacts with the Peking representatives. (C)
4. Since the Cabinet reshuffle to drop the Minister
of Finance, what changes in the power structure have occurred?
Are any other Cabinet-level officials in danger of being dropped?
Are any other high-level officials involved in corruption; if
so, which ones? (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. What is the decisionmaking process within
the junta that has governed Ghana since the coup in January
1972? (C)
3. Which of Acheampong"s military advisers have
the most influence? What are their political and economic
views? Are there any key figures within the civil service? (C)
4. Has the junta been gaining in experience and
confidence since taking over, despite its fears of coup plots
against it? (C)
5. What are the tribal divisions and tensions within
the army and the Government? (C)
6. What political opposition elements could become
a focus for discontent? (C)
7. What is going on at the local government
level? (C)
25X6
8. What is the role of organized labor? Report
on the unemployed and underemployed in Accra, Tema, and
Takoradi; do they have identifiable leaders who might cause
future trouble? (C)
35
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
GUINEA
1. In updating the National Intelligence Survey
on Guinea during 1972, several areas where information gaps
frequently occur were identified; they are structure and
function of government (especially at the local level) and
population, labor, health, and education statistics. Admit-
tedly, basic information on Guinea is particularly difficult
to acquire at this time, and reorganizations of political and
economic structures are frequent and often meaningless. Re-
porting in these areas in whatever detail possible would be
appreciated. (U)
2. During the 1971 purge, Toure claimed he would
decentralize the Government. Have his various reorganizations
had that effect? (C)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Provide details about Soviet improvements on
Conakry harbor carried out in connection with its Kindia
project. Is there evidence that the improvements are de-
signed also to service Soviet warships? Does Moscow want
a Soviet naval base in Conakry as rumored or more regular
use of port facilities by their navy? (S)
2. We believe Guinean police and security offi-
cials are advising the Sierra Leoneans. Provide any details.
Are Guineans involved in Sierra Leone's militia training
program? (S)
3. Provide as much detail as possible about any
new security organizations created since the 1970 attack.
Report on their lines of control, manpower, and roles. How
have the other Guinean security services reacted to any new
groups? (U)
4. Embezzlements of governmental funds, public
disclosure of widespread corruption, grumbling associated
with the currency reform, and defection of students and diplo-
matic representatives abroad are just a few signs of what ap-
pears to us to be a rather pervasive crumbling of morale in
Guinea. How significant is the malaise, and does it present
any real threat to Toure's position? Is the President held
responsible by the people for the excesses and corruption of
his subordinates? (C)
37
S
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
IVORY COAST
Under Houphouet-Boigny's paternal guidance and
in close cooperation with France, the Ivory Coast has achieved
political stability and considerable economic growth. (U)
1. Will this relatively happy situation continue
should Houphouet leave the scene? (C)
2. Who will be his likely successor, and how
will policies differ? Which potential successor appeals most
to the younger generation? (C)
3. Are there any elements within the army that
might become politically ambitious in a successive govern-
ment? (C)
4. Has the Government-sponsored student association
won significant support? (U)
5. Does the Government plan to go ahead with the
Riviera project despite criticism by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development? (C)
1. How far will Houphouet go in pursuing his
policy of dialog with the Republic of South Africa? (C)
2. Has Houphouet's displeasure with the United
States over coffee and cocoa commodity agreements caused any
change in his overall attitude toward the United States? (C)
3. With other Entente members recognizing Com-
munist regimes, is there any indication that Houphouet feels
under pressure to do the same? (S)
4. Houphouet traditionally has opposed the linking
of the francophone states with the anglophone states in economic
unions. Does he still maintain this opposition; if so, how far
would he be willing to go to keep Nigeria, Ghana, etc., out of
budding economic groups like the West African Economic Community
(CEAO)? (C)
39
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
IVORY COAST
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
5. Are there any indications that Houphouet may
be interested in renegotiating the basic accords with France
as is Niger? Is there any pressure to do so from other members
of the Government? (S)
40
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Kenya's most pressing and potentially dangerous
problem is succession. President Kenyatta is about 80. Vice
President Moi is Kenyatta's constitutional successor, at least
for 90 days. Moi is nationally known, and, as a Kalenjin (one
of a relatively unimportant minority tribe), he appears to be
tribally acceptable to most Kenyans. However, growing public
resentment over the increasing dominance of President Kenyatta's
Kikuyu establishment, with which Moi is closely associated, in-
sures a difficult period of intense political rivalry after
Kenyatta's passing. How solid is Moi's support within the
Kikuyu establishment? What support outside the establishment
can Moi count on? What are the chances that he will be able to
consolidate his position within the 90-day period during which
parliamentary elections must be held? Who are the other most
important contenders, and what are their chances? (C)
2. Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribesmen have been squab-
bling over land acquisition in the Rift Valley. How serious
is the situation? Does it have any national political implica-
tions? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. Elections scheduled last March for the Kenyan
African National Union, Kenya's only political party, were
postponed and have yet to be rescheduled. The major reason
for delay appears to be disunity among the Kikuyu. Can some
light be shed on the reasons behind the squabbling? How do
the Kikuyu split up--along northern, central, and southern
innertribal lines or along pro- and anti-Government lines--
or is there a mixture of both? Can members of the various
factions be identified? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM) How much sup-
port does J. M. Kariuki, a Kikuyu candidate for the succession
who is anathema to Kenyatta, have in Kikuyu country? (C)
4. The political rivalry expected in the 90 days
following Kenyatta's death will increase the chances of mili-
tary intervention in the political process. Would such inter-
vention occur primarily along tribal lines with officers in-
terceding on behalf of their own tribal brethren, or would of-
ficers of varying tribal backgrounds move to support a leader
who is less tribally minded than Kenyatta? (S/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
41
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ONAM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
25X6
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
6. Despite events in Uganda, President Kenyatta
is expected to maintain his policy of only very gradually
replacing noncitizen Asians with Africans. A recent study
recommended that he slow down gradual Africanization even
further, for economic reasons. Report any indications of
change in this basic policy. (C) Are Asians in Kenya suf-
ficiently upset with events in Uganda to leave Kenya volun-
tarily in appreciable numbers? (C)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Is President Kenyatta considering any change
in his cautious approach to the USSR or the People's Republic
of China? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. A period of ferment and shifting alignments
in east Africa appear to be working to the disadvantage of
Kenya and the East African Community. Should Uganda line up
with the Somali Democratic Republic, what can Amin do to make
life difficult for Kenya? Are there problems of disputed land
or split tribes along the Kenya-Uganda border that could be-
come serious? There are reportedly 300,000 Kenyan Africans
in Uganda. Is this figure correct? Where in Uganda are they,
how did they come to be there, and in what activities do they
engage? What is the mood among the 300,000 Somalis in the
northeastern corner of Kenya? Are the Kenyan Government's
programs designed to improve their lives working? Is there
much sentiment for joining the Somali Democratic Republic?
