INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERVENTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00957A000100070050-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: September 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Barbara said Stennis ltr to go to Stennis only
4
and not to Braswell"! !
Re attached--apparently GL,C & DCI: talked &
GLC is going to do a draft.
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_DIREAR
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
-UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND AD RESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
Director
2
4
6
A T
R ARE
END
FILE `,
RETURN
INFORIkA ION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: I have covered the waterfront in i list
of items for your call to Stennis but thought you
could pick and choose from them. You might
also try to get him to focus on the NID a little
more by calling his attention to specific items
that you think are significant.
eo a ar
Legislative Counsel
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
OLC 7D43
23 Sept 7
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
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Items for Discussion with Senator Stennis
Interesting aspect of Baker/Weicker joint committee proposal
(S. 4019)-would intermingle law enforcement (FBI and Secret
Service) and foreign intelligence functions (CIA, DIA, NSA) in
the same joint committee.
2. Senator. Mondale's proposal (S. Res. 404) for a select Senate
committee on intelligence policy--we are preparing response to
Stennis' request for our views--our i..lterim view is that if there is
real pressure for some action before adjournment this might be
the best stop gap measure. NOTE: Appropriations Committee
should be consulted; they would not be directly represented on
the select committee as now proposed by Mondale.
3. We should have exchange of -letters he requested on legislation
amending the National Security Act in. Braswell's hands today (Monday).
4. Your scheduled meeting with Saxbe on Wednesday on sources and
methods legislation.
5. Abourezk amendment to Foreign Aid authorization bill to preclude
contact with foreign police, law enforcement or internal security
services.
a. Foreign Relations Committee dropped "or any other law"
from the amendment on basis of DCI's letter before the amendment
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was adopted by the Committee.
b. Abourezk wrote DCI a letter and asked him at Fund
for Peace Conference for further explanation.
c. OLC has talked with Abourezk's staff without apparent
progress. DCI is sending letter to Abourezk.
d. Abourezk has filed an amendment for floor consideration
to restore the words deleted by Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
e. Kissinger has requested that action on aid bill be delayed
for other reasons but Abourezk amendment would be very troublesome.
f. We are discussing matter with Foreign Relations staff and
may take up with the Senator who will manage the bill on the floor
(this may be Senator Sparkman).
6. Briefing of Mahon Subcommittee on Chile this Tuesday at 11:00.
7. Meeting with Kissinger, Morgan, Hebert, Nedzi, Frelinghuysen and
Bray this Wednesday at 5:00.
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ser ices may also be procured by firm-term
multiyear contracts. The description of au-
tomatic data processing equipment in sub-
section (1) is compatible with the General
Accounting Office interpretation of auto-
matic data processing equipment as it is
used in the Brooks bill.
V. I17:ARINOs
One day of public hearings were held by
the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Federal Pro-
curement, March 27, 1974, during which
the following four witnesses testified:
Hon. CaARLES H. PERCY, a United States
Senator from the State of Illinois.
Prrza F. McCLosxEY, President, Comput-
er and Business Equipment Manufacturers
Association.
MICHAEL Cnzmosr, President, Computer
Lessors Association.
M. Say MSxxxa, Commissioner, Automated
Data and Telecommunications Services, Gen-
eral Services Administration.
In lieu of testimony, GAO'submitted its
April 30, 1971 report on multiyear leasing
and Government-wide purchasing of ADP
equipment (B-115369)8 and its written views
and recommendations on S. 2785 (B-151204,
March 26, 1974). Both of these documents
are included in the Committee record of
the hearings. -
Summary of testimony
All four of the witnesses voiced strong
support of the bill's objective of giving GSA
authority to enter into multiyear leases
through use of the ADP Fund without obli-
gating the total anticipated payments under
the lease. They said that the Government
should avail itself of the advantages of mul-
tiyear contracting in the same manner. and
extent as private business and industry.
There was also agreement by the witnesses
that the legislation should facilitate the
widest possible use of the multiyear leasing
authority without interfering with the con-
trols and authorities provided by Public
Law 89-306. The Computer and Business
Equipment Manufacturers Association sug-
gested that this could best be done by grant-
ing all agencies the authority to make multi-
tion of the General Services Administration
was that the objective could best be accom-
plished by retaining the ADP Fund as the
single source of funding for firm-term multi-
year ADP contracts. After reviewing all facets
of the problem, the Subcommittee deter-
mined that delegation by GSA to other agen-
cies to cite and obligate the ADP Fund in
firm-term multiyear contracting would
achieve the objective sought by CBEMA,
while retaining the integrity of the central
management concept prescribed by Public
Law 89-306.
Another point on which there was general
agreement was the need to clarify that the
authority to enter Into multiyear leases ap-
plies. not only to leases for hardware, but
also to contracts for software development
and other related services and supplies. This
was accommodated by the addition of sub-
section (I).
FOOTNOTES
' US. Comptroller General. Multiyear Leas-
ing And Government-wide Purchasing Of
Automatic Data Processing Equipment
Should Result in Significant Savings, Wash-
I.ngton, U.S. General Accounting Office, B-
115.369, April 30, 1971.
'Senate Committee on Government Oper-
ation.;, Automatic Data Processing Equip-
ment. Report of the Committee, Senate Re-
port 89-933, 89th,Congrees, 1st Session, 1965,
page 36.
''T'he Report of the Commission on Gov-
ernment Procurement, December 1972, Vol. 3,
pages 48-49.
'See note 2, supra, pp. 21, 28, 30.
See appendix A.
See appendix B.
' See appendix C.
B See note 1, supra.
GOOD NEIGHBO14 DAY
The joint resolution (;I.J. Res. 235)
to authorize and request the President
to issue a proclamation designating the
fourth Sunday in September of each
year as "Good Neighbor Day" was con-
sidered. ordered to be engrossed for a
third reading, read the third time, and
passed, as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, 'T'hat; the President
is authorized and requested to issue a proc-
lamation designating the fourth Sunday of
September of each year as "Good Neighbor
Day", and calling upon the people of the
United -States and interested groups and
organizations to observe such day with ap-
propriate ceremonies and activities.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the RECORD an excerpt from the re-
port (No. 93-1156), explaining the pur-
poses of the measure.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
ExciRPT
PURPOSD
The purpose of the joint resolution is to
authorize and request the President to Issue
a proclamation designating the fourth Sun-
day of each year as "Good Neighbor Day."
- - - STATEMENT'
Our Nation is undergoing a cultural rev-
olution together with a steady exodus from
the intercity to suburban areas and out of
such movement there is crested a need for
cooperation in the building' of new commu-
nities and happier quality of life for all.
A Presidential proclamation designating a
"Good Neighbor Day" would. encourage all
people to practice brotherly love and to pro-
duce a lasting peace and a better world.
The committee is of the opinion that this
resolution has a meritorious purpose and ac-
cordingly recommends favorable considera-
tion of Senate Joint Resolution 235, without
amendment.
ORDER OF BUSINESS .
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. TOWER. I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask
unanimous consent that the time be
charged against the time allotted to me
under the order.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered,
and the clerk will call the roll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ROBERT C. BYRD). Without; objection, it
is so ordered.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) Is recognized for
not to exceed 5 minutes.
1 PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT 'OF A
JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE OVERSIGHT
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, r, along
with Senators WEICKER, HART, CHURCH,
MANSFIELD, HUMPHREY, CRANSTON, MON-
TOYA, INOUYE, BROOKE, PEARSON, and
JAVITS, send to the desk for appropriate
reference a bill to create within the Con-
gress a Joint Committee on Intelligence
Oversight.
This legislation establishes a 14-mem-
ber joint House-Senate committee, not
dissimilar to the Joint Committee on'
Atomic Energy, specifically entrusted
with primary oversight and legislative
responsibility for the Federal intelligence
community.
While a Joint Committee on Intelli-
gence Oversight will provide increased
assurance that the various intelligence
and law-enforcement agencies are abid-
ing by the Constitution and the Federal
statutes by which they were created, I
believe that the committee also will
strengthen our legitimate intelligence
gathering capacity through insuring
better coordination between the CIA,
FBI, Secret Service, DIA, NSA, and other
agencies possessing intelligence jurisdic-
` tion, and through eliminating much of
the current duplication and apparent
jealousy and competition in the intelli-
gence community. Moreover, it is hoped
that increased 'congressional oversight
would render the intelligence community
more responsive to legitimate Presi-
dential and congressional requirements.
My concern regarding congressional
oversight of the Federal intelligence com-
munity, as well as the extent and thor-
oughness of the information. provided
Congress by the intelligence community,
stems, in large part, from my service on
the Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities. Both in the Water-
gate Committee report and in other se-
lect committee documents, there is found
a substantial body of evidence regarding
the activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of investi-
gation, the National Security Council,
and other governmental intelligence
gathering and investigative organiza-
tions, which provides insight into the ac-
tivities, as well as the abuses, of these
organizations.
Unfortunately, I believe, the select
committee staff investigation or inquiry
into the Central Intelligence Agency
connection to the Watergate breakin and
coverup was effectively ended after we
received a letter from Director Colby,
dated March 7, 1974, stating that the
Agency would make certain critical clas-
sified information "completely available
to inspection by any member of the CIA
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee" but that he did not
"think it appropriate to turn over to the
select committee" any of this material.
And the committee was then confronted
by another, perhaps more effective,
stonewall. I suggest that this is the only
instance of a categorical refusal by any
agency or department of the Government
to cooperate with the select committee.
Nevertheless, I directed the committee
staff to assemble a report and to file
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1., 1 y. I.l';Xe6Jra ( Asza
fore it occurred; had not led the burglars son, joined Mullen and Company and be- The true nature of Bennett's relationship
into a trap; and, that the magazine allega- came its President In 1971. He was introduced to the CIA was not known to us until late
tions had no basis in fact. to the Mullen CIA case officer in April of last November of 1973 when, at Senator Baker's
It would appear that no information rela- year.? Bennett brought the Hughes Tool ac- request, the CIA produced another volume
tive to this Committee's mandate was de- count with him to Mulleng CIA records in- of CIA documents (Volume IV). The follow-
veloped ffrom the testimony adduced during dicate that Agency consideration was given ing information was adduced from this
the hearings before the Senate Armed Serv- to utilizing Ivlullen's Hughes relationship volume.
ices Committee on the St" George matter, for a matter relating to a cover arrangement .. On July 10, 1972, Bennett reported detailed
However, In the aftermath of the St, in [South America], and to garner informa- knowledge of the Watergate incident to his
George inquiry, Senator Baker propounded a tion on Robert Maheu?
number of questions to the CIA on Novem- Bennet's accessibility to the CIA has 'asked this CIA case meeting officer. was The
handcase
written " officer's and Carr of
ber 8, 1973, one of which follows: questions concerning possible Agenc. in- s4a 1972,
to Director Helms or before July 14, y of
7. Question: On or after June 17, 1972, did- voivement in, or knowledge of, Bennett's in this form because of f the sensitivity of
any of the Individuals associated with these activities in regard to Iiunt/Liddy, to wit: the information:6 It revealed that Bennett
break-ins in any way communicate with any Bennett suggested and coordinated the De- had established a "back door entry" to E. E.
break- ual associated with, CIA to discuss Mott interview; regarding Chappaquidick;'? Williams, the attorney for the DNC, in rrrder
the Watergate break-ins or the Itllsberg psy-. Bennett coordinated the release of Dita to "kill off" revelations of the Agency's rela-
chiatrtst office break-In, her than Mr, Mc- Beard's statement from Denver, after con- tionship with the Mullen and Company ui,
Cord who wrote letters to CIA which are Ming Beard's attorneys at the suggestion the course of the DNC lawsuit. He agreed to
part of the Watergate hearing record? that a nssenxe ee e;)' Bennett contained suggested d check with the CIA prior to contacting Wll_
Answer: On 10 July 1972 an officer of a Greenspun's u Our staff has confirmed that Bennett
commercial concern communicated to . an of interest to both Hughes and the C:ZP; " did funnel information to Williams via at-
employee of CIA information which had Bennett asked for and received from :Hunt torney Hobart Taylor and that this in
come to his attention concerning the "Water- a price estimate for bugging Clifford Irving tion was more extensive than the information
gate Flve," The relationship of this inform- for Hughes; v Bennett coordinated the em- Bennett had previous!
gand his The relationship to the Awas and ployment of political spy Tom Gregory by ou 7J provided ed paying
ant classified. Since omp the Agency g on was hear- Hunt and discussed with Gregory the latter's one-half The B CIA has acknowledged for his
s
say, contained ified this to th
a repetition Informati then current refusal to proceed with bugging plans On. 01' Grand J y ppearans attorney fee for habout June 16, 1972.11 Bennett received a
Grand ugh. appearance u
published speculation, and indicated that the scrambler from Hu hen . Although Bennett was su 1
had appeared before the Grand Mullen personnel for duse on y Lion to the CIA about was ash informs pects Jury on the matter, no action.was taken. The telephones; 18 Bennett and LSdd7 set et rJ at that ddy,
tm:e record on this matter is contained in sea- Hughes campaign contributions: 16 and Ben- there there iank bet that unt and Lwere
sitlve material which Agency nett served as the point of contact between is no indication
BI. thathese facts were
officers have Hunt and Liddy during the two weeks disclosed to the FB,
made available for review, but not retention, follow- The aforementioned July 10 by the staffs of the four CIA Subcommittees ing the Watergate break-in.'? Futheralore, mysterious 0 report con4 talns as well as the staffs of the Senate Select aId" Executive Session states that if the te f t "WH gap, " Is
Committee on Presidential Campaign Ac- Testimony of The he ethhae Mullen be cover used
Robert R. Mullen, supra note 1, at 0. terminpinatedstted, the Watergate could not be used
tivities and the Federal Prosecutor. Aside O Executive Session Testimony of (Former as an a It suggests that the Agency
from this, the Agency had no communication Deputy Director of Plans, hereinafter DDP), might have ave to to level with Mullen about the
of the type referred to in this question.. February 5, 1974, at 6-10; CIA Memorandum, ` flap:"16 Nonetheless, a July 24, An examination of the aforementioned undated, Subject: Wrap-17p of Agency's As- contact report shows that the CIA convinced
1972
"'sensitive material" 4 revealed more than was sociation with Robert R. Mullen and Com- Robert Mullen of the need to withdraw its
theretofore known about the scope of the pany, supra note 3, at 2. Far East cover through an "agreed upon
CIA's dealings with Robert Bennett and 'r Executive Session Testimony of (Mullen scenario" which included falsified Water-
Mullen and Company and led to a further and Company Case Officer), supra note 2, gate publicity crisis?v The e Agency advises
Intensification of the stairs investigative ef- at 12. that the "WH flap" has reference to a (dele-
forts In other CIA-related areas. 6 Executive Session Testimony of Robert tion at:.Agency request) that threatened to
ROBERT aErrvErr AND sas M171JEri AND Co F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 132, compromise Western Hemisphere opera-
The Mullen and Company has maintained 6 See (Mullen and Company Case .Officer]
a relationship with the Central Intelligence Memorandum for Record, April 30, 1971, Sub-
Agency since its incorporation in 1959,1 It ject: Association of Robert B. Mullen and 16 Executive Session Tes of Robert
provided cover for an agent In Europe and Company with the Hughes Tool Compe.ny, F. Bennett, supra note 2, at at 100-101.
an agent In the Far East at the time of the This document is found at Tab 16, Supple- 19 (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
Watergate break-ln.2 mental CIA Material, Volume II. Memorandum for Record, July 10, 1973, Sub-
Huat left the CIA in 1970 and joined MuI- 10 Executive Session Testimony of E. ject: Meeting with Robert Foster Bennett
fen and Company with what founder Robert Howard Hunt, December 18, 1973, at 89.70; and his comments concerning E. Howard
en an Company to be Director Robert Executive Session Testimony of Robert F. Hunt, Douglas Caddy, and the "Watergate
blessing.' Hunt's covert security cBennett, supra, note 2, at 62-65. Five" Incident (sic), found in CIA Supple-
was extended by the CIA +; ec was witting clearance 11 Executive Session Testimony of Robert mental Material, Volume IV.
was Bennett, supra note 2, at 93-94. =6 Executive Session Testimony of (Mullen
"Executive Session ' Testimony of E. and Company Case Officer), supra note 2, at
This material was produced as a part of Howard Hunt, supra note 19, at 6-8; But see- 20-21, 28-29,
Volume IV of the documents furnished to us Executive Session Testimony of Robert E.' 21 (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
:)y the CIA.. Bennett, supra note 2, at 79-84. Bennett ;in- Memorandum for Record, supra note 19, at
Executive Session Testimony of Robert dicates that Hunt suggested Bennett coordi- 11-12.
. Mullen. February 5, 1974, at 3. nation with Hughes.
F. Ben, Rec-
Executive Session Testimony of E. S"Robert J
anuar y 1 18 o, 1 at 1Memorandum for Executive Session Testimony of Robert Howard Hunt, supra note 10, at 72-73; Ex- Seses sion onteTestimony Ro F Executive
tive
'. Bennett, February 1, 1974, at 25-26; Ex- ecutive Session Testimony of Robert F. Begin- note 2, at 2, at 129. of Robert b Bennett,
'cutive Session Testimony of (Mullen and nett, supra note 2, at 121-124. Interview nt Report, d See Feb Hobart T1974,
;ompany Case Officer), February 4, 1974, "Staff Interview of Thomas J. Gregory, "m undated, Subject: It 5. September 1, 1973, at 5; Executive Session CIA Memorandu
' CIA Memorandum, undated, Subject: Testimony of E. Howard Hunt, supra note Wrap-Up of Agency's Association with Rob-
'irap-Up of Agency's Association with 10, at 17; Executive Session Testimony of ert R, Mullen and Company, supra note 3.
:obert It. Mullen and Company, found at Robert F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 69-75. at 5.
ab 3 of CIA Supplemental Material, "Staff Interview of Linda Jones, Se,ptem- 24 (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
plume III, at 3; Executive Sessiort Tosti- ber 6, 1973, at 3; Executive Session Testimony Memorandum for Record, supra note 19, at
Sony of Robert R. Mullen, supra note 1, at . of Robert P. Bennett, supra note 2, at 16:0. 13-14-
Executive Session Testimony of Robert 16 Staff Interview of Linda Jones, supra note 211d, at 12-13.
Bennett, supra note 2, at 67. 15, at 9; See Summarized Highlights of Linda ' 26 Id. at 13.
' See Memorandum for Deputy Director Jones Interview, dated September 10, 1973. :v (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
>r Plans, October 14, 1970; Subject: 77Staf Interview of Linda Jones, supra Memorandum for Record, July 24, 1072. Sub-
. Howard Hunt-Utilization by Central note 15, at 8; Executive Session Testimony ject: Withdrawal (Far East) Cover, found in
over Stab, fouhd at Tab 16, CIA -Supple- of Robert F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 15:3- C i
.ental Materials, Volume Jr. Approved ?Fdr6TRe.lease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79 9 ~,n~ffTh0 30v0 ae V at
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1!.asnOL
_o11 to i,lihold such Information from Mul-
len nor explained the significance of same to
Watergate developments.
This Agency explanation is clouded by
conflicting evidence. The Assistant Deputy
Director of Plans has testified that he is very
familiar with the matter and that it had
no unique effect on Mullen's cover.29 The
Mullen case officer testified that the flap con-
cerned cover.J0 Bennett, who thought the
reference concerned a "White House flap,"
did advise of Information received from the
European cover that a (compromise) ad-
versely affected a former Mullen cover (de-
leted at Agency request).."
A memorandum drafted by the Chief of
the Central Cover Staff, CIA, on March 1,
1973, notes that Bennett felt he could handle
the Ervin Committee if the Agency could
handle Hunt .22 Bennett even stated that he
had a friend who had intervened with Ervin
on the matter.U The same memorandum
suggests that Bennett took relish in impli-
cating Colson In Hunt's activities in the
press while protecting the Agency at the
same time l' It is further noted that Bennett
was feeding stories to Bob Woodward who
was "suitably grateful"; that he was making
no attribution to Bennett; and that he was
protecting Bennett. and Mullen and Com-
pany u
PENNINGTON MATTER
The results of our- investigation clearly
show that the CIA had in its possession, as
early as June of 1972, information that one
of their paid operatives, Lee R. Pennington,
Jr., had entered the James McCord. residence
shortly after the Watergate break-in and
destroyed documents which might show a
link between McCord and the CIA. This In-
formation was not made available to this
Committee or anyone else outside the CIA
until February 22, 1974, when a memoran-
dum by the then Director of Security was
furnished to this Committee.'
The evidence further shows that In Au-
gust of 1972, when the FBI made inquiry
about a "Pennington," the Agency response
was to furnish information about a former
employee, (with a similar name), who was
obviously not the man the FBI was interested
in, and to withhold the name of Lee R. Pen-
nington, Jr.
The Pennington information was known
within the CIA at least at a level as high as
the Director of Security, according to the
(former Chief of the Security Research Staff,
"Executive Session Testimony of (DDP),
supra note 8, at 39; Executive Session Testi-
mony of (Mullen and Company Case Officer),
supra note 2, at 43.
-'Executive Session Testimony of (Former
Assistant Deputy Director of Plans), Feb-
ruary 28, 1974, transcript not presently avail-
able.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Mullen
and Company-Case Officer), supra note 2, at
43.
-'Executive Session Testimony of Robert
F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 17-24.
_- ( ) Memorandum for Deputy Di-
rector for Plans, March 1, 1973, Subject:
Current Time Magazine Investigation of
Robert R. Mullen & Company Connection
wish the Watergate Incident, found in CIA
Supplemental Material, Volume IV, at 4.
u Id.
" Id.
" Id.
' See "Memorandum for Director of Intel-
ligence," February 22, 1974, Exhibit 1 to the
Executive Session Testimony of Lee R. Pen-
ninston, February 23, 1974.
Executive Session Testimony of (Person.
fie'. Security Officer No. 1,) February 25, 1974
at 11-14, 15, 17-18; Executive Session Testi-
mony of (Assistant Deputy Director of Per-
sonnel Security), March 2, 1974 (transcrip-
tion not presently available.)
J"
search Stmt), by whom ,'ennington was re-
tained at $250 per month until December of
1973' In January of this year (Director of
Security), ordered that the Pennington ma-
terials be removed from the CL9 Watergate
files when those files were about to be re-
viewed by the CIA's Inspector General's office
In connection with the CIA furnishing this
and other Congressional committees certain
information on the taping capacity at the
CIA.' Our information is that, since the
revelation of the Pennington matter in Feh-
ruary of this year, (Director of. Security'1.)
early retirement has been "accepted."
