JOURNAL - OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 16, 1974
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S. 4019
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel Page 3
Wednesday - 16 October 1974
25X1 P-z"I'
.....)27:CR, I
25X1
9. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Donald G. Henderson, Acting
Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and discussed with
him the debriefing of the Senate members of the recent China travel
delegation. It was Henderson's suggestion that Senator J. W. Fulbright
(D. , Ark.) would be rather difficult to schedule, but that Senators
Hubert H. Humphrey (D. , Minn.) and Hiram L. Fong (R. , Hawaii) would
probably be pleased to meet with us.
As for the Committee study
Henderson does not know at this point whether any
further action will be taken other than responses to the Senate Government
09.erations Committee for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee views on
Aihe Baker/Weicker bill. S.4019. a joint committee on intelligence oversight.
/
25X1 10. Left with Rita Argenta, Secretary to
William B. Hogan, Counsel, Intelligence Subcommittee, House Armed
Services Committee, a copy of the correspondence between Mr. Warner,
General Counsel, and OPIC which Hogan had requested.
25X1 11. Met with Torn Hughes, Press Secretary to
Senator Claiborne Pell (D , R. if.). Hughes told me the problem of the
student at the block party during the Havana trip was a result of confusion
rather than fact. See Journal Item #8, 3 October 1974.
C/LA, has been advised.
25X1
25X1
cc:
0/DDCI Ex. Sec.
DDI DDA DDS&T Mr. Warner
Mr. Thuerrner Mr. Lehman
EA/DDO Compt.
EO E L. CAR
egislative Counsel
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
25X1?
25X1
Armed
the
Journal - Office of Legislative
Wednesday - 25 September 1974
Counsel Page 5
1,4f,
kh17,4rfrLL
18. Met with Ed Braswell, Chief Counsel, Senate25xi
Services Committee, and told him of the review we were conducting of
testimony of witnesses before the Senate Foreign Relationc nrInnryliti-Ar.
L.,..4115
25X1
Lvlias
25X1
Braswell
Op rations
action on
mentioned that he had talked with the staff of the Government 25x1
Committee and was advised by them the Committee plans to take
the Baker/Weicker proposal for a joint committee on intelligence.
19.
Committee
proposed
Kenney copies
20.
Met with Ed Kenney, Senate
on the two amendments whiCh
when it comes up on the
amendments.
Armed Services
Senatot Abourezk
floor. I left with
staff, and briefed hini
to the Foreign Aid bill
of our letters on these
,
Jim Calloway, Senate Appropriations
Committee
staff, called
snortly oetore t:00 p.m. to say they were having
problems with
scheduling and
would have to cancel the briefing tomorrow morning. He said
he would call
me'first thing in the morning to see if it could be
rescheduled
later
in the day or
if necessary at a different time. The Director,
and25X1
25X1
lwere advised.
25X1
The Director advised he had
received a call
21.
from Chairman
John Stennis, Senate
Armed Services Committee, who said he
liked the drafts
of the exchange of letters we had prepared and was having his
letter to the
Director done in final and we could pick it up. The Director asked
if we would have
have his (the
somebody drop by
Director's) reply put
to pick of Stennis' letter and go ahead and
in final form.
25X1
22.
Received a call from Guy McConnell, Senate
Appropriations
Committee staff,
who said he wanted to check as to whether the
money appropriated
for the Agency
was no year or multi-year
funds. After
talking with
Messrs. John Warner,
and Jack lams,
I advised 25X1
McConnell most
of our funds were
multi-year funds (i.e. available
for expenditure
within a period
of three years) but
some were
25X1
in effect two-year
funds. McConnell
thanked me for following up on this.
25X1
? tti-^1AN2'
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Journal - Office of Legislative Counsel
:.1") 118?01 %OP. N, ET
Wednesday - 25 September 1974r-Ar 0.0
23.
He'ise Ways and Means
for
After checking with
1000 hours on Thursday, 26 September.
annual leave starting Monday, 30 September,
25X1 will be doing the Congressional interviews
Page 6
Received a call from Carol Vazis,
Committee staff, requesting a personnel interview
a sociology major and recent college graduate.
I scheduled for
so either
will be on two weeks
during that period.
25X1 24. I I Spoke with a Mrs. Castillo, in the
Albuquerque, New Mexico, office of Senator Joseph M. Montoya (D., N. M.).
She was asking on behalf of an applicant, why the Agency had
not hired her. After having conferred with OP. I advised her
25X1 thati 'application had received very careful consideration by
our personnel people and that I had reviewed it myself and was sure that she
had received every consideration.. Mrs. Castillo appreciated these assurances.
No further action is necessary at this time.
25X1 25. Susan Hamilton, on the staff of Representative
Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen (R. , N. J.), called to ask a question about the
membership of the 40 Committee. I referred her to the 23 September
Newsweek article and she said that that article would satisfy her requirements
25X1 ver w
25X1
25X1
25X1
cc:
0/DDCI
Ex. Sec.
Mr. Thuerrner Mr. Warner
Mr. Lehman
EA/DDO DDI DDA DDS &T Comptroller
GEL.
egislative Counsel
RET
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2. \
ApprovedmisAlima05/11/21,;,CIA-REVF9A0n57A000100060003-1
September 19 19 A.L LI UKU ? ,.) 1?4 S 17005
It with the committee. I delivered a copy
of that report to the chairman of the
Appropriations Committee and the
Armed Services Committee, for the use
of their CIA Oversight Subcommittees.
The staff report was later "sanitized"
for sensitive and classified material by
the CIA. Mr. President, I shall ask unan-
imous consent that a copy of this "sani-
tized" report be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of these remarks.
Based on that experience, meaning the
staff CIA report and other investigations,
I believe there is no question that the
Central Intelligence Agency was "in-
volved" in Watergate; the question is
rather on whose order and for what pur-
pose.
Clearly, the factual circumstances out-
lined in the staff report are, in many
cases, inconclusive and lend themselves
to varying inferences and interpreta-
tions. I believe, however, that this very
uncertainty and the inadequacy of the
explanations provided by the CIA, the
White House, and the other agencies in-
volved, highlights the need for a more
effective, single purpose oversight capa-
bility within the Congress of the United
States. It seems apparent that current
congressional committee oversight does
not function effectively as a deterrent
to those who may seek to utilize govern-
mental intelligence and investigative
agencies for unlawful or unauthorized
Purposes. I wish to say that I have noth-
ing but the highest respect and regard
for the members of the current oversight
committees, particularly Senators STEN-
NIS and McCLELLAN, but I think their
obvious burdens and responsibilities in
the conventional fields of appropriations
and armed services are such that their
committees are unable to accord more
than cursory attention to the oversig
function?witness the fact that accor
ing to committee staff, the Armed Se
ices Central Intelligence Subcommit
has conducted only two formal meeti
during the 93c1 Congress.
The recommendation of the Sel t
Committee on Presidential Campa n
Activities that congressional oversi
of the intelligence community
strengthened, as well as my own call
for the creation of a Joint Committee
Intelligence Oversight, were, of co
based on the knowledge before the c
mittee and in the public domain a of
July of this year. Since that time, e
compelling need for increased cong s-
sional oversight has been increas by
the recent revelation that there ar al-
leged major discrepancies in sworn sti-
mony submitted to the Senate ign
Relations Committee by high Sta De-
partment and Central Inte gence
Agency officials regarding covert CIA
operations in Chile. Apparently, the
House and Senate Foreign Relations
Committees were misled regarding the
expenditure of $11 million, as authorized
by the so-called Forty Committee, to
preserve the opposition press and politi-
cal parties during the administration of
the late Salvador Allende.
This circumstance has prompted, I
understand, legislation, including bills
introduced by our distinguished colleague
from Minnesota (Mr MONDALE) and
Congressman HARRINGION, designed to
provide for increased 1-:)rigressional :fore-
knowledge and oversig at of such activi-
ties. I commend them for their efforts.
Moreover, displaying remarkable fore-
sight, the distinguisho,1 majority leader
of the Senate, Senator MANSFIELD, intro-
duced legislation in 1Pi.3, 1954, and 1955,
to establish a Joint Conunittee on Cen-
tral Intelligence. This legislation even-
tually was defeated on April 11, 1956;
but I hope that intervening circum-
stances now will corn Del a different re-
sult.
In. closing, r wish to urge that the 93d
Congress enact this legislation, after ap-
propriate committee 4:onsideration, be-
fore adjournment. I am pleased that,
during his most recent press conference,
President Ford indicated that he was go-
ing to meet with the responsible con-
gressional committees discuss the need
for changes in the nfltelligence review
process; but I think riat we need more
than a change in the ::?eview process, we
need a change in thi:- committee struc-
ture. Thus, because of the cost, the se-
crecy, the lack of efT4:ctive supervision,
the uncertainty of doinesic activities, and
the extreme difficulty in obtaining ac-
cess to classified materials, I am of the
opinion that congressonal oversight of
governmental intelligence operations
must be entrusted to committee solely
charged with that responsibility; and
that consideration of this proposal de-
serves priority considc,?ation in the wan-
ing days of this sesst:Ft of the 93d Con-
gress.
Mr. President, I ask,: unanimous con-
sent that the aforertentioned Senate
Select Committee stkfi report and the
text of the bill whicl I am introducing
D at this point.
Thete'be g no objection, the bill and
staff report were ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
S. IC ID
Be it enacted by thf: Senate and Mouse
of Representatives of Vie United States of
America in Congress essembled, Thai; this
Act may be cited as the "Joint Committee on
Intelligence Oversight Abt of 1974."
ESTABLISHMENT OF JOI,fT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
SEC. 2. (a) There is Iereby established a
Joint Committee on Ib -:elligence Oversight
(hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Com-
mittee") which shall he composed of four-
teen members appointee as follows:
(1) seven members of the Senate, four to
be appointed by the majority leader of the
Senate and three to appointed by the
minority leader of the fienate; and
(2) seven members of the use of Repre-
sentatives, four to be appointed by the ma-
jority leader of the Houst: of Representatives
and three to be appointed by the minority
leader of the House of Representatives.
(b) The Joint Committee shall select a
chairman and a vice chnirman from among
its members at the begtoning of each Con-
gress. The vice chairmen shall act in the
place and stead of the chairman in the ab-
sence of the chairman, 'Pie chairmanship and
the vice chairmanship shall alternate be-
tween the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives with each Congress. The chairman
during each even-numbered Congress shall
be selected by the Menelers of the Haase of
Representatives on the joint Committee from
among their number ane the chairman dur-
ing each odd-numbered Congress shall be
selected by the Members of the Senate on
the Joint Committee from among their num-
ber. The vice chairman during each Congress
shall be chosen in the same manner from
that House of Congress other than the House
of Congress of which the chairman is a
Member.
(c) A majority of the members of the
Joint Committee shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, except that
the Joint Committee may fix a lesser number
as a quorum for the purpose of taking testi-
mony. Vacancies in the membership of the
Joint Committee shall not affect the power
of the remaining members to execute the
functions of the Joint Committee and shall
be filled in the same manner as in the case
of the original appointment.
(d) Service of a Senator as a member or
as chairman of the Joint Committee shall
not be taken into account for the purposes
of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing
Rules of the Senate.
DITTIES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 3. (a) It shall be the duty of the Joint
Committee to conduct a continuing study
and investigation of the activities and op-
erations of (1) the Central Intelligence
Agency, (2) the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, Department of Justice, (3) the United
States Secret Service, (4) the Defense In-
telligence Agency, Department of Defense,
(5) the National Security Agency, and (6)
all other departments and agencies of the
Federal Government insofar as the activities
and operations of such other departments
and agencies pertain to intelligence gather-
ing or surveillance of persons; and to con-
sider proposals for the improvement and
reorganization of agencies and departments
of the Federal Government within the juris-
diction of the Joint Committee.
(b) The Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the
Secret Service, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the
National Security Agency shall keep the Joint
Committee fully and currently informed with
respect to all of the activities of their re-
spective organizations, and the heads of all
other departments and agencies of the Fed-
eral Government conducting intelligence ac-
tivities or operations or the surveillance of
persons shall keep the Joint Committee fully
and currently informed of all intelligence and
surveillance activities and operations carried
out by their respective departments and
agencies. The Joint Committee shall have au-
thority to require from any department or
agency of the Federal Government periodic
written reports regarding activities and op-
erations within the jurisdiction of the Joint
Committee.
(c) (1) All bills, resolutions, and other
matters in the Senate or the House of Repre-
sentatives relating primarily to the functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the 'United
States Secret Service, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the National Security Agency,
or to intelligence or surveillance activities or
o-erations of any other department or agency
of the Federal Government shall be referred
to the Joint Committee.
(2) No funds may appropriated for the
purnose of carrying out any intelligence or
surveillance activity or onerktion by any
office, or any department or gaceny of the
Federal Government, unless such funds for
such activity or operation have been specifi-
cally authorized by legislation enacted after
the date of enactment of this Act.
(3) No bill or resolution, and no amend- '
ment to any bill or resolution, and no matter
contained in any bill or resolution, in either
House, dealing with any matter which is
within the jurisdiction of the Joint Com-
mittee shall be considered in that House un-
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17006
Approved For ReLedmippgAlaniCatEgi9i)WA010B100060W-epl-lvember 19, 1974
less it is a bill or resolution which has been
reported by the Joint Committee of that
House (or from the consideration of which
Such committee has been discharged) or un-
less it is an amendment to such a bill or
resolution. Nothing in this subsection shall
be construed to deprive any committee of
either House from exercising legislative over-
sight with respect to intelligence and surveil-
lance activities and operations related to the
jurisdiction of such committee.
(4) Members of the Joint Committee who
are Members of the Senate shall from time
to time report to the Senate, and members
of the Joint Committee who are Members of
the House of Representatives shall from time
to time report to the House, by bill or other-
wise, their recommendations with respect to
matters within the jurisdiction of their re-
spective Houses and which are referred to the
Joint Committee or otherwise within the jur-
isdiction of the Joint Committee.
AormusraAms POWERS
SEC. 4. (a) The Joint Committee, or any
subcommittee thereof, is authorized, in its
discretion: to make expenditures; to employ
personnel; to adopt rules respecting its orga-
nization and procedures; to hold hearings;
to sit and act at any time or place; to sub-
pens, witnesses and documents; with the
prior consent of the Federal department or
agency concerned, to use on a reimbursable
basis the services of personnel, information,
and facilities of any such department or
agency; to procure printing and binding; to
procure the temporary services (not in ex-
cess of one year) or intermittent services of
individual consultants, or organizations
thereof, and to provide assistance for the
training of its professional staff, in the same
manner and under the same conditions as a
standing committee of the Senate may pro-
cure such services and provide such assist-
ance under subsections (1) and (j), respec-
tively, of section 202 of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946; and to take depo-
sitions and other testimony.
(b) Subpenas may be issued over the sig-
nature of the chairman of the Joint Commit-
tee or by any member designated by him or
the Joint Committee, and may be served by
such person as may be designated by such
chairman or member. The chairman of the
Joint Committee or any member thereof may
administer oaths to witnesses. The provi-
sions of sections 102-104 of the Revised Stat-
utes (2 U.S.C. 192-194) shall apply in the
case of any failure of any witness to comply
with a subpena or to testify when sum-
moned under authority of this subsection.
CLASSISFICATION OF INFORMATION
SEC. 5. The Joint Committee may classify
information originating within the commit-
tee in accordance with standards used gen-
erally by the executive branch for classifying
restricted data or defense information.
RECORDS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 6. The Joint Committee shall keep a
complete record of all Joint Committee ac-
tions, including a record of the votes on any
question on which a record vote is de-
manded. All records, data, charts, and files of
the Joint Committee shall be the property
of the Joint Committee and shall be kept in
the offices of the Joint Committee or such
other places as the Joint Committee may
direct.
EXPENSES OF JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 7. The expenses of the Joint Commit-
tee shall be paid from the contingent fund
of the Senate from funds appropriated for
the Joint Committee, upon vouchers signed
by the chairman of the Joint Committee or
by any member of the Joint Committee au
thorized by the chairman.
IN
This report is submitted at Senator Baker's
request to summarize the highlights of an
investigation of CIA activity, if any, in con-
nection with the Watergate incident and
aftermath. It Le based on material in the
possession of the Committee, both classified
and unclassifle& It does not attempt to deal
with all the neitters deemed pertinent and
important to a full and complete inquiry, but
is designed to ipenerally describe the areas of
interest and. cc-cern pursued during the staff
investigation and executive session interviews
since the conclision of the Committee's pub-
lic hearings.
In view of the, fact that_the Committee has
chosen to have no further public hearings;
that the Committee staff is in the process
of being reducd in size; that further coop-
eration by the kgency seems more likely on
the request o the standing jurisdictional
committees ratoer than on Me request of
the Watergate f:ommittee, anC that the total
buden of addit .irsal work to coMplete the in-
vestigation thmoughly is probably beyond
the competensi of the remaining staff in
terms of numbers and time, Senator Baker
requested that this memorandum be pre-
pared for submission to the lull Committee
for further position as the Committee
may determine. It is pointed out that, while
the report itsOf_ Is not classified, it makes
reference to, add in some instances quotes
from, material which is classified. There-
fore, each copy of this report has been treated
for security pm poses as if it were classified.
They are numbered and accounted for as in
the case of claa Allied material.
The report it: .moken down into seven cate-
gories, tabbed ,l1,3 follows:
(1) Backgro ?awl: A recitatim of the first
references to CIA connections on the part
of the Watergate burglars, reference to the
possibility of CUA involvement by the Presi-
dent in his speech of May 22, 1073, and certain
other publishet information and correspond-
ence.
(2) Mullen: The fact that the Mullen Com-
pany and its vesident, Bob Bennett, had an
established relationship with the CIA is de-
scribed in coral detail in this section of the
report. Most of the information contained in
this section w- discovered after Volume IV
was requested oy Senator Baker. The CIA
arranged to rei iase this volume and subse-
quent documents to the Watergate Commit-
tee in the custody of George Murphy serving
as security offie r for the Committee through
an arrangement with the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.
(3) Pennington: This section derives from
a CIA supplied memorandum dated February
22, 1974, from toe then Director -of Security,
detailing the l:sfoirreation that Lee R. Pen-
nington, a CIA ,aperative, had entered James
McCord's home and/or office shortly after
the Wategate U:eakin for the purpose of de-
stroying evidefirte of a C/A connection with
McCord.
(4) Tapes: Tots section derives from in-
formation supplied to Senator Baker by Di-
rector
Colby tY.ot there was a central taping
capability at The CIA; that the tapes had
been destroyed and the possibility that some
of the tapes ro sy have been Watergate re-
lated. Director Colby stated that he -did not
know whether etratergtae related tapes had
been destroyeO.
(5) TSD: The initials stand. for Technical
Services Divisir.,,) of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the section deals with rather
extensive contacts between Hunt and the
Agency and tie support su:mlied by the
Agency to Hunt and Liddy, which was used
in a wide .varie t,t of undertakings. A number
of factual di sere -ancies appear in this section
which cannot 1:,4, effectively reconciled on the
basis of the cormation we now possess?
such as Hunt t. receipt of certain Agency
technical assistance and contemporaneous
participation ih the preparation of the Ells-
berg psychiatrir: profile.
(6) Martine., This tab refers to Eugenio
Martinez, one of the Watergate burglars.
The section delineates the Martinez-Agency
relationship, Hunt's early activities in Mi-
ami, the actions taken or not taken by the
Agency's office in Miami, and certain unre-
solved questions.
(7) Recommendations: The seventh tab is
self-explanatory and constitutes the recom-
mendations of the staff for further inquiry.
BACKGROUND
In a speech on May 22, 1973, President
Nixon stated in part the following in connec-
tion with the Watergate matter:
"Within a few days, however, I was advised
that there was a possibility of CIA involve-
ment in some way.
"It did seem to me possible that, because
of the involvement of former CIA person-
nel, and because of some of their apparent
associations, the investigation could lead to
the uncovering of covert CIA operations
totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in.
"In addition, by this time, the name of Mr.
Hunt had surfaced in connection with Water-
gate, and I was alerted to the fact that he
had previously been a member of the special
investigations unit in the White House.
Therefore, I was also concerned that the
Watergate investigation might well lead to
an inquiry into the activities of the special
investigations unit itself."
"I also had to be deeply concerned with
insuring that neither the covert operations
of the CIA nor the operations of the special
investigations unit should be compromised.
Therefore, I instructed Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. Ehrlichman to insure that the investiga-
tion of the break-in not expose either an
unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the
activities of the White House investigations
unit?and to see that this was personally
coordinated between General Walters, the
Deputy Director of the CIA, and Mr. Gray at
the FBI."
One of the matters to which the President
was evidently referring was explored by Sen-
ator Baker in his questioning of John Ehr-
lichman when Ehrlichman appeared before
the Select Committee on July 26, 1973. Ehr-
lichman was questioned with regard to miss-
ing paragraph five of a memo from Egil Krogh
and David Young to John Ehrlichman dated
August 11, 1971.2
' This was the same matter which had been
brought to the attention of the Minority staff
in July of 1973 which resulted in a briefing
of Senator Ervin, Senator Baker, Sans Dash,
and Fred Thompson by White House Coun-
sels Fred Buzhardt and Leonard Garment.
The subject of that briefing is what is now
referred to as the "Admiral Moorer-Yeoman
Radford Incident."
With regard to involvement of the CIA
in the Watergate affair, it should be noted
that since June 17, 1972, there have been
numerous newspaper articles pointing out
the fact that many of those involved in the
Watergate break-in were former CIA em-
ployees; that CIA equipment was used by
Hunt, and other possible CIA links to Water-
gate.
In the September 14, 1973, issue of the
National Review, Miles Copeland wrote an
article entitled "The Unmentionable Uses of
a CIA" 2, suggesting that McCord led the
Watergate burglars into a trap.
In the November, 1973, issue of Harper's
Magazine, an article entitled "The Cold War
Comes Home" 2, By Andrew St. George, indi-
cated strongly that former CIA Director
Helms had prior knowledge of the Watergate
break-in. As a result of the St. George allega-
tion, Senator Baker asked Senator Symington
1 See Public Testimony of John Ehrlichman
dated July 26. 1973, at 2702-2704.
1 National Review, September 14? 1973,
"The Unmentionable Uses of a CIA," at 996.
Harper's Magazine, November, 1973, "The
Cold War Comes Home," at 82.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
BEST COPY
Available
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
geptember 19, 1974
CONGRESSJWAL RECORD ? SENATE
R. ., ,400: An original resolution au- iiy Mr. -.'.&'LLMON:
thOrizins sapPlemental expenditures by the S. 4926 A '.,_0. for the relief of Filemcin
, Corninitteeon _the Budge.; for inquiries and J. Irioeencio, -r., Noemi S. Inocencio, Pamela
investigations (Rept. No. 93-1167). Referred Ann /fiocencn Filemon Jose Inocencio, Jr.;
? to: stiq PoMMittee on Rules and: AdMimiStra- and '
ten . - - S. 4027. A b.... for the relief of Nur Bad-
By Mr. CANNON., from the "Coniniittee on shah. Refenre: to the Committee on the
Rules and Adininistration,. without amend- Judiciary.
ment: " - _ "Ely ItIr.: 7.1EI4MON (for, himself Mr.
Z.R. 007. An act to authorizp_the_cOnveY- Ctrari Nfr. Doie, Mr. HELMS, gr.
..
_ a cc to the city of Salem, Ill., of a statue of ;VICO? ,,viiN. and MT. YOUNG):
e hiss priii.:(11ept. No. 93-1164; S. 4028. A t i' to authorize the Secretary
eS. o.n..authorling acidi- Of-Agrreulture ,. . carry out an emergency as-
tionaA expenditures by the Cinatinitte; -0ii eistance pr )gr -.1 to assist States in reliev-
al-vices "fin' routine PUrPoies (Rept. Mg seVerelirhAilit-eonditioilitberfareaten.
ttrdestroy live ----)ek or crops. Referred to the
S. es.'f --k7r,esplution_ieliMr tIrthe Committee on Agriculture and Foreet17. ,
' iiting- of legislative proceedings With re- Py 7/11.. :474.AM:
t to the death of former Senator Ernest :S. MO:A bil..tcAjtequire the reduq_19,n of
7inv Rept. NO. 98-1106i; and the-r----7M of CM-UnerussAion of Seantors,-Tiepre-
Res. ,,P.4.9:=2,ii...044144:0rii-e--- '
sentatives, an .0 Cabinet officers by the per-
centag! hi %V) LK- iiontrilst f old ontlaticsf
of_ leg s wave proceedings with re-
c-tio thege_afh Of former Senator 19,AE: the trl. 045ei?..K*441 4aeiii iilifitifisl: fund
Mundt:Nei:A:NO. 6a-1in). d'J'Ani-, -t-T140". year. Referred to the
. -
By Mr. MAGNUSON Aro_m:44.__Comrnit_tee Goromittee m-L.1",-:)si. ompe 0.0g_ Civil Service.
OnCt- ---: 7 --'1':
Zt 61.92_:_a0 (-3, amend the Euler- ' "S.'4413:71.7-?'7--traine-nd14-tio,Th. 0.? of tlie?,
? _ayaving Time Energy Conser- POO fttaffib 2TA'C;rfbtt to Arovide that cer-
tat 1074? to exempt from its pLovf ' telt benefits ? elved. by percens under the
Jpriod" from the last Suiiday In Alaska-Native ,:-"lims Settlement Act shall be
?, er 1974-, through the lief .glificlay in disregarded h- determining the eligibility
ruary 1976 (Rept. o..93-1162).N Of the househc :_:!s of which Inch persons are
r - mainiArs to p_...ticipate in the food stamp
_ ,
- ,_ :, , f? - , , - . - _:. - proram. Rae') tAl to the Committee on Agri-
- INTRODUCTZON Or B17 1$ AND cul ure and P
R,E$014110,0-1t$
? -Y
n Lesol ? 0 B.
4413e Ai A bl
cegate to the States cer
le-
I to authorize the Secretary
he following bills tions. wg- P-***Pit: tria4
: firth47i"
tam_ t,_ _ :7li_111 respect to the location
717--
and i- 7 an mous co se 1E e _second rel'or
lit-tn ?xce;vations, or fills
time, and rpferrea as tiicitoo,a.- " ? -&r). oreri-e- navigable witers. Referred
By Mr. bArcEti (fOr 1111741E terthe GoorroltA-A on Public Works.
-
MArrSTrEpii, Mr. ,Invrrs,
Budget Act of )74 to require the Congres -
AZT Mr. CRANSTON Ivo rmorcroyA
WErcress, Mr. 1-raiii;Mr. tAnne,RT'
-S. 4082. A bi- to amend the Congressional
iir tivouvE, Mr, tia-OO4 and fr
_
PEartsow)
S. 4910. A bill to establish a ;70114 Own-,
mittee on Intelligence Overaiglit. Referred
to the Committee on tlovernrnerit OPera.? :
By Mr. NELSON:
4920. A bill to amend tlae Anall
ness Act to authorize Federal reVentip shfir-
ing grants to States to develop model pro-
grams to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the use of independent state and local small
business enterprise centers to provide tech-
nical assistance and other useful and prac-
tical services to small business, and _for_
-other purposes. Referred to the Committee on
Finance.
By Mr. DOMINICK:
a. 4021, A bill to exelude from top gross
income of individuals the interest on an
amount of sayings not in excess of $20,000.
Referred to the Committee on Finance.
By Mr. McGOVERN (for himself, Mr.
ABOVIXEMS, and Mr. Gums):
S. 4022. A bill to amend the Small Business
. Act to provide for compensation for small
business and other losses, [truing out of the
disturbances at WoundedkInee, S. Dalt. Re
ferred to the corrinAttee on. BanlUng, Hou
ing and tirban Affairs.
By Mr. DOMINICK:
S. 4022.,A bill to amend the Internal Re
entle Code of 1954 to eliminate pert
limitations on medical and dental expe
deductions. Referred to the Committee
Vinancp,,,
S. 4924. Wu estahlish within various
jtigetieles an Office of CM151.11ner Advocacy.
Raferr,ed to the Committee on Qovernment
Operations; and
S.' 4028. A bill for tile relief of Laszlo
Sebe. Referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
atonal Budget '
-impact statein
lotion reporter
rzrittees. Ref err.-
the Committec
and the Control'
? - By Mr. r'
- ,nMr. M.,
ffice to prepare inflationary
.ta in connect:on with legis-
)y Senate and House corn-
by u nanime us consent, to
Dn. Government Operations
ee on Rules and Administra-
-MPHREY (for himself and
'DALE):
' 8.3. Res. 242 !). Joint resolution designat-
ing the Naton ? Air and Space Museum, as
the Charles A. indbergh National Air and
Space Museum ieferred to the Committee
on Commerce.
By Mr. M-1?1017ERN:
S.J. Res. 243. joint resolution to provide
direction to thr delegation to the World
Fond ConferAnt Referred to the Committee
on Foreign Bela'_ ms.
STATEMEt S ON INTRODUCED
BILLS ANL JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. ...Alma (for himself, Mr.
Wy.po t]R, Mr HART, Mr. CHURCH,
MP. ki.:11SPIELD, Mr. JAVITS, Mr.
? HUMrY7.REY, Mr. CPANSTON, Mr.
