AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 -- AMENDMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00957A000100040080-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: June 20, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

June 20, /974 Approved Fiatffsesiffia7/3(keekrff2p014)
EASTLAND, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. McGovEttN, Mr.
BUTCALF, Mr. HUDDLESTON, MT. CHURCH,
and Mr. CANNON) submitted an amend-
ment inten d to be proposed by them,
jointly, to th bill (H.R. 14832) , supra.
AME MENT NO. 1503
(Ordered to printed, and to lie on
the table.)
Mr. CHURCH bmitted an amend-
ment, intended to b roposed by him, to
the bill (H.R. 14832) , pra.
AMENDMENT 1505
(Ordered to be printe and to lie on
the table)
Mr. EAGLETON submittel an amend-
ment, intended to be propose y him, to
the bill (H.R. 14832) , supra.
Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. Presiden send
to the desk an amendment to H.R. 832,
an amendment that will insure that he
purpose of the Senate is carried out w
respect to any tax reforms relating
the petroleum industry. I ask that it be
printed and held at the desk, and that
the text of the amendment be printed
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
Mr. President, we have before us the
opportunity to enact meaningful tax re-
form, combining relief for the inflation-
squeezed consumer with long-overdue
changes in the methods of assessing taxes
on oil producers. But should the Senate
decide to eliminate or modify either the
percentage depletion allowance or the
foreign tax credit, as I believe it should,
we are faced with the very real prospect
of those increased corporate taxes being
passed on directly to the consumer and
increasing inflation. This, I believe, would
be contrary to the purposes expressed by
the sponsors of the many amendments
dealing with this important topic.
Thus, I offer my amendments as a
Means of insuring that these additional
taxes on' the petroleum industry will in
fact be borne by the petroleum industry?
to be paid out of their tremendouS
profits?and are not merely passed
through to consumers.
tinder the authority of the Mandat
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, e
Federal Energy Administration wi re-
tain authority over the prices of ?etro-
leum products through Februa 1975.
Since natural gas prices and p fits are
already tightly controlled by; e FPC,
my amendment would not a iict natural
gas producers. My amen ent would
make clear that, unlike ot increases in
basic costs, increased t s as a result
of this act would not be ecepted as jus-
tification for a price ri . My amendment
directs this regulato authority to dis-
allow any increase the price of crude
oil, residual fuel oi or refined petroleum
products that wo d serve to compensate
for any increas in income tax liability
resulting from mendments to this act.
There is a pr sion to permit some offset
to those fe7 small independent com-
panies whii would suffer acute financial
hardship.
Shoul any legislator doubt the need
for su1 an amendment, he need only
consu the public record. The President
of t United States said on May 25 of
th year:
The tax which 15 tritnsferred to industry
simply comes back to ithe taxpayer in some
hidden form, such as r,igher prices or lower
Pay.
He used this as se ificient justitcation
to deny needed tax reform legiolation.
We can today insure that that does not
happen in this case.
Oil company profleA were up 55 percent
last year over 1E172, according to Busi-
ness Week. In the Erst quarter of this
year, similar gains were reported: Tex-
aco, up 123 percent: SoCal. Standard of
Indiana, and Gulf, up more than 75 per-
cent. At the same ;:irrie, we note that
gasoline and motor oil purchased by
consumers increasee in price at a rate
of 77 percent over the last 6 months,
contributing substan daily to the general
inflation. Now Comress can, by accept-
ing my amendment_ do something posi-
tive to control one el the major sources
of the inflation which is draining o
conomy.
There are those who say -very gh
p t levels are necessary to enc age
inv ment in new eietroleum r urces.
I wo have no ob;:cction to a,cil pro-
ductio tax incenti.ve whic was tied
to actua osts of ex ploring d develop-
ing new Is, but I canc accept the
argument t t or ly onli ted profits can
induce new iducti
I saw an a le aft the Wall Street
Journal earlier ? reek reporting that
Mobil, whose pia S are up 70 percent
over a year ago,, moidering investing
a cionsiderablcrtir4of those gains in
the purchase a c:yilIing interest in
Marcor, the olding conany for Mont-
gomery W d. In view- of 's half-billion
dollar de rtment store de ow are we
to con de that: ell those rof its are
neces y for oil ex oloration?
plain fact is;. today's o ompa-
ni profits are ono. of the p tipal
ftees behind the flouble-figure a-
n we are experiencing. The cons r
ays for it not only el the gasoline pu
but to one degree or another in eve
product he buys. 'Without an amertdmen
of this kind, legislation to end the oil de-
pletion allowance would probably do very
little to control fuel price increases or
oil company profits.
ANIENDMENTS NOS. : T06, 1507, AND 1508
(Ordered to be pented, and to lie on
the table.)
Mr. HARTKE isitanitted three amend-
ments, intended to Le proposed by him,
to the bill (H.R. I832),1 supra
AMENDMENT NO. 1509
(Ordered to be printed, and to lie on
the table.)
Mr. TUNNEY. Mi President, I am to-
day offering, for myself and the Senator
from Ohio (Mr. TFT) an amendment to
H.R. 14832, the debt .ceiling bill. This
amendment will accomplish several im-
portant objectives.
First, it will help provide the average
saver with an inflation offset in the form
of a substantial increase in the elective
interest rate on sivings deposits and
the lower interest certificates of
de-
posit.
Second, it will encourage increased
savings. These savings will help to off-
7A000100040080-8 S 11113
set the massive disintermediation which
is today seriously disrupting mortgage
and commercial credit markets. The re-
sults will be lower borrowing ,costs, a
more adequate rate of growth ' - the Na-
tion's housing stock and Is reduced
inflationary pressure.
The approach pr ed by this
amendment is couinflationary in
several other ways. inducing the pub-
lic to voluntarilcrease its savings,
the amendment uld simultaneously re-
duce some o e present very heavy
pressure o immediate consumption
spending, 'ovide needed capital to fi-
nance e nsion of productive capacity
in sho ge-plagued industries and make
unne sary an imprudent rate of money
sup expansion.
e latter point is especially impor-
nt. I am extremely pleased with the de-
ermination of Federal Reserve Chair-
man Arthur Burns to hold down growth
in monetary aggregates for as long as
needed to stop today's runaway inflation.
I believe it is the responsibility of Con-
gress to assist the Federal Reserve in this
effort. The amendment I am proposing
would help relieve today's heavy pressure
,on finandal markets. It thus goes a con-
siderable distance toward dissipating the
growing political pressures on the Fed
to abandon its difficult but necessary
course of monetary austerity.
The amendment itself is quite simple.
It provides for a 3-year period, a tax
credit of up to $100 to taxpayers who in-
crease their savings. The tax credit
would equal the increase in interest in-
come earned in the current tax year over
the amount of such income in the pre-
vious tax year, up to $100. All savings ac-
counts and certificates of deposit which
pay no more than 71/2 percent would
qualify as sources of interest income for
the purposes of this amendment.
A short example illustrates the mech-
anism proposed in my amendment.
Assume that in 1973 a taxpayer has
$1,000 in a savings account. If the ac-
count pays 5 percent, the taxpayer will
m $50 interest in 1973. Next, assume
t in 1974 the taxpayer increases his
o r savings to $2,000 and earns $100
in rest.
Uri r my proposal, the taxpayer could
claim ax credit of $50?the amount of
the inc se in taxable interest income.
The pr iple of this policy is very sim-
ple. For dollar of increased interest
income, up $100, a saver gets $1 of tax
credit.
Dollar-for- ar matching, up to the
$100 limit, ma saving much more at-
tractive. In the ample I used before,
the total return ncreased savings of
$1,000 is $100. The ective rate of in-
terest is 10 percen rate sufficient to
fully offset the rate o flation expected
in 1974.
I would like to streL that, unlike
previous proposals in this ea, the pro-
posed tax credits rewar only in-
creases in savings. It provid no wind-
falls for existing savings. And, ?limiting
the credit to $100 and to savin then which pay no more thin 71/2
percent, this amendment would Insure
that the bulk of the benefit accrues to
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the middle and moderate income eltirens
who so badly need to protect their sale
ings efrom the ravages of today's infla-
tion!,
Mr. President, I intend to offer this
amendment to the debt ceiling bill. In
the event it Is not adopted, I will offer it
again at a later date. I welcome the
intertet and cosponsorship of all other
Members of the Senate.
At - his point, I ask unanimous con-
sent at the text of the amendment be
prin in the RECORD.
Th e being no objection, the amend-
mint 3vas ordered to be printed In the
Rscoi, as follows:
Astesrewriser No 1509
At tl end of the bill insert the fotlowin
new s
SEC. . AI CREDIT FOR INT-EXIST ON SAVIATGi.
(a) I t NERAL ?Subpart A of part IV of
811hr:hap A of Chapter I of the Internal
Revenu e of 1964 (relating to eredire
against Is amended by redasirnailbe
section 4 s 43, and by inserting after !sec-
tion 41 t following new section
aoults of whtch are insured by the Federal
.iauries and Loan Inntrarux Corporation or
rtherwLse insured under State law: or
fc) a credit union take deposits and ac-
,,f which( are insured by the National
Credit Union Admintstration Share Insur-
ance Pend or otherwise Insured under State
Ine table of mentions /or such subpart
a amended by striking out the last item
herein and inserting In lieu thereof the
olloa trig:
`Se- 42 Credit for Interest on savings.
'Se( 43 Overpayment of tax.".
The amendmen'z made by this section
apply to taxable years beginning after De-
oember 31. 1974, and ending before Janu-
ary I, 1978.
Sec. 42. DIT TOR INTEREST ON SAVINGS
-(a) IN ENERAL.?In the case of an Indi-
vidual th is allowed as a credit against
the tax d by this chapter for the
taxable ye an amount equal to the amount
by whichinterest on sayings received by
the taxpaye(.uring the taxable year exceedr
the amount the Interest on SaYblirS re-
cehed by tb taxpayer during the preterite:1e
taxable year.
"(b) Lin
allowed und
year shall n
of .1 married
return of tax
"(c) DETIN
section?
"(I)
terest on say
dends received
Ings account or
dal institution.
"(2) SAVLNGS ter.--The term 'savings
account' means Interest-bearing depnelt
or account whic not payable on a speci-
fied date or at xpiration of a specified
time after the ciai f deposit (although the
individual who ntains the deposit or
acc.-.unt may be uired by the fltienciel
Institution with it the deposit or ac-
count is maintain y require that indi-
vidual to give not in writing of in in-
tended withdrawal less than 30 days be-
fore withdrawal Is e)
"r3) TIME Dews The term lime de-
posit' means a dep of less than 410,000
which is payable on specUled date or at
the expiration of a fled time altar the
date of deposit and ch bears a rate of
interest no greater th the maximum rate
which may be paid by ncial inetitutions
under regulations p ? bed under the
amendments made by Act entitled "An
Act to proylde for the e flexible regula-
tion of maximum rates Interest or divi-
dends payable by bank id certain other
financial institutions o ?posits or share
accounts, to authorize h reserve require-
ments on time deposits member banks,
to authorize open mar operations in
agency issues by the Fed Reserve banks.
and for other purposes", roved Septem-
ber 21, 1966 (Public Law 7).
"(4) FINANCIAL use sr.?The term
'financial institution' mea
"A) a commercial or mut sayings bank
whose deposits and accounts are Insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or
otherwise insured under State law:
"113) a sayings and loan, building and loan,
or similar association the deposits and ac-
tow.?The amount of credit
this section for any taxsble
xceed $100 ($50 In the case
dividual making a separate
NS.?For puzpoRes r.f this
ON SAVINGS.?The term in-
means Interest oe divi-
morey deposited in a say-
me deposit with a finan?
AMENDMENT To tu. FOREIGN AS-
SISTANCE ACT OF 1961?AMEND-
MENT
AllatarDZINST No. 1504
(Ordered to be printed, and referred
to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
eons.)
Mr. CHURCH subnutted an amend-
ment, intended to be proposed by him,
to the bill (S. 3394) to amend the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, and for other
>ur poses.
PII011IBITING NISS.SAR ANSESTANCE
Mr. CrituetCH. Mr. President, I intro-
duce today an amendment to the foreign
assistance bill. B. 3394, which would pro-
hibit U.S. nuclear assistance?equip-
ment, materials, scientific information,
end technology--being furnished to any
country in the world not a party to the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nu-
( tear Weapons.
Daring the last few weeks, the world
has witnessed a spurt of nuclear devel-
opments in several countries. These
events do not bode well for the future.
On May 113, India, neither a signer nor a
party to the Treaty on Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, set off a nuclear
cietonation in the Great Rajastan Desert.
