WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1977
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
Secret
Weekly Summary
State Dept. review completed.
NGA Review Complete
Secret
CG WS 77-005
February 4, 1977
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
KLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
cents of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
nt Reporting Group, reports and analyzes significant
includes material coordinated with or prepared by the
of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Eco-
Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Office of
tific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence,
Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research.
CONTENTS
1 Europe
Spain; Cyprus; Italy;
Romania; Yugoslavia
4 USSR
Economy
5 Africa
Ethiopia-Sudan; Western
Sahara; South Africa
7 Asia
China; India; North
Korea-USSR; Afghanistan
9 North-South Dialogue: New Strains Ahead
11 East Germany: A Harder Attitude
13 South Africa: Continuing Racial Tensions
17 Argentina: Debate on Junta
18 China: Oil Prospects
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
Iq
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16
SPAIN
Political terrorism has subsided, at
least temporarily, in Spain since the
government's institution of stern security
measures last week. Extremist groups of
both the left and the right, however, have
issued new threats of violence.
On January 28, Prime Minister Suarez
suspended portions of the constitution for
one month, thereby enabling police to
search homes without warrants and hold
suspects indefinitely. The new measures,
which still stopped short of an imposition
of martial law, were announced after
gunmen killed three policemen in the
Madrid suburbs, bringing the death toll
from political violence to ten for the week
in the capital area.
Earlier the same day, the government
mobilized all police and civil guards, set
up roadblocks around the capital, and
sent special units to airports and railroad
terminals in search of the suspected
terrorists. Some 200 persons-most said
to be known leftist extremists-were
quickly detained for questioning about the
incident, responsibility for which was
claimed by a purportedly leftist group.
The group, which was responsible for the
kidnaping of a high political official in
December and a senior general last week,
announced it had killed the policemen in
retaliation for the murder early last week
of four Communist lawyers.
The government is taking pains to re-
main in close touch with leaders of the
moderate political opposition, who con-
tinue to give basic support to Suarez' ef-
forts to curb terrorism. Some opposition
parties, however, have voiced complaints
that the police dragnet last weekend was
unduly harsh on members of far-left par-
ties and trade unions, By midweek, the
government had released many of the
leftist suspects.
President Makarios (left) shakes hands with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash
The detention of so many leftists may
in fact have been influenced by a desire on
the part of the government to pacify
rightist senior officers, who had been par-
ticularly upset last week by the kidnaping
of the general. On February 1, King Juan
Carlos, who has played a key role in keep-
ing the military loyal to the government
and out of politics, was pictured
prominently in Spanish newspapers
lunching with a hard-line Francoist
general and his troops.
At the same time, however, the govern-
ment has deported several foreign
right-wing extremists. In addition, the
rightist subdirector of the naval war
college was recently dismissed for in-
subordination.
Both terrorist organizations involved in
the recent incidents have made new
threats. The extreme leftist group said it
would carry out further kidnapings of
prominent officials if the approximately
200 political prisoners remaining in
Spanish jails are not released. The rightist
Apostolic Anti-Communist Alliance,
possibly incensed over police protection
given last week to left-wing political
leaders, threatened a group of Socialist
union members with "execution" unless
they cease political activities.
Despite the threats, Prime Minister
Suarez has reaffirmed his determination
to resume talks with opposition leaders
about a date and ground rules for the
parliamentary election promised for this
spring
1 WEEKLY SUMMARY
CYPRUS
A meeting between Cypriot President
Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader
Denktash in Nicosia on January 27
appears to have set the stage for a
resumption of intercommunal
negotiations, which have been stalled for a
year. Each side has its own expectations
and strategies for such talks, however,
and it is by no means certain they would
be more productive than earlier
negotiations.
The two leaders, who were meeting for
the first time since Turkey invaded
Cyprus in 1974, had a wide-ranging ex-
change. Although it was inconclusive,
both Makarios and Denktash clarified
their positions on certain issues. Makarios
indicated he could accept a bizonal
federation, for example, provided the uni-
ty of the state is safeguarded and all
Cypriots are assured freedom of move-
ment and the right to settle and own
property throughout the island.
Denktash indicated this might be possi-
ble on a limited basis provided adequate
security is established and most authority
resides in the two regional governments.
Moreover, he indicated more clearly than
previously that the Turkish Cypriot claim
to 32.8 percent of the island is negotiable.
Makarios, who for some time has conced-
ed 20 percent of the island to the Turkish
Cypriots, is likely to yield more territory
in a multizonal solution than in a bizonal
one.
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
The Turkish Cypriot leader's initiative
to meet with Makarios and his con-
ciliatory approach seem aimed at reviving
a negotiating process and are part of a
broader mainland Turkish strategy to
appear as reasonable as possible to the
new US administration. Denktash's
moves and Turkey's recently announced
withdrawal of another 1,000 troops from
Cyprus seem intended in part to help
secure approval of the US-Turkish
defense cooperation agreement.
Makarios is just as interested in pro-
jecting a moderate image to the new
US administration. He hopes for
greater involvement by both the US and
the European Community in the nego-
tiating process.
The two leaders agreed to meet again
under the auspices of UN Secretary
General Waldheim in Nicosia on
February 12 and 13 to continue their dis-
Political maneuvering has recently
become more intense within the Christian
Democratic Party and the Socialist Par-
ty-the two groups that must cooperate if
an Italian government not dependent on
the Communists is to be formed.
Prime Minister Andreotti's acceptance
last week of a labor-management agree-
ment that avoids any tampering with
Italy's wage-indexation system, which ties
wages to the cost-of-living index,
triggered criticism from a wide array of
Christian Democratic leaders. Andreotti
appears to have quieted his critics for now
with a promise of further government ac-
tion on labor costs. The promised govern-
ment move, which was to be announced
on February 4, is likely to combine an
assumption of part of industry's social
security expenses with some offsetting tax
increases.
Among the Socialists, former party
secretary Mancini has been trying to un-
dermine Bettino Craxi, the current party
leader. Mancini failed last week to gain
enough backing to oust Craxi, but further
challenges are doubtless in store.
These maneuvers seem likely to in-
augurate a period of heightened political
activity. Many Italians believe Andreot-
ti's minority government will be lucky to
survive the spring. The obstacles to major
changes, however, are still formidable:
? Although the center of gravity
among Christian Democrats may be
moving to the right, party leaders
know that ousting Andreotti would
open a wide range of political and
economic uncertainties.
? The Socialists, whose votes or
abstentions would be critical in any ef-
fort to freeze out the Communists, re-
main a question mark. Craxi says he
would like to move the party back
toward the Christian Democrats, but
he views this as a long-term operation.
For now, the Socialists could not be
counted on even to deliver a cohesive
block of abstentions-much less
positive votes-if the Communists
went into opposition.
? Finally, the Communists are
strongly opposed to a change of
government. Believing the time is not
ripe for further Communist political
gains and reluctant to rejoin the op-
position, they have let it be known that
they regard the Andreotti government
as the best available. Given Com-
munist strength in parliament and in
labor, the other parties will feel com-
pelled to move carefully.
Under these circumstances, a full-
fledged government crisis does not ap-
pear imminent. Nevertheless, the po-
litical maneuvering-with the risk of
crisis at some point-seems likely to con-
tinue into spring.
ROMANIA
President Ceausescu announced on
January 25 the most sweeping shakeup in
the Romanian party and government in
recent years. The country's economic
problems seem to have prompted the
changes, which follow a smaller
reorganization only seven months ago.