Is the three-member East African Community likely to stop
functioning in many areas? Will an effort be made to enlarge
the membership? (C)
42
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
PMP
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
The governing party in Lesotho, headed by Chief
Leabua Jonathan, is maintaining numerous ties with the Re-
public of South Africa while, at the same time, defending
itself against a radical opposition that occasionally criticizes
Jonathan's domestic program and Pretoria's racial policies.
During the 1970 elections, Chief Jonathan declared a state of
emergency and, canceling the results of the election, began to
rule by decree. The King, who supported the opposition, has been
reduced in status and now reigns only as a constitutional monarch.
Chief Jonathan is keenly aware that his country's political in-
dependence is encumbered by its desperate economic situation.
Lesotho is appallingly poor and almost totally dependent on the
Republic of South Africa for trade, transportation, services, and
a market for its surplus labor. The country's prospects for
eventually becoming self-supporting are very dim. (C)
1. What evidence is there that the delicate modus
vivendi between Jonathan on the one hand and the King and oppo-
sition party leaders on the other will continue or fall apart
in the near future? (C)
2. What are the activities, objectives, and popu-
larity of the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP)? What
are the political implications of factional conflicts within
the BCP? Does the BCP receive financial support from Commu-
nist countries? (C)
3. What are the stresses and strains, factional
strife, etc., within the ruling Basutoland National Party (BNP)?
What is the national popularity of the party and key individual
party leaders? (C)
4. Is there any evidence that the reportedly defunct
Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) plans to try a comeback? (C)
5. What is the political significance of trade unions
and other urban groups? What is their political allegiance? Are
they well organized? (C)
6. How competent and loyal are the Basotho Police?
To what extent are they tied to Chief Jonathan or to the South
Africans? (C)
43
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
7. Continue reporting on Basotho attitudes toward
regional cooperation, especially regarding the devolution of
the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. (U)
1. What are the significant trends in Lesotho's
relations with the Republic of South Africa? What is Lesotho's
policy on dialog with Pretoria, and what is the impact of this
policy on relations with white and black African states? (C)
2. What are the significant trends and developments
in Lesotho's relations with the United Kingdom? (C)
3. Is Lesotho being used as a haven and way station
for South African subversives? How much material and money pass
through the territory, and who are the sources and end users in
South Africa? (S)
4. How much cooperation is there between South
African and Basotho security and police agencies? How much
clandestine South African police and intelligence activity is
there in Lesotho? (C)
5. Continue reporting on negotiations with South
Africa on the Malibamatso Dam project. (U)
44
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Immediately following his succession to
the Presidency, William R. Tolbert vowed to continue his
predecessor's "unification" policy. Under Tubman, much
was made of this policy, but there seemed to be few specific
programs. Is Tolbert's vow mere propaganda, or has he inau-
gurated any programs to achieve this end? What are they? (U)
2. Information is needed on the operation of
local government. Is it responsive to the needs of tribal
people or just an instrument of control by the elite in
Monrovia? How does the county superintendent system work?
What is the source of its local budget? What is the process
by which directives from Monrovia are transmitted? How do
paramount chiefs fit into the local system? What is their
relationship to the superintendent and to the Central Gov-
ernment? What is the attitude of tribal people toward the
county superintendent system? How does the local court
system operate? (U)
3. Liberia's only national census was taken
in 1962. Are other more recent population figures avail-
able? Even partial surveys would be useful. (U)
25X1 X
4. How viable is the organization of the True
Whig Party within the various counties? Is there anything
like a local party organization? What changes has Tolbert
made to bring the party under personal control? (U)
Has Tolbert been as effective as Tubman in balancing the key
families? What is the current political status of the Tubman
family itself? Which families are currently in the ascendancy?
Are any of the key families at serious odds with the Tolberts
and their important allies? (C)
6. Periodic reports on the current status and
attitudes of the Americo-Liberian elite would be most use-
ful. (C)
45
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. The planned merger with the Arab Republic of
Egypt will presumably alter the governmental structure of Libya,
which has remained fairly stable since the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) seized power. Do individual members of the RCC
feel that their positions are threatened by the prospective
union? What role does President Qadhafi envision for himself
in the union scheme? Has Qadhafi tried to impose his ideas on
the joint Egyptian-Libyan committee which is planning the in-
stitutional structure of the prospective union? (C)
2. The planned union with Egypt has opened up
Libya still more to an invasion of Egyptian advisers and job-
seekers, now reported to number anywhere from 50,000 to 200,000.
How many Egyptians are there in Libya? How are they integrated
into the Libyan military? Are the Egyptian advisers in the
Libyan Government directly subordinate to Libyan superiors,
or do they remain essentially responsible to their own govern-
ment? (S)
3. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has
made many promises to ameliorate the lot of the Libyans and
has sought many bids on projects that should ultimately improve
Libyan conditions. How much improvement is there in working
conditions, living conditions, medical assistance, and educa-
tion; how has the change--or lack of it--influenced popular
attitudes toward the RCC regime? (C)
4. The Libyan military is the principal prop of
the RCC and presumably has some influence over the regime's
policies. What is the military's attitude toward union with
Egypt, and how do Libyan officers regard the influx of Egyptian
advisers into the military? Which RCC members have influence
within the military? (S)
1. In the last several months, President Qadhafi
has placed major emphasis on the fedayeen as the primary com-
batant against Israel. Does he now feel-that the occupied
territories and the Palestinian cause are separate issues to
be solved separately, or is he convinced that the inability of
Arab governments to join in the "battle of destiny" leaves the
fedayeen as the only hope in the struggle against Israel? (S)
47
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
LIBYA
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
2. President Qadhafi publicly is maintaining his
vehement anticommunism, but he recently has demonstrated a
greater willingness to trade with the USSR and has shown some
initial interest in establishing relations with China. Has
Qadhafi's disillusionment with Western attitudes toward the
Arab-Israel conflict caused him to soften his position toward
Communist countries, or has the recent detente between East and
West brought about a change in the Libyan concept of nonalign-
ment? Has Egypt played any role in changing the Libyan atti-
tude toward the USSR? (S)
3. Libya continues to pursue its policy of sup-
porting Muslim regimes and aiding Muslim insurgencies, despite
Egyptian reluctance to go along with such ventures as the mili-
tary airlift to Ugandan President Idi Amin. Will President
Qadhafi be willing to compromise on such policies in the event
that union with Egypt is achieved? How much influence does
Qadhafi have over Sadat in the area of foreign policy? (S)
48
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. The student-teacher-worker-unemployed youth
coalition is the best organized pressure group on the island.