Its purpose was proclaimed by the New
Delhi government as "peaceful." Last
week, President Nixon promised nuclear
assistance to Egypt, not a party to the
NPT, and to Israel, neither a signer nor
e ratifier. The President proclaimed
these gifts as being for "peaceful ma-
le:05es." France, one of the 30 nonsigners
and nonrattflers of the NPT, has again
conducted atmospheric nuclear tests
over an atoll in the Pacific Ocean. Just
tele Monday. China, also not a signer
nor a party to the treaty, conducted its
16th nuclear test--15 in the atmosphere
and one underground. This latest explo-
sion in the Lop Nor urea was a tbermo-
endear device which Is later to be in-
corporated In a warhead for the inter-
mediate range and intercontinental bal-
listic. missiles that the Peking govern-
ment is known to be developing. Reports
are currently coming in that Pakistan,
Iran, Rernanne and perhaps others, are
knocking at the nuclear door.
I am particularly disturbed that Presi-
dent Nixon has committed the United
States, on a grand scale, to furnish nu-
clear capability to Egypt and Israel, two
countries which have fought four hot
wars over the last quarter century. Help-
ing Egypt develop nuclear reactors, os-
tensibly for "peaceful purposes" only
o ca--
0100041 /9 e/zy.
June 20,'1974
Pe. S- 3159
masks the political-military potentiality
te at accrues to any country acquiring the
technology to produce its own plutonium
ft r nuclear devices. The temptation ear-
ii" becomes irresistible, as India demon-
strated when it chose to become the
world's sixth nuclear power. India re-
ceived Canadian and American assist-
at ice and utilized its own physicists and
eredneers, who were trained for the most
pert in the United States, to use the
Plutonium generated to build a bomb. A
Si niter result might well be anticipated
it Egypt, considering the historic ant-
m witty it exudes toward its Jewish neigh-
lx r, and considering the fact that Israel
hes pursued, since 1956, an ongoing
sophisticated nuclear program of its own,
initiated by the French.
In my judgment, the United States
stated not be the agent for the spread-
leg of nuclear technology outside the
frunework of the Treaty on Nonprolifer-
Won of Nuclear Weapons, which has
to eg been the lodestone of our global pol-
io r. In departing from that policy, with-
cat the benefit of deliberation or debate,
Peesident Nixon may well have sown the
clt agons' teeth of nuclear destruction
throughout the Middle East.
The amendment I offer today is an
al tempt te prevent the United States
trIm becoaaing a stimulant to, and sup-
Pier of, nuclear equipment, nuclear ma-
terials, nuclear scientific information
al d technology, to any country not a
ix rty to the Treaty on the Nonprolifera-
tic in of Nuclear Weapons.
The American-initiated Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
uees signed on July 1, 1968. Its purpose
Yea to avert the devastation that man-
ic id would suffer as a result of nuclear
se.r. In the belief that the proliferation
of nuclear capability would seriously ex-
ec erbate tee danger of nuclear war, the
troaty was drawn up to prevent wider
di isemlnation of nuclear weaponry. I be-
le ye that until a country becomes a party
to this treaty, and agrees to abide by
its terms, the United States should not
bestow it with nuclear capability. In do-
nt I so, we only undermine the treaty,
Heel!, by removing the incentive to join.
Ancordleg to the U.S. Arms Control
ar d Disarmament Agency, the following
30 countries have not signed the Non-
Pt aliferatien Treaty:
tigeria, Argentina. Brazil, Burma, Chile,
China (Peking). Cuba. Equatorial Guinea,
FT1 ace. Guinea, Guyana, India, Israel, Ma-
lta and Mauritania.
:donaco. Niger, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar,
/Wanda. Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South
At Ida, Spain, 'Tanzania. 'Uganda, United
Ar ;I) Emirates, Western Samoa, and Zambia.
(be following 23 countries have signed,
bu i not yet ratified the NPT:
liarbadoe. Belgium, Colombia, Egypt. GAM-
bin, Germany (Bonn), Indonesia, Italy, Ja-
pa-i, Korea (Seoul), Kuwait, and Libya.
Luxembotirg, Netherlands, Panama, Singe-
pot e, Sri Lucke, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tc 'ago, Turkey, Venezuela, Yemen (Aden),
ant Yemen (San's).
fy amerdment reads:
2/one of -Jae funds authorized of appro-
pet tied under this or any other law may be
us d (1) to transfer United States nuclear
eq. tipment or nuclear materials, or to furnish
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scientific information and technology related
to nuclear energy, to any country not a party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, or (2) to transfer such equip-
ment or material or furnish such information
or technology to a party to the Treaty unless
that party agrees not to transfer such equip-
ment or materials or furnish such informa-
tion or technology to any country not a party
to the Treaty.
I ask unanimous consent that a copy
of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons as signed and ratified
by the United States and 83 other coun-
tries be printed at this paint in the REC-
ORD.
There being no objection, the treaty
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(Signed at Washington, London, Moscow
July 1, 1968. U.S. ratification deposited March
5, 1970. Entered into force March 5, 1970.)
The States concluding this Treaty, herein-
after referred to as the "Parties to the
Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be
visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war
and the consequent need to make every effort
to avert the danger of such a war and to take
measures to safeguard the security of peo-
ples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear
weapons would seriously enhance the danger
of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly calling for
the conclusion of an agreement on the pre-
vention of wider dissemination of nuclear
weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating
the application of International Atomic
Energy safeguards on peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities,
Expressing their support for research, de-
velopment and other "efforts to further the
application, within the framework of the
International Atomic Energy Agency safe-
guards system, of the principle of safeguard-
ing effectively the flow of source and special
fissionable materials by use of instruments
and other techniques at certain strategic
points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of
peaceful applications of nuclear technology,
including any technological by-products
which may be derived by nuclear-weapon
States from the development of nuclear ex-
plosive devices, should be available for peace-
ful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty,
whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-
weapon States,
? Convinced that, in furtherance of this
principle, all Parties to the Treaty are en-
titled to participate in the fullest possible
exchange of scientific information for, and
to contribute alone whatsoever of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
of control over such weapons or explosive
devices directly, or indirectly; not to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices? and not
to seek or receive any assistance in the manu-
facture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
ARTICLE II/
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party
to the Treaty undertakes to accept safe-
guards, as set forth in an agreement to be
negotiated and concluded with the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency in accordance
with the Statute of the International Atomic
Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards
system, for the exclusive purpose of verifica-
tion of the fulfillment of its obligations as-
sumed under this Treaty with a view to pre-
venting diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive riev'ees. Procedures for the
safeguards required hy this article ;shall be
followed with respect to source or special fis-
sionable material whether it is being pro-
duced, processed or esed in any principal
nuclear facility or ie outside any such fa-
cility. The safeguard, required by this ar-
ticle shall be applies-I on all source or spe-
cial fissionable material in all peaceful nu-
clear activities withle the territory of such
State, under its juritOiction, or carried out
under its control ameehere.
2. Each State Parte to the Treaty- under-
takes not to provide (a) source of special
fissionable material, r (b) -equipment or
material especially dee igned or prepared for
the processing, use cr production of special
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-
weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless
the source or specie:. fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required
by this article.
3. The safeguards ,repuired by this article
shall be implemented in a manner designed
to comply with articlh IV of this Treaty, and
to avoid hampering the economic or tech-
nological development of the Parties or inter-
national cooperation in the field of -peaceful
nuclear activities, Inc' eding the inter national
exchange of nuclear raaterial and eqiinment
for the processing. ore or production of nu--
clear material for peaceful purposes in ac-
cordance with the pa e visions of this article.
and the prineinle of safeguarding set forth
in the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-wee non States Party to the
Treaty shall conclude agreements with the
International Atomic ilinergy Agency to meet
the requirements of this article either indi-
vidually or together er th other States in ac-
tordance with the Ste Lite of the Internation-
al Atomic Energy Age e. ay. Negotiation, of such
agreements shall commence within 180 days
from the original entry into -force of this
Treaty. For States depositing their instru-
ments of ratification or accession after the
180-day period, riegttAtion of such agree-
ments shall commence not later taan the
date of such deposit. Such agreements shall
enter into force nc t later than eighteen
months after the da te of initiation., of ne-
gotiations.
ART, t,E IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be inter-
preted as affecting tae Inalienable right of
all the Parties to the Treaty to develop re-
search. production ar d use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purnoses without discrimination
and in conformity wi.1 h articles I a:ad II of
this Treaty.
2. All the Parties te the Treaty undertake
to facilitate, and have the right to partici-
pate in, -the fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials and scientific and tech-
nological informal-ion for the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. P eties to the Treaty in
a position to do so shall also cooperate in
contributing alone or together with other
States or international organizations -to the
further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposss, espe-
cially in the territeries of non-nuclear-.
weapon States Party the Treaty, with due
consideration for the seeds of the developing
are-as of the world.
ART1,:-.;,E V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to-
take appropriate measures to ensure that,
in accordance with tt : ; Treaty, under appro-
priate international o aaervation and through
appropriate internati elal procedures, poten-
tial benefits from any peaceful applications
of nuclear explosions -yin be made available
to non-nuclear-wcap el States Party to -the
Treaty on a rion-diteriminatory basis and
that the charge to is- [eh Parties for the ex-
plosive devices used ,111 be as low as pos-
sible and exclude any charge for research and
development. Non-r',clear-weapon States
Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain
such benefits, pursuant to a special interna-
tional agreement or agreements, through an
appropriate international body with ade-
quate representation of non-nuclear-weapon
States. Negotiations on this subject shall
commence as soon as possible after the
Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty so desiring may
also obtain such benefits pursuant to
bilateral agreements.
ART/CLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty under-
takes to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
ART/CLE V/I
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of
any group of States to conclude regional
treaties in order to assure the total absence
of nuclear weapons in their respective terri-
tories.
ARTICLE VIII
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose
amendments to this Treaty. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to
the Depositary Governments which shall cir-
culate it to all Parties to the Treaty. There-
upon, if requested to do so by one-third or
more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Deposi-
tary Governments shall convene a confer-
ence, to which they shall invite all the Par-
ties to the Treaty, to consider such an amend-
ment.
Any amendment to this Treaty must be
approved by a majority of the votes of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of
all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
and all other Parties which, on the date the
amendment is circulated, are members of
the Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall
enter into force for each Party that deposits
its instrument of ratification of the amend-
ment upon the deposit of such instruments
of ratification by a majority of all the Par-
ties, including the instruments of ratifica-
tion of all nuclear-weapon States Party to
the Treaty and all other Parties which, on
the date the amendment is circulated, are
members of the Board of Governors of the
International Atomic Energy Agency. There-
after, it shall enter into force for any other
Party upon the deposit of its instrument of
ratification of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of
this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the
Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland,
in order to review the operation of this
Treaty with a view to assuring that the pur-
poses of the Preamble and the provisions of
the Treaty are being realized. At intervals
of five years thereafter, a majority of 'the
Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submit-
ting a proposal to this effect to the Deposi-
tary Governments, the convening of further
conferences with the same objective of re-
viewing the operation of the Treaty.
ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States
for signature. Any State which does not sign
the Treaty before its entry into force in ac-
cordance with paragraph 3 of this article may
accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratifi-
cation by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession
shall be deposited with the Governments of
the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, which are hereby designated the
Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after
its ratification by the States, the Govern-
ments of which are designated Depositaries
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of ie -he Treaty, and forty other States sip:tri-
ton: to this Treaty and the deposit of their
instrumenta of ratification. Fur the pur-
poses of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State
Is one which has manufactured and exploded
a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to January 1, 1267.
4 For States whose instruments of rati-
fication or accession are deposited subse-
quent to the entry into force of this Treaty,
It shall enter into force on the date of de-
poet of their instruments of ratification or
ace, salon.
5 The Denositary Governments shall
promptly inform all signatory and acceding
Staies of the date of each aignatiire, the
date of deposit of each instrument of ratifi-
cat, on or of accession, the date of the entry
into force of this Treaty, ;aid toe date ot
receipt of any requests for convening a con-
fers nee or other notices.
8. This treaty shall be registered 'ay the
Depositary Governments pursuant to snide
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1 Es,ch?Party shall In exercising Its na-
tior al sovereignty have the right to with-
draw from the Treaty if it decide, that
esti aordtnary events, related to the subject
mat ter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the
sup-erne interests of its country. It shall
give notice of such vrithdrawal to all other
Parties to the Treaty and to the United Na-
tions Security Council three months in ad-
vance. Such notice shall include a statement
of the extraordinary events it regards as hav-
ing jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into
force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
convened to decide whether the Treaty shall
continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
extended for an additional fixed period or
periods. This decision shall be taken by a
majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French,
Spanish and Chinese texts of which are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in
the archives of the Depository Governments.
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depository Government
to :he Governments of the signatory and
acceding States.
AMENDMENT NO. 1510
(Ordered to be printed and referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations.)
CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ON NU.ILEAR
AGREEMENTS
Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, the United
States is in the process of receiving its
relationship with the Middle East In the
wake of the energy crisis and the latest
Arab-Israeli war. There is no dotibt hut
What the change in our relationship to
the Middle East in recent months is the
most dramatic in many years, if not in
decades. This change affects our other
ma or foreign policy relationship! with
the Soviet Union and with Europe.
The importance of this to our foreign
policy is clear. It is highlighted by the
announcement of agreements with Egypt
and Israel to provide them with nuclear
power for the generation of electricity.