Page 2
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
Ceausescu's apparent prescription for
Romania's economic ills-which stem in
large part from his ambitious develop-
ment program-is to consolidate party
control over the government's economic
apparatus. He has advanced party ac-
tivists from the provinces into the middle
levels of those government sectors that are
lagging.
Cornet Burtica, a party secretary, and
Ion Stanescu, a former interior minister,
were named deputy premiers. Stanescu
also became a party secretary and may
assume responsibility for military and
security affairs. It is unusual for two
Romanian party secretaries
simultaneously to serve as deputy
premiers.
New ministers were appointed for
labor, electric power, and the mining and
petroleum industries, and new
minister-state secretaries were selected for
the troubled areas of foreign trade,
agriculture, machine building, and the
chemical industry. Ceausescu's concern
about flagging popular enthusiasm and
discipline led him also to choose new peo-
ple for the posts of justice minister,
general prosecutor, and chairman of the
Supreme Court.
Most of these ministerial appointees
have strong party backgrounds. Seven are
former county first secretaries.
Ceausescu expanded the party's five--
man Permanent Bureau by adding his
wife Elena, Burtica, another party
secretary, and a deputy premier.
Ceausescu appears to use the bureau to
resolve day-to-day operational questions.
In the past, it has seemed to focus largely
on economic matters, but Ceausescu may
now intend to expand its role.
The elevation of Elena Ceausescu to the
bureau formalizes the considerable
behind-the-scenes influence she reportedly
has had in party affairs, especially in per-
sonnel matters, for some time. A full
member of the party's top-level Political
Executive Committee, she has now
become a powerful force in her own right.
She is widely disliked in Romania, and
her new post may spur more charges of
nepotism.
President Tito (left) with party executive committee secretary Stane Dolanc
YUGOSLAVIA
The Yugoslav party presidium on
January 31 gave key posts in the
preparations for the party congress to be
held in 1978 to two bitter rivals for Tito's
mantle as party leader. The move will
result in a test of strength that may well
determine who succeeds Tito.
Party executive committee secretary
Stane Dolanc will be in charge of congress
preparations and will head the highly im-
portant subcommittee on cadre matters.
This post will enable Dolanc to build a
personal power base in the party
hierarchy.
Another sensitive working group is to
be headed by Jure Bilic, a nominal subor-
dinate to Dolanc who in fact tries to un-
dercut him at every opportunity. Bilic has
responsibility for drafting both the new
party statute and a document on party
organizational matters. The latter assign-
Page 3
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
ment offers him a particularly good op-
portunity to undermine his rival.
The stage has thus been set for some
stormy infighting before the congress
meets next year. Dolanc is clearly
stronger than Bilic at this stage, but their
new assignments might well force uncom-
mitted party leaders to choose sides.
Dolanc will be pressed to build a con-
sensus behind himself or face political
oblivion.
The assignments appear to be a
maneuver by Tito to force the party to set-
tle on a successor without appearing to
have made the choice himself. The
84-year-old leader-who celebrates his
40th year as head of the party this
year-nevertheless still is capable of
engineering his own succession. He can
now do so by standing back and merely
resolving conflicts that occur over con-
gress pre arations.
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
ECONOMY
Sovii:t gross national product probably
grew by about 4 percent in 1976, a mark-
ed improvement over the 1975 rate of 2.3
percent and equal to the average for the
early I970s. Although the performance of
Soviet _ndustry continued to be sluggish,
agricultural output was up sharply over
the previous year. Nevertheless, serious
food shortages remained a feature of the
USSR's economy and were surely a ma-
jor concern to Soviet leaders.
Analysis of statistics presented recently
to the USSR Council of Ministers in-
dicates i.hat farm output grew by almost 5
percent last year, following a disastrous
8.5-percent drop in 1975. A record grain
crop of 224 million tons and a near-record
cotton harvest of 8.3 million tons boosted
crop production by over 20 percent and
eased import demand. This was partly
offset, however, by lower output of
livestock products.
Industrial output, on the other hand,
apparently rose by less than 4 percent, the
poorest showing by Soviet industry for the
entire period since World War 11. A
downturn in processed food production
was the principal cause, although
transportation tie-ups and fuel distribu-
tion problems contributed.
Despite a favorable performance in the
energy vectors, the growth rates in
production of other industrial materials
was a poor omen for acceleration of in-
dustrial growth in the first half of this
year. Metals, forest products, and con-
struction materials grew at rates under 3
percent, compared with averages of 4 to 5
percent between 1971 and 1975.
For the Soviet consumer, 1976 was the
worst year for food shortages in more
than a decade. Early in the year, meager
food supplies were reported, principally in
rural areas. By spring, shortages had
spread to cities. The situation improved
some during the summer, with the
availability of fruits and vegetables, but
meat supplies became tighter. Severe
shortages of various food items are still
common.
A rapid expansion in exports, coupled
with maintenance of the previous level of
nongrain imports, allowed the USSR to
cut its hard-currency trade deficit in 1976.
Last year's deficit is estimated at nearly
$5 billion, down from the record $6.4
billion incurred in 1975.
The Soviets were able to protect their
hard-currency reserves only by rapidly in-
creasing the country's debt. By the end of
1976, net indebtedness rose to roughly $14
billion, up $4 billion over the previous
CANADA-BRAZIL
Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson's
mid-January visit to Brazil appears to
have laid a foundation for significantly ex-
panded economic cooperation between
the two countries. It also underscores the
importance they both place on broadening
their foreign contacts and thus reducing
their dependence on the US.
Major contracts were concluded es-
tablishing joint ventures in the areas of
transportation, petrochemicals, and
minerals. A half-billion-dollar barter deal
was also approved involving the exchange
of Brazilian iron ore for Canadian coal.
The two foreign ministers signed three
major technical cooperation agreements
covering a wide range of projects in-
cluding telecommunications, data
processing, education, agriculture, and
science. One of the agreements calls for
special "trilateral" arrangements
providing technical assistance to third-
party developing states, mostly in Africa
and Latin America. Altogether, the two
countries envisage increased cooperation
in trade and technology amounting to
Page 4
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
more than $2 billion over the next 10
years.
Although the visit focused primarily on
economic matters, the Brazilians and
Canadians also discussed. a wide range of
The Brazilians, both in their talks wit
Jamieson and later at a press conference,
stood firm on their determination to
develop a full nuclear fuel cycle regardless
of foreign opposition-a position they
reiterated strongly in a public statement
this week.
Jamieson also visited Peru and Colom-
bia on the same trip; again the talks he
had were mainly on economic subjects. In
Lima, he signed six technical cooperation
accords amounting to $10 million and an-
nounced several new measures to promote
bilateral trade.
ETHIOPIA-SUDAN
Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan
were jolted severely this week by
Sudanese President Numayri's call on
January 30 for all African states to sup-
port the Eritrean insurgents fighting
against Ethiopian rule. Sudan has long
allowed its territory to be used to
transport supplies sent: by other Arab
donors to the Eritreans, but for some time
Numayri had also tried to mediate the
dispute.
The change in Sudanese policy is
probably due to a number of factors.
Numayri wants good relations with
several Arab nations that already support
the insurgents. His relations with Ethiopia
have been bad since last summer, in part
because of his belief that Ethiopia's ruling
military council, in league with Libya, is
backing Sudanese dissidents.