How is it organized? Who are its leaders? What policies
have its strongest support? What differences exist within
and among its component groups? Is there a core of radical
manipulators within the coalition? What is the status of
student-teacher-worker support for the Government? (C)
2. Outward popular support for General Ramanantsoa
was shown by the overwhelming vote giving him a 5-year man-
date. How solid is this support, especially in the various
provinces and among cottiers? What role will political parties
play in politics? (U)
3. Ramanantsoa has committed the Government to
significant changes in Malagasy society. Which reforms have
priority? Does the Government have the capacity to carry out
the various proposed reforms? (C)
4. The military-civilian government maintains an
outward show of unity. What conflicts and personality clashes
are evident within the hierarchy? Is there serious jockeying
for position? How are decisions made within the Council of
Ministers? Which ministers have the most influence? How
strong is the Central Government's control over the provincial
and local government organs? (C)
1. Foreign Minister Ratsiraka has initiated a
bold redirection of foreign policy. Are his actions fully
supported by other members of the Government, especially
Ramanantsoa? What additional openings toward Communist coun-
tries are likely? What specific measures are being taken to
strengthen relations with African countries? What considera-
tions motivate changes in foreign policy? (S)
2. The Government is preparing to seek revisions
in the cooperation agreements with France. What is the status
of the Government's proposals? In what direction are French-
Malagasy relations evolving? What is the level of French in-
fluence on the Government? (C)
49
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MILITARY AFFAIRS
1.
What
changes in the organization of the security
services are
being
carried out by the Ramanantsoa government?
How competent
are
the forces, and what is their manpower levels?
How loyal are
they
to the Government? How many French advisers
remain? Do they have command responsibilities? (C)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL, AFFAIRS
1. Probably the most important long-term
question regarding Malawi is that of President Banda's
eventual successor. Banda's personal style of governing
has precluded the development of potential successors.
Are there any indications that any individual is attempting
to set himself up as a possible successor or that any group
within the Government is considering a possible successor?
Is any person or group, such as the army, making plans con-
tingent on Banda's demise? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
1. Several of Banda's diplomatic overtures
during the latter part of 1972 apparently were intended
to offset his reputation for collaboration with the white
regimes in southern Africa and also to lessen his actual
dependence on the Republic of South Africa. Among such
overtures were an agreement with the United Kingdom in July
1972 for increased military assistance, several pronounce-
ments emphasizing the thawing in Malawi's relations with
Tanzania and Zambia, and Banda's hosting of the October 1972
meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association--
particularly his carefully tempered explanations of his
"dialog" with South Africa. Are there further indications
that Banda is attempting to maintain a genuinely evenhanded
policy despite Malawi's economic dependence on South Africa
and Mozambique? Most significant would be indications of how
Banda intends to cope with the conflicting pressures involved
in such a policy, especially any shifts in his dealings with
Mozambique nationalists. (S)
51
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
1.5 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. What contacts exist between labor and leftwing
students and teachers? What is the likelihood that they could
or would combine into an effective opposition to continued mili-
tary rule? (C)
1. The area of greatest interest over the long
term is Franco-Malian relations, specifically the willingness
of Paris to continue its financing of the Malian Government.
How is this support translated into French leverage on the
Malian Government, and in what political areas do the French
seek to exercise this leverage? (C)
2. Communist Chinese activities in Mali also
are of interest, particularly with regard to the Manantali
Dam. How many Chinese technicians in Mali are connected with
the dam, and how serious is Peking about financing the proj-
ect? (S)
1. In addition to our interest in signs of dis-
unity within the army, we would appreciate continued reporting
on the specific command responsibilities of members of the Mili-
tary Committee of National Liberation (MCNL), particularly iden-
tification of those who retain command of combat troops. (C)
53
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MAURITANIA
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. The ruling Mauritanian People's Party (PPM) is
preparing to integrate the national labor organization into
its ranks. What is the level of union opposition to this
move? (C)
2. President Ould Daddah's regime has experienced
serious student dissent. Is the regime taking action to pre-
vent the further alienation of its youth? (U)
3. As in most African countries, Mauritania's
leaders are attempting to develop a national consciousness
.among the people, above local and tribal loyalties. How suc-
cessful have they been so far? How effective is the PPM as a
mechanism for developing national loyalties? How potent are
local and tribal loyalties as factors in politics? (U)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. The Chinese have extended substantial aid to
Mauritania. Is Chinese assistance increasing or diminishing?
Is the Government satisfied with the Chinese activities? (S)
2. The Government is preparing to revise the co-
operation agreements with France. What specific changes will
be made? In what other respects are relations with France
evolving? What other changes in foreign policy are being
carried out? (C)
55
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MAURITIUS
1. Emergency powers invoked in December 1971 per-
mitted the Government to proscribe the Mauritian Militant
Movement (MMM). What resources does the MMM have on which
to base a comeback if the emergency is lifted? (C)
2. The coalition government recognizes its un-
popularity and is manipulating the electoral system and con-
sidering constitutional changes in an attempt to preserve its
position. What specific proposals are under consideration?
What dissident elements are likely to oppose the Government
on these policies? How much unity is there among the coali-
tion parties? What changes are likely if Finance Minister
Ringadoo replaces Prime Minister Ramgoolam? (C)
3. Wage increases have not ended completely labor
unrest. Which labor organizations are most dissatisfied, and
what are their demands? What are the other major sources of
discontent with governmental policies? (C)
1. A Chinese Ambassador arrived in late 1972,
and negotiations are continuing with the Chinese on the im-
plementation of the Chinese aid program. What differences are
there between the two sides? How much contact is there between
the Chinese Embassy and the local Chinese community? (S)
2. What are the activities of the Soviet Embassy
staff, and which Mauritian politicians are in frequent con-
tact with the Embassy? What liaison is maintained with stu-
dents who have returned from the USSR, and what roles are the
returnees playing in politics and in the administration of the
Government? (S)
3. The Government is not entirely satisfied with
British aid. What policies are in dispute? (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
A second attempt at regicide on 16 August 1972 on
the part of the Armed Forces has pointed up the fragility of
King Hassan's base of support. (C)
1. What policies does the King plan to pursue?
Does he plan to hold elections within the near future? Who
are his principal collaborators? How does he plan to overcome
the antipathy of the armed services? (C)
2. What is the numerical strength of the various
political parties and groups? Where does their strength lie?