These are not every day sorts of agree-
ments. While we have agreements of this
kind with other countries, the exporting
of fissionable materials is obviously of
greater danger and significance than the
average commercial relationship we have
with most countries.
For both these reasons---because of the
Important changes in our foreign policy
and because of the complexity and
danger involved in providing nuclear
Tower to other nations---I feel it is essen-
tial that the Congress play a role in the
enastment of these agreements.
I tm introducing today an amendment
r..) LOA:, foreign assistance bill submitted
by tile administration authorizing aid to
the Middle East. My amendment will re-
quire that agreements made with govern-
ments in the Middle East for the provi-
sion of fissionable materials be submitted
to the Senate as treaties for Senate rati-
fieation. It will also require consultation
with specified Members of both Houses
at soongress before final decisions and
announcements are made regarding the
use of the ;100 million "special require-
ment fund" for the Middle East.
Mr. President, In my view there can be
r.oaouht but what the Congress must
r lay more than a passive role in the de-
termination of the advisability of provid-
log nuclear power to other nations. There
is increasing concern now about the
ability to control the whereabouts and
usage of nuclear materials and in an area
as volatile as the Middle East this can
not help but be a major concern. Such
an issue bears more public discussion and
scrutiny than has been the case with the
agreements with Egypt and Israel.
The "Principles of Relations and Co-
operation between Egypt and the United
Stator." were signed by President Nixon
tad President Sadat last Friday, June
14 The agreement on the provision of
nuclear material to Egypt, we axe told,
must be signed by the Sunday after next,
June 30, to meet the EgYPtlarte Produc-
ton requirernerits. The agreement on
safeguards is to be worked out afterward.
Even though the agreement on the pro-
vision of the material is subject to the
agreement on safeguards. there is reason,
to be concerned about the details of both
agreements and their foreign policy lin-
Plications. The only way we are going to
get a full public debate, discussion, and
decielon on these frames is for agreements
of this sort to be submitted to the Senate
as treaties for ratification.
In the President's aid request for the
Middle East he also asked the Congress
to authorize a $100 million "special re-
quirements fund" which would be at his
discretion and decision to determine to
whom and for what this money would be
used. As written, it would allow the
money to be at the President's disposal
until expended, which could be years
from now. This kind of blank check is
precisely the kind of request the Con-
sres should not comply with. Unless it
is fully consulted with in advance, the
Congress is giving up power of the purse
and is dealing itself out of the decision-
making process on the use of taxpayers
funds which is the orirnary resportalbil-
isy of the Congress.
As the United Stares reshapes its rela-
tion.; with the Middle East, the Congress
Must play a key role. These amendments
would assure that. the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Congress would be
exercised.
I ask unanimous consent to have the
-amendment printed in the RECORD fol-
lowing my remarks.
I am pleased to be able to say that
the distmguished chairman of the For-
elgi Subcommittee of Appro-
pr ations, the Senator from Hawaii (Mr.
IN )uee) and the Senator from Maryland
a as Manilas) are joining me in cospon-
so Ing this legislation.
there bang no objection, the amend-
Ire nt was ordered to be printed in the
Rs CORD, as follows:
AMENDMENT No. 1510
tin page 2 line 24. Insert the following:
To funds shall be authorized and no au-
thority shall be exercised under this or any
otJ er Act for the purpose of providing fis-
sknable msterial to nations in the Middle.
Eat until the agreements drafting the terms
of such provision have been submitted to
th Senate as treaties and have been ratified
by the Senate.
:MC. 904(a) page 3, line 17 strike remainder
of paragrap after the word "purposes" and
imert the following:
:to funds authorized to be appropriated by
this section shall be available for use by the
Pr talent unless the Congress is consulted on
the possible uses of these funds prior to any
akeement or final decision being reached
aril announced. Such consultation shall in-
clt de the majority and minority leadership
of 50th houses of Congress, the Chairman of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. and
the Chair/nem of the Foreign Affairs and Ap-
ple priations Committees of both houses o
CO tress. including the Chairmen of the
Fo vigil Operations Subcommittees of Ap-
propriations.
tDDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AN
AMENDMENT
iMENDMENT NO. 1208
at the ?uest of Mr. INOUYE, the Sen-
ator from asachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY)
We a added a cosponsor of amendment
NE. 1108 ? nded to be proposed to
S. 2923, to a nd chapter 55 of title 10,
Ut ited States ode, to require the Armed
Forces to coat ue to provide certain spe-
cisl education services to handicapped
de sendents of rnbers serving on active
duly.
IsIOUNC
,51.EARINGS 0
OLUTION 119
IESOLLTION
Ser. BAYli. Mr.
Subcommittee on C
me nts is scheduling
tw proposed amen
stitution: Senate Joi
fos the prosection of u
other persons, and Be
tit n 130, to guarantee
thi unborn, the ill, the
ca sacitated.
The next day of heari
on Wednesday, June 26
Di Omen Senate Office B
fling at ap.m.
thy persons wishing to
ten statements for the he
sir add contact the Subco
Ci. nstitutional Amendments,
',amen Senate Office Buildin
tTi, D.C. 20510.
OF ADDITIONAL
ENATE JOINT RES-
SENATE JOINT
esident, the Senate
titutional Amend-
rther hearings on
ents to the Con-
Resolution 119,
rn children and
te Joint Resolu-
right of life to
ed, or the in-
s will be held
room 1318,
ding, begin-
bmit writ-
ing record
ittee on
oom 300,
asking-
AUNOUNCEMENT OF HEARINGS ON
3ARRIERS TO HEALTH CARE FOR
3LDER AMERICANS
,fr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I would
like to announce hearings to be con-
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Ju,n4 6,
`? Foreign profits of the multinational
oil companies are increasing faster than
their domestic profits?doubling in the
last year to well over $7 billion. Yet under
the House bill, domestic oil producers will
pay an extra $11.4 billion in higher taxes
between 1974 and 1979, compared to $1
to $1.5 billion which will be levied on
foreign oil operations. When we fac-
tor in the ratio of foreign to do-
mestic oil operations of the American
companies, these figures mean that the
House tax package imposes new taxes
on domestic oil operations twice as great
as those imposed on foreign oil
operations.
Mr. President, I support Project In-
dependence, but I wonder whether we
will ever have energy independence in
this country if we continue to subsidize
investment in foreign countries at the
expense of investment here at home. To
formulate a tax package which will not
give oil companies so much incentive to
invest abroad, there must be some sort of
minimum U.S. taxation of the foreign
earnings of U.S. oil companies?earnings
on which they presently pay little or no
U.S. taxes at all.
A flat 10-percent minimum tax on ne
foreign earnings of the U.S. oil co
panies?including earnings of the f
eign incorporated subsidiaries of t
companies?would be an approp
S, 341 41
ei,e-c
S 9851
the con-
L. 1974 EONGRESSIO_NAL E 0 ?SENATE
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present system. Sinc - earnings taken in 1950 entered in the RECORD at
controlled foreign corpora iflS are
en t U.S.
here is no
axati on on
ry. and then
the Secretary
regulations to
se
te
minimum tax. This would raise di-
tonal revenue of approximately, $700
million for the Treasury, and ould
make the tax package more neral as
between foreign and domesticsource
income.
Currently U.S. manufactu
panies pay, on the average,
of their foreign earnings to
States in income taxes. This
tion may be too low, a
the Congress must, at so
near future, reevaluate
tern of taxation of fo
These payments, whet
are too low on some a
substantially higher t
international oil com
practically no U.S. t
earnings. This bill
this disparity.
Besides assuring
tic investment, an
ity, this has a
tion. Assuming
made in this C
the abuses of
vision, many of
may be temptheir oversea
shore. ot
them in fon
repatriate
This bill
controlled
the comp
ship in
ings are
In the f
Basic
Impose
on th
multi
ment
g corn-
-5 percent
e Unites]
te of taxa-
aidelieve that
point in the
e entire sys-
ign earnings.
or not they
oIute scale, are
n those of the
flies, which pay
on their foreign
11 largely correct
igh level of domes-
mproving tax equal-
billther important func-
at some progress is
gress toward limiting
foreign tax credit pro-
he major oil companies
to move all or part of
earnings completely off-
Inr words they may take
n subsidiaries and do not
Fern to the United States.
uld tax income earned by
ti reign corporations in which
ies in question have owner-
ter:st, whetheikor not these earn-
mitted to tik parent company
rm of dividends.
ly the purpose of this bill is to
flat 10-percent minimum tax
real economic earnings of each
tional oil company. Since pay-
made to foreign governments are
real osts, these are treated as deduc-
tions, but not as credits as under the
*.N
nevertheless earning, of the
corpoartion, these are taxed
intent here to imposr dou
profits taken in a SII!`iSi
remitted in dividenda:
is authorized to m
prevent this from ha? ening.
Taken in total, Il.itgieve that this bill
will make a positiytt ,ontribution o tax
equity and to segffn I in the supply of
this Nation's vitO en rIrgy resources.
DEPARTME OF ' DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIO AUTEORIZATION ACT,
1975?A NDMENT
ANIENDMEN 5 NO. 1398
(Ord d to be pr oted, and to lie on
the ta .)
Mr.:' CHILES submitted an amend-
me intended to be proposed by him, to
th?ill (S. 3000) to authorize appropri-
a ns during the used1 year 1975 for pro-
ement of aircra:t, missiles, naval
ssels, tracked coribat vehicles, tor-
edoes, and other weaoons, and research,
development, test, ar evaluation for the
Armed Forces, and T o prescribe the au-
thorized personnel iitrength for each
active duty componii,lt and of the Se-
lected Reserve of efa ti Reserve compo-
nent of the Armed Forces and of civilian
personnel of the Department of Defense,
and to authorize tht military training
student loans, and for other purposes.
AMENDIO EN ? NO. 1400
(Ordered to be pri) Led.)
Mr. THURMOND roposed an amend-
ment to Senate bill 1000, supra.
AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSIST-
ANCE ACT OF 1961?AMEND-
MENTS
AMENDMEDfl NO. 1399 ?
(Ordered to be p; inted, and referred
to the Committee or. Foreign Relations.)
FOREIGN MI1 ITARY SALES
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, it is diffi-
cult these days to open the newspaper
without coming across unexpected re-
ports of another U.S. multimillion-dollar
arms deal with ar other small nation
somewhere.
The amendment I am offering today
to the Foreign Assistance Act, S. 3394,
gives Congress over iiight authority on
proposed foreign m litary sales?before
the sale is finalized.
Foreign military sales has become a
instrument of foreik ft policy. The execu-
tive branch of this Nation involves the
United States in !military situations
throughout the world without congres-
sional and public c?Coate, discussion or
deliberation. The suits here are vast. For
1973?the most reos ot figures available
on foreign niilitart sales credit and
cash--show a total of $3.5 billion. This
figure represents a quadrupling of the
fiscal year 1970 total of $926 million.
Fiscal year 1974 sales are estimated to be
in the neighborhooc, of $4.6 billion.
Mr. President, I o,;ic unanimous con-
sent to have a DOD !Mart of foreign mili-
tary sales orders toting $21 billion since
elusion of my remarks.
Despite the serious policy issues raised
by this tremendous increase in Govern-
ment arms sales, these transactions are
made with little regard for congressional
or public opinion. The Department of
Defense is consulted. The manufacturers
of weapons and the providers of military
services are consulted. But Congress is
hardly informed of these transactions,
much less consulted as to their propriety.
As it stands now, the executive branch
of the Government simply presents Con-
gress and the public with accomplished
facts.
This amendment requires the execu-
tive branch to afford Congress the op-
portunity to debate and discuss foreign
sales made by the U.S. Government. It
requires the President to report to both
Houses of Congress his military sales
plans when any single sale to any one
country amounts to over $25 million or
when cumulative sales of over $50 million
occur to one country in 1 year. Although
this amendment was approved by the
Senate last year as part of S. 1443, the
Foreign Military Sales and Assistance
Act, the amendment, as well as a ma-
jority of that bill's provisions, was de-
leted in the Senate-House conference on
foreign assistance legislation. I am rein-
troducing the amendment because the
circumstances which warranted its con-
sideration last year have grown even
more serious in the interval.
There is still no statutory requirement
to insure that Congress receives up-to-
date information on U.S. Government
foreign military sales. The various re-
quired reports either provide information
on last year's sales or provide detailed
information on only a small part of total
American arms sales abroad. Thus, the
report required by section 657 of the For-
eign Assistance Act lists only the total
amount of U.S. Government sales by
country for the past fiscal year. Since
government-to-government arms sales
do not require an export license, the por-
tion of the section 657 report titled "Ex-
port of Arms, Ammunition, and Imple-
ments of War," provides past fiscal year
data only on commercial sales which are
approximately one-eighth of total Amer-
ican arms sales abroad. Similarly, the
more current reports on munition lists
exports totaling more than $100,000, re-
quired under another commercial sales
reporting provision sponsored last year
by Senator HATHAWAY, contain no data
on the majority of U.S. arms sales. These
are government-to-government sales in
which the U.S. acts as an intermediary
between an American munitions firm and
a foreign country.