Mow/" TA, Mr. 1:v0nYE, Mr.
and Mr. PusssoN) :
S. 4019. A bill to establish a Joint Coin-
mitten on In _J.ligence Oversight. Re-
ferred to the ( `Anrnittee on Government
Operations.
(The remar; ..; of Mr. BAKICR and other
Senators on t he introducgon of the
above bill app! ar earlier in the RECORD.)
SY
S. 4020. A 1)1:1 to amend the Small Bus-
iness Act to nthorize Federal revenue
sharing grants ) States to develop model
S 17027
-Programs to demonstrate the effective-
ness of the use of independent State and
local small business enterprise centers to
provide technical assistance and other
useful and practical services to small
businesses, and for other purposes. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Mance.
SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, this is a
bill to amend the Small Business Act to
--authorize Federal revenue sharing grants
to Statei to develop model programs to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the use
of independent State and local small
-business enterprise centers to provide
technical assistance and other useful and
practical services to small businesses,
and for other purposes.
I am proposing this model grant legis-
lation because we tend too often to ig-
nore the general problems a small bud- -
nesses in our overall approach to pre-
serving and strengthening American free
enterprise. For while other laws, and
even other provisions of the Small Busi-
ness Act itself, are designed to help par-
ticular groups of small business con-
cerns?such as agriculture businesses or
minority businesses?or are designed to
help all small business concerns with
particular types of problems?such as
governmental procurement policies or
obtaining small business loans, there is
no program designed to aid small busi-
ness concerns with the entire range of
problems they face.
This program represents a new step
toward the goal of strengthening the
position of small businesses in our sag-
ging economy. It is designed as an ex-
perimental program, with the purpose of
developing and analyzing methods and
techniques so that we may utilize the
more successful ones to realize that goal.
Such a model program requires con-
siderable flexibility, and for that reason
I propose to allow individual States wide
latitude in designing and conducting
their own model programs.
Accordingly, this act authorizes the
Small Business Administration to dis-
tribute the funds appropriated under its
provisions to participating States with
a minimum of strings attached. States
entering into agreements with the ad-
ministration for use of these funds must
only specify the type of centers or train-
ing programs they expect to fund or
establish, the goals of those programs,
and the availability of non-Federal
funds to match the revenue sharing
grants on a dollar-for-dollar basis.
The latter requirement is necessary, I
feel, to Insure that participating States
make a positive commitment to aiding
small business concerns, and to get the
maximum effect out of the expenditure
of each Federal dollar. States desiring
to participate in the program and meet-
ing the minimal requirements spelled
out in the act will divide the funds avail-
able, based on their population relative
to the total population of the participat-
ing States, except that no individual
State may receive more than 10 percent
or less than one-half of 1 precent of the
available funds.
The Small Business Administration
1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17004 Approved For REURC1121185ION241: ORKEEDED9-08B
services may also be procured by firm-term
mUltiyear contracts. The description of au-
tomatic data processing equipment in sub-
section (1) is compatible with the General
Accounting Office interpretation of auto-
matic data processing equipment as it is
used in the Brooks bill.
V. 11:cmtiNGe
One day of public hearings were held by
the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Federal Pro-
curement, March 27, 1914, during which
the following four witnesses testified:
Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY, a United States
Senator from the State el Illinois.
PETER r. MCCLOSKEY, President, Comput-
er and Business Equipment- Manufacturers
Association.
MICHAEL CREEDON, President, Computer
Lessors Association.
M. SHY MEEKER, COMMISS loner, Automated
Data and Telecommunications Services, Gen-
eral Services Administration.
In lieu of testimony, GAO submitted its
April 30, 1971 report on multiyear leasing
and Government-wide purchasing of ADP
equipment (B-115369)8 and its written views
and recommendations on S. 2785 (B-151204,
March 26, 1974) . Both of these documents
are included in the Committee record of
the hearings.
Summary of testimony
All four of the witnesses voiced strong
support of the bill's objective of giving GSA
authority to enter into multiyear leases
through use of the ADP Fund without obli-
gating the total anticipated payments under
the lease. They said that the Government
should avail itself of the advantages of mul-
tiyear contracting in the same manner and
extent as private business and industry.
There was also agreement by the witness
that the legislation should facilitate t
widest possible use of the multiyear leas
authority without interfering with the c
trols and authorities provided by P
Law 89-306. The Computer and Bus
Equipment Manufacturers Association
gested that this could best be done by
big all agencies the authority to make
year leases as prescribed by the bill.
tion of the General Services Admin
was that the objective could best b
plished by retaining the ADP Fu
single source of funding for firm
-te
year ADP contracts. After review
of the problem, the Subcomm
mined that delegation by GSA th
cies to cite and obligate the
arm-term multiyear contra
achieve the objective sough
while retaining the integrity
management concept prescr
Law 89-306.
Another point on which
agreement was the ,need t
authority to enter into
plies not only to leases =
also to contracts for so
and other related servi
was accommodated by
section (i).
PO
U.S. Comptroller
ing And Governm
Automatic Data
Should Result in
ington, U.S. Ge
115369, April 30,
2 Senate Co
ations, Autom
Meat. Report
port 89-938,8'S
page 36.
8 The Repo
ernment Pr
pages 48-49.
I See not 2, supra, pp. 21
5 See app ndix A.
0 See ap endix B.
lie
ess
ug-
ant-
ultl-
posi-
ration
RCCOM-
as the
multi-
all facets
ee deter-
her agen-
Fund in
g would
by CBEMA,
the central
d by Public
ere was general
clarify that the
tiyear leases ap-
or hardware, but
ware development
and supplies. This
e addition of sub-
oTes
neral. Multiyear Leas-
t-wide Purchasing Of
Processing Equipment
gnificant Savings. Wash-
1 Accounting Office, B-
71.
ttee on Government Oper-
ic Data Processing Equip-
the Committee, Senate Re-
h Congress, 1st Session, 1965,
of the Commission on Gov-
rement, December 1972, Vol. 3,
28, 30.
Tee appendix C.
See note 1, aupra.
GOOD NEIGHBOR DAY
The joint resoluti
to authorize and r
to issue a prOcla
fourth Sunday i
year as "Good N
sidered, ordered
third reading,
passed, as folio
Resolved by t
resentatives of
in Congress a
is authorized
lamation de
September
Day", and
United 5
organizat
propriate
Res. 23
est the Preside
on des:ignating t
September of e
bor Day" was co
be engrossed for
the third time,
a
: 0
Senate and House of Re
e United States of Amer a
embied, That 'the Preside t
&requested to issue a pr
rating the fourth Sunday . f
each year as "Good Neighbor
Hog upon the people of the
s and interested groups and
s to observe such day with ap-
eremenies and activities.
Mr. t *MIT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask animous consent to have printed
in t RECORD an excerpt from the re-
port No. 93-1156), explaining the pur-
posA. of the measure.
ere being no objection, the excerpt
w ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
follows:
EXCERPT
PURPOSE
The purpose of the joint resolution is to
authorize and request the President to issue
a proclamation designating the fourth Sun-
day of each year as "Good Neighbor Day."
STATEMENT
Our Nation is undergoing a cultural rev-
olution together with a steady exodus from
the intercity to suburban areas and out of
such movement there is created a need for
cooperation in the building of new commu-
nities and happier quality of life for all.
A Presidential proclamation designating a
"Good Neighbor Day" would encourage all
people to practice brotherly love and to pro-
duce a lasting peace and a better world.
.-The committee is of the opinion that this
resolution has a meritorious purpose and ac-
cordingly recommends favoratle considera-
tion of Senate Joint Resolution. 235, without
amendment.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator from Texas.
Mr. TOWER I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum. I ask
unanimous consent that the time be
charged against the time allotted to me
under the order.
The ACTINO PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered,
and the clerk will call the rcll.
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
ROBERT C. Bytta). Without ,objection, it
is so ordered. ,
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the previous order, the Senator from
Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) is reaognized for
not to exceed 5 minutes,
I
5,1-14) Il
130100060fttermber 19, 1974
PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF A
JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE OVERSIGHT
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I, along
with Senators WEICKER, HART, CHURCH,
MANSFIELD, HUMPHREY, CRANSTON, MON-
TOYA, INOUYE, BROOKE, PEARSON, and
JAVITS, send to the desk for appropriate
reference a bill to create within the Con-
gress a Joint Committee on Intelligence
Oversight.
This legislation establishes a 14-mem-
ber joint House-Senate committee, not
dissimilar to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, specifically entrusted
with primary oversight and legislative
responsibility for the Federal intelligence
community.
While a Joint Committee on Intelli-
gence Oversight will provide increased
assurance that the various intelligence
and law-enforcement agencies are abid-
ing by the Constitution and the Federal
statutes by which they were created, I
believe that the committee also will
strengthen our legitimate intelligence
gathering capacity through insuring
better coordination between the CIA,
FBI, Secret Service, DIA, NSA, and other
agencies possessing intelligence jurisdic-
tion, and through eliminating much of
the current duplication and apparent
jealousy and competition in the intelli-
gence community. Moreover, it is hoped
that increased congressional oversight
would render the intelligence community
more responsive to legitimate Presi-
dential and congressional requirements.
My concern regarding congressional
oversight of the Federal intelligence com-
munity, as well as the extent and thor-
oughness of the information provided
Congress by the intelligence community,
stems, in large part, from my service on
the Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities. Both in the Water-
gate Committee report and in other se-
lect committee documents, there is found
a substantial body of evidence regarding
the activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the National Security Council,
and other governmental intelligence
gathering and investigative organiza-
tions, which provides insight into the ac-
tivities, as well as the abuses, of these
organizations.
Unfortunately, I believe, the select
committee staff investigation or inquiry
into the Central Intelligence Agency
connection to the Watergate breakin and
coverup was effectively ended after we
received a letter from Director Colby,
dated March 7, 1974, stating that the
Agency would make certain critical clas-
sified information "completely available
to inspection by any member of the CIA
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee" but that he did not
"think it appropriate to turn over to the
select committee" any of this material.
And the committee was then confronted
by another, perhaps more effective,
stonewall. I suggest that this is the only
instance of a categorical refusal by any
agency or department of the Government
to cooperate with the select committee.
Nevertheless, I directed the committee
staff to assemble a report and to file
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
September 19, 1949pPnwedtiggialtP9MgegO lit211G6RbRDN191-MW7A000100060003-1 S 17005
It with the committee. I delivered a copy
of that report to the chairman of the
Appropriations Committee and the
Armed Services Committee, for the use
of their CIA Oversight Subcommittees.
The staff report was later "sanitized"
for sensitive and classified material by
the CIA. Mr. President, I shall ask unan-
imous consent that a copy of this "sani-
tized" report be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of these remarks.
Based on that experience, meaning the
staff CIA report and other investigations,
I believe there is no question that the
Central Intelligence Agency was "in-
volved" in Watergate; the question is
rather on whose order and for what pur-
pose.
Clearly, the factual circumstances out-
lined in the staff report are, in many
cases, inconclusive and lend themselves
to varying inferences and interpreta-
tions. I believe, however, that this very
uncertainty and the inadequacy of the
explanations provided by the CIA, the
White House, and the other agencies in-
volved, highlights the need for a more
effective, single purpose oversight capa-
bility within the Congress of the United
States. It seems apparent that current
congressional committee oversight does
not function effectively as a deterrent
to those who may seek to utilize govern-
mental intelligence and investigative
agencies for unlawful or unauthorized
purposes. I wish to say that I have noth-
ing but the highest respect and regard
for the members of the current oversight
committees, particularly Senators STEN-
NIS and MCCLELLAN, but I think their
obvious burdens and responsibilities in
the conventional fields of appropriations
and armed services are such that their
committees are unable to accord more
than cursory attention to the oversight
function?witness the fact that accord-
ing to committee staff, the Armed Serv-
ices Central Intelligence Subcommittee
has conducted only two formal meetings
during thp 93d Congress.
The recommendation of the Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities that congressional oversight
of the intelligence community be
strengthened, as well as my own calling
for the creation of a Joint Committee on
Intelligence Oversight, were, of course,
based on the knowledge before the com-
mittee and in the public domain as of
July of this year. Since that time, the
compelling need for increased congres-
sional oversight has been increased by
the recent revelation that there are al-
leged major discrepancies in sworn testi-
mony submitted to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee by high State De-
partment and Central Intelligence
Agency officials regarding covert CIA
operations in Chile. Apparently, the
House and Senate Foreign Relations
Committees were misled regarding the
expenditure of $11 million, as authorized
by the so-called Forty Committee, to
preserve the opposition press and politi-
cal parties during the administration of
the late Salvador Allende.
This circumstance has prompted, I
tuaderstand, legislation, including bills
Introduced by our distinguished colleague
from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) and
Congressman HARRINGTON, designed to
provide for increased congressional fore-
knowledge and oversight of such activi-
ties. I commend them for their efforts.
Moreover, displaying remarkable fore-
sight, the distinguished majority leader
of the Senate, Senator MANSFIELD, :intro-
duced legislation in 1953, 1954, and 1955,
to establish a Joint Committee on Cen-
tral Intelligence. This legislation even-
tually was defeated on April 11, 1956;
but I hope that intervening circum-
stances now will compel a different re-
sult.
In closing, I wish to urge that the 93d
Congress enact this legislation, after ap-
propriate committee consideration, be-
fore adjournment. I am pleased that,
during his most recent press conference,
President Ford indicated that he was go-
ing to meet with the responsible con-
gressional committees to discuss the need
for changes in the intelligence review
process; but I think that we need more
than a change in the review process, we
need a change in the committee struc-
ture. Thus, because of the cost, the se-
crecy, the lack of effective supervision,
the uncertainty of dornesic activities, and
the ? extreme difficulty in obtaining ac-
cess to classified materials; I am of the
opinion that congressional oversight of
governmental intelligence operatiOns
must be entrusted to a committee solely
charged with that responsibility: and
that consideration at this proposal de-
serves priority consideration in the wan-
ing days of this session of the 93d Con-
gress.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the aforementioned Senate
Select Committee staff report and the
text of the bill which I am introducing
be printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the bill and
staff report were ordered to be printed
In the RECORD, as follows:
5.4019
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Joint Committee on
Intelligence Oversight Act of 1974."
ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT
SEC. 2. (a) There is hereby established a
Joint Committee on Intelligence Oversight
(hereinafter referred to as the "Joint Com-
mittee") which shall be composed of four-
teen members appointed as follows:
(1) seven members of the Senate, four to
be appointed by the majority leader of the
Senate and three to be appointed by the
minority leader of the Senate; and
(2) seven members of the House of :Repre-
sentatives, four to be appointed by the ma-
jority leader of the House of Representatives
and three to be appointed by the minority
leader of the House of Representative:3.
(b) The Joint Committee shall select a
chairman and a vice chairman from among
its members at the beginning of each Con-
gress. The vice chairman shall act :in the
place and stead of the chairman in the ab-
sence of the chairman. The chairmanship and
the vice chairmanship shall alternate be-
tween the Senate and the House of :Repre-
sentatives with each Congress. The chairman
during each even-numbered Congress shall
be selected by the Members of the House of
Representatives on the Joint Committee from
among their number and the chairman dur-
ing each odd-numbered Congress shall be
selected by the Members of the Senate on
the Joint Committee from among their num-
ber. The vice chairman during each Congress
shall be chosen in the same manner from
that House of Congress other than the House
of Congress of which the chairman is a
Member.
(a) A majority of the members of the
Joint Committee shall constitute a quorum
for the transaction of business, except that
the Joint Committee may fix a lesser number
as a quorum for the purpose of taking testi-
mony. Vacancies in the membership of the
Joint Committee shall not affect the power
of the remaining members to execute the
functions of the Joint Committee and shall
be filled in the same manner as in the case
of the original appointment.
(d) Service of a Senator as a member or
as chairman of the Joint Committee shall
not be taken into account for the purposes
of paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing
Rules of the Senate.
DUTIES OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 3. (a) It shall be the duty of the Joint
Committee to conduct a continuing study
and investigation of the activities and op-
erations of (1) the Central Intelligence
Agency, (2) the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, Department of Justice, (3) the United
States Secret Service, (4) the Defense In-
telligence Agency, Department of Defense,
(5) the National Security Agency, and (6)
all other departments and agencies of the
Federal Government insofar as the activities
and operations of such other departments
and agencies pertain to intelligence gather-
ing or surveillance of persons; and to con-
sider proposals for the improvement and
reorganization of agencies and departments
of the Federal Government within the juris-
diction of the Joint Committee.
(b) The Director of the. Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the
Secret Service, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the
National Security Agency shall keep the Joint
Committee fully and currently informed with
respect to all of the activities of their re-
spective organizations, and the heads of all
other departments and agencies of the Fed-
eral Government conducting intelligence ac-
tivities or operations or the surveillance of
persons shall keep the Joint Committee fully
and currently informed of all intelligence and
surveillance activities and operations carried
out by their respective departments and
agencies. The Joint Committee shall have au-
thority to require from any department or
agency of the Federal Government periodic
written reports regarding activities and op-
erations within the jurisdiction of the Joint
Committee.
(c) (1) All bills, resolutions, and other
matters in the Senate or the House of Repre-
sentatives relating primarily to the functions
of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, the United
States Secret Service, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, the National Security Agency,
or to intelligence or surveillance- activities or
o^erations of any other department or agency
of the Federal Government shall be referred
to the Joint Committee.
(2) No funds may appropriated for the
purnose of carrying out any intelligence or
surveillance activity or operation by any
office, or any department or gaceny of the
Federal Government, unless such funds for
such activity or operation have been specifi-
cally authorized by legislation enacted after
the date of enactment of this Act.
(3) No bill or resolution, and no amend-
ment to any bill or resolution, and no matter
contained In any bill or resolution, in either
House, dealing with any matter which is
within the jurisdiction of the Joint Com-
mittee shall be considered in that House un-
Approved For Release 2005/11/21: CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
17006
Approved For Req 19, 19, 1474
lees it is a bell or resolutien which has been
reported by the Joint Committee of that
House (or from the consideration cif Melee
such committee has been discharged) C.F ua
less It is an amendment to such a till or
1...solution Nothing in this subsection shale
be construed to deprive itny cornnetme ii
either House from exercising legislative over-
sight with respect to intelligence and ICUI'Ver-
lance activities and operations related to the
jurisdiction of such committee.
(4) Members of the Joint Committee who
sic Members; of the Senate shall foal time
to time report to the Senate, and members
or the Joint Committee who are Members el
the House of Representatives shall from Urns
to time report to the House, by bill or ohm-
wtse, their recommendations with respeet to
matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses and which are referred to the
Joint Committee or otherwise within the jur-
isdiction of the Joint Committee.
ADM INISTRAT1VIS POWIRS
SEC. 4. la) The Joint Committee, or any
subcommittee thereof, is authorized, ei its
discretion: to make expenditures; to employ
personnel; to adopt rules respecting Its orga-
nization and procedures: to hold hearings-.
to sit and act at any time or place; to sub-
pens witneasee and documents; with the
prior consent of the Federal department cr
agency concerned, to use on a reimbuniable
basis the services of personnel, Inforrnetkee
and facilities of any such department or
agency; to procure printing and bindirm to
procure the temporary services (not Le ex-
cess of one year) or intermittent eel-viols of
individual consultants, or urge lea
thereof, and to provide assistance for the
training of its professional staff. in the ieune
manner and under the sante conditionsi BA e
standing committee of the Senate may pro-
cure such services and provide such assist-
ance under subsections it) and ()), respec-
tively, of section 202 of the Legislative Re?
organization Act of 1946: and to teem depo-
sitions and other testimony.
(b) Subpenes may be Issued over the sig-
nature of the chairman of ine Joint Commit-
tee or by any member designated by teen or
the Joliet Committee, and may be served by
such person as may be designated oy sucli
chairman or member. The chairmait 01 the
Joint Committee or any member thereof may
administer oaths to witnesses. The provi-
sions of sections 102-104 of the Revised Mat-
sites (2 U S.C. 192-194) shall apply in the
case of any failure of any ;witness to comply
with a subpena or to testify when inun-
moned under authority of this subsection.
CLASSISPICATION OP INPORMATP,N
Sec. 5. The Joint Committee may classify
information originating within the eionimit-
tee in accordance with standards used gen-
erally by the executive branch for classirying
restricted data or defense inform:Mk:et
RECORDS OF JOINT COMM ITT7ST,
Sac. 6, The Joint Committee Mall keep a
complete record of all Joint Committee sc-
ions, including a record of the votes 071 ani
question on which a record vote M de-
mended. All records, data, charm and flies of
the Joint Committee Mai" be the property
of the Joint Committee and shall be kept in
the offices of the Joint Committee or such
other places as the Joint Committee may
direct.
EXPENSES OP JOINT COM IA ITIF
Sec. 7. The expenses of the Joint Commit-
tee shall be paid from the contingent film]
of the Senate from funds appropriated: for
the Joint Committee, upon vouchers signed
by the chairman of the Joint Committee or
by any member of the Joint Committee au-
thorized by the chairman.
INTRODUCTION
'This report is submitted at Seikeoor Baker's
request to summarize the highlights or an
Investigation of CIA activity. if any, in con-
nectior. with the Watergate incident and
aftermath. It is based or material in the
poesession of the Committee, both deafened
arid unclassified. It does not attempt to deal
with all the matters deemed pertinent and
important to a full and complete inquiry, but
Is designed to generally describe the areas of
Interest and concern pursued during the staff
Investigation and eximutive session interviews
since the conclusion of the Committee's pub-
lic hearings.
In view of the fact that the Committee has
chosen to have no further public bearings:
that the Committee staff is in the process
of being reduced in sire; that further coop-
eration by the Agency seems more likely on
the request of the standing jurisdictional
committees rather teen on the request of
the Watergate Committee. end that the total
buden of additional work to complete the in-
vestigation thorougtly is probably beyond
the competence of the remaining staff in
terms of numbers and time. Senator Baker
requested that this memorandum be pre-
pared for submission to the full Committee
for further disposition as the Committee
may determine ft is pointed out that, while
the report itself is not cisealfird, it makes
reference to, and in some instances quotes
from, material which is clamlned. There-
fore, each copy of this report has been treated
for security purpose's as if it were oimettleci.
They are numbered and accounted for as in
the case of classified material.
The report is broken down into seven cate-
gories, tabbed as follows:
II) Background: A recitation of the first
references to CIA connections on the part
of the Watergate burglars, reference to the
possibility of CIA involvement by the Presi-
dent in his speech of May 22, 1973, and certain
other published information and correepond-
en('e.
(2) Mullen ? The fact that the Mullen Coen-
patty arid its presideot, Bob Bennett, had an
established relationship with the CIA is de-
scribed in some detail in this section of the
report. Most of the irforrnetion contained in
this section was discovered after Volume IV
was requested by Senator Baker. The CIA
arranged to release this volume and subse-
quent document"' to the Watergate Commit-
tee In the custody of George Murphy serving
as security officer for the Committee through
an arrangement with the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.
(3) Penettnoton: This section derives from
a CIA supplied memorandum dated February
22, 1974, from the then Director of Security,
detailing the Information that Lee R. Pen-
nington, a CIA operaive, had entered James
McCord's house and/or otilice shortly after
the Wategate breakit for the purpose of de-
stroying evidence of a CIA. connection with
McCord.
(4) Tapes. This egottoti derives from in-
formation supplied to Senator Baker by Di-
rertor Colby that there was a central toping
capability at the CIA; that the tapes had
been destroyed, and tee potaibillty that some
of the tapes may bate been Watergate re-
lateen Director Colby stated that he did not
know whether Wetemtme :elated tapes had
been destroyed.
(5) TSV: The initials stead for Technical
Services Division of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the section deals with rather
exter-sive coetacte between Hunt and the
Agency and the support supplied by the
Agency to Hunt and Liddy. which was used
In a wide variety of undertakings. A number
of feet use discrepancies appear in this section
which cannot be effectively reconciled on the
baels of the Information ve now poseeee?
such as Hunt's receipt of certain Agency
technical assistance and contemporaneous
participation In the preparation of the Elle-
berg psychiatric profile.
18) Martinez; This tab refers to Eugenio
Martinez, one of the Watergate burglars.
The section delineates the Martinez-Agency
relationship, Hunt'', early activities in Na-
ftali, the actions taken or not taken by the
Agency's oMce in Miami. and certain mon-
solved questions.
(7) Recommendations: The seventh tab is
Mil-explanatory and constitutes the recom-
rnendatons of the staff for further inquiry.
BACKGROUND
In a speech on May 22, 1973, President
Nixon stated in part the following in connec-
tion with the Watergate matter:
"Within a, few days, however, I was advised
that there was a possibility of CIA involve-
ment in some way.
-It did seem to me possible that, because
of the involvement of former CIA person-
nel, and because of some of their apparent
associations, the investigation could lead to
the uncovering of covert CIA operations
totally unrelated to the Watergate break-in.
"In addition, by this time, the name of Mr.
Hunt had surfaced In connection with Water-
gate. and I was alerted to the fact that he
had previously been a member of the special
investigations unit In the White House.
Therefore, I was also concerned that the
Watergate investigation might well lead to
an inquiry into the activities of the special
Investigations unit itself."
? ?
"I also bad to be deeply concerned with
insuring that neither the covert operations
of the CIA nor the operations of the special
Investigations unit should be compromised.
Therefore, I instructed Mr. Haldeman and
Mr. lehrlithinan to insure that the investiga-
tion of the break-in not expose either an
unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the
activities of the White House investigaticns
unit?and to see that this was personally
coordinated between General Walters, the
Deputy Director of the CIA, and Mr. Gray at
the FBI."
One of the matters; to which the President
was evidently referring was explored by Sen-
*tor Baker in his questioning of John Ehr-
lichman when Ehrlichman appeared before
the Select Committee on July 26, 1973. Ehr-
lichman WWI questioned with regard to miss-
ing paragraph five of ? memo from Egli Krogh
and David Young to John Ebrlichman dated
August 11, 1971.'
This was the same matter which had been
brought to the attention of the Minority staff
In July of 1978 which resulted in a briefing
of Senator Ervin, Senator Baker, Sam Dash,
and Fred Thompson by White House Coma-
Sels Fred Buzhardt and Leonard Garment.
The subject of that briefing is what is now
referred to as the "Admiral Moorer-Yeoman
Radford Incident."
With regard to involvement of the CIA
In the Watergate affair, It should be noted
that since June 17, 1972, there have been
it umerous newspaper articles pointing out
the fact that many of those involved In the
Watergate break-in were former CIA em-
ployees; that CIA equipment was used by
Runt, and other possible CIA links to Water-
gate.
In the September 14, 1978, issue of the
National Review, Miles Copeland wrote an
article entitled "The Unmentionable Uses of
le CIA", suggesting that McCord led the
Watergate burglars into a trap.
In the November, 1973, issue of Harper's
Magazine, an article entitled "The Cold War
(Mines Home",, By Andrew St. George, indi-
cated strongly that former CIA Director
Helms had prior knowledge of the Watergate
break-in. As a result of the St George allega-
tion. Senator Baker asked Senator Symington
See Public Testimony of John Ehrlichman
dated July 26, 1973, at 2702-2704.
'4 National Review, September 14? 1973,
"The Unmentionable Uses of a CIA," at 996
'Harper* Magazine. November. 1973, "The
Cold War Comes Home," at 82.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
September 19, /ft/proved FOORREVREMOigAiiialCORIRDPANIM7A000100060003-1 S 17007
and the Senate Armed Services Committee
to conduct the inquiry into those allegations.
The Senate Armed Services Committee held
hearings on this matter and heard testimony
from CIA officials that the Agency was not
knowledgeable on the Watergate break-in be-
fore it occurred; had not led the burglars
into a trap; and, that the magazine allega-
tions had no basis in fact.
It would appear that no information rela-
tive to this Committee's mandate was de-
veloped from the testimony adduced during
the hearings before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee on the St. George matter.
However, in the aftermath of the St.
George inquiry, Senator Baker propounded a
number of questions to the CIA on Novem-
ber 8, 1973, one of which follows:
7. Question: On or after June 17, 1972, did
any of the individuals associated with these
break-ins in any way communicate with any
individual associated with CIA to discuss
the Watergate break-ins or the Ellsberg? psy-
ohiatrist office break-in, other than Mr. Mc-
Cord who wrote letters to CIA which are
part of the Watergate hearing record?
Answer: On 10 July 1972 an officer of a
commercial concern communicated to an
employee of CIA information which had
come to his attention concerning the "Water-
gate Five." The relationship of this inform-
ant and his company to the Agency was and
is classified. Since this information was hear-
say, contained a repetition of then current
published speculation, and indicated that the
informant had appeared before the Grand
Jury on the matter, no action was taken. The
employee's hand-written memorandum for
the record on this matter is contained in sen-
sitive material which Agency officers have
made available for review, hut not retention,
by the staffs of the four CIA Subcommittees
as well as the staffs of the Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Ac-
tivities and the Federal Prosecutor. Aside
from this, the Agency had no communication
of the type referred to in this question.
An examination of the aforementioned
"sensitive material" revealed more than was
theretofore known about the scope of the
CIA's dealings with Robert Bennett and
Mullen and Company and led to a further
intensification of the staff's investigative ef-
forts in other CIA-related areas.
ROBERT BENNETT AND THE MULLEN AND CO.