Who are the second echelon leaders? What programs of action
do they have? (C)
3. What is the status of the Regency Council? (C)
4. Is the King's brother, Moulay Abdallah, at-
tempting to establish a power base of his own? What are the
potential sources of support for Abdallah? Is he likely to
attempt to usurp power? (C)
Although Morocco has apparently abandoned, or
at least shelved, its claims to southwestern Algeria and
Mauritania, it still covets Spanish Sahara. (U)
1. How are relations with Spain evolving vis-a-
vis Morocco's claims to Spanish Sahara? Has a deal been worked
out with Mauritania for a division of the Spanish Sahara? (S)
2. What steps, if any, are being taken to de-
marcate the Algeria-Morocco border in the northern Sahara? (S)
3. How are Morocco's relations with France, the
United States, and the USSR evolving? (S)
With the death of General Oufkir and the assump-
tion of direct control by the King, a completely revamped
military organization is expected to emerge. (C)
59
S E C R E T
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MILITARY AFFAIRS (Continued)
1. How are the military forces being reorgan-
2. What are the ethnic backgrounds of officers
of field-grade level? To what tribes or extended families
do they belong? What cliques are developing among the of-
ficers? (S)
3. How politically active are the officers who
have retired since 16 August? What controls are maintained
over them, or what surveillance is conducted over their
activities? (C)
4. Provide information on any contacts and/or
affinity between Moroccan officers and their counterparts in
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and the Arab Republic of Egypt. (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MOZAMBIQUE
We appreciate the high level of current reporting
maintained in spite of the difficulties in obtaining accurate
information. (C)
1. What are the plans, sources of aid, size
of membership and field strength, and rivalries within the
Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO)? (C)
2. How strong is support within FRELIMO for
President Samora Machel? Do any factions in FRELIMO prefer
other leaders, such as Vice President Marcelino dos Santos? (C)
3. How much area and population does FRELIMO
influence or control? What is the attitude of the local
population in such areas? What tribal groups cooperate with
or oppose FRELIMO in the Tete District? (C)
4. How much and what kinds of assistance per
annum are Moscow and Peking giving FRELIMO? (C)
5. The implementing statute that defines
Mozambique's relationship with Lisbon should be promulgated
in early 1973. Does the statute alter in any way Lisbon's
fundamental control of Mozambique's affairs? Does it provide
for decentralization of administrative and financial decision-
making without altering the basic political relationship? Are
officials in Mozambique taking advantage of the statute to
foster greater local responsibility? (C)
6. How are local administrations implementing
Lisbon's policies aimed at improving the lot of Africans?
What is the status of the expanded social, educational, and
economic programs for the Africans? (C)
25X6
1. Has Lusaka taken any steps to restrict
nationalist activities in view of Portuguese political lever-
age that threatens the use of access routes vital to the
Zambian economy? If so, how are such restrictions enforced? (S)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
MOZAMBIQUE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)
25X6
3. What is the extent of cooperation with Rhodesia
and the Republic of South Africa? How much support have these
countries furnished for the Portuguese counterinsurgency ef-
fort? (S)
62
S E C R E T
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
President Diori, a capable and moderate leader,
heads a single-party state; there is no significant opposition
to his rule. (U)
1. How much dissatisfaction with the regime exists
among the young educated Niger elite? Is the Government still
capable of absorbing a number of them upon graduation? Has the
recent addition of several younger men to the Cabinet made any
difference in policymaking? (C)
2. What is the relationship between the party
hierarchy, the administrative authorities, and the traditional
aristocracy? (C)
3. What is the status of Hausa discontent with
Djerma dominance? (C)
1. Are there any politically ambitious officers
within the army? (C)
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S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. What procedures have been initiated for
taking the census scheduled for 1973? (U)
2. What reorganization and reequipment programs
are taking place in the army? Do any of the three division
commanders have political ambitions? (S)
3. What will be the long-range effect of local
government changes, especially in the north and east? (C)
4. What new leadership is emerging in the north
and east? (C)
5. What political alignments are shaping up
within the six northern states, between the north and east,
and in the west? (C)
6. What politicians are going after a national
constituency? (C)
7. What is the organization and plans of the
ex-Action Group? (C)
8. Continue reporting on the efforts of top civil
servants, commissioners, and/or military officers to establish
or retain political bases for themselves in anticipation of a
possible return to civilian government. (C)
9. What kind of Constitution is under consideration?
How will it settle the key question of Federal-state relations
and the allocation of revenues? (C)
10. What further measures reflecting economic
nationalism can be expected in domestic policy? (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Amilcar Cabral has often referred to his plans
for establishing a representative government on Portuguese
Guinean soil. Provide any details as to timing procedure,
and evidence of the possibility that such a proclamation
would be accompanied by dramatic military action. (S)
3. It is most difficult to measure the claims
of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese
Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) and the Portuguese
with respect to the military situation because of the lack
of direct third-party observation. We, therefore, would
like as much reporting on the fighting as possible; which
side has the initiative and how much, what parts of the
province are under rebel administration, and has the mili-
tary effort by the rebels weakened during the past 2 or 3
years? (S)
4. It appears to us that, in effect, General
Spinola is transforming the rebellion into a civil war
by successfully exploiting the longstanding animosities
between Portuguese Guinea's Muslim and animist tribes.
General Spinola's increased reliance on black African
troops is also a subject of interest. How many African
troops are being used in Portuguese Guinea--in what areas?
What is their effectiveness? (S)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Some observers believe that the Rhodesians
probably are more disposed to a settlement now because of
economic problems--foreign exchange shortage, declining
mineral prices, growing African unemployment, and the drain
on Rhodesia's reservoir of skilled technicians and managers.
How severe are these problems, and how serious does the Smith
government consider them? (S)
2. In late 1972, there were various indications
that the Smith government was increasingly concerned over
long-range threats to its security posed by the Mozambique
National Liberation Front (FRELIMO). White Rhodesians ap-
parently fear that FRELIMO guerrillas may be growing strong
enough to lend significant support to black Rhodesian na-
tionalists by opening new infiltration routes along the
Mozambique-Rhodesia border or by eventually attacking the
rail and road routes from Umtali, Rhodesia, to the port of
Beira on the Indian Ocean. Prime Minister Smith has re-
sponded to these fears in two apparently conflicting ways.
First, he has made such militant gestures as threatening
reprisal against Zambia for harboring black Rhodesian ter-
rorists and proffering closer collaboration with the Portu-
guese authorities in Mozambique. Second, he reportedly told
a closed session of the Rhodesian Front party congress that
long-range security problems make it imperative for white
Rhodesians to reach a settlement with the United Kingdom and
also to refrain from provoking black Rhodesians who are not
yet revolutionists. How is Smith attempting to resolve the
conflicting pressures to lash back at black nationalists or
to come to terms with those who are not yet revolutionists?