It seems that the Pennington matter was
extremely sensitive not only because of the
above-mentioned facts, but because Pen-
nington may have beem a "domestic agent,"
possibly in violation of the CIA's charter .&
The Agency has advised that the Security
Research Staff was abolished tn6 August of
1973.7
All of the above information was produced
by the CIA only as a result of the position
taken by a staff employee of the Personnel
Security Division, [Personnel Security Of-
fice J. Because of the Senatoi"s and the
staff's request for documentation and in-
formation relating to the destruction of CIA
tapes and other matters, Deputy Legislative
Counsel prepared a statement for Director
Colby's signature on February 19, 1974. In It
was the blanket assertion that t:se CIA had
produced all Watergate-related information .
for this Committee as well as Its Congres-
sional oversight committees' Because he was
aware of many of the above facts, (Person-
nel Security Officer #1) made It clear that
he could not and would not subscribe to
such a statement.- (Personnel Security Of-
' Executive Session Testimony of (Chief,
Security Research Staff) February 24, 1974, at
25-26; Executive t3ession Testimony of Lee
R. Pennington, supra note 1, at 29. (Note;
The Chief, Security Research Staff, was the
recipient of certain. of the McCord letters.)
I Executive Session Testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer No. 1), supra, note 2 at.
46-49, 50-51, 52-54, 57-69, 69-72.
5 The CIA, through its legislative liaison,
has informed this Committee that (Director
of Security) "retired" on or about Febru-
ary 26, 1974, shortly after his Executive Ses-
sion Testimony before this Committee on
February 25, 1974 .
'See Executive Session Testimony of
(Chief, Security Research Staff), :supra note
3, at 25-26, 30; Executive Session Testimony
of Lee R. Pennington, supra note 1, at 4-7,
10, 29. In this regard, Volume VIII: CIA Sup-
plemental Materials references an apparent
CIA file on'a United States citizen, Jack An-
derson (#349691). This reference is contained
in CIA memoranda in November and Decem-
ber of 1972 which discuss Pennington's pro-
viding his CIA case'officer with a memoran-
dum allegedly written by McCord about jack
Anderson and others. It should be noted that
the CIA file on Mr. Pennington was not pro-
vided to this Committee and also apparently
has portions "missing" from It, see Action
Required section of this memorandum, in-
fra, at Miscellaneous, No. 9.
T Executive Session Testimony of (Director
of Security). February 25. 1974, at 17-18.
s Supplemental CIA -Materials. Volume
VIII: see also Executive Sesssion Testimony
of (Personnel Security Officer #1), .supra note
2, at 61-63.
'Executive Session Testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer ?1). supra note 2, at 45-
52. In his Executive Session Testimony, (Per-
sonnel Security Officer #1) states that, at a
meeting on January 22, 1974, to discuss
whether the "Pennington matter" should be
withheld from or disclosed to the appropriate
authorities and Congressional committees, he
informed his supervisory CIA personnel that
(tr. 62) :
P(_-CF : `a) was 30 coe 4 tha, +Ocu.-ii~ mentary evidence of the Pennington infor-
mation would be destroyed by others in the
CIA that he and a co-employee copied the
relevant memoranda and placed them in
their respective personal safes 30 This matter
was subsequently brought to the Inspector
General's attention and the (Director of Se-
curity's) memorandum of February 22 was
drafted and made available to this Commit-
tee, the oversight committees, and the special
Prosector's office .11
Our Investigation In this area also pro-
duced the fact that, contrary to previous
CIA assertions, the CIA conducted a vigorous
in-house investigation of the Watergate
matter, starting almost' Immediately after
the break-in.0 As one member of the Secur-
ity Research Staff stated they were in a state
of "panic." u In November and December of
1972, (Executive Officer to Director of Secur-
ity) was specially assigned to then Execu-
tive Director/Comptroller Colby to conduct
a very secretive investigation of several
Watergate-related matters. (Executive Of-
ficer to Director of Security) was instructed
to keep no copies of his findings and to make
no records. He did his own typing and uti-
lized no secretaries." .
Less clear than the aforementioned efforts
to suppress the Pennington information, is
an understanding of Pennington's actual
role or non-role in the destruction of docu-
ments at the McCord home shortly after the
Watergate break-in. Pennington has testified
that he did not go to the McCord home for
the purpose of searching for or destroying
CLA-related documents, but does acknowl-
edge witnessing the destruction of docu-
ments by Mrs. McCord and others 1i It is
clear from the testimony of others 7s that the
CIA received information, evidently from
Pennington, indicating more active partici-
pation by operative Pennnigton.
TAPES
In a meeting in Senator Baker's office
with Director Colby and George Murphy,
following a discussion of the Cushman tape,
Murphy asked Colby if there were other
tapes, and he replied in the affirmative. In
response to a question from Senator Baker,
"Up to this time we have never removed,
tampered with, obliterated, destroyed, or
done anything to any Watergate documents,
and we can't be caught In that kind of bind
now. We will not do it." (Personnel Security
Officer #1) added that he "didn't cross the
Potomac on (his) way to work in the morn-
ing, and that the Agency could do without
its own L. Patrick Gray" (tr. 53). Subse-
quently, (Personnel Security Officer #1)
prevailed and the information was made
available to this and other appropriate Con-
gressional Committees,
"Executive Session Testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer #1), supra, note 2, at
49, 45-52.
11 See "Memorandum for Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence." supra, note 1.
' Executive Session Testimony of (Per-
sonnel Security Officer No. 1), supra note 2,
at 1-4: Executive Session Testimony of (Se-
curity Research Staff Officer), February 25,
1974. at 5, 31-32, 42, 49.
as Executive Session Testimony of (Secu-
rity Research Staff Officer), supra note 12, at
5.
Executive Session Testimony of (Execu-
tive Officer to Director of Security), March 3,
1974 (transcription not presently avail-
able).
rs Executive Session Testimony of Lee R.
Pennington, supra note 1.
la Executive Session Testimony of (Secur-
ity Research Staff Officer), supra note 12;
Executive Session Testimony of (Personnel
Security Officer 1), supra note 2.
Executive Session Testimony of (Chief,.
Security Research Staff), supra note 3.
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Colby further acknowledged the prior ex-
ts:.ance of central taping capability at the
CLi. Senator Baker then requested that rele-
vant tapes be reviewed and delivered to the
Ccrnmit'ee, to which Colby agreed. Shortly
thereafter, Colby confirmed to Senator Baker
recent press accounts that the tapes had
been destroyed. In that same connection it
should be pointed out that the staff had
pre,::ously interviewed Victor Marchetti, who
final call with regard to the CIA's assistance
to Hunt. Surprisingly, we learned that
(Cushman/Colby Secretary), although she
says she was told- that Mr. Cushman did not
have his calls monitored, did, in fact, monitor
certain of his calls anyway, especially with
people at the White House, without Cush-
man's knowledge?5 The Cushman/Ehrlich-
man transcript was a result of the short-
hand notes she took of a monitored call."
stayed upon questioning that he suspected was taped In many of the room conversations. There are two Interesting aspects to this
that there was a central taping system at In this regard, even the CIA's analysis does transcription. First, only the Ehrlichman
the CIA. When the staff broached this sub- not provide this vital Information. There are portion of the conversation was transcribed,
sec: with the Agency's (Deputy Legisative several references to a "Mr. X." The CIA has contrary to normal praottce;'T and secondly,
Counsel) he stated that if there had been not produced the actual logs for our exami- Cushman does not' recall any reference to
such a system, it was no longer in existence. nations. However, we were informed that the President or to "carte blanche." 1'
Shortly before Director Helms left office, and there are "gaps" in the logs. HUNT--TSD SUPPORT-ELL88ffitG PROFILE
approximately one week after Senator Mans- The circumstances surrounding the tran- The Committee has received much testi-
fietd's letter requesting that evidentiary ma- scriptions of. room and telephone conversa-. mony over the past several months detailing
ter-."cis be retained,' Helms ordered that the- tions of former Deputy Director Cushman the extensive support of Howard Hunt by
tapes be destra+jed.s Although the CIA is ap- are bizarre to say the least. When Cushman
pa: ently unable to state wit any degree of testified before the Watergate Ccmmlttee CIA personnel with CIA materials and the
rwcision the date on which lthe tapes were on August 2, 1973, he presented a trenscrip- CIA's role In the preparation of the psycho-
act-ually destroyed, testimony Indicates that tion of the Cushman/Hunt conversation of logical profiles of Daniel Ellsberg. Howard
ll. as during the week of January 2; 1973? July 22, 1971." We recently discovered that Hunt was Involved in a wide variety of domes- -
g ar4
While the CIA claims that the destruction there exists an original, more complete tran- tic undertakings with the use of CIA equip-
was not unusual and was one of several scription; that the original transcription con- meat and the assistance of CIA personnel.
periodlc destructions, two facts seem clear. tamed an Insignificant but uncomplimentary e.g.. the burglaries of Dr. Fielding's office and
First, the only other destruction for which reference to the President; and, that the the DNC, the preparation of psychological
the CIA has any record was on January 21, original was available to the CIA at the time profiles on Daniel Elisberg and the investiga-
1972, when tapes for 1964 and 1965 were de- of the Committee's hearings in August of tion of the Chappaquidick Incident. In light
strc ed (there are no records of periodic 1973. In fact, the original transcript was not of the facts and circumstances developed
des 'uctton); 4 and secondly, never before produced until February of this year, the day through the documents and conflicting tes-
had there been a destruction of all existing before Senator Baker was to listen to the timony of CIA personnel adduced by this
tap --s.3 It should be noted that there exists Cushman/Hunt tape, per his request. Committee, which are summarized below, the
a separate taping system for the Office of, The Cushman/Hunt conversation and one advance knowledge to whether the CIA had
Security.'' That system is still operative, and other were the only two room transcriptions ga of the Fielding break-in.
the 0/S tapes presumably are still in ex- saved by Cushman's secretary, (presently Dl- The Fielding burglary was not made public
istence. The Agency has advised that It has rector Colby's Secretary, hereinafter referred until May of 1973,
reviewed all Office of Security tapes,' to as Cushman/Colby's Secretary), and his While the CIA has previously belatedly ac-
watch of Ice tapes, and duty office tapes assistant (Executive Assistant to Deputy Di knowledged some of the technical support it
to determine the relevancy of same but rector of CIA, he hereinafter referred to as provided to Hunt and Liddy prior to the
has not provided these tapes to the Se- Exec. Asst. to DDCI), when Cushman.'s safe Fielding break-in, the CIA has continually
lect; Committee, despite the Committee's re- was cleaned out In December of 1971 u They downplayed the extent of that technical sup-
quest. The Agency has provided the Com- claimed that they made a search for the orig- port as well as the specific approval and de-
rnit ee with two selected transcripts which coal transcription shortly after the Water- tailed knowledge of such support by high
purport to constitute, in the opinion of the gate break-in but that it was not found, and level CIA officials.' The scenario of events
Agency, the only Watergate related material therefore an abbreviated transcription was culminating in the Fielding break-in caused
contained on any tapes. typed.'' Therefore, we have a search by (Exec.. a wealth of conflicting testimony among. CIA
l f d t h
ffi i
l
ft
The January, 1973, destruction pertained
only to recordings of room conversations.
However, on Helms' Instruction, his secretary
destroyed his transcriptions of both tole
phone and room conversations? The evidence
' Letter from Senator Mansfield to DCI
Helms, dated January 16, 1973. -
3 Executive Session Testimony of (Director
Hers' Secretary), February 6, 1974, at 14.
See also CIA memorandum for Director of
Security, dated January 31, 1974, at 3. She
states that she told the technicians to de-
stroy only Helm's tapes and not all of the
tapes (Executive Session Testimony at 34-
35). However, there seems to have been no
doubt In the minds of the technicians that
they were to destroy all of the tapes on hand.
Executive Session Testimony of (Office of
Sec' r1ty Technician #1), February 6, 1974,
at 2S, Executive Session Testimony" of (Of-
fice of Security Technician #2), Febru-
ary8,1974,at53.
' Executive Session Testimony of (Office
of Security Technician #2). supra note 2,
at 3.9. See also CIA memorandum for Direc-
tor of Security, supra note 2.
4 Executive Session Testimony of (Office of
Security Technician #1)., supra note 2 at
10. Executive Session Testimony of (Office
of Security Technician #2), supra note 2
a: 33-37. -
3 3rocutive Session Testimony of (Office of
Security Technician #2), supra note 2 at
20.
indicates that among those telephone tran-
scriptions were conversations with the Presi-
dent, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and other
White House officials "'Helms and (Director
Helm's Secretary) have testified that such
conversations were non-Watergate related?
Unfortunately, any means of corroboration
is no longer available. We have examined
summaries of logs made available by the
CIA. but it is Impossible to determine who
break-in in June of 1972 and another search
in May of 1973, the original transcript not
having been found until May of 1973.
In February of this year (Deputy Legisla-
tive Counsel) hand-delivered -to Senator
Baker a very significant document. It was
the transcription of a portion of the Ehr-
lichman/Cushman telephone conversation.
(Deputy Legislative Counsel) stated it had
been recently discovered by (Exec. Asst. to
DDCI):' It was discovered during (Exec.
Asst. to DDCI's) third search for -Watergate-
related materials, and it was Iocatet in the
same file as the Cushman/Hunt transcript."
The document Is especially significant in
that it quotes Ehrlichman as saying that
Hunt was working for the President and
that the CIA was to give Hunt "carte
blanche."' This, of course, substantiates the
CIA's claim that Ehriichman made the orig-
'Executive Session Testimony of (Director
Helm's Secretary), supra note 2 at 22..
' Executive Session Testimony of Helms,
supra note 7; Executive Session Testimony of
(Director Helm's Secretary), supra note 2 at
23.
19 Public Testimony of General Robert E..
Cushman at 3291.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Cush-
man/Colby Secretary), February 21. 1974.
1' Id. at 64; see also memorandum of (Exec.
Asst. to DDCI), July 23, 1973, Supplemental
CIA Mterials, Volume IV.
4 CIA memorandum for Director of Secu- 13 See Ehrlichman/Cushman tape transcrip-
rit-. supra note 2 at 4. tion, CIA memorandum "For All Employees"
r Executl,e Session Testimony of (Director dated January 31, 1974, at Tab B.
Helm's Secretary, supra note 2 at 14, 17, 19; 14 Affiidavit of (Exec- Asst. to DDCI), Febru-
Executive Session Testimony of Richard ary 5, 1974, and Executive Session Testimony
Helms. March 8. 1974 (transcription not yet of (Exec. Asst. to DDCI), March 6, 1074
a
o c s as re erre o ere
n
er.
The CIA's assistance to Hunt began on July
22, 1971, when. Hunt met with General Cush-
man, then Deputy Director of the CIA, is
Cushman's office -to request physical die-
guise and phony identification to effect a
"one time operation, and out," 2 This meet-
in, was tape recorded by Cushman. There-
after, pursuant to the specific approval of
both Cushman and then Director of the CIA
Richard Helms, a member of the CIA's Tech-
nical Services Division was assigned to pro-
vide Hunt with the assistance and materials
he requested? During the next thirty days,
the CIA technical staff met with Hunt on
four separate occasions. Most meetings were
'held at CIA "safe houses" (dwellings owned
1' Executive Session - Testimony of (Cush-
man/Colby Secretary), -supra note 11 at 12-
13.
1' Id. at 17, 18. : - -
17 Id. at 80-81.
-
1s Executive Session Testimony of General
Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974 (tran-
scription not yet available).
' See affidavits of Cushman (Exec. Asst. of
DDCI), and (Deputy Chief, TSD), Original
CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D.
Partial tape transcript of July 22 meeting.
Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab K, at
1; see also Cushman's affidavit, Id., and com-
plete unabridged tape transcript of July 22
meeting. CIA Supplemental Materials, Vol-
ume II, Tab 4. . 3 See Executive Session Testimony of Gen-
eral Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1074, at 10,
12; contra, Executive Session Testimony of
Richard Helms, Marche 8, 1974, and Testi-
mony of Richard Helms before the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, May 16. 1973,
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u: leased, ^ CIA for clandestine meet-
1-_9s) .' Ai. meetings Hunt was provided
ui:h the CIA equipment and assistance de-
scribed in earlier Committee testimony, i.e..
a wig, voice alteration devices, heel lift to
cause a limp.1 fake glasses, phony driver's
li.:enses and identification cards, a Uher 5000
tape recorder disguished in a typewriter case,
a cancer a hidden in a tobacco pouch, prelim-
lnary steps toward a phony New York tele-
phone answering device, and the developing
of the film of Hunt and Liddy's reconnais-
sance trip to Los Angeles to "case" Dr. Field-
Lag's o ce, This assistance was abruptly ter-
rninated on August 27, 1971-one week before
the Fielding burglary of September 3, 1971.+
Recent testimony and documents have de-
veloped several matters of considerable im-
port with regard to the assistance provided
Hunt and Liddy. The technician who dealt
with Hunt has testified that he received ap-
proval for each and every request of Hunt
from his supervisory officiald at the CIA 8 He
-also testified that, contrary to earlier and
other CIA testimony, Hunt informed him
early in August that he would be introduc-
ing a second man (Liddy) to the technician
for the provision of disguise and false iden-
tiflcation.' CIA officials heretofore had
claimed that Hunt introduced Liddy unan-
nounced late in August and that this intro-
duction had been one of the leading causes
for the CIA's ultimate termination of its
support for Hunt'?
Testimony and documents have also re-
vealed, again contrary to the testimony of
high CL-t officials, that Hunt's request for a
New York "backstopped" telephone (a tele-
phone with a New York number which would
in reality be answered by a Washington CIA
switchboard) answering service was well on
its way to completion " A detailed memo-
randum of the TSD technician, dated August
27, 1971, reveals that the backstopped tele-
phone request was about to be Imple-
mented.12 This memorandum Includes the
actual relay number to be called. Previous
CIA testimony had always been to the effect
that this telephone request was so unrea-
sonable that it was immediately disapproved
' See Executive Session Testimony of (TSD
Technician # 1), February 5 and 6. 1974, at
3-25 (February 5 tr.), and Exhibit 1 to that
testimony (notes of (TSD Technician #1)
compiled contemporaneously with the sup-
port of Hunt) also found in CIA Supple-
mental Materials, Volume VII, Tab 8.
s Staff Interview with Howard Hunt, Febru-
ary 4, 1974.
" Public Testimony of Richard Helms and
General Robert E. Cushman, August 2. 1973;
affidavits of (TSD Technician #1, TSD Tech-
nician =2, Deputy Chief, TSD, and Exec.
Asst. to DDCI), Original CIA Materials, Vol-
ume 11, Tab D.
Id.
' Executive Session Testimony of (TSD
Technician #1), supra note 4 at 10 (February
6 tr.), at 57 (February 5. tr.).
i Id. at 55-57 (February 6 tr.) ; see also
notes referred to in note 4, supra.
-o Affidavits of (Exec. Asst. to DDCI), (Dep-
uty Chief, TSD), Cushman, supra note 1;
memoranda (of Exec. Asst. to DDCI) dated
August 23, 26, and 30, Original CIA Materials,
Volume II, Tab K; compare Executive Ses-
sion Testimony of (TSD Technician #1),
supra note 4 at 55-56 (February 5 tr.) with
Executive Session Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TSD), February 5, 1974, at 24.
"Executive Session Testimony of (TSD
Technician #1), supra note 4 at 8-10, 12
(February 6), and Exhibit 1 to (TSD Tech-
nician =1)'s testimony at 5, which details
the steps taken by the CIA to implement
Hunt's request..
13 Id.
and that it was also a leading cause of the
ultimate termination of Hunt's support?3
Recent testimony also established that the
CIA created a file on Hunt's activities en-
titled the "Mr. Edward" file. This file was
maintained outside the normal CIA filing
system, and this Committee's requests to
obtain this file have not been granted, de-
spite the fact that testimony has es.Abiished
that this file was turned over to Director
Colby after the Watergate break-in?' More-
over, recent testimony also indicates that a
"bigot list" (CIA term for treatment of espe-
cially sensitive case restricting access to a
limited number of persons) was created for
Hunt's activities .15
Testimony has Indicated that the film de-
veloped for Hunt and Liddy was, in fact, of
Dr. Fielding's office 1a Not only was the film
developed, however, but it was reviewed by
CIA supervisory officials before it was re-
turned to Hunt?7 One CIA official who re-
viewed the film admitted that he found the
photographs "intriguing" and recognized
them to be of "southern California."" He
then ordered one of the photographs to be
blown up. The blow-up revealed Dr. Field-
.ing's name in the parking lot next to his
office. 10 Another CIA official has testified that
he speculated that they were "casing" photo-
graphs." Recent testimony has shown that
the CIA official who reviewed these photo-
graphs immediately reported their content to
Cushman and his assistant in the office of the
Deputy Director o/ the CIA" With a degree
of Incredulity, however, he denies tailing his
superiors that he blew up one of the photo-
graphs and that It revealed the name of Dr.
Fielding" Moreover, both Cushman and his
"See affidavits of (Exec. Asst. to DDCI),
(Deputy Chief, TSD), Cushman, and memo-
randa of (Exec. Asst. to DDCI), supra note
10; Executive Session Testimony of Cush-
man, March 7, 1974, at 10-21. Moreover,
Executive Session Testimony of Richard
Helms, supra note 3, indicates that it was
Hunt's request for a secretary which caused
him to order the cut-off of support. This
request, however, occurred on August 18 and
was denied the same or next day, see Execu-
tive Session Testimony of (Exec. Asst. to
DDCI), March 6, 1974 (transcription not
presently available), contra, testimony of
Richard Helms before the Senate Committee
an Appropriations. supra note 3, at. 197.
'Executive Session Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TSD), February 5, 1974, at 14-15; Ex-
ecutive Session Testimony of (Chief, TSD),
February 5, 1974, at 29-30.
v Executive Session Testimony of (TSD
Technician #1), supra note 4, at 2-4 (Feb-
ruary 6 tr.)
39 Executive Session Testimony of. (Execu-
tive Officer to Director of Security), March
3, 1974 (transcription not presently avail-
able); Staff interview of Howard Hunt, supra
note 5 (wherein Hunt indicates that the film
the CIA developed included shots of a "close-
up of (Fielding's office) door, a close-up of
the directory of (Fielding's) building, photo-
graphs of the ingress and egress of the park-
ing lot .... as well as shots of the inside of
Fielding's office, including the top of Field-
ing's desk.
