WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
Secret
CG. WS 77-023
June 10, 1977
Copy 1'i 90
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51JM ARY, issued every Friday morning
CONTENTS
ortinsa Group, reports and analyzes signi i
ough noon on Thursday. It fre-
rc inated with or prepared by the
liticol Analysis, the Office of Eco-
of 5 rategic Research, the Off ice of
Office of Weapons Intelligence,
and cartographic Research.
1 Africa
Morocco; Ethiopia;
Tunisia-Libya; Seychelles;
Nigeria
3 Middle East
Israel; Egypt-Libya
4 Asia
Pakistan
5 Europe
Yugoslavia; Turkey; USSR
7 USSR: Draft Constitution
8 Brazil: The Nuclear Alternative
10 South Africa: The Economics of Apartheid
12 Spain: Communist Prospects
15 China: Educational and Cultural Reform
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MOROCCO G~s`v
i
Morocco's successful intervention in
Zaire will temporarily enhance King
Hassan's prestige at home. It may also
help solidify diplomatic support from
African moderates for Morocco in its
continuing dispute with Algeria over
Western Sahara.
The Moroccan success in pushing back
the Katangan exiles who invaded Zaire's
Shaba Region from Angola will appeal to
many Moroccans, who traditionally
regard themselves as warriors. The
triumphant return of the Moroccan ex-
peditionary force this week will
also provide a badly needed boost
for the Moroccan military, which has had
chronic morale problems because of the
continuing guerrilla war in Western
Sahara.
Hassan's decision to intervene in Zaire
was not strongly supported by well in-
formed Moroccans. In addition, the op-
position political parties were initially
stunned by the King's decision, which was
made in isolation and complete secrecy.
The subsequent lack of editorial comment
in party newspapers has indicated con-
tinuing doubts among politically aware
Moroccans about the wisdom of such a
venture. These Moroccans are probably
more relieved than ;jubilant over the
successful outcome.
African reactions to Morocco's in-
tervention have been mixed, with both
moderates and radicals generally taking
previously determined ideological
positions. Hassan probably anticipates
that his support of Zaire may widen the
moderate-versus-radical split within the
Organization of African Unity. He has
shown increasing disdain for the OAU
since it distributed a report last February
charging Morocco and Gabon with com-
plicity in an abortive coup attempt in
Benin in January.
Hassan hopes his solidarity with Zaire
will elicit from other African moderates
stronger support for his position in the
Western Sahara dispute. He may also
hope the Moroccan success in Zaire will
encourage other moderate Africans in the
OAU to play a more active role in
countering radical and Soviet influence in
Africa
Recent guerrilla attacks on Ethiopia's
rail link with the sea-the line that runs
between Addis Ababa and the port of
Djibouti-pose serious problems for
freight movement throughout the country.
The rail line carries roughly half of
Ethiopia's total freight, excluding oil, and
there is no easy way to provide adequate
security. It has several bridges and runs
through remote areas.
At least three bridges were damaged on
June l in attacks that almost certainly
were carried out by insurgents supported
by Somalia. The incidents could mark the
beginning of increased Somali pressure on
eastern Ethiopia, particularly in the
Oga,&en area, which is inhabited by a large
of ethnic Somalis and is claimed
alia.
ges of aviation gasoline would
eTop quickly in Ethiopia and disrup-
tion of its trade would be widespread if the
rail line were effectively closed down.
0 100Miles
0 100 K it ometers
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Ethiopia's two Red Sea ports-Assab
and Massawa-a.re served only by
highways. A shortage of trucks, plus the
active Eritrean insurgency in the north,
inhibits the Ethiopians from shifting
significant amounts of cargo from the rail
line to these roads. The Eritreans
periodically disrupt weekly truck convoys
between Asmara and Massawa, effective-
ly closing that already isolated port to in-
land connections.
TUNISIA-LIBYA
Relations between Tunisia and Libya
went from bad to worse in late May when
a US-owned drilling ship under contract
to the Libyan national oil company ar-
rived in the contested continental shelf
area A the Gulf of Gabes.
As long as the ship remains in place, the
Libyans, who probably believe they have
the upper hand, will continue to seek
negotiations and avoid an open break.
Tunisia is at a distinct disadvantage in
any military confrontation with Libya and
is not in a good position to back up its
tough talk. The foreign ministers of the
two nations, called together under the
auspices of the Arab League, began talks
IS
The moderate pro-Western government
of James Mancham was overthrown on
June 5 by radical members of the
Seychelles Peoples United Party, the
junior partner in Mancham's two-party
coalition government. Mancham was in
London for the Commonwealth
Conference, and the government was
turned over to France Albert Rene, the
head of the Peoples Party.
Rene has attempted to disassociate
himself from the coup, but he undoubted-
ly gave his tacit consent. There is a history
of animosity between the left-leaning
Rene and the more conservative but flam-
boyant Mancham.
The immediate issue that appears to
have prompted the coup was the former
president's continuing effort to dilute the
power of his more radical partners. He
reportedly planned to unite the two coali-
tion parties and to postpone for five years
the parliamentary election scheduled for
1979. In the last election, the Peoples Par-
ty received only a few seats in the
legislature even though it won almost
half of the popular vote.
Rene's new cabinet includes several of
the radical members of his party who led
the coup. The new President's speeches
since June 5 have provided few hints
about future policy, although he has ex-
pressed a willingness to continue all
agreements with foreign countries. His
radical colleagues will undoubtedly have a
strong voice, however, in both domestic
and foreign affairs. The party receives
some political and financial support from
Moscow and actively promotes third
world causes.
Rene has assured the US charge that
the US tracking station near the capital
will be allowed to continue to operate, and
members of the diplomatic community
and the personnel of the tracking station
have been exempted from the curfew im-
posed after the coup. There are some 200
US citizens in the Seychelles, about 150 of
whom work at the tracking station. None
have been directly affected by the coup.
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NIGERIA j(// I
Nigeria recently announced a package
of financial incentives intended to reverse
a three-year downward trend in explora-
tion and development by foreign oil com-
panies. The Nigerians. are concerned
about maintaining their current level of
oil exports in order to provide revenues to
sustain their economic development
program.
Current Nigerian oil production of
more than 2.2 million barrels per day is
near capacity. Without additional invest-
ment, output could fait below 2 million
barrels per day in a few years, but even if
exploration were increased soon, no
significant rise in production would be
likely before 1980. Nigeria exports about
1.2 million barrels of oil per day to the
US, nearly as much as Saudi Arabia.