Many of these dissidents have been
given refuge in Ethiopia, where they
almost certainly continue to plot against
Numayri. A strong anti-Sudanese speech
by Ethiopian council chairman Teferi two
days before Numayri's announcement
was a clear indication that the Ethiopians
have no intention of limiting the activities
of the dissidents.
Numayri also believes the Eritreans are
likely to win their guerrilla war in the long
run and may now see Sudanese support as
a means of shortening the conflict, which
has been going on for more than a decade.
The council's position in Eritrea has, in
fact, been eroding. Recent military set-
backs have lowered morale and discipline
among the central government's forces in
the province; 'last month they sent a
delegation to Addis Ababa demanding a
negotiated settlement of the war. The
government is again trying to begin talks
with the insurgents, but the attempt is no
more likely to succeed than previous ef-
forts. The Eritreans still demand in-
Page 5
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
dependence as a precondition to
negotiations, and the council in Addis
Ababa refuses to give in to this demand.
Growing insurgency elsewhere in
Ethiopia limits the council's ability to
reinforce its troops in Eritrea. In Begem-
dir Province-also adjoining Sudan-the
government recently lost an important
post to forces of the Ethiopian
Democratic Union, which aims to
overthrow the radical-dominated council
and install a moderate government. The
Union, whose leader visited Khartoum
last month, apparently was aided by the
Eritrean Liberation Front.
In southeastern Ethiopia, insurgents
supported by Somalia have seriously
eroded the government's position in Bale
Province and have been active in
neighboring provinces as well.
In Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Party, an underground
Marxist organization, is stepping up its
activities. Last week, they included an at-
tack on the USIS library. The party,
which has support among students and
workers, aims to oust the military and es-
tablish a civilian regime.
WESTERN SAHARA
More aggressive counterinsurgency tac-
tics by the Moroccan army in Western
Sahara since last fall have failed to curb
scattered attacks by guerrillas of the
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
Algerian-backed Polisario Front, which
seeks independence for the former
Spanish colony partitioned by Morocco
and Mauritania last year. The Moroc-
cans, faced with declining army morale,
may have decided to sponsor guerrilla at-
tacks of their own inside Algeria.
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa has completed a pilot
uranium enrichment plant near Pretoria.
The plant may now be operating and ap-
proaching full capacity, after more than a
year of technical difficulties.
Statements by the South Africans have
emphasized the effectiveness of a secret
enrichment process they have developed.
It is unclear, however, whether the
statements reflect the actual technology of
the pilot plant or instead represent South
African expectations of future plant per-
formance.
If the claims are applicable to the pilot
plant, the facility can be used to produce
weapon-grade uranium. In continuous
operation, the plant would be capable of
enriching uranium far above the level re-
quired for South Africa's nuclear power
program. To reach weapon-grade enrich-
ment levels, enriched uranium would be
recycled through the plant. Enough
weapon-grade uranium could probably be
produced in a year to make several dozen
nuclear devices.
The enrichment plant may well be
significantly less effective than the South
African claims would indicate. It was
built with emphasis on ease of construc-
tion and minimal foreign involvement,
using unsophisticated technology and
materials.
As a result, the equipment installed
may not be able to achieve enrichment
levels comparable to those obtainable
with laboratory equipment. In that case,
the plant may be capable of producing
only some 30 tons of slightly enriched
uranium per year, enough to meet the
refueling requirements of one large power
reactor.
South Africa plans to build a second
enrichment plant with a much larger
capacity, to be operational in the
mid-1980s. It is seeking foreign invest-
ment and more advanced technology for
this project. If these plans are realized,
South Africa will be able to supply up
to 10 percent of reactor-grade uranium
enrichment services expected to be sought
by the noncommunist world by the mid-
to-late 1980s
Page 6
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
South Africa's first uranium enrichment plant, near Pretoria
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
CHINA
Chinese leaders appear to be debating
what portion of their budget to allocate to
defense and how much to invest in
developing the economy. The issue is a
touchy one for recently installed Chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng, who favors
emphasizing economic development but
cannot afford to offend many important
military leaders.
The question was moved to the fore in
December with the publication of a 1956
speech by Mao that emphatically called
for gradually reducing "'military and ad-
ministrative" costs and increasing invest-
ment in economic development. Soon
after the speech was published, the Can-
ton Military Region explicitly agreed with
the concept of giving first priority to
economic development.. The other 10
military regions have expressed general
agreement with Mao's instruction but
have yet to endorse it openly.
On January 20, the National Defense
Industry Office-the principal body
supervising China's defense in-
dustry-published an article that seems
to agree with Mao's instruction. The ar-
ticle also urges, however, that defense
industry should be developed "as fast as
possible."
The article appears to be arguing that
no rigid distinction should be drawn
between rapid military modernization and
economic development. Defense industry,
it points out, stimulates economic
development by making "new demands
on other industries and on science and
technology."
There is also an important political
message in the article. It implicitly ex-
onerates former vice premier Teng
Hsiao-ping of leftist accusations that he
took a "revisionist" line in implementing
Chinese military policy during 1975.
This is yet another indication that the
way is being prepared for the rehabilita-
tion of Teng a second time. With the
allocation of resources probably becom-
ing an increasingly difficult issue for the
Chinese leadership, Teng's military con-
nections and administrative talents may
be needed by Hua and his supporters to
strike a balance between military and
nonmilitary spending.
Some military leaders may be ap-
prehensive that civilian planners will take
Mao's 1956 dictum too literally and try to
cut the military budget substantially.
Moreover, the question of just where ad-
justments should be made in defense spen-
ding is bound to be a contentious issue
within the military.
INDIA
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who
appeared to be sailing toward a certain
victory in the national election scheduled
for next month, was abruptly confronted
with a new, possibly serious complication
this week. Several influential members of
her Congress Party rebelled against her
leadership and announced plans to form a
new political grouping.
Agriculture Minister Ram, a veteran
cabinet member and the spokesman for
India's "untouchables," resigned from
both the party and the cabinet, charging
that Gandhi is leading India toward
despotism. Ram was joined by five others,
including former chief ministers of the im-
portant states of Uttar Pradesh and
Orissa. A prominent member of the party
in West Bengal reportedly has also
resigned. The rebels said they would
coordinate efforts in the campaign with
the existing noncommunist opposition
parties.
Gandhi, who survived a serious split in
the party in 1969, enjoys substantial per-
sonal popularity and considerable
political leverage as prime minister.
Moreover, she retains control over a party
organization that is active in almost every
village. Still, the defections raise serious
SECRET
Page 7
questions about Gandhi's chances in four
states, including Uttar Pradesh, where
she is from, and Bihar, Ram's home
state. Together, the four states have
about 40 percent of the seats in Par-
liament.
If Ram and the other defectors can re-
tain the loyalty of their followers and if
they can work out an election arrange-
ment with the main opposition par-
ties-most of which have joined together
for the campaign-Congress Party can-
didates will be threatened in many con-
stituencies. In the past, Congress can-
didates have frequently won elections with
pluralities or small majorities.
Gandhi apparently has already begun a
strong counterattack against Ram,
mobilizing a large number of leading
members of the Congress Party to attack
his decision. The committee that sets par-
ty policy has unanimously criticized his
resignation.
NORTH KOREA-USSR
North Korean Premier Pak
Song-chol's two-day visit to Moscow last
week was the first by a high-ranking
North Korean since 1972. There are no
indications that he accomplished his
probable main purpose-persuading the
Soviets to increase their political,
military, and economic support of North
Korea.