The Mullen and Company has maintained
a relationship with the Central Intelligence
Agency since its incorporation in 1959.1 It
provided cover for an agent in Europe and
an agent in the Far East at the time of the
Watergate break-in?
Hunt left the CIA in 1970 and joined Mul-
len and Company with what founder Robert
Mullen understood to be Director Helms'
blessing., Hunt's covert security clearance
was extended by the CIA t; he was witting of
'This material was produced as a part of
Volume IV of the documents furnished to U8
by the CIA.
1 Executive Session Testimony of Robert
R. Mullen, February 5, 1974, at 3.
Executive Session Testimony of Robert
F. Bennett, February 1, 1974, at 25-26; Ex-
ecutive Session Testimony of (Mullen and
Company Case Officer), February 4, 1974,
at 5.
CIA Memorandum, undated, Subject:
Wrap-Up of Agency's Association with
Robert R. Mullen and Company, found at
Tab 3 of CIA Supplemental Material,
Volume III, at 3; Executive Session Testi-
mony of Robert R. Mullen, supra note 1, at
8; Executive Session Testimony of Robert
F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 67.
'See Memorandum for Deputy Director
for Plans, October 14, 1070; Subject:
E. Howard Hunt--Utilization by Central
Cover Staff, found at Tab 16, CIA Supple-
mental Materials, Volume II.
the Mullen cover 5; and, on occasion he un-
dertook negotiations with the Agency with
respect to that cover---even after becoming
employed at the White House (according to
Agency records)?
Robert Bennett, who is Senator Bennett's
son, joined Mullen arid Company and be-
came its President in 1971. He was introduced
to the Mullen CIA case officer in ApriL of last
year.7 Bennett brought the Hughes Tool ac-
count with him to M Men? CIA records in-
dicate that Agency consideration was given
to utilizing Mullen's Hughes relationship
for a matter relating to a cover arrangement
in [South America], and to garner informa-
tion on Robert Mahati?
Bennet's accessibility to the CIA has raised
questions concerning possible Agency in-
volvement in, or knowledge of, Bennett's
activities in regard to Hunt/Liddy, to wit:
Bennett suggested and coordinated the De-
Mott interview; regarding Chappaqu !dick; "
Bennett coordinated the release of Dita
Beard's statement from Denver, after con-
tacting Beard's attorneys at the suggestion
of a Hughes executive; 11 Bennett suggested
that Greenspun's safe contained information
of interest to both Hughes and the CRP; "
Bennett asked for and received from Hunt
a price estimate for bugging Cliffore. Irving
for Hughes; 18 Bennet' coordinated the em-
ployment of political spy Tom Gregory by
Hunt and discussed with Gregory the latter's
refusal to proceed with bugging plans on or
about June 16, 1972" Bennett received a
scrambler from Hughes personnel for use on
Mullen telephones; " Bennett and Liddy set
up dummy committees as a conduit for
Hughes campaign con tributions; le and Ben-
nett served as the point of contact between
Hunt and Liddy during the two weeks follow-
ing the Watergate break-in.77 Futhermore,
Id.; Executive Session Testimony of
Robert R. Mullen, supra note 1, at 9.
? Executive Session Testimony of (Former
Deputy Director of Plans, hereinafter DDP),
February 5, 1974, at 6- 10; CIA Memorandum,
undated, Subject: Wrap-Up of Agency's As-
sociation with Robert R. Mullen and Com-
pany, supra note '3, at 2.
7 Executive Session Testimony of (Mullen
and Company Case Officer), supra note 2,
at 12.
Executive Session Testimony of Robert
F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 132.
0 See [Mullen and Company Case Officer]
Memorandum for Record, April 30, 1971, Sub-
ject: Association of Robert R. Mullen and
Company with the Hughes Tool Company.
This document is found at Tab 16, Supple-
mental CIA Material, Volume II.
"Executive Session Testimony of E.
Howard Hunt, December 18, 1973, al 69-70;
Executive Session Testimony of Robert F.
Bennett, supra, note 2, at 62-65.
"Executive Session Testimony of Robert
F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 93-94.
IS Executive Session Testimony of E.
Howard Hunt, supra note 19, at 6-8; But see
Executive Session Testimony of Robert E.
Bennett, supra nate 2 at 79-84. Bennett in-
dicates that Hunt suggested Bennett coordi-
nation with Hughes.
1, Executive Session Testimony of E.
Howard Hunt, supra note 10, at 72-73; Ex-
ecutive Session Testimony of Robert F. Ben-
nett, supra note 2, at 121-124.
" Staff Interview of Thomas J. Gregory,
September 1, 1973, at 5; Executive Session
Testimony of E. Howard Hunt, supra note
10, at 17; Executive Session Testimony of
Robert F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 69-75.
1, Staff Interview of Linda Jones, Septem-
ber 6, 1973, at 3; Executive Session Testimony
of Robert F. Bennett. supra note 2, at 140.
" Staff Interview of Linda Jones, supra note
15, at 9; See Summarired Highlights of Linda
Jones Interview, dat&i September 11, 1973.
17Staff Interview of Linda Jones, supra
note 15, at 8; Executive Session Testimony
of Robert F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 153-
157.
Robert Oliver, Mullen's Washington lobbyist
for Hughes Tool, is the father of R. Spencer
Oliver, Jr., whose telephone was tapped at
the Democratic National Committee. Ben-
nett met with the Olivers after the break-in
to discuss the bugging."
The true nature of Bennett's relationship
to the CIA was not known to us until late
November of 1973 when, at Senator Baker's
request, the CIA produced another volume
of CIA documents (Volume IV). The follow-
ing information was adduced from this
volume.
On July 10, 1972, Bennett reported detailed
knowledge of the Watergate incident to his
CIA case officer. The case officer's report of
this meeting was handwritten 79 and carried
to Director Helms on or before July 14, 1972,
in this form because of the sensitivity of
the information." It revealed that Bennett
had established a "back door entry" to E. B.
Williams, the attorney for the DNC, in order
to "kill off" revelations of the Agency's rela-
tionship with the Mullen and Company in
the course of the DNC lawsuit. He agreed to
check with the CIA prior to contacting Wil-
liams." Our staff has confirmed that Bennett
did funnel information to Williams via at-
torney Hobart Taylor and that this informa-
tion was more extensive than the information
Bennett had previously provided the Grand
Jury." The CIA has acknowledged paying
one-half of Bennett's attorney fee for his
Grand Jury appearance.28
Although Bennett was supplying informa-
tion to the CIA about many aspects of the
Watergate incident and was at that time
serving as liaison between Hunt and Liddy,
there is no indication that these facts were
disclosed to the FBI.
The aforementioned July 10 report con-
tains mysterious reference to a "WH flap." 14
The report states that if the Mullen cover is
terminated, the Watergate could not be used
as an excuse?, It suggests that the Agency
might have to level with Mullen about the
"WH flap.", Nonetheless, a July 24, 1972
contact report shows that the CIA convinced
Robert Mullen of the need to withdraw its
Far East cover through an "agreed upon
scenario" which included a falsified Water-
gate publicity crisis." The Agency advises
that the "WH flap" has reference to a (dele-
tion at Agency request) that threatened to
compromise Western Hemisphere opera-
18 Executive Session Testimony of Robert
F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 100-101.
" (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
Memorandum for Record, July 10, 1972, Sub-
ject: Meeting with Robert Foster Bennett
and his comments concerning E. Howard
Hunt, Douglas Caddy, and the "Watergate
Five" Incident (sic), found in CIA Supple-
mental Material, Volume /V.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Mullen
and Company Case Officer), supra note 2, at
20-21, 28-29.
77 (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
Memorandum for Record, supra note 19, at
11-12.
"Robert F. Bennett, Memorandum for Rec-
ord, dated January 18, 1973, at 17; Executive
Session Testimony of Robert F. Bennett,
supra note 2, at 129. See also Hobart Taylor
Interview Report, dated February 11, 1974.
72 CIA Memorandum, undated, Subject:
Wrap-Up of Agency's Association with Rob-
ert R. Mullen and Company, supra note 3,
at 5.
24 (Mullen and Company Case Officer)
Memorandum for Record, supra note 19, at
13-14.
28Id. at 12-13.
"id. at 13.
" ( Mullen and Company Case Officer)
Memorandum for Record, July 24, 1972. Sub-
ject: Withdrawal (Far East) Cover, found in
CIA Supplemental Material, Volume V. at
1-2.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17008 Approved For ReftgdpiCKWPONALciktatillet0-0- Matipi00060glaKmber 19 1974
tiens,n but has not explained sufficient rea-
son to withhold such information from Mul-
len nor explained the signidcance of seine ti
Watergate developments.
This Agency explanation is clouded by
conflicting evidence. The Assistant Deputy
Director of Plans has testified that he le very
familiar with the matter and that it hart
no unique effect on hluilen's coven'. The
Mellen case officer testified that the flap non-
corned cover?5' Bennett, who thought the
reference concerned a "White House hap.'
dirt advise of information received from the
European cover that a foompromise) ad-
versely affected a former Mullen cover (de-
leted at Agency request) ,C
A memorandum drafted by the Chief 01
the Central Cover Staff, CIA, on March 1.
1973. notes that Bennett felt he could handle
the Ervin Committee if the Agency could
handle Hunt. Bennett even stated that he
had a friend who had intervened with Ervie
on the matter." The same memorandum
suggests that Bennett took relish In impli-
cating Colson in Hunt's activities In the
press while protecting the Agency at the
same time." It Is further ncted that Bennett
was feeding stories to Bob Woodward who
was 'suitably grateful"; that he was making
no attribution to Bennett; and that he was
protecting Bennett and Mullen and Com-
pany."
PENNINGTON MATTER
:The results of our investigation clearly
show that the CIA had in its possestlon, as
early as June of 1972, information that one
of their paid operatives, Lee R. Pennington
Jr., had entered the James McCord residence
shortly after the Watergate break-in rnd
destroyed documents which might Ahem a
link between McCord and the 01.4. This in-
formation was not made evallable to this
Committee or anyone else outside the CIA
until February 22, 1974, when a memoran-
dum by the then Director of Security was
furnished to this Committee.=
The evidence further shows that mi
gain of 1972, when the FBI made Inquiry
about a "Pennington," the Agency response
was to furnish information about a former
employee, (with a similar namel. who LIJOS
obriously not the man the FBI wa-s interested
in, and to withhold the name of Lee It Pen-
nington, Jr.'
The Pennington information was known
within the CIA at least at a level as high as
the Director of Security, according to the
(former Chief of the Security Research Staff,
"Executive Session Testimony of ,DInP),
supra note 8. at 39; Executive Session Then-
mony of (Mullen and Company Case Officer),
supra note 2. at 43.
5' Executive Session Testimony of (Former
Assistant Deputy Director of Phalan Feb-
runty 28, 1974, transcript not presently avail-
able.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Mullen
and Company Case Officer), supra note 2. at
43.
',Executive Session Testimony of Rehert
F. Bennett, supra note 2, at 17-34.
" (-) Memorandum for Deputy Di-
rector for Plans, March 1 1873, Senoret:
Current Time Magazine Investigation of
Ro'rert R. Mullen & Company Connection
with the Watergate Incidert found in CIA
Supplemental Material, Volume IV, at 4.
a' Id.
'-Id.
See "Memorandum for Director of Intel-
ligence,- February 22. 1974. Exhibit I to the
Executive Session Teetimony of Lee It Pen-
niri anon , February 23, 1974
:Executive Session Testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer No. 1,) February 26, 1974
at 11-14, 15. 17-18: Executive Ser.4110r1 1'errr1-
mc-ny of (Assistant Deputy Director of Per-
eoenel Security), March 2, 1974 (transcrip-
noir not presently available.)
hereinafter referred to se Chief, Security Re-
search Staff), by whom Pennington was re-
tained at 6250 per month until December of
1973.- In January of this year (Director of
Secuitty). ordered that the Pennington ma-
terials be removed from the CIA Watergate
Slit'. when those flies were about to be re-
viewed by the CIA's Inspector General's office
in connection with the CIA furnishing this
and other Congressional ccommittees certain
nnernietion un the tripling capacity at the
CIA.; Our information 13 that, since the
reveletion of the PeneingUm matter in Feb-
ruary of tine year, tDirector of Secuntre)
early retirement Mu; been 'accepted.",
It seems that the Pennington matter was
extremely eensitive not only became of the
above-mentioned facts, but because Pen-
nington may have been a "domestic agent,"
pontibly in violation of the CIA's charter."
Time Agency has advised that the Security
Research Staff was abolished In August of
1972.'
All of the above Information was produced
by the CIA only Re a result of the position
taken by a staff employee of the Personnel
Security Division, (Personnel Security Of-
fice r j. Because of the Senator's and the
staff's request for documentstion and in-
formation relating to the destruction of CIA
tapes and other matters, Deputy Legislative
Counsel prepared a statement for Director
Colby's signature on Pebreary 19, 1974. In it
was the blanket assertion that the CIA had
produced all Watergate-related information
for this Committee as well as its Congres-
sional oversight corturatteese BeeStlee be was
aware of many of the above facts, (Person-
nel Security Officer nl) made it clear that
he could not and would not subscribe to
such a statement" (Personnel Security Of-
'Executive Session Testimony of (Chief,
Security Research Stan) February 24, 1.914, at
25-26; Executive Seesion Testimony of Lee
R. Penningtoe, supra note 1, at 29. (Notre
The Chief, Security Research Staff, was the
recipient of certain of the McCord lettere.)
Executive Session 'Testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer No. ii. rupee note 2 at
48-49, 50-51. 52-54, 57-59. 80-72
The CIA. through its legislative liaison,
has informed this Committee that (Director
ef Security) "retired" on or about Febru-
ary 26, 1974, shortly after his Executive Ses-
sion Testimony before this Committee on
Pebruary 25, 1974.
? See Executive Session Testimony of
IChief, Security Research Staff), supra note
3, at 25-20, 30, Executive Session Testimony
of Lee R. Pennington, supra note 1. at 4-7,
10, 29. In this regard, Volume trill CIA leup-
plemental Materials references an apparent
CIA tile on a United States aitinen, Jack An-
demon (4349691). This reference is cceitalned
In CIA memoranda in November and Decem-
ber of 1972 which disuse Penning-ton's pro-
viding his CIA cane MOM with a memoran-
dum allegedly written by McCord about Jack
Anderson and others. It should be noted that
the CIA de on Mr. Peonington was not pro-
vided to this Committee and also apparently
has portions from it, see Action
Required section of this memorandum. in
at Miscellaneous, ifo. 9.
'Executive Session Testimony of (Director
of Security), February 25, 1974, at 17-18.
? Su pplemen tal CIA Materiels, Volume
VIII, see also Executive Session Testimony
of (Personnel Security Officer 41), supra note
2. at 61-63.
Executive Seasion 'testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer 41), supra note 2. at 45-
52. In his Executive Session Testimony, (Per-
Ronne; Security Officer eti 1 states that, at a
Mewl:111R on January 22. 1974, to discuss
whether the "Pennington matter" should be
withheld from or disclosed to the appropriate
authorities and Congressional committees, be
informed his supervisory CIA personnel that
tr. 52):
Per #1) was so concerned that the docu-
mentary evidence of the Pennington infor-
mation would be destroyed by others in the
CIA that he and a co-employee copied the
relevant memoranda and placed them in
their respective personal safes.'' This matter
was subsequently brought to the Inspector
General's attention and the (Director of Se-
curitra) memorandum of February 21 was
drafted and made available to this Commit-
tee, the oversight committees, and the special
Prosector's once,"
Our investigation in this area also pro-
duced the fact that, contrary to previous
CIA assertions, the CIA conducted a vigorous
in-house Investigation of the Watergate
Matter, starting almost immediately after
the break-in." As one member of the Secur-
ity Research Staff stated they were in a state
of "panic." " In November and December of
1972, (Executive Officer to Director of Secur-
ity) was specially assigned to then EXeC".1-
Bre Director/Comptroller Colby to conduct
* very secretive investigation of several
Watergate-related matters. (Executive Of-
ficer to Director of Security) was instructed
to keep no copies of his findings and to make
no records. He did his own typing and uti-
lized no secretaries....
Lees clear than the aforementioned efforts
to suppress the Pennington information, is
an understanding of Pennington's actual
role or non-role in the destruction of docu-
ments at the McCord home shortly after the
Watergate break-In. Pennington has testified
tbst he did not go to the McCord home for
the purpose of searching for or destroying
CIA-related documents, but does acknowl-
edge witnessing the destruction of docu-
ments by Mm. McCord and othersee It is
dear from the testimony of other's 1, that the
CIA received information, evidently frorn
Pennington, indicating more active partici-
pation by operative Petumigton.
TAPES
In a meeting in Senator Baker's office
with Director Colby and George Murphy,
following a discussion of the Cushman tape,
Murphy asked Colby if there were other
tepee, and he replied in the affirmative. In
response to a question from Senator Baker,
"Up to this time we have never removed,
tampered with, obliterated, destroyed, or
done anything to any Watergate documents.
and we can't be caught in that kind of bind
now. We will not do it." (Personnel Security
Officer 41) added that be "didn't cross the
Potornec on (his) way to work in the morn-
leg, and that the Agency could do without
its own L Patrick Gray" (tr. 53). Subse-
quently, (Personnel Security Officer 41)
prevailed and the Information was made
Mailable to this and other appropriate Con-
gressional Committees.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Person-
nel Security Officer 41), supra note 2, at
49. 45-52
See "Memorandum for Director of Can-
ted Intelligence," supra, note 1.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Per-
nnel Security Officer No. 1), supra note 2,
at 1-4: Executive Session Testimony of (Se-
cprity Research Staff Officer), February 26.
1974. at 5. 31-32. 42, 49.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Secu-
rity Research Staff Officer), supra note 12, at
a.
" Executive Session Testimony of (Execu-
tive Officer to Director of Security), March 3.
1974 (transcription not presently avail-
able).
"Executive Session Testimony of Lee IL
PiennIngton, suora note 1.
"Executive Session Testimony of (Secur-
ity Research Stair Officer), supra note 12:
Executive Session Testimony of (Personnel
Security Officer 1), supra note 2.
Executive Session Testimony of (Chief,
Security Research Staff), supra note 3.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
M.*
?eptember 19, Albtleoved FoefiNtiMESSIMM2RECMIEDP7SENIATA000100060003-1 S 17009
Colby further acknowledged the prior ex-
istence of central taping capability at the
CIA. Senator Baker then requested that rele-
vant tapes be reviewed and delivered to the
Committee, to which Colby agreed. Shortly
thereafter, Colby confirmed to Senator Baker
recent press 'accounts that the tapes had
been destroyed. In that same connection it
should be pointed out that the staff had
previously interviewed Victor Marchetti, who
stated upon questioning that he suspected
that there was a central taping system at
the CIA. When the staff broached this sub-
ject with the Agency's (Deputy Legisative
Counsel) he stated that if there had been
such a system, it was no longer in existence.
Shortly before Director Helms left office, and
approximately one week after Senator Mans-
field's letter requesting that evidentiary ma-
terials be retained,1 Helms ordered that the
tapes be destroyed? Although the CIA is ap-
parently unable to state with any degree of
precision the date on which the tapes were
actually destroyed, testimony indicates that
it was during the week of January 22, 1973.,
While the CIA claims that the destruction
was not unusual and was one of several
periodic destructions, two facts seem clear.
First, the only other destruction for which
the CIA has any record was pn January 21,
1972, when tapes for 1964 and 1965 were de-
stroyed (there are no records of periodic
destruction); 4 and secondly, never before
had there been a destruction of all existing
tapes.' It should be noted that there exists
a separate taping system for the Office of
Security:, That system is still operative, and
the 0/S tapes presumably are still in ex-
istence. The Agency has advised that it has
reviewed all Office of Security tapes,
watch office tapes, and duty office tapes
to determine the relevancy of same but
has not provided these tapes to the Se-
lect Committee, despite the Committee's re-
quest. The Agency has provided the Com-
mittee with two selected transcripts which -
purport to constitute, in the opinion of the
Agency, the only Watergate related material
cont lined on any tapes.
Th January, 1973, destruction pertained
only to recordings of room conversations.
However, on Helms' instruction, his secretary
destroyed his transcriptions of both tele-
phone and room conversations.' The evidence
1 Letter from Senator Mansfield to DCI
Helms, dated January 16, 1973.
2 Executive Session Testimony of (Director
Helms' Secretary), February 6, 1974, at 14.
See also CIA memorandum for Director of
Security, dated January 31, 1974, at 3. She
states that she told the technicians to de-
stroy only Helm's tapes and not all of the
tapes (Executive Session Testiraony at 34-
35). However, there seems to have been no
doubt in the minds of the technicians that
they were to destroy all of the tapes on hand.
Executive Session Testimony of (Office of
Security Technician #1), February 6, 1974,
at 23, Executive Session Testimony of (Of-
fice of Security Technician #2), Febru-
ary 6, 1974, at 53.
'Executive Session Testimony of (Office
of Security Technician #2), supra note 2,
at 36. See also CIA memorandum for Direc-
tor of Security, supra note 2.
4 Executive session Testimony of (Office of
Security Technician #1), supra note 2 at
10. Executive Session Testimony of (Office
of Security Technician #2), supra note 2
at 36-37.
" Executive Session Testimony of (Office of
Security Technician #2), supra note 2 at
20.
.-crA memorandum for Director of Secu-
rity, supra note 2 at 4.
7 Executive Session Testimony of (Director
Helm's Secretary, supra note 2 at 14, 17, 10;
Executive Session Testimony. of Richard
Helms, March 8, 1974 (transcription not yet
available).
indicates that among those telephone tran-
scriptions were conversations with the Presi-
dent. Haldeman, riltrlichman, ahd other
White House ?facia's.' Helms and (Director
Helm's Secretary) have testified that such
conversations were non-Watergate related.,
Unfortunately, any means of corroboration
is no longer available. We have examined
summaries of logs made available by the
CIA, but it is impossible to determine who
was taped in many of the room conversations.
In this regard, even the CIA's analysis does
not provide this vita! information. There are
several references to a "Mr.. X." The CIA has
not produced the actual logs for our exami-
nations. However, we were informed that
there are "gaps" in the logs.
The circumstance:3 surrounding the tran-
scriptions of room and telephone conversa-
tions of former Deputy Director Cushman
are bizarre to say the least. When. Cushman
testified before the Watergate Committee
on August 2, 1973., he presented a transcrip-
tion of the Cushman/Hunt conversation of
July 22, 1971.10 We recently discovered that
there exists an original, more compete tran-
scription; that the original transcription, con- -
tained an insignificant but uncompl.imentary
reference to the President; and, that the
original was available to the CIA at the time
of the Committee's hearings in August of
1973. In fact, the original transcript was not
produced until February of this year, the day
before Senator Baker was to listen to the
Cushman/Hunt tape, per his request.
The Cushman/Hunt conversation and one
other were the only two room transcriptions
saved by Cushman's secretary, (presently Di-
rector Colby's Secretary, hereinafter referred
to as Cushrnan/Colhy's Secretary), and his
assistant (Executive Assistant to Deputy Di-
rector of CIA, he hereinafter referred to as
Exec. Asst. to DDCI I, when Cushman's safe
was cleaned out In December of 101,13. They
claimed that they made a search for the orig-
inal transcription shortly after the Water-
gate break-in but that It was not found, and
therefore an abbreviated transcription was
typed,' Therefore, we have a search by (Exec.
Asst. to DDCI) shortly after the Watergate
break-in in June of 1272 and another search
in May of 197-3, the original transcript not
having been found until May of 1973.
In February of this year (Deputy' Legisla-
tive Counsel) hand-delivered to Senator .
Baker a very significant document. It was
the transcription of a portion of the Ehr-
lichman/Cushman -,elephone conversation.
(Deputy Legislative Counsel) stated it had
been. recently discotered by (Exec. Asst. to
DDCI) al It was discovered during (Exec.
Asst. to DDCI's) third search for Watergate-
related materials, and it was located in the
same file as -the Cushman/Hunt transcript.14
The document is especially significant in
that it quotes Ehrlieh.man as saying that
Hunt was working for the President and
that the CIA was to give Hunt "carte
blanche." This, of course, substantiates the
CIA's claim that Ehrliclunan made the orig-
Exe cutive Session Testimony of (Director
Helm's Secretary), supra note 2 at 22.
'Executive Session Testimony of Helms,
supra note 7; Executyve Session Testimony of
(Director Helm's Secretary), supra note 2 at
23.
1" Public Testimony of General Robert E.
Cushman at 3291.
11 Executive Session Testimony of (Cush-
man/Colby Secretary ) , February 21, 1974.
1' Id. at 64; see also memorandum of (Exec.
Asst. to DDCI), July 23, 1973, Suppl.emental
CIA Mterials, Volume IV.
1,- See Ehrlichman/Cushman tape transcrip-
tion, CIA memorandum "For All Employees"
dated January 31, 1974, at Tab B.
"Affidavit of (Exe, . Asst. to DDCI I, Febru-
ary 5, 1974, and Exec ative Session Testimony
of (Exec. Asst. to DDCI), March 6, 1974
(transcription not yet available).
inal call with regard to the CIA's assistance
to Hunt. Surprisingly, we learned that
(Cushman/Colby Secretary), although she
says she was told that Mr. Cushman did not
have his calls monitored, did, in fact, monitor
certain of his calls anyway, especially with
people at the White House, without Cush-
man's knowledge?' The Cushman/Ehrlich-
man transcript was a result of the short-
hand notes she took of a monitored call?,
There are two interesting aspects to this
transcription. First, only the Ehrlichman
portion of the conversation was transcribed,
contrary to normal practice:1" and secondly,
Cushman does not recall any reference to
the President or to "carte blanche."1,
HNT?TSD SUPPORT?ELLSBERG PROF/LE
The Committee has received much testi-
mony over the past several months detailing
the extensive support of Howard Hunt by
CIA personnel with CIA materials and the
CIA's role in the preparation of the psycho-
logical profiles of Daniel Ellsberg. Howard
Hunt was involved in a wide variety of domes-
tic undertakings with the use of CIA equip-
ment and the assistance of CIA personnel,
e.g., the burglaries of Dr. Fielding's office and
the DNC, the preparation of psychological
profiles on Daniel Ellsberg and the investiga-
tion of the Chappaquidick incident. In light
of the facts and circumstances developed
through the documents and conflicting tes-
timony of CIA personnel adduced by this
Committee, which are summarized below, the
question arises as to whether the CIA had
advance knowledge of the Fielding break-in.
The Fielding burglary was not made public
until May of 1973.
While the CIA has previously belatedly ac-
knowledged some of the technical support it
provided to Hunt and Liddy prior to the
Fielding break-in, the CIA has continually
downplayed the extent of that technical sup-
port as well as the specific approval and de-
tailed knowledge of such support by high
level CIA officials? The scenario of events
culminating in the Fielding break-in caused
a wealth of conflicting testimony among CIA
officials as referred to hereinafter.
The CIA's assistance to Hunt began on July
22, 1971, when Hunt met with General Cush-
man, then Deputy Director of the CIA, in
Cushman's office to request physical dis-
guise and phony identification to effect a
"one time operation, and out." 2 This meet-
ing was tape recorded by Cushman. There-
after, pursuant to the specific approval of
both Cushman and then Director of the CIA
Richard Helms, a member of the CIA's Tech-
nical Services Division was assigned to pro-
vide Hunt with the assistance and materials
he requested.' During the next thirty days,
the CIA technical staff met with Hunt on
four separate occasions. Most meetings were
held at CIA "safe houses" (dwellings owned
15 Executive Session Testimony of (Cush-
man/Colby Secretary), supra note 11 at 12-
13.
18 Id. at 17, 18.
11 If at 80-81.
1" Executive Session Testimony of General
Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974 (tran-
scription not yet available).
'See affidavits of Cushman (Exec. Asst. of
DDCI), and (Deputy Chief, TSD), Original
CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D.
2Partial tape transcript of July 22 meeting,
Original CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab K, at
1; see also Cushman's affidavit, id., and com-
plete unabridged tape transcript of July 22
meeting, CIA Supplemental Materials, Vol-
ume II, Tab 4.