The government wants to increase the
number of companies operating in
Nigeria and to focus future investment on
high-cost offshore areas where it believes
sizable reserves are located. To this end,
the new program will:
? Reduce the profits tax rate for
companies not yet producing oil until
all their pre-production costs are
recovered.
? Allow all exploration drilling
costs and costs of the first two ap-
praisal wells to be written off during
the year these expenses occur.
? Reduce royalty payments for
offshore production.
? Grant investment tax credits.
? Permit companies to amortize all
but 1 percent of total annual invest-
ment expenditures within five years;
the time span has been seven or eight
years.
These incentives are the most recent in-
dication that Nigeria is easing the restric-
tive oil policies that have slashed company
profits and sharply reduced investment.
Earlier this year, Nigeria raised its
second-quarter prices and allowed the
theoretical average company profits to
rise by about 4 cents per barrel, to 35
cents. This was the first boost in company
per-barrel earnings in about a year.
The companies' response to the new in-
centives will depend on their assessment
of the impact of the package on their in-
dividual financial positions. Production
costs are higher in Nigeria than in many
ISRAEL 26
Likud party leader Menahem Begin
has apparently made little progress so far
toward formation of a broadly-based
government. Talks continue with the
Democratic Movement for Change, but
the Movement reportedly has adopted a
strategy of delay, hoping a strong showing
in Labor Federation elections later this
month will improve its bargaining posi-
tion.
A major split has developed among
Movement leaders over whether to join a
government dominated by the rightist
Likud, adding further uncertainty to the
outcome of talks. Those favoring par-
ticipation argue that the Movement can
carry out its commitment to reform and
can moderate Likud's hard-line stance on
peace negotiations only by joining in the
government. Control of ministries, they
contend, would also allow the Movement
to use patronage to strengthen the party's
grassroots support.
Other Movement members argue that
differences with Likud, especially over
Middle East peace negotiations, are
irreconcilable. They believe the Move-
ment should join with the defeated Labor
Alignment and other parties expected to
be in opposition to work for the fall of a
Likud-led coalition. Without either Labor
or the Democratic Movement, such a
coalition would hold, at best, only a
razor-thin majority in the Knesset.
Even party leaders who otherwise favor
joining Begin's coalition are concerned
that the Movement's flexibility on
negotiations with the Arabs would be
given scant consideration should the new
government's most important posts be
held by hard-liners like Begin, Moshe
Dayan, and Ezer Weizman, Begin's
nominee for defense minister. Many
Movement leaders interpret Begin's
failure to consult with the Movement
before offering Dayan the foreign
ministry portfolio as evidence that Begin
would run a future coalition in the same
autocratic manner he runs Likud.
Movement leader Yigael Yadin
believes that Begin's inability to secure a
comfortable working majority in parlia-
sent without the Movement gives it an
~rdvantage in its coalition bargaining and
strengthens Yadin's claim on the post of
rVgn minister.
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EGYPT-LIBYA Z ) " 25
Egyptian Prime Minister Salim and his
Libyan counterpart, Abd al Ubaydi,
reportedly will meet in Cairo soon to dis-
cuss the strained relations between the
two countries. A Libyan emissary, after
meeting with Egyptian President Sadat on
June 4, told the press that the talks could
start as early as this weekend.
Teisions on the Libyan-Egyptian
border have in fact lessened over the past
several weeks, and the propaganda invec-
tive has softened on both sides. Substan-
tial Egyptian forces are still stationed
near the border, and the airfields at
Matrlh, Sidi Barrani and Siwah have
been readied for combat aircraft; Libyan
air defenses at Tobruk and throughout the
Cyrenaica area also have been improved.
However, the logistics build-up and the in-
crease in force strength that accompanied
the heightened tensions of March and
April appear to have leveled off.
For the past month, Libyan President
Qadh ifi has been preoccupied with efforts
to deter Egypt from. using the forces now
assem bled on the border.
There are some
300,000 Egyptians in Libya; they form the
backbone of the country's professional
and skilled work force.
Qadhafi has also tried to bring
diploriatic pressure! to bear in recent
weeks, appealing both to Moscow and
to Arab states to use their influence on
Sadat. Moscow's response-a preemp-
tory demarche-initially angered the
Egyptians and added another irritant to
Moscow-Cairo relations, but also served
to give the Egyptians pause. F
Sadat may in fact have consented to the
new talks to mollify his Arab benefactors.
Sadat has no illusions tha: any such talks
will significantly improve his relations
with Qadhafi, but Egyptian leaders seem
for the moment to be more concerned
with the results of the Israeli election and
the resumption of talks with the Soviets
than with their dispute with the Libyans.
PAKISTAN ~ 6 - ~ 3
Prime Minister Bhutto and his op-
ponents resumed negotiations late last
week and after several meetings appeared
close to an agreement that could resolve
Pakistan's long political crisis. At present,
the country is calm and the government
has lifted martial law, following a court
decision that the decree imposing it was
unconstitutional.
Bhutto and the opposition leaders with
whom he is negotiating apparently have
agreed on holding new elections, but there
could still be problems in working out
Bhutto's role in the pre-election period.
The opposition will probably have to
abandon its demand that Bhutto resign
immediately; there are indications that at
least some opposition leaders are
prepared to do so. They will, however, be
seeking means of preventing him from
rigging a future election.
There is no confirmation of press
reports that the two sides have agreed to
hold the elections in November, but, if
true, one of the major points of contention
will have been solved. Bhutto had wanted
even more time to rebuild his political
position; the opposition want elections as
soon as possible.
The long political crisis has had a
serious impact on the country's economy.
The strikes and demonstrations staged by
the opposition and the curfews imposed
by the government have on occasion shut
down economic activity in major cities.
Industrial production has been curtailed,
although no reliable measure of the
economic setback is yet available.
Karachi, the country's largest city and
scene of some of the most violent
demonstrations, has been hardest hit.
Labor problems there closed the port for
several days. Transportation from the
port to the rest of the country has also
been disrupted, and industry in the area is
estimated to have lost the equivalent of a
month's production.