Soviet - North Korean relations have
been cool in recent years. The USSR
recognizes that Chinese influence is
predominant in Pyongyang and sees its in-
terests best served by maintaining the
status quo on the Korean Peninsula.
Soviet aid to North Korea has declined
markedly since 1973.
In speeches during Pak's visit, Premier
Kosygin delivered pro forma reiterations
of Soviet support for the withdrawal of all
foreign troops from South Korea and for
speeding "peaceful reunification" of the
Koreas. He made no mention, however, of
the recent proposal by Kim I1-song's
regime for talks between the two Koreas
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
or of its claim to be the only legitimate
Korean government.
No Soviet military personnel were iden-
tified as taking part in the discussions
with Pak's delegation, and it is unlikely
that such new military aid was provided.
The Soviets are probably aware that
North Korea's armed forces already have
a quantitative weapons advantage over
those of the South and thus see no
compelling need to provide Pyong-
yang with additional sophisticated
equipment.
Talks about economic and trade
relations may have been somewhat more
productive. A press release issued at the
end of the visit said that the two sides had
discus:;ed ways to expand economic and
trade relations, and a Soviet deputy
minister was sent to Pyongyang for
follow-up discussions shortly after Pak
left Moscow. It is doubtful, however, that
the USSR is offering North Korea any
hard currency to help it with its current
debt problem with Western
creditors-one of the principal eco-
nomic concerns of the North Koreans
just now.
The Pak visit failed to produce a Soviet
invitation to North Korean President Kim
II-song. Kim had been angling for a
meeting with the Soviet leaders to balance
his highly publicized trip to Peking in
April 1975, but the Soviets put him off, in
part be:ause of the negative impact such a
visit wculd have on their relations with the
US. In view of the passage of time, the
Soviets may calculate that the full
protocol treatment given Premier Pak has
reduced, if not eliminated, any need for a
summit-level meeting.
AFGHANISTAN
A constituent assembly chosen in a con-
trolled election last month will soon ap-
prove a new constitution for Afghanistan
that wil formalize the concentration of
power in President Daoud's hands. The
assembly also will elect Daoud, who took
over after a military coup in 1973, to a
six-year term as president.
The constitution establishes a strong
executive, a weak legislature, a judiciary
that may acquire limited independence,
and a single political party headed by the
president. The party will nominate all
candidates for parliament and the
presidency. Daoud is creating a "Party of
National Revolution" that clearly will be
responsive to him.
Daoud will appoint the cabinet and one
or more vice presidents and, during an in-
itial transition period, will also have
judicial and legislative powers. The parlia-
ment, which is not to begin functioning
until November 1979, will consider bills
proposed by the government or the
judiciary; whether it will be able to initiate
legislation is unclear.
Major decisions are to be ratified by the
constituent assembly. The constitution es-
tablishes the assembly as a permanent
Page 8
supreme institution consisting of the
parliament as well as senior government,
military and party officials, provincial
representatives, and persons appointed by
the president.
As long as Daoud remains in power, the
legislative roles of both the parliament
and the constituent assembly are likely to
be limited to automatic approval of his
decisions. The parliament will thus be
even less influential than the elected
legislatures brought into being by former
King Zahir during the last years before he
was overthrown by Daoud.
The US embassy believes Daoud is
nevertheless trying to create a framework
in which the people could eventually have
a greater voice in political affairs, but
only when he decides the time is right. In
the meantime, approval of the new con-
stitution by the assembly will probably
enhance the legitimacy of Daoud's rule in
the eyes of man Af hans.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
Key developing nations are likely to seek an early test of
US policy on North-South issues, and they may try to play on
differences among the industrialized states to bring added
pressure on the US.
North-South Dialogue: New Strains Ahead
The atmosphere of accommodation
that eased tensions in North-South
relations after the Seventh Special Ses-
sion of the UN in September 1975 is un-
der serious challenge.
Developments over the past several
months have created political pressures
within both camps that could lead to
another round of confrontation. For the
US, this could mean new strains in
relations not only with key developing
countries but also with West European
allies and Japan. The developing coun-
tries apparently intend to put US policy
on North-South issues to an early test. A
number of meetings that are scheduled
this year will provide them with additional
opportunities to put pressure on the US
and its allies.
Pressures fro nn the South
The demands of developing countries
have been specified many times since the
first call for a "new international
economic order" at the summit meeting
of the nonaligned states in Algiers in
September 1973. The demands cover vir-
tually all aspects of international
economic relations, but four areas of ma-
jor contention with the industrialized
countries are likely to be the focus of
negotiations in 1977.
The developing countries are demand-
ing:
. Establishment of formal
mechanisms, under their control, that
would guarantee and substantially in-
crease the real prices of raw materials
they export to the industrialized states.
? A greater say in review and recon-
sideration of their official and com-
mercial debt obligations. Some sup-
port this objective reluctantly, but all
support the demand that the debt
burden of the poorest developing coun-
tries be forgiven or delayed.
? Mandatory programs for the
transfer of technology to them and im-
proved access to financing and
markets in industrialized states for
manufactured goods and semi-
processed raw materials.
? Allotment by the industrialized
states of at least 0.7 percent of their
gross national products for official
development assistance by 1980.
Last December, developing country
participants in the Conference on Inter-
national Economic Cooperation agreed to
postpone ministerial-level negotiations
until a new US administration had taken
office. The review conference that had
been scheduled to begin on December
15 was to be an important test of prog-
ress in the North-South dialogue be-
tween the industrial and the develop-
ing countries.
Postponement of the review conference
probably avoided a showdown over the
developing countries' demands, especially
their highly contentious insistence on
debt relief. It also provided time for
behind-the-scenes efforts to insulate
CIEC from pressures by some members
of the Organization of Petroleum Expor-
ting Countries, notably Saudi Arabia, to
link future oil price decisions, in part, to
US concessions.
Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, India,
Indonesia, Zaire, and Zambia-all
self-styled moderates in the North-South
dialogue-have indicated that their sup-
port for the postponement of the
December conference was based, in part,
on expectations that the new administra-
tion will soften the US position on debt
rescheduling and ask Congress for in-
creased US contributions to the World
Bank's soft loan facility.
Such initiatives, these states argue, will
be essential to the continuation of the
CIEC and to the success of US diplomacy
in the commodity consultations being
carried out under the aegis of the UN
Conference on Trade and Development.
Progress in these areas will also affect
such issues as law of the sea, the UN's in-
ternational development strategy, reform
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, as well as discussions with key
developing states such as Brazil and Iran
on regulating the export of nuclear
technology.
The politically moderate developing
countries in CIEC are under pressure to
show other developing countries that
negotiations with the industrial states can
lead to the realization of at least some of
their goals. Many of the countries that
9 WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
have tcted as moderating influences at
CIEC and elsewhere may threaten to
change their tactics if there are no early
initiatives to break the impasse on the
debt issue or to demonstrate "good faith"
by increasing official development
assistance to the lending institutions
preferr.d by developing countries.
The developing countries will likely
voice renewed skepticism about the US
commitment to a North-South dialogue,
and at least some will threaten to recon-
sider their willingness to negotiate behind
the setnes with the US and other in-
dustria countries to reach compromises.