This lack of required reports to Con-
gress, coupled with the traditional se-
crecy surrounding international arms
transactions, frequently results in Con-
gress learning about arms sales only as
a result of the diligent efforts of the
press. Thus, ironically, the American
public learned of the 1973 sales to Per-
sian Gulf countries only after the Amer-
ican media picked up an Agence France-
Presse report and pressed the State De-
partment spokesman to officially confirm
the fact that we had an agreement in
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principle to sell Phantoms to elaudia
Arabia and that we were negotiating e
giant deal for arms to Kuwait.
So. too, the American public Iturnee
about negotiations for the sale of tete te
Brazil last year from a reportnrigleatine
in Brazil. And just recently the Wash-
ington Post correspondent in Quite.
Eqtzador?not Washington, .?re -
ported U.S. intentions to resume minter:.
sales to Equador after a 3 year ban.
Equador, which has been in a tuna war
with the United States, resulting in
seleure of U.S. tuna boats and explusion
of U.S. military mission to Quito, has a
long shopping list including 12 T-33
trainer jets, basic infantry equipment,
and large quantities of eretineering
equipment.
Mr. President. 1 request unanimous
consent to have the Washington Post
article entered in the record at the cxyn-
clueioxi of my remarks.
Congressional reliance on the press
for hard data on US. Government arrne
sales abroad, however, is not the most
serious deficiency in the decisioitinekine
system governing such sales. At this
time there is Ito formal procedure be
which Congress can participate in deter-
mining the merits of these arms deal:
befere they are finalized, Nor is there
any way for Congress to exert effectivt
oversight authority and monitor the tin-
part of these deals after they are
negotiated.
These foreign military sales constitute
major foreign policy decisions involving
the United States in military activate*
without sufficient deliberation. This has
gotten us into trouble in the past and
could easily do so again.
These matters require serious delibera-
tion by the Congress and should not be
left exclusively to the executive branch
If Congress is serious about reassert-
ing congressional participation in foreign
affairs and exercising its full responsi-
bility in the formulation of American
foreign policy, reviewing foreign rnietary
sales is the best place to start,
When I first introduced this amend-
ment last June, I pointed out the press
reports of burgeoning U.S. arms sales
to the Persian Gulf nations, including
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran, and to
Latin America. Apparently those sales
were only the tip of the iceberg.
A recent article in the Christian
Science Monitor?an article based on in-
terviews with officials of the State and
Defense Departments--estimates that
the size of arms sales to Persian Gulf
countries in fiscal year 1975 alone could
total $4 to $5 billion. These prospective
sales deserve particular attention in the
leen of heavy U.S. sales in the past 2
yew s. In fiscal year 1973 Iran contracted
to buy $2 billion worth of U.S. military
equipment. A January 1974 New York
Times report Indicated that Iran had
ordered 30 F-14A fighters at a total c-oat
of $900 million and was reportedly ne-
gotiating to buy 50 P-15's. Similarly,
Semite Arabia, which last year ordered
a total of between 150 to 200 F-5 fighters,
signed a $355 million agreement in April
for-the modernization of the Saudi Na-
tional Guard. The agreement includes
the purchase of American armored ye-
!tidies antitank weapons, and artillery
batteries. Possible future sales in the
Perarin Gulf are reported to include the
Hawk missile defense system and various
itee.il eta! t ranging from coastal ships to
(Lest layers .
On the basis of its interviews, the
Chaseen Science Monitor article em-
phial:fat that both the regional and the
naei -West implications of these contin-
large weapons sales is beginning to
vim ey some Government officials.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to !lave the Christian Science Moni-
tor _Arid the New York Times articles en-
tered in the RECORD at the conclusion of
ley eeinerks.
Former Secretary of Defense Melvin
lid-il hits publicly echoed this concern
to ire introduction to an American En-
terprise Institute study titled "Arms in
the Persian (lulf." Mr Laird suggests
hile providing armaments to third
world countries miget be a postive short-
eezi. measure, it should be accompanied
by ciplomatic activity so that weapons
tele:- no not become a standard long-term
1..5 policy. He also raises important
queetiores about the implications of such
tie fm foi future newel and at:commode-
eon in the regain. These are certainly
real issues?issues that deserve to be
debated by both Congress and the execu-
tive inexch.
Similar questions might well be raised
eeoet recent and potential sales of jet
aearait to Latin American countries. In
Lila the administration authorized sales
of F--5E international fighters to Argen-
tina. Breen, Chile, Colombia, and Vene-
zuela ending in one sweet) a 5-year ban
an ihe sale of sophisticated military
equipment to underdeveloped countries.
At Ci December 1973. Brazil had ordered
cle atm-nut Potential orders from Chile.
Peru and Venezuela could total 90 air-
craft, At a cost of $2.5 million per plane.
cL nreraft sales in latin America could
amount to $300 to $400 million over the
next few years. And, as previously noted,
the United States plans to sell arms to
Ecuudor as a result of the truce in the
3-year tuna war with the United States.
Perhaps these trensactions?in the
Persian Gulf, in Latin America, any-
weere?have merit. Perhaps they do not.
Without debating the merits of these
tales it seems to me that they represent
such a qualitative change In our involve-
ment in the Persian Gulf area and such
a significant turn in our Latin American
relations. that Congress must be afforded
:he opportunity to deliberate on these
matters as well as on all other significant
tales agreements entered into by the
et S. Government.
That is exactly the purpose of thls
,imendment. It would give Congress the
opportunity to consider?and if neces-
sary. reject?foreign military sales ac-
eording to prescribed conditions.
The proposal requires the President to
eepoet to both Houses of Congress his
military sales plans when any single deal
far Caah Or credit to any one country
amounts to over $25 million. If, after 30
days from the time the President makes
us report, neither Haase objects, the sale
will be permitted. Agreements with .one
ceuntry with a cumulative value of over
160100040080-8
June 6, Nt74
$5) million in 1 year will similarly be
se eject to this procedure for congres-
sic nal deliberation. Additional single
5a es of $25 million or more to such coun-
tr es will also be subject to review. In an
emergency situation, the President may
wt lye the requirement for congressional
deliberation for 30 days. However, if he
wishes to continue arms shipments after
th xse 30 days, he must at the same time
file a report concerning those future arms
rr eisactions.
The enactment of this provision should
piece no significant administrative bur-
den on the executive branch. Neither
Cc tigress nor the executive branch will be
in-mdated in paper work as a result of
lbs adoption of this amendment. A
Lierary of Congress memorandum
wi itten at my request concludes that the
to-al numter of reports that would have
be et submitted for congressional consid-
eration in fiscal year 1973 had the Nelson
anandrnent been in effect is approxi-
int tely 30. Mr. President, I ask unani-
tnt Qs consent to have entered in the
Re CORD the Library of Congress memo-
reeidurn at the end of my remarks.
:for should the 30-day congressional
retiew period prior to consumation of
sale provide any serious interference
with normal procedures. Under normal
citiumsta.nces the negotiation of a sales
areeement can take months and the de-
livery period for such purchases may
etc end over a period of several years.
purchasing country's decision to buy
Ult.-produced military equipment is
made primarily on the basis of the high
technical quality of American weapons
aml only secondarily on the basis of the
pet ie and delivery schedule. Iran, for ex-
ample, negotiated the purchase a F-14's
for more than a year and reportedly paid
more than double the price that the U.S.
Na /3, paid for the same plane. Their tie-
ilyt is not expected to be completed be-
fore 1977. A thirty day congressional re-
view pet-lie, therefore, would not have
cat sed any significant delay nor lost the
sale.
//id in an emergency situation, the
amendment provides a special waiver to
cot er circumstances such as occurred
dui lag the October conflict in the Middle
Eait.
l'he legislative approach used in this
amendment has several important his-
tor cal precedents. The Reorganization
Act?chapter 9 of title 5, United States
Coele?uses this procedure for congres-
simtal approval of reorganization plans
of the executive branch. Congressional
ape royal of Presidential plans to increase
pae for executive level employees, Mem-
ber i of Congress, the Supreme Court, and
the Cabinet is similarly provided for in
title 2, United States Code, section 359.
When the President sends Congress an
alts rnative pay plan for Federal eru-
pt? tees, the Reorganization Act concept
Is also embodied in that legislation, title
5, 1 Witted States Code, section 5305. And
the Administration Trade Reform Act
which has passed the House of Repre-
sen atives and is pending in the Senate
uset the congressional veto procedure in
a n ember of instances.
I request that a study on the constitu-
tiot ality of the legislative veto embodied
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eilkltu 6,
1974 ApprovedgfferiasV9641107Y-1CFW-ff15M-W57A000100040080-8 S 9853
useful function in ass, ;ring that the Con-
gressional policy origins I ion power is not ab-
dicated to the Executl ,re Branch.
In closing, let me memphasize the im-
portance of these forc:ign military sales.
The Defense Department estimates that
U.S. Government arms sales 'could total
$4.6 billion in fiscal year 1974. Arms sales
to the Persian Gulf ire& alone in fiscal
year 1975 could tot:: $4 to $5 billion.
This Government--MAuding both Con-
FOREIGN MIL1TAR,' SALES ORDERS
'Value in Manz Is of dollars'
-in the Nelson amendment prepared at
my request by the Congressional Re-
search Service, be printed at the con-
clusion of my remarks. That study finds
that-
The proposed amendment is constitu-
tional. It closely parallels the analogous pro-
visions of the Executive Reorganization
Act, the constitutionality of which
been challenged by the Executive
Moreover, the amendment would
has not
Branch.
serve
gress and the executive branch-have
the responsibility to its own citizens and
to the international community to give
very careful consideration to weapons
sales of such magnitude. This amend-
ment would provide both the essential
information and the necessary proce-
dure for congressional review.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
1950-63
1964
Worldwide
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Burma
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
E Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Germany
Ghana
, Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
HOnduras ,.__
celand
ndia
ndochina
ndonesia
ran
raq
reland
rael
aly
amaica
apan
ordan
Kenya
Korea
Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Morocco
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Singapore
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanke
Sweden
Syria
Switzerland
Thailand
Trinidad/Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire
International organizations_
3,
738, 726 1,
401, 218
1,
47, 525
144, 208
32, 838
72, 106
736
19, 217
1,474
592, 635
12,742
1,491
9, 986
761
4, 510
29, 448
1,434
2,619
355
874
663
254, 590
680, 792
1,104
719
224
1, 008
52, 22
8,542
622
1,261
665
1361? 7Si
73, 52
828
286
276
1, 146
73
558
27
8,944
40, 037
3,781
1,995
0
5,049
32, 557
13
342
20, 777
4, 213
4, 108
86, 179
925
2,222
3
26,688
15, 233
1,219
2,874
240
92,169
2,305
61, 181
5
9,373
123,687
1,524
134.816
2, 804
6,650
5
60
31
59, 330
3,524
625
195
141
1,627
60
34
1
3
27, 002
591, 903
175
261
2
14
12
24
1,254
(9
332
62, 540
45, 618
1,408
55
614
258
3
949
60
5,460
11,676
21
335
7,477
774
(9
597
36
1, 115
847
2, 157
2,781
2
31, 747
0
182
360,648
(I)
9,551
1,168
19,826
I Less than $500.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
Fiscal years--
1965 1966 I :i2.7 1968
1969
1,261, 585 1, 579, 172 960, 02 1, 177, 109 1, 248, 377
1,276 7,295 6, 5";4 14, 871 4,013
326, 155 47, 521 114, .1,,77 32, 879 35, 768
6, 212 6, 041
2, 167 2, 111' 1, 180
6,310 15,4:2 2,236 9,739
7, 709
28 132 ' 17 3
23, 625223 31, 3114
53 ., 4, 265 11,493
91 1 '. 100 46
41,070 71, 264 21, 82,' 18, 377 16, 183
1, 697
2,181 1,058 2, ,150 4,134
1, 095
5,008 14, fr ,' 42, 996 37, 174
150 496 -, i 56 144
(9
8, 206 7, 330 9, 9, 080 10, 378
115 266 1 (9
1, 476
119 i l 14
2 (9
18 35 514 6
30 4 ? 7
1 1
7, 495 (9
11, Iii 8, 911 6, 47) 6, 289
313, 967 167, 589 191, ; ,0 163, 998 601, 236
1 (*) 2
709 472 8, (139 15. 366 11,283
444 546 1 1 329 153
13 4 59
1,874 389 1, 58 1, 576 167
1 1 24
68, 876 124, 080 142, 516 69, 279 255, 960
10, 783 87 51 0?