Inflation, which was cut to 8 percent in
1975 from more than 20 percent in 1975,
is rising again. Price increases have been
fueled by substantial raises granted to
government employees just prior to the
disputed election last March as well as by
the production losses and shortages that
developed during the height of the tur-
moil. Pay increases in the private sector
are likely to follow, creating new in-
flationary pressures
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YUGOSLAVIA 3 7- 4 I
Yugoslav officials are leaking word
that the party will soon establish a seven-
man group to run its affairs. Other party
changes being mentioned are reducing the
47-man presidium by half and renaming
its 12-man executive committee the party
secretariat. These changes would be the
first significant steps the Yugoslavs have
taken in over a decade to streamline the
party structure.
The new group will reportedly include
President Tito, Stane Dolanc-Tito's
second-in-command-and five other
senior leaders. No military figure has
been mentioned, a surprising omission
given the current prominence and ex-
pected future importance of the Yugoslav
military.
One official has referred to the seven-
man group as a "political bureau," and it
is clearly intended to function like polit-
buros in other communist countries. The
Yugoslavs, however, evidently want to
avoid the appearance of moving closer to
the Soviet model and are likely to come
up with a different name for the group.
Such changes could help clarify Tito's
wishes regarding a party successor.
Dolanc will "lead the work" of the new
"political bureau," thus strengthening his
claim to be first among equals in the party
leadership. According to the leaked infor-
mation, Dolanc will give up his current
post as head of the executive committee,
and Branko Mikulic-the young party
leader of Bosnia-Hercegovina-will take
over the secretariat. This would be his
first important position in Belgrade; he
and Dolanc have had policy differences in
the past.
Such a compact group would probably
become the focal point for decision-
making. In the present structure, collec-
tive decisions are supposedly made by the
large and unwieldy presidium. In practice,
however, Tito makes most key decisions,
and the party structures simply
rubber-stamp and implement them. A
small "political bureau" would be better
able to make decisions after Tito leaves
the scene
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TURKEY
There were no decisive winners in
Turkey'. parliamentary election on June
5, and another period of relatively weak
coalitior governments appears likely.
Such leadership will be hard put to deal
effectively with the country's pressing
domestic and foreign problems.
Complete official returns give opposi-
tion leader Bulent Ecevit's center-left
Republican Peoples Party a larger plurali-
ty. His party gained 28 seats, but has
fallen 13 seats short of the 226 needed for
a majority.
Ecevit will make every effort to attract
enough independents, defectors from
other parties, and splinter-party deputies
to form a working majority. In the end,
howeve?, he will probably have to turn
again to the right-wing, Islamic-revivalist
National Salvation Party, seeking its
cooperation either as a coalition partner
or, less likely, as a 'tacit supporter of a
minority government led by Ecevit.
As they proved during their eight-
month coalition in 1974, Ecevit and
Salvationist leader Erbakan are uneasy
partners because of differences in both
tempe-ament and ideology. Each,
however, seems capable of making the
adjustments and concessions necessary
for gaining power.
Their negotiations will be difficult and
protracted. Ecevit-having come so close
to winning outright-will jealously
protect his prerogatives; Erbakan,
although his party's parliamentary
strength is down, will still be in position to
sell his votes to the highest bidder. He
could switch to Justice Party leader
Demirel if Ecevit's terms are unsatisfac-
tory.
Another Ecevit?Erbakan coalition
would have no assurance of longevity.
Both men would strive to make any coali-
tion accord as specific as possible in order
to minimize the bickering that was a ma-
jor factor in the demise of their earlier
partnership. Erbakan might be slightly
less quarrelsome than before, but dissen-
sior and indecision would probably be the
norm
If Ecevit fails to form a government,
Demirel will try. His Justice Party scored
dramatic gains over 1973; as an
aggregate, the four center-right parties of
the outgoing government, which he head-
ed, now hold an absolute majority. While
a I I parties - particularly Er-
bakan's-would be reluctant to recreate
the stresses of the former coalition, the
lure of power would probably win out.
USSR 45
4,1
The USSR continues to limit for-
eign operations in its coastal
waters in an effort to offset the reduction
in its own fish catch because of the
proliferation of national 200-mile
maritime fishing zones. On May 25,
Moscow extended its control over fishing
in the Barents Sea to 200 miles. On June
4, the USSR concluded an agreement
with Japan that cut in half the amount of
fish and marine products that the
Japanese can take from Soviet waters.
Moscow's announcement on the
Barents Sea was described as a "tem-
porary" measure to regulate fishing in the
region of the Soviet Barents Sea coast.
Moscow had originally exempted this
area when it established its 200-mile
fishing zone on March 1.
The extension focuses attention on the
USSR's three-year-old dispute with
Norway over a demarcation line in the
Barents Sea. The Soviets want a line run-
ning from the border on shore to the
North Pole. The Norwegians insist on a
median line zigzagging between each
country's offshore islands. The area in
dispute covers some 60,000 square
kilometers, some falling within the new
200-mile limit.
Norway hopes that a compromise can
be worked out, possibly by some kind of
joint administration; talks are scheduled
to resume on June 13. One of the pro-
posed areas of joint administration, how-
ever, may impinge on Soviet strategic in-
terests because of its proximity to a So-
viet military facility at Murmansk.
Moscow has backed off from
demands that Japanese catches in Soviet
waters be balanced by the Soviet take in
Japanese waters. The new limit for
Japanese fishermen in the Soviet zone is
700,000 tons, about half the quantity the
Japanese took in 1976. The Soviets took
400,000 tons out of Japanese waters last
year.
Moscow also cut the number of
Japanese fishing boats that will be allow-
ed in Soviet waters from 7,400 to 6,355.
Fishing in the Soviet zone may become
unprofitable for some Japanese boats
because of sharply reduced quotas, and
Tokyo is concerned about the effects of
the new Soviet cuts on the Japanese
fishing industry.
The Japanese rely more heavily on fish
for animal protein than does any other
developed country. Prices are now some
30 percent higher than a year ago.
WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 10, 77
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The changes made in the new constitution give the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet new tools to manage the
bureaucracy. These changes will also enhance Brezhnev's posi-
tion in the leadership, if he assumes the chairmanship of the
Presidium, as expected.
The draft Soviet Constitution published
on June 4 suggests that changes are com-
ing in institutional relationships that have
reportedly been the subject of intense
debate in the leadership. The draft charter
strengthens the role of the Supreme So-
viet and its Presidium in their relationship
to the Council of Ministers. If, as seems
likely, General Secretary Brezhnev
assumes the chairmanship of the
Presidium, not only will he have the trap-
pings of chief of state for his visit to Paris
later this month but, more importantly,
when the constitution is ratified next fall
he will also have new tools to use against
the government bureaucracy.