At leas: initially, however, this is likely to
be posturing aimed not at alienating the
US or at breaking off the dialogue, but at
getting the US more engaged in seeking
mutually satisfactory compromises on
North-South issues.
Most developing countries-especially
the more influential ones-believe that ac-
tive US leadership is essential for progress
on such key issues as commodity
agreements, debt relief, and the reform of
international financial institutions, which
will be high on the agenda of the
North-South dialogue in 1977.
Coming Meetings
Calks will begin in Geneva on March 7
on a proposed UNCTADfund to stabilize
prices of* raw materials. The developing
countries will view the initial stands of the
industrialized states as a test of their
willingness to negotiate. The UNCTAD
talks cculd thus influence talks in the
CIEC framework. At the same time, the
scheduli.ig of the CIEC ministerial is cer-
tain to depend on when the economic
summit meeting of the major noncom-
munist industrialized countries is held.
A delay of the CIEC ministerial
meeting until June would subject it to
pressure from the OPEC oil ministers'
conferen:e that will be held in early July.
Additional pressures on US policy could
also result if the UN General Assembly is
called back into session. Delegates agreed
last December not to adjourn as usual but
to recess and then reconvene after the
CIEC ministerial to evaluate progress in
the North-South dialogue.
An unsatisfactory CIEC
ministerial-or its cancellation-would
provide the poor countries with the oppor-
tunity to raise North-South issues again
in a highly politicized fashion in the UN
General Assembly-a forum where the
US and the industrialized states are at a
distinct disadvantage.
Pressures From the North
(IS policy toward developing country
demands will also be complicated by the
likelihood of conflicting pressures in 1977
from the West European states and Japan
over how that policy is formulated and the
shape it takes.
These states are more dependent on the
developing countries-as suppliers of raw
materials and markets for exports-than
is the US, and some groups in Europe and
Japan argue that the US would have less
to lose than they should a new confronta-
tion between industrialized and develop-
ing countries erupt. At the same time,
however, some West German and
Japanese officials are concerned that the
US may move too quickly to accept some
of the developing country demands.
They will exert pressure for close con-
sultations.
Many West Europeans argue that the
industralized countries' policies must be
developed cooperatively if their support is
to he counted on, and they, as well as the
Japanese, have been looking for early
meetings with the new administration on
these issues. The EC has been working on
new positions for CIEC and the
UN( FAD talks and will reportedly soon
seek to involve the US in discussions on
these proposals.
Finding a common stand, however, is
likely to he complicated by differences in
regional and historic economic interests
and relationships and by the differences in
each of the industrialized states' percep-
tions of its vulnerability to pressure from
the developing countries.
Some of the European states and the
Japanese believe, I'or example, that they
might face serious social and political dis-
ruptions should a new round of
North-South friction lead to uncertainties
over raw materials supplies. The West
Europeans face the additional burden of
harmonizing policy among the nine
members of the EC before they can begin
to negotiate a common stand with the US
and Japan.
There are, however, many common
points of'interest among the industrialized
states; continued efforts to find a common
response to developing country demands
stem even more from this than from a
recognition of the tactical disadvantages
of disunity. Virtually all industrialized
states agree that wholesale acceptance of
the developing countries' demands would
undermine the stability of existing
economic and political systems.
At the same time, most agree that to
refuse to concede on any demands or to
fail to put together a program ofaction on
which most developing countries would
find it possible to compromise could lead
to a strong reaction by the developing
countries and with it the possibility of ten-
sion in relationships among the in-
dustrialized states.
Implications
To date, most of the political tensions
in North-South relations have been
caused by the developing countries'
search for bargaining leverage. Ever
since the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo,
the non-OPEC developing countries
have tried unsuccessfully to convert
control of raw materials into influ-
ence over the industrial countries.
Current indications are that a growing
number of influential developing coun-
tries believe their most potent leverage
may now lie in exploiting the political
divisions among the industrial countries
on North-South issues. A key objective of
this strategy would be to intensify
pressures from the industrialized states on
the US to soften its opposition to some
developing country demands.
Unless tensions within both camps are
checked, a new round of North-South
confrontation could interfere with
attempts to address cooperatively such
pressing global issues as energy shortages,
food and population problems, and the
performance of the world's economy.
Page 10
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
East Germany in recent weeks has hardened its attitude
toward West Germany and the status of Berlin. The new stance,
in part, reflects a belief by both the East Germans and their
Soviet supporters that West German Chancellor Schmidt's ap-
proach toward Ostpolitik is more negative than his
predecessor's.
East German sensitivity--and by exten-
sion Soviet sensitivity as well-toward
West Germany and Berlin has heightened
recently. The East Germans have re-
moved some of the few remaining sym-
bols of the special status of East Berlin.
Last week the Honecker regime struck out
sharply against the West German govern-
ment in a formal diplomatic note.
Since the first of this year, the East
Germans have taken several steps that in-
dicate a hardening attitude. They include:
? Requiring entry visas to East
Berlin for non-German third country
nationals, excluding Allied personnel.
? Removal of border markers at the
East Berlin - East German border,
thus removing a symbolic reminder
that East Berlin is not an integral part
of East Germany.
? Temporarily turning back East
German citizens attempting to visit the
West German mission in East Berlin to
obtain emigration visas.
? Occasionally refusing West Ger-
mans and West Berliners entry into
East Berlin.
? References in the party daily on
January 13 to the formation of a ninth
city district in East Berlin. This step
could be used by East Germany as
another demonstration of its
"sovereignty" over East Berlin.
? Heightened polemics against
West German leaders, including recent
East Germany: A Harder Attitude
personal criticism of Chancellor
Schmidt and West Berlin Mayor
Schuetz.
On January 27, the East German
government handed a toughly worded
aide-memoire to the head of the West
German permanent mission in East
Berlin. The note criticized West Germany
for presuming "to concern itself with the
interests of East German citizens" and
said East Germany expected Bonn to
"desist immediately from any activity"
interfering in East German domestic af-
fairs. This is an implicit reference to the
West German mission's counseling of
East Germans who apply for exit visa
applications. The note added that
cooperation could come only when West
Germany recognizes that there are "two
sovereign, mutually independent German
states."
East German guard observes memorial service in East Berlin last August honoring
border guards killed during escape attempts by refugees
Page 11
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
NERVOUSNESS IN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN
Possible Motivations
Several factors apparently underlie
these actions. Among them are concern
about the impact on the populace of the
emigration provisions of the 1975
Iieliinki accords, and especially the re-
cem surge in applications for exit visas.
The regime is also unhappy over what it
sees as a more negative attitude by the
West German government toward East
Gernany. This includes inertia in in-
ter-German movement toward
agreements, references by West German
leadrs that could be interpreted as non-
recognition of East Germany's
"sovereign" status, and the "meddling"
role of the West German mission in East
Berl: n.
There are signs of Soviet concern about
the unrest in East Germany, which the
Soviets attribute in part to the impact of
the Helsinki accords and in part to the ex-
panded contacts between the two German
states in recent years. These concerns may
be behind Moscow's apparent approval of
East German efforts to reduce visible
signs of the special status of East Berlin.
US embassy contacts in East Germany
have hinted that the leadership is also an-
noyed with West German Chancellor
Schn- idt's failure to give clear-and
tangible-signals that he wants better
relations with East Germany.