Are there further indications that the FRELIMO threat is
pushing Smith toward a settlement with the United Kingdom
or toward measures which would preclude a settlement? What
are the indications that white Rhodesians approve or disap-
prove of Smith's responses to the FRELIMO threat? (C)
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WEAMM
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Although Gregoire Kayibanda has been President
since October 1961, he remains a shadowy figure both as an
individual and a head of state. What are Kayibanda's personal
characteristics and motivations? What are his relations with
the men around him? Who holds his confidence and influences
him? Does he have any political opposition within the Parti
du Mouvement de 1'Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU)? (S/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
2. Are there any signs of unrest within Rwanda's
political or social institutions because of President Kayibanda's
long tenure? (C)
1. Rwanda's relations with the Republic of
Burundi and Uganda have been severely strained since late
summer 1972. What actions is the Government likely to take
to ease relations? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. What is the Government planning to do in order
to foster improved relations with Zaire? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. What, if anything, is the Government doing to
insure that the Chinese do not become involved in internal
politics in Rwanda? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
71
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
SENEGAL
1. Are there any nascent groups of young civil
servants likely to become politically powerful in the near
future? If so, who would be the leaders of such groups, and
what would be the groups' goals? If not, what factors inhibit
the formation of such groups, and what power base do they rely
on? (C)
2. Are there any groups capable of or interested
in staging a coup? Who are the leaders of such groups, and
what is their present status? What is the present status of
the various outlawed dissident groups such as the Provisional
Student Committee, the Committee for Prolonged Revolutionary
Action, and the African Independence Party? (C)
3. How much of a threat is posed by student dis-
sidence at the University of Dakar and Senegal's lycees to
the Senghor regime? (C)
4. Who would be likely to take power if President
Senghor were to die in office, retire, or be assassinated? (C)
5. How important is Prime Minister Diouf within
the Government? Are any Cabinet members or high-level offi-
cials more loyal to him than to Senghor? (S)
6. How successful has President Senghor been in
revitalizing the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) by ex-
panding membership, strengthening organization, and finding
competent leaders? (C)
7. What is likely to be the future role of the
Muslim brotherhoods in Senegalese politics? What trends
toward progressive politics or antiregime politics within
the brotherhoods are evident? Which marabouts, if any, might
be likely to establish a political force outside the present
structure? Are the Muslim leaders likely to cause Senghor
trouble in the upcoming elections; if so, how? (C)
8. Is foreign aid and investment likely to
increase, stabilize at present levels, or decrease during
the next decade? What will be the effect on the economy in
the event either aid or investment decreases, and what plans,
if any, has the Government taken to meet this contingency? (U)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
9. What is the forecast for continued rural
migration to the urban areas; is it likely to increase,
stabilize at current levels, or decrease? What, if any,
are the Government's plans for slowing such migration? (U)
1. Senegal recently has recognized several Com-
munist governments, and Senghor has taken an active role in
pushing the recognition of Prince Sihanouk's government-in-
exile in the United Nations and with other African states.
To what extent do these activities indicate a change or
reorientation of Senegal's foreign policy? (S)
2. Are there any indications that Senghor may
be interested in renegotiating the basic accords with France
as is Niger. Is there any pressure to do so from other mem-
bers of the Government? (S)
3. As President of the Afro-Malagasy and Mauri-
tian Common Organization (OCAM), Senghor frequently has ex-
pressed his desire to see the anglophone states join the
francophone states in some form of economic grouping. How
committed to this policy is Senghor, given some French re-
sistance? What is he actively doing to bring such a group-
ing about? (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Although President Stevens' position seems
stronger now than in early 1971, it appears to be based in-
creasingly on force of arms rather than public support. Has
he made any progress in building the All People's Congress
(APC) party into a nationwide political instrument? What
inroads have been made in the south, the traditional strong-
hold of the opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)?
Does the APC have a viable local party organization anywhere
in the country? Is the idea of a Temne-based rival party
dead? (C)
2. What are the political views of Battalion
Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tarawalli? Is he loyal to
Colonel Momoh and Stevens, and does he seem to possess the
leadership and personal qualities required to lead a coup?
How is he regarded by the rank and file? (C)
3. Periodic reporting on the "People's Militia,"
which totaled some 300 members in early October 1971, and
on the special Internal Security Unit (ISU) would be useful.
What is the size and effectiveness of each force, and how
are they regarded by the regular army? (C)
4. It appears to us that President Stevens
wants a one-party state system, despite his denials. Do
you see a pattern developing as to how he will achieve his
aim? Who within the APC is pushing hardest for a one-party
state, and who will oppose? Will there be anything like a
Creole position? (C)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af--1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. The military government continues to be
marked by heavily veiled plotting, rivalries, and political
maneuvering. President Siad, however, appears to have tight-
ened his grip on the Government. How secure is General Siad's
position? To what extent does he exercise authority over the
ruling Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC)? (C)
2. Vice President Samantar appears to have
been stripped of much of his powers. What is his role in
the SRC? (C) Is he able to challenge Siad? (S)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. An aid pact signed with the People's Re-
public of China provides for several projects and the in-
troduction of up to 15,000 Chinese laborers and technicians
to work on the projects. How many laborers and technicians
have arrived? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. Have the Soviets been able to maintain their
considerable influence with the military government? (S) Is
Chinese influence growing at the expense of the Soviets? (S/NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. What was discussed by General Siad and Ethio-
pian Emperor Haile Sellassie during the June 1972 meeting and
any subsequent meetings? What is the personal relationship
between the two leaders? What is the state of relations be-
tween the Somali Democratic Republic and Ethiopia? (C)
77
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. How much does Vorster involve himself in
policy and decisionmaking at the ministerial level? Who
are his key advisers, and do they change depending upon the
topic under consideration? Who are Vorster's closest as-
sociates, and who are his friends? (C)
2. What following does Vorster and his clique
have within the National Party? If a referendum were held
soon, what percentage of the party would remain faithful to
Vorster? What pressures and incentives does Vorster utilize
to get party leaders to follow his bidding? (C)
3. How is Vorster's health? We had reports
several years ago that he suffers from low blood pressure.