A new position-first deputy chairman
of the Supreme Soviet Presidium-has
been established, presumably to assist the
Supreme Soviet with protocol duties. Pre-
mier Kosygin's retirement, should it come,
and this new position will open up impor-
tant additional vacancies in the top leader-
ship, and further shifts are to be expected.
In defining the relationship between the
Supreme Soviet and the Council of
Ministers more precisely than does the
1936 constitution, the draft charter
specifically gives the Supreme Soviet and
its Presidium the power to decide on all
matters of state, economic, social, and
cultural developments, and to control the
execution of those decisions by the Coun-
cil of Ministers.
More importantly, the draft gives the
Supreme Soviet and the Presidium more
political muscle. Supreme Soviet deputies
will have the right to address inquiries to
USSR: Draft Constitution
government organizations and officials,
who must reply at a session of the
Supreme Soviet.
The draft also transfers the system of
people's control committees from the ex-
ecutive branch, where it served essentially
as a powerless watchdog, to the Supreme
Soviet, where in the hands of a vigorous
Presidium chairman it could be used to
spotlight bureaucratic obstructionism.
In the 1936 constitution, government
ministries were listed individually. In the
new draft, they are referred to in general
terms and in broad blocks of respon-
sibilities. In his speech to the Central
Committee plenum last month, Brezhnev
explained that this would relieve the
Supreme Soviet of the necessity of amen-
ding the constitution each time a ministry
is established or its responsibilities revis-
ed. In addition, however, the change may
make it easier for Brezhnev and others
long interested in streamlining economic
management to effect a reorganization of
the ministerial structure.
The guiding role of the party has been
more explicitly spelled out and given add-
ed prominence. Recognition of the mul-
tinational character of the USSR has
been made more explicit. For example,
the right to schooling in minority native
languages, which is provided for in laws
on education and the nationalities, has
now been enshrined in the draft constitu-
tion.
On the other hand, in spelling out in
greater detail the relationship between the
central authorities and the republics, there
is heavy emphasis on strengthening in-
tegration and control at the center.
Brezhnev, in fact, alluded to this at the
Central Committee plenum last month,
his carefully chosen phrases indicating the
sensitivity of the shift.
The draft contains several concessions
to the interests of senior party secretary
Suslov. For example, of the six major
tasks identified for the current stage of the
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USSR's development, the first three are
in the Field of ideology. Brezhnev's oft-
repeated desire to raise the standard of
living follows in fourth place, ensuring
national security is fifth, and helping to
strengthen peace and promote inter-
national cooperation ranks sixth.
A brief foreign policy section in the
draft constitution incorporates key
phrases Brezhnev has voiced before in
summarizing the USSR's diverse aims
abroad. The order in which these are
listed it the draft is intended to indicate
Soviet long-term priorities.
? First, the preservation of
favorable external conditions for inter-
nal Soviet development and the
strengthening of the position of "world
socialism"-that is, those communist
countries dominated by the Soviets
and those world communist parties
still on speaking terms with the
Soviets.
? Next, support for "national
liberat on" struggles-meaning an-
ticolonialist movements of the third
world--and "social progress"-mean-
ing i:he. improvement of communist
positions in the capitalist world.
? Then, the prevention of "wars of
aggression," and the implementation
of peaceful coexistence with the
capitalist states.
The order adopted for the draft con-
stitution is consistent with recent Soviet
practice, and probably is congenial to
such ideologues as Suslov. At times in the
past, peaceful coexistence ranked higher
in Soviet foreign policy goals than it does
here.
Another article in the foreign policy
section repeats, without attribution, the
10 principles of the Helsinki Final Act,
reaffirming Soviet determination to
adhere to the line of Brezhnev's peace
program. The draft elevates to first place
the CSCE provision on nonuse of force
to settle disputes. This may have been in-
fluenced by the ongoing Soviet campaigns
to promote multilateral treaties on non-
use of force and non-first-use of nuclear
weapons in Europe. There is evidence that
the Soviets are planning very widespread
and lengthy diplomatic efforts on behalf
of these proposals, particularly the second
one.
A section on defense in the draft con-
stitution contains assurances to the
military that everything necessary for the
defense of the country will be provided.
The draft also specifies that the Supreme
Soviet Presidium will formally appoint
the members of the Defense Council, rais-
ing the possibility that the membership
will for the first time be published.
Obviously with an eye to the coming
CSCE review conference opening on June
15 in Belgrade, the section on human
rights has been expanded, but deals
primarily with those rights involving
physical well-being-the rights to work,
to housing, to medical care, and to pen-
sions. The civil liberties section is un-
changed, but strengthens the previous
constitution's admonition that these
rights must be exercised only in support of
the interests of society and the state.
There are new provisions, however, that
give citizens recourse against the actions
of officials, to sue those officials, and to
seek compensation for damages deriving
from unlawful actions of state or public
institutions. These provisions appear
designed to protect the nonpolitical
citizen, not dissidents or other would-be
reformers of the system.
Brazil is unable to meet present or future energy re-
quirements.from domestic resources and hopes to establish a
nuclear Industry by the turn of the century.
11 /
001
Brazil is laying the foundation for a
nuclear i idustry to meet its electric power
needs. Hydroelectric sources will be fully
used toward the turn of the century, and
Brazil hopes to achieve nuclear self-suf-
ficiency by establishing a complete
nuclear fuel cycle. The large investments
needed may worsen Brazil's balance-of-
payments situation over the next decade
or so, but in the long run, establishment of
Brazil: The Nuclear Alternative
a nuclear industry would bring substantial
savings of foreign exchange.
Imported energy accounts for nearly 30
percent of Brazil's total import bill and is
the largest single component of its huge
current-account deficits in recent years.
Imported energy, almost entirely
petroleum, met about 47 percent of total
energy requirements in 1976, up from 43
percent in 1970.
Hydroelectric power, the major domes-
tic energy source, meets one third of
Brazil's energy needs; most of the re-
mainder is met by oil, more than 80 per-
cent of which is imported.
Requirements
Demand for electricity will continue to
grow rapidly. Brazil could require as
much as 180 million kilowatts of electric
power capacity by the turn of the century,
up from 21.8 million kilowatts at the end
of 1976. Hydroelectric capacity is ex-
pected to reach only 110 million kilowatts
by the year 2000. Only about one third of
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potential hydroelectric power is in
south-central Brazil where nearly three
fourths of all electricity consumption
takes place. About two fifths of Brazil's
power potential is in the Amazon region,
too remote for economic transmission to
major consumption centers.