In removing some of the remaining
overt signs of East Berlin's special status,
the East Germans have been careful so far
to nibble at gray areas of understandings
on Berlin. Many of these measures are no
doubt designed to impress the populace
that the regime is indeed in sovereign con-
trol over East Berlin. Nothing East Ger-
many has done so far undermines the con-
tinuing four-power status of the city.
The Soviet Angle
F as. German efforts to put pressure on
West Ciermany almost certainly enjoy ac-
tive support from the Soviets. For one
thing, Moscow shares East Germany's
Nerves are on edge in West Germany
and West Berlin as a result of the re-
cent series of unfriendly moves by the
Soviet-supported East German
regime of Erich Honecker. This week
rumors were flying that action in-
volving East German, and possibly
even Soviet, troops might be pending.
Feeding the rumors, in addition to
the East German regime's crackdown
on attempts by its civilians to
emigrate and its recent efforts to
erode the special status of East Berlin,
was a call-up of some East German
reservists. The call-up, in fact,
appears to be a routine move un-
related to any crisis situation,
although it is being characterized as
suspicion of the Schmidt government and
believes that Schmidt lacks the commit-
ment to Ostpolitik of his predecessor,
Willy Brandt.
The Soviets are suspicious, too, of West
Germany's intentions toward West Berlin
and the ideological inroads of the West in
East Germany as a result of the expansion
of contacts between the two Germanies.
But Moscow is also concerned that the
East Germans themselves have been mov-
ing too close to the West Germans, par-
ticularly in the economic sphere. For the
Soviets, then, a period of some tension
between the two Germanies might not be
a had thing.
The Soviets may, in addition, be using
the East Germans to test the forbearance
of the Western powers in a low-risk way.
The evidence, however, suggests that the
Soviets have not been the prime movers
Moscow's attitude is the key to how far
the East Germans are willing to push. At
Page 12
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
full-scale "mobilization" in some
stories.
Rumors about the purpose of the
"mobilization" are varied. Some
suggest that it has been necessitated
by the prospect of serious disorder in
East Germany, and others link it with
possible action against Allied interests
in West Berlin and particularly Allied
access to the city.
The "explanations" strain credibili-
ty, although there is surely con-
siderable unease in East Germany and
some unofficial East German
spokesmen have made threats about
curtailing West German traffic
present, the USSR has larger foreign
policy objectives, so it seems likely that
Moscow will want to keep the rising ten-
sion between the two German states
within bounds and to prevent another
serious Berlin imbroglio.
The Soviets would probably support the
East Germans, however, in any steps they
might take to keep contacts between the
two Germanies under control. The op-
tions available to the Honecker regime in-
clude:
? Imposing some restrictions on
travel to East Germany by West Ger-
mans and West Berliners.
? Taking a tougher line toward East
Germans desiring to emigrate.
? Pressing the Soviets for a stricter
interpretation of the 1971 Quadripar-
tite Agreement on Berlin.
? Increasing the mandatory curren-
cy exchange rate for visitors to East
Germany.
? Introducing visa requirements for
West German citizens visiting East
Berlin. This, however, would violate
the 1972 East-West German transit
agreement.
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
The suppression over the years of black organizations that
might have served as channels for peaceful pressure makes it
virtually certain that rising black assertiveness will be expressed
in increasingly violent action.
South Africa: Continuing Racial Tensions
The most extensive urban violence in
South African history has subsided, but
racial tensions remain appreciably higher
than before the violence started last June
in the black township of Soweto. Further-
more, the day-to-day interaction between
government authorities and urban blacks
seems stuck in a pattern of confrontation
that will be difficult to reverse.
Indeed, the future seems sure to bring
more, not less, violence: to South Africa,
which is increasingly exposed to the
pressures of black nationalism. At least
some of these pressures, and the black ac-
tivism they have given rise to, might be
finding a peaceful outlet had not the
authorities, over the years, suppressed a
wide range of organized activities among
urban blacks that could have served to
channel black action into nonviolence.
Such suppressive tactics have radical-
ized thousands of students and driven
hundreds to take refuge abroad, where
they may serve as recruits for foreign-
based insurgent activities.
For the first 15 years or so after the
1948 electoral victory of the Afrikaners'
National Party and its apartheid policy,
active resistance to the system among
blacks came mainly from communist-
oriented organizations spawned by the
white South African Communist Party,
which was suppressed in 1950. The oldest
of these, the African National Congress,
has maintained ties through the years with
the USSR. The Pan-Africanist Congress,
which split off from the ANC in 1958, has
looked primarily to China for support.
In the early 1960s, the ANC, the PAC,
and their covert action groups conducted
set up offices in several African capitals.
Each has received some support from the
Organization of African Unity and main-
tains guerrilla training bases in Tanzania.
There is no evidence, however, that
significant numbers of trained insurgents
have returned to South Africa.
As the police rooted out the com-
munist-oriented organizations, students
emerged as the most vocal opponents of
the apartheid system. A separate national
black student group came into existence
in 1969, when a number of black student
many small-scale acts of sabotage and
violence. The PAC also took the lead in
organizing mass violations of various
apartheid rules, including the march in
1960 that resulted in the "Sharpeville
massacre"-the bloodiest single clash
between police and blacks in South
African history
Groups Suppressed
By the mid-sixties, both groups had
been thoroughly suppressed inside South
Africa, and their most active members
were in either prison or exile. Both groups
Page 13
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16
Fire-gutted shopping center in black township near Cape Town shows effects of rioting last August
leaders broke away from the
predominantly white South African stu-
dent union and founded the South African
Students' Organization. Its leaders enun-
ciated "black consciousness" as a non-
violent legal strategy for overcoming
white supremacy.
Organization Grows
Within a few years, the South African
Students' Organization had formed
strong units at most of the universities for
nonwhites and had also launched the
South African Student Movement at the
secondary level. Leaders of the student
organizations were also instrumental in
the formation of the Black People's
Convention, which is intended to develop
solidarity among adult residents of the
black townships.
From its start, however, the "black
consciousness" movement has reflected
tension; between moderates, who have
hoped i.o win a better deal for blacks by
nonviolent action, and militants, who
have tried to provoke police crackdowns
that would radicalize the participants in
protest actions.
Police harassment has tended to tip the
balance against the moderates. Although
none of the "black consciousness" groups
has been outlawed, many leading
members have been arrested or "banned,"
a system of personal restrictions amount-
ing to virtual house arrest. By 1975, both
the South African Students' Organization
and the Black People's Convention had in
effect gone underground.
By early 1976, the only nonwhite urban
organizations not subject to harassment
were the authorized representative bodies
of each nonwhite racial group-the urban
Bantu council in each black township, the
South African Indian Council in Durban,
and the Colored Representative Council
in Cape Town. Although these bodies
have popularly elected as well as ap-
pointed members, they can only submit
recommendations to white administrative
officials in the segregated residential
areas.
Page 14
Since last June, sporadic urban rioting
has occurred in the all-black residential
areas outside Johannesburg, Pretoria,
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and smaller
cities, and in the colored (mixed blood)
areas near Cape Town. By
mid-September, after the outbreaks had
subsided, the rioting had brought death to
at least 300 blacks, 30 coloreds, and a few
whites. Almost all of the rioting, arson,
and other property damage was confined
to the black or colored townships.
Student Militancy
The students who first clashed with
police in Soweto last June were protesting
the mandatory use of the Afrikaans
language as a medium of instruction.
Their march, like most of the subsequent
student demonstrations, was intended to
broaden participation in school boycotts.