Does he intend to stay on as Prime minister until removed
by ill health or death? (C)
4. Are relations between the intelligence services,
the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), the Security Branch (SB)
of the South African Police, and the Military Intelligence Unit
(MI), improving since their low point in 1969-70? Are there
signs that the principal individuals commanding these services
have overcome their personal animosity, or are relations main-
tained on bureaucratic levels only? (S)
5. Do the black militant groups have any plans
to get into political action? How large and how militant
is the hard core of these groups? (U)
6. What has happened to the Herstigte National
Party (HNP)? How large is its following, what is its financial
status, and what is its expected lifespan? (C)
7. Report on progress of the Bantustans, and
especially note any boundary changes, new administrative
changes, and major inputs of money and administrative talent
by the South African Government. (C)
8. Are there signs of rivalry or personal
jealousy among the top Bantustan leaders? We are thinking
primarily of Buthelezi, Matanzima, and Mangope? Do any (or
all) harbor desires to become the sole spokesman for all non-
whites in South Africa? (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
9. What are the white students thinking? Are
there signs that this group is being swayed by the worldwide
student militant movement? Is there much significant dif-
ference between Afrikaner and English students? (U)
10. We see once-a-year signs that the African
National Congress (ANC) still exists in South Africa as
an underground movement, but we have seen nothing to indi-
cate that the Pan-African Congress (PAC) still exists. Does
it? What is your estimate of the size and capabilities of
the ANC and PAC undergrounds? Do they have much contact
with their respective exile groups? (C)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. What is the Government's attitude toward
the united Nations (UN) and the importance of maintaining
UN membership, particularly since the expulsion of Taiwan? (U)
2. What is the extent of cooperation (mili-
tary and intelligence) between South Africa, Rhodesia, and
Portugal? (S)
3. What kind of assistance is South Africa
willing to grant to black African states in return for
recognition? What would be in it for South Africa, aside
from gaining international status? (C)
4. How is the United Kingdom's move into the
European Common Market going to affect relations with South
Africa? Report on all indications of new arms and equipment
deals with South Africa? (C)
5. Report on French arms and equipment deals
with South Africa. (C)
'Aw
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S E C R E T
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
1. What does the Republic of South Africa have
in terms of a military presence in the Caprivi Strip--how
much equipment and arms and how many camps and men? How
often do they go on patrols, and where? (S)
2. What is the South African Government's
assessment of the present signs of black discontent in
South-West Africa? Is the level of discontent really on
the increase, or is there simply an increase in the reporting
from South-West Africa following the June 1971 International
Court of Justice (ICJ) decision and accompanying increased
-international awareness of the area? Is it possible that
dissident groups have not really changed their attitude much
but are acting up more at this time to take advantage of
this increased international awareness? (C)
3. As in the Republic of South Africa, we some-
times find ourselves out of date with regard to Bantustan
development. What advances are being made? What incentives
is the South African Government offering to get the nonwhites
to move into the Bantustans? Are there any good maps showing
Bantustan boundaries? (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Little information is available on the internal
politics of the Spanish-administered areas. (U)
1. Who is the ranking Spanish administrator?
How large an administrative organization assists him? What
advisory councils or bodies are employed? How are they
selected, what are their functions, and how extensive is
their influence? (C)
2. What police or security forces are employed?
Who are their commanders? How large are the forces? (S)
3. What opposition or subversive organizations
exist in Spanish Sahara? Who are the leaders, and what is
their tribal affiliation? What is the source and the amount
of any foreign assistance? (S)
4. What are Spain's policies relative to the
travel of foreigners to Spanish Sahara? (S)
5. What are Spain's policies regarding self-
government for any of these areas? (C)
1. How large a military establishment is
maintained in each area? Who are the commanding officers?
To whom (or what) is each subordinate? (S)
2. In Spanish Sahara, are the natives conscripted?
If so, what is the duration of such service? What type of
training is given? (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. What changes has the revolutionary government
imposed on the structure of the Central Government? Are the
ministries still organized according to the British pattern?
Assess the competence and morale of the civil service. How
do the duties and responsibilities of a minister of state
differ from those of a Cabinet minister? List the republican
orders and decrees under which the Government operates. Inter-
pretive reporting will be needed on the permanent Constitution
and the National Charter which are expected to be promulgated
in 1973. What role will the newly formed Sudan Socialist
Union play, if any, in the formulation of policy? (C)
1. Since the July 1971 coup, Numayri has placed less
public emphasis on Sudan's commitment to the Arab fight with
Israel and has tried to reestablish Sudan's African credentials.
To what extent will Numayri cooperate with Ethiopia, Uganda,
Chad, and Zaire in removing irritants in relations? Is Numayri
prepared to take measures to deny Sudanese territory for use as
a safe haven to rebels from neighboring countries? To what
extent will Sudan become immersed in sub-Saharan problems? (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
Swaziland became independent from the United
Kingdom on 6 September 1968, Power is firmly in the hands
of the country's traditional rulers, who govern through the
Imbokodvo political movement and the traditional Swazi National
Council. The ruling oligarchy is opposed by some ineffectually
led urban groups. Nevertheless, there are potential challenges
to the present rulers, notably from modernists and educated
youth within the Imbokodvo itself. A difficult, but not in-
surmountable, challenge for the ruling group will be to main-
tain its power in the face of increasing modernization in the
economy and in the political life of the country, while at the
same time providing the kind of administration which will foster
progress in the country's potentially viable economy. (C)
1. Who are the principle advisers and confidants
of the ruler, King Sobhuza II? How much does he rely on the
small informal privy council for advice? Is the king becoming
more involved in the constitutional affairs of state as opposed
to "Swazi Nation" affairs? (S)
2. How much contact or cooperation is there between
the whites and the ruling Swazi traditionalists? (C)
3. Will Swaziland become a one-party state? What
is the status of the small nationalist parties? What is likely
to happen to them if the Government adopts a single-party
system? To what degree has the organization and activities
of the primary opposition, the Ngwane National Liberatory
Congress (NNLC), been maintained despite the imprisonment,
exile, or defection to the Imbokodovo of many of its leaders?
What assistance does the NNLC receive from non-Swazi sources,
Communist, or radical African states? (C)
4. How much is Swaziland used as a haven and
way station for South African political refugees? What gov-
ernmental restrictions are there on the activities of refugees?
What assistance do other African states give these groups? (S)
5. What conflicts and maneuvers for power are
going on between modernist and traditionalist elements within
the Imbokodvo? How successful has the Imbokodvo been in win-
ning the allegiance of trade unions, civil servants, teachers,
students, etc.? (S)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
6. Is there any maneuvering among potential
successors to King Sobhuza II? Is there any desire among
politically significant groups to reduce the political
powers of future kings? (C)
7. What conflicts are there between the Swazi
National Council and the Imbokodvo government? (C)
8. What are the implications and likely con-
sequences of basic policy shifts in land tenure, mineral
rights, etc.? (C)
9. What is the personal prestige of Prime
Minister Makhosini Dlamini? Who are his possible suc-
cessors? (C)
10. What are the significant activities of
Simon Sishayi Nxumalo, Minister of Industry, Mines, and
Tourism? Is there any loosening of his close relationship
with the Prime Minister? (C)
11. Continue reporting on Swazi attitudes toward
regional cooperation, especially with regard to such institu-
tions as the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland
and the Regional Testing Center. (U)
1. What contacts are there between the Swazi
ruling elements and other black African states? What is
the status of the Swaziland Government's relations with the
Governments of the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique?
To what degree does Swaziland try to limit its relations with
its white-ruled neighbors? (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. The Peoples Militia apparently has not turned
out to be the serious rival to the army that many observers
feared. We would still like to be kept informed of its
activities, particularly if the Chinese become involved in its
training program. (S)
2. We would appreciate continued reporting on the
Ujamaa village program and Nyerere's decentralization program.