Brazil plans to have only 15 million
kilowatts of conventional thermal capaci-
ty by the turn of the century unless large
petroleum reserves are found. The coun-
try's large coal reserves have been
neglected because of their low heat and
high sulfur and ash content.
The government has increased oil ex-
ploration, spending S400 million on
domestic exploration last year, compared
with only $140 million in 1973. Brazil has
broken a long-standing policy by bringing
foreign oil companies back into domestic
oil exploration.
The Nuclear Option
Policymakers are turning to nuclear
energy against the contingency that oil
discoveries will fall far short of re-
quirements.
The nuclear agreement signed in 1975
with West Germany is designed to meet
Brazil's requirements through 1990, the
first stage of the current nuclear develop-
ment program. Under the accord, Brazil
will buy four 1,300 megawatt reactors
with an option on four more. Brazil will
also receive a pilot uranium enrichment
plant that can be expanded to commercial
scale, a fuel fabrication plant, and a fuel
reprocessing plant. If the agreement is ful-
ly carried out, Brazil will have 10,000
megawatts of nuclear capacity by 1990,
enough to meet 5 percent of the econ-
omy's energy needs.
Reported cost estimates for the West
German agreement range from $4 billion
to $10 billion. Assuming that Brazil ac-
quires the full package-eight reactors
and a complete fuel cycle large enough to
support them-the total cost will
probably approach $1.3 billion.
Brazil's known uranium resources can-
not support its nuclear development
plans. Official reserves are estimated at
about 26,000 tons of U308, little more
than the amount needed to provide the
Nuclear plant under construction in central Brazil
first core and 10 annual reloads for the 8
reactors. Undiscovered uranium may ex-
ist in significant amounts, however, and
exploration now under way has turned up
evidence of uranium deposits at a number
of sites.
Balance of Payments
During its early years, the nuclear
energy program could add slightly more
to Brazil's foreign-exchange expenditures
than would thermal power. Over the
longer term, however, a nuclear program
should greatly ease energy import expen-
ditures.
Including capital costs for the fuel cy-
cle, for example, total foreign-exchange
expenditures required for the first 1,300
megawatt reactor-scheduled for comple-
tion in 1983-would be approximately
$1.6 billion, almost all of which would be
spent during the first 5 years of its ex-
pected 30-year life. Unless large uranium
reserves are found, an expanding nuclear
power industry would require growing
fuel imports. Barring a radical change in
uranium prices compared with those of
other fuels, however, uranium import
costs would be relatively small.
If an equivalent conventional power
plant fired with imported oil were built in-
stead of a nuclear reactor, foreign-ex-
change costs over the 30-year period
probably would exceed $4.5 billion.
Although conventional plants cost less
than nuclear plants, and Brazilian in-
dustry could supply more than 90 percent
of an oil-fired plant, fuel imports would
cost about $150 million annually. These
costs, moreover, probably would continue
indefinitely.
Foreign-exchange savings per unit will
increase as additional reactors are built
and as Brazilian industry expands its
ability to supply reactor components. By
the late 1980s or early 1990s, Brazil
probably will be able to manufacture 80 to
90 percent of the components for its new
reactors.
Imported enriched uranium fuel for a
1,300 megawatt reactor operating 70 per-
cent of capacity would cost about $40
million annually. Domestic enrichment
would cut this cost in half, and recycling
the uranium and plutonium contained in
the spent fuel could reduce it to as little as
$14 million per year-about one tenth the
cost of the oil imports needed to generate
an equal amount of power.
Despite large foreign-exchange savings
per reactor, Brazil's nuclear program may
have little beneficial impact on the
balance of payments until after the year
2000, when the growth of hydroelectric
capacity levels off. If nuclear power were
not available to replace hydroelectricity,
however, the cost of energy imports by the
year 2010 would be nearly twice the cost
of fuel imports with a self-sufficient
nuclear industry-and perhaps con-
siderably more.
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South Africa's white government remains firmly com-
mitted to apartheid, and neither outside pressures nor actions
by the black majority are likely to effect meaningful changes in
the system any time soon.
South Africa: The Economics 0/Apartheid
SOUTH AFRICA: Expanding Black/White Wage Gap
Ann jai Wages (US S)
10.200
Basic Industries: 1.7 Million Blacks
0.4 Million Whites
Services: 1.0 Million Blacks
0.8 Million Whites
Apartheid, to which South Africa is
firmly committed, is designed to maintain
the essential labor contribution of blacks
to a white-run economy. The economy is
divided into two labor markets: one for
whites restricted largely to skilled and
management positions, for which there
are personnel shortages; and one for
blacks consisting of semiskilled and un-
skilled jobs, for which there are massive
personnel surpluses. The division is main-
tained by laws, customs, white union
regulations, and the overwhelming advan-
tage of the whites in education and train-
ing.
Although blacks have received steady
wage increases in the past few years, the
income gap between blacks and whites has
continued to grow. In industry and
government, for example, the gap
between average current wages of blacks
and whites widened from about $3,350 in
1970 to $5,000 in 1976. Whites now
receive about 65 percent of the national
income but account for only 17 percent of
the population.
Outlook for Change
Widespread rioting last summer and
fall represented a spontaneous expression
of urban black frustrations with
apartheid, not the kickoff of organized
battle against the system. Students and
teenage dropouts-objecting to the
Afrikaans language curriculum in
schools-were the principal participants.
Support from the black working class was
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short lived, reflecting fears for job se-
curity.
The riots caused roughly $50 million in
physical damage. They weakened
Pretoria's standing in Western credit
markets and provoked a sharp drop in
private foreign investment, forcing the
leadership to prolong controls on imports
and government spending. But the
government made few concessions to the
young blacks: Afrikaans language is no
longer obligatory in black schools, and
blacks are now permitted to buy instead
of rent homes in black townships. More
unrest is likely but is not apt to bring
important changes soon in the system.
The South African government is un-
likely to cut white living standards to
accelerate black progress. To do so would
require a turnaround in the key apartheid
policy of protecting the whites' economic
position. Labor and social legislation
passed in the last few decades has been to
ensure the opposite-reinforcement of
white advantages.
International economic pressures
against apartheid are still too weak and
disorganized to force meaningful reform.