As the police increased their arrests of
student militants and blacks suspected of
encouraging the militants, demands for
the release of the detainees became the
basic motif of the protests. The students
i
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
began calling for area-wide work stop-
pages to show that all urban blacks sup-
ported such demands and wanted basic
changes in the government's racial
policies.
The new tactic met with a measure of
success, but also led to some violent
clashes between students., who were trying
to impose the work stoppages, and
migrant workers, who did not want their
earnings interrupted. The most serious of
these clashes, in Soweto last August,
resulted in the worst bloodshed and most
extensive property damage of the rioting
period.
The most successful work stoppage
organized by the students occurred in the
Johannesburg area in mid-September,
when they sponsored a three-day strike in
which at least 70 percent of the black in-
dustrial workers in the metropolitan area
participated. A call for a five-day general
strike in early November, however, went
largely unheeded after employers had
made clear that all workers would be
docked for absenteeism during the strike.
Fresh Leadership
Government spokesmen have asserted
that the surge of student militancy was
orchestrated by the foreign-based in-
surgent organizations, presumably work-
ing through the "black consciousness"
groups inside South Africa.
Emigre leaders of the African National
Congress and the Pan-Africanist
Congress have made similar claims.
Neither the authorities nor the emigres,
however, have presented convincing
evidence of centralized direction or of
significant support for the student
militants from existing black
organizations.
The protest actions that clearly re-
quired concerted leadership-particularly
the mid-September strike among black in-
dustrial workers-have displayed the non-
violent tactics of the "black con-
sciousness" groups. It seems likely that
the students who have played leading roles
in such action since June had some earlier
association with the student unions.
The frequent skirmishing between
students and police has shaped a new style
of leadership-less cohesive than the stu-
dent unions, but more flexible and
resilient. The new leadership has
demonstrated its existence, yet has largely
evaded detection. The new student
leadership may be more structured than it
appears; it probably has organized sup-
port within each black and colored
township.
Only one of the new local groups-the
Soweto Students' Representative Coun-
cil-has openly flaunted its militant
leadership. Tsietsi Mashinini, the coun-
cil's first president, told a journalist that
he was on an "action committee" that
organize the protest against compulsory
use of Afrikaans in June. By August,
when Mashinini escaped to the UK, the
council had emerged as the most promi-
nent student group in Soweto.
The council's elusive leadership, usually
manifested through leaflets circulating in
Soweto, appears to be taking setbacks in
stride and asserting influence in whatever
ways it can. Since August, the council has
called for carefully prepared boycott ac-
tions instead of mass demonstrations that
draw police gunfire.
The council's reputation as a "shadow
Page 15
government" came to a peak with the
highly effective and largely nonviolent
strike of black industrial workers in
mid-September. The Soweto students had
apparently not only mobilized their
parents, but had also extended their in-
fluence to other townships in the
Johannesburg area.
The negligible response to the council's
strike call in November was a setback for
the students. This was partially offset,
however, by a positive response by
Soweto residents to the council's calls for
other boycotts. The government liquor
stores and many of the
"sheebeens"-illegal bars operated by
blacks-have been closed since early
November. The near-total student
boycott of year-end exams has also been
attributed to the council.
Police Crackdown
Last June, the police arrested hundreds
of participants in the first round of rioting
in the Johannesburg area and began a
roundup of activists in the "black con-
sciousness" groups still at large. Through
July, however, government leaders were
receptive to prominent urban blacks who
had stayed clear of dissident activity and
were offering to mediate between the
authorities and the thousands of newly
militant students.
In early July, an agreement to phase
out Afrikaans as a language of instruction
in the black schools was reached at a
meeting between a cabinet minister and a
delegation from the Soweto Bantu Coun-
cil.
The agreement seemed a psychological 25X1
breakthrough and encouraged the forma-
tion of such groups as the Black Parents'
Association in Soweto, which sought a
hearing for more grievances than the
usually docile members of the Bantu
council had seen fit to express.
In early August, however, a second
round of student demonstrations and
rioting broke out in Soweto and spread to
other localities. In response, government
authorities not only broke off talks with
the Soweto Bantu Council but also began
arresting the leaders of the Black Parents'
Association.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
Erom Soweto to other black townships
across the country, the most extensive
police roundups in South African history
gathered momentum. In late August, the
minister of justice and police acknowl-
edged that some 800 "subversives" were
under detention. The dragnet has been
extended to teachers, social workers,
clergymen, journalists, and others
suspected of encouraging student militan-
cy.
Ever though the rioting has subsided
since September, the silencing of actual or
potential agitators continues. In
November, there was a marked increase
in orders prohibiting "banned" in-
dividuals from continuing activities that
are lawful but disapproved of by the
authorities.
Among the persons "banned" in
November, 27 were involved with black
trade u lions. A few were union officials.
[here io. no evidence that black unions had
helped the student militants to stage the
general strikes in the Johannesburg area.
Others "banned" in November were
whites engaged in such projects as a train-
ing program for union officials in
Johannesburg and a survey of wage
scales.
In early November, intensified police
efforts to ferret out student militants in
Soweto caused a sudden increase in the
flow of black South African refugees to
neighboring countries. By late November,
at least 500 refugees from Soweto had
arrived in Botswana and some 200 in
Swaziland.
Most of the refugees apparently had
fled on the spur of the moment to evade
police searches of their neighborhoods.
Some told authorities in the host coun-
tries that they wanted to continue
academic studies wherever they could find
places, but many said they were deter-
mined to get military training and return
to South Africa as "freedom fighters."
In Botswana, where authorities have
allowed the rival South African insurgent
organizations to conduct discreet
recruiting, the African National Congress
and the Pan-Africanist Congress are vy-
ing for the allegiance of the newly arrived
refugees. Each group reportedly has
Page 16 WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
recruited significant numbers of the
refugees who claimed membership in one
of the student unions.
Outlook
The flow of recruits for the foreign-
based insurgent organizations will con-
tinue as long as the South African govern-
ment persists in its repressive tactics
toward blacks striving for a nonviolent
transformation of the apartheid system.
Prime Minister Vorster has recently
authorized some economic palliatives for
black grievances, such as allowing
residents of black townships to buy the
homes they had been renting, but he has
reasserted his determination to keep ur-
ban blacks politically impotent.
Many of the blacks who had been
detained without trial for months were
released in December. Some of them will
surely go underground; others will join the
refugees abroad.
The increased flow of refugees may
augment the foreign-trained guerrillas at
the Tanzanian bases of the South African
insurgent organizations, but it seems un-
likely that the black states adjacent to
South Africa will allow extensive cross-
border operations. Even the militant
leaders of Mozambique are wary of South
Africa's superior economic leverage and
military capabilities.
As states farther north increase their
backing of South African insurgency,
however, mounting pan-African pressures
will eventually compel the border states to
permit passage of small guerrilla cadres.
Even if incursions by guerrilla squads
become frequent, it will be difficult for
guerrillas to do serious damage to impor-
tant military or industrial targets. On the
other hand, even occasional instances of
small-scale urban terrorism or sabotage
would very likely trigger costly expan-
sions of South Africa's economically
burdensome security forces.
Given the Afrikaner predisposition to
lash out at any flicker of black revolt,
small-scale insurgent strikes would be
likely to draw sweeping repressive
measures that would heighten already ex-
plosive racial tensions.
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
A debate among Argentines in and out of government over
whether to reorder the structure of national authority mirrors
their propensity for politics despite the junta's ban on political
activity. The debate is likely to cause President Videla in-
creasing problems.