"Executive Session' Testimony of (TSD
Technical #1), supra note 4 at 20-?24, 52-53
(February 5 tr.); Executive Session Testi-
mony of (Deputy Chief, TSD), supra note 14
at 43-47.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TSD), supra note 14 at 44.
io Id. at 45-46.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Chief,
TSD), February 5, 1974, at 19-20.
a Executive Session Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TSD), supra note 14 at 47-')9.
a Id.
assistant denied ever having been tolu jOkmt
the content of the photographs by (Deputy
Chief, TSD) or anyone else" In any event,
recent testimony shows that it was only after
these photographs were developed and ex-
amined that the, CIA technician dealing with
Hunt was ordered to cut off all support for
Hunt?' This decision was made by the Deputy
Director of the CIA (Cushman) and/or the
Director of the CIA (Helms) s
Finally, while previous public CIA testi-
mony claimed that the CIA "had no contact
whatsoever with Mr. Hunt subsequent to 31
August, 1971," 26 recent testimony and secret
documents indicate that Hunt had extensive
contact with the CIA after that date. Not
only did Hunt play a large role in the CIA's
development of. psychological profiles on Dan-
iel Ellsberg (not completed. until November
of 1971). but he actually contacted the CIA's
External . Employment Assistance Branch
(EEAB) and approached. active CIA person-
nel regrading several operations, including,
e.g., Hunt's requests to the CIA for person(s) -
skilled in lockpicking, electronic sweeping,
and entry operations?r -
It is significant that during the same pe-
riod as the ongoing support of Hunt by the
CIA, August of 1971, the CIA was also com-
piling a psychological profile on Daniel Ells-
berg. Recent testimony has revealed that
Hunt was deeply involved in that project as
well. -
sa Executive Session Testimony of General -
Robert E. Cushman, March .1, 1974, at.22-23;
Executive Session Testimony of (Exec. Asst.
to DDCI), March 6, 1974 (transcription not
presently available).
"Executive Session Testimony of (TSD
Technical ;t'i), .supra note 4, at 59-60, and
Exhibit 1 to that testimony-
" Ex:ecutive Session Testimony of General
Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 21-22,
16-20; E' ecutive Scission Testimony of Rich-
ard Helms. March 8, 1974, contra (.transcrip-
tion not presently available).
ra Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Memorandum for Record, July 28, 1972, Orlgi-
nal CIA Materials, Volume I, Tab S.
' Contacts after August 31, 1974, Indicated
in the Secret Supplemental CIA Materials,
include the following: ..
(a) Hunt was referred to (Former CIA em-
ployee) by (Chief, EEAB) of the CIA's EEAB,
(Chief, EEAB) retired on June 9, 1972) when
Hunt requested a "retired Iockpicker" and
entry man in the time period of March-May,
1972. CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I,
Tab. 4, Memorandum of June 19, 1973.
(b) Hunt, in late 1971, requested some
'security types' to check physical security
and monitor telephones in Las Vegas," In
connection with Hunt's work on the Hughes
account with Mullen ' and Company. Hunt
was referred by (Chief, EEAB) to an (Agency
proprietary (name deleted at Agency request)
(CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I, Tab-
4.)
(c) Hunt contacted (deleted at Agency re- -
quest) (an active CIA employee until No-
vember 10, 1972) sometime in late 1971 re-
garding a weekend entry operation. '
(d) Hunt contacted CIA employee (deleted
at Agency request) in October of 1971 con-
cerning certain Indo-China War documents
(Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D). -
(e) On December 8, 1971, Hunt requested
and received a CIA computer name trace, by
CIA employees, on a person who had allegedly
formed the (deleted name of Latin American
country at Agency request) National Inde-
pendent Party in December of 1971 (Original
CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D),
(f) The CIA acknowledges that the Deputy
Director of Plans of the CIA did meet with
Hunt on October 15, 1971 to discuss Mullen
and Company problems. ..
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The prepa.-itloa of this profile was specifl- .the possible Illegality of the profie 37 It March 27, 1972, the Chief of Station received
cally approved by then Director Helms in late should be noted, however, that in a memo- a cryptic response at the direction of the
July of 1971 The actual compiling of the randum from the psychiatrists' CIA super- Assistant Deputy Director of Plans advising
profile :van done by, the CIA's medical serv--, visor to Helms in November of 1971, which the Chief of Station not to concern himself
ices staff and, in particular, its chief accompanied the completed profile, their with the travels.of Hunt In Miami, that Hunt
pevchiatrist..' Testimony has Indicated that concern is expressed as follows: was on domestic White House business of an
a meeting was held on August 12, 1971, in "(DHSS) and (Chief Psychiatrist,, , . unknown nature and that the Chief of Sta-
which both Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy confirmed that their worries did not tion should "cool it." 7 (It should be remem-
participated. They told the CIA psychiatrist involve professional ethics or credibility. In- bered that this was after the Agency pro-
that Ellsberg had been undergoing psychl- stead, they are concerned lest the Agency's vided Hunt with TSD support in July and
atric analysis. Hunt and Liddy discussed involvement ... become known and particu- August of 1971. It is not explained why Hunt,
with him -.heir desire to "try Ellsberg in larly that It might come to light during any who had "used" the CIA, was not of more
public," render him "the object of pity proceeding..* ? ? We will be guic,ed by interest to the Agency, especially when he was
as a broken man," and be able to refer to your determination after you have had an contacting a current operative, Martinez.)
he already had been in contact with General vestigation of this Committee, would appear report on-the Hunt information provided the
Guyhman and was on good terms with Direc to raise many unanswered questions as to Chief of Station In Marche Martinez com-
tar Helms. The psychiatrist has testified the involvement of the CIA in matters out- piled a "cover story" 10 on April 5, 1972, after
recently that he was. extremely concerned side Its legislative parameters. -.. being told by his case officer not to nut any
about
and to a? meeting on. August' about Martinez, has consistently testified to did not contain any of the alarming in-
20, 1371. Access to the memoranda of both ,, little more than the fact that Eu
enio Mar- nuendos suggested earlier by Martinez, was
g
the psychiatrist and his superiors has been:. tines was on a 8100 per month retainer with maintained In the Chief of Station's file until
refused to this Committee.'' . after the Watergate break-In1i'
The CIA psychiatrist also was given the , -the CIA as an informant on Cubans of in- It is known that Martinez had two case
name of Dr. Fielding as Ellsbe terest to the Agency. Our investigation has.
g rg's psychl' . revealed relevant information concerning officers during 1971 and 1972. There is con-
atrist and numerous FBI reports of Inter- Martinez' CIA relationship, as set out below, flicting evidence concerning the precise date
views with 3IIsberg's associates, as well as not previously brought forward in testimony of the spring, 1972 case officer change-over :u
a memorandum of a reported telephone con- by CIA officials.. It is known that Martin 6, 19ez met with his last
vetsatn between Ellsberg and another Because of Hunt's 'clo a relationship with case officer on June 6, 1972, and at that tt,
party. and recent testimony has revealed Martinez at a time when Martinez was a paid had at least two reporting ationemen?s,
that it ua reported back to the psychl CIA operative, the basic question arisen as to maritime operation information and
atrtst that Director Helms was advised of 'whether the CIA was aware of Hunt's ac- motion pertaining to possible ." contrar7
his concerns regarding Hunt's participation tivities early in 1972 when he was recruiting at the Miami conventions; " contrary
and comments l' While Director Helms has , Cubans to assist in the Watergate break-in to earlier testimony by CIA officm t The
denied that he was ever told that Hunt was prior to assuming a retainer status In the Agency has not afforded this Committee an
involved in the CIA's Ellsberg profile prof- summer of 1971, Martinez had been r, full- unabridged examination of the case officer
ect,u it is not without significance that the contact. reports, despite requests for same,
time period during which the CIA ps chi- salaried operative involved in Agency [deleted
y at Agency request] endeavors.' In November The Agency has advised that Hartiari"
atrist was briefing his superiors of his con- of 1971, a month after his participation in first case officer was on an "African safari"
corns regarding Hunt was circa August 20, the Fielding break-in, Martinez mentioned throughout June of. 197210 The second case
1971-a week prior to the developing of his contact with Hunt In an allegedly in-
Hunt's film of "intriguing" photographs of nocuous fashion to his case officer and the formation from (Martinez' Code Name),
medical offices in southern California which. -94Iiami Chief of Station:, There is also evi- found at Tab 1, CIA Supplemental Materials,
Impressed at least one CIA official as "cos- :dance that Martinez had mentioned Hunt Volume II; (COS) (sensitive) letter, March
Ing" photegraphs. even earlier to his case ofiicer.4 In March of 17, 1972, found at Tabe 1, CIA Supplemental
With the aforementioned-background, we 1972, Martinez advised the Miami Chief of Materials, Volume II.
are reminded that when the second profile Station that Hunt was employed by the White 7 Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
on Ellsberg was completed (completion`was- House and asked the Chief of Station if he supra note 2, at 31-34; (Chief, Cuban Op-
delayed until November of. 1971), Director was sure that he had been apprised of all erations Branch, Western Hemisphere Dtvi
Helms took pains to inform the White House Agency activities in the Miami area.' This sion, hereinafter referred to as Chief, COB)
that: concerned the Chief of Station who rent a ? letter to (COS), March 27, 1972, found at Tab
"I do wish to underline the point that letter to CIA headquarters requesting infor- 1, CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume II,
our involvement In this matter should not mation on Hunt's White House status,4 On 0-Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
be revealed in any context, formal or in supra note 2; at 32, 80.
formal" (emphasis added)." rExecutive Session Testimony of Richard 9Id. at .33-34, 38-40; (Case Officer #1)
In his recent testimony before this Com-.- Helms, supra note 3. Cable (deleted at Agency request), Decem-
mittee, DL-ec-or Helms stated that the above - ?1 Memorandum from (DOS), CIA Deputy her 15, 1973, found at Tab 2, CIA Supple-
quoted language represented his concern . Director of Support, to Richard Helm.,, DI- - mental Materials, Volume II; Executive Ses-
only for the professional reputations of the. -rector of Central Intelligence, November 9, , sion Testimony of Eugenio Martinez, De-
CIA psychiatrists and not any concern over 1971, Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab., cember 10, 1973, at 45-47.
J. "Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
Affidavit of (Deputy Director of Support; ' 'Senate Foreign Relations Committee Re- supra note 2, at 91; see Executive Session
hereafter referred to as the DDS) and. (Direc- port of Richard Helms Testimony, Febru- - Testimony of Eugenio Martinez, supra note
tar of Medical Services Staff, hereinafter re- ail 7, 1973, at 24, 50; Senate Select Com- 9, at 11.
ferred to as the DMSS) and (Chief of Psychs- mittee Transcript of Richard Helms, Testi- "Executive Session Testimony of Eugenio
aerie Staff on Medical Services Staff, here- many, August 2, 1973, at 6733-6734, 6814- Martinez, supra note 9, at 53, 58-59. (Case
i.aafter referred to as Chief Psychiatrist), 6815. - Officer #1) Cable (deleted at Agency re-.
Original CIA Materials, Volume I, Tab U; ' Executive Session . Testimony of (Miami quest), supra note 9.
Volume II, Tab D. Chief of Station, hereinafter COS), Febru- ''Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
Id. ary 7, 1974, at 5-9. Spanish Report and Translated Spanish Re-
'3 Eeecutive Session Testimony of (Chief '(Martinez' Case Officer (1971-1972), here- port, found at Tab 1, CIA Supplemental
Psychiatrist), March 6, 1974 (transcription matter referred to as Case Officer #1) Mem- Materials, Volume .1 (attention to discrep-
not presently available), orandum for the Record (excerpt), Novem- ancies).
"Id., see also Colby letter refusing access, ber 19, 1971, Agent (Martinez' Code Name), 13 Tab 2, CIA Supplemental Materials, Vol--
infra. found at Tab 1, CIA Supplemental Materials, urne VIT (indicating April 14, 1972 change.
:" Id. Volume II; Executive Session Testimony over) ; Tab 10, Original CIA Materials, Volume
'Id. of (COS) supra note 2, at 14-18. 111 (indicating a March, 1072 change-over);
' Executive Session Testimony of Richard- 4(Case Officer #1) Memorandum for the . Executive Session Testimony of (COS), supra
Helms, supra note 3: Testimony of Richard Record (excerpt), supra note 3; Executive note 2, at 38 (indicating April 23-30, 1972
Helms before the Senate Armed Services Session Testimony of (COS), supra note 2, change-over). _
Committee, :City 17, 1973, at 17. at 13. 14 Executive Sesalon Testimony of (Case
"See Executive Session Testimony of - ' Executive Sessions Testimony of (COS), Officer #2), February 4, 1974, at 25-26, 41-42.
(Chief, TED), supra note 20. supra note 2, at 23-27. 13 Supra note 1.
?OSfemorandarn from Richard Helms to "Id, at 25-27; See (COS) Memorandum 10CTA Deputy Legislative Counsel showed
David Young, November 9, 1971, Original CIA for Chief, (deleted at Agency request), this staff a printed itinerary fnr the first case
Materials, Volume II, Tab. J. March 17, 1972, Subject: Mlsceilaneous In- officer which contained the referenced entry.
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 unity for .i,, ,;,fir period from 8. A .evsew of all CIA activities (regard- from Idaho (Mr. CliORCH),
Jun 72 to June 22, 1972. This lnfor- less of nature or degree of support) in Mex- the Senator
mattoi( been requested but it is avail- - Ico during the calendar year, 1971-1972. This from California (Mr. event and
able to the Senate Armed Services Committee information, which Is relevant to an objec- myself is intended to prevent a reoccur-,
only, Such information is critical to any tive assessment of CIA's post-Watergate rence not of a dream but of a fact.
determination as to the chronology of Water- posture and pre-Watergate potential involve. Indeed, for many years the American
gate notification and related actions. ment, has been requested (to an extent con- intelligence community has ignored Con-
3. Access to the five inch reel of tape sistent with national security) since Feb- gress; or, to put it the other way around,
labeled, "McCord Incident/1&-19 June 1972;" ruary 1, 1974.1s
which was found in the Office of Security 9. The "Pennington File," whi,-h was pro- r Congress ae has ign communit the The abuses American i unco v-
on March 1, 1974. It is not known what is viously requested and made available only ecannot In this tape, but its importance to the House Armed Services Oversight Com- ered Cannot be considered illogical.
is obvious. mittee. This file contains memoranda and Rather, they are the logical ending to a
Miscellanenrev other A...,..
me
t
h
h
n
o why `
i
'' r
e
formerly maintained in the Office of Security. alleged to have s participated in the burning delivery this morning, one of the mem-
This file was requested as early as mid-Jae of documents in the McCord home after the bers of my staff had written, "While the
uary, 1974, and its existence at that time Watergate break-in. This file aIm contains intelligence activities of Federal agen-
was denied by legislative liaison: Sworn test,- data regarding the "domestic activities" of
most' has since confirmed existence of such Pennington, and the CIA has made it known hies have been within the law and in the
a file, now under control of the Inspector that there are "gaps" in this file during cer- national interest." I turned to him and
General, tain relevant time periods, said, "I can't sav that. I don't know that
2. Any and all CIA files relating to the ac 10. At the conclusion of his Executive they have been."
tivities of E. Howard Hunt. This was re- Session on Friday, March 8, 1974; Ambas- That is the problem. It is not a prob-
quested in January of 1974 and was ignored sador Helms testified concerning an individ- lem that can be resolved solely by th,,,<
by the Agency. We are aware of at least an ual in a peculiar position to know the ac President of the United States. It Is as
executive registry file in which information tivities of, both the Agency and the FBI.
on Hunt was placed in 1971 and suggest that While Helms knew of no Watergate informa- much our responsibility and our job.
this would be a good starting point for com- tion in this individual's possession, other I find it interesting that we read in
pliance with this request, evidence suggests the contrary. Considera- the newspapers today and viewed on
3. Any and all CIA files relating to G. Gor- tion should be given to interviewing this television last night that there is to be
don Liddy during the time frame of Janu- individual who has already commenced a briefing of congressional leaders by
dry, 1970, to the present. When this request preparation of a Watergate-related memo- the President as to what was going on in
was made to the prey of 1974, e the staff eat randum in response to a previous request by the CIA. It that not something that the
advised that CIA iary of t Liddy was the staffR
tion, on
mited to sensitive briefings, the subject 11. Michael Mastrovito of the Secret Serv- congressional leaders should have known,
matter of which was beyond the purview of ice should be interviewed concerning his without getting a briefing from the Pres-
this Committee= Flies relative to these brief- Agency communications on June 17, 1972. ,dent of the United States? Is that not
this need to be Fiexamined, les to t here particularly is Agency documents Indicate that Mastrovito something on which perhaps we should
fight n the time period .of same, icu August agreed to downplay McCord's Agency. em- brief the President? Of course, we are
and Spthe time 19,71.
ployment; that Mastrovito was being pres- in no position to do so, because we do not
4. Any and all CIA files pertaining to at- sured for Information by a Democratic state know an thin
torney (name deleted at Agency request) chairman; and that Mtrovito was advised Whereas y g about it.
and/or his law firm from the period January by the CIA that the Agency was concerned I have uncovered the ilitar
1971 to the present. While the CIA has con- with McCord's emotional stability prior to abuses in the CIA, the Secret the Service, firmed that (attorney) is a former case o5- his retirement,' intelligence, t and the Secret Service,
cer and that (potentially significant infor- cannot honestly stand here and say that
oration deleted at agency request) .during The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under that is all that went on. There has been
the period et time that req ). dud fig the the previous order, the Senator from no agency accountability to Congress.
counsel for the committee to Re-Elect the Connecticut (Mr. WEIcvER) is recognized This is not to say that we do not have
Presidents contact reports and memoranda for not to exceed 5 minutes.
must be reviewed in raw form, before a deter- Mr. WEIICKER, Mr. President, I rise mittees, ut as the di the various ena-
mination can be made as to the impact of In support s, but as the pointed Ss art
the aforementioned facts, ? pport of the legislation submitted tor from Tennessee pointed out. it is an
5. Offlee tonedd facDirector Helms, Caen by the distinguished Senator from Ten- ancilary duty; It Is not the principal duty
affil Once cafe and the Deputy elms, Gen nessee (Mr. BAzza). - . of those committees. The chairmen and
Plans for the time frame from January of As I have said on other occasions, the the members of those committees have
1971 through June of 1973. These calendars job which was started a little over a substantial burdens in the areas of the
have been previously requested and are crit- year ago by the Senate Select Commit- judiciary, foreign relations, and defense,
ical to a thorough investigative analysis of tee will only -be considered a 'ob well So oversight Of the law enforcement In-
knowledge available to these respective or- done if we take the facts learned and teliigence community suffers.
ficlals at the critical times. These calendars construct legislation around those. facts- The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ros-
for review. '
have not been made available to this staff more particularly, if we construct legisla- ERr C. BYRD) ; The time of the Senator
6. All record pertaining to Agency financ- tion to see to it that the abuses uncovered has expired. Does the Senator desire aid-
ing of Egli record pert activities, as evidenced will never occur again. Unless we do that, ditional time? Krogh' by sworn testimony before this Committee, it can be said, with basis in fact, that Mr. WEICKER. I request an addi-
Also, interviews of superiors of (Secretary to ' the only purpose of the committee. was tional 2 minutes.
Chief, CIA Narcotics Control Group).' to indulge in acts of sensationalism rath- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
7. Interviews of (Chief, FEAB), (former er than in acts of legislation. ob the time wil.1 be taken of
outplacement director), (Agency employee), Insofar as the abuse of the Constitu- the@time, allotted tote Se atorofrom
(Agency employee), (former 'Agency ern- tion and the laws of this country by West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRA).
ployee), (former Agency employee) and at-
torney (former Agency employee), all of the law enforcement intelligence com- Mr. WEICKER. Congress itself has
whom were either in the employ or were munity, it cannot be said that Water-
former employees of the Agency at the time gate was a bad dream. It was a fact The ti long been reluctant to ask the hard ques-
former a4---- --
entr
---a
y operations) during 1971 and ator from Tennessee and the Senator of agencies such as the CIA, the FBI, the
1x72. from Michigan (Mr. HART) the Senator
11-19 Liddy, Supplemental Materials, volume
IT, Tab 13:
See CIA's response to this inquiry regard-
ing (attorney), CIA Supplemental Materials,
Volume ]:I, Tab 14; IV (CIA Memorandum,
June 28, 1973) .
'See Executive Session Testimony of (Sec-
retary" to Chief, CIA Narcotics Control
Group). March 2, 1974, (transcription not
Presently avallable).
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Secret Service, the Defense' Intelligence
.5 The CIA, through its legislative liaison, Agency, the National Security Agency,
has confirmed that Mexico Is an "important and numerous others charged with gath-
country" to the CIA, but has refused to pro- ering intelligence and surveillance of
vide any other information regarding CIA Persons.
Mexican activities. during the 1971-72 time With no accountabili
period. ty, we can readily
6 See CIA Supplemental Material, Volume anticipate abuse of agency powers and
11.
I See CIA Tab 18. constitutional rights. The record of
can-
Watergate break-in, cable CIA Suppletmental M te. nots be dismissed as last isolated instances
real. Volume vi. of individual excesses. It is a record that
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tears at cry fabric of our con-
stitutional ndcracy.
The lesson of these abuses of the na-
tional intelligence function is that ac-
countability cannot be assured without
congressional oversight, oversight that
has constancy, purpose, and real power
to get the facts out.
It is in this interest of strengthening
this congressional oversight respon-
sibility, that Senator BAKER, Senator
Cxu-Rcx, Senator CRANsroN and I are
today introducing legislation to establish
the Joint Committee on Intelligence
Oversight, with broad powers to au-
thorize, investigate, and legislate on
matters related to the intelligence agen-
cies, as well as to the intelligence activi-
ties of all other Federal agencies and de-
partments.
In this way, we seek to consolidate the
congressional intelligence oversight
function in one joint committee with
sweeping powers to demand full and cur-
rent accountability.
Mr. President, this is the opportunity
for Congress to act. The facts are
on the table, and now the American
people look to us for leadership. Oth-
erwise, the abuses that occurred de facto
become a part of the laws of this Nation.
What a tragedy that would be, in light
of what those facts say.