See Executive Session Testimony of Gen-
eral Robert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 10,
12; contra, Executive Session Testimony of
Richard Helms, March 8, 1974, and Testi-
mony of Richard Helms before the Senate
Committee on Appropriations, May 16, 1973,
at 195-196.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000.100060003-1
S 17010
Approved For ReettUaRMW114241.: IZECO287-9440451M001000660?3einber 19, 1914
or -.eased by the CIA for clandestine 7r:set-
's:mei.. At tbeee 'meetings Hunt was provided
erne the CLA equipment and assistance 'ie-
scribed In earner Committee testimony. ,
a nig, voice alteration devices, heel 1St to
CAW& a iimpn fake glasses. phony drivers
licenses and leentitleation cards, a Uher fr100
tape recorder disoulehed in a typewriter case,
S camera hidden in a tobacco pouch, prelim-
lna.o steps toward a phony New Yore tele-
phone answering devke, ant the develop ng
of the film of Hunt and Liddy's recontiale-
sante trip to Los Angeles to -case" Dr. Plied-
logo. ofnoe" .? This assistance was abruptly tee-
mix.ated on August 27. 197I?one week before
the Fielding burglary of September 3, 19'-'1.7
Recent testimony and documents have de-
velc,ped several matters of considerable im-
port with regard to the assistance provided
Hunt arid Liddy_ The technician who dealt
with Hunt him testified that tie received up-
pro:al for each and every request of Hunt
front his supervisory officials at the CIA.' He
also testified that, contrary to earlier and
other CIA testimony, Hunt informed him
early In August that he would be introduc-
ing a second man (Liddy) to the technician
for the provision of disguise and false Men-
tifIcatione CIA officials, Siereteefore 1- ad
claimed that Runt introduced Liddy unan-
nounced late in August and that this intro-
duction had been one of the leading onuses
for the CIA's ultimate termination of its
support for Hunt
Testimony and documents have also re-
veined, again contrary to the testimony of
high CIA officials, that Hunt's request fel a
New York "backstopped" telephone (a tele-
phone with is New York number which would
In reality be answered by a Washington CIA
switchboard) answering service was well on
its way to completion." A detailed memo-
randum of the 113D technician. dated Aurist
27, 1971, reveals that the beckatopped tele-
phone request was about to be Imple-
mented?, This memorandum lecludes the
actusl relay number to be called. Previous
CIA testimony had always been to the erect
that this telephone request was in iMeell-
gamble that It was Immediately cilsapproied
See Executive Seealon Testimony of (TSD
Technician 4 1), February 5 and 6. 1974. at
8-25 (February 5 tr.), and Exhibit I to that
testimony (notes of (TED Technlelaa 4-1)
compiled contemporaneously with the sup-
port of Hunt) also found In CIA Supple-
mental Materials, Volume VII, Tan 8.
'Staff interview with Howard Hunt, Febru-
ary 4, 1974.
Public Testimony of Richard Helms and
General Robert E. Cushman, August 2, 1978:
affidavits of (TED Tecbniciar. #1, TED Tech-
nician #2, Deputy Chief, 113D, and Elec.
AXE to DWI), Original CIA Materials, Vol-
ume II, Tab D.
'ord.
Executive Session Testimony of (I'm
Technician #1), supra note tat 10 (February
5 tr.), at 57 (February 5 tr. i
*Id at a5-57 (February 5 tr.); see atop
notes referred to In note 4. supra.
*Affidavits cif (Exec. Asst. to DDCI), (Dep-
uty Chief, TSD), Cushman supra note 1:
memoranda (of Exec. Asst. to DDCI) dated
August 23, 26. and 30, Original CIA Mater/kin
Volome II, Tab IC: compare Executive Ses-
sion Testimony of (TED Technician 01).
supra note 4 at 55-56 (Febroary 5 W.; with
Executive Seesion Testimony of (Depilty
Chief, TSD), February 5. 1974, at 24.
" Executive Session Testimony of (TED
Technician #1), supra note 4 at 8-10, 12
(February Si, and Exhibit 1 to (TSD Tech-
nician #1)5 testimony at 3. which details
the steps taken by the CIA to implement
Hunt's request
1' Id.
end that it was also e leading cause of the
ultimate termination of Hunt's support'
Recent testtniony also eambitstied that the
CIA created a file on Hunt's activities, en-
titled. the "Mr Edward' file. This Ole was
maintained outside the normal CIA filing
system, and this Coternitteeei request* to
rennin this al, tut ee not beeri granted, de-
spite the fact that test Unon) has established
that this file was turned over to Director
Colby aim' the Watergate break-in." More-
ever, recent testimony also indicates that a
-bigot list" (CIA term for treatment of peps-
daily sensitive case restricting access to Ft
wanted number of persons) was created for
Hunt's activitiee.
Testimony has Indicated that the Min de-
%eloped for Until and Liddy was, in fact, of
13r. Fielding's office.* Not only was the dim
developed, however, but it -was reviewed by
CIA supervisory offielids before it was re-
turned to Hunter One CIA ?Medal who re-
- lewe.d the Men admitted nut he found the
photographs end recognized
them to be of "southern California."' He
then ordered one of tee photographs to be
Silence up. The blow-up revealed Dr. Field-
lag's name in the aeking lot next to his
office." Another CIA official has testified that
ler speculated that they were "cuing" photo-
graphs.n Recent testimony has shown that
the CIA official who reviewed these photo-
graphs immediately reported their content to
Cushman and his assistant in the office of the
Deputy Director of the CIA.", With a degree
of incredulity, however, he denim telling his
superiors that he blew up one of the photo-
graphs and that it revealed the name of Dr.
Fielding!' Moreover. both Carew:um and his
"See effidaelts of (Exec Amt. to DDCI).
(Deputy Chief. TED), Ow/intim, and memo-
randa (Exec Apet. to DDCI), rupee note
10; Executive Se0140,1 Testimony of Cush-
man, March 7, 1974. at 10-21. Moreover,
Executive Session Testimony of Richard
Helms, supra note 3. indicates that it was
Hunt's request for a secretary which caused
him to order the cut-off of support. This
request, however. occuered on August 18 and
was denied the same or next day, see Execu-
tive Session Testimony of (Exec. Asst. to
DDCI) March II. 1974 (tranicriptiOn not
presently available), eontra, testimony of
Richard Helms before the Senate Committee
en Appropriations, supra note 3. at 107.
"Executive Seesion Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TED), February 5, 1974, at 14-15: Ex-
ecutive Session Testimony of (Cnelef. TED).
February 5, 1974, at 20-30.
"Executive Session Testimony of (TEM
Technician *li, supra note 4, at 2-4 (Feb-
ruary 6 W.)
I" Executive &MOOR Testimony of (Beecu-
tire Ofncer to Director of Security), March
3, 1974 (tieueseription not presently avail-
able): Staff Interview of Howard Hunt, supra
note 5 (wherein Hunt Indicates that the film
the CIA developed Included shots of a "close-
up of (Fielding'e ofilce) door, a close-up of
the directory of (Fielding'.) building, photo-
graphs of the !agrees and egress of the park-
ing " as well as shots of the inside of
Pieldinget oMce, including Inc top of Field-
ing's desk.
Exurruttre Session Testimony of (iED
Technical #1) supra !tote 4 at 20-24, 52-53
(Februery 5 tr.); Executive Session Teeti-
inony of iDeputy (Miele TED), supra note 14
at 43-47
"'Executive Session Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TSD, supra note 1+ at 44.
Id. at 45-46.
"Executive Session Testimony of Chief.
'OSD February 5, 1974, at 19-20.
o Executive Session Testimony of (Deputy
Chief, TEID' supra note 14 at 47-49.
n Id.
aseisitant denied ever Mitring been told about
the content of the photographs by (Deputy
Met, TSD) or anyone else." In any event
recent testimony shows that it was only afte:
throe photographs were developed and ex-
amined ti-at the CIA technician dealing with
Rent was ordered to cut off all support fo:
}Tante This decision was made by the Deputy
eotor of the CIA iCushman) and/or the
ctor of the CIA (Helms)."
Finally, utile previous public CIA testi-
mony claimed that the CIA "had no contact
wbateonver with Mr. Hunt subsequent to 31
August. 1971," recent testimony and secret
documents indicate that Hunt had extensive
cantact with the CIA after that date, Not
only did Hunt play a large role In the CLen
davelopinent of psychological profiles on Dan-
iel =fibers (not completed until Novembe:
of 1971), but he actually contacted the CIA's
Uterus). Employment Assistance Branch
(*EAB ) and approached active CIA person-
nel regrading several cperations, including,
eg., Hunt's requests to the CIA for persoois;
aMlled in lockpicking, electronic sweeping,
and entry operations."
It 13 significant that during the same pe-
reed as the ongoing support of Hunt by the
CLA. August of 1971. the CIA was also com-
piling a psychological profile on Daniel Ells-
berg. Recent testimony has revealed' that
Went was deeply involved in that protect, as
will.
"Executive Session Testimony of General
Robert E. Cushman. March 7, 1974, at 22-28.
Enecutive Session Testimony of (Mrec. Asst.
to DDCI) March 6, 1974 (transcription not
presently available).
"Executive Session Testimony of (TED
Technical Irl u, supra note 4, at 59-60, and
Exinbit 1 to that testimony.
Executive Session Testimony of General
Matiert E. Cushman, March 7, 1974, at 21-22,
16-20; r ecutive Session Testimony of Rich-
aryl Helms. March 8, 1974, contra (traoscrip-
nen not presently available).
4" Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters
Memorandum for Record, July 28, 1972, Origi-
me CIA Materia)s, Volume I, Tab S.
P' Contacts after August 31, 1974, indicated
in, the Secret Supplemental CIA Materials,
inelittle the following:
Is) Hunt was referred to (Former CIA ern--
ploy:ea) by (Chief, HEAD) of the CIA's EMA13,
(Chief. =AB) retired on June 9, 1972) when
Hunt requested a "retired loekpicker" and
entry man In the time period of March-May,
19172, CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I,
Tab 4, Memorandum of June 19, 1973.
41:0 Hunt, in late 1971, requested some
"'Security types' to check physical security
awl monitor telephones in Las Vegas," In
cohnecnon with Hunt's work on the Hughes
account with Mullen and Company. Hunt
was referred by (Chief. EEAS) to an (Agency
proprietary (name deleted at Agency request)
(CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume I. Tab
4.)
C) Hunt contacted (deleted at Agency res
quest) (an active CIA employee until No-
Yernber le, 1072) sometime in late 1971 re-
garding a weekend entry operation.
1d) Hunt contacted CIA employee (deleted
at Agency request) in October of 1971 con-
cerning certain Indo-China War documents
(Original CIA MateriaLs, Volume II. Tab D),
t e) On December 8, 1971, Hunt requested
and received a CIA computer name trace. by
CTA employees, on a person who had allegedly
formed the (deleted name of Letin American
coluntry at Agency request) National Inde-
pendent Party in December of 1971 (Original
CIA Materials, Volume II, Tab D).
f) The CIA acknowledges that the Deputy
Dilector of Plana of the CIA did meet with
Hint on October 15, 1971 to discuss Mullen
end Company problems.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
September 19, An-roved Fccasselasgn015,11i11,2tECCFREDRZIEROVIEA000100060003-1 S 17011
The preparation of this pis:dile was specifi-
cally approved by then Director Helms in late
July of 1971." The actual compiling of the
profile was done by the CIA's medical serv-
ices staff and, in particular, its chief
psychiatrist." Testimony has indicated that
a meeting was held on August 12, 1971, in
which both Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy
participated. They told the CIA psychiatrist
that Ellsberg had been undergoing psychi-
atric analysis. Hunt and Liddy discussed
with him their desire to "try Ellsberg in
public," render him "the object of gity
as a broken man," and be able to refer to
Eilsberg's "Oedipal complex."' At the close
of the meeting, Hunt asked the psychiatrist
not to reveal his presence in the profile dis-
cUssions to anyone at the CIA, stating that
he already had been in. contact with General
Cushman and was on good terms with Direc-
tor Helms. The psychiatrist has testified
recently that he was extremely concerned
about Hunt's presence and remarks. He so
reported this to his CIA superiors, both in
memoranda and in a meeting on' August
20, 1971. Access to the memoranda of both
the psychiatrist and his superiors has been
refused to this Committee."
The CIA psychiatrist also was given the
name of Dr. Fielding as Ellsberg's psychi-
atrist and numerous FBI reports of inter-
views with Ellsberg's associates, as well as
a memorandum of a reported telephone con-
versation between Ellsberg and another
party." and recent testimony has revealed
that it was reported back to the psychi-
atrist that Director Helms was advised of
his concerns regarding Hunt's Participation
and comments." While Director Helms has
denied that he was ever told that Hunt was
involved in the CIA's Ellsberg profile proj-
ect," it is not without significance that the
time period during which the CIA psychi-
atrist was briefing his superiors of his con-
cerns regarding Hunt was circa August 20,
1971=a week prior to the developing of
Hunt's film of "intriguing" photographs of
medical offices in southern California which
impressed at least one CIA official as "cas-
ing" photographs."
With the _aforementioned background, we
are reminded that when the second profile
on Ellsberg was completed (completion was
.delayed until November of 1971), Director
Helms took pains to inform the White House
that
"I do wish to underline the point that
our involvement in this matter should not
be revealed in any context, formal or in-
formal" (emphasis added)."
, In his recent testimony before this Conn-
mittee, Director Helms stated that the above
quoted language represented his concern
only for the professional reputations of the
CIA psychiatrists and not any concern over
2' Affidavit of (Deputy Director of Support,
hereafter referred to as the DDS) and (Direc-
tor of Medical Services Staff, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the DMSS) and (Chief of Psychi-
atric Staff on Medical Services Staff, here-
inafter referred to as Chief. Psychiatrist),
Original CIA Materials, Volume I, Tab U;
Volume It, Tab D.
82 Nxexcutive Session Testimony of (Chief
Psychiatrist), March 6, 1974 (transcription
not presently available).
"Id., see also Colby letter refusing access,
Infra.
"Id.
,
" Id.
"Executive Session Testimony of Richard
supra nate 3; Testimony of Richard
Helms before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, May 17, 1973, at 17.
"See Executive Session Testimony of
(Chief, TSD), supra note 20. _
"Memorandum' from Richard Helms to
David Young, November 9, 1971, Original CIA
'Materials, Volume II, Tab. J.
the possible illegallty of the profile." It
should be noted, however, that in a memo-
randum from the wychiatrists' CIA super-
visor to Helms in November of 1911, which
accompanied the cempleted proft.e, their
concern is expressed as follows:
"(DMSS) and (Chief Psychiatrist) . . .
confirmed that their worries did sot
Involve professional ethics or credibility. In-
stead, they are concerned lest the Agency's
involvement. . . bectune known and particu-
larly that it might come to light during any
proceeding. * * * We will be guided by
your determination after you have had an
opportunity to read t le new paper." (Empha-
sis supplied.)"
The facts and circumstances related above,
at derived from the recently curtailed in-
vestigation of this Conunittee, would appear
to raise many unanswered questions as to
the involvement of the CIA in maters out-
side its legislative parameters.
HUNT--14
Director Helms, upon being questioned
about Martinez, has consistently testified to
little more than the fact that Eugenio Mar-
tinez was on a 111100 per month retainer with
the CIA as an informant on Cubans of in-
terest to the Agency 1 Our investigation has
revealed relevant lhformation concerning
Martinez' CIA relaticashlp, as set out below,
not previously brought forward in testimony
by CIA officials.
Because of Hunt's close relations sip with
Martinez at a time when Martinez w as a paid
CIA operative, the basic question arises 'as to
whether the CIA wits aware of Hunt's ac-
tivities early in 1972 when he was recruiting
Cubans to assist in the Watergate break-in.
Prior to assuming a retainer status in the
summer of 1971, Martinez had been a full-
salaried operative involved in Agency (deleted
at Agency request] endeavors.' In November
of 1971, a month af-er his participation in
the Fielding break-ln, Martinez msntioned
his contact with Hunt in an allegedly in-
nocuous fashion to his case officer and the
Miami Chief of Station.' There is also evi-
dence that Martinev had mentioned Hunt
even earlier to his case officer., In March of
1972, Martinez advised the Miami Chief of
Station. that Hunt wa., employed by tite White
House and asked thc Chief of Station if he
was sure that he had been apprised of all
Agency activities in the Miami area.' This
concerned the Chief of Station who sent a
letter to CIA headquarters requesting infor-
mation on Hunt's White House status.' On
" Executive Seadm Testimony of Richard
Helms, supra note 3.
"Memorandum fr rn (DDS), CIA Deputy
Director of Support, to Richard Helms, Di-
rector of Central In lelligence, November 9,
1971, Original CIA Materials. Volume II, Tab.
J.
1 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Re-
port of Richard Helms Testimony, Febru-
ary 7, 1973, at 24, 50; Senate &lest Com-
mittee Transcript of Richard Helms, Testi-
mony, August 2, 19-'3, at 6733-6734, 6814-
6815.
'Executive Session Testimony of (Miami
Chief of Station, hereinafter COB) , Febru-
ary 7, 1974, at 5-9.
'(Martinez' Case Officer (1971-1972), here-
inafter referred to as Case Officer #:.) Mem-
orandum for the Record (excerpt), Novem-
ber 19, 1971, Agent (Martinez' Code Name),
found at Tab 1, CIA ,3upplemental Materials,
Volume II; Executive Session Testimony
of (COS) supra note 2, at 14-18.
,(Case Officer #1) Memorandum for the
Record (excerpt), supra note 3; Executive
Session Testimony of (COS), supra note 2,
at 13.
5 Executive Sessions Testimony or (COS),
supra note 2, at 23-27
Id, at 25-27; Se,' (COS) Memorandum
for Chief, (deleted at Agency request),
March 17, 1972, Subect: Miscellaneous In-
March 27, 1972, the Chief of Station received
a cryptic response at the direction of the
Assistant Deputy Director of Plans advising
the Chief of Station not to concern himself
with the travels of Hunt in Miami, that Hunt
was on domestic White House business of an
unknown nature and that the Chief of Sta-
tion should "cool it." (It should be remem-
bered that this was after the Agency pro-
vided Hunt with TSD support in July and
August of 1971. It is not explained why Hunt,
who had "used" the CIA, was not of more
interest to the Agency, especially when he was
contacting a current operative, Martinez.)
The tone of this letter infuriated the Chief
of Station and left him uneasy about the
matter.' Accordingly, the Chief of Station re-
quested that Martinez prepare in Spanish a
report on the Hunt information provided the
Chief of Station in March.' Martinez com-
piled a "cover story" 10 on April 5, 1972, after
being told by his case officer not to put any-
thing in the report which might come back
to haunt him." The Spanish report, which
did not contain any of the alarming in-
nuendos suggested earlier by Martinez, was
maintained in the Chief of Station's file until
after the Watergate break-in"
It is known that Martinez had two case
officers during 1971 and 1972. There is con-
flicting evidence concerning the precise date
of the spring, 1972 case officer change-over."
It is known that Martinez met with his last
case officer on June 6, 1972, and at that time
had Rt least two reporting requirements, i.e.,
maritime operation information and infor-
mation pertaining to possible demonstra-
tions at the Miami conventions," contrary
to earlier testimony by CIA officials?' The
Agency has not afforded this Committee an
unabridged examination of the case officer
contact reports, despite requests for same.
The Agency has advised that Martinez'
first case officer was on an "African safari"
throughout June of 1972.1" The second case
formation from (Martinez' Code Name),
found at Tab 1, CIA Supplemental Materials,
Volume II; (COS) (sensitive) letter, March
17, 1972, found at Tabe 1, CIA Supplemental
Materials, Volume II.
Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
supra note 2, at 31-34; (Chief, Cuban Op-
erations Branch, Western Hemisphere Divi-
sion, hereinafter referred to as Chief, COB)
letter to (COS) ,,March 27, 1972, found at Tab
1, CIA Supplemental Materials, Volume II.
'Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
supra note 2, at 32, 80.
'lit, at 33-34, 38-40; (Case Officer #1)
Cable (deleted at Agency request), Decem-
ber 15, 1973, found at Tab 2, CIA Supple-
mental Materials, Volume II; Executive Ses-
sion Testimony of Eugenio Martinez, De-
cember 10, 1973, at 45-47.
10 Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
supra note 2, at 91; see Executive Session
Testimony of Eugenio Martinez, supra note
9, at 11.
txecutive Session Testimony of Eugenio
Martinez, supra note 9, at 53, 58-59. (Case
Officer #1) Cable (deleted at Agency re-
quest), supra note 9.
"Executive Session Testimony of (COS),
Spanish Report and Translated Spanish Re-
port, found at Tab 1, CIA Supplemental
Materials, Volume I (attention to discrep-
ancies).
"Tab 2, CIA Supplemental Materials, Vol-
ume yr (indicating April 14, 1972 change-
over) ; Tab 10, Original CIA Materials, Volume -
III (indicating a March, 1972 change-over) ;
Executive Session Testimony of (COS), supra
note 2, at 36 (indicating April 23-30, 1972
change-over) .
14 Executive Session Testimony of (Case
Officer #2), February 4, 1974, at 25-26, 41-42.
"Supra note 1.
"CTA Deputy Legislative Counsel showed
this staff a printed itinerary for the first case
officer which contained the referenced entry.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17012 Approved For RE:MINIM oltat : glitenBlaret145M0010006gaptelnber 19, 1974
officer has testified that the former colas of-
ficer was in Miami on June 19, ;972 n The
first case officer has been transferred to iln-
dochina) and was not made available for m-
terview by our Committee. The second nee
officer stated in his interview that he was
rushed to CIA headquarters the week folicw-
ing Watergate and told that he would be re-
quired to nay there. until September for
reason related to his involvement w: lb
Martinez." This case officer rernabe asonped
to CIA headquarters.
On the morning of June 18, 1972, the Mi-
ami Mel of Station dispatehed a cable to
CIA headquarters regarding the activities
of Martinez but deliberately omitting liar-
Inez' prior reference to Hunt's Waviness.",
On June 19, 1872, the One of Station re-
ceived correspondence from CIA headquar-
ters advising him to keep in better touch
with his operatives in Miami in This prompted
the chief of Station to forward a copy of the
Martinez report in Spanish to beaciquar-
terea The Chief of Station WSW confounded
as to why he was not told to terminate the
Martinez relationship if the CIA headquar-
ters suspected the involvement of Hunt in
political activities. He later brought tins
matter up with the Andstant Deputy Di-
rector of Plans, who told hint that the Agency
was uneasy about Hunt's activities for the
White House In 'March or May" of 19711.0
The Assistant Deputy Director of Plans testi-
fied that he assumed in Marsh of 1972 that
Must was involved in partisan political work
for the White House and that this assump-
tion formed the bitals for his guidance to the
Miami Chief of Station at that time He
further testified that the Miami Chief of
Station wanted to check on Hunt's activities
domestically:4 an allegation denied by the
Chief of Station" and not reflected in any
of the CIA correspondence made available
to us.
Despite conflicting evidence from the FBI
and the CIAO" It Is known that the Agency
received information on June 19, 1972, from
an operative that Martinez' vehicle was at
the Miami airport and contained compromis-
ing documents.," The Agency contacted the
P131 with this; information on June 21, 1972.10
Our staff has yet to receive a satisfactory ex-
planation regarding the aforementioned time
lag and an accounting of Agency actions dilat-
ing the interim.
legislative Counsel has not made that Itin-
erary a part of the supplemental materiels
furnished the staff.
"'Executive Session Testimony of (Case
Officer #2), supra note 14, at 73.
1" /d. at 49-50.
19 Id. at 36-37, 78.
" (Chief, Western Hemisphere Diviskon
"Dear Friend" letter June 20. 1972, found at
Tab 2, CIA Supplemented Materials, Volume
" (008) "Dear Friend" letter, June 20,
1972, found at Tab 2, CIA Supplemental
Materials, Volume II; Executive Session Tes-
timony of (COS). supra note 2, at 73-75.
=Executive Session Testimony of (COO),
eupra note 2, at 80-82.
n /d. at 82-83.
a Executive Session Testimony of ADDP,
February 28, 1974, transcript not presently
available
Id.
" Executive Session Testimony of COS,
supra note 2, at 84.
31 Id. at 82-65; Report of Interview of Ageot
Robert L. Wilson, dated January 11, 1974, a-. 4.
A comparison reveals a discrepancy as to
manner in which PHI was notified and raises
euestions concerning what the FEST found.
" Executive Session Testimony of COS,
supra note 2. at 58-60; Executive Session Tes-
timony of Case Officer #2, supra note 14. at
15-17.
*Report of Interview of Agent Robert T
Wilson, supra note 27, at 3.
ACTION ar2111102:*
The following Is a breakdown by ares Of
Interest of anion desirable to complete the
Watergate-related CIA Investigation com-
menced by this staff
Martinez relationship
1. I Il ter views
cal Chief. Western Hemosphere Division
'1971-April, 1972).
kb) Chief. Western Hemisphere Division
( Apr11,1072-1973) .
IC) Chief, Cuban Operations Breech,
western Hemisphere Division (1971-1972)
di Martinez' case officer (1971-March.
April, 1972). Prior efforts to interview this
Individual have been frustrated by virtue of
los present assignment in (Indochina).
.).
!e3) Executive Astistant to the ADDP (1971-
104).
ti Executive Assistantth to e DDP n1971-
19r
The aforegoing interview( are necessary
In order to determine the extent of the
CIA's knowledge of Bunt's activities.
(g) Chief. affe.m! ?tee of Security (June,
19721.
(hi Miami Chief of atation's Informant with
regard to Martinez' car
(1) Above informant's source with regard
to Martinez' car.
These Interviews are necetsery to explain
the time lag in giving notice to the FBI;
to Identify CIA actions particularly 'the
Miami Office of Security) regarding this
information; and to determine the scope of
Information received by the Agency and
transmitted to the FBI
2. Documents:
(a) All Martineo case officer contact re-
porta (1971-July. 1972), We have repeatedly
requested lteCe133 t unabridged reports, but
the Agency has made available only an
abridged version of early reporta. Access Is
neceesary to determine Ile scope of Martinez'
relationship In the relevant time frame and
whether he provided. any Watergate-related
information to his oase officer.
(hi All CIA corresproldenne re: Martinez
car (cables, etc ) This information, although
not prevlowely requested per as, Is critical
I') the documentetion of Agency action on
this iasue and to resolve conalcting evidence
supplied by the FBI.
(c) All reports; or memoranda relating to
the debriefing of Manatee' last case officer
upon his return to Washington, D.C., after
one Watergate break-in This information
ben been previously requested but not pro-
vlded to this staff.
Mullen and Co. relationship
I. Interviews:
(a) Mullen and Cootapeny secretarlee (1971-
1972). This Is needed to confirm or deny
suspicions relevant to the indicated Agency/
Bennett/Hughes link.
(b) Far east cover (June, 1972)
(c) European cover.
The etforegolhg Interviews are necessary to
meaningful understanding of the nV/H
lap" and to gauge any relationship of same
to the Watergate break-kn.
(d) Chief. Central eclat Staff (1971-1972).
This interview is nese-way to clarify the "Wit
nap" and to ascertain the Agency's response
to the Bennett Information contained in the
oinuner, 1972 mem:smiles,.
2. Documents:
Any and all reports of contacts between
(Mullen and Company Case Officer) and
Mullen, Bennett, Hunt and anyone else at
Muller; and Company from April 30, 1970 to
January 1, 1974. including bus, not limited to
loge, records, or memoranda reflecting such
contact or the content of that contact This
information was requested during the Feb-
ruary 4, 1974 Executive Session of (Mullen
aid Company nue Officer) along with data
reflecting changes in the procedure for main-
taining and/or making reports of contacts
outside the Agency.
TSD support of Hunt
1. Interviews:
nt) (POD Technician #3)?TSD technical
who developed the photographs for Hunt and.
blew up & particular photograph for (Deputy
Met TSD). Determination needed as to
what was done with blow-up and whether
it was subsequently used for briefing others
at
(b) (TSI) Technician #2)?TSD tech-
nielan wh3 purchased the Mier 5000 tape re-
corder and equipped it for Hunt's purposes
(c) (Executive Assistant to DDP)?Con-
suited during initial stages of TSD support
and relayed the TSD requirement to the
DDP.
2. Documents:
(a) "Mr. Edward" file?The file containing
all memoranda and other materials relating
to the CIA's TSD support of Hunt. This file
het been requested, but has not been pro-
dticed, despite the fact that the file was given
to Director Colby after the Watergate
break-tn.
(b) All memoranda prepared by (Executive
Officer to Director of Security), or any other
CIA emplcyee, regarding the TSD support of
Hunt, including but not limited to all inter-
nal memoranda concerning the TSD support
which is not contained in the "Mr. Edward'
MO.
Psychological profile of Daniel Ellabery
1. Interviews:
(a) (DMISS) ?Director of Medical Services
who supervised and participated in the prep-
erotica of both Ellsberg profiles.
(b) (DDS)--The immediate supervisor of
the Medical Services staff who prepared the
psychological profile and who served as
Hinson between Director Helms and the
psychiatric staff.
(c) Executive Assistant to DDS?Knowl-
edgeable with regard to the psychological
profile.
2. DOCUlnenta:
(a) AU information received by the CIA
from the FBI or the White House which
served as raw data for preparation of both
psychological profiles. Testimony has estab-
lisbed that this data contained FBI reports
of interviews with female associates of Ells-
berg, as well as a report of a purported tele-
phone conversation between Elisberg and an-
other party.' The data should establish the
extent of the CIA's admitted knowledge of
the name of Ellsberg's psychiatrist as well as
the CIA's knowledge of the activities of Hunt.
(b) All documents, reports, or memoranda
relating In any way to the psychological pro-
illee, including but not limited to the in-
ternal memoranda prepared by (Chief Psy-
chiatrist), (D11815), and (DDS) regarding the
two psychological profiles. Testimony has es-
tablished that memoranda for the record
wear written detailing the concerns about
Hunt. Director Helms has testified that he
has no knowledge of same.
(e) The so-called "psychological profile
ale". presently located in the office of the
Dinector of Medical Services, CIA, containing
all materials regarding the preparation of
this psychological pronles. Note: This file
was previously requested, as well as the
materials described in parts (a.) and (b.)
above. By letter dated March 8, 1974, Director
Coy indicated that he would release this
infermation to the oversight committees
only.