In general, foreign firms in South Africa
have adapted to apartheid, changing their
own employment practices only when
pressured by church groups, stockholders,
or home governments. Pretoria has either
accepted or ignored such changes, leaving
management and unions to deal with local
labor matters. Foreign firms are not will-
ing to jeopardize their position by taking
part in political actions aimed at breaking
down the system.
Optimism that normal market forces
arising from economic growth would
bring evolutionary change is not being
realized. Growth had been expected to sop
up the pool of black unemployed and
gradually bring black opportunity and
economic participation into equality with
whites.
Reduced infant mortality among blacks
since the 1950s, however, has pushed the
growth of the black labor force well past
the ability of the economy to absorb it,
particularly since the recession in 1975
and 1976 slowed the growth of job
openings. Moreover, whites have
successfully tinkered with job definitions
and pay scales to preserve their
prerogatives in cases where blacks have
moved up to skilled positions.
At current economic growth rates-3.6
percent annually during 1974-1976-
job openings for blacks are falling far
short of the increase in the black labor
force. Black entrants into the labor
market in these two years are estimated to
have outnumbered nonagricultural job
vacancies by 155,000 a year; the excess
was 100,000 a year in 1971 to 1973. Add-
ing to the problem is a steady decrease in
agricultural jobs because of mechaniza-
tion.
An annual gross national product
growth rate of about 7 percent would
probably be needed to absorb labor force
increases and cut into the existing pool of
unemployed during 1977 to 1980.
Foreign exchange limitations, however,
point to an economic growth rate con-
siderably short of the long-term average
of 5 percent. No extraordinary spurt in
foreign exchange income is in sight to
fund the imports of raw materials and
capital equipment needed to boost
growth. More rioting would cut into
capital inflows and force Pretoria to
tighten controls in imports.
Moreover, South Africa receives no
foreign aid now and is not likely to in
the future. Pretoria is anxious to insulate
itself from outside pressures and probably
would be reluctant to accept any foreign
assistance with strings attached.
Under present conditions, progress by
blacks will most likely be along the lines
already established-gradual expansion
of black training programs, more elec-
trical hookups to township housing,
grudging pay raises, erosion of rules on
separate facilities, and perhaps more steps
toward local self-government for the
townships around white cities. Improve-
ment in the black standard of living will
continue to be very slow.
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Communist leader Carrillo has a strong grip on the party
leadership and is a force for moderation in party councils,
wor,cing to dominate the labor movement and make the party a
respectable and important influence in parliament.
Spain: Communist Prospects
Ir the Spanish election scheduled for
June 15, the Communist Party is likely to
win about 10 percent of the vote, but party
boss Santiago Carrillo will have to deal
with significant problems inside his party
once the election is over. Carrillo will
probably hew to the party's moderate line,
but he could be in trouble if the party
stumbles badly at the polls. Given Spain's
economic problems, he will also find it
hard to maintain his parry's leading role
in organized labor and at the same time
avoid confrontation with the government.
The Spanish communists have emerged
quickly and confidently f?om the years of
repression and clandestine operation un-
der Franco. The party's surprisingly rapid
acceptance in a country weighted down by
bitter memories of the civil war and
almost 40 years of anticommunist
rhetoric is a tribute to the population's
support for reconciliation of the "two
Spains"-the concept encouraged by
King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister
Adolfo Suarez.
The party's success is also traceable to
the astute policies of communist leader
Santiago Carrillo who, since the late
1960s, has fostered a party image of
moderation and respectability. Over-
coming initial internal resistance, Carrillo
rejected the Soviet system as a model and
asserted the primacy of Spanish national
interests over the interests of the USSR.
He advocated the "Eurocommunist"
commitment to pluralistic democracy,
civil liberties, and other principles com-
mon to most West European democratic
parties.
The legalization of the party on April 9
vindicated, for the time being, Carrillo's
strategy of working within the post-Fran-
co constitutional system. His opponents
in the party maintain, however, that the
party was legalized because of its
weakness, rather than its strength, and
I
hi
h
h
s
em t
at
Carrillo must still convince t
is a viable road to power.
The communists have assets in the
scramble for votes. The party has:
? An experienced political
organization that is well-established in
nearly all of the country's 50 provinces
and is particularly strong in the most
populated urban areas.
? A strong leadership with a
well-defined and articulately presented
political strategy.
? A formidable propaganda
machine, including a clandestine radio
station that broadcasts from Romania.
? A firm base in organized labor; it
controls the most powerful of the
newly-legalized trade unions, the
Workers Commissions.
? An unassailable-record of opposi-
tion to Franco.
These strengths contrast with the dis-
array of most Spanish parties. Com-
munist domination of working class
neighborhood associations, which have es-
tablished a sound reputation for resolving
grievances, could be especially effective in
turning out the vote, and possibly boost
the party's share over the 10 percent
mark.
The party's showing at the polls will be
affected, however, by the civil war legacy
of distrust that persists in the military and
in many quarters of the civilian popula-
tion, even among leftists. Furthermore,
the wrenching transformation from a
tightly-controlled and dedicated
clandestine organization to an "open par-
ty" has opened old wounds and inflicted
new ones in the party itself.
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The Return of La Pasionaria
Some of these problems were
highlighted by the return to Spain last
month of Dolores Ibarruri-the 81-year-
old titular head of the party-after near-
ly 40 years of exile in Moscow. At her first
public appearance, an emotional rally of
some 35,000 supporters, "La Pasionaria"
embarrassed the party's leadership by
praising the USSR and declaring that
Eurocommunism does not exist. Subse-
quently the party announced that "health
reasons" prevented her from participating
in the ensuing press conference. Carrillo
and Ibarruri have both stoutly denied that
they have policy differences, but Carrillo
confessed to reporters that he found her
remarks about Eurocommunism "very
strange."
La Pasionaria's peccadillos are not in
themselves significant since she has little
power in party councils. They are, how-
ever, symbolic of two deep divisions that
have long existed with the party. A hard-
core Stalinist minority remains out of
tune with Carrillo's moderate line, and a
"generation gap" separates many of the
elderly members who fought in the civil
war and endured imprisonment and exile
during the Franco era from younger
militants who chafe under the party's
older leaders.
During the past few months Carrillo
has had to fight dissension on both these
fronts. Older rank-and-file
Stalinists-pointing a contemptuous
finger at the party's recent efforts to avoid
confronting the government in the
streets-accuse him of having made too
many concessions as a price for legality.
Younger militants also object to his
moderate approach to the government
and complain about the authoritarian way
he imposes his Eurocommunist policy on
the party.