The joint committee would be com-
posed of 14 members evenly divided be-
tween the House and Senate, chosen by
the leadership. In order that this im-
portant committee remains independent
and healthily skeptical, we would en-
courage the leadership of both Houses
to consider some form of rotating mem-
bership for the joint committee.
The joint committee would possess pri-
mary authorization and legislative juris-
diction over all activities and operations
of: the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
U.S. Secret Service, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, and the National Secu-
rity Agency, as well as over all intelli-
gence or surveillance activities or oper-
ations of any other department or agency
of the Federal Government.
The bill clearly states that the direc-
tors of the above-named agencies-
shall keep the Joint Committee fully and
currently informed with respect to all of the
activities of their respective organizations,
and the heads of all other departments and
agencies of the Federal Government conduct-
ing intelligence activities or operations or the
surveillance of persons shall keep the Joint
Committee fully and currently informed of
all Intelligence and surveillance activities
and operations carried out by their respective
departments and agencies.
The joint committee may require from
any department or agency of the Federal
Government periodic written reports re-
garding activities and operations within
the jurisdiction of the joint committee.
To back up requests for relevant infor-
mation, the committee would have full
subpena powers.
Furthermore, the proposed legislation
provides that:
No funds may be appropriated for the pur-
pose of carrying out any intelligence or sur-
veillance act or operation by any office, or
any department, or agency of the Federal
Government unless such funds for such
activity or operation have been spe.iBcally
authorized by legislation enacted after the
date of enactment of this act.
Therefore, the budgets of secret agen-
cies like the CIA and NSA could not be
hidden in Defense appropriation bills,
and no blanket authorizations could be
used to avoid the committee's scrutiny
of intelligence agency budgets.
While the creation of the joint com-
mittee would not deprive the current
oversight committees-Armed Sl;rvices,
Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and
so forth-of the opportunity to exercise
oversight over intelligence matters re-
lated to the jurisdiction of these com-
mittees, no legislation or.no provision
contained in any legislation dealing with
any matter within the jurisdiction of the
joint committee can be considered by
either House unless such legislation has
been reported by the joint comm'.ttee or
Is a floor amendment to committee leg-
islation.
And, given national. security consid-
erations, the joint committee would be
empowered to take any and all precau-
tions necessary to maintain the confi-?
dentiality of sensitive information, before
it.
The hearings last year before the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities documented the sys-
tematic abuse of governmental agencies.
The facts of the White House respon-
siveness programs which pressured Fed-
eral agencies to favor political friends
and disadvantage enemies are startling
indeed. But the litany of White House
domestic and foreign intelligence opera-
tions conducted under the banner of "na-
tional security" can only be termed a na-
tional disgrace.
The executive branch had at Its dis-
posal a massive intelligence apparatus-
the CIA, the FBI, the National Security
Agency-NSA-and the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency-DIA. The Nixon adminis-
tration simply used at home what had
been developed in clandestine operations
abroad.
This was the proposal of Tom Charles
'Huston in his July 1970 memorandum to
White House Chief of Staff H.R. Halde-
man. Houston wrote:
In the past there has been no systematic
effort to mobilize the full resources of the
intelligence community in the internal secu-
rity area. . Domestic Intelligence infor-
mation coming into the White House has
been fragmentary and unevaluated.... Un-
like most of the bureaucracy the Intelligence
community welcomes direction and leader-
ship from the White House.
In other words, the intelligence com-
munity was available, acquiescent and
unaccountable.
And what did this facade of "national
security" really cover up?
These were the sordid activities it jus-
tified:
In a massive operation, mail sent to a
Democratic Party was opened and photo-
granhed by the U.S. Army.
Military agents spied on a group of Mc-
Govern supporters in Berlin.
Internal Security Division of the Jus-
tice Department on a daily basis, pro-
vided the Committee to Re-Elect the
President information on individuals of a
political and nonpolitical nature.
An FBI agent was used by the White
House to spy on Newsday which was do
ing an article on one of the President's
friends.
The FBI conducted an investigation on
Daniel Schorr, an investigation designed
by the White House to embarrass and
harass.
The CIA provided support materials to
E. Howard Hunt for the purposes of an
illegal entry and burglary into offices of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
This litany could run for pages, but the
message is clear and convincing: Unless
Congress exercises its oversight responsi-
bility over the intelligence community,
our constitutional democracy is vulner-
able to continued subversion.
Congress must act now to reaffrm the
accountability of the American intelli-
gence community. .
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
excerpt from the final Watergate report.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
EXCERPTED FROM FrNAL WATERGATE REPORT
(By Senator Low=LL WEIcitEa)
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMANTrr
The attitudes and policies that led to
Watergate had a profound impact on the
intelligence community, from the FBI and
the CIA to the lesser intelligence sections of
other agencies.
Soon after the new administration took
office in 1968, there seems to have been a
basic dissatisfaction within the White
House as to our existing intelligence capa-
bilities. They were variously considered too
timid, too bound by tradition, and generally
incapable of acting effectively with respect
to what the White House perceived as neces-
sary intelligence.
One of the responses by the White House
was to set up a plan, an intelligence plan,
so that the objectives, methods, and results
of the Intelligence community would coin-
cide with the White House. This plan was
drafted by Tom Charles Huston in early
1970,30' and came to be known as the 1970
Domestic Intelligence Plan, or the Huston
Plan.
Much of the plan, which has been described
previously,184 was illegal, either in its objec-
tives or in the methods It proposed.
Nevertheless, there are numerous indica-
-tions, in evidence received by this Commit-
tee, that the types of activities recommended
in the plan were carried out in the following
years. The net effect was to subvert or
distort the legitimate intelligence functions
of the government.
The plan recommended an expanded use
of electronic surveillance, However, the ex-
panded wiretapping that took place in
succeeding years was done outside legitimate
channels, such as the 17 so-called Kissinger
taps,180 the tap on Joseph Kraft,, the
1' According to Mr. Haldeman, "the Presi-
dent set up an interagency committee con-
sisting of the Directors of the FBI, the CIA.
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Na-
tional Security Agency," and "Mr. Huston,
the White House staff man for this project,
was notified by a memorandum from me of
the a'proval of the President." Testimony of
H. R. Haldeman, Vol. 7, 2875.
jB9 See, notes 183-186.
ix Testlrr ony of Robert Mardian, Vol. 4,
pp. 2392-2393; John Ebrlichman. Vol. 4, p.
2629: and John Dean, Vol. 3. p. 920.
_"Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 919.
in June, 1969, Ehrlichman directed Caulfield
In lieu of the FBI to place a national security
tap on Kraft's home phone. Caulfield con-
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Watergate and even the
on the President's brother .m
The second element of the plan called
for surreptitious entries. Burglaries In fact
took place at the office of Dr. Ellsberg's
psychiatrist,701 at the Democratic National
Committee; at the office of publisher Hank
Greenspun, according to multiple evi-
dence;-^` and were suggested or planned for
the cotes of the Potomac Associates; 04
The Brookings Institute,-"A and Senator
McGovern's campaign headquarters? d
Ziail sent to an affiliate of the Democratic
party was opened and photographed, by the
United States Army, in a well-documented
and apparently massive operation?m and
mlltary agents spied on the Concerned
Americans in Berlin, a group of McGovern
supporters who were officially, recognized by
the Democratic party.R06
The specific actions proposed by Huston
are only one aspect of the plan, Equally
important are the policy recommendations,
The heart of this new policy was better
coordination and use of existing intelligence
from all areas of the government" The
means of carrying it out was to be a new
intelligence "Committee" sitting above all
the agencies. Again, the plan was carried
out.
On September, 17, 1970, an Intelligence
Evaluation Committee was set up In the
White House a" It was to receive informa-
tion from the CIA,- the FBI, the National
Security Agency, and other intelligence sec-
tions. Notwithstanding the fact that the
statues prohibit the CIA from participating
in any domestic intelligence function, it was
called upon to evaluate domestic intelli-
gence-gathering by the other agencies when
the intelligence Evaluation Committee was
set up. This Intelligence was to be digested by
the CIA experts and then disseminated for
use wherever useful, regardless of the stat-
utory limits placed on the agency that
collected the information as
What was important about setting up that
Committee was not the work it actually did,
but rather the legitimization of a concept.
That concept was that Intelligence functions
of the various agencies were there for what-
ever purpose the Executive decided it
tatted Jack Regan, former FBI agent, who
ultimately installed the tap. Executive Sea-
-stop of John Caulfield, March 23, 1974.
-"Presidential Press Conference, Novem-
ber 17. 1973.
Testimony of Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, p.
3683.
207 Testimony of Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, p.
3887. See Transcripts of Presidential Conver-
sations. Sept. 15, 1972.
:04 White House memo, July 6, 1971, from
John Caulfield to John Dean, stating in part,
"a penetration Is deemed possible if
required."
20" Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 920;
Executive Session of John Caulfield,. March
23, 1974.
=O4 Testimony of Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, p.
3688.
pT See, testimony of Senator Lowell P.
Weicker, hearings on Warrantless Wiretap-
ping and Electronic Surveillance, relating to
Intelligence activities of the United States
military directed against "The Concerned
Americans in Berlin." an affiliate of the
American Democratic party. (Exhibit 8)
0 Id.
20" Ths was the final section of the 1970
Domestic Intelligence Plan, entitled "Meas-
ures to Improve Domestic Intelligence Oper-
ations." Vol. 3, Ex. 35, p. 1323. Sea testi-
mony of John Dean, Vol. 4, p. 1457.
21"The memo to the Attorney General de-
scribing the setting up of the IEC was quoted
in full in the text of the hearings. Vol. 3,
wanted, not for the purposes Congress de- long as the IRS has the power to be a s-
clded by statute. tential harassment for the average citizen
As an illustration, Mr. McCord testified ' if audits are not conducted on an objective
that he eventually received information for basis this procedure of developing files on
. The
questioned
be
must
g citizens
l Divi-
it
l S
;
ecur
use by CRP from the Interna
hat duties
Is
t
point
more, im portant
slop of the Justice Department, on a daily .and responsibilities are spelled out by the
FBBrI, , pertained Itertained to fed to I indlividualals, an s and from wee of the a Congress, and such an operation is not one
political as well as non-political natureR?? of them.
This arrangement was made pursuant to a The IRS and the Justice Department were
request sent to Mr. Mitchell from 10r. Mc not the only agencies pressured into assist-
Cord, which led to a call from Assistant ing White House intelligence demands. A
Attorney General Mardian In which he re- Secret Service agent spied on Senator Mc-
layed the Attorney General's approval and Govern, 220 when supposedly protecting him
told McCord to work through the Internal during the campaign. When the White House
Security Division 214 - was informed of this, no objection was made.
The Internal Security Division of the Jus- An FBI agent was used by a White House
tice Department also provided political legal staff member to spy on a Long Island news-
assistance to the White House. For example, paper doing an article on one of the Press
it provided information regarding c.emon deat'saafriends.n The Commerce Department
strators, and information that would em- was called on to provide commercial infor-
barass Individuals in connection with their mation in a project that it was hoped would
embarrass. Senator Muskie?ZI The Depart-
relationship with demonstrators and c,emon- went of Defense was used to find out infor-
stration Ieaders 2' . mation as to Senator McGovern's war rec-
Another Illustration of misuse of ;ntelli- ords, at a time when there were public
genes was the request made to the IRS, on charges that he may have acted with coward-
July 1, 1969, by Mr. Huston, to set up a ice.
means of "reviewing the operations of Ideo- There wary testimony to the effect that
logical. Organizations" n" Soon the IRS had there was nothing short of a basic policy to
set up an "Activists Organizations Commit- use any governmental agencies to seek poll-
tea,"617 collecting intelligence to "find out tically embarrassing information on individ-
generally about the funds of these organiza- uals who were thought to be enemies of the
bons." An internal memo pointed out that White House. The, so-called "enemies list-'
"its activities should be disclosed generally was maintained in the White House for this
only to those persons who need to know, purpose, and a memo was prepared to imple-
because of its semi-secretive nature." "We do ment a means of attacking these enemies .=
not want the news media to be aleded to Apparently it was not enough to maneuver
what we are attempting to do or how we the intelligence community and related
are operating because the disclosure of such agency functions. Plans were made to take
Information might embarrass the Adminis- what is clearly a function of government out
tration. " "The type of organization In which side the government, to set up an independ-
we are interested may be ideological . . ent intelligence operation.
or other." "In effect, what we will attempt to ? The first plan was put forth by Mr. Caul-
do is to gather Intelligence data on the orga- ? field, in proposals to Messrs. Dean, Mitchell
nixations in which we are interested and to and Ehriichman. He suggested a private
use a Strike Force concept." n1 This was not security entity that would be available for
tax collection; it was the IRS.being con- White House special projects, thereby In-
verted into an intelligence agency; and it was sulating the White House from its deeds. It
stopped In- the midst of this committee's was called Operation Sandwedge.=4
hearings In mid-1973. Mr. Caulfield rejected the Sandwedge plan,
The next step was when the IRS began and it was apparently replaced with an op-
gathering intelligence from other parts of the eration that came to be known as the
government, with no attempt made to re- "Plumbers." In the meantime, Caulfield be-
strict this to tax-related information. Ar- gan conducting Intelligence functions from
rangements were made with the military, the a position on the White House counsel's staff,
Internal Security Division of the Justice De- functions that properly belong in the ages-
partment, and the Secret Service to turn over ties, if anywhere.
Information on individuals or groups go
2nD White House memo from Steve $aralekas
2u McCord received information, including to Charles Colson, August 18, 1972, referring
FBI data, from the Internal Security Division - to the activities of Agent Bolton. See also,
of the Justice Department, upon his request testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, pp. 923, 1071.
to Attorney General Mitchell. Mitchell told : 231 John Caulfield testified that he re-
Mardian to direct McCord to I.S.D., where quested a New York City FBI agent to go out
McCord's contact was John Martin, Chief of to the Newsday offices. This was done, and
the Evaluation Section. Testimony of James included a report of the newspaper's con-
McCord, Vol. 1, p. 178. fidential publication - schedule. Executive
Id., at 181. Session of John Caulfield,. March 23, 1974.
214 Id., at 178. 224 Memo to Charles Colson from Thomas
215 Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, pp. 916- Thawley, Deputy Asst. Secretary of Com-
919. ? merce, April 16, 1971.
ue Memo from Tom Huston to Roger Barth, 220 White House memo from John Dean.,
Asst. Co~oner of IRS, August 14, 1970. August 16, 1971, entitled "Dealing With Our
nT See testimony of Senator Lowell P. Political Enemies." Vol. 4, Ex. 48, p. 1689.
Weicker, hearings on Warrantless 'Wiretap- x4 Drafted in late summer 1971, Operation
ping and Electronic Surveillance, April 8, Sandwedge called for- an offensive intelll-
1974 (Exhibit 1, memo by D. O. Virdin of the gence-gathering operation for infiltration of
IRS; report of meeting to set up an "Activists campaign organizations and headquarters
Organizations Committee"). with "undercover personnel, surveillance of
21h Id. Democratic conventions and meetings, de-
'10 For example, on December 4, 1989, D. W. rogatory Information-seeking Investigations,
Bacon, Asst. Commissioner, IRS, contacted and "black bag" activities. Though dropped
Colonel Heston C. Cole, Counterintelligence from active consideration by late 1071, Op-
Division, Directorate Office of Special 'Investi- eration Sandwedge can be seen as a pre-
gations, and on January 26, 1970 the IRS cursor of the Gemstone Plan which achieved
contacted Director Rowely of the Secret Serv- the capabilities championed by Caulfield.
ice, In both cases to coordinate intel'agence- See, Caulfield Executive Session, March 23,
gathering operations through the Activists 1974; See also, Campaign Practices Section
Organizations Committee. See, testimony of of Select Committee Report, exhibit of mem-
Senator Lowell P. Weicker, hearings on War- orandum of Caulfield to Dean entitled "Op.
919, 1057-1974, and Vol. 4, p. 1457. lance, April 8, 1974. Vol. 3, pp. 924-8; Vol. 6, p. 2537.
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Caulfield was instructed, for example, to
develop political intelligence on Senator Ken-
nedy, including instructions from the Assist-
ant Attorney General to obtain certain
information about the travels of Mary Jo
Kopechne.=5 When he took the job, he told
Mr. : nrlichman that he would hire an ex-
New York City policeman to do investigative
work.--
Ulasewicz was then used to collect
Mr.
Information on various enemies, political,
ideological. and personal. A sample of his
acts. ides reveals not only why intelligence
should not be outside the checks of a pro-
fessional organization, but also the rather
broad scope of what the White House was in
fact doing. His investigations included such
things as Richard Nixon's old apartment in
New York, a Kennedy official trip to -Hawaii,
name checks on White House visitors, the
President's brother, political contributors to
a dozen Senators who opposed, the admin-
istration, Jefferson Hospital in Philadelphia,
Louis Harris Polls the Businessmen's Educa-
tion Fund, the House of Mercy home for
unwed mothers, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, a comedian named Dixon, Mrs. Rose
Kennedy's secretary, and Birmingham, Ala-
bama City Council. Mayor, and Executive
Staff.141 And that is just a sample of the
much larger number of his investigations.
Many of them are clearly the responsibility
of established agencies, if they are anybody's
responsibility at all.
Eventually, a semi-official unit, the Plumb-
ers, was established within the White House,
with a combination of police and intelligence,
duties. It conducted what Mr. Mitchell re-
ferred to in his testimony as the "White
House horrors" .= According to Mitchell,
these operations were so wrong that If the
President had heard about them he would
have "lowered the Boom", even though there
is other evidence that the President did know
about them and didn't lower any boom=
The legitimate Intelligence agencies were
used to support this operation, specifically
by providing materials for their operations.
General Cushman of the CIA testified that
after a personal request from Mr. Ehrlich.
man. CIA technical services people provided
Mr. Hunt with a drivers license, social secu-
rity card, wig, and speech altering device,
=In the summer of 1969, when Dean was
working at the Justice Department,i "then
Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst called
(Dean) into his office and told (him) that
the White House wanted some very Important
information ... regarding the foreign travels
of Mary Jo Kopechne." Dean was directed to
obtain the information from Mr. De Loach,
Deputy Director of the FBI, and give It to
John Caulfield from the White House. Vol. 3,
P. 922.
Ehrlichman appointed Caulfield to the
White House staff on April 8. 1969, as a liai-
son with various law enforcement agencies,
with the understanding that the services
of Mir. Ulasewlcz, a retiring New York detec-
tive, would be obtained. Commencing July,
1969, Ulasewicz reported on his Investigatory
activities to the White House through Caul"
field, on the orders of Mr. Ehrlichman and
Mr. Dean. Vol. 1, p. 251.
=T See, Committee interviews with Mr.
Ula_;ewicz, Mr. Dean, Mr. Caulfield, Anne
Dawson, Tony LaRocco.
8~* Mr. Mitchell described the Plumbers'
activities which he learned of from Mr. Mar-
dian and Mr. LaRue, as the "White House
horror stories." Vol. 4. pp. 1824-25.
On '.larch 22, 1973, the day after Mr.
Dean told the President of the Watergate-
related White House horrors and other facts,
the President, according to Mitchell, dis-
cussed the possibility of using Dean as a
liaison with the Ervin Committee, rather
than lowering any boom. Vol. 5, p. 1894.
which were delivered to a "safe house" off
CIA premises per Hunt's Lnstructlons.m
Around August, 1971, Hunt began to make
additional demands on the CIA: first, for a
stenographer to be brought In from Paris,
which Cushman and Director Helms con-
sidered merely a face-saving move and
rejected. Later demands were made for a tape
recorder in a typewriter case, a camera in a
tobacco pouch, for film development, and for
an additional alias and false papers for an-
other man ("probably Liddy"), which re-
quests came to Cushman's attention after
they had been granted by the technical serv-
ices people .=
After Hunt's additional demands and a
subsequent request for a New York address
and phone services, Cushman and Helms de-
cided Hunt's requests had exceeded his orig-
inal authority. On August 31, 1971, Hunt
made a final request, for a credit card, which
was denied .=
Mr. Young of the Plumbers unit asked
the CIA to do a psychological profile of Dr.
Ellsberg. It was clearly a domestic project,
the only one of its type ever requested, ac-
cording to. Gen. Cushman of the CIA, who
also testified that such profiles are reserved
for foreign leaders. Nevertheless, It was done,
but Mr. Young considered it unsatisfactory,.
so another profile was prepared and sent.2"
Other projects spanned a broad range, such
as spiriting Dita Beard from the East Coast
to a Denver hospital, and a subsequent trip
to Denver by Hunt in disguise to question
her about the ITT affair754 To bring the full
influence of the White House to bear on
this extraordinary activity, Mr. Ehrlichman
testified that he personally - introduced
Messrs. Krough and.Young, who headed up
the Plumbers to the heads of various agen-
cies, such as the Secretary of Defense, the
Attorney General, and the Director of the
CIA .=
Members of the Plumbers eventually went
on to similar work for the Committee to Re-
elect. Although they were clearly outs'.de the
government, they again used the legitimate
agencies. Ex-CIA employees were recruited
on the basis of their loyalty to the CIA. Na-
tional security responsibilities were misused.
Mr. Barker was even told that the interests
of national security he was serving were
above the FBI and the CIAJ'8 To reinforce
this position, classified and critical Informa-
tion about the mining of Haiphong harbor
was relayed to Barker the day before the
Presideat's announcement 5" This was not
only a misuse of secret Defense Depa:rtment
intelligence, but it also furthered a misuse
of national security entrustment in the ex-
ecutive,branch.
5 Vol. 8, pp. 3292-93. -
231 Id. -
5'Id.
2" Id., at p. 3311.
224 Shortly after the ITT memo was pub-
lished in February, 1972, Mr. Liddy trans-
ported Dita Beard from Washington to a hos-
pital In Denver. In his interview there, Mr.
Hunt elicited from Pita Beard a public
statement that the memo was a fraud. Testi-
mony of Robert Mardian, Vol. 6, p. 2359;
Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, pp. 3752-53.
2?8 Mr. Ehrlichman testifies further that
Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young "described the
function of the special unit" (the Plumbers)
to the heads of the various agencies. Vol. 7,
p. 2691.