Argentines in and out of government
are actively debating the question of
whether the structure of national authori-
ty should be altered; a number of substan-
tive points on the matter have been raised
in the press.
To a large extent, the debate mirrors
the irrepressible tendency of the highly
politicized Argentines to have their say
despite government bans on political ac-
tivity and discussion. There is, however,
genuine concern that power should be
wielded differently in succeeding phases of
the "revolution." In addition, some see in
the debate a chance to influence events in
their own favor.
The politics of Argentina, where formal
institutions even in normal circumstances
play only a secondary role, are generally
played out in behind-the-scenes fashion.
Thus, the debate is far from an irrelevant
exercise, despite its lack of official sanc-
tion. Many participants are military men
or have contact with influential officers.
Virtually all the current speculation
presupposes the continuing existence of
the three-man military junta, but it seems
a foregone conclusion to most Argentines
that the formal power structure will even-
tually be modified. Debate centers on
whether the presidency of Argentina, now
held by army commander General Jorge
Videla, should continue to be held by a
member of the junta or should go to a
fourth man.
Many believe that the current structure,
which has worked well during the period
Argentina: Debate on Junta
when the military was consolidating its
authority, does not give the presidency the
necessary power to direct longer term
policies and plans. Some commentators
have suggested that leaving the presidency
within the junta actually worsens the
potential for crippling interservice
rivalries.
The particular facets of this administra-
tion that are causing concern are its
perceived lack of dynamism-at times
outright clumsiness-and President
Videla's mild, some say indecisive,
manner. To many, the junta seems to have
"run out of steam." There has been no
resolution of the most pressing political
problem, the uncertain status of the
powerful labor movement, despite fre-
quent announcements that a new
regulating law is about to be presented.
Moreover, the statements of cabinet
members have sometimes contradicted
those of other top officials or have been at
variance with subsequent policy. Hun-
dreds of complicated, confusing directives
are still being sorted out and interpreted.
Because he eschews personal power and
has advocated a relatively moderate line,
President Videla seems to many inade-
quate to the task of bringing order to this
situation. The conciliatory approach he
lieves is necessary to bring badly divided
Argentines together is viewed by his de-
tractors as weakness.
All Argentine political sectors have a
strong interest in the outcome of the
debate, and politicians, journalists, un-
ionists, and others are probably joining in
Page 17
as much to test and challenge the regime
as to express real concern. The unions in
particular see an opportunity to con-
tribute to a weakening of the junta's
power. Labor leaders, more than any
other group, have been engaged in a test
of wills with the junta and are seeking
ways to demonstrate their strength.
The debate is likely to cause increasing
problems for Videla, chiefly because it
appears to have the backing of at least
some highly placed individuals in the
government. Videla thus can hardly af-
ford to continue ignoring the situation, as
he has seemingly done so far.
Within the regime, one of the men most
likely to take a strong interest in effecting
change is navy commander and junta
member Admiral Massera. Another is
Planning Minister General Diaz Bessone,
who last year outmaneuvered Videla to
engineer changes that gave him his
cabinet post and placed him next in line
for the presidency. Both are highly am-
bitious and apparently regard Videla as
politically vulnerable.
The two will not necessarily be able
easily to profit from the debate. Massera
has tried in the past to unsettle the jun-
ta-and Videla. The President, for all the
complaints that are heard, continues to
have substantial support in and out of the
military. Moreover, any alliance between
Massera and Diaz Bessone will be sorely
tested by the inevitable rivalry between
the two power-seekers.
The debate and the machinations of
men like the navy chief and planning
WEEKLY SUMMARY 4 Feb 77
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
SECRET
minister will not necessarily undo the
President, even if that is intended. It
seems clear, however, that Videla will in-
creasingly need to be on guard lest he be
caught unaware, and that he will have to
divert his attention from policy matters he
wants to address as chief executive.
Ironically, in attempting to protect
himself from his critics, Videla may
become still more vulnerable to the charge
Contrary to some earlier predictions, it now appears un-
likely that China will become an important exporter of crude in
the foreseeable future.
that he is ineffective. This in turn could
strengthen the hand of his political rivals
and lend further weight to the argument
that changes in the power structure are in-
China: Oil Prospects
C'iina's potential as an oil exporter has
beer a subject of interest in noncom-
munist industrialized countries since the
Chinese made their first commercial sale
of crude oil in 1973 during the Arab oil
embargo. Some observers, assuming
China has vast oil reserves and the finan-
cial and technological means to exploit
them, have seen it as a possible important
source of crude. It is now clear that this is
not ikely to be the case any time soon.
Not even the Chinese know the size of
their reserves. Scholars, oil companies,
and the US Geological Survey generally
agree that China's onshore oil reserves are
comparable to the 39 billion barrels
remaining in the US. It had been thought
that China's continental shelf might be
one of the world's largest oil and gas
rose voirs, but this has not been borne out
by tie offshore seismic studies conducted
by Japanese and Western oil companies.
The most optimistic estimates now
suggest that China's offshore oil reserves
are about the same as those on land.
Beyond the question of reserves, there
are severe financial and technological
constraints that will limit the ability of the
Chinese to increase their oil production
and exports. For 26 years, the regime has
force-fed the oil industry with funds and
technical manpower. In response, produc-
tion grew 20 percent or more annually un-
til late 1975, much faster than the rest of
Chinese industry.
China will not be able to maintain such
a growth rate. The most accessible
reserves already are being exploited, and
investment in other industries, especially
coal and steel, can no longer be held back
to free funds for oil. Trained manpower is
spread thin just to operate existing in-
dustry. Moreover, internal political con-
flicts have discouraged the influx of
foreign capital and technology needed for
rapid development of offshore reserves.
Production growth, in fact, already has
slowed. According to an official an-
nouncement, China's oil production in-
creased 13 percent last year, down slightly
from the I3.3-percent increase recorded in
1975. Domestic oil consumption,
meanwhile, has been growing rapidly, ac-
counting for 23 percent of all primary
energy consumed in 1976 compared with
less than 10 percent 10 years ago.
11' the Chinese were to succeed in
boosting production growth to the earlier
20-percent rate, the estimated reserves of
20 billion barrels to 33 billion barrels in
the north and northeast-the regions like-
ly to supply the bulk of production in the
short run-would be exhausted in 10
years. If the growth rate were to drop to
10 percent, expanding domestic demand
might not be satisfied.
Until mid-1975, the Chinese were plan-
ning to export increasing amounts of oil.
These plans were nullified by buyer
resistance from Japan-China's major
customer-and domestic dissension over
the policy of selling national resources to
raise foreign exchange.
At present, it appears that China
probably will produce 2.4 million to 2.8
million barrels per day by 1980. Most of
this oil will be needed for domestic con-
sumption; exports are likely to be only
200,000 to 600,000 barrels per day. By the
mid-1980s, domestic demand, which is ex-
pected to expand steadily, will absorb
total capacity unless possible deposits in
western China or offshore are proved and
exploited much more rapidly than ex-
pected.
Development of such reserves quickly
may not be feasible without help from the
international oil companies. Some foreign
technology has been acquired through
purchases of advanced equipment from
the US and elsewhere for use throughout
the industry. Not enough technology,
however, has been acquired to affect out-
Page 18
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
 Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2008/06/16: CIA-RDP79-00927A011500050001-1