Tapes
1. Log maintained by the Office of Security
with reference to known tapings of which
transcripts are thought to be available. This
hae been previously requested, but not fur-
nished.
n All logs, memoranda, or notations re-
fiesning communications into or out of the
'Executive Session Testimony of (Chief
Psychiatrist), March 7, 1974 (transcription
not presently available).
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Siptember 19, lOrr?ved Fe~sisiemitiiktcolopPgtotwA000100060003-1 S 17013
Office of Security for the time period from
June 16, 1972 to June 22, 1972. This infor-
mation has been requested but it is avail-
able to the Senate Armed Services Committee
only. Such 'information is critical to any
determination as to the chronology of Water-
gate notification and related actions.
3. Access to the five inch reel of tape
labeled, "McCord Incident/18-19 June 1972,"
which was found in the Office of Security
On March 1, 1974. It is not known what is
Contained in this tape, but its importance
is obvious.
Miscellaneous
1. Access to the special Watergate file
formerly maintained in the Office of Security.
This file was requested as early as mid-Jan-
uary, 1974, and its existence at that time
was denied by legislative liaison. Sworn testi-
mony has since confirmed existence of such
a file, now under control of the Inspector
Generel.
2. Any and all CIA flies relating to the ac-
tivities of E. Howard Hunt. This was re-
quested in January of 1974 and was ignored
by the Agency. We are aware of at least art
- executive registry file in which information
on Hunt was placed in 1971 and suggest that
this would be a good starting point for com-
pliance with this request.
3. Any and all CIA files relating to G. Gor-
don Liddy during the time frame of 'Janu-
ary, 1970, to the present. When this request
was made in January of 1971, the staff was
advised that CIA information on Liddy was
limited to sensitive briefings, the subject
matter of which was beyond the purview of
this Committee.2 Files relative to these brief-
ings need to be examined, particularly in
light of the time period of same, i.e., August
and September, 1971.
4. Any and all CIA files pertaining to at-
torney (name deleted at Agency request)
and/or his law firm from the period January
1971 to the present. While the CIA has con.-
firmed that (attorney) is a former case offi-
cer and that (potentially significant infor-
mation deleted at agency request) during
the period of time that (attorney) served as
counsel for the Committee to Re-Elect the
President75 contact reports and memoranda
must be reviewed in raw form before a deter-
mination can be made as to the. impact of
the aforementioned facts.
5. Office calendars for Director Helms, Gen-
eral Cushman, and the Deputy Director of
Plans for the time frame from January of
1971 through June of 1973. mese calendars
have been previously requested and are crit-
ical to a thorough investigative analysis of
knowledge available to these respective of-
ficials at the critical times. These calendars
have not been made available to this staff
for review.
6. All record pertaining to Agency financ-
ing of Egil Krogh's activities, as evidenced
by sworn testimony before this Committee.
Also, interviews of superiors of (Secretary to
Chief, CIA Narcotics Control Group) .4
7. Interviews of (Chief, EEAB), (former
outplacement director), (Agency employee),
(Agency employee), (former Agency em-
ployee), (former Agency employee) and at-
torney (former Agency employee), all of
whom were either in the employ or were
former employees of the Agency at the time
they discussed Hunt operation activities (in-
cluding entry operations) during 1971 and
1972.
See CIA's response to this inquiry regard-
ing Liddy, Supplemental Materials, Volume
II, Tab 13.
a See CIA's response to this inquiry regard-
ing (attorney), CIA Supplemental Materials,
Volume' II, Tab 14; IV (CIA Memorandum,
June 28, 1973).
4 See Executive Session Testimony of (Sec-
retary to Chief, CIA Narcotics Control
Group), March 2, 1971, (transcription not
presently available).
8. A review of all CIA activities (regard-
less of nature or degree of support) in Mex-
ico during the calendar year, 1971-1972. This
information, which is relevant to an objec-
tive assessment of CIA's post-Watergate
posture and pre-Watergate potential involve-
ment, has been requested (to an extent con-
sistent with national security) since Feb-
ruary 1, 1974.5
9. The "Pennington File," which was pre-
viously requested and made available only
to the House Armed Services Oversight Com-
mittee. This file contains memoranda and
other documents dealing with the abtivities
of the CIA operative, Pennington, who was
alleged to have participated in the 'burning
of documents in the McCord home after the
Watergate break-in. This file also contains
data regarding the "domestic' activities" of
Pennington, and the CIA has made 11; known
that there are "gaps" in this file during cer-
tain relevant time periods.
10. At the conclu9ion of his Eicecutive
Session on Friday, March 8. 1974, Ambas-
sador Helms testified concerning an individ-
ual in a peculiar position to know the ac-
tivities of both the Agency and the FBI.
While Helms knew of no Watergate informa-
tion in this individual's possession, other
evidence suggests tile contrary. Considera-
tion should be given to interviewing this
Individual who has already commenced
preparation of a Watergate-related memo-
randum in response to a previous request by
the staff.?
11. Michael Mastrovito of the Secret Serv-
ice should be interviewed concerning his
Agency communications on June 17, 1972.
Agency documents indicate that Mestrovito
agreed to downplay McCord's Agency em-
ployment; that Mastrovito was being pres-
sured for information by a Democratic state
chairman; and that Mastrovito was advised
by the CIA that the Agency was ccncerned
with McCord's emotional stability prior to
his retirement.,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the the previous order, the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. WEICKER) is recognized
for not to exceed 5 minutes
Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I rise
in support of the legislation submitted
by the distinguished Senator from Ten-
nessee (Mr. BAKER)
As I have said on other occasions, the
job which was started a little over a
year ago by the Senate Select Commit-
tee will only be considered a Job well
done if we take the facts learned and
construct legislation around those facts?
more particularly, if we construct legisla-
tion to see to it that the abuses uncovered
will never occur again. Unless we do that,
It can be said, with basis in fact, that
the only purpose of the committee was
to indulge in acts of sensationalism rath-
er than in acts of legislation.
Insofar as the abuse of the Constitu-
tion and the laws of this country by
the law enforcement intelligence com-
munity, it cannot be said that Water-
gate was a bad dream. It was a fact. The
bill introduced by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Tennessee and the Senator
from Michigan (Mr. HART) , the ,Senator
'The CIA, through its legislative liaison,
has confirmed that Mexico is an "important
country" to the CIA, but has refused to pro-
vide any other information regarding CIA
Mexican activitiee di,ring the 1971-72 time
period. --
See CIA Supplemental Material, Volume
II, Tab 18.
See CIA cable traffic shortly after the
Watergate break-in, CIA Supplemental Mate-
rial, Volume VI.
from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) , the Senator
from California (Mr. CRANSTON) , and
myself is intended to prevent a reoccur-
rence not of a dream but of a fact.
Indeed, for many years the American
Intelligence community has ignored Con-
gress; or, to put it the other way around,
Congress has ignored the American in-
telligence community. The abuses uncov-
ered cannot be considered illogical.
Rather, they are the logical ending to a
practice of total unaccountability.
In the preparation of my remarks for
delivery this morning, one of the mem-
bers of my staff had written, "While the
intelligence activities of Federal agen-
cies have been within the law and in the
national interest." I turned to him and
said, "I can't say that. I don't know that
they have been."
That is the problem. It is not a prob-
lem that can be resolved solely by the
President of the United States. It is as
much our responsibility and our job.
I find it interesting that we read in
the newspapers today and viewed on
television last night that there is to be
a briefing of congressional leaders by
the President as to what was going on in
the CIA. It that not something that the
congressional leaders should have known,
without getting a briefing from the Pres-
ident of the United States? Is that not
something on which perhaps we should
brief the President? Of course, we are
in no position to do so, because we do not
know anything about it.
Whereas I have uncovered certain
abuses in the CIA, the FBI, the military
Intelligence, and the Secret Service, I
cannot honestly stand here and say that
that is all that went on. There has been
no agency accountability to Congress.
This is not to say that we do not have
oversight functions in the various com-
mittees, but as the distinguished Sena-
tor from Tennessee pointed out it is an
ancilary duty; it is not the principal duty
of those committees. The chairmen and
the members of those committees have
substantial burdens in the areas of the
judiciary, foreign relations, and defense.
So oversight of the law enforcement in-
telligence community suffers.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Roe-
ERT C. BYRD). The time of the Senator
has 'expired. Does the Senator desire ad-
ditional time?
Mr. WEICKER. I request an addi-
tional 2 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the time will be taken out of
the time allotted to the Senator from
West Virginia (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) .
Mr. WEICKER. Congress itself has
long been reluctant to ask the hard ques-
tions, and insist on the policy super-
vision that assures the accountability
of agencies such as the CIA, the FBI, the
Secret Service, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency,
and numerous others charged with gath-
ering intelligence and surveillance of
persons.
With no accountability, we can readily
anticipate abuse of agency powers and
constitutional rights. The record of
these abuses in the last few years can-
not be dismissed as isolated instances
of individual excesses. It is a record that
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
s 17014 Approved For Rtlomingfb1142Ar1 ? wapdLogwAypo 000600
,03-1
3eptember 19, 1974
tears at the very fabric of our con-
stitutional democracy.
The lesson of these abuses of the na-
tional intelligence function is that ac-
countability cannot be assured without
congressional oversight, oversight that
has constancy, purpose, and real power
to get the facts out.
It is in this interest of strengthening
this congressional oversight respon-
sibility, that Senator BAKER. Senator
CHURCH, Senator CaAiserox and I are
today introducing legislation to establish
the Joint Committee on Intelligence
Oversight, with broad powers to nu-
thorize, investigate, and legislate on
matters related to the intelligence agen-
cies, as well as to the intelligence activi-
ties of all other Federal agencies and de-
partments.
In this way, we seek to consolidate the
congressional intelligence oversight
function in one Joint committee with
sweeping powers to demar.d full and cur-
rent accountability.
Mr. President, this Is the opportunity
for Congress to act. The facts are
on the table, and now the American
people look to us for leadership. Oth-
erwise, the abuses that occurred de facto
become a part of the laws of this Nation.
What a tragedy that would be, in light
of what those facts say.
The joint committee would be cona-
pcsed of 14 members evenly divided be-
tween the House and Senate, chosen by
the leadership. In order that- this :en-
portant committee remains independent
and healthily skeptical, we would en-
courage the leadership of both Houses
to consider some form of rotating mem-
bership for the Joint committee.
The joint committee would possess pri-
mary authorization and legislative Juris-
diction over all activities and ?Aerations
of: the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
U.S. Secret Service, the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, and the National Secu-
rity Agency, as well as over aU intelli-
gence or surveillance activities or oper-
ations of any other department or agency
of the Federal Government.
The bill clearly states that the direc-
tors of the above-named agencies?
shall keep the Joint Committee fully and
currently informed with respect to all of the
activities of their reepective organizations.
and the heads of all other departments and
agencies of the Federal Gover amen t coildu et-
ing intelligence activities or operations or the
surseillance of persons shall keep the Joint
Committee fully and currently informed of
all intelligence and surveillance activities
and operations carried out by their respective
departments and agencies.
The joint committee may require from
any department or agency of the Federal
Government periodic written reports re-
garding activities and operations within
the Jurisdiction of the joint committee.
To back up requests for relevant infor-
mation, the committee would have lull
subpena powers.
Furthermore, the proposed legislation
provides that
No funds may be appropriated for the pur-
pose of carrying out any intelligence or sur-
veillance act or operation by any otnce, or
any department, or agency of the Federal
Government unlees such funds for such
activity or operation have been specifically
authorized by legislation enacted after the
date of enact ment of this act.
Therefore, the budgets of secret agen-
cies like the CIA and NSA could not be
hidden in Defense appropriation bills,
and no blanket autnorinitions could be
used to avoid the committee's scrutiny
of intelligence agency budgets.
While the creation of the Joint com-
mittee would not deprive the current
oversight committees?Armed Services,
Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and
so forth?of the opportunity to exercise
oversight over intelligence matters re-
lated to the jurisdiction of these com-
mittees, no legislation or no provision
contained in any legislation dealing with
any matter within the Jurisdiction of the
Joint committee can be considered by
either House unless such legislation has
eeen reported by the joint committee or
Is a Boor amendment to committee leg-
islation.
And, given national security consid-
erations, the Joint committee would be
=powered to take any and all precau-
tions necessary to maintain the confi-
dentiality of sensitive information before
The hearings last year before the Sen-
se() Select Committee on Presidential
ampalgn Activities documented the sys-
tematic abuse of governmental agencies.
The f acts of the White House respon-
eiveness programs which pressured Fed-
eral agencies to favor political friends
and disadvantage enemies are startling
ndeed. But the litany of White House
domestic and foreign intethgence opera-
ions conducted under the banner of "na-
ional security- can only be termed a na-
? ional disgrace.
The executive branch had at its dis-
eosin a me-salve intelligenee apparatus?
? he CIA, the FBI, the National Security
egency?NSA--and the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency--DIA. The Nixon adminis-
tration simply used at home what had
been developed in clandestine operations
broad.
This
This was the proposal of Tom Charles
Huston In his July Heal memorandum to
White House Chief of Staff H.R. Halde-
man. Houston wrote:
In the past there has been no systematic
effort to mobilize the full resources of the
intelligence community in the internal secu-
rity area. . . Domestic intelligence infor-
mation coming into the white House has
teen fragmentary snd nnevaluated. . . . Un-
Nos most of the bureatcracy the intelligence
community welcomes direcLon and leader-
ship from the White House.
In other words, the intelligence com-
munity 'nes available, acquiescent and
unaccountable.
And what did this facade of "national
security" really cover up?
These were the sordid activities it jus-
tified:
In a roassiVe operation. mail sent to a
Democratic Party was opened and Photo-
grarhed bs the U.S. Army.
Military agents spied on a group of Mc-
Geetern supporters in Berlin.
Internal Security Division of the Jus-
tice Department on a daily basis, pro-
vided the Committee to Re-Elect the
President information on individuals of a
political and nonpolitical nature.
An FBI agent was used by the White
House to spy on Newsday which was do-
ing an article on one of the President's
friends.
The FBI conducted an investigation on
Daniel Schorr, an investigation designed
by the White House to embarrass and
harass.
The CIA provided support materials to
E. Howard Hunt for the purposes of an
Illegal entry and burglary into offices of
Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.
This litany could run for pages, but the
message is clear and convincing: Unless
Congress exercises its oversight responsi-
bility over the intelligence community,
our constitutional democracy is vulner-
able to continued subversion.
Congress must act now to reaffrm the
ageountability of the American intelli-
gence community.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
excerpt from the final Watergate report.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ERCERPITO FROM FINAL WATERGATE REPOR r
(By Senator LOWELL Wercereo
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The attitudes and policies that led to
Watergate had a profound impact on the
Intelligence community, from the FBI and
the CIA to the lesser Intelligence sections of
other agencies.
Soon after the new administration took
office in 1908, there seems to have been a
basic dissatisfaction within the White
Reuse as to our existing intelligence capa-
bilities. They were variously considered 'too
timid, too bound by tradition, and generally
incapable of acting effectively with respect
to what the White House perceived as neces-
sary Intelligence.
One of the responses by the White House
was to set up a plan, an intelligence plan,
so that the objectives, methods, and results
of the intelligence community would coin-
cide with the White House. This plan was
drafted by Tom Charles Huston in early
1910,F, and came to be known as the 1970
Domestic Intelligence Plan, or the Huston
Plan.
Much of the-plan, which has been described
previously.," was illegal, either in its objec-
tives or in the methods it proposed.
Nevertheless, there are numerous indica-
tions, in evidence received by this Commit-
tee, that the types of activities recommended
in the plan were carried out in the following
yearia. The net effect was to subvert OT
distort the legitimate intelligence functions
of the government.
The plan recommended an expanded use
or electronic surveillance, However, the ex-
panded wiretapping that took place in
succeeding years was done outside legitimate
chtinnele, such as the 17 so-called Kissinger
taps,100 the tap on Joseph Kraft,F? the
r Accord! ig to Mr. Haldeman, "the Presi-
dent set up an interagency committee con-
sisting of the Directors of the PHI, the CIA.
the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Na-
tinsel Security Agency," and "Mr. Huston.
the White House staff man for this project.
waa notified by a memorandum from me of
the anproval of the Prevident." Testimony of
HR. Haldeman, Vol. 7, 2875.
Ft See. notes 183-186.
IF Testimony of Hobert Mardian, Vol a.
pp. 2392-2393 John Ehrlichman. Vol. 4. p
2529: and John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 920.
F. Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 919
In June, 1969, Ehrlichman directed Caulfield
in lieu of the FBI to place a national security
tap on Kraft's home phone. Caulfield con-
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
proved
September 19, 1911T ETTRABSSIMVillifiNCOMAGRIDOIN-liagB7A000100060003-1 S 17015
Watergate wiretaps, and even the wiretap wanted, not for the purposes Congress de- long as the IRS has the power to be a po-
on the President's brother.= clded by statute. tentia1 harassment for the average citizen
The second element of the plan called As an illustration, Mr. McCord testified if audits are not conducted on an objective
for surreptitious entries. Burglaries in fact that he eventually received information for basis this procedure of developing files on
took place. at the office of Dr. Ellsberg's use by CRP from the Io_ternal Security Divi- dissenting citizens must be questioned. The
psychiatrist= at the Democratic National sion of the Justice Department. on a daily more important point is that IRS duties
Committee, at the office of publisher Hank basis.= It included 1r-formatio7l from the and responsibilities are spelled out by the
Greenspun, according to multiple evi- FBI, pertained to indi,,iduals, and was of a Congress, and such an operation is not one
dence;= and were suggested or planned for political as well as non-political nature.= of them.
the offices , of the Potomac Associates,= This arrangement was made pursuant to a The IRS and the Justice Department were
The Brookings Institute, = and Senator request sent to Mr. M tchell from Mr. Mc- not the only agencies pressured into assist-
McGovern's campaign headquarters.= Cord, which led to a call from ASAStarit ing White House intelligence demands. A
Mail sent to an affiliate of the Democratic Attorney General Martian In which he re- Secret Service agent spied on Senator Mc-
party was opened and photographed by the layed the Attorney Mineral's approval and Govern, 228 when supposedly protecting him
during the campaign. When the White House
United States Army, in a well-documente told McCord to work -through the Internal
and apparently massive operation,= and Security Division.= was informed of this, no objection was made.
military agents spied on the Concerned The Internal Securitto Division of the Jus- An FBI agent was used by a White House
Americana in Berlin, a group of McGovern tice Department also provided political legal staff member to spy on a Long Island news-
supporters who were officially recognized by assistance to the White House. For es:ample, paper doing an article on one of the Presi-
: the Democratic party.= It prcivided informatImi regarding demon-
dent's friends.= The Commerce Department
The specific actions proposed by Huston strators, and information that woui.d em- was called on to provide commercial inter-
are only one aspect of the plan. Equally harass individuals in tonnection with their mation in a project that It was hoped would
f misuse of intelli
ti
tillusraon o
important are 'the policy recommendations. relationship with demonstrators and d embarrass Senator Muskie.= The Depart-
emon- ment of Defense was used to find out infor-
mation heart of this new policy was better stration leaders.=
:- as to Senator McGovern's war rec-
coordination and use of existing Intelligence Another ords, at a time when there were public
from all areas of the government.= The gence was the request made to the MS, on charges that he may have acted with coward-
July 1, 1969, by Mr. Huston, to set up a
means of carrying it out was to be a new ice.
intelligence "Committee" sitting above all means of "reviewing the operations of Ideo- There was testimony to the effect that
tions
ilogical Organza." '16 Soon the IRS had
the .agencies. Again, the plan was carried -
out. ? set up an "Activists Organizations Commit- there was nothing short of a basic policy to
use any governmental agencies to seek poli-
tee," = collecting intelligence to "find out
On September 17, 1970, an Intelligence tically embarrassing information on individ-
uals about the funds of these or ganiza-
Evaluation Committee was set up in the who were thought to be enemies of the
internal memo pointed t
i
" A
tions.n ne out that
White House.= It was to receive informs- White House. The so-called "enemies list"
Its activities l
tion from the CIA, the FBI, the National " should e disclosed generallywas maintained in the White House for this
erson
se th p who need to know,
t
only o o: , se
Security Agency, and other intelligence sec- on purpose, and a memo was prepared to imple-
because of its semi-secretive nature." "We do
tons. Notwithstanding the fact that the ment a means of attacking these enemies.=
want the news media to be alerted to wa
statutes prohibit the CIA from participating no Apparently it was not enough to maneuver
ng to do or how we t we are attempti
ha .
in any domestic intelligence function, it was w the intelligence community and related
called upon to evaluate domestic intelli-
are operating because the disclosure of such
information might en.barrass the Adminis- agency functions. Plans were made to take
gence-gathering by the other agencies when
what is clearly a function of government out-
the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was tration." "The type of organization in which
side the government, to set up an independ-
set up. This intelligence was to be digested by we are interested may be ideological . . .
or other." "In effect, what we will attempt to or
intelligence operation.
the CIA experts and then disseminated for
do is to gather intelligence data on the orga- The first plan was put forth by Mr. Caul-
use wherever useful, regardless of the stat- do
in which we are interested and to field, in proposals to Messrs. Dean, Mitchell
utory limits placed on the agency that and Ehrlichman. He suggested a private
use a Strike Force coo,cept." 2" This was not
collected the information.= it security entity that would be available for
What was important about setting up that tax collection; it wa the IRS being con- White House special projects, thereby in-
verted into an intelligence agency; and it was sulating the White House from its deeds. It
"Committee was not the work it actually did, stopped in the midst of this Committee's was called Operation Sandwedge.=
but rather the legitimization of a concept.
That concept was that intelligence functions hearings in mid-1973. Mr. Caulfield rejected the Sandwedge plan,
The next step was when the MS began and it was apparently replaced with an op-
of the various agencies were there for what-
ever purpose the Executive decided it gathering intelligence from other pans of the eration that came to be known as the
government, with no attempt made to re- "Plumbers." In the meantime, Caulfield be-
tacted Jack Regan, former FBI agent, who strict this to tax-related Information. Ar- gan conducting intelligence functions from
ultimately installed the tap. Executive Ses-
rangements were made with the military, the a position on the White House counsel's staff,
Internal Security Division of the Justice De-
sion of John Caulfield, March 23, 1974.
partment, and the Secret Service to tiirn over cies, if anywhere.
functions that properly belong in the agen-
"1 Presidential Press Conference, Novem-
information on individuals or groups.= So
her 17, 1973.
- 282 Testimony of Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, p.= White House memo from Steve Karaleltas
2" McCord received information, including to Charles Colson, August 16, 1972, referring
3663. FBI data, from the Internal Security Division
to the activities of Agent Bolton. See also,
= Testimony of Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, p. of the Justice Department, upon his request
3687. See Transcriptsof Presidential Conver- to Attorney General Vfitchell. Mitchell told testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, pp. 923, 1071.
sations, Sept. 16, 1972. Mardian to direct McCord to I.S.D. where quested a New York City FBI agent to go out
John Caulfield testified that he re-
= White House memo, July -6, 1971, from McCord's contact was John Martin, Chief of
to the Newsday offices. This was done, and
John Caulfield to John Dean, stating in part, the Evaluation Section. Testimony of James included a report of the newspaper's con-
""a penetration is deemed :possible if McCord, Vol. 1, p. 178.
required." 0" Id., at 181. fidential publication schedule. Executive
Session of John Caulfield, March 23, 1974.
206 Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 920; 2 Id., at 178.
.
222 Memo to Charles Colson from Thomas
Executive Session of John Caulfield, March 015 Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, pp. 916- Thawley, Deputy Asst. Secretary of Com-
23, 1974. - 919. merce, April 16, 1971.
= Testimony of Howard Hunt, Vol. 9, p. 2" Memo from Tom Huston to Roger Barth, 223 'White House memo from John Dean,
3686. Asst. Commissooner cf IRS, August 14, 1970. August 16, 1971, entitled "Dealing With Our
= See, 'testimony of Senator Lowell P.
Weicker, hearings On Warrantless Wiretap- 211 See testimony -of Senator Lowell P. Political Enemies." Vol.. 4, Ex. 48, p. 1680. ping and Electronic Surveillance, relating to Weicker, hearings on Warrantless Wiretap- 228 Drafted in late summer 1971, Operation intelligence activities of the United States ping and Electronic Surveillance, April 8, Sandwedge called for an offensive intelli-
1974 (Exhibit 1, memo by D. 0. VIrdin of the gence-gathering operation for infiltration of
military directed against "The Concerned IRS; report of meetint; to set up an "Activists campaign organizations and headquarters
Americans in Berlin," an affiliate of the Organizations Commitee"). with "undercover personnel, surveillance of
American Democratic party. (Exhibit 8) 218 Id. Democratic conventions and meetings, de-
MI Id. 2" For example, on, Oecember 4, 1969, D. W. rogatory information-seeking investigations,
= This was the final section of the 1970 ?
Domestic Intelligence Plan, entitled "Mess-
Bacon, Asst. Comm', stoner, IRS, contacted and "black bag" activities. Though dropped
ures t6 Improve Domestic Intelligence Oper-
Colonel Heston C. Cole, Counterintelligence from activt consideration by late 1971, Op-
Division, Directorate Office of Special Investi- eration Sandwedge can be seen as a pre-
ations." Vol. 3, Ex. 35, p. 1323. See testi- gations, and on Jan nary 26, 1970 the IRS cursor of the Gemstone Plan which achieved
? mony of John Dean, Vol. 4, p. 1467. contacted Director Rowely of the Secret Serv- the capabilities championed by Caulfield.
2" The memo to the Attorney General de- ice, in both cases to oordinate intelligence- See, Caulfield Executive Session, March 23,
scribing the setting up of the IEC was quoted gathering operations through the Activists 1974; See also, Campaign Practices Section
in full in the text of the hearings. Vol. 3, Organizations Comm ttee. See, testimony of of Select Committee Report, exhibit of mem-
p. 1063. Senator Lowell P. Weicker, hearings on War- orandum of Caulfield to Dean entitled "Op-
= Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, pp. 916- rantless Wiretapping and Electronic Surveil- eration Sandwedge." See also, Vol. 2, p. 786;
' 919, 1057-1974, and Vol. 4, p. 1457. lance, April 8, 1974. Vol. 3, pp. 924-6; Vol. 6, p. 2537,
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17016 Approved For Wilt% AtANItIRAL elt/a5f139-:-P- CAF
Caulfleld was instructed, for example, to
develop political intelligence on Senator Ken -
nedy, including Instructions from the Assist-
ant Attorney General to obtain certain
Information about the travels of Mary Jo
Kopechneee When he took the job, he tole
Ehrlichman that he eould hire an ex
-
New York City policeman to do investigative
work .211
Mr. Ulasewlez was than used to collect
information on various enemies, political
ideological, and personal A sample of he:
activities reveals not only why intelligence
should not be outaide the checks of a pro-
fessional organization, but also the rather
broad scope of what the White House was in
fact doing. His investigations included .sucFi
things as Richard Nixon's old apartment to
New York, a Kennedy omelet trip to Hawaii,
name checks on White House visitors, the
President's brother, political contributors to
a dozen Senators who opposed the admio-
filtration, Jefferson Hospital in Philadelphia,
Louis Rare% Polls the Businessmen's Educa-
tion. Fund, the House of Mercy home for
unwed mothers, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, a comedian named Dixon. Mrs. Rose
Kennedy's secretary, and Birmingham, Ala-
bama City Council, Mayor, and Executive
Staff.= And that is just a sample or the
much larger number of his investigations.
Many of them are clearly the responsibility
of established agencies, if they are anybody's
responsibility at all.
Eventually, a semi-official unit, the Plumb-
ers, was established within the White ficorse,
with a combination of police and intelligence
duties. It conducted what Mr. Mitchell re-
ferred to in his testimony ise the 'White
House horroreees According to Mtteeell,
these operations were so wrong that tf the
President had heard about them he would
have "lowered the Boom", even though there
Is other evidence that the President did know
about them and didn't lower any boom.'*
The legitimate intelligence agencies were
used to support this operation, specifically
by providing materials for their operatiene.
General Cushman of the CIA testined that
after a personal request From Mr. Ehrlich-
man, CIA technical services people provided
Mr. Hunt with a drivers license, social secu-
rity card, wig, and speech altering device,
=? In the summer of 1989, when Dean W1LS
working at the Justice Department, "then
Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst called
(Dean) into his office and told (him; that
the White House wanted 901119 very importeni
information . regarding the foreign travels
of Mary Jo Kopechne." Dean was directed to
obtain the information from Mr, De Loarh,
Deputy Director of the FBI, and give It to
John Caulfield from the White House. Vol 3,
p. 922.
Ehrlichman appointed Caulfield to the
White House staff on April 8 1909 as a ne-
e= with various law enforcement agencies
with the understanding that the services
of, Mr. lelsaewicz, a retiring New York detec-
tive, would be obtained. Commencing July.
1989, Clime/ice reported on his investigatory
activities to the White House through Caul-
field, on the orders of Mr. Learlichmen and
Mr. Dean. Vol. 1, p. 251.
=See, Committee interviews with Me
illasewicz. Mr. Dean, Mr. Caulfield. Anne
leawson, Tony LaRocco.
re Mr. Mitchell described the Pltunbers'
activities which he learned of from Mr Mar-
dian and Mr. LaRue, as the "White Hoe se
horror stories." Vol. 4, pp, 1824-25.
no On March 22, 1973, the day after Mr.