22e Testimony of Bernard Barker, Vol. 1,
p.360. - -
"'Mr. Hunt testified that he was "in very
general terms aware of" the President's
speech announcing the bombing of Haiphong
harbor prior to the speech. Hunt requested
that Mr. Barker "attempt to.have as many
telegrams as possible sent to the White
House . . . manifesting approval of the Pres-
ident's move.". Testimony of Howard Hunt,
Vol. 9, pp. 3745-46. 1
. In a different type of situation, Mr. Halde-
man was appointed "the Lord High Execu-
tioner of leaks". This technique of attacking
and solving the leaks problem Illustrates the
contempt for normal government functions.
It resulted in Mr. Caulfield, by his own testi-
mony, being directed by Ehrlichman to wire-
tap a newsman's telephone (Joseph Kraft)
in pursuit of a leak.m outside the safeguards
of government wiretap procedures and regu-
lations. There are capabilities within the
legitimate operations of our government for
handling such a problem. The attitude that
these problems had to be treated Independ-
ently was the same attitude that led to the
17 Kissinger taps being installed outside
normal FBI channels and Mardian's instruc-
tions from the President regarding the dis-
position of those wiretap logs "that related
to newsmen and White House staff suspected
of leaking",=9 and that led to unusual and.
perhaps illegal White House involvement in
the Ellsberg case itself.
There is a reason for demanding that gov-
ernment officials use only the tested and ac-
countable facilities of government. It has
been illustrated by the kind of projects un-
dertaken independently by the White House.
The final contempt for the Intelligence
community can be seen in efforts to exploit
them in the coverup. Mr. Ehrllchman said
that he and Mr. Haldeman had spoken to
General Walters and Mr. Helms of the CIA
shortly after the Watergate break-in.
Ehrlichman further said that Walters was a
friend of the White House and was there to
give the White House Influence over the
CIA241 Dean testified. that Ehrlichman asked
him to explore the possible use of the CIA
with regard to assisting the Watergate
burglars 242
On June 23, 1972, Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Ehrlichman met with Director Helms and
General Cushman of the CIA. According to
Director Helms, Haldeman said something to
the effect that it had been decided that Gen-
eral Walters was to go talk to FBI Director
Gray and inform him that "these investiga-
tions of the FBI might run into CIA opera-.
tions in Mexico" and that it might be best
if they were tapered off-or something like
that.U2 According to General Walters, Halde-
mandirected Helms to inhibit the FBI in-
vestigation on grounds that It would uncover
CIA assets in Mexico. Haldeman also indi-
cated he had information the CIA did not
have, and that five suspects were sufficient. u4
When Director Helms and Director Gray of
the FBI scheduled a meeting between them-
selves on June 28, 1972, Mr. Ehrlichman In-
tervened and canceled the meeting, thus pre-
venting any independent contacts.
At a later time, Mr. Dean discussed with
General Walters the possibility of using cov-
ert CIA funds to pay the Watergate defend-
-See note 21, supra.
225 The President Instructed Mr. Mardian
in the fall of 1971 to transfer the logs from
Mr. Sullivan, Assistant Director of the FBI,
to Mr. Ehrlichman, who kept them In his safe
for over a year. Testimony of John Dean,
Vol. 3. pp. 920-21.
21? Ehrlichman and Haldeman were In-
structed to insure that covert CIA activities
were not exposed by the Watergate investi-
gation being conducted by the FBI. Vol. Go-
p. 2557.
241 On June 26, 1972, Mr. Dean on Mr.
Mitchell's suggestion, sought through Mr.
Ehrlichman to contact the CIA as to the
Watergate break-in. Vol. 3, p. 946.
242 Mr. Dean indicated to Gen. Walters that
witnesses were wobbling and could cause
problems, and asked if the CIA could raise
ball for some of these defendants. Testimony
of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 1037; Vol. 4, p. 1461.
242 Testimony of Richard Helms, Vol. 8,
p, 3238.
244 Memorandum of General Walters, Vol. 7.
Ex. 101, pp. 2948-49. .
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;.- n ' 1973, the CIA was asked
b the Wh+' ' ? to take custody of Justice
Department - un Watergate, but the re-
quest was denied. ?'
'Mr. 'McCord testified that at the time of
the Watergate trial, pressure was brought on
himself and other defendants to claim for
purposes of a defense that Watergate was a
CIA ooeratlon.='T
The FBI was likewise abused in numerous
ways. Some of these, such as turning over
Hunt's flies to Mr. Gray, have been well doc-
umented. But there were other examples.
The FBI set up the so-called Kissinger wire-
taps outside channels, effectively insulating
them from routine discovery and account-
ability, and at the President's instructions,
Mr. William Sullivan (who had supervised
the wiretaps) turned over all evidence of
them to the White House when it was re-
portedly related to the President that Hoover
might use them to preserve his job.:" The
F Iran an investigation of CBS newsman
Daniel Schorr, in. what was a White House
tactic to embarrass him, according to one
witness.Tw
Mr. Ehrlichman testified- that he was in.
structed after the Watergate. break-In to see
to it that the FBI investigation did not un-
cover the El_'sbergg break-in or, get into the
Pentagon Papers episode=" ' -
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the dis
tinguished Senator from Michigan now
be recognized under the order previously
entered, without prejudice to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr.-
CHURCH).
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore (Mr.METCALF). Without objection,
it is so ordered.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, I ant de-
lighted to have the opportunity today
to join the Senator from Connecticut
tMr. WEICxza), the Senator from Idaho
(Mr. CHURCH), and the Senator from
Tennessee (Mr. BAxzx) in introducing
proposed legislation for a joint committee
Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 1937.
On February 9, 1973, Mr. Dean called the
new Director of the CIA, Mr. Schlesinger, and
suggested that the Justice Department
be required to return to the CIA a package
of all the materials turned over to Justice
.regarding Hunt and the break-in at Dr.
F elding's office. Mr. Schlesinger and General
Walters decided this was "out of the ques-
tion". Testimony of General Walters, Vol. 9,
pp. 3417-19.
='7 Testimony of James McCord, Vol. 1, pp.
193-98.
"In In July. 19.72, Mr. Sullivan, Associate
Director of the FBI, informed Mr: Mardian
of the existence of "some very sensitive na-
t!onal security surveillance logs that were
r,ot ... in-channel", that Mr. Hoover might
use to preserve his job. Mr. Mardian then
new by courier plane to see the President in
San Clemente. who directed him to obtain
the reports from Mr. Sullivan and deliver
them to Mr. Ehrlichman. Testimony of
Robert Mardian, Vol. 8, pp. 2392-93.
-"air. Haldeman requested Mr. Higby to
direct the FBI to investigate Daniel Schorr.
But "to the dismay of the White House, Mr.
Hoover proceeded with a full field wide-open
investigation" which became apparent and
"put the White House in a rather scrambling
position to explain what had happened."
Ultimately the White House attempted to ex-
plain that ',Ir. Schorr was being considered
for a Presidential appointment in the en-
vironmental field. Testimony of John Dean,
Vol. 3. 107-1. -
=A Testimony of John Ehritehman, Vpl. 6,
p. 2544. .
to oversee ant.. evaluate the intelligence
gathering, surveillance. and covert polit-
ical action undsrtrz!-f:-: by our national
intelligence est: nt.
Such an idea new. It has been
proposed and sidetracked in the past.
But as the distinguished Senator from
North Carolina (Mr. EavIY) often re-
minds us, the Bible speaks of a time
and a season for everything. Now is the
time, the season, for such a committee.
Hopefully. one legacy of Watergate and
of revealed efforts to subvert elected gov-
ernments abroad will be this overdue
step to reassert democratic control over
foreign policy and to preserve a free en-
vironment here in America. -
. To create such a committee does not
require criticism of past efforts by ex-
isting oversight subcommittees in each
House of Congress to monitor particular-
portions. of the intelligence community.
We can recognize the sharp increase in
public concern over the threat of im-
proper surveillance and other clandes-
tine activity by Government agencies.
We can recognize as the Senator from
Connecticut has just emphasized, that
Congress needs the benefit of compre-
hensive scrutiny of all Government in-
telligence, surveillance and covert politi-
cal operations if it is to carry out Its
constitutional responsibilities and to re-
assure the public.
And finally, we can recognize. that such
systematic evaluation and monitoring
can best be done by a joint committee
with the broadest charter, the resources
and the status comparable to the .Joint
Atomic Energy Committee.
Mr. President, we have had consider-
able discussion in the past year of such
problems as the alleged national secu-
rity wiretaps on newsmen and others,'
the so-called plumbers' operations, the
FBI "Co-Intel-Pro" effort to dis-
rupt and discredit dissident political
groups, and Army surveillance of Ameri-
can citizens: These and many other Is-
sues which would be addressed by the .
joint committee proposed here today will
be the subject of further comment as
the merits of this bill are debated.. To-
day, let me confine my remarks to
another .important area of oversight cov-
ered by this proposal: covert political
operations in foreign countries.
Last week the Center for National Se-
curity- Studies held a very significant
conference on the conduct of covert po-
litical operations-as distinct from in-
telligence gathering-by our clandestine
agents in other countries. Participants
included former CIA officials, CIA. Di-
rector William Colby. others who have
held responsible positions in the na-
tional security machinery of our Govern-
ment, and informed journalists and
scholars. One point which emerged from
the conference sessions was that sev-
eral strawman arguments might easily
divert attention from the real issues in
regard to covert operations. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind what the issues are
and what they are not.
Those who defend the present opera
tions of the CIA and its oversight by
Congress suggest that critics naively fail
to appreciate our need for accurate in-
telligence. That is nonsense. No one, in-
cluding those of us introc.incing this --CAI,
doubts the importance of intelligence
about what is happening in the world
or about what might happen which could
endanger American security. And, of
course, we appreciate that the balance
of nuclear deterrence particularly re-
quires accurate, strategic intelligence..
To question the extent of our covert
political capability and activities is nei-
ther to imply that intelligence Is bad nor
that we do not need a CIA. Some intelli-
gence gathering must be covert. But we
must keep in mind that much of-it is
derived from careful analysis of open -
sources or diplomatic reporting. Most of
the rest, especially in the crucial area
of strategic intelligence on nuclear
weapons, comes from technical means
such as satellite reconnaissance.
Moreover, evaluation of intelligence is
done by the analysts of the CIA's Direc-
torate for Intelligence--hand their coun-
terparts at other agencies-and not by
the covert operators. Indeed, one of the
concerns about covert operations is that
they not only may have a distorting ef-
fect on our professed foreign policy
goals but also that they distort the pri-
orities of the intelligence community. I
think this is true particularly for the -
CIA. In some instances, the past or cur-
rent, operations, or future plans, of cov-
ert operations may even affect the objet-'
tivity of the intelligence analyses pro-
vided our top policymakers and to Con-
gress.- In short, the organization of the na-
tional security establishment' to obtain
and use intelligence is an important
question for our proposed committee to
examine. But it is distinct from the more
pressing question of the impact which
covert political -operations have, both in
other countries and ultimately in our
own society. . -
Second, if our concern is to enhance
the Intelligence function and not to do
away with it, neither are we saying that
the United States should never, under -
any circumstances, interfere with the in- -
ternal affairs of other nations. We could
not rid ourselves of that option entirely -
even if we wanted to do so. - -
But there is a legitimate concern
about the far-flung empire of thousands
of agents or contract employees, of large
commercial cover operations, airlines,
banking operations, and a large bureauc-
racy which together create a tremendous
momentum to use the Agency's covert
"assets" because they are there.
While we may hear a lot about the
threat posed by Russia's nuclear arsenal,
covert political operations have long
since proved of little value against such
closed societies. Such operations are not
aimed in any significant degree at Mos-
cow or Peking today. -
Rather they are aimed at so-called
third-world countries where penetration
and political corruption or clandestine
use of force may be easier but the threat
posed to national security of the United
States is also much more difficult to -
perceive.
As Director Colby noted in a speech be-
fore the conference on covert operations
last week, the world and our perception
of our interests have changed substan-
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tially and, ?;s!:s has affected the impor-
tance of covert operations. Let me quote
briefly from what he said:
it is advocated by some that the United
States abandon covert action. This is a le-
gitimate question, and in light of current
American policy, as I have indicated, it would
not have a major Impact on our current So-
tivites or the current security of the United
States. I believe, however, that a sovereign
nation must look ahead to changing circum-
stances. I can envisage [sic) situations in
which the United States might well need to
conduct covert action in the faco of some
new threat that developed In the world.
As he clarified In response to questions
at the conference, it Is Mr. Colby's view
that no operations currently underway or
contemplated are vital to our security at
this time.
His main argument seems to be that we
should maintain this capability because
times may change.
No one can deny that the future is un-
certain, but against that we must weigh
the known costs of maintaining this ca-
pability under current executive branch
decision procedures and congressional
oversight.
In Laos the President waged a secret
war financed and run by the CIA. The
Constitution says nothing about a secret
war-a concept which the Executive now
seems to take as its perogative. The Con-
stitution does not give the President
power to order advisers who are nomi-
nally civilians into the field to make war
In the secret name of the United States.
In Chile we admittedly spent: millions
of dollars over many years. First we.
tried to keep former President Allende
out of power, and then when he was
duly elected, to "destabilize" his govern-
ment. We are now told that the latter
effort, which even a high school student
could suspect would spark a coup, was
necessary to "preserve the forces of
democracy in Chile."
Indeed, former CIA officials and pres-
ent representatives of the State Depart-
ment have suggested that Allende's gov-
ernment was not to be taken seriously
because it was elected by a mere plural-
ity. Well, so are many elected officials in
the United States, including U.S. Sen-
ators.
I am afraid we may be glimpsing an at-
titude all too reminiscent of the Ameri-
can military officer in Vietnam who
blandly explained to newsmen that we
had to destroy a Vietnam village in order
to save it. Are we also prepared to sub-
vert the democratic political process in
other countries in order to "promote the
forces of democracy?" The result in Chile
at least has been to precipitate a repres-
sive abolition of constitutional govern-
ment and widespread violation of mini-
mal civil liberties.
We had best extricate ourselves from
the quicksand of such Orwellian double-
speak before it is too late. The first step
is to take a very careful look at out
covert operations.
At home the consequences have been
equally troubling: The perceived need
to deny covert operations has led official
after official in successive administra-
tions to lie to the Congress, or, as the
Executive seems to prefer to describe it,
to deceive without actually lying. Thus,
Congress was not told about the secret
war in Laos because, as one official later
explained, the right question was not
asked. When Mr. Helms was asked the
right question about Chile, he seems to
have lied.
Nothing is more corrosive to constitu-
tional government than deception of
Congress by the Executive. If that is the
price for covert operations, it is too high
a price. It becomes an absurd price when
even the Director of Central Intelligence
asserts that cancelling all such opera-
tions would not now have a major im-
pact on our security.
The existence of this covert apparatus
tempts Presidents to use it for iaegiti-
mate purposes. It is unnecessary tc recite
again the degree of CIA involvement in
Watergate, much of it denied until ex-
posed in Senator BAKER'S extremely im-
portant report. But we must ask if we
have learned anything. Are we simply
to count on the hope that no future
President will be equally tempted?
It is virtually impossible for Congress
to exercise its responsibilities when it is
ignorant of the facts. Congress could not
long be kept in the dark about operations
such as the Laotian one if a majority of
both Houses were to insist-by exercising
their power of the purse-that Congress
should be informed. Catch 22, of course,
is that we cannot demand to be told in-
formation unless we know what that in-
formation is, and if we knew in the first
place, we would not need to be told.
As Morton Halpern and Jeremy Stone
put it in an earlier analysis of this
problem-
The Executive branch thrives on secrecy
because secrecy frees it from Congressional,
Judicial and public scrutiny. But the Con-
gress suffers from secrecy because ita power
is based on the ability to expose, to rally
public opinion, to maintain dialogue between
constituents and elected officials and the
press.
In a-sense this problem is simply one
part of the larger question of secrecy in
regard to all aspects of national security
affairs-Congress cannot obtain all the
information it needs, or if it does obtain
it, cannot use it to make a case to the
American people, because the informa-
tion is secret.
To a great extent, the best approach to
this larger difficulty may be the most
direct: simply to point out that the
Emperor has no clothes and that much
of the withheld material need not be
secret for any reason other than to pro-
tect the Executive from criticism or em-
barrassment.
But covert operations are inherently
secret. If they are made public they then
become, by definition, part of our overt
foreign policy. One cannot say: "Make
them public and let us have a national
debate on whether we should engage in
this particular covert operation." But one
can ask: "Is this trip really necessary?
Do such large scale and frequent covert
operations make sense. When should we
be undertaking them?"
We can discuss and demand informa-
tion regarding past covert operations.
We can insist that the Congress and the
American people be made aware of, and
understand the implications of the kinds
of covert activities we engage in abroad
and the extent and frequency with which
we undertake them.
All of this is essential for Congress to
be able to conduct meaningful oversight
of foreign policy-oversight which does
not prove superficial or irrelevant in light
of subsequently revealed secret opera-
tions.
But for me the most Important long-
range issue is the understanding by the
American people of the impact such op-
erations can have on our own society.
What is its impact on the Government's
general attitude toward- deception, on
the Government's general attitude
toward dissident political views viewed
as a threat to stgbilityor on its attitude
toward using dirty tricks and other ques-
tionable means to achieve desired ends?
Mr. President, Disraeli once said of a
political opponent that his conscience
had become an accomplice rather than
a moral guide. It is important we make
sure that our national conscience re-
mains a guide and does not become our
mere accomplice. Strengthened oversight
of all clqndestine activity Is an essential
.element of that resolve.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the entire article by Morton H.
Halperin and Jeremy J. Stone on this
subject from which I quoted be included
in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SECRECY AND COVERT INTELLIG"IM-fCS COLLEC-
TION AND OPERATIONS
(By Morton H. Halperin and Jeremy J. Stone)
We aim in this paper to assess the effects
of secrecy on the conduct of American covert
intelligence collection and covert operations,
and the effects of those programs on Ameri-
can society and foreign policy. We begin with
a description of the structure by which the
executive branch plans and carries out covert
intelligence collection and operations and
then briefly discuss covert activities in
which. the United States has engaged since
World War II. This is followed by an analysis
of the costs of such operations, with parttcu-
lar emphasis on the decision-making within
the executive branch, the effect on American
society, and the effects on American foreign
policy. We conclude with an analysis of the
covert operations and intelligence programs
and some specific recommendations.
1. THE STRUCTURE OF COVERT ZNTSLLXGENCE
AND OPERATIONS
The only Congressional authorization for
covert intelligence operations is contained
in the Congressional Act of 1947, which cre-
ated the entire national security system as
well as the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Act listed the primary functions of the CIA
as advising the National Security Council on
intelligence matters and correlating and
evaluating Intelligence related to national
security. The fifth item listed under the
functions of the CIA, under the direction
of the National Security Council, was: "to
perform such other functions and duties re-
lated to Intelligence affecting the national .
security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct."-
Based upon this very general Congressional
authority, Presidents have authorized the
CIA to engage in covert intelligence collec-
tion and covert operations. Over the years,
a structure has grown up within the Ameri-
can government for devising such programs
and for implementing them.
At the heart of the covert operations is the
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'i LL Within the CIA such operations are con- tional Security Affairs, has in the past been The Soviet colonel Oleg Ponkovaky Is prob-
tered in the "Plans Directorate," under the staffed simply by a liaison officer assigned by ably the best-known example of a spy.
Deputy Director of the CIA for Plans (known the CIA. Beyond covert intelligence-gathering lie
as the DDP). Under the DDP there Is an as- Proposals-for covert intelligence collection the activities in support of political groups
sistant in charge of each region of the world or operations normally come from the sec- In a foreign country. Sere a line Is crossed'
and operators dealing with particular coun- tion of the DDP charged with the relevant between efforts to get information and ef=
tries or areas. These officials are drawn large- geographic area, and, after Informs', discus- forts to manipulate. Political parties, labor
ly from a career service of covert operators sion among the staffs of the members of the unions, student groups, and military officers,
within the CIA. This grbup is distinct from Forty Committee, they are approved by the etc., may be given funds, information, or
the career Intelligence analysts, who serve Committee itself. In some cases, the pro- other help in an effort to win influence over'
only in Washington and only in the evalua- posals come from other members of the them and to advance shared alms. The first
tion of intelligence material. The covert op committee. such operation was apparently the massive
eratcrs (who have a "cover" identification Evaluation of the proposals is limited to American intervention in the 1948 Italian
indicating that. they work for the Depart- the members of this Committee and the election. Later, the United States apparently
men, of Defense, the State Department, or sought to buy votes- in, the French National
staffs designated for this purpose. Under nor-
ome other agency private organization)
the h ti C mal procedures, a proposal for a covert oper- peaembly to secure ity arson of the Euro-
alternate
between assignments in CIA peat Defense Commas-itv Treaty.
headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and as. ation in Latin America, for examplewould
not be cleared b the State Department desk Still greater involvement occurs when in.
stgnments overseas. by surgent movements get covert support. Here,
re,
American embassies have a separate section officer dealing with that Latin American the United States takes a hand in active
staffed by career covert intelligence operators - country or by the Deputy Assistant Secre- struggle. Examples Include Indonesia In 1948.
from the CIA. The head of this unit, who Is tary, or even, in some cases, the Assistant Tibet after 1949, Cuba under Batista, China
one of the senior officials of, the embassy Secretary for Latin American Affairs. Like- immediately after the Communist revolu-
below the ambassador; is known as the CAS wise, it would not be cleared by the Regional tion, and Katanga. In Iran, the United States
(apparently standing for Chief at Station). Deputy Assistant Secretary In the Office of . sponsored a countercoup to restore the Shah.