(1)
60,009 72, 134 9, ' 25 430, 822 71, 850
- 41,563 38, 418 21, '83 101,761 38, 259
1 1 3 3
15, 977 16, 742 10, ;'82 20, ri 52, 4
2P
41, 100 1,627 30,1,97 33, 485 13, 421
3,32
9 1, 504
Q.? 2, 2't5
67 48 60
77
52 541 15, 524 2, 389
1, 811
443 457 , /1 1
1, 608 113
17 563 5121 I, 323
6, 010401 84
573 .,1 2 96 399
4, 631
I.,/ 12, 955
16, 157 24, 192 25, 516
5, 361 6, 485
24, 424 5, 248
9, '01 11, 144 30, 267
26 10 15 105 2
5 0 2
21, 334 12, 949 38, 15 56, 855 24, 330
1,319 I, 147 5, 6/1 15, 031 22, 532
0)
3' 43'1'93 1, 6611 3
34
1, 015
3, 727 2, 679
260 137 237 454
425 115 17 780
4, 844 500
4, 096
8, 443 8, 652 46, 175
I 841 196
0) 56 1 1 4
28,857 20,019 122, 942 8,647 14, 226
(9 (9 1
880 449 2? 8, 011 106
492 1, 345 '02 25, 790 19, 980
5:02
12 1 10 3,829
11
129 804 139 2, 106
154,741 875,136 239: ,i'ii...,6070 16, 370 17, 523
56 30 26
10, 529 11,833
1, 242 1, 177
2
2 185 - /7 221 212
1, 142
226 (i)
3,672 24, 780 24, 519 18, 316 9,989
1970
1971
1972
1973
1950-73
926, 343 1,
599, 979 3,
282, 431
3, 619, 368
20, 914, 340
11,406
611,, 737507
4, 458
2, 584
7
53, 500
7, 738
33, 638
176
6,937
20
6
3, 487
253, 990
61
29, 302
464
2, 095
112, 62
45, 2 R
37,403
8
21, 291
30, 655
1,558
5, 447
107
1, 838
5
13
2, 441
7, 618
5,499
93
9,790
4,854
15
(9
2,244
868
1,191
4, 625
2, 476
1
25, 954
324
4, 428
21, 150
85
2, 480
63, 582
241
788
44
54
36, 224
14,374
44, 361
24, 814959
45
21, 489
84
239,, 068163
61, 143
2, 179
15, 570
31
315
11
1
6, 085
186, 997
(I)
25, 416
8, 779
82
18
433, 108
11
313, 489
27, 245
9
11,639
20, 109
847
492
...d
632
93
272
437
2, 627
11
7, 651
6,524
797
23, 409
20, 473
10
1, 492
1,107
1,461
96, 863
2, 089
1
111, 304
1,037
581
48
1, 154
46, 805
2, 086
1, 607
12
17, 490
17, 478
16, 795
117, 222
2, 359
5, 080
15
34, 567
281
38, 429
6,075
81, 073
5, 514
34
16, 276
16
4
S1.2
59
7, 826
958, 024
193, 406
2,511
1, 45231765
(9
521, 700
248
435, 525
78, 205
3
46,593
18, 637
2, 362
22
3, 125
24
28, 547
48
182
7, 179
17, 832
3,453
92
2
20,24 3384
449
20
1' 61350
3,676
333, 388
5, 917
2
23, 888
1, OW
176, 396709
5, 499
125, 993
1, 683
42, 208
2
123
301
37, 926
14, 032
18, 515
2, 450
5,660
19
12, 386
167
83, 793
14,896
961,, 310391
7, 657
80
70
7, 951
200, 535
52, 669
3,727
418
47
(9
148
2,054, 311
197
183, 499
89, 984
7
50,856
14,740
2, 579
53
5, 634
1, 636
177
624
1, 821
1, 097
2, 386
83
46, 476
3,264
15
684
17, 729
211,, 956275
35
6, 659
708
558
60, 693
7, 573
1
49, 484
2,489
18:917007
212, 801
117, 836
1, 612
23, 373
1, 089
717
589
94,119
139, 647
1, 06726,, 919692
1401,, 201025
1626,, 424939
1, 05296,, 662861
375, 014
20, 324
4, 953105
121,607
42, 971963
358
1, 546
734
63
347, 237
5, 310, 810
64
313871,,, 095393256
224
62, 749398
8, 542
3,789,13, 911581205
458
1, 629, 151
668, 500
34
365, 118
206, 607
10, (9136
10, 72535
2, 860
30, 385
326,, 756249
13, 519327
39, 016
94
202, 363
114,795
3,242
3,281
237, 954
126, 633
1, 627
45, 346133
194, 942995
654, 805
19, 0960
31.9
410, 3426
4
42, 606
1
115, 284
45, 608
85
2, 885
226, 456
1, 894, 487
8, 389
173, 260
1, 09 8
12, 43 3
53599
41109,9
Source: Departa ent of Defense.
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S9854
Approved For Rei4
[Prom the Christian Science-Monitor, May re
1974]
efxreteirr AIMS DZALS Memo Darren Marie:
COSTLY Weapons ?Rolf Weer, 71erae Erne:
ON ARAB /STATION% SMELTS CAIISE (10Natri4
(By Dana Adams Schmidt)
Wessurorotra-The prospect of nicoe mut
tibillion-dollar areas deals with Iran and
Saudi Arabia in the 1975 fiscal year---arel
the arms race such deals may portend? a.
beginning to worry some officials of the 8tatc-
and Defense Departments.
The outlook, these offiGials say, is for de
billion and possibly as much as $4 billion
worth of aalee to Iran during this period
anti more than $1 billion worth tc Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait Is, meanwhile, in the maritel
for a several hundred million dollar air de-
fenee system.
Privately, American officials are convincte
that hundreds of millions of dollars- wortit
of costly weapons sent to these and other
countries of the Middle East are bound It
end up rusting In vrarehouees, Of more like-
ly, out In the open. These efeciale point out
that It is a great deal easier to buy a piece
of rnilltary hardware than to train men to
use it.
But the thing that worries the efliciate
inueh more than the waste is the effect these
huge programs, combined with adcalonie
punthases from Prance and Britain. tire go-
ing to have on Iraq and its superpower back-
er, the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait.
Iran, and Iraq are the principal countries oo
the shore of the Persian Gulf, all at them
oil eillionaires.
The rationale for the program; ti that.
since the British military withdrawal from
the gulf at the end of 1967 the trotintries
of the area have themselves begun to fill
the power vacuum the British presumably
left behind.
But some here believe it is likely that they
are In fact getting Into a new and major
arms race?s race made more complex he
the fact that in 'addition to the East-West
implications, Saudi Arabia end Iran are tra-
ditional rivals.
Here are some of the sketchy facts on the
sales available from company and credal
sources. (The purchasing countries object to
the publication of details of their transac-
tions, and American companies coneernel
with their own profits and American officiate
concerned with the United States balance
of payments are usually eager to coaperate
In withholding the information.)
The $3 billion to $4 billion deals 'site Iran
for the period In question include about It
billion worth of la-14 Jet fighters built by
Grumman, together with the extra gear that
may be required over ? period of three years-
spare parts, spare engines, technical equip-
ment, ground support, bombe. missiles
and electronic firecoutrol equipment
NCI.LnirG eregaaarere
In addition the Shah probably will be buy-
ing McDonnell-Douglas F-15's as these be-
come available. The U.S. already has .agreec
to sell them.
Other deals with the Iranhans which art
included in the coming fiscal year (although
they may take yens longer to complete) In-
dude $400 million to $500 million for navel
craft, notably two Spruance-class destroyers
MISSILES' uectotego
Another item on the Iranian list, is re-
equipment with the latest-model Hawk Mis-
siles These are air-defense missiles said to
be the American answer to the Russian SA-6
which proved so effective against the Lraelis
last October.
The size of the corning year's military deals
should be appreciated against the background
of about $2 billion worth of military sales
last year and about $1 billion worth curing
the preceding years.
aafbi3NRIO'CitAWRoWalOgYAM100040080-8 June 6,-1974
ihe Saudis have not thus far purchased
the nmet expensive American Jet fighters,
altaouga they were told last fall that the
United States was willing to sell them P-4
Phantoms. No answer has been received from
Saudi Arabia, and American officials now me-
stere that the Salute are buying Preach
MirafeS,
'l he biggest itani In the coming year will
be a $750 nIjhliomu. naval expansion program_
rlu.; includes aleable sums for the bricks
sine mortar of navalbeee development as well
as 19 stew; ranging It size from (-vestal craft
`rigate.
Mott of the rest of the billion-dollar esti-
mate for the year Is devoted to modernize-
:tor. ant! mechanizielon of the Saudi na-
tiOnal guard.
Not included la the estimate for the year
5 a $3e0 million agreement recently con-
eheleci between the Sp.uat Government and
Raytteon for the modernization of the court-
try'.eight-year-old Hawk missile-defense sys-
een.
The Kuwaitis, who have definitely opted
out of the P-4 market in favor of French
efireges. are engaged in comparing the Hawk
with the French crotne and British missile
systilins.
PrO121 the New York Times,
January 18. 1974]
axets SAIXS Doom ;11 MIDEAST: tharren
firerrs Is ma PrINCTrAL SIIPPLTER
Pace, January 12.- -The decision by Iran
to order 000-railliou in American-built
fighters Is only ens sign of the growing bust-
Us arms in the eliddle-East---a business
that In expected to continue booming as cof-
airs of the oil state swell following recent
price Increases
Several Industrial countries. in pa.rticular
France, Britain.. Italy and Japan, are cons-
pectus for oil supply contracts with the Mid-
dle Fast producers.
Among the induceseente. are commitments
by rile industrial eourtries to participate in
the economic, technological and military de-
velnpmert of the producer countries.
The oil states of she Persian Gulf are
eweethlly interested in military development.
and even though Washington Is not com-
peting for oil supplres --or at least not Open-
ly?It is the United Beaten that is the prin-
crpia arms supplier in the region.
Mai DICASI RUTS JETS
But Prance and Britian ars coming up fast.
Prat:sit,. for Instance, has Just sold the tiny
emirate of Abu Dhabi 14 Mirage Jets, Abu
Death, has only 80,000 people and no pilots.
ehe pilots will coins from Pakistan.
The prod-icing state- Neatly their deiriend
hoc :allitary equipment in several ways.
In the first place. rnany are still run on
cAniservativo feudal lines and face constant
:eternal threats from- eeparetertS and Pales-
tine guerrillas. So they say they need the
arme to maintain internal stability.
'Its keep ,control on border conflicts, such
as that between Kuwait ard Iraq last spring.
and :o reduce the possibilities of Intervention
or the region by the major powers are other
arguments used to 'wally the arms build-up.
1.081170N or e..5.
United Stalin,. which late contingents
ei arms salesmen techruclare; and counselors
It most of the Middle Eastern state*, main-
calm- tikal Its desire Is to help the producers
resist eventual penetration by the Russians
sr 01,1 Chinese.
While the oil producers have been raising
teen prices, the cost cf arms has also been
novItig tip swiftly.
In .'act, from the poen. or" view of Iran, the
biggest arms purctsaaer la the region, the
feet that defense goods have moved up so
espicly wen one of the elements behind the
reset: sharp increases in oil prices.
Inua wee reportedly interested in the la-
1 IA tighter for some time, but was reluctarit
to pay the high price, MO-million for each
a:craft. demanded by the manufacturer, the
C rumman Corporation of Long Island.
That figure, which includes spare parts,
believed to be twice what the United States
Navy and Marine Corps have paid for their
Ir -14A fighters.
LiNzL or firzfrinNG
With prospects for quardupled oil rev-
eaues this year, /ran presumably now feels
a Ile to afford the Grumman price.
Iran's annual military budget has risen
rt =natty at a rate of nearly SO per cent and
tJ at of Saudi Arabia by nearly a third.
In the nineteen-fifties Iran's arms buying
wIs lees than $10-million a year. By the late
U neteen-sixties the figure exceeded 1150-
n Ilion, and it will reach $2-billion a year
during the current live-year plan, begun last
M arch.
The Pretch have military contracts with a
n-unber of Persian Gulf states. Saudi Arabia,
fc ? instance. Is buying 88 Mirage III jets,
A.4E-30 tanks, light automatic machine
sa no. amphibious equipment, and tactical
se '-to-air and ground-to-air missiles.
KUWAIT: CONTRACTS SOI7OHT
French and American arms salesmen are
151 w fighting for new contracts in Kuwait.
11.e French are proposing Mirage Jets for the
Kewalti air force, while the United States is
ot ering F-f 's or F'-4's.
elthough Britain's influence in the region
Is on the wane, the British were able to get
at important contract with Saudi Arabia last
ye tr, representing deliveries of $800-million
of arms purchases, mainly aeronautical
eqnprnent, over five years.
3ritain has sold naval equipment to, several
of the emirates, and some aircraft and culti-
st' 'marine helicopters to Iran.
3ut the United States is by far the big-
ge a supplier to the two principal arms pun-
ch leers in the region, Iran and Saudi Arabia
rff the Washington Post, May 21, 1974]-
/mese &mass REVIYLNO ABMS SALES TO
actrencer. Arrant Cerroer
(By Terri Shaw)
.Jurro, Ecumeme?As part of U.S. Secretary
of etate Henry A. Kissinger's drive to improve
reit More with Latin America, the United
Mates reportedly is about to resume some
mi itary Mille to Ecuador after a three-year
ba
-nformed sources here said that Ecuador's
mi leery government had presented a long
lit of military equipment it wants from the
United States, Including 12 T-33 trainer lets,
bit ic infantry equipment and large que;nti-
tie of engineering equipment.
r'he sources said the united States Is also
pie toning to invite Ecuadorean officers to at-
tet d training programs in the Panama Canal
Zo.ie.