Dean told the President of the Watergate-
related White House horrors and other facts,
the President. according to Mitchell. dis-
cussed the possibility of using Dean as a
liaison with the Ervin C,ommittee, rather
than lowering any boom. Vol. 5, p. 1894.
which were delivered to a 'safe house" off
C/A premises per Hunt's lastructiensee
Around August, lOt I, Hunt began to make
additional demands on the CIA: first for a
stenographer to be brought in from Paris
which Cushman ant Director Helms con-
sidered merely a race-saving move and
rejected Later demands were made for a tape
recorder in a typewriter case, a camera in a
tobacco pouch, for fien development, and for
an additional alias and false papers for an-
other man teprobs,bly Liddy"), which re-
quests came to Customs-el aetentlon after
they had been granted by the technical serv-
ices people.=
Atter Hunt's additional demands and a
subsequent request for a New York address
and phone .cervices, Cishmen and Helms de-
cided Hunt's requests had exceeded his orig-
inal authority. On August 31, l973, Hunt
made a final request, for a credit card, which
was denied.=
Mr. Young of the Plumbers unit seked
the CIA to do a psychological profile of Dr.
Ellsberg. It was clearly a domestic project,
the only one of its type ever requested, ac-
cording to Oen. Custuntan of the CIA, who
also testified that such proftles are reserved
for foreign leaders, Nevertheless. it wee done,
but Mr. Young considered It unsatisfactory,
so another profile wan prepared and sen t.=
Other projects spanned a broad range, such
aa spiriting Dita Beard from the East Coast
to a Denver hospital, and is *subsequent trip
to Denver by Hunt La disguise to question
her about the 17T effete= To bring the full
;nnuence of the White House to bear on
this extraordinary activity, Mr. Ehrlictunan
testified that he personally introduced
efeseers. F.rough and Young, who headed Up
the Plumbers to the Leeda of various agen-
...les, such as the Becretary of Defense, the
ttorney General, anti the Director of the
eIA.=
Members of the Pitunbers eventually went
on to similar work for the Committee to Re-
elect, Although they were clearly outside the
government, they again used the legitimate
egericies. Ex-CIA employeee were recruited
ire the bests of their loyalty to the CIA. Na-
tional security responstbilities were misused.
Mr. Barker was even told that the interests
of national security he was serving were
hiaove the FBI and the CIA. = To reinforce
this position, classified and critical informa-
tion about the minese of Haiphong harbor
tia.s relayed to Barker the day before the
President's annotumementee This was not
only a misuse of secret Defense Department
Intelligence but It also furthered a misuse
Cf national security ertrustment in the ex-
ecutive branch
se Vol. 8, pp. 3292-93,
le Id.
e Ids at p.3311.
Shortly sattr l;he ITT memo was pub-
lehed in February, 1972, Mr. Liddy trans-
ported feta Beard from Washington to a hos-
pital In Denver. In his interview there, Mr.
Hunt elicited from Dits, Beard a public
statement that the memo was a fraud. Testi-
-nom- of Robert Mardian, Vol. 8, p. 2359;
leivcrand Hunt, Vol. 9, pp. 3752-53.
= Mr Ebrlichman teatines further that
Me. Kregh and Mr. Young "described the
f ruction of the epeeist ersit" (the Plumbers)
to the heads of the various agencies. Vol 7,
p.28111.
Tmaltncny of Bar lard Barker, Vol. 1,
r) 380.
e' Mr. Hunt testified that he was "In very
enteral terms aware of" else President's
speech announcing the 30mb:rig of Halpheng
harbor prior to the speech Hunt requested
that Mr. Barker "attempt to have as many
telegrams as possible sent to the White
House . . manifesting approval of the Pres-
icent's seer." Testimony of Howard Hunt,
vol. 9, pp. 3745-48.
*W1000600.03 1
zep7ember 19, 197:4
In a different type of situation, Mr. Heide-
Men was appointed "the Lord High Execo-
Boner of leaks". Thiseechnique of attacking
and solving the leaks problem Illustrates the
, clontempt for normal government functions.
F resulted in Mr. Caulfield, by his own testi-
ebony, being directed by Ehrlichnaan to wire-
tep a newstaanei telephone (Joseph Kraft)
Iii pursuit of a leakee outside the safeguards
or government wiretap procedures and regu-
lations. There are capabilities within the
legitimate operations of our government for
handling such a problem. The attitude that
thence problems had to be treated independ-
aptly was the same attitude that led to the
Kissinger tape being Installed outside
normal FBI channels and Mardian's instruc-
tions from the President regarding the dis-
position of those wiretap logs "that related
to newsmen and White House staff suspected
of leaking"," and that led to unusual aed
perhaps illegal White House involvement in
the Ellsberg case itself.
There is a reason for demanding that gov-
ernment oMciale use only the tested and ac-
countable facilities of government. It has
been Illustrated by the kind of projects ue-
dertaken independently by the White House.
The final contempt for the intelligence
community can be seen in efforts to exploit
them In the coverup. Mr. Ehrlichman said
that he and Mr. Haldeman had spoken to
General Walters and Mr. Helms of the CIA
shortly after the Watergate break-inee
Ehrlichinan further said that Walters was a
friend of the White House and was there to
give the White House influence over the
CIA.'" Dean testified that Ehrilchman asked
tem to explore the possible use of the CIA
with regard to assisting the Watergate
bnrglaraid
On June 23, 1973, Mr. Haldeman and Mr.
Etrlichmen met with Director Helms and
General Cushman of the CIA. According to
Director Helms, Haldeman said something to
the effect that it had been decided that Gen-
emit Walters was to go talk to FBI Director
Gray and Inform him that "these investera.-
eons of the FBI might run into CIA opera-
tions in Mexico" and that it might be best
if they were tapered off-or something like
teat= According to General Walters, Heide-
men directed Helms to inhibit the FBI in-
vaistigation or. grounds that it would uncover
C/A assets in Mexico. Haldeman also indi-
cated he had information the CIA did not
have, and that five suspects were suMciente"
When Director Helms and Director Gray of
the FBI scheduled a meeting between them-
selves on June 28, 1972, Mr. Ehrlichman in-
tervened and canceled the meeting, thus pre-
vatting any independent contacts.
At a later time, Mr. Dean discussed with
General Waiters the possibility of neing cov-
ert CIA funds to pay the Watergate defend-
re See note 21, supra.
se The President instructed Mr. Mardian
in the fall of 1971 to transfer the logs from
Mr. Sullivan, Assistant Director of the FBI.
to Mr. Ehrlichman, who kept them in his safe
for over a year. Testimony of John Dean
Vol 3. pp. 920-21.
? Ehrlichmen and Haldeman were in-
structed to insure that covert CIA activizi
were not exposed by the Watergate investi-
gation being conducted by the FBI. Vol. 6
P.21 0557i
* June 26, 1972, Mr. Dean on Mr.
Mitchell's suggestion, sought through Mr.
Ehrlichman to contact the CIA as to the
Watergate break-in, Vol. 3, p. 948.
z" Mr. Dean indicated to Gen. Walters that
witnesses were wobbling and could cause
problems, and asked if the CIA could raise
bail for some of these defendants. Testimony
of John Dean, Vol. 3, le 1037; Vol. 4, p. 1461.
=Testimony of Richard Helms, Vol. 8,
P.?238.
Mernot?andum of General Walters, Vol. 7,
Ex. 101, pp, 2e48-49?
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
September 19, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE S 17017
ants.24s In February 1973, the CIA was asked
by the White House to take custody of Justice
Department files on Watergate, but the re-
quest was denied.'
Mr. McCord testified that at the time of
the Watergate trial, pressure was brought on
himself and other defendants to claim for
purposes of a defense that Watergate was a
CIA operation.=
The FBI was likewise abused in numerous
ways. Some of these, such as turning over
Hunt's files to Mr. Gray, have been well doc-
umented. But there were other examples.
The FBI set up the so-called Kissinger wire-
taps outside channels, effectively insulating
them from routine discovery and account-
ability, and at the President's instructions,
Mr. William Sullivan (who had supervised
the wiretaps) turned over all evidence of
them to the White House when it was re-
portedly related to the President that Hoover
might use them to preserve his job.248 The
FBI ran an investigation of CBS newsman
Daniel Schorr, in what was a White House
tactic to embarrass him, according to one
witness.=
Mr. Ehrlichman testified that he was in-
structed after the Watergate break-in to see
to it that the FBI investigation did not un-
cover the Ellsberg break-in or get into the
Pentagon Papers episode.=
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the dis-
tinguished Senator from Michigan now
be recognized under the order previously
entered, without prejudice to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH) .
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore (Mr. METCALF). Without objection,
it is so ordered.
Mr.- HART. Mr. President, I am de-
lighted to have the opportunity today
to join the Senator from Connecticut
(Mr. WEICKER ) , the Senator from Idaho
(Mr. CHURCH) , and the Senator from
Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) in introducing
proposed legislation for a joint committee
"'Testimony of John Dean, Vol. 3, p. 1937.
"'On February 9, 1973, Mr. Dean called the
new Director of the CIA, Mr. Schlesinger, and
suggested that the Justice Department
be required to return to the CIA a package
of all the materials turned over to Justice
regarding Hunt and the break-in at Dr.
Fielding's office. Mr. Schlesinger and General
Walters decided this was "out of the ques-
tion". Testimony of General Walters, Vol. 9,
pp. 3417-19.
247 Testimony of James McCord, Vol. 1, pp.
193-98.
'4' In July, 1972, Mr. Sullivan, Associate
Director of the FBI, informed Mr. Mardian
of the existence of "some very sensitive na-
tional security surveillance logs that were
not . . . in-channel", that 'Mr. Hoover might
use to preserve his job. Mr. Mardian then
flew by courier plane to see the President in
San Clemente, who directed him to obtain
the reports from Mr. Sullivan and deliver
them to Mr. Ehrlichman. Testimony of
Robert Mardian, Vol. 6, pp. 2:392-93.
---`249Mr. Haldeman requested Mr. Rigby to
direct the FBI to investigate Daniel Schorr.
But "to the dismay of the White House, Mr.
Hoover proceeded with a full field wide-open
Investigation" which became apparent and
"put the White House in a rather scrambling
position to explain what had happened."
Ultimately the White House attempted to ex-
plain that Mr. Schorr was being considered
for a Presidential appointment in the en-
vironmental field. Testimony of John Dean,
Vol. 3, 1071.
= Testimony of John Ehrlichman, Vol. 6,
p. 2544.
to oversee and evaluate the intelligence
gathering, surveiLance, and covert polit-
ical action un.d.ertaken by our national
intelligence establishment.
Such an idea a not new. It has been
proposed and sidetracked in the past.
But as the distinguished Senator from
North Carolina Mr. Easing) often re-
minds us, the Bible speaks cf a time
and a season for everything. Now is the
time, the season, I or such a committee.
Hopefully, one legacy of Watergate and
of revealed efforts to subvert elected gov-
ernments abroad will be this overdue
step to reassert oemocratic control over
foreign policy and to preserve a free en-
vironment here in America.
To create such a committee does not
require criticism of past efforts by ex-
isting oversight subcommittees in each
House of Congress to monitor particular
portions of the intelligence corrununity.
We can recognize the sharp increase in
public concern over the threat of im-
proper surveillance and other clandes-
tine activity by Government agencies.
We can recognise as the Senator from
Connecticut has just emphasized, that
Congress needs the benefit of compre-
hensive scrutiny of all Government in-
telligence, surveillance and covert politi-
cal operations if it is to catry out its
constitutional responsibilities and to re-
assure the publis.
And finally, wr can recognize that such
systematic eval nation and monitoring
can best be done by a joint committee
with the broadest charter, the resources
and the status omparable to the Joint
Atomic Energy iommittee.
Mr. President we have had consider-
able discussion in the past year of such
problems as the alleged national secu-
rity wiretaps on newsmen and others,
the so-called plumbers' operations, the
FBI "Co-Intel-Pro" effort to ' dis-
rupt and disci edit dissident political
groups, and Amy surveillance of Ameri-
can citizens. These and many other is-
sues which would be addressed by the
joint committee proposed here today will
be the subject of further comment as
the merits of this bill are debated. To-
day, let me (online my remarks to
another important area of oversight cov-
ered by this proposal: covert political
operations in foreign countries.
Last week the Center for National Se-
curity Studies held a very significant
conference on the conduct of covert po-
litical operations?as distinct from in-
telligence gathering?by our clandestine
agents in othea countries. Participants
included former CIA officials, CIA Di-
rector William Colby, others who have
held responsible positions In the na-
tional security machinery of our Govern-
ment, and in formed journalists and
scholars. One point which emerged from
the conference sessions was that sev-
eral strawman arguments might easily
divert attention from the real issues in
regard to covert operations. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind what the issues are
and what they are not.
Those who defend the present opera-
tions of the (IA and its oversight by
Congress suggest that critics naively fail
to appreciate nur need for accurate in-
telligence. That is nonsense. No one, in-
eluding those of us introducing this bill,
doubts the importance of intelligence
about what is happening in the world?
or about what might happen which could
endanger American security. And, of
course, we appreciate that the balance
of nuclear deterrence particularly re-
quires accurate, strategic intelligence.
To, question the extent of our covert
political capability and activities is nei-
ther to imply that intelligence is bad nor
that we do not need a CIA. Some intelli-
gence gathering must be covert. But we
must keep in mind that much of it is
derived from careful analysis of open
sources or diplomatic reporting. Most of
the rest, especially in the crucial area
of strategic intelligence on nuclear
weapons, comes from technical means
such as satellite reconnaissance.
Moreover, evaluation of intelligence is
done by the analysts of the CIA's Direc-
torate for Intelligence?and their coun-
terparts at other agencies?and not by
the covert operators. Indeed, one of the
concerns about covert operations is that
they not only may have a distorting ef-
fect on our professed foreign policy
goals but also that they distort the pri-
orities of the intelligence community. I
think this is true particularly for the
CIA. In some instances, the past or cur-
rent, operations, or future plans, of cov-
ert operations may even affect the objec-
tivity of the intelligence analyses pro-
vided our top policymakers and to Con-
gress.
In short, the organization of the na-
tional security establishment' to obtain
and use intelligence is an important
question for our proposed committee to
examine. But it is distinct from the more-
pressing question of the impact which
covert political operations have, both in
other countries and ultimately in our
own society.
Second, if our concern is to enhance
the intelligence function and not to do
away with it, neither are we saying that
the United States should never, under
any circumstances, interfere with the in-
ternal affairs of other nations. We could
not rid ourselves of that option entirely
even if we wanted to do so.
But there is a legitimate concern
about the far-flung empire of thousands
of agents or contract employees, of large
commercial cover operations, airlines,
banking operations, and a large bureauc-
racy which together create a tremendous
momentum to use the Agency's covert
"assets" because they, are there.
While we may hear a lot about the
threat posed by Russia's nuclear arsenal,
covert political operations have long
since proved of little value against such
closed societies. Such operations are not
aimed in any significant degree at Mos-
cow or Peking today.
Rather they are aimed at so-called
third-world countries where penetration
and political corruption or clandestine
use of force may be easier but the threat
posed to national security of the United
States is also much more difficult to
perceive.
As Director Colby noted in a speech be-
fore the conference on covert operations
last week, the world and our perception
of our interests have changed substan-
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17018 Approved Forftcfmg;1R4/14/1 6,43?Bpijsgpsnit000i 000aoo03-1
,september 19, 1974
of *wen activities we engage in abroad
and the extent and frequency with which
we undertake them.
Ail of this is essential for Congress to
be able to conduct meaningful oversight
of foreign policy--oversight which does
not prove superficial or irrelevant in light
of subeequently revealed secret opera-
tions.
But for me the most important long-
range issue Is the understanding by the
American people of the impact such op-
erations can have on our own society.
What is Its impact on the Government's
general attitude toward deception, on
the Government's general attitude
toward dissident political views viewed
as a threat to stebility or on its attitude
toward using dirty tricks and other ques-
tionable means to achieve desired ends?
Mr. President, Disraeli once said of a
political opponent that his conscience
had become an accomplice rather than
a morel guide. /t is important we make
sure that our national conscience re-
mains a guide and does not become our
mere accomplice. Strengthened oversight
of all clendestine activity is an essential
element of that resolve.
Mr President. I ask unanimous con-
sent that the entire article by Morton H.
Halperin and Jeremy J. Stone on this
subject from which I quoted be included
In the Recoen at this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Sicatt r AND !COVERT iNTELLIGENCE COLLEC-
TION AND OPERATIONS
(By Morton H. Halperin and Jeremy J. Stone)
We aim in this paper to assess the effects
of secrecy on the conduct of American covert
intellioence collection and covert operations,
and the effects of those programs on Ameri-
can society and foreign policy. We begin with
a description of the structure by which the
executive branch plans and carries out covert
intellikence collection and operations and
then briefly discuss covert activities in
which the United States has engaged since
World War II. This is followed by an analysis
of the costa of such operations, with particu-
lar emphasis on the decision-making within
the executive branch, the effect on American
society, and the effects on American foreign
policy. We conclude with an analysis of the
covert operations and intelligence programs
and some specific recommendations.
I. THE STRUCTURE Or comer INTELLIGENCE
AND OPERATIONS
tially and this has affected the impor -
twice of covert operations, Let me quote
briefly from what he said:
It is advocated by SOIAIS that the United
States abandon covert action. This is it, le-
gitimate question, and in light of current
American policy, as I have Indicated, it wou. d
not have a major Impact on war current So7-
tIvItes or the current security of the United
Statsg; I believe, however, that a sovereign
nation must look ahead to changing circum-
stanocs. I can envisage laic) situations In
which the United States !nigh-, well need to
conduct cover. action in the face of some
new threat that developed in the world.
As he clarified in response to questions
at the conference, it is Mr. Colby's view
that no operations currently underway or
contemplated are vital to our security at
this time.
His main argument seems to be that we
should maintain this capabeity because
times may e.hange.
No one can deny that the luture is un-
certain, but-against that we must weigh
the known costs of maintaining this ca-
pability under current executive branch
decision procedures and congressional
oversight.
In Laos the President waged a secret
war financed and run by the CIA. The
Constitution says nothing about a secret
war?a concept which the Executive now
seems to take as its perogative. The Con-
stitution does not give the President
power to order advisers who are nomi-
nally civilians into the field to make war
in the secret name of the United States.
In Chile we admittedly spent millions
of dollars over many years, First we
tried to keep former President Allende
out of power, and then when he was
duly elected, to "destabilize" his govern-
ment. We are now told that the latter
effort, which even a high school student
could suspect would spark a coup, was
necessary to "preserve the forces of
democracy in Chile."
Indeed, former CIA officials and pres-
ent representatives of the State Depart-
ment have suggested that Allende's gov-
ernment was not to be taken seriously
because it was elected by a mere plural-
ity. Well, so are many elected officials in
the United States, including U.S. Sen-
ators.
I am afraid we may be glimpsing an at-
titude all too reminiscent of the Ameri-
can military officer in Vietnam who
blandly explained to newsmen that we
had to destroy a Vietnam village in order
to save It. Are we also prepared to sub-
vert the democratic political process In
other countries in order to "promote the
forces of democracy?" The result in Chile
at least has been to precipitate a repres-
sive abolition of constitutional govern-
ment and widespread violation of mini-
mal civil liberties.
We had best extricate ourselves from
the quicksand of such Orwelliaia double-
speak before it Is too late. The first step
Is to take a very careful look at our
covert operations.
At home the consequences have been
equally troubling: The perceived need
to deny covert operations has led official
after official in successive administra-
tions. to lie to the Congress, or, as the
Executive seems to prefer to describe it,
to deceive without actually lying. Thug,
Congress was not told about the secret
war in Laos because, as one official later
explained, the right question was not
aaked. When Mr. Helms was asked the
right question about Chile, he seems to
have lied.
Nothing is more corrosive to constItta-
goverrurient than deception of
Congress by the Executive. If that is the
once for covert operations, it is too high
a price. It becomes an absurd price when
even the Director of Central Intelligence
asserts that, cancelling all such opera-
tions would not now have .1 major lin-
pact on our security.
The existence of this covert apparatus
tempts Presidents to use it for illegiti-
mate purposes. It ts tumecessary to recite
egaln the degree of CIA involvement in
Watergate, much of It denied -until ex-
posed in Senator BAKICS extremely im-
portant report. But we must ask if we
have learned anything. Are we simply
to count on the hope that no future
President will be equally tempted?
It is virtually impossible for Congress
to exercise its responsibilities when it is
ignorant of the facts. Congress could not
long be kept in the dark about operatione,
such as the Laotian one if a majority of
both Houses were to Insist?by exercising
their power of the purse?that Congress
should be informed. Catch 22. of course
is that we cannot demand to be told in-
formation unless we know what that in-
formation is, and if we knew in the first
place, we would not need to be toici.
As Morton Halpern and Jeremy Stone
Put it in an earlier analysis of this
problem?
The Executive branch thrives on secrecy
bccause secrecy trees it frond Congreselonal,
judicial and public scrutiny. But the Con-
Krone suffers from secree:y because its power
Is based on the ability to expose, to rally
public opinion, AO Mfthltf?lit dialogue between
constituents and elected offichlls and the
pt4'6%
Tr a sense this problem is simply one
pert of the larger question of secrecy in
regard to all aspects of national security
affairs?Congress cannot obtain all the
Information It needs, or if it does obtain
it. cannot use it to make a case to the
American people, because the informa-
tion is secret.
To a great extent, the best approach to
this larger difficulty MEV be the most
dieeet: simply to wine out that the
Emperor has no clothes and that much
of the withheld material need not be
secret for any reason other than to pro-
tect the Executive from criticism or em-
barrassment.
.!_iet covert operations are inherently
secilt. If they are made public they then
become, by definition, part of our overt
foicin policy. One cannot my: "Make
them public and let us have a national
debate on whether we should engage in
thi. particular covert operation." But one
can ask: "Is this trip really necessary?
Do S4 ch large scale and frequent covert
operations make sense. When should we
be undertaking them?"
We can discuss and demand informa-
tion regarding past covert operations,
We can insist that the Congress and the
American people be made aware of, and
ureic?stand the implications of the kinds
The only Congressional authorization for
covert intelligence operations is contained
In the COngresaional Act of 1947, which cre-
ated the entire national security system as
well as the Central Intelligence Agency. The
Act listed the primary functions of the CIA
as advising the National Security Council on
intelligence matters and correlating and
evaluating Intelligence related to national
security. The fifth item listed under the
functions of the CIA, under the direction
of the National Security Council, was: "to
perform such other functions and duties re-
lated to intelligence affecting the national
security as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct."
Based upon this very general Congressional
authority, Presidents have authorized the
CIA tol engage in covert intelligence collec-
tion arid covert operations. Over the years,
a structure has grown up within the Ameri-
can government for devising such programs
and for implementing them.
At the heart of the covert operations is the
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
4ppmed For Qs:MteRTMCW2it: aft607_9.:WMPAPO100060003-1
September S 17019
CIA. Within the CIA such operations are cen-
tered in the "Plans Directorate," under the
Deputy Director of the CIA for Plans (known
as the ,DDP). Under the DDP there is an as-
sistant in charge of each region of the world
and operators dealing with particular coun-
tries or areas. These officials are drawn large-
ly from a career service of covert operators
within the CIA. This group is distinct from
the career intelligence analysts, who serve
only in Washington and only in the evalua-
tion of intelligence material. The covert op-
erators (who have a "cover" identification
Indicating that they work for the Depart-
ment of Defense, the State Department, or
some other agency or private organization)
alternate between assignments in the CIA
headquarters in Langley, Virginia, and as-
signments overseas.
American embassies have a separate section
staffed by career covert intelligence operators
from the CIA. The head of this unit, who is
one of the senior officials of the embassy
below the ambassador, is known as the CAS
(apparently standing for Chief at Station).
This unit maintains its own communica-
tions systems with Washington. In friendly
countries, its members often operate as liai-
son with the local intelligence services, but
in all cases they are available for the plan-
ning of covert intelligence collection and
operations.
The only other resources known to be in
the field to conduct covert intelligence op-
erations are the military attaches attached
to most American embassies. In addition, the
service intelligence divisions operate intelli-
gence-collection stations on land, and aboard
ships and airplanes. Many of these operations
are under the auspices of the National Secu-
rity Agency, the group charged with the col-
lecting of communications signals and their
evaluation.
The National Security Council Act pro-
vided that other activities should be con-
ducted only when the National Security
Council shall direct them from time to time.
In fact, procedures have grown up which
provide for continuing authorization to the
CIA to conduct covert operations and which
put the initiative in the hands of the CIA
to come forward with proposals. Beginning
in the late 1950s, covert intelligence collec-
tion and operations have been approved by
a committee chaired by the Special Assistant
to the President for National Security Af-
fairs. The existence of the committee and its
membership have never been publicly an-
nounced, and its name (or rather the number
by which it is designated) has changed from
time to time. It is now apparently known as
the Forty Committee, because its duties were
redefined in National Security Decision Mem-
orandum number 40.
In addition to the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs, the mem-
bers of the Forty Committee are the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs, and the Director
of Central Intelligence. .Each member is
staffed by his own department or agency.
For the Director of Central Intelligence, the
staffing is done by his Deputy Director of
Operations and staff; for the Under Secre-
tary of State, by a small group under an
Assistant Director of the Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research in the Department of
State; for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
by the Special Assistant to the Chairman for
Counter Insurgency and Special Activities
(SACSA). Until very recently, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense was staffed simply by
one of his military assistants, who relied
primarily on the evaluations from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It is possible that this func-
tion has more recently been taken over by
the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. The ?Chairman of the Forty
Committee, the President's Assistant for Na-
tional Security Affairs, has in the past been
staffed simply by a liaison officer assigned by
the CIA.
Proposals for covert intelligen.ce collection
or operations nwrnally come from the sec-
tion of the DDP charged with the relevant
geographic area, and, after informal discus-
sion among the ritaffs of the members of the
Forty Committee, they are approved by the
Committee itself. In some cases, the pro-
posals come from other members of the
committee.
Evaluation of the proposals Ls limited to
the members of this Committee and the
staffs designated for this purpose. Under nor-
mal procedures, a proposal for a covert oper-
ation in Latin America, for example, would
not be cleared. by the State Department desk
officer dealing with that Latin American
country or by the Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary, or even, in some cases, the Assistant
Secretary for Latin American Affairs. Like-
wise, it would not be cleared by the Regional
Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Office of
International Security Affairs :in the Pen-
tagon, or even lin, the Assistant Secretary or
the military officers in the Joint Staff
charged with pin ming and policy toward the
particular Latin American country. Within
the CIA itself, proposals for covert opera-
tions are normally not staffed by the Intel-
ligence Branch of the CIA charged with col-
lating and evaltriting intelligence materials
from all sources. In exceptional cases, par-
ticular people from these various organiza-
tions may be brce ,ght in to consult on a par-
ticular problem, out only at th e sufferance
of the officials formally involved.
Covert operations and intelligence-gather-
ing is conducted, then, Under a cloak of what
we will call Super Secrecy. Executive Order
10501 specifically prohibited any classifica-
tion other than the three cate3ories it set
out ("top secret." "secret," "confidential")
and others authorized by law (such as those
involving cryptology and atomic energy).
Nevertheless, covert operations carry addi-
tional classification markings, a:ad access to
them depends on an additional set of clear-
ances whose very existence is classified. Thus,
information about them is limited very se-
verely, even within the executive branch.
Mcst of this paper is devoted to an analysis
of the consequences of this Super Secrecy for
executive-branch decision-making, for the
American constitittional system, and for the
conduct of Amen, an foreign policy.
Ir. THE RANGE OP COVERT INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION AND OPERATIONS
Covert intelligence operations are of many
different kinds nod raise quite different is-
sues. The best known concern covert Intel-
ligence-gathering. At the beginning of the
cold war, the United States had planes en-
gaged in short dashes into Soviet territory.
Later, the U-2 flights overflew the territory
and a special technology was developed for
just this purpof.e. Stationed trouncl the
"Communist bloc," there are planes and ships
gathering electronic intelligenc e?informa-
tion on the plane: flying through Soviet air-
space, transcripts of the conversations of the
pilots in them, characteristics of Soviet ra-
dars, information on Soviet space and missile
firings, and so on. The Pueblo, captured .off
North Korean shores, was such a ship. More
information cornea from satellites encircling
the globe and tre nsmitting or dropping in-
formation to earth. From satellites, very good
pictures of the ground can now be developed.
Covert intelliger.ce gathering also involves
the more traditional spy, although the rela-
tive effectiveness of spying has greatly de-
creased. Spies rut. the gamut from agents
injected into a foreign territory, to foreign-
ers recruited for this purpose, to paid in-
formers in friend)/ or neutral governments,
to sympathizers of many kinds and degrees.
The Soviet colonel Oleg Penkovsky is prob-
ably the best-known example of a spy.
Beyond covert intelligence-gathering lie
the activities in support of political groups
in a foreign country. Here a line is crossed'
between efforts to get information and ef-
forts to manipulate. Political parties, labor
unions, student groups, and military officers,
etc., may be given funds, information, or
other help in an effort to win influence over
them and to advance shared aims. The first
such operation was apparently the massive
American intervention in the 1948 Italian
election. Later, the United States apparently
sought to buy votes in the French National
Assembly to secure ratification of the Euro-
pean Defense Community Treaty.