This unit maintains its own, communica- International Security Affairs in the Pen- Still greater support is involved when the
tions systems with Washington. In friendly tagon, or even by the Assistant Secretary or United States seeks to give covert aid to for-
countries, its members often operate as lial- the military officers In the Joint Staff eign military forces. Here we have assistance
son with the local intelligence services, but :. charged with planning and policy toward the ' to the South Vietnamese against the North,
in all cases they are available for the plan- particular Latin American country. Within to the secret army in Laos, and to the lung
ning of covert Intelligence collection and the CIA itself, proposals for covert opera- of Jordan.
operations. tions are normally not staffed by the Intel- At the end of this spectrum lie major co-
The only other resources known to be in ligence Branch of the CIA charged with col- vert military operations. In 1949 the United
the field to conduct covert Intelligence op- lating and evaluating intelligence materials States air-dropped hundreds of agents into
erations are the military attaches attached from all sources. In exceptional cases, par- Alban" in an effort, much like that of the
to most American embassies. In addition, the ticular people from these various organiza- Bay of Pigs (another example), to over-
service Intelligence divisions operate intelli- tions may be brought in to consult on a par- throw the Albanian government.. Tipped off
gence-collection stations on land, and aboard ticular problem, but only at the sufferance by the Soviet spy Harold Philby, the Albani-
ships and airplanes. Many of these operations of the officials formally' nvolved. ans had no trouble putting down the revo-
are under the auspices of the National Secu- Covert operations and intelligence-gather- lotion.
rity Agency, the group charged with the col- ing is conducted, then, under a cloak of what Sometimes, covert operations involve do-
lecting of communications signals and their we will call Super Secrecy. Executive Order mestic manipulations, and foreign opera-
evaluation, 10501 specifically prohibited any clessifica- tions abroad require domestic covers. Travel
The National Security Council Act pro- tion other than the three categories; it set organizations, student organizations, busi-
vided that other activities should, be con- out ("top secret," "secret," "confidential") nesses, foundations, and American ls.bor
ducted only when the National Security and others authorized by law (such as those unions may all be asked to help In providing
Council shall direct them from time to time. involving cryptology and atomic energy). a base for covert CIA operations. Alternately,
In fact, procedures have grown up which Nevertheless, covert operations carry addi- ? they may be infiltrated-with few, if any,
provide for continuing authorization to the tional classification markings, and access to of their own higher-ups being aware of it.
CIA to conduct covert operations and which them depends on an additional set o:[ clear- Lastly, the United States government can-
put the initiative In the hands of the CIA - antes whose very existence is classified. Thus, not credibly deny any involvement In dra-
to come forward with proposals. Beginning information about them is limited very se- matic attacks or incidents abroad, a coup
Iii the late 1930s. covert Intelligence collec- verely, even within the executive branch. in Cambodia or an, Israeli -attack on. Leb-
tion and operations have been approved by Most of this paper is devoted to an analysis anon, promptly brings charges of CIA in- -
a committee chaired by the Special Assistant of the consequences of this Super Secrecy for -olvement.
to the President for National Security Af- executive-branch decision-making, for the ' M. DrsTORTtoses IN DECISION-seMcING'
fairs. The existence of the committee and its American constitutional system, and for the The Super Secrecy system under which
membership have never been publicly an- conduct of American foreign policy. decisions about covert operations are made
nounced, and its name (or rather the number R, THE RANGE OF COVERT INTELLIGENCE increases the chances that such operations
by which it Is designated) has changed from COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS will be chosen over more desirable alterna-
time to time. It is now apparently known as Covert intelligence operations are of many
redefined tives, reduces the effectiveness with which
the Forty Committee, because its duties were different kinds and raise quite different is. they are designed and carried out, distorts
rIn National Security Decision Mem- sues. The best known concern covert Intel- decision-making . within the executive
orandum number 40, ligence-gathering. At the beginning of the
dent - branch, and reduces the effectiveness of In-
In addition National to o the AffAssistantafro the Prom- cold war, the United States had planes en- telligence evaluation.
"bets of or the Forty y Committee are Affairs, - gaged in short dashes into Soviet territory, The Super Secrecy of covert operations
of are the e Deputy Later, the U-2 flights overflew the territory Increases the chances that thePresident will'
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the and a special to ghtso; y was developed for choose covert action rather than other, do-
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, and the Director just this purpose. Stationed around the sizable options, which might be adopted
n the adopted
of Central Intelligence. Each member is "Communist bloc," there are planes and ships given n a a free
branch-and and and open even debate more within clearly If
staffed by his own department or agency. gathering electronic intelligence-intorma- the Congress and the public were involved. For the Director of Central Intelligence, the, tion on the planes flying through Soviet air- American Presidents face multiple staffing is done by his Deputy Director of space, transcripts of the conversations of the audi-
Operations and staff;- for the Under Secre- pilots in them, characteristics of Sov;.et ra- ences. Whatever the President does is seen
tary of. State, by a small group under an dars, information on Soviet space and missile not only by the foreign group against which
Assistant Director of-the Bureau of Intelli- firings, and so on. The Pueblo, captured off he may be directing his action but also by
North Korean shores, was such a ship. More leaders and active groups in other countries,
fiance and Research in the Department of
State, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, information comer from satellites enc,.rcling by the Congress, and by the American public.
by the Special Assistant to the Chairman for the globe and transmitting or dropping in- One of the major attractions of covert oper-
Counter Insurgency and Special Activities formation to earth. From satellites, very good ationa is that with them one avoids the
c pictures of the round can now be developed. multiple-audlence problem. If something is
(SALSA). Until very recently, the Deputy conducted conducted in secret, then one can avoid the
Secretary of Defense was staffed simply by ? Covert intelligence gathering also involves fight over means (as well as ends) which
one of his military assistants, who relied the more traditional spy, although the' rela- erupts when other audiences - perceive an
primarily on the evaluations from the Joint tive effectiveness of spying has greatly de- ongoing operation. For example, when Press-
Chiefs of Staff. It Is possible that this,func- creased. Spies run the gamut from agents dent Nixon was asked in the summer of 1970
tion has more recently been taken over by ? injected Into a foreign territory, to foreign- why the United States had been willing to
the new Assistant Secretary of Defense. for ers recruited for this purpose, to. paid in- send military forces -to Vietnam to prevent
Intelligence. The Chairman of the -Forty formers in friendly or neutral governments, the Communist take-over but ,was not will-
Committee, the President's Assistant for Na- to sympathizers of many kinds and degrees. trig to send American military forces to
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stem
Chile to prevent a Marxist government from cial clearances the existence of which are monitoring sy over the President and
com?n.g into power, he replied that the not even known to officials who do not have other top officials. This does not occur with
United States could not send military forces such clearances. Moreover, authority to grant a covert operation unless it reaches such pro-
to Chile without provoking an adverse P0- them is in the hands of the officials who portions that the press in the field begins
litical reaction in the rest of Latin America. manage the programs, who can use this tool to learn of it. (Paradoxically, in such cases
Though he did not make it clear at the to exclude anyone they fear might be skepti- the press may serve to alert other parts of
time, It was later revealed that the United the United States government to what is
cal or critical. oln on. This appears to have been the case
States government had engaged in covert Normally, an official observing an ongoing in Laos through the 1960x, where covert
operations in Chile. These operations avoided policy which he sees a3 a threat to his or- activities came to the attention of many
the political outcry which would come from ganizatlon's interests, or to the national- government officials through press reports
P an overt step, such as the introduction of security Interest as he defines it, would at- from Laos.)
American forces. tempt to fight his way into the process. He Super Secrecy also reduces the possibility
As compared to alternatives, the necessary would argue that he hats a special expertise of effective monitoring within the American
approval for covert operations is easier to to contribute or that the Interests of his government. The acknowledged need for
obtain. The President himself can often organization are involved. In covert opera- flexibility in covert operations often makes
usually authorize them without having to tions, Super Secrecy makes it extreme}.y dif- it easy to justify discretionary authority for
go to Congress for funds or to make a public ficult for this to occur. officials in the field to implement an ap-
justiacation. They also seem cheap and easy First of all, the official usually dos not proved plan. Ambassadors who sometimes
because they can usually be disavowed, if know that the activities are under consider- provide effective monitoring or control often
necessary. Indeed, the working definition of ation or being implemented. The existence of do not know, and do not want to know, about
a covert operation appears to be that it is the special clearances makes it difficult to CIA operations in their countries. Moreover,
one which can be disavowed with Impunity. assert a right to be involved, since one is the CIA controls its own money, people, and
As with many other aspects of covert opera- asserting the need for a clearance whose communications channels to Washington,
tions of this kind, extreme optimism seems to existence one is not supposed to know and often enabling it to move without normal
accompany the evaluation of this factor. which is supposedly kept to a small number internal executive-branch monitoring, by-
Thus, in the cases of both the U-2 and the of people. Thus, someone attempting to fight passing skeotics who might otherwise try to
Bay of Pigs, an explicit element of the cal- his way into the evaluation of a covert opera- persuade the President that it was an error
culatlon leading to the authorization of the tion faces not only the normal difficulties of and should, be abandoned.
plan was the belief that It could. be dis- getting into a new policy arena but special Super Secrecy of decision-making and ex-
avowed with a cover story if it was dis- problems of appearing to be jeopardizing ecutton of covert operations also casts a
covered. security requirements. shadow ' over executive-branch decision-
The mechanism of decision-making also As a result, a person who finally does get making in general on national security mat-
tends to bias the system toward the choos- cleared for a particular operation Is likely to ters. Creating a special class of those with
ing of covert options. When the United feel that he has been admitted on the suf- a "need to know" for covert operations tends
States government is faced with a problem, . ferance of the planners. He knows he will to give people a sense that on all matters
meetings are held to discuss the range of continue to be involved only if he accepts the they are better Informed than others.
overs possibilities; they are weighed against basic principles involved and presents his Moreover, within the government, lying
each other in an adversary procedure that. criticism on the edges of the operation. becomes an accepted habit. In order to -pro-
will permit critics of one proposal to be Someone who Is skeptical about covert opera- tect the existence of additional clearances
heard while the proponents of that pro- tions In general, or covert operations in a and of covert operations, officials with access
posal are present. Covert operations are not particular area, is likely not to get the neces- to information about these things must
discussed at such meetings, but are consid- sary clearances. If he does, he may feel that routinely deceive other officials. This lying
ered separately at meetings from which ad- he must mute his views or find himself iso- breeds cynicism and contempt for those who
vocatee of other proposals, and critics of lated and, ultimately, have his clearance are lied to, andthis must influence the en-
covert operations, are excluded. Indeed, par- withdrawn. tire pattern of decision-making.
ticipants in meetings considering overt op- With the circle of those "in the know" The most obvious demonstration of how
tions are often not aware that covert alter- kept so small, those in it tend to discount Super Secrecy distorts executive-branch de-
natives are being considered at other meet- the views of other government officials who cision-making Is in the CIA Itself. The CIA
ings. Those advocating covert operations can are not aware of the details of covert opera- was envisioned by President Truman, who
bring them up through the mechanism of Lions. For example, expert estimates of the called for its creation, and by the Congress
the rorty Committee, and thus do .not have unlikelihood of a successful anti-Castro that authorized It, primarily if not exclusive-
to compete for the time and attention of operation in Cuba in 1961 were discounted ly as an intelligence-evaluation organization.
top-revel decisionmakers. by the officials who knew about the Bay of Prior to its creation, President Truman re-
These same factors serve to reduce efli- Pigs operation. These officials knew th.y were ceived intelligence reports from each of the -
ciency in the design and execution of covert the only ones receiving all the repors from armed services and from the State Depart-
operations. The Super Secrecy increases the our covert operations in Cuba; intelligence ment. He felt the need for a single agency
probability that covert operations will be analysts in the CIA and State Department which would collate and evaluate these re-
designed and implemented poorly and with were discounted because they had not re- ports and which would do so without the
little regard for the realities of the external ceived some of the reports from covert. agents bias that an operating agency had in favor of
world or for appropriate principles of Ameri- operating within Cuba. its oWn programs. Thus, Truman wanted- a
can behavior. Many problems arise precisely The process by which proposals for covert professional and independent intelligence
because the circle of people involved In co- operations move up. through the narrow capability. -
vert operations is kept so very small and is group of those with necessary clearance re- This conception of the CIA's role differs
limited to people who tend to be sympathetic duces the likelihood that the senior officials markedly from reality because of covert in-
to such operations. on the Forty Committee will examine them telligence operations. The CIA has always
Other aspects of covert operations add to critically. Proposals that come before the been dominated by officials whose primary
the general difficulties of getting any opera- Committee are unanimous because of the concern has been covert- operations rather
tion evaluated by the people responsible for close working relationships of the staffs in- than intelligence or evaluation. The only ca-
devising it and later responsible for its execu- volved, and they tend to be rubber-stamped reer officials to be named heads of the CIA-
tion. For example, the "play god" aspect of by the committee. Presumably, they .are also Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and William
covert work-involving as it often does inter- rubber-stamped by the President when they Colby-rose through the covert side of the
ventlon in the internal affairs of other na- are brought to his attention. The lack of agency, and Helms and Colby were former
tions-tends to attract people who are likely vigorous dissent, so common with other pro- DDP's before becoming Directors. The doml-
to be insensitive to the difficulties of the posals of a controversial nature, leads to nance of covert operations within the CIA
work and to its implications for American routine approval. has diminished the quality of personnel on
constitutional procedures. Moreover, the cab- The inability of top officials to rrtaintain the intelligence side, The officials who work
alien-the close working relationship be- control is particularly acute when an open- on intelligence evaluation recognize that they
tween the small number of people involved- ation is very large. For then the danger of are not operating in a totally hospitable en-
substantially reduces the chance that any adverse political consequences exist;; if the vironment and are unlikely to rise to the
insider will object to somebody else's favorite operation is halted after it is well on its top.
scheme. Officials involved from other agencies way. In the case of the Bay of Pigs, President Moreover, because of its involvement in
are often simply on loan from the CIA or Kennedy was confronted with statements operations, the CIA is not the neutral intel-
intimately connected with CIA operations. from Allen Dulles that if the operation were ligence-evaluation organ that President Tru-
As in all policy areas, the responsible of- to be canceled, Cuban refugees who had been man and others envisioned. It has a policy
facials have an interest in keeping the num- recruited would talk about it and cause ax to grind concerning its covert operations.
bar of participants down and to exclude those. political problems because of the intense The Director of Central Intelligence is re-
who are likely to be critics. In covert intelli anti-Castro feeling then rampant in the luctant to put out intelligence reports that
genes operations, a special tool facilitates United States. contradict a view that the CIA is pressing in .
such exclusion: the special clearances re- - One form of monitoring is often entirely the Forty Committee or in other covert In-
quired for such operations. A "top secret" absent in the case of covert activities. The telligence channels.- Suner Secrecy of co-
clearance is not sufficient; one must get spa- press provides one critical aspect of the vert operations also reduces the quality of its
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1..eLigence o, In that the evaluators tions are not done "for the benefit of the order. in the history of the country against
are often unir `?~1--1nd of covert operations existing Intelligence agencies," nor are they a daily newspaper, The Washington Post and
and of matters that would enhance their duties "related to intelligence." It Is entirely The New York Times and other papers were
ability to make sensible intelligence inputs. possible that a court might rule such actions restrained from publication of the Penta-
T hus, the covert operations staff domin- unauthorized by statute.. Yet within the ex-. ' gon Papers. Part of the government's ob-
sting the CIA weakens it in Its primary funs- ecutive branch, secret directives authorize jection to publication was Its fear of re-
tion of providing objective Intelligence evalu- special operations of all kinds provided they vealing covert operations and intelligence
anon of ongoing problems. The Vietnam war are small enough to be plausibly deniable. collection. And the only permanent In-
this well. The Penetagon Papers Unfortunately, these directives do not cover junction against free speech in the history
:eal that intelligence analysts in the CIA the impossible-to deny operations: 11-2 of the United States has been issued against
frequently produced much more sensible fights, Bay of Pigs, the Iranian coup, the Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official-
est'Wlates of the situation In Vietnam than Laotian war, etc. based partly upon his secrecy oath and partly
other parts. of- the intelligence community A traditional method of Congressional con- on the need to keep secret the covert op-
d:d_ What the Pentagon Papers do not indi- trol is through the power of the purse-the . era-lions of which he might have knowledge.
of American covert operations, is that the ly supports this power of Congress wher. it requests to the press not to publish articles.
DDP was as wrong on Vietnam as any other asserts in Article I, Section 9, Clause 7, that: In the case of the Bay of Pigs. President
eluding the training and arming of ethnic - made by Law; and a regular Statement end based In the United States, they can also
minorities. The CIA operators were optimistic Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of interfere with individual rights. An effort to
about the success of their programs, and the - - all public Money shall be published from hide. the fact that Tibetans were being
government was to defend these programs ? tures are in violation of this constitutional men to surround, and. hold at gunpoint, a -
rather than to push the consequences of the .clause, since no accounting whatsoever is number of civilians who happened to- wit-
pessimistic intelligence evaluations. made public. Indeed, the burial of CIA ex- ness their departure. And then the govern.
f7. IiOWCOVF$T OPERATIONS DISTORT THE penditures In the accounts of other depart- meat apparently asked The New York Times
AMERICAY, coNsT -morn o sysTE.li meats puts the latter accounts In violation not to publish the story. - ,
of law. They cease to be accurate. Covert operations tend to distort the per- ?
The American constitutional system, is., . Complete control of funding for covert ceptlons of foreign policy held not only by
fundamentally distorted by . secrecy-al operations is evidently delegated only to Congressmen but also by scholars and, in
.hough the different branches of government subcommittees of the Armed Services and turn, the public. The entire image of U.S.-
are affected In different ways. - Appropriations committees. This, Senator Soviet relations during the cold war would
The executive branch thrives on secrecy Stuart Symington would not be permitted have been significantly different if U.S. peas
b c u and public re it from But Congressional, a to discuss CIA appropriations, although he is trations of Soviet airspace had been made
on the Appropriations Committee and the . known. It' would have shown that not all
.. es suffers from secrecy because its power CIA oversight subcommittee of Armed Serv- - the Russians' fear of encirclement was -
is based on the ability to expose, to rally ices, because he is not one of the five senior "paranoia."
public opinion, to maintain a dialogue be, members who mak
h
-
e up t
e CIA oversight
It Iiblith
.s posse, w covert operations, to
.sen constituents and elected officials; and subcommittee of appropriations. The fall -induce reactions from other nations which
with the press. When a Congressman is told committees do not vote on these matters, x,or are self-fuifllling. Castro's anti-American
:ha; CIA operations are Super Secret, self are they discussed on the floor of the SenE to - attitude can be shaped by American sabotage
Merest makes him prefer not to know any Tsessions on the CIA. - of which he is cognizant but the American
ninn g ratio about to -he may hit. im These secree a operations
ed of have The failure of Congress to approve covert public is not. The Chinese knew that Downey
operations hampers its activities In other and_FeCteau were CIA agents; the American
ng breached secrecy If the matter gets tti ways as well. Congressmen cannot properly public did not. The North Vietnamese gauge
'e, the Information Is of no political use assess the implications of many foreign our willingness to stay in Indochina by as-
_im unless it can be made public. Only a events unless they understand the extent to sessing, in part, the commitment shown
ens of duty can sustain his willingness to which these events were shaped by covert through covert operations; the American
ianicipate in hearings on such matters. In- American operations. The Gulf of Tonkin public can not. In these matters, Super
reed., in the House of Representatives, the affair may have been encouraged by ongoing .. Secrecy is effectively directed only at the
IA subcommittee of the AppropriationaSub- covert operations in the Gulf b
i
ut
gnorant Aibli Th "
,mercan puc.eenemy" may under-
oa:mittea has a membership that is secret. of these activities, Congressmen considered stand only too well what is happening, and
-ae Congressmen do not want it known who any attack on U.S. ships to be "unprovoked." so
her east
histicated ob
i
p
p
servers
n third countries
Similarly, interpretations of the true de-
may also. But the American public is the
The Congressmen risk being asked whether sires of Chileans ma
ha
b
y
ve
een based on
e knew of covert operations. In 1971 Sen- election. results In Chile which in fact were last to know.
to s John Stennis and Allen Eliender--the manipulated by covert American campaign from acts of Government o mission mission credibility but also suffers o not m the
;natrmen of the Armed Services and Apro- fro
committees, as well as of their . contributions. The Laotians may desire to necessity to lie, to cover up. It was a se
avoid fighting, but a secret war financed -oy sation when President Eisenhower lied to
.e=sight subcommittees---said that they a covert operation may persuade Congress- cover up the U-2 incident. The extensive lies
new nothing about the CIA-financed war men that Laotians want to continue the covering up the Bay of Pigs Included Ambas.
Laos, surely the CIA's biggest operation. struggle.
is hard to know whether to believe these Today covert operations are what most asssser er a tioons ns in the ehe U.N. S unwittingly untrue
en.ais, -which would suggest enormous laxity require the Super Secrecy of the CIA. ati Se ecurity Cbe because Such
i oversight. Electronic intelligence-gathering does not actsare less sensational now bauser.)
Covert operations are especially difficult for require it, nor does Intelligence assessment. Even Presidential Pdly has candidates dso much lower.)
ongsessmen to come to grips with because it is the potentially explosive disclosure of Even n e yare forced
to
ey involve, or seem to Involve, men In the interference in the i. to al oar L__ Ile. During the K-Nixon debates in
tes wer
protect these men and to bring them back CIA employees must take a special oath with their secret knowledge of plans for the
caught. Thus the flag is wrapped around to maintain CIA secrets. By restricting them invasion of Cuba. What to say about Cuban the
face of
this
kno :e personnel, L not the funds, that go Into from discussing these matters with their policy Waterate affair amply documents the
iv operations. Congressman or Senators, the oaths inter-
So Super Secrecy is at the heart of Con- fere with our political system. Moreover, they corruption the the political eration by anch,
rest' problem In fulfilling Its function of constitute a special security system, un- Some of the CIA covert operations branch.
e:sAght of CIA operations. Even the author- authorized-on top of a variety of other un- of the ca level Some of the CIA thought er uhired at the lower
ari:,n for CIA activities was promptly dis- authorized systems ( working they were still
):zed in secrecy. The National Security Act Super Secrecy has led to ("sensitive,"
the etd operative for the Agency. A have gotten ten help In
. h wiespreF.d operative is said to have gotten help In
orized the CIA to: "perform for the bens- use, inside the CIA, of lie detectors. This locating a suitable locksmith from a CIA
t of the existing intelligence agencies such may be a handy method for detecting double roster. Throughout, the skills and tech-
idittenal services of common concern as the agents and for other use in covert operations. niques of CIA operators were ready andwait-
ational Security Council determines can be But their use spreads to all CIA employees, Ing. And those at higher levels directing the
ore effectively accomplished centrally; per- t
ch
o o
er branches oft
governmen, and lairs operatives had seen Mission impossible and
c=n such other functions and duties re- the society at large. The funds available to knew, or thought they knew, how the game
red to intelligence affecting the national the CIA make it possible for it to pioneer was played.
cure? as the National Security Council In a technology that undermines traditional The public's response to Watergate was to
a-. from time to time direct" (Italics added). judicial and ethical processes.