Carrillo is a tough infighter who has
survived nearly 40 years in the upper
councils of the party. He has defeated the
Stalinists before-most decisively in the
early 1970s when he expelled a Soviet-
backed faction led by Enrique
Lister-and probably feels confident that
he can contain them again. The Stalinists
the party's leadership be democratically
elected.
Internal criticism of Carrillo's policies
reportedly increased dramatically follow-
ing a plenum of the party's central com-
mittee in mid-April. The central com-
mittee, apparently alarmed by the
Spanish military's strongly negative reac-
tion to the party's legalization, attempted
to mollify the armed forces by announcing
the party's acceptance of the Spanish flag,
its support for the monarchy (as long as
the monarchy works for democracy), its
commitment to national unity, and its
dedication to democracy.
The central committee reached these
controversial decisions without consulting
the rank and file, and the statement raised
a howl of protest when party members
read about it in the press. Although the
protests focused on specific issues, it was
the authoritarian manner in which the
decisions were reached that sparked most
of the criticism.
In Catalonia, where the opposition is
traditionally anti-monarchical, some par-
ty militants told the press that they were
Republicans before they were Com-
munists and boasted that the Catalan par-
ty base simply would not accept the
Dolores Ibarruri, titular head of Spain's Communist Party
are not likely to pose a serious threat un-
less Carrillo fails to prove that his tactic
of moderation is benefiting the party-for
example, if the party does not win the
predicted 7 to 10 percent of the vote in the
coming election.
Carrillo seems more concerned by the
"generation gap." It will not go away if
the party is successful at the polls; a
strong electoral showing could even en-
courage militants to press demands for
greater internal democracy. This form of
dissidence is also likely to increase as the
party expands and draws in members who
have not been subject to party disci-
pline in the past.
Growing Dissent
The first rumbling that there was grow-
ing dissent appeared in the Spanish press
in early April after a group of communist
lawyers issued a document criticizing the
party's leadership. In it they charged that
the party had lost its revolutionary
character and accused Carrillo and his
colleagues of making deals with the
government. They further noted with
regret that although the party was on the
verge of legality there had been no in-
crease in its internal democracy. Finally,
the lawyers proposed that all members of
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decisions. Apparently party officials from
Madrid were able to smooth over
differences for the time being. The inci-
dent could, however, foreshadow
problems between the central party
leadership and the strong, nominally
autonomous regional branches.
Carrillo's Defense
Carrillo and his colleagues have met
specific criticism of party decisions by
stressing that they were necessary, tac-
tical, and successful in allaying military
fears.
The criticism of the party's lack of in-
ternal democracy is hard to counter,
however. Officially, Carrillo endorses the
principle of democratic centralism, under
which party members are free to discuss
issues within the organization but only un-
til a decision has been reached.
One of Carrillo's most effective tactics
has been to insist that the party must close
ranks and allow nothing to interfere with
the effort to win as many votes as possible
in the election. His efforts appear to have
succeeded, and for the past month the
party membership has been pulling more
or less in the same direction.
Rumors of Carrillo's imminent ouster
discourage foreign investment
necessary for growth.
? Act with as much restraint as
possible in labor matters to avoid
economic destabilization.
? Pursue a Eurocommunist foreign
policy, advocating Spanish
membership in the EC, acquiescing in
the defense treaty with the US and
possibly membership in NATO, and
criticizing the USSR when the occa-
sion arises.
So long as the party perceives the
military to be a potential threat-it is the
only remaining Francoist force capable of
reversing the party's legalization-and so
long as the party does not suffer signifi-
cant reverses in elections or parliament,
party members are likely to accept this
approach.
Carrillo's goal could conflict, however,
with his effort to establish the party as the
only true representative of the working
class. The greatest strain on his policy will
almost certainly come from organized
labor, especially if the next government
imposes harsh austerity measures. There
have already been signs that the com-
munists will have trouble, even in the par-
ty-dominated Workers Commissions,
making their political objectives mesh
with worker demands.
Last fall, when the Workers Com-
missions abandoned for the time being
attempts to build a single, united labor
confederation and played the
government's game by applying for
legalization as a trade union, several
radical factions pulled out, exposing the
communists as the moving force behind
the union. Since then, the Workers Com-
missions have sought to avoid any con-
frontations with the government that
might endanger the Communist Party's
bid for legality.
Last month, during the turbulent Bas-
que campaign for full political amnesty,
the Communist Party and the Workers
Commissions refused to support the call
for a nationwide general strike. They
asserted that strikes and demonstrations
might jeopardize the parliamentary elec-
tions. This stand not only provoked
abound, but this does not seem likely any
time soon. His success in containing dis-
sidence during the critical pre-election
period implies that he is still firmly in con-
trol. There is no viable alternative.
Carrillo's Goals
Carrillo's twin goals reportedly are to
build the Communist Party into a respect-
able organization that can exert its in-
fluence through parliament and to con-
solidate the party's dominance of labor.
He estimates that becoming a genuine op-
position power will take three to five
years.
In order to achieve these goals, Carrillo
must convince skeptics in both his party
and the military that the democratic
system will work in Spain and that the
communists should take part in it.
Toward this end, Carrillo seems likely to
urge that the party:
? Cooperate informally with
Spain's moderate, centrist majority to
ensure the political stability necessary
to prevent military intervention.
? Resist political polarization in the
country that might enable the hostile
and frustrated right wing to pull off a
military coup.
? Play down demands for radical
change in the economy in order not to
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criticism from other leftists but also tore
open the papered-over rift between com-
munists and noncommunists in the
Workers Commissions.
Noncommunist members complained
bitterly and publicly that the communist
leaders of the union were using the
Workers Commissions for political pur-
poses at the expense of workers' interests.
A Basque branch of the Workers Com-
missions went so far as to condemn the
action of the confederation's national
leadership and called for the resignation
of Marcelino Camacho, the communist
head of the organization.
Some degree of control over organized
labor will be a prerequisite for the con-
tinuation of Carrillo's policy of modera-
tion. Without this major trump card, the
party would have little negotiating power
with the next government. But the
party has a thin line to walk if it is to
enhance its leverage with the labor rank
and file without jeopardizing its new
image of respectability in the country
as a whole.
The potential conflict between
Carrillo's two major goals could lead to
renewed questioning within the party of
the wisdom of his policies. Carrillo's sup-
port among the leadership of the party
seems sound, and the people most likely
to move onto the central or executive
committees in the near future-a large
number of members on both commit-
tees is over 60 years old-seem likely
to endorse his line.