I aisruzaptien of military weapons salee,
.ch were cut off in January, 1971, during a
die lute over Ecuador's seizure of American
tied Ing boat,, appeared to be part of a gen-
era i warming of relations between Wesh-
ine ton and the two-year-old military govern-
me it that Jules this small country on the
wet court of South America.
Ult. officials reportedly hope that an lin-
prt vement In relations will make Ecuador
num receptive to U.S. views during His-
sin per's periodic meetings with Latin Ameri-
cat foreign ministers.
I eusaor will receive no U.S. government
ere fits for the weapons, because the country
Mu recently begun exporting oil and has
enough hard currency to buy the arms on
eta- udard, corunercial terms, the sources said.
living money to buy modern weapons is
nee for Ecuador, for many years one of the
poc test Latin-American countries. The milie
tar government, which seized power in Feb-
rue ty 1972. has pledged to spend most of its
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reserves on economic development, and
some Ecuadoreans question the wisdom of
the arms purchases while there is still hun-
ger and widespread poverty, especially in the
countryside.
Most of the equipment used by the 56,000-
man armed forces is of World War II vintage.
Military aircraft visible at Quito's airport,
high in the Andes mountains, include sev-
eral C-47 transports, a Constellation and a
Flying Boxcar. The military government re-
cently purchased 41 new tanks from France
and sent a mission to Moscow to discuss pos-
sible arms purchases.
A factor in Ecuador's quest for new arms
is fear neighboring Peru, which in 1942 oc-
cupied a large chunk of Ecuadorean jungle
at the headwaters of the Amazon River.
While the two countries now have good re-
lations, Ecuador has not given up its ambi-
tions as an "Amazonian country." Peruvian
oil exploration in the area has fed rumors of
military incursions and even of skirmishes
between forces of the two countrtes.
Lifting,of the U.S. ban on military aid fol-
lowed a discreet exchange of "smoke signals"
between Quito and Washington, informed
sources said.
While the United States quietly eased some
of the restrictions placed by Congress on aid
to Ecuador after the seizures of U.S. tuna
boats, the Ecuadoreans reportedly moderated ?
their criticisms of American "economic
coercion" in international forums like the
United Nations and the Organization of
American States.
There was also a letup in the "Tuna War,"
which began in 1962 when Chile. Peru and
Ecuador declared a 200-mile territorial limit
and required boats fishing within 200 miles
off their coasts to purchase licenses.
The military government has decreed a
new fishing law which informed sources said
could open the way to joint ventures by
Ecuadorean and U.S. interests. The U.S. em-
bassy is expected to mediate between the
Ecuadorean government and the 'U.S. fishing
companies in San Diego in an attempt to
work out an agreement under the new law.
The truce in the "Tuna War" prompted
President Nixon's formal lifting of the sales
ban in January.
Resumption of military sales and training
is not expected to bring back a large U.S.
military mission to Quito. The last one was
expelled in 1971 following the cutoff of the
arms sales program. Ambassador Robert C.
Brewster is expected to enlarge his staff of
military attaches to handle the paper work
involved in the training program and
weapons sales.
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, D.C., May 29, 1974.
To: Hon. Gaylord Nelson; Attention: Paula
Stern.
From: Allan W. Farlow, National Defense
Specialist.
Via: Chief, Foreign Affairs Division.
Subject: Report Required under the Proposed
Nelson Amendment.
This memorandum responds to your recent
request for answers to the following ques-
tions:
1, How many individual Sales of U.S. arms
to other countries involving an amount of
$25 million or more were made by the United
States government in FY 1973?
Answer: According to the Office of the
Comptroller, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, Department of Defense there were
nineteen such sales.
2. How many instances of total sales of
U.S. arms to a single country by the
government of $50 million or more during
FY 1973 were there?
Answer: There were eleven such instances.
3. How many individual sales of U.S. arms
of ?25 million or more to countries which
had previously purchased an accumulation of
$50 million from the ti E. government were
made during FY 1973 :Do not include in-
dividual sales reported in the answers to
question number 1 aboat ?
Answer: None not is etuded in the nine-
teen reported in the aneser to question num-
ber 1. ?
In Summary, during PY 1973, based on the
information furnished -oy the Office of the
Comptroller, Defense Security Assistance
Agency, in response to ne above questions,
there were a total of not more than 30 sales
incidents during FY 1E11 which would have
required reports by the executive branch to
the House of Represent dives and the Senate
under the provisions of the proposed Nelson
Amendment.
THE LIBRAR 07' tiONGRESS,
CONGRESSIONAL RE:3 q:ARCII SERVICE,
Washington, D.0 . September 4, 1973.
To: Hon. Gaylord Nei:soli; Attention: ? Paula
Stern.
From: American Law D
Subject: Constitutions I ,sy of the Legislative
Veto Amendment t. the Foreign Military
Sales and Assistanse Act.
This memorandum Id in response to your
request of July 30, 1971, for material on the
constitutionality of the legislative veto.
Amendment No. 253 to S. 1443, the pro-
posed Foreign Military sales and Assistance
Act, requires Congressamal approval of any
foreign military sale ,sceeding 25 million
dollars. or sales to any sountry exceeding 50
million dollars for a fissal year. The amend-
ment permits either Heise of the Congress
to disapprove a sale or increase in assistance
by means of a simple re elution within thirty
days of the report to he Congress Df the
proposed transaction. see 119 Cong. Rec. S.
11930 (daily ed. June 21 1973).
Our analysis of the oroblem persuades us
that the proposed amsodment Is constitu-
tional. Perhaps, the be way to demonstrate
this is to examine the historical background
of the legislative veto ai it developed in the
Executive Reorganizataie Acts. We wil:. begin
by defining the ternis Commonly used in this
area.
narnarr EONS
A. Congressional vete The term "congres-
sional veto" is a generic term covering a vari-
ety of statutory devicee which enable one or
both Houses of the Congress, or one or more
committees of the Consress, to preclude the
Executive from final implementation of a
proposed action authorized by law. This
definition includes clay those measures
which legally compel the Executive to forego
the proposed action. It excludes many pro-
visions that are ones described as Con-
gressional legislative r committee vetoes,
but which do not legs Sy preclude Executive
action if Committee approval is not forth-
coming.
B. Legislative veto. A legislative veto is a
provision in a statuos that requires the
President or an Execuo,ie agency to submit
actions proposed to 1,s taken pursuant to
statutory authority to the Congress at a
specified interval, usura1y-30 to 60 days, be-?
fore they become istfe s Live. The action be-
comes effective at the 'Arse of the interval 1)
if the Congress fails to express its disap-
proval, or 2) in a few :saes, if the Congress
expresses its approval. ,f the disapproval or
approval takes the f orris of a concurrent reso-
lution by both Housed of the Congress, the
measure can be termea a "two-House" legis-
lative veto. If the disapproval takes the form
of a simple resolution 1.y either House, then
the device is a "one-Weise" legislative veto.
Neither a concurre st resolution nor a
simple resolution is se: Isented to the Presi-
dent for his signasura Thus, neither form
of approval or disapproval is subject to veto
by the President. In 1.7-is memorandum, the
term legislative veto eaes not include meas-
ures which require tee Congressional dis-
approval to take the form of legislation en-
acted by both Houses and signed by the
President (or passed over his veto).
C. Committee veto. The committee veto
includes several types of statutes. Among
these are provisions which require an Ex-
ecutive agency to submit a report of a pro-
posed action to one or more committees
of the Congress at a stated interval, usually
30 to 60 days, prior to its effective date.
During the interval, the action may be
blocked by a resolution of disapproval by
any of the committees. In some instances,
the action does not become effective until
all designated committees pass resolutions
of approval. Finally, some committee veto
provisions do not specify an interval, but
rather provide that the Executive agency
must "come into agreement" with the re-
sponsible committees before it may take the
proposed action.
D. Reporting Provisions. The term "report-
ing provision" refers to those statutes which
provide that a proposed action by the Ex-
ecutive branch shall not take place until
the expiration of a specified time, usually 30
to 60 days, after the proposed action has
been reported to the two Houses of the
Congress or to designated committees of the
Congress.
This type of statute is often referred to as
a waiting period, a report-and-wait? or a
laying-on-the-table provision. In some cases,
the waiting period may be waived in whole
or in part by resolutions of approval by the
designated Houses or committees, Some of
these laws do not specify the waiting period,
but simply provide that no action may be
taken until after there has been "full con-
sultation" with the designated committee.
During the waiting period, the responsible
committees have an opportunity to review
the proposed action and make their ap-
proval or disapproval known to the agency.
The agency, however, is not legally bound
by a committee's resolution of disapproval.
It may go forward with the proposed action
unless the disapproval takes the form of
enacted legislation.
The practical effect of most reporting pro-
visions may be the same as that of a com-
mittee veto, because most agencies are usu-
ally reluctant to take an action that is clearly
contrary to the wishes of its oversight Con-
gressional -committee. For this reason, re-
porting provisions are frequently lumped to-
gether with true legislative or committee
vetoes in discussions of the general topic.
See Harris, Congressional Control of Admin-
istration 204-48 (1962). From a constitu-
tional viewpoint, however, there is a major
distinction between the two types of legisla-
tion.
Many of the statutory provisions commonly
referred to as committee vetoes pr Congres-
sional vetoes are actually reporting provi-
sions. Twelve of the 19 veto provisions com-
piled by this Division in 1967 were reporting
requirements. See Small, The Committee
Veto: Its Current Use and Appraisals of Its
Validity (Legislative Reference Service,
Jan. 16, 1967). Twenty-two of the 39 provi-
sions compiled by the American Law Divi-
sion in January 1973 were reporting provi-
sions.
See Williams, Federal Statute Citations
Which Give Congressional Veto Over the
Power of the Executive Relating to Disposal
of Federal Property or Interest (American
Law Division, January 15, 1973) .
PARALLEL PROVISIONS
There are numerous other statutes which
also contain "one-House" legislative vetoes.
See, for example, 22 U.S. Code sec. 2587, deal-
ing with transfer of functions to the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency; 50 U.S.
Code App. sec. 194g, dealing with sales of
military rubber plants; and 8 U.S. Code sec.
1254, governing the suspension of deportation
proceedings for aliens by the Attorney Gen-
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era:. Because the legislative veto csrlienated
in the Reorganization Acts. this Luernar1313-
duns will concentrate on the legislative back-
ground of that Act. ft would appear ciear
that if the legislative veto feature of the ex-
ecutive Reorganization Act is constitvtionae,
then the similar provisions in arielogout
statutes are also constitutional.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY : ACTH Or 1932 AND 1933
The legislative history of the prove .on for
disapproval of reorganization piens by either
House of the Congress extends back to 1932.
The Economy Act of 1932 gave President
Hoover the authority to consolidate, redis-
tribute, and transfer various Government
agencies and functions by Executive Order.
The Act provided that each order should be
transmitted to Congress In asseica., tune
should not become effective until el days
thereafter. The Act also provided that 'if
either branch of Congress within such 60
calendar days shall pass a resolution rump-
proving such Executive order or any part
thereof, such Executive order shall become
null and void to the extent of such disap-
proval." 47 Stat. 414 (1932).
In an opinion denting with the propriety in
an urgent deficiency bill of a pr talon au-
thorizing a joint committee of Congress to
make the fLnal decision as to whether refeincLi
over $20,000 shall be made and to lot the
amount thereof, Attorney General William D.
Mitchell cast doubt on the one-House dtsap-
pros al mechanism.
"It must be assumed that the functions of
the President under this set were executive
in their nature or they could not have beet,
conetitutionally conferred upon him, end so
there was set up a method by wrath one
house of Congress might disapprove Execu -
Live action. No one would question the power
of Congress to provide for delay in the execu-
tion of such an administrative order, or Its
power to withdraw the authority to mate the
order, provided the withdrawal Wet the
forte of legislation The attempt te give is
either Rouse of Congress, by action which ie
not legislation, power to disapprove aimin-
istrative acts, raises a grave question as to
the validity of the entire provision in toe Act
of June 30, 1932 for Executive reorgenteation
of governmental functions." 37 Op. Attt . (len.
64-65 ;1933).
Largely as a result of the Attorney Gen-
erale criectien, Congress replaced the one-
Howe disapproval provision In 1933 with a
"waiting period" provition. This latter pro-
vide:: than an order because effective alter 60
days, unless Congress provided otherwise by
statute: this disapproval, In turn. wat sub-
ject to being vetoed by the President. Act of
March 3, 1933, Sec 407, 47 Stat, 151F. The
Coneress appeals to have counterec the ob-
jection to its disapproval power by limiting
the Act's duration to two years. Atereeingle
It expired in 1935. The next Reoreniniastion
Act was not enacted until 1939.