But secret directives promptly expanded Super Secrecy as required by covert op- foruestion
so littlwhy sould take e. Theanyone
answer probably Ileshinit e
.ere fund :one. Overthrowing governments, erations threatens the freedom of the press. - fact that the administration had "institu-
cret wins, assassinations, and fixing sled- For fifteen days, In the first prior restraint tionalized" dirty tricks. The same people
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had performed other "mission impossible"
assignments, including breaking into a safe
In Lai Vegas, into Daniel Ellsberg's psychia-
trist's office in Los Angeles. The resistance
to covert operations was lowered; those who
otherwise might have warned of the danger
were, to that extent, silenced. -
Watergate also reveals the dangers of per-
mitting "hardened" operatives to work
freely in American society. Ordinarily, only
a criminal would be available to do these
break-ins. The criminal clement would have
few contacts with a normal administration
and would lack the sophistication and re-
liability. But a gang of Cubans led by a
covert master spy like Howard Hunt is an-
other matter. They can Inspire confidence
and-encourage assignments from an admin-
istration.
The use of private institutions for covert
operations tends to bring them all under
suspicion. This Is what happened when it
became known that the CIA.' had financed
the National Student Association and about
250 front organizations and conduits. Presi-
dent Johnson appointed a panel headed by
Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzen-
bach to review the ground rules for such
operations. It concluded.
de
.-? .-a----+
States Government hag no + e
shall provide any covert financial assistance dirty tricks are institutionalized. First, the
or support, direct or indirect, to any of the NSC is requested to order covert operations
nation's educational or private voluntary on an occasional basis. In time, the CIA is
organizations. proposing these operations to a passive NSC.
2. The Government should promptly de- Then, in turn, the businesses through. which
velop and establish a public-private mech- the CIA operates, as in the ITT case, make
anism to provide public funds openly for proposals to the CIA and try to use the
overseas activities or organizations which are Agency for its own ends. Thus work cxpands
adjudged deserving, in the national interest, to fill the covert possibilities available. Se-
of public support. crecy debases control.
The first resolution was adopted. But It The credibility, efficiency. and authority of
officials are undermined
State Department
left a number of loopholes. In the first place,
organizations that seemed to be. "private by the presence of covert CIA operatives. The workers to unload our goods. In the Corn-
voluntary" might not be. They could be CIA has better communications, better logic- munist industrialized world (and in China).
quietly organized as "for profit" and few tics, larger and more available sources of CIA covert operations are of little effect, even
would know. Alternatively, philanthropists secret money, and greater security of com- if desirable. And electronic intelligence is
mizht be enriched, perhaps through stock- municatioris. Under these circumstances, Its providing If there are CIA operatives around, why most subjects of interest.
dew organizations ius with covert uses. Mean- As .a result, the institutionalization of co-
be funded rivate businesses could continue t0' should The sources information o talk a dipes- vert operations is certain to lead to Its influ-
b fuby CIA: mats? The reported American closeness of the lent lives ence being applied to the Third World-an
The second recommendation does not seem ddent Nasser to American CIA representatives hich we are not at war, and from
rather than to Foreign Service rep resenta- area which with washcht in we are no The ar and rom
have been adopted. The r of tives is a case in polnt.'Nasser may have
private organizations forces peoopleple to defend thought that the real power lay with the are penetrable. The agents have room for
their "covert stories" and lose their integrity. CIA. maneuver. But there is little work that needs
Friends become unsure whether they can , CIA.operatives undermine the effectiveness - to be done.
believe each other. Persons wonder whether of the Foreign Service not only by competing In the Third World, nationalism is a proven
they should accept funds from this founda- with it but by implicitly smearing it. The force against the rapid Communist expansion
tion or that. To this day, legitimate "Stern with nnate diplomatic operations abroad can- once feared. Soviet, Chinese, and American
Foundations" are confused with the conduit not prove that they are legitimate. While interference In Third World states tends only
"Stern Foundation," which the CIA used in some sources are attracted to the CIA, others to produce resistance to a large power's
1966. The Asia Society and the Asia Founda- are repelled. Members of diplomatic missions further involvement. The problem ceases to
tioa have both suffered from the decision are suspected of being CIA agents much as . be one of fighting fire-with fire. It becomes
of the latter to accept CIA funds. Suspicion. American civilians might wonder if a Soviet' one of giving competitors enough rope to
spreads. diplomat Is really a KGB agent. hang themselves. No situation-. better illus-
V. DISTORTIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY The internal power balance in a, foreign . trates these principles than Egypt. Unusual ,
When foreign countries are aware of U.S. country can be distorted by the alliance of needs in Egypt, and unusual Soviet willing-
covert operations and the American public the CIA with certain elements in it rather ness to help, has nevertheless produced a
is not, the possibility arises of having our than with others. Ramon Magsaysa?y in the history of strained relations between the
go. ernment blackmailed by foreign govern- Philippines may have risen to power on the Egyptians and the Soviets and a drain on
ments. For example, they may insist on for- basis of help or information provided him Sovfet resources.
elo aid They might not otherwise receive in by the CIA. Others who do not cooperate The time has come for America to change
return for participating in our covert activi- find themselves disadvantaged, relatively, its strategy from covert intervention to non-
ties. They may seek ransom for captured even if no action is taken against them. From intervention. When there is no emergency, it
pilots-vs Indonesia did in a case much like the CIA's point of view, small services can should be an easy choice to stand for prin-
that of Gary Powers. They may hold prison- be of great significance-a few weapons, ciple. In the long battle for respect and sup-
ers until the United States admits they were money, some investment advice, dirt on other port in the Third World, principles and in-
CL?A agents-apparently China's approach. members of the government, and so on, tegrity will be the most important force. The
And since covert operations, unlike electronic Part of the purpose of CIA pol:.tical op- short-run opportunist approach embodied
intelligence, require assets in place, the sensi- erations is to gain just such influence as In the CIA's Directorate of Plans sells the
tine problems of purchasing and maintaining these operations make possible. But even long run short.
such assets can increase the risk of black- when these "benefits" are not intended, CIA Furthermore, it will be increasingly difii-
mail. covert operations can still pervert a foreign cult to keep covert operations secret. As each
But even when pressure is not applied, CIA government's structure. It is hard for a CIA operation is "blown," " our reputation will suf-
covert operations can lead to greater recognf- operative to be passive. Some sources will be . fer; we live in an era that is increasingly im-
tton of or commitment to a government. A cooperating with him; others will not. Grad- patient with such manipulations. Each cov-
U-2 base at Peshawar can buttress a particu- ually, even without direct effort, the CIA- ert operation Is a time bomb waiting to go
-
lar regime in Pakistan. A country that gives and the United States-may become aligned OR.
us a base for invading Cuba, as Guatemala with and encouraging X rather than Y. Covert operations diminish the flexibility
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did, can discover that we are committed to Covert operations seem to encourage rebel-`
maintaining stability there, if only to protect lions or revolutions without hope. In Laos,
the, base, teen-agers were encouraged to fight against
Because these commitments are undextak- the North Vietnamese troops until they were
en indirectly and without full debate, it is destroyed. In Tibet, guerrillas fought against
difficult for anyone to be sure where they the Chinese in hopeless uprisings. In the
will lead. Laos is a good example. The com- Bay of Pigs, miscalculations only somewhat
mitment and involvement may outrun the less obvious were made. The dynamic of
conflict in Vietnam which reinformed them. covert activities seems to have a logic that
Meanwhile, the secret war may decimate the can produce violence which, on later reflec-
population and otherwise dramatically - tion, is not worth It.
change the original conditions of conflict. vr. CONCLUSIONS AND RFCO'aIazzNDATIONS
For businesses abroad, the charge of-their The vexistence, much less the mode of
possible Involvement with CIA cannot be o pa The very e of the CIA's Directorate of Plans
va of fans
answered. The Johnson administratiori took is ation, of the CIA's War II rates
the view that one could not legislate "pri- iC Services (OSS). In the hot war of the
vats morality" and that, s any e case, a was
with toOSS. any and all tricks were considered con-
t for ncyiinsincooperate sonant with the world-wide struggle against
a gover men
not Improper to a hneres agency elsewhere, the telsewhere, securing hsecuring g of inf i nferor. -- the Axis. Many imaginative and creative per- -
But h, as sons were drawn into its- operations. After
motion is something of a "cover concept" for World War II, the OSS was institutionalized
covert operations: While it might not 'se im- in the CIA. Many of the OSS operatives left,
get a innvolv but some stayed. The pattern of imaginative
moral, it n poor the to CIA permit
with us s scar the or ngvoed Involved involvement in covert operations remained.
with busi n nesses business the. In the long The cold war was seen, as late as the early
run, -hmerican usirelations will suffer 1060s, as a "long twilight struggle"; CIA co-
and the n inevitable charges of government t In ins vert operations fell neatly into that twi-
i wherever Am erican business rears light-a, gray area, whose propriety was
it ts head head d do our foreign
policy no good. . buried in secrecy.
shows
CIA is bidding for permanent Lnstitutaliza-
tion of its structure and role. Richard Helms
argued that America's role as a "great power" -
demands a CIA even if the cold war does
not. Thus what began in a hot war and grew
in a cold war may come to base its right to
exist simply on the permanent fact of Amer-
ican power.
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the CIA's
covert operations in the industrialized world
has vastly diminished. In Europe, the in-
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of Amertcaz:' policy when it is most tional responsibilities. This would mean Elim- force for peace. Take, for example, Soviet
required, in a stage of disengagement. They mating the entire Plans division of the CIA maneuvers In East Germany and Czechoalo-
tend to fin . its to established forces and to and the career service of covert operators. It vakia in 1968. If you had no idea what they
encourage the existing tendency of American would mean also that the CIA would no were doing, you thought maybe they were
policy to resist the popular aspirations In un- longer have clandestine agents in overseas going to march to the Rhine or the English
derdeveloped countries. embassies. Their clandestine contacts with Channel, and maybe you got your contin-
Especially Important, covert operations government ofbcials and opposition groups gency plan for the Strategic Air Command
pose a serious threat to democracy at home.. abroad should be taken over, to the extent out of Omaha ready. If, on the other hand,
Jamie Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson on necessary, by State Department officials and you knew what they were doing, that they
May 13, 1798: "Perhaps it is a universal truth military attaches. were only worried about Dubcek, and you
that the loss of liberty at home is to be Adoption of this proposal would permit the had already decided you could not really
charged to provisions against danger, real CIA to emerge from the shadows. Its func- protect Dubcek, you calm down. I think there
or pretended, from abroad." The effort to tions would be discussed publicly. Its budget is a lot of that in both directions. So it may
suppress information about covert operations could be publicly-identified and its functions well be that a certain level of espionage is
abroad has already damaged freedom of the largely explained in a public defense of its a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing force.
press and freedom of speech in America. The budget and operations. The Intelligence-anal- Where does espionage tilt over into opera-
Pentagon Papers case and the Marchetti case ysis branch of the CIA would. become, the tions? That- is very hard to say. Take, for
may be precedents for still more ominous in-?. dominant career service, with intelligence example, the U-2-was that an operation or
cursions on the First Amendment. Covert in- analysts. rising to top positions, including was it information-gathering? It is a bit of
t.erference abroad is interference with free. that of Director. both. I am not sure that you can really make
dam at home. The gains from these proposals would in- the separation that Messrs. Stone and Hal-
Finally, the greatest Presidential scandal elude the elimination of the costs to execu- perin suggest.
of modern times has arisen from the injec tive-branch declslon-making, American so- Mr. RANSOM. I am an academic observer
Lion of covert CIA methods, used by CIA ciety, and to American foreign. policy dis- of this subject, The only time I ever worked
graduates, Into American society. No greater'cussed above, The- adverse consequ-antes with the government was quite a while back,
signal can be given of the danger of these:' would be minimal. If the United States gov- when I joined the U.S. forces to stamp out
methods to the highest Interests of Ameri- ernment decided-to conduct a limited covert fascism--which I see returning, I am afraid,
cans operation-for example, obtaining informa- In a? different uniform. I find the Halperin-
We believe, therefore, that it is time for a., tion from a spy within a potentially hostile Stone essay is a very original analysis, and
drastic overhauling of the, Super Secrecy sys- government-it could be carried out either I 'think I have read everything else on the
Lem surrounding the planning and conduct by the Military attaches or by State Depart- subject in English dealing with how Super
of covert intelligence collection and" covert ment officials. But there would no longer be a Secrecy and Super Secret agencies can subvert
operations. We recommend that certain op-. group whose raison d'etre was such opera- our policy-making system.
erations and structures be abolished and that tions, a group constantly looking for ways to I want to say a word about definitions,
the secrecy surrounding others be eliminated. employ covert means as an instrument of because while this may seem elementary and
The United States should continue to con- American foreign policy. . ..: pedantic, I think we have all discovered re-
duct operations involving the collection of . vu. DISCUSSION .. cently that definitions are important. At the
intelligence materials by, technical means, Mr. Lowzwvrzto. I am not quite sure why I highest levels of our government we have
but not in any greater secrecy than other gov was asked to be a commentator here. I was discovered with Watergate that there are peo-.
ernment activities. Implementation of this told by the organizers that they wanted ' pie who don't know the difference between
purpose would mean the elimination of the somebody who had government experience in war and politics.
special classifications surrounding these pro- foreign affairs. As I read the paper and lis- Intelligence means evaluated information.
grams and a public acknowledgement of their tened to Mr. Halperin and Mr. Stone, I real Espionage is one of the several tecbn:vu.es
existence. - . ized what they meant. I was one of those for gathering Information and Is by Ca :,>
In this category we would put the various guys who had all the appropriate clearances tion illegal. Counterintelligence is a po::;S
satellite collection programs for the gather ' and worked on some things that I thought and security function. Covert or clandestine
ing of data by photographic and other means, was critical and Important, and for the most political operations are activities having no
as well as ships and planes carrying elec- part I did not know about all those other direct relation to intelligence or espiona, ee
Ironic equipment. The government should meetings, the Super Secret meetings. functions, although they produce some and
carefully review all such programs to deter- It did come across to me once. I remember use- some intelligence. That is all very sim-
mine which ones in fact produce information In August 1964 I was Acting Deputy Legal ple, and I restate it because I feel that at
of significant importance ? to the United Adviser of the State Department. Bill Bundy the highest levels of government these dis-
,States.-An assessment should be also made of called up and said, "I want a resolution au- tinctions are thoroughly confused.
-which programs are- provocative--running thorizing the President to act in Southeast 1 What did Congress intend when it set up
high risks of penetrating the air, spaces Asia." It turned out that my boss, the Acting the Central Intelligence Agency? My read-
or territorial waters of other countries. The Legal Adviser, was on leave-it was the middle frig of the legislative history is that Congress
United States should make a public state- of August-and I was the one who picked up did not intend to create a clandestine or co-
ment in general terms about the activities to the phone. I said, "What happened?" He said, vert political action organization. We need
be continued. The budgets for such programs . "Never mind; just write a resolution." further research into the legislative his-
should be publicly identified and be a regular - It was fairly easy to write the resolution. tory-and scholarly research on this subject
part of the budget of the Defense Depart- As any good lawyer, I had a form book. We encounters many obstacles-but I am con-
ment. Officials of the Defense Department had the Cuba resolution, the Formosa resolu- vinced from my research to date that Con-
should be required to justify them as they tion, the Lebanon resolution, all contained gross did not intend to authorize anything
justify all other programs. The organiza a nice little book called Legislation on but a Central Intelligence Agency whose
Lions that operate and conduct them and the Foreign Affairs. It was not too hard to dictate functions were to be related to intelligence,
responsible officials for them should be pub- a Vietnam resolution. But I said, "Tell me that is, information.
holy Identified and be made a matter of pub, -what happened, so I can put in the appro_ If Congress did not Intend covert political
lie record. "whereas" clauses." The the -r -was, action, how did it come about? I think it was
There is, of course, a case for keeping some priate ,,you are not- authorized," and I never did an American reaction to Stalin and com-
aspects of a program secret. For example, find out. munism. The covert political activities of the
the, technology of the most advanced cameras A'few days later my boss came back. He last twenty-five years have been justified In
1-1 satellites might justify continued secrecy. had not yet been confirmed. There was. some
context of an the same way that we justify activities in
However, such secrecy should be within the doubt whether he could see the reports from time of war generally. We have been in a
ongoing classification system. Tonkin Gulf. I think ultimately he did gray zone between a war declared by Con-
and should be treated within the government . briefly, but only looking over somebody's greys and what bas in fact been a wartime
epee condition-a. cold war since 1947.
like other classified material. shoulder. So I knew there was something
6 We do not believe that electronic inte111- going on in Tonkin Gulf, and also that there The first big covert operation was the Ital-
-collection ro ems, if any, w . Ian. election of 1948. Our government felt
limit access to the in-
penatrate the air spaces or territorial waters was an attempt to that we had to make that election come out
of other countries (or run a high risk of such formation. Whether the news was actually right. Ever since then, at least until 1967,
penetration) should he continued. managed, I don't know, we have secretly Intervened in a major way
Our proposals regarding covert operations I am sort of depressed by Mr. Halperin's in elections all over the world. I was startled
are more drastic. We believe that the United and Mr. Stone's essay. I thought one of the to see in The New York Times a few days
States no longer needs a large establishment excitements of my job as a government otfi- ago that we subsidized one wing of the Ital-
whose function is to conduct covert opera- cial was that I was really in on a lot of Ian Christian Democratic party to the tune
tions and gather intelligence covertly. Ac- important decisions. Since then, as a teacher of three million dollars a year between the
cordingly, the entire covert-operations sec- and scholar, I have tried to write about them. early 1950s and 1967. I had no idea that as
t'1011 of the CIA should be dismantled. The - Now I have to consider that maybe I was an American taxpayer I was contributing to
CLA should become what it was originally just misinformed. - a particular wing of an Italian political
meant to be-an Intelligence evaluation and I think it may well be true that espionage party. I think most.of you here didn't know
coordinating organization with no opera- Is a good thing, a stabilizing influence, a that.
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as by
of "Viaterymes" around intelligen . dg-- Senator Pul- lites. You send the sateili., s higi, and
.a gl, it has waged secret politi- bright and otaers, "Sorry, Senator, I cannot they swoop down low over the Sovie. Union
cal war ttempted to give history a tell you that, because Congress has given and gather stuff. So satellites play a major
push hel- xere and make things happen . me the discretion to decide whether I should role in the, interception of foreign com-
in what ou government considers. its favor, tell you this or that." Now that the CIA has munication.
As the cold war intensified after Korea, co- been disgraced-disgraced to some extent by The thing that interested me for all those
'vert operations were stepped up, and came Watergate in the public eyo-I ;hink we years was how little of the surveillance tech-
to include the secret subsidy of U.S. domes- have an opportunity to organize for a new nology actually diffused into our own econ-
tic organizations. You might say, as the cold Hoover Commission-type study. In 1945 omy, though some of It was developed right
z:ar stepped up, covert operations came to Harry Truman, as President, told his Budget here in this country. This was, I think, be-
be used internally and included, as Messrs. Director, and these are Truman's words, "I cause there was no force for such diffusion.
Halperin and Stone have indicated, the so- am very much against building up an Amer. Now, there is such a force-the fight against
cret CL4 subsidy of an estimated two hun- ican Gestapo." Tragically, Watergate demon- crime. The Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
dred and twenty-five domestic organizations strated that Truman's fears were not un- ministration [LEAA] poses a very definite
between the early 1950s and 1967. The most founded, threat to the right of privacy and to civil lib-
famous, of course, was the National Students Mr. XaoNFsLn. I think we have to take a erties by funding the use of this technology
A_ssoclatlon, whose budget at one time was rather jaundiced view of Congressional over- in domestic affairs. For example, in Wash-
supported ninety per cent by a secret sub- sight in this area. When something comes up ington, we fought very hard and success-
s_dy from the CIA. . before the Congress, the Congressmen often fully against a group which was going .to
These widespread domestic subsidies were don't know what they are voting on. They receive money from LEAA. It was going to
perhaps the second greatest mistake in the go by what the committee leadership says; it have some $150,000 worth of equipment for
history of the CIA. I would say the program .. gets down to a very few people. The Armed an electronic surveillance van to use, they
of subsidizing domestic organizations was Services Committee does have an oversight said, for fighting organized crime and heavy
clearly against the law. What, then, was the role now, but the oversight Is done by the drug traffic. We are going to see more and
greatest mistake? The greatest mistake was staff. A good example of the qualii;y of the more of this across the United States, funded
to allow CIA personnel and equipment to oversight is suggested by the fact that the by LEAA.
be used for doubly Illegal acts at home-, just-retired chief counsel of the House Armed Mr. ScxwAars. I want to make two brief
illegal because burglary is illegal, and illegal. Services Committee was also a major general , points. The first point is with regard to Con-
because Congress had very explicitly pro- in the Marine Reserves. Most of the senior gressional oversight. I think few people really
hibited the use of the Central Intelligence staff on the Armed Services Committee treat feel Congressional oversight is adequate. All
Agency for internal purposes, the junior dissident Senators with a certain too often it turns Into the primary diction-
In 1971, the then Director of the Central disdain. They don't talk to them. They don't ary meaning of the term. Yet we must use
Intelligence,- Richard Helms, gave a rare give them information. These junior men- the tools we have. This Is, in our constitu-
public speech defending the CIA. He raised bars and some middle-rank members don't tional governmental structure, the only real
the problem of the compatibility of its ac- have a chance. They can't get through to the instrument We have for controlling executive
tivity with American democracy. He said ex- chairman, they can't get through to the action.
plicitly and clearly,. "We do not target on staff, they have to rely on outside people. - Secondly, as one who is not involved in
American citizens." Was he telling the. Mr. Lewis. I am skeptical of the suggestion this area at all, my sympathies are with the
truth? Because r _thought he was telling the that covert operations could continue safely suggestions made in the paper and discus-
truth, I found something else he said even if they were scrutinized by an effective Con- slon. This bloated, elephantine apparatus
more shocking. "The nation must to a degree gressional committee. I don't believe that a that has grown up completely distorts the
take it on faith we who lead the CIA are joint Congressional committee is ever going constitutional center of gravity. Of course,
honorable men, devoted to the nation's serv to deal effectively with these matters. It it ought to be pruned, refined, improved, and
ices." I don't think that any government won't be in on the operation early enough. maybe abolished, and yet one has a lingering
ocials at any level should ask the American It won't have the expertise. Even supposing a doubt. You all remember Secretary Stimson's
people to take it on faith that they are hop- Senator thought landing people in Cuba was famous remark- when he dismantled this
arable men, because we, I hope, are a govern- - a bad idea, by the time he found out about it kind of operation, at what now seems a very
menu of laws and not of men.