The depth of support in the party,
however, is more difficult to gauge. The
party rank and file probably does not fully
understand Carrillo's rationalization for
the break with Moscow, the Eurocom-
munist line, or the declaration of support
for the monarchy. Party members have,
however, demonstrated a willingness to
follow Carrillo's lead-either because
they believe in his concepts or because
they have accepted the tactical necessity
of his policy.
Carrillo is a past master at riding the
currents of change and achieving unity
among bickering factions. His grip on the
party is strong enough, and his ambition
great enough, for him to retain control
even during the period of economic and
social turbulence that may follow the elec-
tion this month. As long as he is at the
old
heaof the party, radical Chan es
are nikely.
China in recent months has moved to restore discipline in
the schools and-within limits-to ease restrictions on cultural
activity.
7 China: Educational and Cultural Reform
Since the purge of China's leading
leftists last October, Peking has taken
several steps to improve the Chinese
educational system and to relax the
stranglehold on cultural life. Peking's call
to "let a hundred flowers bloom" in
literature and the arts, however, has so far
focused on the revival of older, politically
acceptable works, rather than on the crea-
tion of new and innovative ones. China's
leaders, moreover, seem willing to allow
real debate only in fields-such as science
and technology-that might benefit
China's economic development.
Discipline in Schools
One of the most important steps has
been an attempt to restore discipline in
Chinese schools, many of which have been
torn by factional struggles and under-
mined by lax educational policies since
the Cultural Revolution a decade ago.
The latest effort to restore discipline first
became apparent early this year in news
articles that attacked the leftists for un-
dermining the authority of teachers and
encouraging students to revolt. An article
in People's Daily in February, for exam-
ple, denounced the leftists for wanting to
"make revolution without teachers" and
for encouraging students to believe that
their only job was to transform other
people's attitudes, not their own.
An item in the Kuangming Daily in
March was even harsher, charging that
leftists had "upset the regular order of
schools," abolished school discipline and
"rational rules and regulations," and tried
"by every means to create chaos in
schools"-moves that were "contrary to
Mao Tse-tung's principles."
In February, central education
authorities ordered students to stop at-
tacking their teachers for political mis-
takes, to study conscientiously, and to pay
attention to their teachers. Several
schools have tried to implement these
orders. A school in Honan Province has
been made a model for reimposing dis-
cipline in schools throughout the country.
In some schools, proposals have been
discussed for strengthening discipline, in-
cluding the reintroduction of strict
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grading standards. A school in Canton
requires students to hand in work on time,
attend lectures, and remain quiet in class.
Repeated offenders are called before the
school's revolutionary committee, and, in
extreme cases, may be expelled.
Efforts to restore order in Chinese
schools nave been helped by the resump-
tion of strict grading standards and ex-
ams, es 3ecially college entrance exams.
The leadership has found that students
whose careers depend at least in part on
academic achievement, rather than on
vague standards of political reliability,
have been less inclined to engage in dis-
ruptive political activities. On the other
hand, continued propaganda stressing dis-
cipline in schools may also reflect some
resistance on the part of students dis-
gruntled with the purge of the leftists, who
had worked actively to gain the support of
young people.
Cultural Revival
In the cultural field, a number of films
and plays produced before the Cultural
Revolution and later banned by the left-
ists have been revived. Although these
works are hardly innovative by Western
standards, they have helped to enliven the
drab Chinese cultural diet.
There also has been a revival of folk art
and culture. In February, a national fine
arts exhibition featuring many
traditional-style paintings, cartoons, and
sculptures opened in Peking. Tibet
celebrated the new year with programs on
Tibetan folk art. Such presentations had
been taboo in China since the Cultural
Revolution.
Revivals of cultural works are also be-
ing discussed in a more touchy
area--Chinese literature written before
the Communists came to power in 1949.
Altho lgh many of these works are still
unavailable, Chinese students in at least
one university reportedly have asked for
novel. written by "progressive writers" of
the 930s. At Futan University in
Shanghai, students have put up posters
demanding broader courses in literature.
Finally, there has been a greater
openness to foreign literature, music, and
art. For the first time in several years
Electronics class in Swatow, Kwangtung Province
Western music can be heard in China.
During a recent visit, the Canadian Brass
Quintet played works by Beethoven and
won a "tumultuous ovation." More sur-
prisingly, China's Central Philharmonic
Orchestra commemorated the anniver-
sary of Beethoven's death by playing his
Fifth Symphony. In April, the Stuttgart
Chamber Orchestra performed works by
Bach, Mozart, Gluck, and
Pachelbel-composers who, with
Beethoven, were until recently condemned
as products of bourgeois culture.
Chinese media have praised the
literature and art of ancient Greece, the
Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and the
19th century, and recommended the
works of Tolstoy, Chern.yshevsky, and
Gorky. Study of these works, they have
argued, could improve China's
proletarian literature and art. The govern-
ment recently took a step to make such
works available by announcing that it is
lifting the 10-year-yid ban on
Shakespeare and publishing a new
Chinese language edition of his works.
There have even been hints that the
Chinese might be ready to consider in-
creasing cultural exchanges with the
West. During a recent visit of the
Shanghai Ballet to Paris, a Chinese of-
ficial suggested that China might be will-
ing to return "to the attitude of develop-
ing cultural exchanges with other coun-
tries."
Although these revivals of Chinese and
foreign literature and art have enlivened
the Chinese cultural scene, they have not
produced a cultural renaissance nor even
a Soviet-style "thaw." There have been
few, if any, signs that the government is
encouraging new and original works of
art. No innovative films have appeared,
no new, nonpolitical works of literature
have been written, and no original music
has been composed. Recent editions of
poetry and literature journals have
featured not works of creative imagina-
tion, but politically motivated tracts.
There have been some signs that this is
all the government wants-that there are
limits to debate and cultural flowering
beyond which it is unwilling to go. Last
month, for instance, an article in People's
Daily attacked the notion that authors
should be free to write on any subject they
please. Contemporary literature and art,
it said, should deal only with those sub-
jects that serve the revolution.
In 1957, when "letting a hundred
flowers bloom" was last a national
policy for literature and art, the Chinese
interpreted the policy as permission not
only to produce more original artistic
works, but also to criticize the govern-
ment and its policies-something the
government certain) wants to keep from
happening again.
16 WEEKLY SUMMARY Jun 10, 77
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