Has there been any progress in the implementation of Nyerere's
educational ideas? Have there been any significant changes
at the University of Dar es Salaam--a school Nyerere once,
in effect, accused of breeding elitist attitudes? (C)
3. In the wake of Amin's expulsion of the Asian
community from Uganda, have Tanzania's remaining Asians become
more restive? Do the Asians still control any significant
portion of the economy other than perhaps the retail trade?
How many Asians are still in Tanzania? How badly have serv-
ices and the economy, in general, deteriorated since the
1971 exodus? (C)
4. Many mainlanders seemed to have admired Karume
despite his crude ways. How do they feel about his successor,
Aboud Jumbe? Who would you say are Jumbe's main associates?
What has become of Himidi? (S)
1. How deeply committed do you think Nyerere
remains to the East African Community? (C)
2. How much and what kinds of assistance per
annum are Moscow and Peking giving the Mozambique National
Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA)? (C)
89
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
President Brigadier General Eyadema, who seized
power in a coup in April 1967, heads a single-party state
in which the military wield power. (C)
1. What steps has Eyadema taken to consolidate
his power? (C)
2. Has there been any real movement toward
constitutionalization of the regime? (C)
3. Are there ambitious military officers who
would like to oust Eyadema? Are there any other potential
challenges to Eyadema's control of the party? (S)
4, What political influence will student radi-
cals have in the foreseeable future? (C)
5. Will growing resentment against foreign small
traders eventually lead to their expulsion? (C)
6. Has Eyadema had any success in winning southern-
ers to his side? (C)
1. Now that Togo has recognized Peking, can any
changes be expected in Togolese foreign policy; if so, in
which direction? Which Government officials are pro-Chinese,
if any? (C)
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S E C R E T
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
As the Tunisian Government and the Destourian
Socialist Party (PSD) prepare for the inevitable post-
Bourguiba period, there is considerable jockeying for
position among the rival factions and personalities. The
1971 PSD congress showed that there is strong popular
support for a more democratic and less authoritarian system,
although there was a consensus for retaining a strong
Presidency. Meanwhile, President Bourguiba still is
very much in command, despite failing health and strength.
Prime Minister Nouira may also be moving toward liberalizing
the regime. (C)
1. What changes are being made in governmental
and party procedures toward more democratic systems? How
are these changes effected? (C)
2. How much power has President Bourguiba
delegated to Prime Minister Nouira? What, if any, elements
are attempting to undermine the Prime Minister? What is the
Prime Minister's relationship with the more prominent liberals,
such as Bahi Ladgham, Ahmed Mestiri, and Hassib ben Ammar?
Where does the President's wife, Wassila Bourguiba (Ben
Ammar), fit into the political picture? (S)
3. What is the political complexion of each
minister, his relative standing within the contending factions,
his relationship with Prime Minister Nouira, and the extent and
source of his political influence? (C)
4. Nouira has told the US Ambassador that a consti-
tutional amendment increasing the powers of the National As-
sembly will be submitted to the assembly in late 1972. What
is the status of the other amendments drafted in 1970, sub-
mitted to the National Assembly in February 1971, and con-
sidered by the PSD congress? (C)
5. How are the factions within the National
Assembly aligned? What issues are brought before the as-
sembly? (C)
6. How are the factions evolving within the PSD?
Who are the 26 regional representatives to the Central
Committee; how and when are they selected? Has Mestiri's
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
position been strengthened or diminished by the sending of a
letter to President Bourguiba advocating implementation of
the reforms approved by the PSD congress? What other actions
will he take to further the reformists' cause? (C)
7. How active politically is Bahi Ladgham? What
are his political resources? Is he likely to make a bid for
power when Bourguiba dies or in 1974? (S)
8. What dissident Tunisian organizations exist?
Who are their leaders, how much support do they have within
Tunisia, and how are they financed? (S)
9. What changes.are being made in the police and
security forces? Who are the responsible officials? What is
their political complexion? (S)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. How are relations with Algeria evolving? (C)
2. How are relations with Libya developing? (C)
3. What are Foreign Minister Masmoudi's plans for
securing Tunisian and other Arab states' participation in the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? (C)
1. In the event of a struggle for power between
contending political factions, how would the military forces
be aligned? (S)
2. How are the Armed Forces being reorganized? (S)
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.NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. General Amin ousted ex-President Obote in
January 1971. Since then, Amin has made vague statements
about elections and a return to a civilian government. What
are Amin's intentions with respect to a return to a civilian
rule? Under what conditions would he agree to hold elec-
tions? (C)
2. Amin continues to travel widely over the coun-
try talking to various tribal groups and leaders. How strong
is Amin's grassroots support? Are there any signs of dis-
enchantment with his failure to remain in the capital and
seriously attempt to resolve the country's many problems? (S)
3. Amin raised and then dashed the hopes of the
Baganda, Uganda's largest tribe, that their traditional king-
dom would be restored. Is there any evidence of significant
Baganda resentment or opposition to Amin as a result of his
actions? (S)
4. General Amin has surrounded himself with a
number of military colleagues who appear to have considerable
influence with him. The Defense Council is one of the groups
on which Amin relies. Who are the members of this group,
what is the extent of their influence, and what is their
role in forming domestic and foreign policy? (S/NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
5. Uganda's normally conservative students have
disagreed openly with Amin on some important issues. He has
responded by banning the leading student organization and
announcing that students will undergo military training and
that army and police officers will supervise student organi-
zation elections. Is there any evidence of organized stu-
dent opposition to the regime? (C) If so, who are the
leaders of this opposition? (S)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Amin has developed closer ties with the USSR,
the People's Republic of China, and other Communist countries.
Is there any indication that his moves are more than just an
effort to seek badly needed aid and additional markets for
Ugandan agricultural exports? (S)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
2. Deteriorating relations between Uganda and
Tanzania have strained the East African Community and given
rise to rumors that Amin is seeking closer ties to Zaire,
the Somali Democratic Republic, and other African countries.