THE 1939 ACT
Tlie Reorganization Act of 1930 granted re-
orga eizatIon authority to President leeeseveli
for e two year period. The Act provided that
the Presidential reorganization proposee
were to be embodied lu "plans", not in Iser-
ecuove "orders". Each plan would become
effective 60 days after its trensmittel io the
Congress, =lees it was disapproved en Its
entirety by a concurrent resolution of both
Houses of the Congress. Such a concurrent
resolution was not subject to Presidential
veto
The House Committee which reported the
bill proceeded on the constitutional theory
that the power conferred upon the Preiadent
by tee Act was legislative in character: be-
cause of this, it seemed inaccurate to provide
that his action take the form of an F-xecu-
eve order, as did the 1983 Ace The Commit-
tee reasoned that the power was neither 'ex-
ecutive.' in a true sense, or an "order", for
the reereanizattons weuld take place not as
con-sequence of the President's order, but
43 consequence' of the happening of the
contingencies set etre. in the Act. The Corn-
roit ee stated:
"ehr fahure of Congress to pass such a
soneurrent resolutioe is the contingency
upont which the reorearierations take effect.
Their taking effect is not because the Pres-
ider.; orders them That the taking effect of
action legislative ui cearee ter may be made
depeincietit upon conditions or contingencies
to well recognized: Louise Report No. 120,
76th Cong., let teries. 4-5 (1939.)
Tee Committee relied oil the then recent
:Supreme Court decisioe in Curtin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1 i1939), wheel upheld the validity
of a eeferendum of faieliers which determined
whether the Secretes" of Agriculture could
exercise the authority given him by the
atatete. The Gomeniteee concluded that it
mien:eft difficult to believe that the ellec-
ovelees of action legelative in character
may be conditioned upon a vote of farmers
but ina.y not be conditioned on a vote of the
two legislative bodies of the Congress." House
Report No. 120, 76th (eing.. lit Seise 6 (1939).
See elso United Stales v. Rock Royal Coops-r-
atter, Inc., 307 U.S. 583 i1932) (agricultural
marketing etatutel; Morahan Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 640 (18112) (ending of fact by
executive ofecer under Tariff Act): J.W.
Nate pine, Jr. & Co. V. ,7 ailed States, 276 U.S.
3e4 1038). The Supreme Court has stated
that the Congress may fulfill -the essentials
of the legialative funetion" by authorizing
"is statutory commune to become operative
sacertainceere of a basic condition of
feet by is designated representative of the
serveirunent." liirabar eht v. United States,
320 7.1Y13. 81, 104 (1943)
TH1 1943 Aer
In 1945, ei Report of the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary recommended a veto by
eith." House.
Ti, committee reeve:fled that the Reor-
ganization Act delegates part of the legis-
lative- power of the Co great to the President:
when subject to a one-House veto, such a
&gazetteer does not operate to deprive either
ilOuu of its oonstitutional right not to have
any .:hangs made In the law without the
Resent of at least a majority of its members;
either House, after seeing precisely how the
Preseleut proposes to exercise the general
powet delegated effectively to him would
have its own independent right to veto the
I-residential action and thus to retain the
esaeretal authority veseed in it by the Con-
stew Ion Senate Repolt No 638. 79th Cong.,
let Steen, at 9 (1945). The Senate, however,
restored the veto try concurrent resolution,
titer a diecession cf the constitutionality of
the one-House veto. See 95 Cong. Rec. 10289-
74, 1s714 (1045)
Ten. 1E444 ACT
The one-House veto 'war: first enacted In
Its present form in 1942. The specific provi-
non ertginated in the proposed Senate bill.
the eeruite Committee on Expenditures In
the execritive Department% (now the Corn-
'II it t in Government OperationsI requested
the eusteee Department's current GIME Of
the .innaeitutional !sates raised earlier by
At tor ley rleneral Mitchell In 1933.
The Department responded, first, that
Mitchelet statement concerning the 1932
Act wee obiter dictum, (that is, not essential
ei the central matter bailie decided and,
eenee not bLndingi, because his opinion was
.:oneernell only with the constitutionality of
proposed legislation offectiag tea funds.
eecondiy, the Department stated that
elitclielle opinion was based on the unsound
premise that the Congress. in disapproving
.4 Wee. e exercising e legislative function
dl a nonlegislative ins icier The memoran-
dum continued
'But the Congress exercises Its full legis-
lie lye power when It passes a statute au-
th nersing the President to reorganize the
ex,eutive branch of the Government by
nee ens of reorganization plans. At that point
the Congress decides what the policy shall
be and laye down the statutory standards
an 1 limitations which shall be the frame-
we-it of Executive action under the Reor-
ga lization Act. If the legislation stopa there,
wl ea no provision for future reference to the
Coegress, the President's authority to reor-
ga ilas the teoverntnent is complete. Indeed,
such authority was given in full to President
Rcesevelt in the Reorganization Act of 1933
Stat. 1517).
The pattern of the 1939 and 1945 Fteor-
ga.iisatIon Acts has been to give the reor-
ga 'elation euthorfty to the President, and
the n provide machinery whereby the Con-
go is may approve or disapprove the plans
preposed by the President. Nor is it, in the
cir mrastanc as, an improper legislative en-
en sehment upon the Executive in the per-
for mance of functions delegated to him by
Us Congrets. As indicated above, the au-
therity given to the President to reorganize
Us Government is legally and adequately
vet ted in the President when the Congress
tales the iritial step of passing a reorgani-
rat ion act.
' The quertion here raised relates to the
re; ervation by the Congress of the right to
die spprove action taken by the President un-
ties- the statutory grant of authority. Such
res ervations are not unprecedented. There
Mee been a number of occasions on which
Us Congress has participated in similar
fat oion in the administration of the laws.
An example is to be found in section 19 of
the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended
(8 U.S.C. 155(c); Public Law 863, Beth
(70 ig.), wleieh requires the Attorney General
to report tc. the Congress cases of suspen-
se>s of deportation of aliens and which pro-
teen further that "if during the session of
the Congress at which a case is reported ? ? ?
the Congress passes a concurrent resolution
eta .ing in sibstance that it favors the SUE-
pea sion of such deportation, the Attorney
Oe teral shell cancel the deportation pro-
cee !Inge ? ? ? If prior to the close of the
sett ion of the Congress next following the
sea ton at which a case Is reported, the Con-
gre a does not pass such a concurrent reso-
lut on. the Attorney General shall thereupon
dee ort such alien ? ? ?.' The Congress has
tins reserved the opportunity to express ap-
petrel or disapproval of executive actions in
a d +scribed field.
Still other examples may be found in the
lee s relating to the administration by the
Set !teary of the Navy of the naval petroleum
res. rves, wits ch require consultation by him
wit s the Armed Services Committees of the
Cos gress before he takes certain types of ac-
t:ce such as entering into certain contracts
relating to those reserves, starting condem-
nat on proceedings, etc. (34 U.S.C. 524): and
in the statute which requires the Joint Com-
mit tee an Printing to give its approval before
an executive agency may have certain types
of i tinting cork done outside of the Govern-
mime. Printing Mace (44 U.S.C. 111).
" t cannot be questioned that the Presi-
dee : in carrying out his Executive functions
ma:* consult with whom he pleases. The Pres-
Ida it frequeetly consults with congressional
less ers, for example, on matters of legisla-
tive interest--even on matters which may be
con edered to be strictly within the purview
of she Executive, such as those relating to
Tort ign policy. There would appear to be no
rem on why the Executive may not be given
exp vas statttory authority to communicate
to 'he Congress his Intention to perform a
give
is Executive function unless the Congress
by tome stated means indicates Its (neap-
pro The Reorganization Acts of 1939 and
194. gave recognition to this principle. The
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Iriresident, in asking the Congress to pass the
instant reorganization bill, is following the
pattern established by those acts, namely by
taking the position that if the Congress will
delegate to him authority to reorganize the
Government, he will undertake to submit all
reorganization plans to the Congress and to
put no such plan into effect if the Congress
indicates its disapproval thereof. In this pro-
cedure there is no question involved of the
Congresa taking legislative action beyond its
initial passage of the Reorganization Act. Nor
is there any question involved of abdication
by the Executive of his Executive functions
to the Congress. It is merely a case where the
Executive and the Congress act in coopera-
tion for the benefit of the entire Government
and the Nation.
'Tor the foregoing reasons, it is not be-
lieved that there is constitutional objection
to the provision in section 6 of the reorgani-
zation bills which permits the Congress by
concurrence resolution to express its disap-
proval of reorganization plans."
Memorandum Re: Constitutionality of
Provisions in Proposed Reorganization Bills
Now Pending in Congress, reprinted in Sen-
ate Report No. 232, 81st Cong.; 1st Sess. 18-
20 (1949) (Citations omitted; emphasis
added).
Although the conclusion was limited to the
use of the concurrent resolution, he under-
scored portions of the memorandum noted
that "disapproval . . . by . . . either House"
was not a legislative act and thus not con-
stitutionally objectionable.
On the Report accompanying the Bill, the
Senate Committee stated:
"It was determined that the most direct
and effective way to eliminate the need for
exemptions was to include an amendment
providing that a simple resolution of disap-
proval by either the House or the Senate
would be sufficient to reject and disapprove
any reorganization plan submitted by the
President.
"By reserving to either House the power to
disapprove, Congress retains in itself the
power to determine whether reorganization
plans submitted to the Congress by the Presi-
dent shall become law. The power of disap-
proval reserved to each House by the bill
does not delegate to either House the right to
make revisions in the plans, but it will en-
able each House to prevent any such plan of
which it disapproves from becoming law. The
power thus reserved to each House seems es-
sentially the same as that possessed by each
House in the ordinary legislative process, in
which process no new law or change in exist-
ing law can be made if either House does not
favor it. No significant difference -would seem
to exist by reason of the fact that under the
ordinary legislative process' the unwillingness
of either House to approve the making of new
laws or a change in existing law is manifested
by the negative act of refusing to register a
favorable vote, whereas under the bill the un-
willingness must be manifested by the af-
firmative act of the passage of a resolution
of disapproval of a reorganization plan. The
unessential character of this difference be-
comes even more apparrent when regard is
had to the stringent rule contained in the
bill which makes impossible actions cal-
culated to delay or prevent consideration of
resolutions of disapproval which have been
favorably reported by the appropriate com-
mittee."
Senate Report No. 232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1949).
Since the House version of the bill called
for disapproval by concurrent resolution, the
bills went to conference:
The Senate conferees stood solidly for re-
tention of the provision for rejection by a
simple majority vote of either House, which,
had been included in the Senate bill, the
conferees agreeing -to a considerable broaden-
ing of the President's authority compared
with previous reorganization acts.
As finally approved in conference, after an
impasse which lasted 1', -1 several weeke, the
bill incorporated Senate proopsals granting
the President authority 1 o propose the crea-
tion of new departmentr- --a power whic:o was
not given to him und sr earlier acts---and
eliminated all restrictive and limiting pro-
visions, but incorporat-,4 the provision re-
quiring that a reorganization plan submitted
under the act would require the adcption
of a resolution of dtsaparoval by a majority
of the authorized nor.. abership of either
House. The Senate, in approving the original
Senate bill, had made it ;gear that the grant-
ing of these additional powers to the IPresi-
dent had been conditi ;..ed upon retention
of the provision permit og rejection of any
plan by a simple majc)rity vote of either
House, and the ooncessi as made by the con-
ferees were approved on..),' because they were
necessary if any reorgan clation authority was
to be granted to the Pre .;dent.
Senate Report No. 136, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957).
The Act was discusse 1 on the floor of the
Senate at 95 Cong. R. 7785, 7827 & 7829
(1949) and in the Hous s of Representatives
at 95 Cong. Rec. 7838-9a & 7444-46 (1949).
For an extensive discu ion and analysis of
the legislative history (1 the legislative veto
provisions of the Reor.;anization Acts from
1932 to 1949, see Ginth: ne, The Control of
Federal Administration by Congressional
Resolutions and Comm: ti.ees, 66 Harv. L. Rev.
569 (1953).
In 1957, the Act was, amended to permit
disapproval by a simpls., majority of either
House, rather than by alajority of the au-
thorized membership or either House, 'Public
Law 85-286, 71 Stat. 311 (1957). In 1964,
the President's power to create new Cabinet
Executive Departments was eliminated from
the Act, Public Law 98-351, 78 Stat. 240
(1964).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OE' 1" HE ONE-HOUSC VETO
As the foregoing legislative history sug-
gests, the constitutions- tty of the one-House
legislation veto mechan ism embodied. In the
Reorganization Act of 1949 and in other stat-
utes is virtually unia ersally accepted. Al-
though occasional erg voents in opposition
have been raised durb,g floor debates, they
have been resolved in favor of the consti-
tutionality of the prows:0ns, either expressly
or implicitly, by all ,aencerned legislative
committees from 1945 1,1) the present; by the
Justice Department, viten its opinion was
requested; and by the i,otes of both liouses
of the Congress, which a-e not inconsiderable
since the Act has undergone successive ex-
tension in 1953, 1955, 957, 1961, 19(19 and
1971.