Still greater involvement occurs when in-
surgent movements get covert support. Here,
the United States takes a hand in active
struggle. Examples include Indonesia in 1948.
Tibet after 1949, Cuba under Batista, China
immediately after the Communist revolu-
tion, and Batanga. In Iran, the United States
sponsored a countercoup to restore the Shah.
Still greater support is involved when the
United States seeks to give covert aid to for-
eign military forces. Here we have assistance
to the South Vietnamese against the North,
to the secret army in Laos, and to the King
of Jordan.
At the end of this spectrum lie major co-
vert military operations. In 1949 the United
States air-dropped hundreds of agents into
Albania in an effort, much like that of the
Bay of Pigs (another example), to over-
throw the Albanian government. Tipped off
by the Soviet spy Harold Philby, the Albani-
ans had no trouble putting down the revo-
lution.
Sometimes, covert operations involve do-
mestic manipulations, and foreign opera-
tions abroad require domestic covers. Travel
organizations, student organizations, busi-
nesses, foundations, and American labor
unions may all be asked to help in providing
a base for covert CIA operations. Alternately,
they may be Infiltrated?with few, if any,
of their own higher-ups being aware of it.
Lastly, the United States government can-
not credibly deny any involvement in dra-
matic attacks or incidents abroad, a coup
in Cambodia or an Israeli attack on Leb-
anon promptly brings charges of CIA in-
volvement.
III. DISTORTIONS IN .DECISION-MAKING
The Super Secrecy system under which
decisions about covert operations are made
Increases the chances that such operations
will be chosen over more desirable alterna-
tives, reduces the effectiveness with which
they are designed and carried out, distorts
decision-making within the executive
branch, and reduces the effectiveness of in- -
telligence evaluation.
The Super Secrecy of covert operations
increases the chances that the President will
choose covert action rather than other, de-
sirable options, which might be adopted
given a free and open debate within the ex-
ecutive branch?and even more clearly if
the Congress and the public were involved.
American Presidents face multiple audi-
ences. Whatever the President does is seen
not only by the foreign group against which
he may be directing his action but also by
leaders and active groups in other countries,
by the Congress, and by the American public.
One of the major attractions of covert oper-
ations is that with them one avoids the
multiple-audience problem. If something is
conducted in secret, then one can avoid the
fight over means (as well as ends) which
erupts when other audiences perceive an
ongoing operation. For example, when Presi-
dent Nixon was asked in the summer of 1970
why the United States had been willing to
send military forces to Vietnam to prevent
the Communist take-over but was not will-
ing to send American military forces to
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17020
Approved Ftr~S,S3KINVVE:66W-PHIQRAVA00010PCOMAr 19, 1974 ,
Chile tO prevent a Marxist government from
coming into power, he replied that the
United States could not send military forces
to Chile without provoking an adverse po-
liticnI reaction in the rest of Latin America,
Though he did not make it clear at the
time. It was later revealed that the United
States government had engaged in covert
operations in Chile. These operations avoided
the political outcry which would come from
an over: step, such as the introduction of
American forces.
As compared to alternatives, the necessary
approve: for covert operations is easter to
obtain. The President himself can often
usually authorize thorn without having to
go to Congress for funds or to make a public
justification. They also seem cheap and easy
because they can usually be disavowed. If
neceseary. Indeed, the working definition of
a covert operation appears to be that it is
one which can be disavowed vino impunity.
As with many other aspects of covert opera-
tions of this kind, extreme optimism enema to
accompany the evaluation of this factor.
Thus, in the cases of both the U-2 and the
Bay of Pigs, an explicit element of the cal-
culation leading to the authorization of the
plan was the belief that it could be dis-
avowed with a cover story if it was dis-
covered
The mechanism of decision-making also
tends to bias the system toward the choos-
ing of covert options. When the United
States government Is faced with a problem,
meetings are held to discuss the range of
overt possibilities; they are weighed against
each other in an adversary procedure that
will permit critics of one proposal to be
heard while the proponents or that pro-
posal are present. Covert operations are not
&sensed at such meetings, but are consid-
ered separately at meetings from which ad-
vocates of other proposals, and critics of
covert operations, are excluded. 'ndeed, par-
ticipants in meetings considering overt op-
tions are often not aware that covert alter-
natives are being considered at other meet-
ings. Those advocating covert operations; can
bring them up through the mechanism of
the Forty Committee, and thus do not have
to compete for the time and attention of
top-level decisionmakers.
These same factors serve to reduce eel-
elency In the design and execution of covert
operations. The Soper Secrecy Increases the
probability that covert operations will be
designed and implemented poorly and with
little regard for the realities of the external
world or for appropriate principles of Ameri-
can behavior. Many problems arise precisely
because the circle of people involved in co-
vert operations is kept so very small and is
limited to people who tend to be sympathetic
to such operations,
Other aspects of covert opera:ions add to
the general difficulties of getting any opera-
tion evaluated by the people responsible for
devising it and Inter responsible for its execu-
tion. For example, the "play god" aspect of
covert work?involving as it often does inter-
vention In the internal affairs of other rua-
tions?tende to attract people who axe likely
to as insensitive to the difficulties of the
work and to its implications for American
constitutional procedures. Moreover, the cab-
alism?the close working relationship be-
tween the small number of peop.e involveci?
substantially reduces the chance that any
insider will object to somebody else's favorite
scheme. Officials Involved from other agencies
are often simply on loan from the CIA or
intimately connected with CIA operations.
As in all policy areas, the responsible of-
ficials have an interest in keeping the num-
ber of participants down and to exclude those
who are likely to be critics. In covert intelli-
gence operations, a special tool facilitates
such exclusion_ the special clearances re-
quired for such operations. A "top secret'
cleararste is not sufficient; one must get spe-
ctal clearances the existence of which are
not, even known to Oldish; who do not have
such clearances. Moreover, authority to grant
Linea is in the hands of the efficials who
manage the programs, who can use this Wel
to exclude anyone they fear :night be skepti-
cal or critical
No oneily, an oiScial observing an ongoing
policy which he esee as a Unmet to his or-
gausation's interests, Or to the national-
security intereest se he defines it, would at-
tetopt to fight his way into the proems. He
woo .1 argue that he has a special expertise
to eontrIoute or that the interests of his
oreolization are Involved. In Covert opera-
tions Super Secrecy mikes it extremely dlf-
Scull for this to occur.
Piret or all. the official usually does not
knew that the oetivItileO are under consider-
an 03 or 'ueing implemented. The existence of
the special clearances makes It difficult to
assert a right to be involved, since one is
asserting the need for a clearance whose
exist tnce one le not supposed to know and
whicie is supposedly kept to entail number
of people Thus. someone attempting to fight
his way into the evaluation of a covert opera-
tion faces not only the normal difficulties of
getting into a new policy arena but special
problems of appearing to be leopardiang
security reri 11 lremehtz.
As a result, a persor. who finally does get
cleartd for a particular operation is likely to
feel that he has been *emitted on the suf-
ferer:or of the planners. He knows he will
continue to be involved only if he accepts the
basic principles involved and presents his
criticism on the edges of the operation.
Someone who is skeptical about covert opera-
time in general, or cover: operations in a
particular area, is likely not to get the neces-
sary clearances. If he does, be rcay feel that
he must mute his views or find himself iso-
lated and, ultimately. hove ros; clearance
withdrawn.
With the circle of those "In the know"
kept so smali, those In it tend to discount
the views of other government officials who
art not aware of the details of covert opera-
tions For example, expert estimates of the
unlikelihood of a successful anti-Castro
operation in Cuba in Ike were discounted
by toe officials who knew about the Bay of
Pigs operation. These officials knew they were
the only ones receiving all the eeporta from
our covert operations in Cuba: Intelligence
enalysts in the CIA and State Department
were discounted because they had not re-
ceived some of the reports trorn covert agents
operating within Cuba.
She process by which proposals for covert
operations move up through the narrow
group of those with necessary clearance re-
duces the likelihood that the senior officiate
on the Forty Committee will examine them
critically. Proposals that come before the
Committee are unanimous because of the
clone working relationships of the staffs 'n-
eon:ed, and they tend to he rubber-stamped
by the committee. Presumably, they are also
rubber-stamped by the President when they
are brought to his attention. The lack of
vigorous dissent, so common with other pro-
meals of a controversial nature, leads to
routine approval.
The inability Of top ?Metals to maintain
control is particularly sente when an oper-
ation is very Large. For then the danger of
advent's political consequences exists if the
operation is halted after it is well on its
way In the case of the Say of Pigs. President
Kennedy was confronted with statements
froni Allen Dulles that U the operation were
to be canceled. Cuban refugees who had been
recruited would talk about it and cause
political problems because or the intense
anit-Castro feeling then rampant In the
United States.
One form of monitoring la often entirely
absent In the case of covert activities. The
press provides one critical aspect of the
monitoring system over the President and
other top officials. This does not occur with
a covert operation unless It reaches such pro-
portions that the press in the field begins
to learn of it. (Paradoxically, in such cases
the press may serve to alert other parts of
the United States government to what is
going on. This appears to have been the case
In Lewes through the IBMs, where covert
activities came to the attention of many
government officials through press reports
from Laos.)
Super Secrecy also reduces the possibility
of effeetive monitoring within the American
government. The acknowledged need for
flexibility in covert operations often makes
It easy' to justify discretionary authority for
Officiall in the field to implement an ap-
proved plan. Ambassadors who sometimes
provide effective monitoring or control often
do not know, and do not want to know, about
CIA operations In their countries. Moreover.
the CIA controls its own money, people, and
communications; channels to Washington,
often enabling it to move without normal
internal executive-branch monitoring, by-
passing skeptics who might otherwise try to
persuade the President that it was an error
and should be abandoned.
Super Secrecy of decision-making and ex-
ecution of covert operations also casts a
shadow over executive-branch decision-
making in general on national security mat-
ters. Creating a special class of those with
a "need to know" for covert operations tends
to give people a sense that on all matters
they are better informed than others.
Moreover, within the government, lying
becomes an accepted habit. In order to pro-
tect the existence .of additional clearances
and of covert operations, officials with access
to information about these things must
routinely deceive other officials. This lying
breeds cynicism and contempt for those who
are lied to, and this must influence the en-
tire pattern of decision-making.
The most obvious demonstration of how
Super Secrecy distorts executive-branch de-
cision-making is in the CIA itself. The CIA
was envisioned by President Truman, who
called for its creation, and by the Congress
that authorized it, primarily if not exclusive-
ly as an intelligence-evaluation organization.
Prior to its creation, President Truman re-
ceived intelligence reports from each of the
armed services and from the State Depart-
ment. He felt the need for a single agency
which would collate and evaluate these re-
ports and which would do so without the
bias that an operating agency bad in favor of
Its own programs. Thus, Truman wanted a
professional and Independent intelligence
capability.
Tble conception of the CIA's role differs
markedly from reality because of covert in-
telligence operations. The CIA has always
been dominated by officials whom primary
concern has been covert operations rather
than intelligence or evaluation. The only ca-
reer cadets to be named heads of the CIA?
Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, and William
Colby?rose through the %covert side of the
agency, and Helms and Colby were former
DDP's before becoming Directors. The domi-
nance of covert operations within the CIA
has diminished the quality of personnel on
the intelligence eide. The officials who work
on intelligence evaluation recognize that they
are not operating in a totally hospitable en-
vironment and are unlikely to rise to the
top.
Moreover, oecause of its involvement in
operations, the CIA is not the neutral intel-
ligence-evaluation organ that President Tru-
man and others envisioned. It has a policy
ax to grind concerning its covert operations
The Director of Central Intelligence is re-
luctant to put out intelligence reports that
contradict a view that the CIA is pressing in
the Forty Committee or In other covert in-
telligence channels, Sutter Secrecy of co-
vert operations also reduces the quality of its
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
5September 19Ap/pf---484ed For FORilifasME12105/21,:glit-6RE)19.E:is .MA1)0100060003-1 S 17021
intelligence over-all in that the? evaluator
are often uninformed of covert operation
and of matters that would enhance thei
ability to make sensible intelligence inputs
Thus, the covert operations staff domin-
ating the CIA weakens it in its primary func-
tion of providing objective intelligence evalu-
ation of ongoing problems. The Vietnam war
well.illustrates this The Penetagon Papers
reveal that intelligence analysts in the CIA
frequently produced much more sendible
estimates of the situation in Vietnam than
other parts of the intelligence community
did. What the Pentagon Papers do not indi-
cate, because they did not draw on the files
of American covert operations, is that the
DDP was as wrong on Vietnam as any other
part of the government. The CIA was heavily
involved in covert operations in Vietnam, in-
cluding the training and arming of ethnic
minorities. The CIA operators were optimistic
about the siaccess of their programs, and the
great weight of the CIA effort within the
government was to defend these programs
rather than to push the consequences of the
pessimistic intelligence evaluations.
Iv. HOW COVERT OPERATIONS DISTORT THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
S tions are not done "for the benefit of th
S existing intelligeiace agencies," nor are the
S 17022
aes ?
Approved FrAatRaSieRAntlE.C%119D-PnriPRWA00010g9p9fargr 19, 1974'
had performed other "mission impossible"
assignments including bre.aking into a safe
In Las Vegas, into Daniel Ellsbetnes psychic,
triste office in Los Angeles. The retest/mess
to covert operations was lowered; those who
otherwise might have warned of the danger
were, to that extent, silenced.
Watergate also reveals the da.nsers of per-
mittlng "hardened" operatives to work
freely in American society. Ordinarily, only
a criminal would be available to do these
break-ins. The criminal element would have
few contacts with a normal administration
and would lack the sophistication and re-
liability But, a gang of Cubaes led by a
covert master spy like Howard Hunt is an-
other matter. They can Inspire confidense
and encourage assignments from an admin-
istretion.
The use of private institutions for covert
operations tends to bring then n all under
suspicion. This is what happened when it
became known that the CIA had financed
the National Student Asisociation and about
250 front organizations and conduits Presi-
dent, Johnson appointed a panel headed ey
Under Secretary of State Nichclas Stamen-
bach to review the ground rules for such
operations. It concluded.
I. It should he the policy of the United
States Government that no Federal agency
shall provide any covert financial assestaitee
or support. direct or indirect, to any of the
nation's educational or private voluntary
organizations.
2. The Goverument should promptly ee-
velop and establish a public-private mesh-
anism to provide public funds openly for
overseas activities or organizations wIeWb are
adjudged deserving, in the natienal interest,
of public support.
The first resolution was adopted. But it
left a number of loopholes. In the fire:. place,
organizations that seemed to be -private
voluntary" might not be. They could be
quietly organized as "for profit" and lew
would know. Alternatively. philanthropists
might be enriched, perhaps through stalk-
market operations, and they would then en-
dow organizations with covert uses Mean-
while, private businesses could continue to
be funded by CIA.
The second recommendation toes not seem
to have been adopted. The 11.111tration of
private organizations forces people to defend
their "covert stories" and lose their integrity.
Friends become unsure whetter they earl
believe each other. Persons 'wonder whether
they should accept funds from this foureia-
non or that. To this day, legitimate "Stern
Foundations" are confused with the conduit
"Stern Foundation," which the CIA used in
19116. The Asia Society and the Asia /Murcia-
tion have both suffered from the decielon
of the latter to accept CIA funds. Suspicion
spreads.
V. DISTORTION/5 or AMERICAN IFOAIIIGN POLICY
did. can discover that we are committed to
malloolnine stability there, if only to protect
the bese,
because these conicnitmeide are undertak-
en :ndirectiy and swithout full debate, it Ls
cileiritlt for anyone to be sure where they
will lead Laos ri a good erample. The com-
miernent and invoivement may outrun the
conflict in Vietnam which -einformed them.
Meanwhile, the secret war :nay decimate the
pope .atio n and otherwise dramatically
ch.-nee the original conditions of conflict.
I,, km:Week-5es abroad, 41-e charge of their
pre-stele Involvement with CIA cannot be
anieverecl The Solansor, administration took
the t lew that one could tot legislate "pri-
vate inonelity" and that, ft. any case, it was
not i:nproper for bust/ICS-94i to CooperStk with
a seerernneent agency in securing Information.
But here_ as visewlaere, the securing of infor-
nue ion I, something of a "cover eoncept" for
co' tt operatior.s. While it might not be Im-
moral. e Is poor policy to permit a govern-
levee agency like the CIA to get Involved
,l, 1)m-in.:nos around the world. In the long
rut American bueiness mations will suffer
and he ;1,evitahle charges ef government in-
tee: erence wherever Anserkan business rears
,lead do our foreign polley no good.
-nht. TIT case shows how successive levels
of negeneration in function are revealed when
/117!) tricks are LOSIAllt1011SlIZed. First, the
eitei is requested to order covert operation*
or an oeresional Ijiesis. in time. the CIA IS
proposing these operations to a passive NSC.
Tleee. in turn, the busLuesies through which
the CIA operates, as In II& rn, ease, make
preposals to the CIA and try to use the
Agency for its own ends. Thus work expandS
to fill the covert possibilities available. Se-
cret debases control.
The credibility, efficience, and authority of
SI ate Department are undermined
lier toe presence of covert CIA operatives. The
Cie, has better communications, better logis-
ti is, larger and :note atellatle sources of
secret money, and greatet security of cona-
remecations. Under these circumstances, its
atirliority in the field Call hardly be matched,
it there are CIA operatives ;wound, why
should sources of informetlon talk to diplo-
mitts? The reported 0o:senses of 'she late Pres-
icieet Stiffer to Arriericau CIA repretrentatiVes
ro:ter than to Foreign feerviet, representa-
tives Is a CaSe In point. Nasser may have
thought that the reel power isey with the
CIA.
CIA operatives iinderrnild the effectiveness
o' the Foreign Service not only ay competing
with It but by irtmlicita, smeering it. The
legitimate diplomatic operations abroad Can-
nee prove that they are legitimate. While
see e smuces are attrectet, to the CIA, others
are repelled Members of diplomatic 111165/0153
ate suspected of being Ca% agents much as
American civilians might wonder if a Soviet
dipomat is really a KGB 'gent.
lhe Internal power balance In ? foreign
country can be distorted ay the alliance of
tees CIA with certain elements In it rather
than with other*. Ramon Magsaysay ba the
Plellppines may have risen let power on the
betels or help or information provided 1513711
by the CIA. Others whc do not cooperate
ltd themselves disadvantaged, relatively,
teen if no actIOn is taken against them. From
I he CIA's point of view, small services can
Is- of great arignificanese-s few weapons,
money, some Investment advice, dirt on other
members 01 the government, and so on.
Part or tne purpose of CIA political op-
erations is to gain just such. influence as
these operations make possible. But even
wrien these "benefit*" aro not: intended, CIA
sseeert operations, ran sill pervert- a foreign
government's structure. Si is hard for a CIA
eperattve to be passive. Etene sources will be
rooperating with him; others will not. Grad-
- aeely, oven without dtreet effort, the CIA---
s end the United States?ensy become aligned
1/4 with lied eteeterreeing X either than Y.
When foreign countries are aware of CS
covert operations and the American public
is not, the possibility arises ef haying ow
government blackmailed by foreign govern-
ments For example, they may insist or, for-
eign aid they might not otherwise receite Li
return for participating in our covert act lel-
ties. They may seek ransom for capture:
pllots--as Indonesia did in a case much like-
that of Gary Powers, They may hold prison-
ers until the United States admits they were
CIA agents?apparently China's approach
Mid since covert operations, unlike electrone%
intelligence, require assets in place, the semi-
tive problems of purchasing and traelntaininil
such assets can increase the risk of black'
mail.
But even when pressure is nut applied. CIA
covert operationee can lead to greater recogni-
tion it or commitment to a government. .1/4
U-2 base at Peshawar can buttress a par icei
lar regime in Pakistan. A courant that give
ur a base for invading Cubs, as Guatemee
Coveet operations seem to encourage rebel-
lions at revolutions without hope. In Laos,
teen-agers were encouraged to fight against
the North Vietnamese troops until they were
destroyed. In Tibet, guerrillas fought against
the Chinese in hopeless uprisings. In the
Bay of Pigs. nascislculations only somewhat
lees obvious were made. The dynamic of
covert activities seems to have a logic that
can produce violence which, on later reflec-
tion, id not worth it.
? VI, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The very existence, much less the mode of
operation, of the CIA's Directorate of Plans
is a legacy of the World Weer II Office of Stra-
tegic Services (OSS). In the hot war of the
OBS, any and all tricks were considered con-
sonant with the vtorld-wide struggle against
the (Ws, Many Imaginative and creative per-
sons Were drawn into its operations. After
Worldalear U. the OSS was institutionalized
in the CIA. Many of the OSS operatives left,
but some stayed, The pattern of lmaginative
involvement In covert operations remained.
The cold war was seen, as late as the early
1980$, '-is a "long twilight struggle"; CIA co-
vert operations fell neatly into that twi-
light---a gray area, whose propriety was
buried in secrecy.
Todey, with the cold war waning, the
CIA Is bidding for permanent institutalisa-
tion of its structure and role. Richard Helms
argued that America's role as a "great power"
demaricia a CIA even if the cold war does
not. Thus what began in a hot war and grew
In a cold war may come to base its right to
exist temp's, on the permanent fact of Amer-
lean IX)wer.
Meenwhile, the effectiveness of the CIA's
covert operations in the industrialized world
has vlestly diminished. In Europe. the in-
stability of the post-World War TT period is
over. We no tenger need to bribe Italian dock-
workers to unload our goods. In the Com-
munist industrialized world (and in China).
CIA cnvert operations are of little effect, even
if desirable. And electronic intelligence is
providing more than we want to know about
most !objects of mterest.
As sc result, the institutionalization of co-
vert operations is certain to lead to its influ-
ence being applied to the Third World?an
area with which we are not at war, and from
whirls we are not in danger. The governments
are penetrable. The agents have room for
maneuver. Bet there is little work that needs
to beidone.
In the 'Third World, nationalism Is a proven
force against the rapid Communist expansion
once feared. Soviet. Chinese, and American
Interference in Third World states tends only
to produce resistance to a large power's
further involvement. The problem ceases to
be one of fighting fire with fire. It becomes
one Of giving competitors enough rope to
hang themselyee. No situation better illus-
trates these principles than Egypt. Unusual
ne-ede in Egypt, and unusual Soviet willing-
news' to help, has nevertheless produced a
lastory of strained relations between the
Egyptians and the Soviets and a drain on
Scrviet resources.
Thf., time DRS corns for America to change
its strategy from covert intervention to non-
intervention. When there ia no emergency, it
shotdd be are easy choice to stand formrin-
ciplee. In the long battle for respect and sup-
port-In the Third World, principles and in-
tegrely will be the most important force. The
short-run opportunist approach embodied
in the CIA's Directorate of Plans sells the
long run shore
Furthermore, it will be increasingly diffi-
cult 70 keep covert operations secret. As each
operation is "blown," our reputation will stif-
fer; we live in an era that is increasingly im-
patient with such manipulations. Each cov-
ert Operation Is a time bomb waiting to go
off.
Covert operations diminish the flexibility
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
ISeptember 19, RI *NAN litt4EgO P-ZMINNTA0 0 0 100060003-1 S 17023
Pfforpved ForcliNfe
force for peace. Take, for example, Soviet
maneuvers in East Germany and Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968. If you had no idea what they
were doing, you thought maybe they were
going to march to the Rhine or the English
Channel, and maybe you got your contin-
gency plan for the Strategic Air Command
out of Omaha ready. If, on the other hand,
you knew what they were doing, that they
were only worried about Dubeek, and you
had already decided you could not really
protect Dubcek, you calm down. I think there
Is a lot of that in both directions. So it may
well be that a certain level of espionage is
a stabilizing rather than a destabilizing force.
Where does espionage tilt over into opera-
tions? That is very hard to say. Take, for
example, the U-2?was that an operation or
was it information-gathering? It is a bit of
both. I am not sure that you can really make
the separation that Messrs. Stone and Hal-
perin suggest.
Mr. RANSOM. I am an academic observer
of this subject. The only time I ever worked
with the government was quite a while back,
when I joined the U.S. forces to stamp out
fascism?which I see returning, I am afraid,
in a different uniform. I find the Halperin.-
Stone essay is a very original analysis, and
I think I have read everything else on the
subject in English dealing with how Super
Secrecy and Super Secret agencies can subvert
our policy-making system.
I want to say a word about definitions,
because while this may seem elementary and
pedantic, I think we have all discovered re-
cently that definitions are important. At the
highest levels of our government we have
discovered with Watergate that there are peo-
ple who don't know the difference between
war and politics.
Intelligence means evaluated information.
Espionage is one of the several techniques
for gathering information and is by defini-
tion illegal. Counterintelligence is a police
and security function. Covert or clandestine
political operations are activities having no
direct relation to intelligence or espionage
functions, although they produce some and
use some intelligence. That is all very sim-
ple, and I restate it because I feel that at
the highest levels of government these dis-
tinctions are thoroughly confused.
What did Congress intend when it set up
the Central Intelligence Agency? My read-
ing of the legislative history is that Congress
did not intend to create a clandestine or co-
vert political action organization. We need
further research into the legislative his-
tory?and scholarly research on this subject
encounters many obstacles?but I am con-
vinced from my research to date that Con-
gress did not intend to authorize anything
but a Central Intelligence Agency whose
functions were to be related to intelligence,
that is, infatmation.
If Congress did not intend covert political
action, how did it come about? I think it was
an American reaction to Stalin and corn-
munism. The covert political activities of the
last twenty-five years have been justified in
the same way that we justify activities in
time of war generally. We have been in a
gray zone between a war declared by Con-
gress and what has in fact been a wartime
condition?a cold war since 1947.
The first big covert operation was the Ital-
ian election of 1948. Our government felt
that we had to make that election come out
right. Ever since then, at least until 1967,
we have secretly intervened in a major way
in elections all over the world. I was startled
to see in The New York Times a few days
ago that we subsidized one wing of the Ital-
ian Christian Democratic party to the tune
of three million dollars a year between the
early 1950s and 1967, I had no idea that as
an American taxpayer I was contributing to
a particular wing of an Italian political
party. I think most of you here didn't know
that.
- of American foreign policy when it is most
reqUired, in a stage of disengagement. They
tend to link us to established forces and to
encourage the existing tendency of American
policy to resist the popular aspirations in un-
derdeveloped countries.
' Especially important, covert operations
pose a serious threat to democracy at home.
James Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson on
May 13, 1798: "perhaps it is a Universal truth
that the loss of liberty at home is to be
charged to provisions against danger, real
or pretended, from abroad." The effort to
suppress information about covert operations
abroad has already damaged freedom of the
press and freedom of speech in America. The
Pentagon Papers case and the Marchetti case
may be precedents for still more ominous in-
cursions on the First Amendment. Covert in-
terference abroad is interference with free-
dom at home.
? Finally, the greatest Presidential scandal
of modern times has arisen from the injec-
tion of covert CIA methods, used by CIA
graduates, into American society. No greater
signal can be given of the danger of these
, methods to the highest interests of Ameri-
cans.
We believe, therefore, that it is time for a
drastic overhauling of the Super Secrecy sys-
tem surrounding the planning and conduct
of covert intelligence collection and covert
operations. We recommend that certain op-
erations and structures be abolished and that
the secrecy surrounding others be eliminated.
The United States should continue to con-
duct operations involving the collection of
intelligence materials by technical means,
but not in any greater secrecy than other gov-
ernment activities, Implementation of this
purpose would mean the elimination of the
special classifications surrounding these pro-
grams and a public acknowledgement of their
existence.
In this category we would put the various
satellite collection programs for the gather-
ing of data by photographic and other means,
as well as ships and planes carrying elec-
tronic equipment. The government should
carefully review all such programs to deter-
Mine which ones in fact produce information
of significant importance to the United
States. An assessment should be also made of
which programs are provocative?running
high risks of penetrating the air spaces
or territorial waters of other countries. The
United states shonld make a, public state-
ment in general terms about the activities to
be continued. The budgets for such programs
should be publicly identified and be a regular
part of the budget of the Defense Depart-
Ment. Officials of the Defense Department
should be required to Justify them as they
justify all other programs. The organiza-
tions that operate and conduct them and the
responsible officials for them should be pub-
licly identified and be made ,e. matter of pub-
lic record.
There is, of course, a case for keeping some
aspects of a program secret. For example,
the technology of the most advanced cameras
in satellites might justify continued secrecy.
However, such secrecy should be within the
context of an ongoing classification system
and should be treated within the government
like other classified material. _
We do not believe that electronic intelli-
gence-collection programs, if any, which
penetrate the air spaces or territorial waters
of other countries (or min a high risk of such
penetration) should be Continued.
Our proposals regarding Covert operations
are more drastic. Vire believe that the United
States no longer needs a large establishment
Whose function is to conduct covert opera-
tions and gather intelligence covertly. Ac-
cardingly, the entire covert operations sec-
tion of the CIA should be dismantled. The
CIA should become what it was originally
meant to intelligence evaluation and
coordinating organization with no opera-
tional responsibilities. This would mean elim-
inating the entire ine,ns division of the CIA
and the career sere cc of covert operators. It
would mean also that the CIA would no
longer have clandestine agents in overseas
embassies. Their c =destine contacts with
government officiai s and opposition groups
abroad should be aken over, to the extent
necessary, by State Department officials and
military attaches.