.. everybody would be all cranked up on the elementary if not infantile level: "Gentle-
I recommend a thorough audit of all CIA operation and would say, Senator, it is too men don't open other people's mail," he said.
activities, foreign and domestic, by a Hoover. late to change. It is just not a realistic notion But what happens if, in the world, you are
Commission-type study, independent'of the that you can control such operations. Their' not dealing with gentlemen, and all other
government. It is an ordinary suggestion, but whole nature is that you cannot control. governments have this kind of thing?
I remind you that not since 1965 has such a them, and that Is the danger.. Mr. HALPERN. I want to distinguish be-
study been made. There have been dozens of Mr. LowENFELD. It may be possible to-build tween two things, Mr. Stone and I were not
studies of the CIA's problems by secret. gov- in some notion of regular accountability, I proposing the abolition of reading other peo-
ernment committees; the government was am skeptical too, but it may be worth the ple's mail. That is precisely one of the things
investigating itself. In 1955, the Hoover effort. we are proposing to continue. It is very hard
Commission task force on intelligence actin- One footnote to what professor Ransom to make estimates; but I don't know any-
hies, a very Establishment-oriented group,, said about the historical record. I am more body. who has been In the government who
called public attention to the dangers that and more skeptical of the historical record. would challenge the notion that something
we now see have become real,. We need an- I am skeptical of the notion that In 1 X47 Con- over ninety per coat, I would say ninety-
other such study. I believe such a study gress did not intend the Central Intelligence eight per cent, of the useful information the
should go forward separate and apart from Agency to do anything but evaluate. I realize United States government has comes either
the CIA involvement in the Watergate scan- that is what the statute says and that is what from overt sources: newspapers, public
dal. Watergate Is going to be thoroughly in- the formal record, says, but that's just the radio broadcasts, or thing of that kind-,or
vestigated, but there is a much, much larger Point, from technical and intelligence-gathering:
question: the policy, organization and con- Mr. DoasEN. Are you suggesting there were satellites, reading other people's mail, the
trols of the intelligence system. separate meetings in the Congress; with a kinds of things the National Security Agency
I predict such a study will recommend record that might not have been made pub supposedly does.
what Messrs. Stone and Halperin have rec lie? We are not proposing to abolish that range
ommended: that the CIA become again an Mr. LowENFSLn, Sure, of activity. What we are proposing is to move
intelligence agency, as Congress intended, Mr. CALLEN. I wish to comment on Intel- it out of its Super Secrecy. For example, it Is
and that covert operations be abolished. If ligence-gathering, as distinct from covert now clear to anybody who reads anything
we need a reserve force for covert operations, operations. I worked at the National Security ' that the United States has a very large satel-
then we will create and use it. I don't rule Agency for eight years, sometimes helping lite program. It is still the case that any-
out all overseas use of covert operations. But among other things to develop analytical in- body with a security clearance Is violating
such covert activity is an act of war, so let's terception and surveillance apparatus. I the law if he says so publicly: The budget
call it war and get the CIA out of It. agree with Professor Lowenfeld that a great for spy satellites and the offices that runs
I predict that such a study will also call, deal of what goes on, in NSA at least, is very them are buried. If you go as a Congressman
as the Hoover Commission did in 1955, for a much in the interest:; of peace, because you or a citizen and say, "Who runs the satellite
joint Congressional committee on intelli- don't really trust what any other government program which we read about In the news-
gence activities. I realize that this is a close says. You really have much more confidence papers all the time?" you can't find out. If
question. The Congressional Joint Atomic in what you intercept, in what they are say- you say, "How much does it cost?" you can't
Energy Committee has not worked the way ing among themselves, find out. -
we wanted it to work. But Congress needs a Much of what used to be done by people There is absolutely no reason In the world
sustained surveillance group for the intelli- is now done by satellites. You can 'ring the for either of those two facts to be secret, and
genes community. Congress gave far too Soviet Union with interception apparatus, no reason in the world for Congress not to
much away in 1947 and 1949. Congress did but that only gets at long-range communi- be able to get Into that program in executive
give the CIA the right to spend funds cations, - Microwave communloationtti which session on a classified basis, the way it gets
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00957AO00100070050-8
i '-L missile program or any
,'her r,: , gram.
Again I want to acknowl-
edge the work of Senator WEICKER and
Senator B.tlczx in this area.
Mr. CHURCH subsequently said: Mr.
President. earlier this morning I under-
stand that a colloquy took place herein
the Senate Chamber with respect to the
policy pursued by the CIA in Chile, which
has now been revealed by Mr. Colby, the
CIA Director, and' confirmed by the
President.
In connection with that colloquy,- I
further understand that a bill is to be
introduced which would establish a joint
committee of Congress with jurisdiction .
over the CIA, mandated to exercise sur
veillance over its operations.
States Gov . ..;lent tried to imply it was at must not be allowed to obscure this ?ordid
the time oC the overthrow of Salv
dor
a
story of !defibl A
ensemerican intervention
Allende. In the internal affairs of Chile, In the years
The CIA, It turns out, engaged for years in gust b
f
e
ore the violentth
overrow of the.
clandestine activities against the late Chilean Allende Government and the death of pres.
President. CIA director William Colby ac- !dent Salvador Ailende Gossens.
knowledged in secret testimony to the Con- Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ap.
grass that some $8 million had been author- posts to have been a principal force in
ized by a high-level Intelligence committee this covert intervention, and is being
beaded by Henry Kissinger to "destabilize" charged once again with not having told the
Allende's Marxist government and bring whole truth to a Senate committee. Demands
about its downfall after 1970. are being heard for a reopening of the hear-
The disclosures are shocking. and dictate ings which recommended his confirmation
the urgent need for a public scrutiny of na- as Secretary. -
tioral security policies, a reform of C::A func- The Times story, by Seymour Hersh, was
tions, and a system of strict accountability based on a letter from Representative
for CIA actions. They also point again to the Michael Harrington of Massachusetts to
deception practiced by previous adn dnistra- Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the House
tlons.. . Foreign Affairs Committee. The Harrington
The State Department sticks by its guns. letter gave an account from memory, of
It stated this week it backs the testimony of testimony to a House Armed Services sub-
high officials who previously told Congress committee by William E Colb
y the director
., and I intend to join as a cosponsor of.'' dmestic affairs of Chile after Allenda''seleca of the Central Harrington Intelligence the measure. said he had twice read a
clearly transcript of the Colby testimony, As he de-
It was not possible for me to be on the y the. full -story has yet to. be told, : scribed It to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Colby said that.,.-
floor at the time that the colloquy took' In light. of the developing dispute aye favor the Nixon Administration bad authorized
place, but I do have some newspaper full-scale public hearings into the CIA's role about $8 million to be spent covertly to make
place, but ch relate to the Chilean per In Chile, as called for by Congressman - It impossible for President Allende to govern.
fair that I ich think could the Chute af- Michael .Harrington. Specifically, $500,000 was authorized to both
elect-
made a part of the record in reference invo eis Is the fir the d in tquest onah ee covert operations opp nents,9andt$350, 00 was later autos
to the colloquy, against foreign states. Its record Includes the - for bribing members of the Chilean
Mr. President, I submit for your ap aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, the secret war gress to vote against ratifying Mr. AJlerce.
proval and ask unanimous consent that in Laos, and efforts to overthrow govern- election.
the following articles be printed in the ments in Iran and Guatemala. More recent- Later $5 million was authorized for clan-
clan-
the on at the conclusion of printed remarks: ly the domestic front, it furnished tho White destine "destabilization" efforts In Chile;
RE article th Tom Wicker, the New York House plumbers" with technical aid and a and in 1973, $1.5 million was provided to An by Times colamnist entitled, "Secret War ' thathvio ated piitts man Denlei Ellsber;-acts help anti'-Allende
The authorizing andidates body for all municipal
on Chile," and an- editorial from the - The record- is disturcL elections. bing. - C.I.A. activity The aubade for all
September 11, 1974, edition . of the - However distasteful, clandestine' opera- mLittee" of the was Nixon the so-called "40
coomm-
Christian Science Monitor, Henry inger. -
'~ions sometimes are necessary. If a [oretgn mittee chaired hatted by nry Kissinger.
The PRESIDING OFFICES, Without - power, for instance, is engaged in activities But Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign
objection, it is so ordered; ' in a country that could impair Amertoan in
-
know what it is up to. But gathering U.0. mus
in forma.
Mr. CIIURCg Mr. President, it seems Mon and exposing Communist subversion,
to me that these two articles eloquently . say, are one thing. Attempts to undermine or
sum up the issues which are raised for overthrow legitimate governments area quite
this country arising out of the CIA's another. - -
intervention in Chile for the purpose of A distressing aspect of all this Is the double
"destabilizing" the government of the -- standard which the U.S. has set for Its inter-
COnstitutionally elected President of national conduct. It apaprently is permissibl
P
den
e
an activities to undermine
Chile, S odor Allende
Mr, for the CIA to maneuver against local goo-
that . Government.
s
hile ende was a it Ailst, and I would not for thews which Washington does not like-- Similarly, Edward M. Korry, ambassador to
t Is deemed the he
Chile during most of the period in
have chosen him or the ideas he advo-
u
ec
us
q
estion
w
,
n the US d
li
i
.nes tose itrifiuenceto .' a
cated for my own country. But the fact - dissuade representative regimes from anti- tee .denied that su ushr er ha oaab d bron American sn atte mit-
"pressure, e. n a attempts
is that he was elected, ill accordance democratic excesses-a;i in South Korea or to "pressure, subvert, influence a single
with the electoral process established by Greece-this is Justified as "noninterfe;-ence" member of the Chilean Congress." Charles A,
the constitution Of Chile, as President ,.In another country's internal affairs. - Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary of State
of that counf-ry. If the CIA is permitted to abet the dlsinte- for Latin-American affairs also swore that
As the Christian Science Monitor gration of constitutionally elected govern- the United States had scrupulously followed
states: meats-however unpalatable their ideol- a policy of non-intervention in Chile.
No wonder, then, that the sworn
author. Se
It apparently is permissible for the CIA to ' -ity to condemn similar! bve mveaction by Church, to whose subcommittee
n
maneuver against local governments which" a Communist power? " testimony was offered, was reported to be
Washington does not like-this is deemed in The Allende regime was hardly a model outraged upon learning ofsthColby testi-
the national interest -but when the Us. for Latin America, But the late President did mony. He has properly raised not only the
declines to use its influence to dissuade rep- carry on his Marxist experiment within the possibility of perjury charges but the ques-
ion regimes from anti-democratic ex- constitutional framework. If Washington
ceases-as in South Korea or Greece--this Is chose not to -render help-except gn Relati nsnCommitteegonb hehinte 11
p-except tt> tht ventt
justified as "non-interference in another Chilean mlliary-.that at least was an overt ventton in Chile,
country's internal affairs. if debatable, position_ If such hearings are held, or If Mr. Kissin-
Or, as Mr. `Picker pungently puts it But by colluding in the effort to unde,znine ger's confirmation hearings should be re-
The real questions are whether this su the Chilean Government by covert rr eons, opened-as they already have been once, to
posed! _ P Washington has only helped destroy the inquire into charges bout that iretaps nib pot ers nd
e
- on des any eac or moral rand ight eo conduct cavort credibility of thet argument that Coramu- whole truth about ate -Th e ireporters and
y 1 g nists should participate in the democratic pours of his urther th n th nquiry should
eperatiotyy abroad, and whether app Admin-
eat n of either party has the co drain- process rather than seek power through vio- cial press testimony, immp tit candor of g_ Is.
tional authori-y to order taxpayers' money-. lent means, t Rs oe portant tont as that oin ti dn t
spent for clandestine warfare against the Buts ono Gov overt ac viti s against ant
SECar?r Wna oar Crxrr s r Hersh, 1Y revert horized, against en-
legitimate government of a sovereign country, ofheer country
Exarnrr 1 (By Tom Wicker) ot are authorized, Government
CIA AND Carr E
On the very day that President Ford ex- S ateal and mPre tclentns-haveg tocliea~bout
l ow the facts are coming to light. The a otherph.igh crime of the Nixon Adminis- - questions areei hether his bus osedly p real
eace-
Central Intelligence Agency was not the in- tration was being disclosed in The New York loving and democratic nation has any legal
nocent bystander in Chile that the United, Times, Public outrage because of the pardon or moral right to conduct covert operations
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I believe such a- bill to,be necessary
lion hearings that "the C.I.A, had nothing to
do with the coup, to the best of my kno
!
w
-
.
edge and belief." While that may have been
true in the narrowest sense,' it was at best
one of those- torturous non-lies in which
governments specialize and at worsta con-
cealment of the true nature of U.S. policy
toward the All
ende Governt
men and the
scope of Americ
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abroad. and ' !:her-any Administration of
either partI' ~ 3 the constitutional authority
to order taxpayers' money spent for clan-
destine warfare against the legitimate gov-
ernment of a sovereign country.
These questions are long overdue for full
and c,pen debate; the Colby testimony, for
exam le. said the first intervention against
Mir. A1ende -was ordered by Lyndon Johnson
in 1S54. Congress, the press, Presidential
candidates-all have consistently shied away
from this subject. Supposed liberals have
pled the supposed need to be "hard-nosed."
The real need is to face the fact -that gang-
ster s n-heroes of bribery, violence and even
assasIaticn are being carried out, in the
name of the great American people;
The CS --- may be.only an Instrument, but
it seems to have its own sinister vitality. The
Chilean ef'icrts, in fact, were authorized by
the lineal descendent of a body set up by the
Kennedy Administration to "control" the
CSA Isn't it clear at last that such "con-
order by the Acting President pro tem-
pore (Mr. METCALF).
QUORUM CALL
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum. -
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE
At 12:30 p.m., a message from the
troll, can be achieved only by a Government House ofRepresentatives by Mr. Hack-
with the political will to cut the C.X.A. in riey, one of its reading clerks, announced
'half. or in it altogether?
%J that the House disagrees to the aniend-
ments' of the Senate to the bill (H _R.
OG-NITlcuv 0Jt ~r;ivnivrc ,.n.vcw++ cation, and Welfare, and related agen-
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, Gies, for the fiscal year ending Julie 30,
I ask unanimous consent that the order 1975; agrees to the conference requested
for the recognition of Mr. Cotton be by the Senate on the disagreeing votes
vacated. of the two Houses thereon: and that Mr.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- FLOOD, Mr. NATCHER, Mr. SMITH of Iowa,
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. ? Mr. CAsI Y of Texas, Mr. PATTEN, Mr.
ML-. ROBERT C. BYRD. If any Sena- OBEY, Mrs. GREEN o Oregon, Mr. MA-
tor wishes time, I have time under an, Hot, Mr.. MICHEL, Mr. SHRIVER,. Mr.
order which I shall be delighted to yield. CONTE, Mr. RoBrNsoN of Virginia, and
Mr. President, there being no request Mr. CEDERBERO were appointed managers
for such time, I yield back the remainder of the conference on the part of the
of my tirne House.
The ACTING PRESIDENT prof ten- The message also announced that the
pore- The Senator from West Virginia House disagrees to the amendment of
yields back the remainder of his time. the- Senate to the bill (H.R. 6274) to
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore- Under the previous order, there
will now be a period for the transaction
of routine morningbusiness not to ex-
tend beyond the hour of 9:30 a.m., with
the statements therein limited to 3 min-
utes-
QUORUM CALL
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the rolL
The assistant- legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
M:r. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
UUrSf;CS ,A +a aU"-?o.p ??.. checks drawn on designated depos..taries
of the United States by extending the
availability of the check forgery Insur-
ance fund, and for other purposes.
At 4:10 p.m., a message from the Housa
of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one
of its reading clerks, announced that the
House insists upon its amendments to the
bill (S. 1233) to esablish a national pro-
gram for research, development, and
demonstration in fuels and energy and
for the coordination and financial sup-
plementation of Federal energy research
and development, and for other pur-
poses; disagreed to by the Senate; agrees
to the conference requested by the Sen-
ate on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses thereon; and that Mr. UDALL, Mr.
BINGHAM, Mr. SEIBERI.ING, Mr.. TEAGUE,
Mr. MCCORMACK, Mr. RYIPF'z, Mr. DELLEN-
BACK, and Mr. MOsHER were appointed
managers of the conference on the part
of the House.
The message also announced that the
House disagrees to the amendment of
the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14214) to
amend the Public Health Service Act and
related laws to revise and extend pro-
grams of. health revenue sharing and
health services, and for other purposes;
agrees to the conference requested by the
Senate on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses thereon; and that Mr. STAG-
GERS, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. SATTERFIELD, Mr.
$YROS, Mr. PREYER, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mk.
Roy, Mr. DEviNE, Mr. NELSEN, Mr. CAR-
TER, Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. HEINZ, and Mr.
HUDNUT were appointed managers of the
conference on the part of the House.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECU-
TIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC. .
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore (Mr. BAKER) laid before the Senate
the following letters, which were re-
ferred as indicated:
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE Dx-
FARTMENT OS LABOR (SEN. Doc. 93-111)
A communication from the President of
the United States proposing supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year 1975, in-
volving transfers of $7,400,000 from other
appropriations, forthe Department of Labor
(with accompanying papers). Ordered to be
printed and referred to the Committee on
Appropriations.
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS TOR THE DE-
PARTMENT OF LABOR (SEN. DOC. 93-110)'
A communication from the President of
the United States proposing supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year 1975 in the
-amount of $9,650,000 for the Department of
Labor (with accompanying papers). Ordered
to be printed and referred to the Committee
on Appropriations.
The message also announced that the
Speaker has affixed his signature to the
following enrolled bills:
S. 210. An act to authorize the establish-
ment of the Boston National Historical Park
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
8. 3301.. An act to amend the act o; Qcto-
ber 27, 1972 (Public Law 92-578) ;
H.R. 6395. An act to designate certain lands
in the Okefenokee National Wildlife ]3efuge, '
Ga., as wilderness;
H.R. 12000. An act to enable egg producers
to establish, finance, and carry out a3 coot-
for a quorum call be rescinded. -- dinated program of research, producer and
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- consumer education, and promotion to lm-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered, prove, maintain, and develop markets for
e s roducts sent fowl and p:;oducts
e
P
s
RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL
OF THE CHAIR
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
stand in recess awaiting the call of the
Cbah', with the understanding that the
recess- not extend - beyond the hour of
9:30 a.m. today.
There being no objection, the Senate,
at 9:14 a.m., recessed subject to the call
of the Chair; whereupon, the Senate re-
assembled at 9:27 a.m. when- called to
. gap '
gg
of spent fowl; and
H.R. 13595. An act to authorize appropria-
tions- for the Coast Guard for the procure-
ment of vessels and aircraft and construc-
tion of shore and offshore establishments, to
authorize appropriations for bridge altera-
tions, to authorize for the Coast Guard an
end-year strength for active duty personnel,
to authorize for the Coast Guard average
military student loads, and for other pur-
poses.
The enrolled bills were subsequently
signed,by the Acting President pro tem
pore (Mr. BAKER).
PETITIONS
Petitions were laid before the Senate
and referred as indicated:
By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore
(Mr. BAKER) :
A resolution adopted by the Council of
the city of Cleveland, Ohio, memorializing
the Congress to design and implement an
effective program, of food price control. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs.
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
The following' reports of committees
were submitted:
By Mr.. MUSSIE, from the Committee on
the Budget: -
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00957A000100070050-8
D,3,) CONGrvESS
2D S],SSTON
404
IN TIIE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
SEPTEMBER 1.7,1974
Mr. ~IoND.~r.r submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee oil .Lri iecl ServiceB
RESOLUTION
To establish a select committee of the Senate on intelligence
policy.
Whereas revelations concerning the role of foreign intelligence
operations of the United States Government in undermining
the stability of democratically elected governments have
raised serious questions concerning the management, policies,
and purposes of United States intelligence operations and
their compatibility with the authority of the Congress and.
the values of the American people : Now, therefore, be it
1 Il esol i:ed, Tha t-
SIcTIO-N 1. There is hereby established a select com-
mittee of the Senate, which may be called, for eonveuirnce
of expression, the Select Committee on. Intelligence Policy.
V
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 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79-00957AO00100070050-8
1 SEC. 2. The select committee created by this resolu-
2 Lion shall consist of fifteen Members of the Senate, composed
3 of three majority and two minority members of the Com-
4 mittee on Armed Services, three majority and two minority
5 members" of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and three
6 majority and two minority A.1embers of the Senate, to be
7 selected in the same manner as the chairman and members
8 of the standing committees of the Senate, For the purposes
9 of paragraph 6 rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Son-
10 ate, service of a Senator as a member, chairman, or vice
11 chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into
12 account.
13 SEC. 3. The select committee is authorized and directed
14 to examine past, present, and projected intelligence opera-
15 Lions and policies of the United States Government, and to
16 determine the role of such operations in supporting the deci-
17
sionmaking of the United States Government, and the im-
1S pact of such operations on national security and the conduct
19 of foreign policy. The select committee shall make an interim
20 report to the appropriate committee of the Senate not later
21 than June 30, 1975, and shall make a Canal report not later
22 than January 31, 1974. Such Final report shall contain the
23 findings of the committee together with recommendations
24 respecting the management of intelligence operations within
25 the executive branch, the appropriate role of Congress, the
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1 appropriate function of varying types of intelligence activi-
2 ties, and recommendations requesting any appropriate legis-
3 lative action.
4 SEc. 4. To enable the select committee to make the
5 investigation' and study authorized and directed by this
6 resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select coin
7 mittee as an agency of the Senate to employ and fix the
8 compensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, techni-
9 cal, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appro-
10 priate; to sit and act at any time or place during sessions,
11 recesses, and adjournment periods of the Senate; to hold
12 hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive docu-
13 mentary or physical evidence (including classified in
14 formation respecting clandestine operations, which shall
1-5 be made available to the select committee and senior
1G staff designated by the select committee) relating to the
IT matters it is authorized to investigate and study; and to
IS expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate
I9 any money made available to it by the Senate to perform
20 the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this
21 resolution and to make the investigation and study it is
authorized by this resolution to make.
SEc. 5. The expenses of the select committee under this
-'-t- resolution shall not exceed .$ 750,000. per anlnuin. Such
ex- pense,, shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate
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4
upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the select corn-
rnittee.
CD
0
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