Reorganization plat 3 submitted by the
President more closely resemble proposed
legislation, in form a ral substance, rather
than Presidential actions or Executive orders.
Legislation proposed t4 , Congress cannot be-
come law if either Houss votes "no". The ef-
fect of the Reorganizso.ion Acts have been
similar, that is, no "p an" can become "ef-
fective" if either HOU A: Votes "no". as the
Senate Committee remarked in 1949, there is
no significant differenc between the nega-
tive act of refusing ta register a favorable
vote and the affirmativ act of a resolution of
disapproval.
As to the question or legislative encroach-
ment on the powers of the President, it
should be noted that 1 President arguably
accepts the limitation sn his delegated pow-
ers when he signs tire Reorganization Act
itself; he has the alternative of vetoing the
Act. The power of legislation, including the
power to reorganize tti Executive branch, is
vested by the Constlb ,ion in the Cangres,s,
U.S. Constitution, Art . Secs, 1 and 13. Con-
gress has no obligation to delegate th!s pow-
er to the President, lid the President has
no obligation to accEflt the delegation. As
the Justice Departrnerr: pointed out in 1949,
each Reorganization A ot is a case of the Ex-
TE
57A000100040080-8
S 9857
ecutive and the Congress acting in coopera-
tion.
There are no court decisions dealing with
the constitutionality of the provisions of the
Reorganization Act of 1949 under discussion.
However, in Sibbach. v. Wilson & Co., 312
U.S. 1 (1941), the Supreme Court did con-
sider the validity of the analogous "waiting
period" provided for the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its dis-
cussion of this provision, the Court stated:
"The value of the reservation of the pow-
er to examine proposed rules, laws and regu-
lations before they become effective is well
understood by Congress. It is frequently, as
here, employed to make sure that the action
under the delegation squares with the Con-
gressional purpose. That no adverse action
was taken by Congress indicates, at least,
that no transgression of legislative policy was
found." (Footnotes omitted). 312 U.S. at
15-16.
In support of this position, the Court
cited three analogies; a) the organic acts of
some of the territories, providing that laws
passed by the territorial legislature prior
to their admission to statehood would be
valid unless Congress disapproved; (b) the
provisions of the Act of March 3, 1933, for
the laying over of reorganization orders be
the Congress, (also known as a "waiting
period" provisions); and (c) the Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1939, which included provision
for disapproval by concurrent resolution.
(312 U.S. at 15 n. 17).
The holding in the Sibbaeh case does not
apply directly to the one-House veto in the
1949 Reorganization Act, because the Court
cited only those statutes which required
disapproval by both Houses of the Congress.
However, the rationale of the, case appears
to be that the absence of adverse congres-
sional action implies that there is no trans-
gression of legislative policy in a proposed
rule, law or regulation. The one-House veto
is consistent with this rationale, because it
is an accurate method of recording the lack
of congressional assent to a proposed change;
it is accurate because either House can voice
its objection readily and independently. In
the case of reorganization plans, the failure
of either House to register its disapproval
is even stronger support for the inference
that the plan under consideration does not
transgress any legislative policy.
In the case of the proposed Foreign Mili-
tary Sales and Assistance Act, the legislative
veto would enable the Congress to review the
proposed military sales and assure itself that
it is consistent with Congressional policy.
Therefore, it may be asserted that the leg-
islative veto is neither unconstitutional nor
"extra-constitutional". The Act does not
allow one House of the Congress to take leg-
islative action binding on the President. It
may be persuasively argued that the resolu-
tion of disapproval is not a legislative act;
that there is no opportunity to amend, alter
or delay the proposed plan. Rather, it is
merely a reservation to the Congress of the
power to examine the exercise of power de-
legated to the Executive. Congress presum-
ably can be far more generous in amounts
of authority which it delegates when the
power of review is expressly retained; in the
absence of a legislative veto, the Congress
usually substitutes other, more stringent
limitations on the subject matter and dura-
tion of the delegated powers.
Perhaps the best summary of the argu-
ment in favor of the legislative veto is con-
tained in Professor Corwin's treatise on the
Presidency:
"It is generally agreed that Congrese, being
free not to delegate power, is free to do so
on certain stipulated conditions, as, for ex-
ample, that the delegation shall terminate
by a certain date or on the occurrence of a
specified event; the end of a war, for in-
stance. Why, then, should not one condition
be that the delegation shall continue only as
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long as the two houses are of opinion that it
le working beneficially? Furthermore, if the
national legislative authority Is free to dele-
gate powers to the President, then why not
to the two houses, either jointly or singly?
And if the Secretary of Agriculture may be
delegated powers the exercise of which is
subject to a referendum vote of producers
from time to time, as he may be, then why
may not the two houses of Congress be simi-
larly authorized to hold a referendum now
and then as to the desirability of the Pre-
dent's continuing to exercise certain legisla-
tively delegated powers?
"As we have seen, moreover, It Is generally
agreed that the maxim that the legislature
may not delegate its powers signiften at the
very least that the legislature may not ab-
dicate Its powers_ Yet how, ha view of the
scope that legislative delegations take now-
adays. is the line between delegation ano
abdication to be maintained? Only. I urge, by
rendering the delegated powers recoverable
without the consent of the delegate; and for
this purpose the concurrent resolution aeemr,
to be an available mechaniem, and the only
one. To argue otherwise is to affront col:n-
inon sense."
Corwin, The President: Office and Powers,
1787-11)57 (4th rev. ed. 1957 (Ptotnotes
omitted). (Emphasis In original).
By serving as a limitation on the delegre
tion of powers to the Executive braecb. the
legislative veto serves to strengthen rather
than weaken the traditional separation oi
p0-vera. Faced with a choice betweea legis-
lating in excessive detail, on the one hand
and a major abdication of authority to the
Executive on the other, the Congrnssiona:
veto provides a practical middle oaurse. In
Corwin's phrase, what better way is there to
maintain the line betweee delegattin she
abdication of legislative powers,
CONCLUSION
The legislative veto has become generally
accepted on the theory that It is a reserva-
tion by the Congress of the power to approve
or disapprove the exercise of a delegated
power by an official of the Executive branch
This is a power which the Congress reserved
to itself in the original law that delegated
authority to the ?facial.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it
would appear that the proposed eunendment
la constitutional. It closely parallels the
analogous provisions of the Executive Re-
orge.nization Act, the constitutionality of
which has not been challenged by the Psecu-
tive trench. Moreover, the amendment would
I serve a useful function in assuring that the 0
not abdicated to the Executive branch.
Congreselooal policy origination power let
VINCIINT E. Peewey i
r
[
Legislative A t toasty., 1-
DEVELOPMENT OF A PAIR WORLD
ECONOMIC SYSTEM ?AMENDMENTS
AMENDNALENT NO. 1403
Ordered to be printed, and referred to
the Committee on Finance./
Mr. MONDAI.E. Mr. President, I am
submitting several amendments to the
Trade Reform Act of 1973. The proposed
amendments are intended to deny tax
credits to American firms operating in
territories deemed to be, by both the
United Nations and the International
Court of Justice, under illegal occupa-
tion. Therefore, these amendments ex-
press American concern ever countries
where basic human rights are still out-
rageously flouted and majority rule de-
nied.
My amendments most specifically ad-
dress themselves to the tragic siteation
in Namibia, an arid, mineral-rich noun-
try located in the southwestern corner of
Airica. Namibia suffers a unique inter-
national wrong in the unlawful perpetu-
ation of South African rale. This Is com-
pounded by the introduction into Nam-
ibia of the apartheid system and of the
whole apparatus of arbitrary South Af-
rican police laws and political trials.
It is 8 years since the General Assem-
bly, after other remedies had been ex-
hausted, declared the South African
mandate. dating from 1918, at an end,
and with it, South Africa's right to gov-
ern that territory. rt is 3 years since the
Internatiorial Court of Justice's advisory
opinion concurring with the United Na-
tions ruling. Yet Solth Africa remains in
defiance of the United Nations.
The United States has continually
suraiorted the actions of the United
Ne rions and of the World Court. To date.
American action has been, first, to of-
ficially discourage investment in Nam-
ibia. by U.S. nationals; second, to deny
Export-Import Bank credit guarantees:
third, to deny U.S. government assist-
ance In protection of any U.S. invest-
ment there: and fourth, to encourage
ither nations to fonow suit. However, we
allua tax credits, for taxes paid to the
SoLth African Got ernment, on Ameri-
can investments in Namibia. We, in ef-
fect, allow tax crec its to a government
in places where we don't recognize their
ut hort ty
In 1972, 27 U.S. Senators and Repre-
aematives wrote a letter to the Secre-
eery of the Treasury expressing concern
the inconsisteecy between interne-
tioral law and U.E. policy on the one
land. and the Treasury Department's
allowariee of credit against U.S. tax due
to taxes paid by U.S. companies to South
Afr tea on Income earned, in Namibia, on
the other. In a letter dated May 4, 1973,
the Secretary of the Treasury. Mr.
Shultz, replied to that letter saying:
We have concluded that the existing tax
(-teen legislation doer not provide discretion
to deity the tax crede to United States tax-
payers, even though the occupation of the
ere,. by South Africa has been determined
to be Illegal under it tematimuil law.
I believe that Secretary Shultz's reedy
wee an invitation to the Congress to
emend the Internal Revenue Code to dis-
faker the foreign tex credit to U.S. in-
vestors in Namibia who are paying taxes
to the illegal South African occupiers.
Today, we should set the record straight
anti bring the tax laws into line with
U.S. policy, and in total compliance with
our international obligations.
There are important U.S. interests at
stake In my amendments. Other nations
of Africa, strategically important, are
seriously concerned over Namibia, Their
cecisions on major economic and politi-
cal questions may be affected by our ac-
tiorto Oh this issue. Der example, Nigeria,
a country whose government is a vigor-
ous critic of South Africa's illegal admin-
istration of Namibia, is a growing sup-
elier of all U.S. oil imports. Moreover,
one of the greatest potential areas for
oil exploration in the world is in the
Onshore area of the "western bulge" of
Africa. All of the countries in this area
are strongly opposed to South Africa's
presence in Namibia Such strategic fac-
bra, together with diplomatic and hu-
t ianitarian considerations, compel our
attention and our action on the Namibian
I sue.
Change is coming in southern Africa.
171th the recent events in Portugal and
I ie Portuguese colonies, we must not de-
ity in making it clear where the United
e tater' stands. This is the purpose of
t iese amendments. I, therefore, believe
t sat they deserve the support of the Con-
s rem and of the Government of the
I. Bates, for they are in keeping
* ith our policies, our basic values, and
c ar national interests.
DDMONAL COSPONSORS OP AN
AMENDMENT
rilirtIMENT NO. 1377
A he request of Mr. liewrxe, the
6 ma from South Carolina (Mr.
(m)le the Senator from Texas
(dr. ?sera), the Senator from Mary-
ii . Ewa), the Senator from
C klah (Mr. BELLMON), the Senator
fa - Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH), the
Banat? from California (Mr. Cam-
e sax), the Senator from New Mexico
Cdr. zerta) were added as cospon-
es of nendment No. 1377 to Senate
b 11 300 the Department of Defense
A aprop tions Authorization Act, 1975.
NOTE
As sho in the RECORD of June 5,
11 74, at bottom of the third column
oiL page E 09, the text of amendment
Ni.1388, bmitted by Senator Coos,
w as not PX Accordingly, the perma-
nl mit Ram be corrected to read as
ft [lows:
I ask una ?tie consent that the text
of the erne ent I submit today and
tle remar de on the introduction
oi El. 3240 on rch 26, 1974, be inserted
is the Recoae
There being objection, the amend-
in nit and re were ordered to be
printed in the OED, as follows:
an page .0, strl everything alter line 12,
sad Insert In lleu reof the following:
al) Tax ow:'ONE BILLS.?
'1) Section 42 the Internal Revenue
Cc de of I9e4 (eela to exemptions to the
imposed on unication services) is
ar tended by insertin t the end thereof the
to lowing new au on:
'(1) Siert AND Taxes?No tax shall
oe Imposed under on 4251 on so much
of any amount paid f ices as is properly
at .ributatne to any imposed on the
aS aunt paid for se or otherwise im-
pc led on the providing such services, by a
St de, or any political a vision thereof, or
thi District of Columb
2) The amendmen e by this Act
sh Ill apply to taxable beginning after
De xember 31, WU.
Remarke by Senate) 00H on March
26 1974:
_Sr. Coon Mr. Preeld on behalf of
ifl= self and Senator BANC am pleased to
in reduce a bill which will nel the Inter-
ns Revenue Code of 1954 roviele that the
tie on the amounts paid for mmunications
sea vices shell not apply to e amount of
th , State and local taxes pa or such serv-
ices. The purpose of this 1 4ation is to
ste p the Internal Revenue Se from levy-
hal a "tax on a tax." At th sent time,
IRS is requiring the telephone penises of
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