Adoption of _this croposal would permit the
CIA to emerge fron the shadows. Its func-
tions would be dist itssed publicly. Its budget
could be publicly leentifled and it; functions
largely explained 71 a public defense of its
budget and operati; ns. The intelligence-anal-
ysis branch of tht CIA would become the
dominant career ierviee, with intelligence
analysts rising to top positions, including
that of Director.
The gains from ;these proposals would in-
clude the elimination of the cost; to execu-
tive-branch decisii in-making, American so-
ciety, and to American foreign policy dis-
cussed above. The adverse consequences
would be minimal. If the United States gov-
ernment decided to conduct a United covert
operation?for example, obtaining informa-
tion from a spy within a potentially hostile
government?it cc rld be carried out either
by the Military attaches or by State Depart-
ment officials. But ,there would no longer be a
group whose raison. d'?e was such opera-
tions, a group constantly looking for ways to
employ covert means as an instrument of
American foreign policy.
VII. DISCUSSION
Mr. LOWENFIELD. I am not quite sure why I
was asked to be a commentator here. I was
told by the organzers that, they wanted
somebody who had government experience in
foreign affairs. As I read the paper and lis-
tened to Mr. Halperin and Mr. Stone, I real-
ized what they nes-nt. I was one of those
guys who had all the appropriate clearances
and worked on some things that I thought
was critical and important, and for the most
part I did not know about all 'those other
meetings, the Super Secret meetings.
It did come across to me once. I remember
in August 1964 I was Acting Deputy Legal
Adviser of the State Department. Bill Bundy
called up and said, "I want a resolution au-
thorizing the Preznident to act in Southeast
Asia." It turned out that my boss, the Acting
Legal Adviser, was in leave?it wan the middle
of August?and. I was the one who picked up
the phone. I said, '-What happened?" He said,
"Never mind; just write a resolution."
It was fairly ea:iv to write the resolution.
As any good lawyer. I had a form book. We
had the Cuba resolution, the FOTE3.04311 resolu-
tion, the Lebanon resolution, all contained
in a nice little book called Legislation on
Foreign Affairs It MIS not too hard to dictate
a Vietnam resolution. But I said, "Tell me
what happened, oi I can put in the appro-
priate "whereas" clauses." The answer was,
"You are not authorized," and I never did
find out.
A few days later my boss came back. He
had not yet been confirmed. The:7e was some
doubt whether he could see the reports from
Tonkin Gulf. I think ultimately he did
briefly, but only looking over somebody's
shoulder. So I knew there was something
going on in Tonkin. Gulf, and also that there
was an attempt to limit access to the in-
formation. Whether the news was actually
managed, I don't :-:now.
I am sort of depressed by Mx. Halperin's
and Mr. Stone's cesay. I thought one of the
excitements of m:: job as a government offi-
cial was that I was really in on a lot of
important decisions. Since then, as a teacher
and scholar, I have tried to write about them.
Now I have to consider that maybe I was
just misinformed,
I think it may well be true that espionage
is a good thing, a stabilizing influence, a
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17024 Approved F o captlitsiAggiqUAIAL2 1c?931091=2?69Awo o o 1 00%9,99kler 19, 1974,
Since 1948. I estimate that the CIA halt secretly. Congress did glee the director of are slant range. can be intercepted by satel-
comducted hundreds of "Watergates" around intelligence the right to tell Senator Fut- Mee. You send the satellitee high up and
the globe. That Is, It has waged secret polite bright and others, 'Sorry. Senator, I cannot they awoop down low over the Soviet Union
cal warfare, has attempted to give history 5. cell you that. because Congress has given and *ether stuff. Bo satellites play a major
push here and there and make things happen me the discretion to decide whether I should role in the interception of foreign com-
es what our government considers Its favor, tell you this or that." Now that the C/A has munieation.
As the cold war intensified after Korea, co- torn disgracect--disgraced to same extent by The thing that interested me for all those
vert operations were stepped up, and came Watergate in the public eye-- -Ithink we years was how little of the surveillance tech-
to Include the secret subsidy of U.S. domes- have an opportunity to crgatiese for a new nolog$ actually diffused into our own SCOII-
tie organizations. You might say, as the cold Hoover Commission-type study. In 1945 cony, though some of it was developed right
war stepped U. covert operations came to Harry Truman, as President, told hie Budget here in this country. This was, I think, ba-
be used internally and Included, as Messrs Dtrector, and these are Irvine-Vs words, "I cause there was no force for such diffusion.
Halperin and Stone have 171de-sled, the ae- ant very much against building up an Amer- Now, there Is such a force?the fight against
cret CIA subsidy of an estimated two bun- icsa Gestapo.'"aragicelly, Watergate demon- crime. The Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
dred and twenty-five domestic organizations strated that Truman's fears were not un- ministration ILEAA1 poses a very definite
between the early 1950a and 1067. The most fcunded, threat to the right of privacy and to civil lib
-
famous., of course, was the National Students Mr. Item:veto. I think -se have to take a ertles by funding the use of this technology
Association, whose budget at one tame was rather jaundiced view of Congressional over- in domestic affairs. For example, in Wash-
supported ninety per cent by a. secret sob- sight in this area. When something comes up ington, we fought very hard and success-
ski', from the CIA, berere the Congresr., the Congreesmen often fully against a group which was going to
'these widespread domestic sebsidies were don t know what they are voting on. They receive money from LEAA. It was going to
perhaps the second greatest mistake In the go by what the committee leadership says, it have tome $150,000 worth of equipment for
history of the CIA. I would say the program gets down to a very few people The Armed an electronic surveillance van to use, they
of subsidizing domestic organeratiens wan Set-vices Committee does have an oversight said, for fighting organized crime and heavy
clearly against the law, What, then, was the role now, but the oversight is done by the drug traffic. We are going to see more and
greatest mistake? The greatest mistake was Meta A good example of the quality of the more Of this acmes the United States, funded
to allow CIA personnel and equipment to oversight is suggested by the fact that the by LEAL
be used for doubly illegal act:, at home-- just retired chief counsel of the House Armed Mr. Scowearz. I want to make two brief
illegal because burglary is !liege, and Illegal Services Committee was alao a major general point.. The first point is with regard to Con-
because Congress had very explicitly pro- In the Marine itaservee. Mose c-f the senior gressional oversight. I think few people really
hibited the use of the Central Intelligence stall on the Armed Services Committee treat feel Congressional oversight is adequate. All
Agency for Internal purposes. the junior dissident Senators with a certain too oaten it turns into the primary diction-
In 1971, the then Director of the Central disdain. They don't talk to them. They don't arty meaning of Use term. Yet we must use
Intelligence. Richard Helms, gave a rare give them ihformation. These Junior mem- the thole we have. This is, in our constitu-
public speech defending the CIA. He raised beet and some middle-reset members don't Metal governmental structure, the only real
the preblem of the compatibility of its he- have a chance. They can't get through to the instrttment we have for controlling executive
tivive with American democracy. He said ex- autopilot. Lora can't get through to the ection,
plicitly and clearly, "We do not target on staff they have to rely on outside people. SecOndly, as one who Is not involved in
American eitireas." Wee he telling the Mr. Lewis. I am skeptical of the suggestion this area at all, my sympathies are with the
truth? Because I thought he was telling the that covert operations could cocUnue safely suggestions made in the paper and discus-
truth, I found something else he said even If they were acrutinized by an effective Con- Mon. This bloated, elephantine apparatus
more shocking. "The nation must to a degree greseional committee. I don't believe that a that has grown up completely distorts the
tette It on faith we who lead the CIA are jcaet Congressional committee is ever going constitutional center of gravity. Of course,
honorable men, devoted to the nation's serv- to deal effectively with these matters. It it ought to be pruned, refined, improved, and
Ices." I don't think that any government wott-t be in on the operation early enough. maybe abolished, and yet one has a lingering
officials at any level should ask the American It won't have the expertise. Even supposing a doubt, You all remember Secretary Stlmson's
people to take it on faith that they are bon- Senator thought landing people In Cuba was famous remark when he dismantled this
orable men, because we, I hope, are a govern- a hart idea, by the time he found out about it kind of operation, at what now seems a very
meat of laws and not of men. everybody would be all cranked up on the elementary if not infantile level: "Gentle-
I recommend a thorough audit of all C/A operatima and would hay, Senutor, it is too men dent open other people's mail." he said.
activities, foreign and domestic, by a Hoover late to change. It is just not a realistic notion But valet happens if, in the world, you are
Commission-type study, independent of the thet you can control euch operations. Their not dealing with gentlemen, and all other
government, /t is an ordinary suggestion, but whole nature a that yon cannot control governments have this kind of thing?
I remind you that not Mace 1951; has such a then-a and that is the danger. NIx. 'HALPERN. I want to distinguish be-
study been made. There have been dozens of Sit. LOWENFZI-D. It may be possIble to build tween two things. Mr. Stone and I were not
studies of the CIA's problems by secret goy- ln scene notion of regular accountability. I proposing the abolition of reading other peo-
ernment committees; the government was am tkeptical too, but it may tae worth the plea mail. That Is precisely one of the things
investigating itself. In 055. the Hoover effort, we are proposing to continue. It is very hard
Commission teak force on Intelligence activ- One footnote to what Professor Ransom to make estimates: but I don't know any-
ales, a very Establishment-oriented group, said about the historical record. I sin more body Who has been in the government who
called public attention to the dangers that anti more skeptical of the historical record. would challenge the notion that something
we now see have become real. We need an- I ant skeptical of the notion that in 1047 Con- over ninety per cent, I would say ninety-
other such study, I believe such a study limos did not intend the Central Intelligence eight per cent, of the useful information the
should go forward separate and apart from Agency to do anything but evaluate. / realize United States government has comes either
the CIA involvement In the Watergate scan- that is what the statute says and that is what from overt sources: newspapers, public
dal. Watergate is going to be thoroughly in- the formal record says, but that's just the radio broadcasts, or thing of that kind?or
vestigatcd, but there is a much, much larger Pain', from tecbnical and Intelligence-gathering:
question: the policy, organization and con- Mr. Iaoasse Are you sup:eating there were satellites, reading other people's mail, the
trots of the intelligence system. seperate meetings in the Congress, with a kinds Of things the National Security Agency
I predict such a study will recommend mord that might not have been made pub- sup/a/madly does.
what Messrs. Stone and Halperin have lee-lid We are not proposing to abolish that range
on:intended: that the CIA become again an
Mr, LOWENFELD. Sure, of activity. What we are proposing IS to move
intelligence agency, as Congress intended, Mr. CALLttv I WISh its comment on Intel- it out vf its Super Secrecy. For example, it is
and that covert operations be abolished. If Egrnce-gatherteg, as dtst-net from covert now clear to anybody who reads anything
we need a reserve force for covert operations, operations. I worked at the National Security that the United States has a very large satel-
then we will create and use it. I don't rule Agency for eight years, somettraes helping lite program. It is still the case that any-
out all overseas use of covert operations. But mere; other things to develop analytical in- body with a security clearance is violating
such covert activity Is an act of war, so let's terception and surveillarsce appanatus, I the law if he says so publicly: The budget
call it war and get the CIA out of it. agree with Prefesscir Loweefeld that a great for sp$ satellites and the offices that runs
I predict that such a study will also call. dell of what goes on, in NBA at least, is 'Fere them are burled. If you go as a Congressman
as the Hoover Commission did it. 1956. for a 131111ch in the alternate of peace, hecauae you or a citizen and say, "Who runs the satellite
Joint Congressional committee on intent- don t really trust what any other government program which we read about In the news-
genre activities. I realize that this is a close say's You really have much more confidence papers all the time?" you can't find out. If
question. The Congressional Jcint Atomic in what you Intercept, in what they are say- you sae, "How much does it cost?" you can't
Energy Committee has not worked the way lug among thenteelves. find out.
we wanted it to work. But Congress needs a Much of whet used to be done by people There is absolutely no reason in the world
sustained surveillance group for the inte111- Is now done by satellites. You can ring the for either of those two facts to be secret, and
genre community, Congress gave far too Soviet Union with interruption apparatus, no reseon in the world for Congrees not to
much away in 1947 and 1949. Congress did but that only gets at long-range communi- be able to get Into that program in executive
give the CIA the right to spend funds amity-is. Microwave communications, which session on a classified basis, the way it gets
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
iff,r4oved Fotleiftan
September 19,
into the Minuteman missile program or any
other military program.
Mr. HART. Again I want to acknowl-
edge the work of Senator WEICKER and c
Senator BAKER in this area.
Mr. CHURCH subsequently said: Mr.
President, earlier this morning I under-
stand that a colloquy took place here in
the Senate Chamber with respect to the
policy pursued by the CIA in Chile, which
has now been revealed by Mr. Colby, the
CIA Director, and confirmed by the
President.
In connection with that colloquy, I
further understand that a bill is to be
Introduced which would establish a joint
committee of Congress with jurisdiction
over the CIA, mandated to exercise sur-
veillance over its operations.
I believe such a bill to be necessary,
and I intend to join as a cosponsor of
the measure.
It was not possible for me to be on the
floor at the time that the colloquy took
place, but I do have some newspaper
columns which relate to the Chilean af-
fair that I think could appropriately be
made a part of the record in-reference
to the colloquy.
Mr. President, I submit for your ap-
proval and ask unanimous consent that
the following articles be printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks:
An article by Tom Wicker, the New York
Times columnist entitled, "Secret War
on Chile," and an editorial from the
September 11, 1974, edition of the
- Christian Science Monitor.
The ?RESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, it seems
to me that these two articles eloquently
sum up the issues which are raised for
this country arising out of the CIA's
intervention in Chile for the purpose of
"destabilizing" the government of the
constitutionally elected President of
Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens. Mr.
Allende was a Marxist, and I would not
have chosen him or the ideas he advo-
cated for my own country. But the fact
is that he was elected, in accordance
with the electoral process established by
the constitution of Chile, as President
of that country.
As the Christian Science Monitor
states:
It apparently is permissible for the CIA to
maneuver against local governments which
Washington does not like?this is deemed in
the national interest but when the U.S.
declines to use its influence to dissuade rep-
ressive regimes from anti- democratic ex-
cesses?as in South Korea or Greece?this is
justified as "non-interference in another
country's internal affairs.
Or, as Mr. Wicker pungently puts it:
The real questions are whether this sup-
posedly peace-loving and democratic nation
has any legal or moral right to conduct covert
operations abroad, and whether any Admin-
istratipn of either party has the constitu-
tional authority to order taxpayers' money
spent for clandestine warfare against the
legitimate government of a sovereign country.
Extirsrr 1
CIA AND CHILE
Now the facts are coming to light. The
Central Intelligence Agency was not the in-
nocent bystander in Chile that the United
NidislAVIaqtqa921montsm000l00060003-1 S 17025
States Government tried to imply it was at
he time of the overthrow of Salvador
Allende.
The CIA, it turns out, engaged for years in
landestine activitic s against the late Chilean
President. CIA director William Colby ac-
knowledged in secrat testimony tc: the Con-
gress that some $8 million had been author-
ized by a high-level :intelligence :`,ommittee
headed by Henry Kissinger to "destabilize"
Allende's Marxist government and bring
about its downfall after 1970.
The disclosures r,re shocking a:ad dictate
the urgent need feu: a public scrutiny of na-
tional security policies, a reform of CIA func-
tions, and a system of strict accountability
for CIA actions. They also point again to the
deception practiced by previous administra-
tions..
The State Depar.ment sticks by its guns.
It stated this week it backs the testimony of
high officials who previously told Congress
that the U.S. hail. not intervened in the
domestic affairs of Chile after Allende's elec-
tion. - transcript of the Colby testimony. As he de-
Clearly the full story has yet to be told. scribed it to Mr. Morgan, Mr. Colby said that
In light of the developing dispute we favor the Nixon Administration had authorized
full-scale public in into the CIA's role about $8 million to be spent covertly to make
in Chile, as called for by Congressman it impossible for President Allende to govern.
Michael Ilarringtoi Specifically, $500,000 was authorized in both
This is-not the first time the CIA has been 1989 and 1970 to help Mr. Allende's election
involved in questionable covert operations opponents, and $350,000 was later authorized
against foreign states. Its record lacludes the for bribing members of the Chilean Con-
aborted Bay of Piir;s invasion, the secret war gress to vote against ratifying Mr. Allende's
in Laos, and efforts to overthrow govern- election.
ments in Iran and Guatemala. More recent- Later $5 million was authorized for clan-
ly, the domestic in ,nt, it furnished the White destine "destabilization" efforts in Chile;
House "plumbers'' with technica:. aid and a and in 1973, $1.5 million was provided to
psychiatric profile of Daniel Ellsberg?acts help anti-Allende candidates in municipal
that violated its mandate. - elections. The authorizing body for all this
The record is disturbing. C.I.A. activity was the so-called "40 Corn-
However distasteful, clandestine opera- mittee" of the Nixon Administration?a com-
tions sometimes are necessary. If a foreign mittee chaired by Henry Kissinger.
power, for instance, is engaged In activities But Mr. Kissinger told the Senate Foreign
in a country that ,2ould impair American in- Relations Committee during his confirma-
terests, it stands to reason the U.S. must tion hearings that "the C.I.A. had nothing to
know what it is up to. But gathering informa- dm with the coup, to the best of my knowl-
tion and exposing Communist subversion, edge and belief." While that may have been
say, are one thing. Attempts to undermine or true in the narrowest sense, it was at best
overthrow legitimate governments are quite one of those- torturous non-lies in which
another, governments specialize and at worst a con-
A distressing asieect of all this L3 the double cealment of the true nature of U.S. policy
standard which the U.S. has set for its inter- toward the Allende Government and the
national conduct. Etlapaprently is permissible scope of American activities to undermine
for the CIA to maneuver against local gov- that Government.
errunents which Washington does not like? Similarly, Edward M. Korry, ambassador to
this is deemed in the national interest. But Chile during most of the period in question,
when the U.S. dec ,ines to use its influence to denied under oath to a Senate subcommit-
dissuade representative regimes from anti- tee that there had been American attempts
democratic excesses?as in South Korea or to "pressure, subvert, influence a single
Greece?this is justified as "noninterference" member of the Chilean Congress." Charles A.
in another country's internal affairs. Meyer, a former Assistant Secretary of State
If the CIA is permitted to abet the disinte- for Latin-American affairs, also swore that
the United States had scrupulously followed
gration of constitutionally elected govern- the
policy of non-intervention in Chile.
ments?however unpalatable their ideol-
N wonder, then, that Senator Prank
ogy? does not the U.S. lose its moral author- ? w
ity to condemn tOmilar subversive action by Church, to whose subcommittee this sworn
testimony was offered, was reported to be
a Communist power? outraged upon learning of the Colby testi-
The Allende rrgime was hardly a model mony. He has properly raised not only the
for Latin America. But the late President did possibility of perjury charges but the ques-
carry on his Mariciat experiment within the tion of comprehensive hearings by the full
constitutional framework. If Washington Foreign Relations Committee on the inter-
vention in Chile.
Chilean military- .that at least was an overt
if debatable, posieion. If such hearings are held, or if Mr. Kissin-
ger's confirmation hearings should be re-
But by colluding in the effort to undermine
the Chilean Government by covert means, opened?as they already have been once, to
i quire into charges that he did not tell the
must not be allowed to obscure this sordid
story of idefensible American intervention
in the internal affairs of Chile, in the years
just before the violent overthrow of the
Allende Government and the death of Pres-
ident Salvador Allende Gossens.
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ap-
pears to have been a principal force in
this covert intervention, and is being
charged once again with not having told the
whole truth to a Senate committee. Demands
- are being heard for a reopening of the hear-
ings which recommended his confirmation
as Secretary.
The Times story, by Seymour Hersh, was
based on a letter from Representative
Michael Harrington of Massachusetts to
Chairman Thomas E. Morgan of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. The Harrington
letter gave an account from memory, of
testimony to a House Armed Services sub-
committee by William E. Colby, the director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Mr. Harrington said he had twice read a
Washington has only helped destroy the whole truth about wiretaps on reporters and
credibility of tb vt argument that Commu- some of his associates?the inquiry should
nista should participate in the democratic press much further than the candor of offi-
process rather ti, an seek power through vio- cial testimony, important as that question is.
lent means
SECRE2 WAR ON CHILE
(By Tom Wicker)
On the very day that President Ford ex-
tended preventh e pardon to Richard Nixon,
another high crime of the Nixon Adminis-
tration was beim; disclosed in The New York
Times. Public outrage because of the pardon
But as one Government official pointed out
to Mr. Hersh, if covert activities against an-
other country are authorized, Government
officials?sometimes including Secretaries of
State and Presidents?have to lie about
them. Lies are part of the business. The real
questions are whether this supposedly peace-
loving and democratic nation has any legal
or Moral right to conduct covert operations
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
S 17026 Approved Fore9MATEMENIAV1RIDREp19sM7l,10001000,??4003cenqber 19 1974
abroad, and whether any Administration of
either party has the oonstitutional authority
to order taxpayers' money spent for clan-
destine warfare against the legitimate gov-
ernment of a sovereign country.
These questions are long ol.erdue for full
and open debate; the Colby testimony, for
example, said the first intervention against
Mr. Allende was ordered by Lyndon Johnson
in 1964. Congress, the prees. Presidential
candidates---all have consistently shied away
from this subject. Supposed liberals tieve
pled the supposed need to be "hard-nosed.'
The real need is to face the fact that gang-
ster schemes of bribery, violence and even
assasination are being carried out, in the
name of the great American people.
The CIA. may be only an instrument, bu.,
it seems to have its own sinister vitality. The
Chilean efforts, in fact, were authorized by
the lineal descendent of a body set up by the
Kennedy Administration to "control" the
C./A. Isn't It clear at last that such -con-
trol" can be achieved only by a Government
with the political will to cut the C.I.A. In
half, or kill it altogether?
ORDER VACATING ORDER FOR REC-
OGNITION OF SENATOR CHURCH
Mr ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the recognition of Mr. CHURCH be
vacated.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
Pore. Without objection, it is so ordered,
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. If any Sena-
tor wishes time, I have time under an
order which I shall be delighted to yield.
Mr. President, there being no request
for such time, I yield back the remainder
of my time.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Senator from West Virginia
yields back the remainder of his time.
ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
Pore. Under the previous order, there
will now be a period for the transaction
of routine morning business not to ex-
tend beyond the hour of 9:30 eats . with
the statements therein limited to 3 min-
utes.
QUORUM CALL
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll,
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for a quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
Pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL
OF 'nig CHAIR
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the Senate
stand in recess awaiting the call of the
Chair, with the understanding that the
recess not extend beyond the hour of
9:30 a.m. today.
There being no objection, the Senate,
at 9:14 a.m., recessed subject to the call
of the Chair; whereupon, the Senate re-
assembled at 9:27 a.m. when called to
order by the Acting President pro teen-
pore 11Mr. METCALF)
QUORUM CALL
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President. I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
M. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask tman-
:MOUS consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE
At 12:30 p.m., a message from the
House of Representatives by Mr. Hack-
ney, one of its reading clerks, announced
that the House disagrees to the amend-
ments of the Senate to the bill (11.R.
151,80) making appropriations for the
Departments of Labor, and Health, Edu-
cation. and Welfare, and related agen-
cies, for the fiscal year ending June 30,
1975; agrees to the conference requested
by the Senate on the disagreeing votes
of she two Houses thereon; and that Mr.
Moore Mr. NATcHER, Mr. StdITH Of Iowa,
Mr CASEY of Texas, Mr. PATTEN, Mr.
Geer, Mrs. Germ of Oregon., Mr. MA-
HON, Mr. MecetzL, Mr. Saltine, Mr.
COtITZ. Mr. ROBINSON of Virginia, and
Mr CEDERBERG were appointed managers
of the conference on the ,,sart of the
House.
The message also announced that the
House disagrees to the amendment of
the Senate to the bill (H.R. 8274/ to
grant relief to payees and special in-
doreees of fraudulently negotiated
checks drawn on designated depositaries
or the United States by extending the
availability of the check forgery insur-
ance fund, and for other purposes.
ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED
The message also announced that the
Speaker has a/Axed his signature to the
following enrolled bills:
S. 210. An act to authorise the establish-
ment of the Boston National Historical Part
In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts;
U. 3301. An act to amend the act of Qcto-
be r 1072 (Public Law 92-576):
H.R. 5395. An act to designate certain lands
In the Okefenokee National Wildlife Refuge,
03. as wilderness;
H.R. 12000. An act to enable egg producers
to establish, finance, and carry out a coos:-
Mowed program of research, producer and
consumer education, and promotion to im-
prove. maintain, and develop markets for
eggs, egg products, spent fowl, and products
of spent fowl; and
R H. 13595. An act to authorize appropria-
tkhs for the Coast Guard for the procure-
mert of vessels and aircraft and construc-
tion 3f shore and offshore ('stablishment,s. to
authorize appropriations for bridge altera-
tions to authoriee for the Coast Guard an
enl-;'ear strength for active duty personnel,
to sothoriste for the Coast Otisrd average
meitary etudent loads. end for other pur-
poses.
Tte enrolled bills were subsequently
signed by the Acting President pm tern-
pore (Mr. BAKER).
At 4:10 pen., a message from the House
of Representatives by Mr. Hackney, one
of its reading clerks, announced that the
Hottse insists upon its amendments to the
bill (S. 1283) to esablish a national pro-
gram for research, development, and
demonstration in fuels and energy and
for the coordination and financial sup-
plementation of Federal energy research
and development, and for other pur-
poses; disagreed to by the Senate; agrees
to the conference requested by the Sen-
ate on the disagreeing votes of the two
Houses thereon; and that Mr. UDALL, Mr.
BINGHAM, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. TEAGUE,
Mr. MCCORMACK, Mr. RUFFS, Mr. DELLEN-
BACK and Mr. MOSHER were appointed
managers of the conference on the part
of the House.
The message also announced that the
Houle disagrees to the amendment of
the Senate to the bill (H.R. 14214) to
amend the Public Health Service Act and
related laws to revise and extend pro-
grams of health revenue sharing and
health services, and for other purposes;
agrees to the conference requested by the
Senate on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses thereon; and that Mr. STAG-
GERS, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. SATTERFIELD, Mr.
HYROS, Mr. PASTER, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr.
ROY, Mr. DEVIere, Mr. NELSEN, Mr. CAR-
TER, *Mr. HASTINGS, Mr. HEINZ, and Mr.
Hrreense were appointed managers of the
conference on the part of the House.
COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECU-
TIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore (Mr. &mut) laid before the Senate
the following letters, which were re-
ferred as indicated:
SuPPLEM,RNTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE Da-
PantateNT or LABOR (Sm. Doc. 93-111)
A Communication from the President of
the United States proposing supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year 1975, in-
volving transfers of $7,400,000 from other
appropriations. for the Department of Labor
(with accompanying papers). Ordered to be
printed and referred to the Committee on
Appropriations.
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS POR THE Dr-
paiermizer or LABOR (SZN. Doc. 93-110)
A ComMunicatiOn from the President of
the United States proposing supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year 1975 in the
amount of $9,650,000 for the Department of
Labor (with accompanying papers). Ordered
to be printed and referred to the Committee
on Appropriations.
PETITIONS
Petetions were laid before the Senate
and referred as indicated:
By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore
(Mr. Emma):
A resolution adopted by the Council of
the city of Cleveland, Ohio, memorializing
the Congress to design and implement an
effectere program of food price control. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs.
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
The following reports of committees
were submitted:
By Mr. MUSKIE, from the Committee on
the Buidget:
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
25X1
25)0
5.4)11
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-1
JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
-*
' rrnA day - 24 September 1974
1
1. Called Rebecca Switzer, Legislative Assistant
to enator James Abourezk, to tell her that a letter to the Senator on his
roposed amendaalent to the Foreign Assistance bill prohibiting certain
contacts as being handcarried
to their office this morning. See Memo for Record.
25)(1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2.
Accompanied the Director
and Dave Phillips
Group on Agency
, to a briefing of the House Appropriations Committee Special
activities
See
Memo for Record.
3.
Received a call from
General
25X1
Counsel of
NSA, who expressed
interest in the fact that
the Baker/Weicker
, proposal for a joint committee had been referred to the Senate Government
Qperations Committee. I told him I thought this referral was proper and
as I recalled it was the same procedure followed when Senator Mansfield'
introduced his joint committee proposal
111.1956. We also
discussed the
Mondale select committee proposal
and I told it
was the feeling of our
25X1
committee staffers that no action would be taken on either of these measures
in this Congress. also asked me about the "Ervin bill" now pending
in the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. I told him I would have
bring him 2to-date on the status of that bill.
I mentioned to I 'the flurry of activity in a number of legislative
_.1.'r
Vicroposals including amendments to the Freedom of Information Act and other
similar legislation. I said he might want to check on their position on these
items.
4. Received a call from Ralph Preston, House
cAppropriations Committee staff, who told me that Representative Elizabeth
oltzman (D., N. Y.) offered an amendment to the Continuing Appropriations
Resolution on the floor this afternoon objecting to any funds for CIA for
destabilization of foreign governments. The motion was defeated.
e.i21.imporr 02,2
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP79-00957A000100060003-.1