Is there any evidence that Amin is attempting to establish
such ties? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. Amin has developed close relations with the
Arab world. Does he intend to emphasize Uganda's Arab ties
at the expense of its position in Africa? What is the nature
of domestic reaction to Amin's pro-Arab moves? (C)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
Upper Volta will have a transitional government
for the next 3 years, headed by General Lamizana, in which
military officers will hold one-third of the Cabinet posts. (U)
1. Are there younger army elements who have
acquired a taste for the perquisites and exercise of political
power and might be tempted to move against Lamizana? (C)
2. Are there radical elements within the army? (C)
3. How important will the new National Assembly
4. Are economic grievances such that they can
be expected to spark serious strikes over the next few years? (C)
5. Will Upper Voltan political affiliations con-
tinue to be tribally and geographically based for the foreseeable
future? (C)
6. Has Gerard Kango Ouedraogo's program of social
reform generated opposition from traditional leaders? (C)
7. Have there been any moves toward lessening
French influence on the economy? (C)
8. How close is the relation between the ruling
Upper Voltan political party and the ruling party of the Ivory
Coast? (C)
9. What steps are being taken to prepare the coun-
try for a return to fully representative government? (C)
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. What is the continuing impact of President
Mobutu Sese Seko's drive to reorganize the Central Government
and the Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR)? How is it
affecting governmental and party operations in the central
and local levels? (S)
2. What Government officials appear to be popular
or influential with President Mobutu? To what extent does he
delegate responsibility to key individuals or rely on individ-
uals for advice in particular areas of expertise? (S)
3. What is the continuing impact of Mobutu's drive
to integrate the labor union, the church, and the army into
the MPR? (S)
4. What is Mobutu's personal relationship with
the Catholic Church since his dispute with Cardinal Malula? (C)
5. What is the continuing impact on Zairian
university students of their induction into the army in June
1971 and the subsequent reorganization of Zairian univer-
sities? (C)
6. What are the current strength and capabilities
of rebel bands in eastern Zaire? To what extent have army
counterinsurgency operations in this area resulted in
alienating local inhabitants and increasing their suscepti-
bility to subversive movements? (S)
7. Are tighter controls on governmental expendi-
tures and reorganization programs causing resentment among
significant numbers of personnel who lose jobs or undergo
reductions in income? Are increases in the cost of living
causing significant unrest in Kinshasa or other urban
areas? (U)
8. Are there any signs of increasing tensions
between the Central Government and local areas, such as
Kivu, which feel that Kinshasa is neglecting regional
development? (S)
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. What long-range plans does President Mobutu
have for improving relations with radical African states
such as Guinea and Algeria? How does he plan to assume a
leading role in African affairs? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
2. What future contacts does Mobutu plan with
the USSR? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
3. What is Mobutu's current attitude toward
Zaire's reconciliation with the Congo? (S)
4. What is the current relationship between
Mobutu and Holden Roberto, President of the Angolan Revolu-
tionary Government-in-exile (GRAE)? Is Mobutu seriously
seeking reconciliation between the GRAS and the rival
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)? (S)
5. What is the actual extent of collaboration
between Zairian officials and Portuguese authorities in
Angola? (S/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
6. Are there any indications that Mobutu intends
to expel more alien residents, tighten control measures on
alien commercial activities, or intensify propaganda attacks
on aliens? Continuing reporting is especially useful on
Belgian businessmen in Zaire, the treatment they receive
from Zairian officials, and their ability to solicit official
Belgian support when Zairian governmental measures impinge
on their interests. (C)
7. What is the continuing status of Zaire's
relations with Belgium? (S)
MILITARY AFFAIRS
1. What is the continuing impact of President
Mobutu's army reshuffle of summer 1972? What is the status
of Mobutu's relationship with Captain General Bumba and other
senior officers? (S)
2. What is the continuing impact of Mobutu's efforts
to strengthen army discipline? Are his measures causing any
morale problems throughout the army? Is Mobutu considering
any further major reforms within the Military Establishment? (S)
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. Information is needed particularly on fac-
tionalism within the United National Independence Party (UNIP).
What are the aims and the strengths of tribal-based politi-
cal activity? To what extent do nontribal factors--i.e.,
race, generational differences, rural divisions, urban divi-
sions, economic interests, and personal ambitions--influence
political alignments in and out of the UNIP? How organized
are political groupings? What are their strengths and weak-
nesses? To whom do they give allegiance? (C)
2. Assess President Kaunda's role in calming
factionalism. How successful are party and governmental
policies aimed at steering the energies of domestic groups,
including labor and youth, into constructive channels? What
is the effect of factionalism and Kaunda's response on his
political and personal position? (C)
3. What are the political consequences of Zambia
becoming a one-party state? Has the step facilitated Kaunda's
efforts to check the disruptive effects of tribalism and
other social divisions, or has imposition of the new system
only further alienated those tribal groups that supported
opposition parties? How have apolitical, educated Zambians
who fill important positions in the civil service and econ-
omy reacted to the move? Has a one-party system resulted in
the often poorly educated party leaders having a greater
influence on national policy? Is Kaunda willing or able to
clamp down on poorly disciplined or personnaly ambitious
members of UNIP cadre at the branch and section levels? (C)
4. What governmental or UNIP policies could
disrupt domestic stability? What is Kaunda's role in
formulating or accepting such policies? What about
Zambianization or other policies affecting race relations,
particularly in the Copper Belt? What about UNIP efforts
to eliminate or control active and potential political
opposition from the military, labor unions, and apolitical
civil servants and businessmen? (C)
5. What is the degree of political consciousness
in the security services? To what extent have tribal sym-
pathies been aroused in these services? To what extent is
there resentment against UNIP politicians or the Government's
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Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)
policies? How much rivalry is there between or within the
services? What are the attitudes of established services
toward the military aspects of the National Youth Service
(NYS)? What are the Government's plans for the NYS? (C)
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
1. Are there indications of any expansion
in Communist contacts or influence in Lusaka? Provide
information on politically significant activities by the
Soviet Embassy, the Chinese Communist Embassy, or other
Communist embassies in Lusaka, including overt or covert
relations with foreign nationalist groups in Zambia. What is
the policy of the Zambian Government for coping with Com-
munist political action, and how effective are Zambian
countermeasures? (C)
2. Continue reporting on the foreign nationalist
or insurgent groups currently operating in Zambia. What
are their present organized elements, activities, capabili-
ties, and interrelations with other nationalist or Communist
groups? (C)
3. How much support is the Zambian Government
giving to the military efforts of foreign resistance groups
currently established in Zambia? What activities does Zambia
permit or deny? How effective are Zambian restrictions? What
activities do foreign groups carry on that are not sanctioned
by the Zambian Government? (C)
4. Continue reporting on the Zambian Government's
reaction to Rhodesian independence. Pending the completion
of efforts to end economic dependence on Rhodesia, what contacts
with a white-ruled Salisbury will Zambia accept, official or
otherwise? What similarities and differences are there in
Zambia's relationships with Rhodesia, Portugal, and the Republic
of South Africa? (C)
5. Zambia's internal instability and hostility
toward southern African countries make it a fertile area for
political involvement by those governments. What evidences
are there of southern African support of Zambian political
parties and factions? Are southern African contacts with
domestic Zambian opposition groups or dissidents growing? (S)
102
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S E C R E T
Africa IRG-Af-1972
15 December 1972--14 December 1973
1. Continue reporting on Zambia's changing
defense policies. What is the extent and importance of
the defense buildup? To what extent could new weaponry
be used in offensive operations? To what extent are
Italian and Yugoslav military training and equipment
replacing British programs? Whom else might Zambia
be turning to for military aid? (C)
103
S E C R E T
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No Foreign Dissem
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